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With a whirlwind of dramatic events gripping the world's attention, it can be easy to forget that we are now less than one year away from the 2024 presidential election.Despite their expected focus on domestic issues, candidates will have a lot to answer for this cycle when it comes to foreign policy as the war in Ukraine drags on and U.S.-China relations continue to deteriorate.The Democratic Party has chosen not to hold debates despite growing concerns about President Joe Biden's chances next year. With only a couple of months to go before the primaries start, the Quincy Institute decided that it would be useful to survey Biden's challengers from the left on how they would handle a range of foreign policy issues if elected.The candidates' responses show interesting differences on a range of questions, from a potential Israeli-Saudi normalization deal to the possibility of using military force to fight the cartels in Mexico. The questionnaire went out before the October 7 Hamas attacks against Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza, but we pulled together candidates' reactions to the events where possible.We received responses from Democratic candidate Marianne Williamson as well as independent candidates Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Cornel West. Biden's campaign declined to participate, so we have aggregated relevant quotes and information about the president's stances where possible. We did the same for Rep. Dean Phillips (D-Minn.), who entered the race in late October and has not responded to our requests. We will update this page if we receive further responses.Biggest challenges to U.S. security; how to avoid war with China; potential negotiations to end the war in Ukraine; U.S. role in Saudi-Israeli normalization; withdrawing troops from Middle East; military force and the Mexican cartels; Israel-Hamas warWhat, in your view, are the three most pressing challenges to U.S. national security?Joe Biden (D)While President Biden has not directly addressed this question, his national security adviser said the following about the White House's 2022 National Security Strategy: "Our strategy proceeds from the premise that the two strategic challenges — geopolitical competition and shared transnational threats — are intertwined. We cannot build the broad coalitions we need to out-compete our rivals, if we sideline the issues that most directly impact the lives of billions of people." He further argued that "this is a decisive decade for shaping the terms of competition, especially with the PRC [China]. This is a decisive decade for getting ahead of the great global challenges — from climate to disease to emerging technology."Marianne Williamson (D)"The three most pressing challenges to U.S. national security are the nuclear threat, climate change, and our inability to go beyond the adversarial positioning in which countries view each other. We are closer to nuclear war than we've been in a long time. We must move towards a nuclear-free world, and we must begin by adopting a no first use policy. Once we adopt this policy, it will be much easier for us to get other nuclear-armed countries to do the same. There is no threat I am more concerned about than climate change. We are living through the last few years where we have a chance to save humanity. We must immediately undergo a just transition from a dirty fossil fueled economy to a clean renewable economy, and create millions of good jobs in the process. The time for incrementalism on climate is over. If we only view other countries through an adversarial lens, in terms of how they can harm or serve our interests, then we cannot deal with these crucial issues that challenge the security of all of us. We must work together with the international community for the common interest so that we can begin to deal with climate change, nuclear weapons, pandemics, and other threats."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"The most pressing challenges are the ones we have created ourselves. First is the risk of nuclear war, which belligerent and provocative U.S. policy has elevated to levels not seen since the Cold War.The second is the bankrupting of America's wealth, the result of decades of elevated military spending. The trillions spent on armaments could have gone toward building modern infrastructure, feeding and housing people, tackling chronic disease, and nourishing a thriving domestic economy.A third threat to national security is the epidemic of violence in our streets and in our homes. When we wage endless wars abroad, their mirror image afflicts us at home. Realistically, our nation is not threatened by an armed invasion by a foreign power. We have to broaden what we mean by 'national security' to include the things that actually make Americans feel insecure."Cornel West (I)"Climate Change: Climate change is not an endpoint that awaits us in the distant future, it is among us right now and impacting lives across the country and the entire world, especially the most vulnerable and most disadvantaged populations here in the U.S. — Black, Brown, Indigenous, and the poor. According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), climate change-related damages cost the United States an estimated $165 Billion in 2022, Hurricane Ida, a Category 4 storm that massacred communities in Florida, including the loss of 150 lives, cost taxpayers approximately $112.9 Billion alone. Moreover, NOAA estimates that in the last 40 years, 341 storms exacerbated by climate change have cost the nation more than $2.5 Trillion. To put that into perspective, that's $80 Billion more than the national deficit of approximately $1.7 Trillion, thus far, for Fiscal Year 2023, and 1.5 percent of the national debt that stands at $161.7 trillion and counting. A nation already in massive debt, coupled with the astronomical costs of a growing climate crisis is the direct antithesis of national security. It's undeniable that more calamities associated with the climate crisis, including more powerful weather incidents that induce extreme flooding, extreme heat, and other environmental stressors, are inevitable. These events will have profound impacts on myriad systems and institutions that are necessary to maintain a livable society including, but not limited to, the production of food, access to clean water sources, the quality and availability of housing, transportation, education, and healthcare. The collapse of these systems could reasonably engender massive social unrest that would result in the massive displacement and forced migration of people as we are already witnessing with the United Houma Nation, Pointe-au Chien Indian Tribe, and Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw of present-day Louisiana, who are the first federally recognized climate migrants, whose land is literally sinking due to oil and gas extraction in the Gulf of Mexico, which has rendered their land susceptible to the impacts of climate change. In fact, the United Nations Office of the High Commissions for Refugees has predicted that more than 200 million people, globally, will be forced to relocate due to climate change, including 40% of United Statesians who currently reside in coastal areas. From the atrocities of Hurricane Katrina to the current situation at the United States border with Mexico, we have already witnessed the consequences of climate-related breakdowns of social, economic, and other systems necessary to maintain quality of life and life itself breakdown all coupled with mass migration of innocent people seeking refuge.Increased Militarism: The United States is the single biggest military spender in the world with an annual budget roughly the size of the next seven largest military budgets combined. According to records kept by the National Priorities Project at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), in any given year, military spending accounts for over half of the federal government's annual discretionary budget. The U.S. military's bloated budget is utilized to build weapons and warcraft, which are in turn utilized to threaten other nations and demand their cooperation with the perceived U.S. military hegemony or offered to cooperative nations as part of military alliances. In FY 2023 alone, out of a $1.8 trillion federal discretionary budget, $1.1 trillion – or 62 percent – was for militarized programs. On top of war and weapons for the Pentagon, these expenditures include domestic militarism for police departments across the country and mass incarceration, as well as increased detentions and deportation, which represent direct threats to the security of Black, Brown, Indigenous and poor people in the United States. As we are witnessing right now, the current administration is complicit in thousands of civilian deaths by giving Israel military aid at $3.8 billion this year, half of which goes to Israel's missile system. They are now requesting a combined supplemental aid package at $106 billion for Israel along with Ukraine, Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region, and US immigration enforcement at the US-Mexico southern border. To put this in perspective, combined with the estimated $113 billion in military aid the US has already sent to Ukraine, should the Congress grant President Biden's additional $105 billion package to Ukraine and Israel, this would represent almost 60% of the initially estimated $379 billion in climate change expenditures over 10 years included as part of the so-called Inflation Reduction Act. Further, the $105 billion military aid package to Israel and Ukraine is one hundred times the paltry $1 billion that the US pledged to the Green Climate Fund earlier this year, to fund climate mitigation and adaptation in the formerly colonized countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific. Our friends at IPS also indicate that the U.S. could safely redirect at least $350 billion from the Pentagon's current spending per year and achieve true security by ending wars, reducing our aggressive posture overseas, and reining in military contracts that drain public coffers for private gain - all measures that would actually increase national security, while making resources available for critical domestic needs including, but not limited to, increased access to healthcare, improving the nation's broken education system - including an iniquitous student loan debt crisis, and real action to address the climate crisis. With the largest military in the world, the US is the single largest greenhouse gas emitting institution and consumer of fossil fuels on the entire planet, with a carbon footprint bigger than 140 other countries. The environmental and climate impacts of global militarism and war are staggering. Militarization continues to increase greenhouse gas emissions and pollute and poison land, water and air through weapons production, storage, and use, which is ironic Defense Secretary, Lloyd Austin, himself recently declared, 'There is little about what the Defense Department does to defend the American people that is not affected by climate change. It is a national security issue, and we must treat it as such.'Rising White Supremacy and Nationalism: We have already observed how the interlinked crises of the calamities associated with climate change, which push those disproportionately impacted further to the margins and thereby increasing the militarization of the southern border, urban areas, and throughout the world to address associated entropy of social systems and infrastructure tends to increase sentiments that beguile far too many U.S. residents to embrace elements of white supremacy ideology, thereby increasing instances of violence and acceptance of authoritarian and fascist paradigms that represent clear and present dangers to national security – no one knows this better than the U.S. Department of Justice. In 2001, Attorney General, Merrick Garland admonished the Senate Appropriations Committee stating, in part, "Domestic violent extremists pose an elevated threat in 2021 and in the FBI's view, the top domestic violent extremist threat we face comes from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, specifically those who advocate for the superiority of the white race." This salient issue has the potential to literally tear our nation asunder. A nation this divided is itself a national security risk that can be taken advantage of by nations hostile to the U.S. due to imperialist and interventionist past and present foreign policies of our country and their lasting impacts to [a] marked number of nations across the globe. Dismantling growing white supremacy and nationalism will require a multifaceted and intersectional approach that seeks to deracinate the root causes of this epidemic that prevents the U.S. from living up to its best self while also remaining a seemingly indelible threat. This will require tying requisite economic relief from an oligarchic approach to wealth accumulation and redistribution that exacerbates the white supremacy ideology ensconced in the fabric of this nation in such a way that has been negatively radicalizing poor white folk who may not even realize how the capitalist domination system upheld by the political duopoly extract from them as much as non-white people they are bamboozled to hate and stigmatize. I am confident that my Economic Justice prescriptions that include establishing a federal Universal Basic Income commission, wealth tax on all billionaire holdings and transaction, ending all tax loopholes for the oligarchy, and establishing a national $27 minimum wage, with special considerations for specific geographies where $27/hour would not be a family-sustaining wage, will be key steps in eviscerating the rise of white supremacy and nationalism in our nation that hurts the people perpetrated against as much as the people doing the perpetrating."As president, what would you do to avoid a direct military confrontation with China?Joe Biden (D)Biden has not directly addressed this question since becoming president, but a White House readout from his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping last year gives a good summary of his administration's stated approach to relations with China. "President Biden explained that the United States will continue to compete vigorously with the PRC, including by investing in sources of strength at home and aligning efforts with allies and partners around the world. He reiterated that this competition should not veer into conflict and underscored that the United States and China must manage the competition responsibly and maintain open lines of communication. The two leaders discussed the importance of developing principles that would advance these goals and tasked their teams to discuss them further. President Biden underscored that the United States and China must work together to address transnational challenges – such as climate change, global macroeconomic stability including debt relief, health security, and global food security – because that is what the international community expects."Marianne Williamson (D)"We absolutely cannot have a direct military confrontation with China, which would be one step away from World War III and nuclear Armageddon. The U.S. must accept that we are in a multipolar world. While I am deeply concerned about China's authoritarianism and serious violations of human rights, I do not think that China is interested in invading the U.S. or in starting a war with us. While we should do what we can through peaceful diplomacy to lessen Chinese human rights violations, we cannot start World War III between two nuclear-armed countries. Our military must stop trying to encircle China in the South China Sea. Instead, we must talk to China and seek peaceful coexistence."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"We believe that China has no desire for military confrontation. We will therefore ratchet down the tensions and cease the provocations in the South China Sea and elsewhere. We will adopt a posture that does not see China as an 'adversary,' and begin to negotiate arms control treaties in good faith so that both countries can reduce military spending to better the lives of their citizens."Cornel West (I)"We all know where a direct military confrontation with the People's Republic of China (PRC) will lead — irreparable nuclear holocaust that will lead to the loss and alteration of hundreds of millions of innocent lives over a conflict engendered by two so-called superpowers. We need to be honest with the people of the world, the U.S. and PRC are currently in a cold war that must be thawed to save lives and a global economy both hanging in the balance. The first step in thawing the current cold war will require a cessation to the myriad proxy wars that use nations like Ukraine, Taiwan, and numerous global south nations from Africa to Southeast Asia, to Latin America as pawns in an arms and resource extraction race. As president I will cease the saber rattling and chest beating that are doing nothing but instigating the PRC with military war games in waterways of Southeast Asia such as the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, East China Sea and others. I am confident this will open pathways for diplomacy that leads to cooperation in lieu of competition with the PRC. I agree with the Quincy Institute's assessment that the current administration's rhetoric of competition with the PRC is a feckless attempt to marginalize and exclude the nation from the global community, which in turn pushes them to form alliances with nations the U.S. also finds itself in a contemporary cold war with including, but not limited to, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Russia. One area where I believe we should especially be cooperating rather than competing with the PRC is the climate crisis. While it's true that the PRC is the largest emitter in the world, the U.S. remains the largest historic emitter despite only representing five percent of the world's population. Planetary survival literally requires less finger pointing at who is most responsible for the climate crisis and more finger pointing towards mutual and cooperative solutions. And rather than compete with the PRC for requisite critical resources to develop the infrastructure for renewable energy and regenerative economies, we must cooperate with them such that we don't render the need to address the climate crisis into a rationalization for casus belli over possession critical resources that will also drag global south nations into proxy wars they want no part of. The PRC, the U.S., and the entire world has a collective interest in protecting lives and the planet from the impacts of climate change. As president, my first step in avoiding a military confrontation with the PRC would be to invite and work with them to be a leading partner in addressing the climate crisis by exchanging ideas, resources, and technologies that can rapidly emancipate both nations from reliance on fossil fuels, which will improve relations, cooperation, and the habitability of the planet at once, while also preventing a military confrontation that will take more lives than the climate crisis."Is it in the U.S. national interest for the president to convene negotiations in an effort to end the war in Ukraine?Joe Biden (D)Biden generally emphasizes that Ukraine should be the driving force behind any peace negotiations and has argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin has not shown signs that he is ready to negotiate. He has, however, helped to convene several international conferences to discuss a diplomatic path forward, one of which reportedly included discussions about concessions that Ukraine may make in exchange for peace. (The administration denied these reports.)Marianne Williamson (D)"Firstly, this question is framed in terms of the 'U.S. national interest,' but I think it's time we start concerning ourselves more with the interests of humanity as a whole than the interests of the American government or American corporations, which is usually what is meant by 'U.S. national interest.'Yes, I think the U.S. should convene negotiations with Russia and Ukraine. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a despicable crime, and we should support Ukraine and their autonomy. However, we need to do what we can to bring about a just but realistic peace. It seems extremely unlikely that either side in this conflict will have a complete victory over the other anytime soon, so if we don't want to let this draw out for two decades like our war in Afghanistan, then we should press for negotiations. I think that the withdrawn letter by progressive Congress members from last year that urged negotiations was a good and reasonable letter, and they should not have buckled to pressure and withdrawn it."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"Yes. Current U.S. strategic thinking is that the war serves the national interest by weakening Russia. That thinking is faulty on two counts. First, it is not weakening Russia. Second, a weak and unstable Russia would make us much less secure, not more secure. The United States and the world will be best served when Russia knows that we are not out to destroy her."Cornel West (I)"The conflict between Ukraine and Russia is not going to be ameliorated by military means. With $113 billion of taxpayer dollars already sent to Ukraine leading to no more than an endless war of attrition, as well as poll numbers indicating dithering support for a series of blank checks to continue it, it's clear the people of the United States have had enough. It's not just in the national interest for a diplomatic solution to this conflict, it's the duty of the President of the United States to lead this process with our global partners in Europe, Asia, and Africa. As president, I will give Ukraine no other choice but to enter a diplomatic process as part of my commitment to cease all war funding and weapons to Ukraine and instead invest in peacemaking."If Saudi Arabia agreed to normalize relations with Israel but requested a guarantee from the United States to defend the Kingdom militarily in exchange, would you seek to ratify a treaty making that commitment?Joe Biden (D)President Biden has not directly commented on this proposal, but his administration has led the initiative to negotiate a defense commitment in exchange for normalization.Rep. Dean Phillips (D)Phillips has endorsed the Biden administration's approach. "Never did we imagine it possible in our lifetimes to see the possible normalization of relations between the Saudis and Israelis. It's an extraordinary and historic opportunity not just for these two countries, but for the entire world," he told NPR. "The United States plays a significant role relative to a defense pact with the Saudis equipment and materiel relative to their military and potentially a civilian nuclear program as well. If those things can be met and also meeting some of the needs of the Palestinians, this could be an extraordinary legacy at a time the world surely needs it." Marianne Williamson (D)"No. The U.S. cannot get involved in another war in the Middle East – especially not in order to defend Saudi Arabia, arguably the worst human rights violator in the region. It is time the U.S. stops aiding Saudi Arabia and Israel in their egregious human rights violations."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"We think the premise of this question to be unlikely. Saudi Arabia is armed to the teeth and has no need of such a guarantee. As it has good relations with most other nations, its [only] plausible national security threat is Iran. However, much of the Sunni-Shiite conflict in the past arose from U.S. geopolitical maneuvering that elevated tensions throughout the region."Cornel West (I)"I wouldn't even qualify this request as a treaty as it would be more of a death sentence for innocent civilians in the region and more service members, too many who have already been lost due to U.S. empire building in the Middle East, mainly to protect oil profits of fossil fuel cartels both domestically and globally. We need less iron domes and a more iron-clad diplomatic process that leads to lasting peace and mutual dignity for all people in the Middle East. To this end, as president I would insist that any normalization of relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Israel include immediate steps to liberate Palestinian people from occupation and a wanton cycle of violence that's killing precious Palestinian and Israeli lives alike."As Commander-in-Chief, would you bring home the U.S. troops currently stationed in Iraq and Syria?Joe Biden (D)While Biden has not directly addressed this question, a senior Pentagon official recently said the U.S. "has no intent to withdraw in the near future" from Syria.Marianne Williamson (D)"Yes I would, but in Syria, I would first negotiate an agreement that ensures the Kurds will not be harmed before withdrawing the troops that are protecting them."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"Yes. Those nations do not want our troops there. I will instigate bold peace initiatives in places where there are still military tensions, in some cases replacing troops with international peacekeepers."Cornel West (I)"As indicated in my Policy Pillars Rooted in a Movement of Truth, Justice, and Love, as president I would immediately embark on a responsible and expeditious closure of global U.S. military bases as part of a larger initiative to cease and desist U.S. empire building and maintenance and slash the bloated military budget, including the disbanding of NATO, such that we can reinvest those funds in myriad social and economic justice programs domestically. As tensions in the Middle East associated with the crisis in Palestine/Israel grow, the U.S. presence is only exacerbating an already incendiary situation while putting brave service people in harm's way for no other reason than to maintain U.S. empire and a military hegemony in a region that needs less bullets and rockets and more diplomacy. To this end, as president, I would bring those troops home immediately, honor them for their service and ensure a Just Transition so that they can use the skills they gained in the military and put them to use for beneficial services to the people of the U.S."If elected, would you request an authorization from Congress to use military force against drug cartels in Mexico?Joe Biden (D)Biden has not commented directly on calls to authorize military force against the cartels, but a National Security Council spokesperson said in April that the administration "is not considering military action in Mexico.""Designating these cartels as foreign terrorist organizations would not grant us any additional authorities that we don't already have," the spokesperson added.Marianne Williamson (D)"No. The U.S. has invaded and militarily intervened in Latin America time after time, and it has only brought violence and misery and fueled the immigration that we now complain about. It is time we reject the imperialist Monroe Doctrine, which declared Latin America our backyard. It is time we respect our neighbors to the south and stop invading their countries."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)"Absolutely not. The Mexicans have the power to overcome the drug cartels themselves. We can aid them by sharing intelligence, by shutting down the illegal weapons trade, by cracking down on money laundering activities of US banks, and by prosecuting the cartels' collaborators in this country."Cornel West (I)"Absolutely not. To be clear, asking the Congress for authorization to use military force in Mexico would essentially be asking Congress to approve a military invasion through a declaration of war against Mexico. The so-called war against drugs in the United States has been and continues to be an abject failure. This 50-year war has been used as a rationalization for crimes against humanity, especially those most marginalized by failed drug policies - Black, Brown, Indigenous and poor people, who have been subjected to a racialized and classist mass incarceration pogrom that has needlessly locked up over 400,000 people for non-violent drug-related crimes between 1980 and 1997 alone. A failed domestic drug war should not be an impetus to start a foreign drug war in the sovereign territory of one of our North American partners. It should instead be an impetus to enact efficacious policies that treat addiction as a national threat to public health. Instead of increasing militarism and launching a foreign war, we should declare war against the lack of access to healthcare and the lack of economic opportunities that contribute to drug use. Reducing and decriminalizing drug use in the United States will directly reduce the amount of drugs that are smuggled across the border, thereby reducing revenues for drug cartels in Mexico. This is less an issue of militarism and more an issue of addiction driven by supply and demand."Reactions to Israel-Hamas warJoe Biden (D)In a speech on Oct. 20, Biden said: "In Israel, we must make sure that they have what they need to protect their people today and always.The security package I'm sending to Congress and asking Congress to do is an unprecedented commitment to Israel's security that will sharpen Israel's qualitative military edge, which we've committed to — the qualitative military edge.We're going to make sure Iron Dome continues to guard the skies over Israel. We're going to make sure other hostile actors in the region know that Israel is stronger than ever and prevent this conflict from spreading.Look, at the same time, [Prime Minister] Netanyahu and I discussed again yesterday the critical need for Israel to operate by the laws of war. That means protecting civilians in combat as best as they can. The people of Gaza urgently need food, water, and medicine."Rep. Dean Phillips (D)In a long tweet, Phillips said, "The destruction of Hamas is necessary, but the military campaign must follow international law and conventions of civilized nations. [...]I support a pause in hostilities and the immediate safe passage of civilians from Gaza into temporary shelters in Egypt and/or Jordan and the largest humanitarian relief effort in world history.I am pro-Israeli and anti the Netanyahu government — and [its] enabling of settlements on Palestinian land. [...]Israel has a right to exist, defend itself, and ensure the terror and butchering of Oct 7 never happens again.Palestinians have a right to a nation of their own, and that begins with a free and fair election for the first time since 2006 in which a choice can be made; peace or war.Israelis must also be afforded the same right to choose peace or war."Marianne Williamson (D)Williamson tweeted: "For Israel to prosecute an all out war on Gaza is already a catastrophe for the people of Gaza. It can easily become a catastrophe for the people of Israel as well. There's no end game there, for them or for the rest of the world, that doesn't multiply the horror. The United States should join an international consortium — Egypt, Jordan and others — in efforts to secure release of the hostages and cessation of the bombing."Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (I)On Oct. 7, Kennedy said the following in a statement: "This ignominious, unprovoked, and barbaric attack on Israel must be met with world condemnation and unequivocal support for the Jewish state's right to self-defense. We must provide Israel with whatever it needs to defend itself — now. As President, I'll make sure that our policy is unambiguous so that the enemies of Israel will think long and hard before attempting aggression of any kind.I applaud the strong statements of support from the Biden White House for Israel in her hour of need. However, the scale of these attacks means it is likely that Israel will need to wage a sustained military campaign to protect its citizens. Statements of support are fine, but we must follow through with unwavering, resolute, and practical action. America must stand by our ally throughout this operation and beyond as it exercises its sovereign right to self-defense."Kennedy later warned against using the attacks and subsequent war as a justification for war with Iran. "It didn't take long for the neocons in Washington to spin the Hamas terror attacks to advance their agenda of war against Iran," he tweeted on Oct. 27. "If President Biden doesn't resist them, they might get their wish."Cornel West (I)














In a recent statement, West said, "US taxpayers want no part in funding the Israeli war machine that is committing genocidal war crimes in Gaza. We need stronger, clearer headed representation like this within our highest levels of government." He has also said, "We want a ceasefire. We want an end of the siege. We want an end of occupation. We want equal rights, equal dignity, and equal access for Palestinians and Jews."

This past Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin sat down for an interview in which he yet again made clear that, despite the insistence of pro-diplomacy voices in the West, he was not ready to negotiate an end to the Ukraine war, because Kyiv's uncertain battlefield prospects meant Russia could secure further advances by continuing the war. "It would be ridiculous for us to start negotiating with Ukraine just because it's running out of ammunition," Putin told interviewer Dmitry Kiselyov, according to one particularly viral and widely cited tweet by Wall Street Journal chief foreign affairs correspondent Yaroslav Trofimov. Except that's not what Putin said. In fact, by reading the full text and seeing the quote in context instead of as a selectively edited soundbite, it's clear he was putting out the exact opposite message: "For us to hold negotiations now just because they are running out of ammunition would be ridiculous. Nevertheless, we are open to a serious discussion, and we are eager to resolve all conflicts, especially this one, by peaceful means."What is true is that Putin once more restated the more stringent conditions for peace talks he adopted last year, namely that Moscow will not give up the four regions it officially annexed in September 2022 and that, given the state of the battlefield, Ukraine will have to accept the loss of this territory. "Are we ready to negotiate? We sure are," he said. "But we are definitely not ready for talks that are based on some kind of 'wishful thinking' which comes after the use of psychotropic drugs, but we are ready for talks based on the realities that have developed, as they say in such cases, on the ground."This didn't stop the truncated version of the first quote from being spread far and wide on social media and being held up, often by reporters at top newspapers like Trofimov and other authoritative voices, as definitive proof that negotiations to end the war were impossible and that prolonged war is the only option. "Republican leadership of the House cutting off military supplies to Ukraine has made Putin drop his pretense about desiring peace talks. He wants it all," was Trofimov's summary of the interview. "Putin indicated he won't discuss surrendering territory annexed from Ukraine and appeared confident Russia's army could advance further," the Financial Times Moscow bureau chief Max Seddon reported, before offering the clipped quote as evidence. "Russia spreads rumors about negotiations. Uncritical people write naive articles. US cuts off aid to Ukraine. Putin says — thanks, with your help I'll win the war [and] destroy Ukraine," wrote historian Timothy Snyder, citing Trofminov's summary. "War criminal Putin doesn't want to negotiate, only to rape, murder & pilage innocent Ukrainians," tweeted Belgian MEP Guy Verhofstadt. "The only way this war ends is if we step up and give Ukrainians what they ask for. Those in the West calling for negotiations serve this monster."Rep. Don Beyer (D-Va.) used it to claim the GOP's hold-up of military aid was "fueling Putin's aggression and the Russian war effort." Identical arguments — that the truncated quote showed Putin's talk of negotiations was a smokescreen, and that the only way to get to a peaceful end to the war is to double down on a military solution — were, and still are today, being spread by a wide variety of prominent, influential and often hawkish voices, largely piggybacking off Trofimov and Seddon's misrepresentation of the remarks. It's not been much better outside of social media. Putin's comments about negotiations were left entirely out of Western media reports on his interview at Reuters, the Associated Press, PBS and Voice of America. Only CNBC included the comments with the full quote; CNN also reported that "Putin said Russia would be willing to negotiate," though citing only his remark about "realities on the ground." Others double down on using the shortened quote for a misleading framing, such as this Washington Examiner headline, or this Telegraph report. The latter went beyond merely the headline and opened by telling readers that Putin "has ruled out opening peace talks with Ukraine," before putting together a composite quote from the interview that deliberately skipped over his remark that Moscow was open to talks and eager to resolve the conflicts diplomatically.Why is this important? Hawks would charge that simply daring to correct the record here is a sign of suspicious pro-Putin sympathies. But willingness to negotiate has nothing to do with moral virtue: the violently repressive Saudi government, which recently went on an execution spree, also eventually negotiated an end to its horrific war on Yemen despite the horror it had unleashed on the country. More recently, Hamas has shown a willingness to negotiate throughout the Israeli assault on Gaza, talks that bore fruit back in November with a ceasefire and hostage swap, none of which absolves it for the atrocities of October 7 or renders its members model citizens. Just as in those cases, one does not need to trust in Putin here, an authoritarian and practiced politician, to proceed with talks. Peace negotiations are, by their very nature, carried out between parties without ample reserves of faith in and goodwill towards each other, and part of any talks involves devising a mechanism with acceptable security guarantees for each party that removes the need to rely on mere trust. The surest way to verify if someone is serious about such negotiations is to actually try them. The fact that Putin insists he's open to negotiations, albeit with major territorial concessions from the Ukrainian side, should be encouraging news for anyone who genuinely cares about Ukraine. The RAND Institute argued in January last year that the economic and social damage caused by a longer war outweighed the possible benefits of military reconquest of lost territory. Indeed, the effects of prolonging the war in search of a morally satisfying military victory have been devastating for the country: tens of thousands killed and wounded, widespread destruction of infrastructure, a demographic crisis, and massive debt that will leave the country vulnerable to rapacious creditors. Many thousands of Ukrainians are desperately dodging conscription to avoid dying in the war, with a plurality of 48 percent of Ukrainian men admitting they are not prepared to fight. These remarks by Putin are only the latest signal that Moscow is ready to enter talks. Putin similarly told Tucker Carlson in February several times that Russia was "ready" to negotiate. More importantly, three separate reports in the New York Times, Bloomberg and Reuters have revealed behind-the-scenes overtures by Moscow, reportedly as early as last September, to Washington for peace talks, which the Biden administration has so far not acted on. We can't know for sure if Putin's remarks are serious until they're tested in negotiations. But that doesn't give journalists and commentators free rein to mislead the public that they don't exist, all for the purpose of undermining the possibility of peacefully ending a war that more and more Ukrainians don't want to fight in.

 I am not an international law specialist nor have I extensively studied the Israel-Palestine conflict, but I have written extensively about irredentism--the effort to enlarge one's country to include territories that are considered to be one's own by history and by blood.  So, when I see pictures like this, I get engaged:The river to the sea, used by either side, is an inherently irredentist phrase: that the lands between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River belong to just one side of this means seeking to get all of the territory of the other.  Palestianians and their supporters have been saying this, and so have Israelis and their allies.  Irredentism does not have to be this maximalist--Russia has claimed just a chunk of Ukraine.  But these claims and efforts are inherently violent--that any effort to change one's boundaries to include territories governed by others will produce war because no country (or quasi-state) surrenders inhabited territory without a fight.  Not Ukraine, not Taiwan, not Israel, and not Palestine.The thing is: all territory has been occupied by multiple groups, so there will always be competing claims pretty much everywhere on the planet except perhaps Antarctica.  Stuart Kaufman illustrated this nicely at the start of his book on Modern Hatreds:So, if irredentist claims are possible everywhere, then why isn't there violence everywhere?  Despite the news suggesting otherwise, ethnic violence, including irredentism, is rare.  Ethnic conflicts do end, people do find a way forward without fighting. Remember that the key grievance between Germany and France for ... at least three wars ... was Alsace-Lorraine.  Yet that is not an issue these days.  It is rare because irredentism is usually very self-destructive.  It didn't work out so well for Nazi Germany and not so well for 1990s Armenia, Croatia, or Serbia.  It has worked out well for China (Tibet), but Taiwan would be another story entirely.  Bill Ayres and I compared the irredentisms that occurred in the 1990s (the aforementioned Armenia, Croatia, and Serbia) and those that did not--Hungary, Romania, and Russia.  We confirmed that irredentism is very costly and self-destructive, but some countries do it anyway--when it benefits the politicians in power.  What is good for the politicians may not be good for the public, which produced our title: For Kin or Country.  Helping the kin abroad is often very bad for the country as war is bad.  Russia is paying a pretty high price for its irredentist campaign against Ukraine, but, thus far, Putin hasn't paid a price himself.  So, when I see what is going on in Israel and Palestine, my bias is to watch the strategies politicians use to stay in power and see how that intersects with the nationalism of the country. Politics is in part about shaping the nationalism, defining the us, the them, and whether the them can be tolerated.  A central irony we found is that the nationalisms that were more willing to include the thems, the others, in the state, the more able they are to engage in irredentism since any successful expansion will generally lead to more thems as well as us's in the larger state.  Indeed, why do folks often oppose irredentism--a successful campaign would produce the equivalent of a massive wave of immigration, upsetting the balance of domestic politics.  For example, a Greater Albania including Kosovo would likely weaken those who currently hold power in Albania since there are a lot of Kosovars.  And, yes, this gets to a key dynamic that the Hungarian case revealed--shades of identity, of us-ness.  That for Hungarians in Hungary, they identify with the Hungarians outside of Hungary (due to the Treaty of Trianon in 1920) but only up to a point.  Those Hungarians didn't experience post-1956 Hungary, so they don't have the same experiences and thus are not seen as quite the same.  So, Hungarians in Hungary want the Hungarians outside of Hungary to do well but to stay put--they don't want to share power or their welfare state with them.  Anyhow, irredentism varies over time and over targets based on who matters to the politicians in power.  Somalia's irredentism from 1960 to 1990 varied depending on who was in power and whose clans they needed for support.  So, Somalia sometimes targeted all three neighbors, despite that being profoundly unwise, because the clans with ties to those in Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia all mattered in the domestic political game. At other times, only those in Ethiopia matters (1976-1977).  Back to Israel and Palestine: the irredentist efforts of Hamas (it aims to eliminate Israel and govern the entire space) and of Netanyahu (his coalition includes many parties that seek to incorporate the occupied territories, hence the support for the crazed settlers)* reinforce each other, giving each set of politicians more support from those who fear the other.  Not unlike Milosevic and Tudjman being each other's best allies as Tudjman could get Croats to support him because of the threat posed by Milosevic, and Milosevic could do the same to get Serbs to support him.  Have Hamas and Netanyahu delivered on other public policy issues?  No, they are utter failures, but they are hard to replace when the enemy is at the gates.  The coverage of this war has been quite clear that Netanyahu empowered Hamas to weaken the Palestinian Authority and perhaps also to keep the Israeli public focused on this than his own corruption.So, what is good for the politicians--war--is bad for the public, but the publics go along with it because they don't see any alternatives.  That people on both sides are talking about claiming territory from the river to the sea is understandable and horrifying, given what it requires--lots more bloodshed.

It empowers the worst leaders. It requires incredible leadership by alternative politicians to push in another direction. But until that happens, there won't be peace. BUT if that were to happen, you could have peace.

Alas, extremists have killed or marginalized the peacekmakers. So, things are going to be grim. We did cover this a bit in the book when we survey the world's irredentist hotspots including Ireland, Kashmir, Taiwan, etc.Anyhow, the focus should be on the politicians and their incentives. Irredentism is not inevitable, it can be sidelined.  But it can be really hard to stop once it gets started because of the media it generates, the fear it generates, and how the two sides can reinforce each other's worst instincts. *Yes, killing the two state solution is a key part of an irredentist strategy.  Never really thought about that before, but two state solution inherently recognizes limits on expansion, so one must do away with that if one wants to add the desired territories.

Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 23, much ink has been spilled on the future of his private military company (PMC), Wagner Group, and its affiliated companies. Most attention remains on Ukraine, where the PMC has not been formally active since Prigozhin declared victory in Bakhmut on May 20. Meanwhile, Wagner continues to conduct military operations in both Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).On November 14, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA), backed by Wagner, took the separatist stronghold of Kidal. Despite entering a town nearly abandoned, the capture was undeniably a symbolic victory for Mali's Interim President, Colonel Assimi Goïta, and his military regime. There is a significant risk that FAMA's March on Kidal will further exacerbate humanitarian crises in the region, all at a time when the international community is stepping back from the Sahel. This is a mistake. The Sahel has become the epicenter of the West's, including the United States', two great threat narratives: jihadist terrorism and the expansion of Russian influence. Their accompanying containment narratives almost ensure counterproductive, knee-jerk reactions to future events on the ground.To avoid these pitfalls, the international community must focus today on creative solutions that account for Russia's presence in Africa.BackgroundThe past five years have seen a popular backlash against peacekeeping and humanitarian-military operations in central Africa and the Sahel. While politicized, the criticism has not been without merit. Peacekeeping missions have undoubtedly improved the lives of many. They have also often empowered the most violent and produced more, not less, armed groups. Yet it was Wagner Group's interventions in Sudan and CAR that turbocharged the criticism.
The structure of Wagner's 2017 intervention in Sudan initially followed standard practices for Africa's private security sector: training and security provision in exchange for mineral concessions. (A notable exception was the political consulting and media operations Prigozhin's team also offered.) In Sudan, the structure stayed consistent. In CAR, events on the ground shaped the nature of Wagner's intervention. In 2018, Prigozhin's men became diplomats.Wagner's diplomacy in CARIn February 2019, the CAR government and 14 major armed groups signed the Khartoum Agreement — a peace deal hailed by the United Nations. A considerable contribution to this process belonged to Prigozhin's working group, although experts from various Russian government entities also participated.
For Prigozhin, the prospect of peace would translate into increased access to mining concessions. It would also deliver a win to Moscow and increase the chances for Kremlin subsidies to fund his Africa gambit. For armed group leaders, the Agreement was a chance to obtain lucrative ministerial positions, while President Faustin-Archange Touadéra could shore up his vulnerable position vis-à-vis the armed groups.
The significance of the Agreement was immense, but unfortunately most walked away with the wrong conclusions. The international community felt it could finally distance itself from CAR's seemingly endless problems. The CAR government and Prigozhin, victims of their own success, felt they could abandon notions of an inclusive government. All seemed unable to account for the return of the largest potential spoiler of the peace, former president François Bozizé, and his decision to run in the 2020 presidential elections.
Despite rising tension between Touadéra and Bozizé, the CAR government, Wagner, and the international community pushed elections at all costs, even as a new coalition of armed groups — nominally led by Bozizé and including six of the fourteen Khartoum Agreement signatories — advanced on Bangui, the capital.
As a result of the rebellion, Wagner's mandate changed from that of a training mission to a military operation. The resulting counteroffensive brought nearly all major towns under government control.
The partial victory — armed groups are down but not out — led to overconfidence within Wagner's ranks: Military solutions were possible. The PMC came to view the Khartoum Agreement through a cynical lens as insiders reframed it as a clever way to weaken and divide the armed opposition, rather than the genuine effort at conflict resolution it was at the time.Wagner began to fashion itself as Russia's "security solution," Moscow's most successful export to Africa. Back then, Prigozhin had the ear of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Taking advantage of Moscow's light footprint on the continent, Wagner's boss could define what Moscow's interests in Africa were.Wagner's military solution in the SahelBy 2020, all actors recognized the value of the "Wagner threat" to Africa; not least African governments which leveraged narratives of "cooperating with" or "countering" Wagner to extract concessions or support from both Russia and the West.
Cold War containment narratives became a self-fulfilling prophecy in 2021 when, after a second coup, tensions between Colonel Goïta and France resulted in French military withdrawal from Mali and Wagner's arrival. Goïta's grievances with Paris were first political: He wanted France to recognize his government. Second, anti-French rhetoric helped build political legitimacy for the military regime.
The rhetoric tapped into genuine grievances with France's Operation Barkhane, especially among Mali's military class. At the top of the list was France's quiet cooperation with Tuareg separatists to oust the jihadists in northern Mali. Bamako saw that cooperation as a violation of sovereignty. Intervenors and those intervened upon could not agree on who the terrorists were.
Wagner's arrival in Mali further revealed the conflict's separate realities. Western analysts focused on human rights abuses and the territorial expansion of Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISIS-GS) to prove Wagner's intervention a failure.
Goïta's circle was far less focused than western analysts on controlling territory outside the capital. The potential for another coup in Bamako was more important, and the government relied on internet influencers and political entrepreneurs to shore up its popularity. In turn, it became a prisoner of its own jingoistic claims to return Kidal to the fold.The resulting Wagner-backed operation has enjoyed more success than predicted. The Malian army has demonstrated increased combat capability and coordination between branches of the armed forces. Wagner's operations in Mali also reflect a new level of cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Russian officers are involved in planning military operations and acting as advisors. Wagner mercenaries participate in ground operations, but, unlike in CAR, they are always embedded within FAMA.A return to diplomacyFAMA does not have the ability or capacity to fight both separatists and jihadists. Indeed, FAMA and Wagner are on the path to an unwinnable counterinsurgency in the north. Interaction between Tuareg separatists and JNIM suggest the jihadi group is not quite neutral in the conflict, and its role could grow.Despite the current success of Wagner's military solution, it is evident that only peace talks, a process of reconciliation, and the equitable distribution of power and resources between Bamako and the provinces can end the conflict.The victory in Kidal puts the government in Bamako in a stronger position to negotiate with separatists. But given the prospect of an unwinnable war in the north, the continued threat of jihadist groups, and a host of economic woes, the window for "cashing in" on victory will be short.Of course, the Malian government has demonstrated little interest in serious negotiation to date. Few outside powers have leverage over its decision-making. Russia, and the Wagner Group in Mali, have more influence than most. For Russian diplomats, efforts to bring peace to Mali would reinforce Moscow's growing prominence in the Sahel. Wagner Group, too, has consistently engaged in diplomacy when it sees greater potential for profit in peace than open warfare.The international community has leveraged the presence of Wagner Group in Mali as a pretext to step away from the conflict. Yet the crisis in Mali, and the Sahel more generally, cannot be ignored. Efforts should be made to create at least conditions for a negotiating process.The West's exceptional concentration on the war in Ukraine and its support for Israeli operations in Gaza have damaged its credibility in the Global South. Competing with or trying to contain Russia (or China, for that matter) in Africa only does further damage to that credibility. Limited, compartmentalized work with all partners in the Sahel will show that the U.S. can view issues in the Global South outside these prisms.Russia is here to stay in Africa. Mali, and the Sahel more generally, should be an opportunity to engage in geopolitical deconfliction rather than competition.

Minority and community are concepts that have dominated the analysis of Christians in the Arab world, leading to a perception of Middle-Eastern societies as confessional or sectarian mosaics. This paradigm posits that religious and political identities and dynamics are closely intertwined in countries where the dominant culture is Islam, and that religious and ethnic groups live side by side, maintaining limited interactions while their immutable identities offer a strong potential for conflict. This work questions the paradigm of the mosaic by focusing on identity formation and interaction across religious boundaries over a period that extends from the later decades of Ottoman rule in Transjordan (1870) to present Jordan (1997). It asks whether confessionnal identities are by nature conflictual and if the 'minority' concept is the only relevant one to evaluate the degree of social, political and economic participation of non-Moslems in countries where Islam is the dominant culture. The approach is inductive and historical but mobilises concepts from the disciplines of social and political anthropology and political sociology. The dissertation comprises of 10 chapters set chronologically and covering the period 1870 to 1997. Taking a historical approach, it focuses on the modalities of exchanges, transactions, cooperation and communication (looking at kinship, mariage patterns, the role of women, economic cooperation, and various aspects of local and national politics) between Christians and Moslems and between several Christian denominations in Jordan (Orthodox and Roman Catholic, or Latin, in particular), more particularly in the town of Madaba however set within a broader national and international context. These broader contexts (that encompass the politics of states and of transnational Church actors over time) allow to bridge between the local and other levels to document how institutions regulate identity formation and cross-communal interactions. Over a century, Madaba provides the background, widely open to the rest of the country and the world, of a social, religious and political history of Arab Christian families. The work combines historical and anthropological approches and sources (in particular so far unexploited parish and Vatican archives, together with other archival sources). It questions the nature and the maintenance of the social and political link between Christians and Moslems in Madaba and in Jordan, and the changes that have affected identity boundaries between groups: both as Christians and Moslems, but equally as members of different Christian denominations, particularly in the context of missionary activities. The thesis defended here is that it is time to 'break the mosaic' so as to cast light from the inside on the societies and polities within which Christians in the Arab world are inserted. The title of the dissertation refers both to this paradigm and to the Byzantine mosaics that have made Madaba famous as an archaeological site. In place of the static image of the mosaic, the dissertation offers successive episodes of a moving picture where political powers, Churches (missionary or not), those local families that transfer their assets to Amman, the Jordanian capital, and the national arena, negotiate the organisation of local social interactions. One important contribution of the dissertation is to document how the tribe, over more than a century, remains a central social form to express identities, regulate economic and political interactions, and manage conflict both between Christians and between Christians and Moslems. Communal identities, however central they have become since the inception of the modern state, do not appear to threaten the cohesion of the society and the polity, either at the local or national levels. The maintenance of tribal identities is dealt with throughout the dissertation as a dynamic process in which both successive states, regimes, social actors at the national and local levels play a part, in particular in the historical context of the arrival of the Palestinians in Jordan and in the town of Madaba. At another level, the dissertation deals extensively with the institutional relations between the Greek Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Churches and the Jordanian state, bringing a new insight into a previously under-studied domain. Finally, this work offers an argument about the relationships between state and society in contemporary Jordan by interrogating the changing nature of the social pact between the Hashemite regime and local constituencies, more specifically with non-Moslems but also with Transjordanians as opposed to Palestinians. This work is therefore not a mere monograph about Christians in the town of Madaba: looking at a 'marginal' and local phenomenon, it enlightens broader social, political and historical dynamics. ; En partant d'un phénomène observé 'à la marge' afin de mieux illustrer ce qui se passe au centre, ce travail aborde des questions fondamentales pour la compréhension des sociétés du Moyen-Orient en déconstruisant notamment la catégorie de 'minorité', en s'interrogeant sur la nature du lien social entre chrétiens et musulmans dans l'agglomération de Madaba et au-delà dans la Jordanie contemporaine et en analysant la construction des identités collectives sur plus d'un siècle (1870-1997). Sont proposés d'autres paradigmes que ceux des traditions orientaliste et développementaliste pour l'analyse des minorités en pays musulmans. Ces traditions postulent la primauté du facteur religieux dans la formation et l'expression des identités sociales et envisagent les sociétés arabes comme des 'mosaïques' formées de groupes ethnoconfessionnels homogènes, relativement hermétiques les uns aux autres et inscrits dans une hiérarchie de statuts. On s'est plutôt inspiré ici de l'approche sur les frontières et les interactions entre groupes ethniques proposée par F. Barth en lui adjoignant une certaine profondeur historique et en intégrant une analyse des rapports entre le pouvoir politique et les groupes sociaux. Il s'agit de poser les affiliation religieuses et confessionnelles comme des constructions sociales et historiques dont on peut étudier le développement, les méandres et les interactions avec d'autres types d'affiliation. S'inspirant de tous les travaux récents portant sur la construction des identités collectives, qu'il s'agisse de nations ou d'ethnies, l'approche choisie défend une conception plurielle et mouvante des identités décrites en termes de processus dynamiques et interactionnels en s'interrogeant sur les temporalités et les facteurs de continuité/changement et en montrant des continuité beaucoup plus longues que celles qui posent la période coloniale comme période charnière de fixation des identités collectives. En plus d'une méthodologie d'observation anthropologique du terrain et des acteurs, quatre types principaux de sources ont été exploités : la littérature des voyageurs occidentaux, les archives paroissiales et missionnaires (en particulier celles de la Propaganda Fide à Rome), les témoignages oraux, la littérature d'histoire locale produite à Madaba. On a adopté un plan chronologique découpé en trois périodes principales. A l'intérieur de chaque partie, l'analyse thématique a été privilégiée en suivant, dans l'agglomération de Madaba depuis sa fondation en 1880, les alliances matrimoniales, politiques et économiques entre chrétiens et musulmans et entre groupes de différents rites chrétiens (essentiellement orthodoxes et latins) afin de déterminer où passent les frontières de l'identité et comment elles changent. Une variété d'acteurs institutionnels et individuels, dont certains apparaissent à un moment historique donné, influent sur la forme de ces frontières : les administrations des États qui se succèdent et leur personnel, les hiérarchies ecclésiastiques, les prêtres, les Grandes Puissances occidentales et leurs représentants locaux, les intellectuels de formation moderne, les partis politiques, les notables traditionnels et modernes, les organisations de la société civile, les émigrés et les immigrés, les tribus et leurs membres. Centré sur l'agglomération de Kérak, dont sont issus les chrétiens qui fondent Madaba en 1880, le prologue fait apparaître que, dans la Syrie du Sud (Transjordanie) du milieu du XIXe siècle, les institutions ecclésiastiques (grecques orthodoxes) et impériales (ottomanes) n'ont que très peu d'influence sur ce territoire situé à l'extrême périphérie de l'empire. Minoritaires sur le plan démographique et dispersés sur le territoire, les chrétiens ne sont pas marginalisés du fait de leur appartenance religieuse car l'ordre tribal des relations sociales assure différents niveaux d'intégration sociale et de coopération politique et économique entre lignages chrétiens et musulmans en fonction d'autres critères que ceux de l'appartenance religieuse. Les chrétiens sont fragmentés en plusieurs clans et tribus sans que l'on puisse repérer de cohésion confessionnelle. Sur le plan de la pratique religieuse, c'est une forme de syncrétisme qui prévaut. L'impossibilité des échanges matrimoniaux entre chrétiens et musulmans n'est pas nécessairement perçue comme témoignant d'un frontière religieuse infranchissable mais s'inscrit dans le contexte plus vaste des règles qui régissent les alliances matrimoniales entre tribus. L'appartenance religieuse est avant tout un marqueur d'identité tribale. La première partie analyse comment l'ordre communautaire religieux apparaît dans les dernières décennies du XIXe siècle, sous l'action conjuguée des organisations missionnaires (protestantes et catholiques) et de l'administration alors que les Ottomans entreprennent de rétablir leur autorité sur la Syrie du Sud. Autour de la fondation du village de Madaba par des lignages chrétiens immigrés de Kérak sous l'impulsion des missionnaires latins, on montre comment de nouveaux acteurs religieux et civils entreprennent d'imposer un ordre communautaire des relations sociales à travers l'éducation missionnaire, le marquage d'espaces chrétiens, le contrôle des alliances matrimoniales, de nouvelles pratiques cultuelles, l'accès aux instances de représentation administratives et juridiques ottomanes. Les modalités d'insertion des tribus chrétiennes qui fondent Madaba dans leur environnement permettent de mettre en lumière les résistances à l'ordre communautaire par l'établissement de partenariats économiques et d'alliances politiques avec les tribus musulmanes du lieu selon des logiques lignagères persistantes où les acteurs instrumentalisent à leur profit les nouvelles ressources communautaires fournies par les Églises ou les consulats européens. Au cours du XXe siècle, la Transjordanie, d'abord sous mandat britannique, accède à l'indépendance. Malgré ce changement politique, le régime monarchique se perpétue sans que les modalités d'insertion sociale des chrétiens ne soient bouleversées au niveau du pays dans son ensemble ou au sein de l'agglomération de Madaba. La deuxième partie se penche alors sur la manière dont l'État hachémite et les Églises majoritaires (grecque orthodoxe et romaine catholique) négocient les frontières des espaces communautaires à travers la législation sur les communautés confessionnelles et leurs prérogatives religieuses, éducatives et caritatives. Le traitement différencié accordé par l'État aux différentes Église en présence ainsi que des relations diverses entre les hiérarchies ecclésiastiques et les laïcs des communautés sont deux dimensions qui contribuent à empêcher la cohésion des chrétiens pris comme un ensemble. Le statut politique des chrétiens est ensuite étudié non en isolation mais en parallèle avec celui d'autres groupes sociaux, Circassiens, bédouins, réfugiés palestiniens, familles musulmanes transjordaniennes du nord et du sud, etc. afin de poser question quant à la réalité d'un statut minoritaire et à l'existence d'une majorité politique dans le royaume hachémite. Il ressort que le régime octroie aux communautés chrétiennes et aux familles chrétiennes de notables (anciens ou modernes) un espace privilégié d'expression et de représentation qui leur permet d'occuper une place centrale, et non marginale, dans la société. Dans le même temps, il est difficile d'identifier une norme identitaire autre qu'hachémite et il apparaît qu'une des modalités d'exercice du pouvoir monarchique repose sur la cooptation d'individus et de familles appartenant à tous les groupes de la société. Dans un second temps, recentrer l'analyse sur l'agglomération de Madaba permet d'observer comment les acteurs locaux relaient les efforts de l'État qui visent à maintenir une fragmentation sociale selon des clivages communautaires et lignagers afin de résister à la formation d'identités politiques transversales qui mettraient en danger sa stabilité. La modernité politique et économique n'en engendre pas moins un système de relations multiples entre chrétiens et musulmans que l'on peut repérer à travers les alliances politiques lors d'épisodes électoraux, dans les mouvements associatifs, dans les partenariats économiques, dans les partis politiques ou lors d'épisodes de conflit aigus tels celui de Septembre noir. En parallèle, les logiques tribales continuent à ordonner conflit et coopération entre groupes de religions différentes qui se définissent d'abord selon leur affiliation lignagère. C'est le cas, en particulier, dans les domaines de l'économie agricole et pastorale traditionnelle, dans les épisodes de règlement de conflits de sang ou d'honneur où prévaut encore le droit coutumier, parfois à l'encontre des prescription du droit musulman. La fragmentation des chrétiens en groupes lignagers est ainsi préservée sans que ne s'effectue une communautarisation incluant une dimension politique. De même, les valeurs qui permettent aux chrétiens de participer pleinement à l'échange social, telles l'honneur individuel ou collectif, le prestige familial, la limitation de l'autonomie des femmes, ne sont pas menacées par l'imposition de normes islamiques. A partir des années 1970, la polarisation de la population du royaume hachémite entre Jordaniens 'de souche' et Jordaniens 'd'origine palestinienne' amène un processus de différenciation identitaire dans lequel l'organisation tribale en vient à symboliser l'identité jordanienne. Dans le même temps, les islamistes deviennent la principale force d'opposition que le régime tente d'endiguer en réaffirmant son propre caractère musulman et en islamisant de nouveaux espaces de la vie publique. Ces changements de paradigmes de la société politique jordanienne touchent Madaba, ville mixte où cohabitent Jordaniens des tribus et Palestiniens réfugiés, chrétiens et musulmans. De plus, les équilibres démographiques et politiques de la ville penchent de plus en plus en faveur des musulmans. Les chrétiens, autrefois majoritaires, entreprennent alors de défendre leur position de prééminence dans la ville. Les stratégies qu'ils mettent en place pour combattre une double logique de minorisation (en tant que chrétiens et Jordaniens 'de souche') font l'objet de la dernière partie de ce travail. On montre tout d'abord comment les chrétiens résistent sur le terrain à un recul de la neutralité religieuse de l'espace public et à leur mise en minorité démographique et politique (conseil municipal) dans l'agglomération et comment ils se redéploient dans l'espace urbain, créent des réseaux de soutien financier avec les immigrés, amorcent un rapprochement entre Églises, compensent dans le champ politique national la perte de leur hégémonie locale. Dans un second temps, on se penche sur la littérature d'histoire locale que produisent les chrétiens de Madaba afin d'analyser comment ces derniers, en reformulant leur histoire ancienne et récente, se construisent à la fois des identités confessionnelles, ethniques et lignagères et comment elles sont rendues compatibles afin de lutter contre une marginalisation symbolique. Le dernier chapitre se penche sur les élections législatives de 1997 afin d'illustrer la manière dont les chrétiens utilisent leurs imaginaires identitaires comme vecteurs de mobilisation politique à l'occasion des élections législatives, nouvelle arène de compétition depuis la libéralisation de la vie politique intervenue en 1989. Malgré l'existence d'un siège chrétien réservé pour la circonscription de Madaba, ce n'est pas la mobilisation communautaire qui apparaît comme efficace mais bien plutôt le discours des solidarités tribales, éventuellement (mais non nécessairement) en conjonction avec l'appartenance partisane ou confessionnelle. On peut alors avancer que les chrétiens participent pleinement aux dynamiques de la société dans son ensemble. Tout au long de la période étudiée, la parenté joue un rôle central comme vecteur essentiel de l'identification des groupes, que ceux ci soient dans un espace rural ou urbain. Les chrétiens de Madaba mobilisent les mêmes ressources symboliques que les autres groupes avec lesquels ils sont en contact. Comme l'ensemble de la société, les chrétiens participent à une multitude d'échanges et d'interactions et se positionnent en fonction de ces interactions. Au-delà de l'étude de cas qui s'ancre dans une ville moyenne de la Jordanie centrale, ce travail s'interroge en conclusion sur le système politique jordanien et sur les modes de légitimation de sa monarchie. Les analyses en termes de construction nationale sont critiquées, le terme de 'minorité' est mis en question tout comme le présupposé classique d'une imbrication nécessairement étroite du religieux et du politique dans les pays dits, ou qui se disent, musulmans.