In this dissertation I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyse the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. Despite attempts by developing countries to alleviate this imbalance through the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a multitude of soft law initiatives and the reluctance to address human rights issues in MNCs at the level of the United Nations failed to make MNCs incorporate human rights standards in their operations. The merging of the two concepts became increasingly more challenging throughout the 70s and 80s when the world was faced with the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism. This shift in the global legal architecture forced the Third World to take a new approach to tackle the conceptual gap, this resulted in the emergence of the Third generation of human rights and ultimately, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. CSR presented a platform for global soft law initiatives to minimise the conceptual gap they had created over throughout the preceding decades. This allowed people such as John Ruggie to develop the Guiding Principles, the most successful initiative to date. This dissertation will provide its readers with a fruitful understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and further, what implications this had on the political and economic level. - Introduction In the words of Sundhya Pahuja and Anna Saunders, the second half of the twentieth century staged a 'series of encounters between rival practices of world making, each of which travelled with rival accounts of international law'.[1] Anti-colonial disputes, the Cold War, the rise of developmental issues and the increasing popularity of neoliberalism are only some of the events that generated these competing views of the international legal order. These events brought different coalitions across the Global North and Global South, and different 'alliances of interest between 'public' and 'private' actors'.[2] At the heart of the system that emerged lie two fundamental elements: the modern multinational corporation and human rights. How to conceptualize multinational corporations (MNCs) and how to define their relation to the law and the State was part of these rival stories. In this paper I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyze the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. In particular, I examine how this encounter, which became evident as calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were being advanced within the UN, came to produce the idea of 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (CSR). I show that CSR emerged from the failure of the NIEO, particularly in relation to the roles and responsibilities of private actors in the global economy and how this can be traced to the limits of initiatives addressing the tensions between human rights claims and the interests of multinational corporations. In so doing I provide an understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and the implications this had at the political and economic level. The first section of this essay examines the lack of direct use of human rights language in the UN literature focusing on MNCs and their role in world development from the 1960s to the 1970s. This includes an analysis of the report entitled 'Multinational Corporations in World Development'.[3] I demonstrate the emphasis and enthusiasm for multinational corporations displayed at the level of the United Nations and how the concepts of the corporation and human rights were kept separate due to their respective supporters during the Cold War. I then focus on the attempts by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 'Group of 77' (G77) to bridge this conceptual gap through the imposition of policies and initiatives, though without major success. The second section analyzes the influence of the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism on the shift of the global legal architecture, ultimately promoting the birth of the new developmental state. Here concern is with the new legal structures' attempt to merge the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights through a third generation of human rights, [4] and I engage in theoretical approaches by legal scholars such as Samuel Moyn and Antonia Darder. In the third section investigates the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and analyzes its application and limitations. CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. I demonstrate how CSR aspired to close a gap between human rights and corporate action in a way that would harmonize them through a multitude of soft law initiatives. This leads to the question of whether direct regulations can apply to MNCs under international law and a discussion of the UN Global Compact, at the time the world's largest and most far-reaching CSR initiative.[5] Finally, this paper closes with the most recent developments in the global legal order designed to tackle the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights, namely through the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises[6] and the development of the Guiding Principles. Dawn of co-existence The United Nations lies at the heart of the international regime with its normative, institutional and procedural human rights activities.[7] By adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN created a milestone document in the history of human rights. The Declaration has had an enormous influence on the world both in terms of 'spreading the philosophy of human rights, and in terms of inspiring legal texts and decisions'.[8] New states have used the Declaration as a basis for their constitutions, while domestic and international courts have invoked the Declaration in their judgments.[9] As human rights law developed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, were both drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Together, these three instruments make up the 'International Bill of Human Rights'.[10] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the world became a stage for global changes that altered the legal order. The end of colonialism dawned in the Global South, and during the height of the Cold War the West faced the Soviet Bloc and its mission of 'exporting revolution'.[11] Leaders of nationalist resistance movements received military as well as financial aid from the Soviet Bloc which intensified anti-colonial mobilization for self-determination.[12] Simultaneously, globalization was increasing rapidly, with multinational corporations emerging onto the global scene with heightened awareness of their existence as an entity with legal personality. As outlined by Sornarajah, their distinct bases of power allowed them to assert their interests through the law. With economic resources often exceeding those of their host state, MNCs had the ability to sculpt and manipulate legal outcomes through arbitration processes concerning foreign investment protection. This was done by exerting lobbying pressure on a host state which might be reluctant or even unable to object to the activities of MNCs.[13] The 'Multinational Corporations in World Development', report drafted by the UN Secretariat's Department on Economic and Social Affairs in 1973, considers 'the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process of development, especially that of developing countries [.] [and] international relations'.[14] From the outset, the Report identifies the emerging phenomenon of the MNC in international economic affairs, how its size and spread has increased, and identifies the wide array of its activities and its use of natural resources which 'rival traditional economic exchanges between nations'.[15] It is surprising therefore, that a Report from the Department on Economic and Social Affairs, does not contain the term 'human rights' throughout the entire document. In the Report's introduction the UN makes a clear distinction between the differing views of impacts MNCs have on host countries. While 'depicted in some quarters as key instruments to maximizing world welfare, [they] are seen in others as dangerous agents of imperialism'.[16] The fact the United Nations recognized the potential neo-colonial nature of multinational corporations further highlights the need for guidance on human rights violations by MNCs. Yet the Report's reluctance to engage in the area of human rights provides a first glimpse into the divergence of the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. An explanation for this can be identified by analyzing the Conventions, on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the UN's reluctance to avoid tensions between the supporters of both Conventions, respectively the United States and the Soviet Union. The US pushed for the development of civil and political rights, reflecting the protection of the freedom and liberties of individuals. Stemming from a Western philosophy, John Locke identified that in a 'state of nature' humans had 'natural rights' including the right to life, liberty and property. Similarly, French legal philosophers such as Rosseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire argued that such rights emerge from the inherent nature and virtue of man.[17] As Joseph and Castan argue, 'natural rights theories were highly influential [.] particularly in the revolutionary fervor of the United States'.[18] The advancement of civil and political rights reflects the capitalist ideology of the United States, conforming to the libertarian nature of Western capitalist societies.[19] In contrast, the Soviet Union pushed for the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights. These included the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to physical health. Contrary to the civil and political rights, these rights were based on the idea of equality, one deeply rooted in the political ideology of socialism. As the US would not commit to a proposition that there is a right to social goods, the US has never ratified this Convention.[20] The Soviet Bloc promoted the right of self-determination by providing military and financial aid to indigenous political activists in their fight for independence; an idea enshrined in Article 1 of the Covenant which states that: 'All peoples have the right to self-determination'.[21] For the Soviets 'national self-determination was an adjunct to revolutionary communism'.[22] They envisioned self-determination as the tool for the transition from dismantling a colonial empire to establishing a socialist state.[23] However, while the United Nations was reluctant to adhere to human rights in the framework of multinational corporations, other international institutions were motivated to develop this area. The OECD attempted to impose human rights on MNCs by adopting the Guidelines for MNCs (hereinafter 'OECD Guidelines') in 1976.[24] These were 'voluntary recommendations for business practices relating to human rights, disclosure of information, anti-corruption, labour relations, taxation, the environment and consumer protection'.[25] The Guidelines were intended to strengthen the international investment climate by improving the relationship and confidence between MNCs and host countries. National Contact Points (NCPs) were created that bore the responsibilities of enforcing and promoting the Guidelines, and any natural person could make a claim related to the violation of the Guidelines.[26] This aspect of the Guidelines provided an enforcing mechanism accessible to the public. But although the Guidelines were formally adopted by member states as a corporate responsibility instrument, they were subject to widespread criticism in the international legal order. As explained by Cernic, the Guidelines are ambiguous while the NCPs are limited in their influence on host states. Even though they outlined the need to respect human rights, the obligations were not framed in mandatory terms.[27]. Since the Guidelines lacked legal basis, the OECD was unable to assert sanctions on non-compliant corporations, and critics labeled them weak and ineffective. However, it was the intention of the OECD to guide rather than to legislate, because they saw voluntary versus legally binding standards as less of a dichotomy and more a continuum.[28] Although voluntary, corporations would be under scrutiny and potentially harm their reputation if they violated the Guidelines.[29] Yet, the Guidelines were hardly successful in the international legal order. A year later, in 1977, the ILO attempted to bridge this gap by adopting the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning MNCs and Social Policy. These also attempted to 'encourage the positive contribution the MNEs can make to economic and social progress'.[30]. Article 8 emphasizes the respect for the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants. However, its voluntary and non-binding nature, as well as its weak monitoring process made this instrument as frail as the OECD Guidelines.[31] The lack of responsibility and perseverance stemming from international organizations and their disappointing attempt at bridging the gap between multinational corporations and human rights forced national and regional change. On the one hand, developing nations began taking matters into their own hands. To portray unity and solidarity throughout the 'Third World' the G77 coalition, formed in 1964 by developing member countries with the primary intention of promoting its members' economic and humanitarian interests through cooperation at the level of the United Nations, took a strong initiative. In the late 1970s the Group expressed its concern at the 'imbalance of negotiating power between TNCs [transnational corporations] and their host countries and inability on the part of the latter to control the activities of the TNCs within their territories'.[32] Simultaneously, home countries wanted to ensure their investments abroad would be protected, 'specifically from expropriation without a commitment to compensation based on international law'.[33] In accordance with the principles and concerns of the freshly adopted NIEO, developing countries raised the issue of the dominance of MNCs over natural resources and strongly urged the UN for a reaffirmation of their sovereignty over their resources. The NIEO was an attempt by Third World developing states, in the wake of decolonization, to deploy international law to achieve economic justice and improvements in the areas of development and socio-economic rights.[34] Pushed by the G77, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) member states devised a set of NIEO proposals in 1974 including (1) that developing states are entitled to control and regulate all activities of MNCs within their territory; and (2) that international trade must be based on equitable, stable and remunerative prices for raw materials.[35] Despite its impressive aims and careful compilation, the NIEO was unsuccessful. It failed 'to displace the power and advantage held by influential states', it failed to alter international law which favoured the economic interests of capital-exporting states and, most importantly, it demonstrated the Third World's acceptance of the economic ideology of the capitalist mindset, inflating the value of foreign capital including the exploitation of local labour in developing countries.[36] Consequently, the UN set up the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations which drafted a code of conduct for TNCs, one of the first formalized instruments drafted by the UN that set an obligation upon MNCs to respect human rights in host countries.[37] However while developing countries insisted on the idea of adopting an international instrument that was binding on MNCs, developed countries were not prepared to go beyond the voluntary sets of guidelines already in place.[38] On the other hand, due to the ineffectiveness of the international institutions, some MNCs that sought to abide by human rights law attempted to create some provisions themselves. An example is the Sullivan principles designed by Leon Sullivan, former member of the General Motors' Board of Directors. These principles included the elimination of discrimination based on race, and the concept of equality in the workplace. The objective was that by engaging in human rights concepts like dignity and respect, MNCs could be a lever for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. However, like the previously established soft law on obligations on multinational corporations, these principles were voluntary and unlike the OECD Guidelines which had the NCPs, there was no enforcement mechanism. The great majority of MNCs that adopted his principles did so with the sole motive of being able to continue to prosper in South Africa.[39] In summary, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there were attempts at a variety of levels to bring together the concepts of human rights and multinational corporations. Though it was largely absent on the level of the United Nations until the late 1970s there were many first steps by international institutions to bridge this gap. The NIEO was the first set of concrete economic principles that were prescribed in international law 'articulating a form of justice based not on domination of one people over another'.[40] It was an 'effort to assert the sovereign autonomy of the non-western world',[41] exemplifying the importance of linking human rights and development, and the fundamental values of duties of international cooperation. However, there was still much to be done as the new decade of the 1980s saw a drastic restructuring of the global trade and investment system - ultimately ending in massive international debt and a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment. A Change in the Global Legal Architecture An accumulation of capital obtained by the main oil producing states in the Middle East led to the establishment of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Cartel in 1972. With the intention of creating a monopoly and obtaining major profits, OPEC raised the price of oil by approximately 400%, with its members keeping revenue in US or European banks, from which developing countries regularly borrowed in the form of aid and loans.[42] However, banks were now lending at higher interest rates to these countries as they were deemed less creditworthy. As a result of sovereign debt and the surplus problem in the international banking system, developing states were forced to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI), as opposed to private borrowing. The very principle that developing states wanted to control with the establishment of the NIEO was now negated by Western states selling MNCs to the developing world as necessary for their survival.[43] Simultaneously to the effects of the oil crisis, the political ideology of neoliberalism emerged on the global scene. Conservative governments gained power in western countries, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe with a move towards market economics, and Latin America implemented stabilization policies to boost their economies.[44] This process saw neoliberalism became an enemy for structural equality, political inclusion, economic access and human rights.[45] Prior to the implementation of neoliberal policies, the relationship between multinational corporations and their host state was formed through the conflict between the host country's national developmental interests as opposed to the corporation's global investment interests. The state being the more powerful actor, attempted 'to channel its private investments to serve its own developmental objectives'.[46] However, as Michael Peters argues, neoliberalism provides 'a universalist foundation for an extreme form of economic rationalism'[47], which according to Paul Haslam, was a re-forming of the modern state rather than the perceived notion of the state 'unambiguously withering away'.[48] As a result, power shifted from host countries towards multinational corporations as the era was characterized by liberalization of foreign investment rules.[49] As the United Nations World Investment Report of 2000 showed, out of the 1035 changes made in national legislation regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1991 to 1999, only 5.9% were directed at restricting FDI.[50] Now more than ever before, the existence and nature of human rights were jeopardized in the sphere of multinational corporations led by neoliberal politics. Yet when analyzing human rights and neoliberalism, the two concepts have a plethora of similarities that run counter to this assertion. Samuel Moyn states that human rights and neoliberalism share (1) a predecessor and (2) a target, namely the welfarist West and the post-colonial nation state seeking economic autarky respectively.[51] Both concepts emerged and were formalized in the West. As a target, developing countries need both economic (neoliberalism) and social (human rights) elements to establish economic control. Furthermore, the two concepts share key foundational building blocks. Firstly, the principle of prioritizing the individual 'whose freedoms matter more than the collectivist endeavours' and secondly, their shared antipathy toward the state due to their rejection of its moral credentials.[52] As described by Darder, neoliberalism is characterized by a rampant greed that subsumes any notions of equality and public responsibility.[53] At the heart of this lies the ultimate subversion of human rights. When faced with the powers of global capitalism, human rights struggle to maintain themselves in the Third World. A prime example countering this thesis is the idea that human rights are a handmaiden to neoliberal policies. The argument follows that human rights are so tightly related to the role of a freely functioning market that there could be no socio-economic rights without extreme capitalism.[54] Unfortunately under this notion, human rights fall victim to being seen as dependent upon the capitalist order, creating the illusion that multinational corporations enhanced and promoted human rights in the developing World. What Wolfgang Streeck termed as 'non-market notions of social justice' became impossible to secure. Any attempt to place social commitments over economic ones were expelled, leaving market pressures to form human obligations and be governed by the dictatorship of neoliberalism.[55] The World Bank and the IMF, backed by the United States and other western states, became key in the project for liberalization, privatization, and market-friendly policies, known as the Washington Consensus. MNCs were given the protection they needed to flourish, be it proprietary or intellectual property rights. The interests of human rights on the other hand were not regarded. Though excelling and growing more than ever before, human rights had done so 'on a discrete track spearheaded internationally through the UN'.[56] Directed by developing states, human rights were intentionally dealt with by the United Nations while international economic law was being dealt with by the international institutions where they hold the balance of power.[57] Simultaneously, the developing world saw the third generation of human rights emerge as a result of anti-colonialist movements in the post-Second World War era. Newly born independent nations voiced their concerns over repeating their colonial past and demanded a new set of rights. These included the right to self-determination, the right to a healthy environment and the right to participation in cultural heritage. These are reflected in Declarations and Conventions such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968 and the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.[58] What makes this generation of human rights exceptional however is that while they reflect neither the traditional individualistic approach of the first generation, nor the socialist tradition of the second generation, they simultaneously demand certain recognitions from the state while being able to be invoked against the state. Most importantly though, as articulated by Vasak, the third generation of human rights 'can be realized only through the concerted efforts of all the actors in the social scene: the individual, the State, public and private bodies and the international community'.[59] In other words, these rights belong to the community as a collective, rather than to an individual.[60] Drafted in 1986 by the UNGA, the Declaration on the Right to Development [61] (DRD) calls for effective international cooperation towards development objectives through the enhancement of human rights and the distribution of benefits.[62] The DRD gained inspiration from the NIEO as it relied on providing equal national opportunity through measures of fair distribution of natural resources and income. Alongside neoliberal policies, the two contradicting concepts were forced to work in tandem. Foreign investment in the developing world could proceed under the neoliberal ideology as long as it did not infringe the DRD. Interestingly, the right to development was coined by the former UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Arjun Sengupta, as 'growth with equity'. Growth should not only focus on the economic aspect, but also emphasize human rights and the principles of justice. This focus on equity, would require a 'a change in the structure of production and distribution in the economy to ensure growth was equitable', including the required international cooperation and not having to rely on the market.[63] Though the United Nations are promoting and enhancing the development of human rights, they are disregarding the fact that their work should be focused more on the human rights aspects entailed in the market, rather than solving human rights issues outside of the market framework. The development of human rights and the regulatory frameworks supporting multinational corporations attended very different interests. The new global legal architecture born of the oil crisis and rise of neoliberalism reorganized the relations between the Global South and Global North. At this point human rights and the regulation of corporations, with their distinctive genealogies, were forced to come together, but the failure of this exercise could not be challenged until the late 1980s when the third generation of human rights provided another opportunity for the merging of the two concepts. The outcomes of these new sets of discussions produced a more clearly defined relationship between human rights and multinational corporations which, although more sophisticated, was still unable to produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, the right to development began to take root in the corporate world. For the sake of their reputations, corporations were forced to appreciate the power held by vulnerable individuals that could act together as a strong collective.[64] As Claire Dickerson argues, multinationals became more aware of their relationship with human rights not only in regards to the individual, but rather to the society as a collective.[65] These were the first formalized steps to the recognition of what came to be known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The Heterodox Approach What became apparent in the sphere of business and human rights were two situations, (1) that states were either unable or unwilling to implement human rights; and (2) that multinational corporations acting in such states were unprepared to deal with the risks of harming human rights through their activities. This was seen especially in the private extracting sector, such as oil, gas and coal, using aggressive means to exploit remote areas and leaving large physical and social 'footprints'. Local communities began resisting the activities by the multinationals and the language of human rights became increasingly popular in challenging corporate norms.[66] Some of the world's largest MNCs had become culprits of violating human rights standards, including Nike, Shell or Yahoo. Nike was guilty of using child labour, while Shell misused public funds to practice corruption and theft at all levels.[67] The effects were reflected in local communities that resorted to violence and criminal behaviour, significantly affecting the living conditions of these areas. In the early 1990s, some corporations began adopting measures to comply with responsible business conduct. CSR was a voluntary form of business self-regulation that attended the current societal goals. It involved the creation of monitoring schemes that regulated the workplace standards and policies of the global supply chains. However, what caused CSR to emerge, was not only pressure exerted by nations that felt their human rights had been impinged, but also a wider global political ethos. With its emphasis on privatization and deregulation, neoliberalism promoted CSR initiatives in order for corporations to gain self-control and rely less on direct government initiatives. Due to its voluntary nature, CSR was not conceived as a regulatory instrument but as a learning forum to promote strategies that enhanced socially responsible policies. This included the enhancement of human rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption efforts. [68] CSR had now progressed to the forefront of the global business scene by morphing out of corporate philanthropy.[69] Corporations began adopting voluntary schemes that not only adhered to social policy, but at times even went beyond the standard set by local requirements, which occasionally created conflict between the two.[70] Unilateral corporations produced company codes, with companies such as Gap and Nike adopting theirs in 1992. This involved internal audit teams and ethics officers to be established, verifying that contractors were complying with their company's codes of conduct. Gradually, social audit teams emerged onto the global scene. As one of the most prominent, the Fair Labour Association (FLA) monitored the working conditions for some of the top athletic brands such as Nike, Puma and Patagonia. In the food industry, the label of Fair Trade emerged, ensuring for local farmers the social, economic and environmental standards they deserved. Corporations adopted CSR measures mainly to improve their reputation. However, perhaps a greater incentive for corporations to adopt CSR measures lies in the financial risks posed by community pushback as a result of human rights violations. These pushbacks cause delays in design, operation, construction, siting, granting of permits etc. Further, they can create problems and relations with local labour markets, higher costs for financing, insurance and reduced output.[71] In a study of a large multinational company that wished to remain anonymous, Goldman Sachs found that it had accrued $6.5 billion in such costs over a two year period.[72] A great percentage of these costs could be related back to the staff time in managing conflicts that arise in communities as a result of human rights violations. In some instances between 50% and 80% of an assets manager's time can be devoted to these issues. Thus, it is clear that in this lose-lose situation, where MNCs violate human rights and thus incur losses, it makes sound corporate sense to adopt some sort of CSR measures.[73] Despite the improvements and the clear step forward the business world took in addressing human rights, CSR involved limitations and fragmentations that challenged its success. It was built on the assumption that it is an effective mechanism for a corporation to positively reconnecting with the community it is based in. Thus, in practice, CSR operates under the presumption that society has granted authority to corporations with naturally applying legal responsibilities.[74] In 2000 John Ruggie conducted research in the Fortune Global 500 and a wider range of corporations to assess the extent and success of voluntary initiatives promoting human rights. Staff monitoring schemes had evolved, demands by socially responsible investors had grown, and large public sector funds all aided in this development. However, the research also found 'company-based initiatives fell short as a stand-alone approach'.[75] Most companies still did not have the capabilities of managing human rights risks and instead were acting on a reactive based notion. Moreover, it was within the company's discretion to decide which human rights the company would address and furthermore how to define its measures. Thus, their voluntary nature could often be used as a camouflage to delay real reform.[76] A logical response to such a broad limitation would be to impose direct obligations under international law upon MNCs. Though only states and international organizations have legal standing in international law, the general view on this contention is that it would be possible to impose obligations upon MNCs due to their major economic and political influence as explained earlier, and their capabilities of influencing the enjoyment of human rights.[77] However, as explained by Zerk, the challenge lies in 'developing jurisprudence which refines and makes precise the vague aspirational statements [.] in the CSR debate'.[78] However, as the law stands, the most promising and efficient method for applying obligations on multinational corporations remains to be the national courts. Yet the fact that claims must be raised as a tort-based litigation proving a violation of domestic tort principles rather than claiming a violation under international human rights casts doubt over this method. An interesting exception to this is the US Alien Tort Statute of 1789. The tort states that district courts 'have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States'.[79] The original intention of the statute was to establish a civil remedy for violation of international law norms such as piracy, mistreatment of ambassadors and the violation of safe conducts.[80] This piece of legislation lay dormant until the 1980s when human rights lawyers discovered its potential for foreign plaintiffs to raise a claim for certain human rights abuses against an individual of any nationality, or a corporation as long as they had a presence in the United States. The question whether the Act could be enforced against a corporation was considered in 2012 in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Kiobel.[81] The court held that there was a presumption against extraterritoriality applying to claims under the Statute. There is therefore no application of the statute abroad unless it is explicitly stated in the international law which is the subject of the claim.[82] As stated by John Ruggie in his advice to the Human Rights Council in 2007 'no single silver bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge. A broad array of measures is required, by all relevant actors.'[83] Ultimately, as a measure to seek guidance on the matter, this led to the UN Global Compact in 2000, the largest global CSR initiative.[84] The UN Global Compact was a strategic policy initiative posed by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that aimed at improving corporate conditions in areas such as human rights, environmental protection and labour rights.[85] It was a prospective and hopeful initiative that was designed as a learning forum to develop, implement and disclose sustainability principles among corporate actors.[86] At its time, the Global Compact was the most far-reaching, non-governmental set of policies aimed at catalyzing the voluntary nature in the corporate citizenship movement.[87] Legal scholars such as Meyer and Stefanova felt the Global Compact could shape the relationship between MNCs and human rights through 'rewarding responsible TNCs [MNCs], while shaming at least some of the irresponsible TNCs [MNCs] into better promoting human rights'.[88] Their only concern about the extent of the success of the Global Compact lay, in the Global Compact's voluntary nature. Comparing it to the OECD Guidelines implemented 25 years earlier, an initiative like the Global Compact will only be successful if there is commitment to the initiative at all levels of the international system. Thus, the main task is to put a human face on globalization through the values and principles shared by the people, the corporation and the state.[89] However, Aravalo and Fallon dispute this. Published in 2008, their Report uses the Compact Quarterly and UNGC Annual Review to critique the Global Compact's activities and practices throughout its eight years of existence. Published by local networks and the UN respectively, they evaluate new businesses adhering to the Global Compact, as well as Global Compact practices and responses. Aravalo and Fallon found that after evaluating the various progress reports, the Global Compact falls short of being a successful initiative. According to the UNGC Annual Review, there are a multitude of gaps existing in the Global Compact framework. Research instruments for instance, under the principles of human rights and labour protection, have been deemed as inadequate as participants have failed to voice their concern over the protection of such rights within their corporation. The Global Compact has solely used online surveys to administer data, which smaller businesses are often unwilling or unable to provide. The methodology applied by the Global Compact was ambiguous and did not show the extent of the success of CSR initiatives.[90] Alavaro and Fallon argue that it would be highly beneficial for the Global Compact to re-think its methodology process of evaluating its success by introducing a chronological component into its future research models. [91] It would allow for a clearer comparison not only for participants of the Global Compact, but also for the comparison with non-Compact companies in the area of corporate responsibility.[92] As a result of this poor research methodology, the Global Compact has difficulty assessing its direct influence on the broad and voluntary concept of CSR. There are key principles of CSR that fail to receive the attention they deserve in the scope of the Global Compact. However, this is not to say that the Global Compact has been an outright failure. The Annual Review, though lacking quantifiable data, has provided a wide array of case studies providing evidence for the practical influence of the Global Compact on participants. These include programs in education and working relationships the Global Compact has encouraged and facilitated. It can be said therefore, that the Global Compact is making a difference, even if only in these cases. Until shortly after the turn of the millennium, neither company codes nor multilateral initiatives such as Global Compact, successfully achieved the necessary, concrete obligations in regard to human rights and environmental protection demands. This was set to change with the arrival of the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Norms). Drafted in 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights attempted to merge the concepts of MNCs and human rights and transform these newly developed principles into hard law. The intention was to impose human rights obligations upon companies through the domestic legal systems of their host countries. The Norms clearly express that 'states retain primary, overarching responsibility for human rights protection' and that corporations are identified as 'Duty-bearers' based on that expectation of following human rights principles.[93] The expectations expressed by the Norms are supported by enforcement mechanisms for their implementation which address the requirements that MNCs must adopt in terms of their internal practice. Furthermore, there are a multitude of rights that go beyond what is traditionally accepted as international human rights law. Examples include rights associated with consumer protection, the environment or corruption which are covered by different areas of the law.[94] However, the Norms failed to achieve promising results. Described as a 'train wreck' by John Ruggie, the Norms fell under heavy criticisms for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, the Norms fall under heavy scrutiny for attempting to impose obligations upon corporations, while simultaneously imposing parallel obligations on the state. The intention was to address the fact that MNCs operate in a legal vacuum due to their status of acting as a multinational. To alleviate this issue, it was thought that binding MNCs to hard international law would be the best option. On the one hand, minimalists argue that binding multinational corporations to international law is not an appropriate method as this would go beyond the concept of soft law initiatives such as Global Compact. This argument is developed by stating that binding corporations to international law would 'privatise human rights'. The Norms would be placing obligations on an entity that was never democratically elected, nor eligible to make reasonable decisions in regard to human rights at the level of international law.[95] On the other hand, maximalists lobby for a judicial body solely focused on the practice of multinational corporations and argue that corporations should be bound by international law.[96] Secondly, there was severe backlash against the Norms from states, corporations and businesses who argued that there was a lack of consultation from the Sub-Commission when drafting the Norms. However, this argument has since been disputed by institutions such as the Corporate Europe Conservatory or the scholars Weissbrodt and Kruger.[97] In regard to the discontent presented by states, many argued that there was a lack of involvement on their behalf in the Norms' development. As stated by Kinely, Nolan and Zerial, it is of vital importance that in issues revolving around CSR and their wide variety of stakeholders, everyone's voice must be heard when protecting human rights.[98] Thirdly, issues were raised regarding the language used by the Norms. Terms like 'sphere of influence'[99] and 'complicity' were deemed as vague and unclear.[100] It is agreed upon, even by supporters of the Norms, that such terms must be defined more definitively and where possible, draw definitions from more grounded areas of the law like criminal law, tort or contract law. This attitude towards the Norms from corporations shows the extent of their distrust and the scare factor used to attempt to dismantle the Norms.[101] However, even though the Norms failed as a concept, as Kinley, Nolan and Zerial maintain, 'the Norms have been a beneficial and fruitful initiative, reinvigorating debate on business and human rights'.[102] Previous to the imposition of the Norms, CSR had found itself in a position that was stagnant, focusing solely on codes of conduct that should be implemented by corporations using a bottom-up approach. The Norms altered the position of CSR to now provide a top-down approach and provided human rights activists with hope that human rights protection in regard to multinational corporations was now in the hands of the United Nations. However, the reactions to the Norms from the CSR community varied. CSR had been a newly emerging concept which was still unclear when fitted into the international legal order. It was still in its early years of development with highly broad-reaching initiatives in the fields of both soft and hard law. The playing field for CSR was simply too big for such an underdeveloped concept to handle. Further, it was attempted to implement CSR through domestic laws and quasi-legal initiatives raised to the level of international law. It is therefore often perceived that the implementation of the Norms were an attempt to remedy CSR by uniting these various aspects into one document at the level of the United Nations. The Norms conjoined national and international levels of CSR while maintaining that states continued to hold the primary responsibility of ensuring that businesses protect human rights. The world was a 'deeply divided arena of discourse and contestation lacking shared knowledge, clear standards and boundaries; fragmentary and often weak governance systems concerning business and human rights in states and companies alike'.[103] A range of governments still expressed their demand for further attention to be given to the relationship between human rights and the practices of multinational corporations. Thus, the United Nations appointed a team led by John Ruggie to establish the Guiding Principles. Rather than establishing a new international framework as was previously attempted with the Norms, Ruggie was 'urged [.] to focus on identifying and promoting good practices and providing companies with tools to enable them to deal voluntarily with the complex cluster of business and human rights challenges'.[104] Ruggie moved away from the traditional 'mandatory approach' which involved the compliance of national laws in correspondence to a corporation's voluntary measures and practices, to a heterodox approach. This heterodox approach was devised to create an environment of mixed reinforcing policy measures that provided cumulative change and large-scale success. The Guiding Principles lay on three foundations: (1) the state duty to protect against human rights abuses; (2) the responsibility by corporations to respect human rights and the implied obligation of acting in due diligence; and (3) the need for greater access to remedies for victims. However, there are two things that the Guiding Principles fail to accomplish. Firstly, to create binding international law and instead rely on normative contributions which further elaborate the implications of existing standards. Secondly, the Guiding Principles 'fail to ensure the right to an effective remedy and the need for States' measures to prevent abuses committed by their companies overseas'.[105] Amnesty International goes further by reiterating that aside from lacking accountability measures, the Guiding Principles should mandate a due diligence approach rather than only recommending it, as this would solve internal as well as extraterritorial accountability issues. Alongside Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch criticized the Guiding Principles for not adopting a global standard in corporate responsibility, and instead resort to a 'sliding scale' based on a corporation's size and geographic location.[106] However, when compared to other governance regimes in the past and present, the Guiding Principles seem to be a robust framework. Although various human rights organizations and NGOs identify neglect of human rights in the framework of MNCs, the Guiding Principles reiterate business as an instrument to contribute to societal welfare.[107] Thus, it acts as a basis for the empowerment of society and a benchmark to judge practices and conduct of corporations and governments.[108] Conclusion The discourse of the co-emergence of multinational corporations and human rights took the world by storm. The ongoing globalization of multinational corporations and the evolution of the concept of human rights were born attending different aims in the global legal order. Their greatest challenge however was not necessarily their harmonization and co-existence, but more importantly co-existing under the intentional gap created through the world's largest and most influential actor, the United Nations. This was clearly visible in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the various Reports and Declarations that were passed through the international institution, the two concepts were kept separate. While the United Nations was enthusiastic for the growth of both MNCs and human rights, it intentionally avoided discussing the harmonization of both concepts. Due to the underlying pressures imposed on the United Nations by the tensions from the Cold War, the UN was left in a legal vacuum unable to merge the two distinctive genealogies. The global international legal order was unaware of the extent of the importance of such a gap being eradicated before adopting a resolution as complex as the NIEO. Thus, from this point onwards, the NIEO was therefore already bound to be unsuccessful. Not only had international law not developed enough to impose such obligations upon MNCs, the corporations themselves were not aware of the ramifications and necessity for abiding human rights obligations as I showed in the third section of this dissertation. Enthusiasm for further initiatives such as the push by the G77 or the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations was only short lived. The events of the 1980s greatly disrupted the already turbulent environment of the global international legal order creating a greater gap between the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. The 1980s became a stage which saw a great change in the global legal structure. The NIEO was an already broken concept from the outset as the conceptual gap had already created a disparity in the relationship between MNCs and human rights. This meant that although they were not aware of it at the time, the Global South could not rely on the imposition of the NIEO. Fostering the Western neoliberal policies, the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights was now well established. For human rights to become a globally instructed concept, MNCs are a useful tool to spread, promote and enhance human rights across the globe. This of course is under the condition that the MNC does not violate human rights. From the other perspective MNCs rely on human rights in terms of their societal and financial risks. It becomes clear that when this is not realized by the proponents of both concepts, it can lead to major discrepancies and disparities as was proven in the Global South during this period. If there had not been this conceptual gap, and instead there had been a clear and devised relationship between MNCs and human rights, the effects of the oil crisis and neoliberalism would not have left the detrimental mark in developing countries that they did, potentially allowing the NIEO to prevail. However, the ongoing persistence of developing countries and their call for the third generation of human rights to gain prominence forced MNCs to catch up with their relationship to human rights. What emerged, were essentially the first initiatives and practices of CSR. CSR was heavily affected by the fact that it relied on the voluntary nature of businesses to adhere to as well as practice CSR. Even though corporations had an incentive to adopt CSR measures, weak monitoring systems allowed violations to still occur on a grand scale. The issue was that the multinational corporation as a concept was still unclear and lacked definition and that tying MNCs down with hard international law was not possible due to the diversity of MNCs. CSR allowed for too large a divergence from the issue at hand and required to approach human rights at a different angle. This was the key reason for the partial success of the Guiding Principles. Ruggie's unconventional, heterodox approach provided clarity and distinct concepts that individuals, business and states could adhere to. Although the conceptual gap has still not vanished, the UN has after an array of various attempts, managed to narrow the gap that it had created almost sixty years ago by continuously forcing society to rethink and redefine the relationship. What exactly lies in the future is uncertain and impossible to foresee. It can be said with great certainty however, that if initiatives such as Global Compact or the Guiding Principles are enhanced and given more attention, the world will be faced with a much clearer and concise relationship between multinational corporations and human rights. Focusing on monitoring mechanisms, methodological research and greater transparency and accountability among all actors involved will undoubtedly seal the conceptual gap that has caused the international legal order to experience such unsettling times. [1] Pahuja, Sundhya. Saunders, Anna. Rival Worlds and the place of the Corporation in International Law in Dann and Von Bernstorff (eds). Decolonisation and the Battle for International Law (OUP, 2018) p.1 [2] Ibid. [3] UN, Multinational Corporations in World Development ST-ECA/190 [4] Linarelli, John. Salomon, Margot. Sornarajah M. The Misery of International Law. (OUP, 2018) p.245 [5] Ruggie, John. Just Business. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) p.70 [6] United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [7] Alston, Philip. Mégret, Frédéric. (eds) The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Second Edition, OUP, 2020) p.1 [8] Clapham, Andrew. Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2007) p.42 [9] (n.8) p.108. [10] ibid . p.109 [11] Allina, Eric. Imperialism and the Colonial Experience in Paul A. Haslam, Jessica Schafer and Pierre Beaudet, Introduction to International Development (3rd Edition, OUP, 2017), pp. 24-42. p.39 [12] Ibid. p. 40 [13] Sornarajah M. International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP, 2010) p.5 [14] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, 1973 ST-ECA/190 p.VI [15] ibid. p.1 [16] ibid. [17] Joseph, Sarah. Castan, Melissa. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials. (3rd Edition, OUP, 2013) p.4 [18] ibid. p.5 [19] ibid. [20] Alston, Philip. U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy. The American Journal of International Law Vol.84, No.2 (CUP,1990) pp.365-393, p.4 [21] UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Article 1 [22] Simpson, Gerry. The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age (Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p.266 [23] Ibid. [24] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976 [25] Carasco, Emily. Singh, Jang. Towards Holding Transnational Corporations Responsible for Human Rights. European Business Review Vol.22, No.4, (Emerald Publishing Group, 2010). p.4 [26] Cernic, Jernei. Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Hanse Law Review, Vol.4, No.1, (2008). p.16 [27] Ibid. p. 12 [28] Sanchez, Juan Carlos Ochoa. "The Roles and Powers of the OECD National Contact Points Regarding Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by a Transnational Corporation." Nordic Journal of International Law (2015) Vol.84, No.1, pp: 89-126 p. 18 [29] Bolt, Cassidy. "Leveraging Reputation in Implicit Regulation of MNEs: An Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises' Capacity to Influence Corporate Behavior." Corporations and International Law, 20 Jan. 2018, Available at: sites.duke.edu/corporations/2018/01/20/leveraging-reputation-in-implicit-regulation-of-mnes-an-analysis-of-the-oec
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The European Commission recently delivered on its promise to bring enlargement back into the limelight. On March 12, it recommended opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and put forward draft negotiating frameworks for Ukraine and Moldova. The three countries checked off another significant (if yet symbolic) step on their respective paths towards EU membership, receiving approval from EU leaders at their meeting on March 21-22. The day before, the Commission also adopted the Communication on proposed pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews. Unlike the (justified) fanfare around Bosnia and Herzegovina's green light for membership talks, this document received little to no attention. However, according to the Commission it marks the start of the policy review process on internal EU reforms needed for enlargement. So how does the Commission plan to prepare for a larger and stronger union? Values remain fundamentalAs laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, the EU is founded on the respect for democratic principles, rule of law, and fundamental rights. Welcoming new member states therefore requires ensuring these values can continue being upheld throughout the Union. With the revised enlargement methodology from 2020, the Commission already put rule of law at the center of the accession process. Under this approach, new candidate countries must open and close their membership negotiations with the fundamentals cluster. This enables continued monitoring of progress and the ability to address backsliding in democratic norms and values throughout the negotiations. In last year's State of the Union Speech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the integration of candidate countries who are further along in their accession process into the annual Rule of Law Reports. This would provide an added tool for steering dialogue on the necessary reforms, if assessments are effectively integrated into the country progress reports, as well as a smoother administrative transition once they become full-fledged members. The EU, however, continues to have its fair share of difficulties fostering democratic resilience even among its current members. Since joining the EU, the bloc has seen democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland. Most recently the Slovakian government also proposed worrisome legislation that would curtail freedom of expression, media freedom and protection of civic space. The key to protecting the rule of law after enlargement therefore does not only lie in "deep-rooted" transformations in candidate countries, but also in reforming the EU's internal approach for protecting its fundamental values and democratic principles. The EU has been struggling in this area with 27 members. Without concrete steps, it could struggle even more with over 30 members in the future. Resilience is crucial to safeguard democratic norms. The upcoming policy reviews should therefore not only focus on reinforcing a corrective and punitive rule-of-law mechanism. But also on how to strengthen the proactive measures, such as the Rule of Law Toolbox and support for democratic civic actors in member states, to effectively protect from democratic backsliding. Managing EU PoliciesBringing new countries into the mix will inevitably affect the benefits and functioning of several EU policies. While some policy reforms will be straightforward, others will be tougher to crack. The EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a good example of the challenging reforms the future enlargement will bring. In the case of the CAP, the key will be successfully integrating Ukraine, which is among the top agricultural producers in the world, while ensuring a level-playing field between current and new members. Under the current CAP subsidy scheme, Ukraine would receive €85 billion in agriculture subsidies after joining the EU. This would result in a 20% cut of funds for current member states. Ukrainian agricultural imports are already testing the EU's unity and solidarity with the country. With vested interests of several member states, such as France and Poland, and big agribusiness stakeholders as well as recent pressures from farmers protesting across Europe, one can already picture more convoys of tractors rolling down the streets of European capitals. The CAP–although the most prominent–represents only one of the several difficult policies that will need to be substantially changed ahead of future enlargement. Another uphill battle will be reforming the cohesion policy and the EU budget. While the Commission is a well-oiled machine when it comes to drafting new policy proposals, the negotiations that follow among EU institutions can often be long, arduous, and highly politicized. These announced policy reviews by the Commission are only the beginning and will show the extent of reforms the EU will need to undertake.Gradual Access to the Single Market?The proposed policy reviews will also factor into gradual access to the Single Market for candidate countries. Western Balkan candidate countries have long been arguing for such an approach. The tangible economic benefits from access to certain areas of the Single Market would mitigate the public dissatisfaction with the speed and credibility of the enlargement process. This approach regained attention with the revived enlargement momentum after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Since then, EU leaders have agreed on the need to "further advance gradual integration" in the European Council conclusions from June 2022. The Commission's proposal is, however, the first formal attempt to assess the feasibility of rolling out gradual access to the Single Market. While a positive development, more work needs to be done to define how candidate countries will be granted such "preliminary" access. Currently, progress in negotiations depends on member states' unanimous support. If the same applies for gradual integration, managing expectations in candidate countries will be crucial to avoid further loss of trust in the EU integration process. In addition, if candidate countries already take on certain obligations and benefits of EU membership before joining, this should have an impact on their formal accession process. To continue the enlargement momentum, the next Commission therefore needs to outline how gradual access to the Single Market can translate to progress in specific accession benchmarks. This can motivate further reforms in candidate countries, strengthen the merit-based approach, as well as make it more difficult for member states to block progress due to bilateral issues. Governing with 30+ MembersPreparing for a larger union will also require institutional adjustments. Discussions around EU institutional reform are not new, yet even two years after the end of the Conference on the Future of Europe there seems to be little agreement on the way forward. As the EU faces geopolitical challenges, the need for more efficient decision-making persists. The Commission's proposal, however, lacks ingenuity when it comes to institutional reform. It only puts forth refurbished ideas of changing the decision-making process from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) using the passerelle clauses or constructive abstention, brushing aside the European Parliament's (EP) call for a convention for the revision of the treaties. Despite current security imperatives, many, mostly smaller, member states remain against QMV, due to fears of losing influence in the EU's internal power dynamics. These concerns will need to be reconciled if the EU really wants to move from words to deeds on becoming a more agile actor in this increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape. Unanimous decision-making does not only affect the governing of an enlarged Union, but the process of getting to it. The candidate country's progress depends on unanimous support in the Council at every stage of the accession process. Yet most Western Balkans accession paths have up to this point been vetoed at least once by a member state due to bilateral issues, affecting the credibility of the process in the region. In the proposal, the Commission rightly calls for the Council to change to voting with a qualified majority in "certain interim steps of the enlargement process." Such a change is needed. It could drastically speed up the negotiations process as well as build up its credibility. The Commission's proposal is a welcomed reassurance of the EU's commitment to be ready for new members. It shows enlargement remains the EU's strongest geopolitical tool, while also its biggest challenge. In the coming months, the European Council is expected to adopt a new strategic agenda and an internal reform roadmap. While Europe is in campaign mode for the European Parliament elections in June, adoption of these documents will play a vital role in ensuring the reform and enlargement efforts stay the course in the next EU institutional cycle. The EU of tomorrow will be defined by change. The to-do list of reforms is long and ambitious, and will require strong political will from all actors involved. The results of the upcoming EP elections as well as several national elections will therefore serve as a crucial indicator of whether and how the EU will move towards a Union fit for enlargement and fit for tomorrow.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
The European Commission recently delivered on its promise to bring enlargement back into the limelight. On March 12, it recommended opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and put forward draft negotiating frameworks for Ukraine and Moldova. The three countries checked off another significant (if yet symbolic) step on their respective paths towards EU membership, receiving approval from EU leaders at their meeting on March 21-22. The day before, the Commission also adopted the Communication on proposed pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews. Unlike the (justified) fanfare around Bosnia and Herzegovina's green light for membership talks, this document received little to no attention. However, according to the Commission it marks the start of the policy review process on internal EU reforms needed for enlargement. So how does the Commission plan to prepare for a larger and stronger union? Values remain fundamentalAs laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, the EU is founded on the respect for democratic principles, rule of law, and fundamental rights. Welcoming new member states therefore requires ensuring these values can continue being upheld throughout the Union. With the revised enlargement methodology from 2020, the Commission already put rule of law at the center of the accession process. Under this approach, new candidate countries must open and close their membership negotiations with the fundamentals cluster. This enables continued monitoring of progress and the ability to address backsliding in democratic norms and values throughout the negotiations. In last year's State of the Union Speech, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the integration of candidate countries who are further along in their accession process into the annual Rule of Law Reports. This would provide an added tool for steering dialogue on the necessary reforms, if assessments are effectively integrated into the country progress reports, as well as a smoother administrative transition once they become full-fledged members. The EU, however, continues to have its fair share of difficulties fostering democratic resilience even among its current members. Since joining the EU, the bloc has seen democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland. Most recently the Slovakian government also proposed worrisome legislation that would curtail freedom of expression, media freedom and protection of civic space. The key to protecting the rule of law after enlargement therefore does not only lie in "deep-rooted" transformations in candidate countries, but also in reforming the EU's internal approach for protecting its fundamental values and democratic principles. The EU has been struggling in this area with 27 members. Without concrete steps, it could struggle even more with over 30 members in the future. Resilience is crucial to safeguard democratic norms. The upcoming policy reviews should therefore not only focus on reinforcing a corrective and punitive rule-of-law mechanism. But also on how to strengthen the proactive measures, such as the Rule of Law Toolbox and support for democratic civic actors in member states, to effectively protect from democratic backsliding. Managing EU PoliciesBringing new countries into the mix will inevitably affect the benefits and functioning of several EU policies. While some policy reforms will be straightforward, others will be tougher to crack. The EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a good example of the challenging reforms the future enlargement will bring. In the case of the CAP, the key will be successfully integrating Ukraine, which is among the top agricultural producers in the world, while ensuring a level-playing field between current and new members. Under the current CAP subsidy scheme, Ukraine would receive €85 billion in agriculture subsidies after joining the EU. This would result in a 20% cut of funds for current member states. Ukrainian agricultural imports are already testing the EU's unity and solidarity with the country. With vested interests of several member states, such as France and Poland, and big agribusiness stakeholders as well as recent pressures from farmers protesting across Europe, one can already picture more convoys of tractors rolling down the streets of European capitals. The CAP–although the most prominent–represents only one of the several difficult policies that will need to be substantially changed ahead of future enlargement. Another uphill battle will be reforming the cohesion policy and the EU budget. While the Commission is a well-oiled machine when it comes to drafting new policy proposals, the negotiations that follow among EU institutions can often be long, arduous, and highly politicized. These announced policy reviews by the Commission are only the beginning and will show the extent of reforms the EU will need to undertake.Gradual Access to the Single Market?The proposed policy reviews will also factor into gradual access to the Single Market for candidate countries. Western Balkan candidate countries have long been arguing for such an approach. The tangible economic benefits from access to certain areas of the Single Market would mitigate the public dissatisfaction with the speed and credibility of the enlargement process. This approach regained attention with the revived enlargement momentum after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Since then, EU leaders have agreed on the need to "further advance gradual integration" in the European Council conclusions from June 2022. The Commission's proposal is, however, the first formal attempt to assess the feasibility of rolling out gradual access to the Single Market. While a positive development, more work needs to be done to define how candidate countries will be granted such "preliminary" access. Currently, progress in negotiations depends on member states' unanimous support. If the same applies for gradual integration, managing expectations in candidate countries will be crucial to avoid further loss of trust in the EU integration process. In addition, if candidate countries already take on certain obligations and benefits of EU membership before joining, this should have an impact on their formal accession process. To continue the enlargement momentum, the next Commission therefore needs to outline how gradual access to the Single Market can translate to progress in specific accession benchmarks. This can motivate further reforms in candidate countries, strengthen the merit-based approach, as well as make it more difficult for member states to block progress due to bilateral issues. Governing with 30+ MembersPreparing for a larger union will also require institutional adjustments. Discussions around EU institutional reform are not new, yet even two years after the end of the Conference on the Future of Europe there seems to be little agreement on the way forward. As the EU faces geopolitical challenges, the need for more efficient decision-making persists. The Commission's proposal, however, lacks ingenuity when it comes to institutional reform. It only puts forth refurbished ideas of changing the decision-making process from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV) using the passerelle clauses or constructive abstention, brushing aside the European Parliament's (EP) call for a convention for the revision of the treaties. Despite current security imperatives, many, mostly smaller, member states remain against QMV, due to fears of losing influence in the EU's internal power dynamics. These concerns will need to be reconciled if the EU really wants to move from words to deeds on becoming a more agile actor in this increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape. Unanimous decision-making does not only affect the governing of an enlarged Union, but the process of getting to it. The candidate country's progress depends on unanimous support in the Council at every stage of the accession process. Yet most Western Balkans accession paths have up to this point been vetoed at least once by a member state due to bilateral issues, affecting the credibility of the process in the region. In the proposal, the Commission rightly calls for the Council to change to voting with a qualified majority in "certain interim steps of the enlargement process." Such a change is needed. It could drastically speed up the negotiations process as well as build up its credibility. The Commission's proposal is a welcomed reassurance of the EU's commitment to be ready for new members. It shows enlargement remains the EU's strongest geopolitical tool, while also its biggest challenge. In the coming months, the European Council is expected to adopt a new strategic agenda and an internal reform roadmap. While Europe is in campaign mode for the European Parliament elections in June, adoption of these documents will play a vital role in ensuring the reform and enlargement efforts stay the course in the next EU institutional cycle. The EU of tomorrow will be defined by change. The to-do list of reforms is long and ambitious, and will require strong political will from all actors involved. The results of the upcoming EP elections as well as several national elections will therefore serve as a crucial indicator of whether and how the EU will move towards a Union fit for enlargement and fit for tomorrow.
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Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
The geopolitical repercussions from the war in Ukraine continue to reverberate across Eurasia.With global attention preoccupied by Moscow's invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan has been depriving the estimated 120,000 ethnic Armenian population in the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh access to humanitarian aid in a blockade that has lasted over eight months and has recently intensified. Much to Armenia's consternation, the 2,000 Russian peacekeeping forces stationed in the enclave since the most recent round of fighting in 2020 have appeared ineffective in the face of increasing Azerbaijani pressure against the besieged Armenian population.As a result, Armenia is openly seeking to diversify its security relationship away from Russia, its longstanding ally, including conducting joint military drills with the United States in Armenia that began Monday and is set to end on September 20.Yerevan, Armenia's capital, has increasingly expressed a sense of betrayal at Moscow's inability, or unwillingness, to lend support to its treaty ally since last September when Azerbaijani armed forces attacked Armenia's internationally recognized territory and where they still occupy 10 square kilometers, according to Armenian officials.The Backdrop of Current TensionsThe two former Soviet Republics fought the First Nagorno-Karabakh War during the early 1990s after the indigenous Armenian majority in the autonomous oblast proclaimed their independence from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a full-scale war broke out between the two newly independent countries, eventually leaving tens of thousands casualties dead and hundreds of thousands displaced between 1992 and 1994. The war ended with a victory by Armenia.A Russian-brokered ceasefire resulted in Armenian control of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions of Azerbaijan proper. The United Nations and international community, however, continued to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.After over 25 years of unsuccessful negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chaired by the U.S., France, and Russia, Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, bolstered by the "brotherly" military support from NATO member Turkey and years of stockpiling Israel-supplied weapons, launched an all-out assault to recapture the disputed territory in September 2020. The 44-day war saw Azerbaijan secure a military victory with further territorial gains guaranteed under a Moscow-brokered ceasefire, leaving a rump self-governing Nagorno-Karabakh Republic alongside a Russian peacekeeping contingent as stipulated by the November 2020 ceasefire agreement. That agreement also guaranteed that a link between the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and Armenia, the Lachin Corridor, would be sustained and controlled by the Russian peacekeeping contingent. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh and its inhabitants remained unresolved. Last December, however, Baku effectively blockaded the Lachin Corridor and, five months later, it established a checkpoint on the road, formalizing the blockade. While the European Union, Russia, the U.S., and even the International Court of Justice have increasingly called for lifting the blockade, Azerbaijan remains defiant. The Azerbaijan foreign ministry insists that claims of a blockade are "completely baseless" and has accused Armenians of transporting arms into the territory, a claim Yerevan denies. Nevertheless, even the International Committee of the Red Cross struggles to continue its vital deliveries into the territory, resulting in what several United Nations Special Rapporteurs describe as a "dire humanitarian crisis." There were hopes the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, which has been at the heart of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, would be resolved by negotiations facilitated by a complementary EU and U.S. approach (although a separate track by Moscow also persists). However, the ongoing blockade has dimmed hopes for a viable negotiated settlement. Current TensionsThe war in Ukraine has drained the Kremlin's military resources and room for maneuver, especially in a region like the South Caucasus where Russia vies with Turkey for regional hegemony. Moscow's increased reliance on Ankara over the last 18 months to balance against the West diplomatically has resulted in its inability to fulfill its own obligations in the ceasefire agreement following the 2020 war. Given this new reality, Armenia has started to hedge against Moscow by actively searching for new military partners and security guarantors. The publicity surrounding Eagle Partner 2023, the Armenian-hosted joint military exercise with the U.S., clearly worries the Kremlin, which has said it would "deeply analyze" the latest events. However, these exercises are "narrowly focused on peacekeeping operations" and do not represent a "breakthrough in U.S.-Armenia defense cooperation," according to Benyamin Poghosyan, senior fellow at APRI, a Yerevan-based think tank. Nevertheless, the exercises follow Armenia's refusal in January to host Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization exercises on its territory, citing the organization's unwillingness to support Yerevan during last September's escalation by Azerbaijan. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, has recently made a distinctly public effort to distance itself from Russian actions in Ukraine and even from Moscow itself. In just the last weeks Yerevan has moved to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and recalled its ambassador to the CSTO. Pashinyan said depending solely on Russia for security was a "strategic mistake." Pashinyan's spouse, Anna Hakobyan, traveled to Kyiv last week and delivered the first package of Armenian humanitarian aid to Ukraine. However, the fact remains that only Russia has sent peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh, and that these peacekeepers are all that stands between the local Armenian population and Azerbaijani conquest, almost certainly leading to massacre and expulsion. As Poghosyan sees it, the driving cause behind a potential new attack is "Azerbaijan's desire to establish control over Nagorno Karabakh without providing any status or special rights to Armenians." This aligns with the view of Shujat Ahmadzada, a Baku-based researcher on foreign and security policies of the South Caucasus countries, who believes Azerbaijan is pursuing a "3D policy" with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh. The three D's stand for "De-internationalization, De-territorialization, and De-institutionalization." Such a process is intended to transform the status of the ethnic Armenians living there into a "purely 'internal matter' of Azerbaijan'' while "incorporating the self-governing institutions into the Azerbaijani political system in such a way that there is no single territorially defined unit for the ethnic Armenian community." While the deployment of over 80 U.S. troops on Armenian soil will hopefully guarantee against imminently anticipated Azerbaijani attacks on Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia itself, Washington's move in a region Moscow has long viewed as a vital interest does not come without risk. Moscow views Washington's increased involvement as the Biden administration taking advantage of Russia's war in Ukraine in order to weaken or challenge its influence in the South Caucasus region, where Russia has a history of over 200 years of regional military domination. The latest American proposal for unblocking the Lachin Corridor plans to simultaneously open an alternative route to Nagorno-Karabakh through the Azerbaijani town of Aghdam. However, Armenians have regarded this proposal as a clear threat. Tigran Grigoryan, a Karabakh-born analyst and head of the Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a Yerevan-based think tank, assessed that, even if both the Lachin Corridor and the Aghdam route were to be opened, the potential remained for Baku to again close the corridor and create a "new status quo on the ground." Recent reports show that the first delivery of aid by the Russian Red Cross has entered Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan. However, the acute crisis in food, energy, and humanitarian supplies continues as the Lachin Corridor remains shut and Azerbaijan continues its buildup along the border regions.The Biden administration would do better to use its leverage over Azerbaijan to ensure an end to the Lachin Corridor blockade while simultaneously working to achieve a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that would both recognize Azerbaijani sovereignty and provide enforceable guarantees for the future rights and security of the Armenian population there. For such an approach to work would likely require coordination with Russia. While such a scenario might be hard to imagine, Washington and Moscow have worked together in the past over Nagorno-Karabakh, even when relations were severely strained elsewhere. Such coordination is particularly compelling given the tens of thousands in the enclave who currently face famine. Rather than taking steps that Moscow views as threatening to its military presence in the South Caucasus (a process which led to disastrous consequences for neighboring Georgia 15 years ago), Washington, and the region itself, would be better off if American involvement instead demonstrated its commitment to ensuring human rights.
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When under pressure, people revert to their true natures. And insofar as political leadership goes, in the final session of the 2020-24 term of the Louisiana what we saw from the Legislature leadership was ugly, hopefully the last gasp of a mentality that has left Louisiana in tatters.
In the House of Representatives, Republicans Speaker Clay Schexnayder and Pro Tem Tanner Magee have come under much fire for their handling of the session. It all crystallized in the last week of the session, when they muscled through a resolution allowing state government to spend, as opposed to banking, about 10 percent more of transitory revenue generation, and in the final half-hour of the session, when most of the spending bills were presented for members' approval with hardly any of them knowing any details about what they were asked on which to vote.
This failure of leadership occurred at two levels, beginning with their unwise squandering of dollars ahead of a bleaker revenue picture. The Revenue Estimating Conference foresees fiscal year taxes, licenses, and fees falling from $15.277 billion in fiscal year 2024 to $15.103 billion in FY 2025, $14.666 billion in FY 2026, then a bump upwards to $14.936 billion in FY 2027 – a drop of over a billion bucks from FY 2023 just wrapping up. Given that new commitments (at least in intention) of around $320 million annually were doled out for education alone starting in 2024, maintaining this total level of spending will be difficult.
This leads to consideration whether this budget isn't some kind of poison pill left to the next governor and Legislature. Frontrunner GOP Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry has made no secret of wanting to rein in government, and neither is hidden the distaste that Schexnayder and Republican Sen. Pres. Page Cortez have for Landry and those legislators sympathetic to Landry's right-sizing goal, who certainly would gain considerable power in the Legislature with Landry in office.
Of course, one goal with the bloated budget was to allow its backers to puff their chests out with pride in to leave in the history books or as a resume-builder for future elections the fact that they "gave" stuff to the people (as if one can be made a gift of your own resources; it's not legislators' money, it's the people's) – a legacy of Louisiana's liberal populism where politicians seeks to hoard as much money as they can then distribute it as a way that makes themselves seem indispensable to the wellbeing of the polity. But another motive also was using it as a tool of payback against those with a different vision.
It's all right to have competing visions, where the Schexnayders and Magees of the world take the grasshopper version of blowing it all now in the face of a certain looming winter, and the fiscal conservatives who voted against the enabling resolution to do this adhere to the ant version of saving to deal with that future. Realize as well a good portion of the excess spending authority went to non-priority items, mainly transportation infrastructure, while $237 million went towards more critical things such as stabilizing property insurance markets and coastal protection – which could have been afforded without busting the cap. There absolutely was no need to spend so much at this time.
For their trouble, most of the fiscal conservatives had Schexnayder yank their capital projects from the supplemental bill after the successful vote to violate the cap. This turned into a tag team effort when liberal big spender Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards subsequently used his line item vetoes on those in the regular capital outlay bill.
The grasshopper view is a flawed vision and in and of itself may disqualify those who follow it from being entrusted with elective office. It's why Louisiana has lurched from fiscal crisis to fiscal crisis historically while remaining relatively overtaxed, which manifested in the Edwards era – who backed Schexnayder for Speaker and with whom has cooperated in keeping bloated government – as declining population and stagnant job and wage growth contrary to most other states.
But truly reprehensibly about these people is their avoidance of taking responsibility for this and trying to blame others for their failures. This excuse-making stems not just from bad policy-making, but from bad leadership as an extension of trying to explain away policy mistakes. Remarks by both Schexnayder and Magee after the session attempted to address widespread complaints about budget priorities and the zero transparency involved in its promulgation that hardly was distinguishable from budgeting in the heyday of the Soviet Union.
In a radio interview, Magee (like Cortez before him) adopted the spousal abuser role by blaming the victims in causing the budgetary chaos, saying "You have a group of lawmakers who are more interested in making headlines about obstructing government than they are about doing the people's work." Note the breath-taking arrogance of this remark: equating a desire to spend less as "obstructing … the people's work" and attempting to cancel legitimation of opposition to his big-spending agenda, as well as the avoidance of responsibility for his cabal's cutting $100 million out of health care in the operating budget and $136 million out of Jimmie Davis Bridge funding in the capital outlay budget.
In media remarks, Schexnayder attempted even more vigorously to distance himself from accusations of failure to budget responsibly and transparently. Also assuming the spousal abuser role by calling those who voted against raising the cap "a small group of blockers, instead of helpers" – similar to Magee voicing a sentiment that trying to keep government spending under control was illegitimate – he mischaracterized outside assessments of the budget in trying to defend his actions as the chief budget architect (and who sat on the conference committees that approved removing dissenters' projects, as did Magee, and the bridge money). "Someone sent me PAR [Public Affairs Research Council] and CABL[Council for a Better Louisiana]'s evaluations of the budget. The budget is a good budget; a good, conservative budget that moves our state forward. That has excellent projects in it."
PAR did say the operating, capital, and supplemental bills had "many state priorities and positive developments," but also noted that those "were overshadowed by the messy way lawmakers handled the spending of taxpayer dollars" and "lawmakers wasted tens of millions on favored projects for their districts that don't represent state priorities. They continued unnecessary giveaways through tax break programs with uncertainty about their long-term impact on the state treasury. And they stripped hundreds of millions of dollars from the state health department with no idea what the impact might be on services to the poor, elderly and people with developmental disabilities."
CABL noted that "lawmakers did enact spending bills that make many wise investments in the future of Louisiana" where for the "most part it spends non-recurring revenue on one-time expenses, mostly infrastructure projects." But it also declared "there needs to be more time and transparency when making decisions over such huge sums of money" and "It also remains to be seen what the fiscal impact of this session's spending will mean in a couple of years when some current taxes are removed from the State General Fund."
Regarding these and other critiques of how the process was handled, Schexnayder followed the playbook by saying this could have been avoided if only the fiscal conservatives hadn't dissented. But that's a failure of leadership in that only at the last minute relatively speaking did Schexnayder convince enough of them to back a breach – by promising to retain the majority of dollars to pay down unfunded pensions and use much of the authorized excess on one-time expenses – and then he had an entire day after to clear up everything. Maybe if he hadn't spent so much time trying to find ways to punish dissenters he might not have produced such shoddy results.
And his laughable assertion that dissenters deliberately disengaged themselves from the process so they didn't know about contents is absurd on its face since he went out of his way to punish them, a style of leadership that doesn't invite participation of your opponents. Nor does it address similar complaints from others who voted to bust the cap.
These attitudes and behaviors by Schexnayder and Magee, as representations of legislative leadership and policy-making, reveal everything that is wrong with Louisiana and why it has fallen so far behind other states by squandering its resources. Making mistakes and blaming others, neither wisely nor warily, only continues a long history state politicians of doing the same. As for the future as they and others who think like them seek elective office, voters should know Schexnayder and Magee are the problem and having nothing to do with the solution.
El Cambio Climático (CC) es uno de los grandes desafíos actuales de la humanidad. Es una de las principales amenazas para el desarrollo sostenible, siendo el origen de importantes impactos económicos, sociales y ambientales. En este contexto, varios países han asumido compromisos para un desarrollo sostenible relacionados con el cumplimiento de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS) de la Organización para las Naciones Unidas (ONU). En el mismo sentido, los países han asumido la necesidad de generar y exigir normas de producción sostenible y otras acciones orientadas todas a reducir las emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero (GEI) a la atmósfera. Parte central de estas actuaciones promueven cambios tecnológicos orientados a alcanzar una mayor eficiencia energética. Chile no ha quedado ajeno a los procesos mencionados y busca contribuir activamente a la mitigación de emisiones de GEI y a la lucha contra el CC. Para ello ha desarrollado políticas y acciones entre las que destacan: mantener un registro actualizado y periódico de emisiones de GEI por sector productivo, fomentar el cambio de recursos energéticos convencionales y contaminantes hacia el uso de energías renovables no convencionales (ERNC), la reforestación y restauración de bosques, entre otras actividades. Para el positivo desarrollo y resultado de estas políticas y acciones señaladas, aún permanecen numerosas cuestiones no resueltas. Las investigaciones realizadas en el marco de la presente tesis contribuyen a avanzar en este camino compartiendo el objetivo general de desarrollar un análisis económico a distintas escalas de la reducción de la contaminación identificando los factores inductores e inhibidores de la misma así como el uso de nuevas tecnologías energéticas para la calefacción y refrigeración del sector residencial en Chile. Todo ello orientado a favorecer un desarrollo económico sostenible. Dos son las investigaciones centrales a modo de pilares de esta tesis doctoral. El primer trabajo tiene como objetivo evaluar los aportes mitigadores o contaminantes de los sectores productivos de Chile para el periodo 1990 a 2013, con un énfasis especial en identificar el papel del sector forestal en esta ecuación. Esto responde al hecho de que el sector se considera como una variable proxy de las actividades de uso de la tierra, cambio de uso de la tierra y silvicultura (UTCUTS). Junto con ello también calcula los pesos y el papel de cada uno de estos sectores así como de otros factores de descomposición económica, energética y demográfica. El segundo pilar de esta tesis doctoral descansa en una investigación a escala local en la ciudad de Temuco perteneciente a la región de La Araucanía. La ciudad de Temuco tiene un alto uso de leña para calefacción que alcanza al 80% de los hogares. También es una ciudad que ha sido declarada zona saturada de partículas MP 10 y 2,5. La investigación es un aporte a la evaluación de políticas ambientales de Chile, específicamente al Plan de descontaminación de Temuco que incluye la medida de cambio de estufa, la cual aún no ha logrado establecerse como la opción preferente para la comunidad. Por tanto generar este tipo de información es altamente relevante para dar conocimiento a la población y los responsables políticos del Estado de los efectos de esta iniciativas y ver las posibles mejoras que se les pueden hacer, además de utilizar la información para proponer prioridades en la aplicación de nuevas políticas de descontaminación. Ambas investigaciones desarrolladas para la elaboración de esta tesis ofrecen información relevante en la evaluación de políticas públicas a distinta escala. También prueban la aplicabilidad de metodologías de análisis económico como herramientas de valoración, identificación y seguimiento de los efectos económicos de las acciones evaluadas y orientadas a la mitigación de emisiones de GEI. El proceso conjunto de investigaciones generadas ofrece también como contribución a la literatura una valoración y validación del papel trascendental que juega el sector forestal en el desarrollo sostenible, tanto con efectos positivos a escala país, como negativos a escala local por el mal uso del recurso. Esta situación es relevante si consideramos que Chile no presenta políticas claras asociadas a un desarrollo sostenible del sector forestal a pesar de su relevancia dada la importancia de la superficie forestal en el conjunto del territorio de este país. ; Climate change (CC) is one of the great current challenges of humanity, being one of the main threats to sustainable development, producing great economic, social and environmental consequences. In this context, several countries have generated commitments for sustainable development, for example: encourage compliance with the of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations (UN), generate and demand sustainable production standards and other actions associated with reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into the atmosphere aimed at achieving greater energy efficiency. In the same way, the countries have assumed the need to generate and demand sustainable production standards and other actions, aimed at all, to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions into the atmosphere. A central part of these actions promotes technological changes aimed at achieving greater energy efficiency. Chile has not been oblivious and seeks to contribute to the mitigation of climate change, for which it has developed policies and actions aimed at maintaining an updated GHG registry by productive sector, promoting energy change, the use of renewable energies Unconventional (NCRE), reforestation and forest restoration, among other activities. For the positive development and result of these policies and actions indicated, many unresolved issues still remain. The research carried out within the framework of this thesis contributes to advance in this path, sharing the general objective of developing an economic analysis at different scales of pollution reduction, identifying the factors that induce and inhibit it, as well as the use of new technologies energy for heating and cooling in the residential sector in Chile. All this aimed at promoting sustainable economic development. There are two central investigations as pillars of this doctoral thesis. The first work have as aim to evaluate the mitigating or polluting contributions of the productive sectors of Chile for the period 1990 to 2013, with a special emphasis on identifying the role of the forestry sector in this equation. This responds to the fact that the sector is considered as a proxy variable for land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities. Along with this, it also calculates the weights and the role of each of these sectors, as well as 6 other decomposition factors economic, energetic and demographic. The second pillar of this doctoral thesis rests on local research in the city of Temuco, La Araucanía region. The city of Temuco has a high use of firewood for heating that reaches 80% of homes. It is also a city that has been declared a zone saturated with MP 10 and 2.5 particles. The research is a contribution to the evaluation of Chile's environmental policies, specifically to the Temuco decontamination plan that includes the stove change measure, which has not yet been established as the preferred option for the community. Therefore, generating this type of information is highly relevant to inform the population and the political leaders of the State of the effects of these initiatives and to see the possible improvements that can be made to them, in addition to using the information to propose priorities for implementation. of new decontamination policies. Both research developed for the elaboration of this thesis offer relevant information in the evaluation of public policies at different scales. They also test the applicability of economic analysis methodologies as tools for evaluating, identifying and monitoring the economic effects of the actions evaluated and aimed at mitigating GHG emissions. The joint process of research generated also offers as a contribution to the literature an assessment and validation of the transcendental role that the forestry sector plays in sustainable development, both with positive effects at the country level and negative effects at the local level due to the misuse of the resource. This situation is relevant if we consider that Chile does not present clear policies associated with the sustainable development of the forestry sector despite its relevance given the importance of the forest area in the whole territory of this country.
Energy is at the heart of the climate crisis—but also at the heart of any efforts for climate change mitigation. Energy consumption is namely responsible for approximately three quarters of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Therefore, central to any serious plans to stave off a climate catastrophe is a major transformation of the world's energy system, which would move society away from fossil fuels and towards a net-zero energy future. Considering that fossil fuels are also a major source of air pollutant emissions, the energy transition has important implications for air quality as well, and thus also for human and environmental health. Both Europe and Germany have set the goal of becoming GHG neutral by 2050, and moreover have demonstrated their deep commitment to a comprehensive energy transition. Two of the most significant developments in energy policy over the past decade have been the interest in expansion of shale gas and hydrogen, which accordingly have garnered great interest and debate among public, private and political actors. In this context, sound scientific information can play an important role by informing stakeholder dialogue and future research investments, and by supporting evidence-based decision-making. This thesis examines anticipated environmental impacts from possible, relevant changes in the European energy system, in order to impart valuable insight and fill critical gaps in knowledge. Specifically, it investigates possible future shale gas development in Germany and the United Kingdom (UK), as well as a hypothetical, complete transition to hydrogen mobility in Germany. Moreover, it assesses the impacts on GHG and air pollutant emissions, and on tropospheric ozone (O3) air quality. The analysis is facilitated by constructing emission scenarios and performing air quality modeling via the Weather Research and Forecasting model coupled with chemistry (WRF-Chem). The work of this thesis is presented in three research papers. The first paper finds that methane (CH4) leakage rates from upstream shale gas development in Germany and the UK would range between 0.35% and 1.36% in a realistic, business-as-usual case, while they would be significantly lower - between 0.08% and 0.15% - in an optimistic, strict regulation and high compliance case, thus demonstrating the value and potential of measures to substantially reduce emissions. Yet, while the optimistic case is technically feasible, it is unlikely that the practices and technologies assumed would be applied and accomplished on a systematic, regular basis, owing to economics and limited monitoring resources. The realistic CH4 leakage rates estimated in this study are comparable to values reported by studies carried out in the US and elsewhere. In contrast, the optimistic rates are similar to official CH4 leakage data from upstream gas production in Germany and in the UK. Considering that there is a lack of systematic, transparent and independent reports supporting the official values, this study further highlights the need for more research efforts in this direction. Compared with national energy sector emissions, this study suggests that shale gas emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) could be significant, though relatively insignificant for other air pollutants. Similar to CH4, measures could be effective for reducing VOCs emissions. The second paper shows that VOC and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions from a future shale gas industry in Germany and the UK have potentially harmful consequences for European O3 air quality on both the local and regional scale. The results indicate a peak increase in maximum daily 8-hour average O3 (MDA8) ranging from 3.7 µg m-3 to 28.3 µg m-3. Findings suggest that shale gas activities could result in additional exceedances of MDA8 at a substantial percentage of regulatory measurement stations both locally and in neighboring and distant countries, with up to circa one third of stations in the UK and one fifth of stations in Germany experiencing additional exceedances. Moreover, the results reveal that the shale gas impact on the cumulative health-related metric SOMO35 (annual Sum of Ozone Means Over 35 ppb) could be substantial, with a maximum increase of circa 28%. Overall, the findings suggest that shale gas VOC emissions could play a critical role in O3 enhancement, while NOx emissions would contribute to a lesser extent. Thus, the results indicate that stringent regulation of VOC emissions would be important in the event of future European shale gas development to minimize deleterious health outcomes. The third paper demonstrates that a hypothetical, complete transition of the German vehicle fleet to hydrogen fuel cell technology could contribute substantially to Germany's climate and air quality goals. The results indicate that if the hydrogen were to be produced via renewable-powered water electrolysis (green hydrogen), German carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2eq) emissions would decrease by 179 MtCO2eq annually, though if electrolysis were powered by the current electricity mix, emissions would instead increase by 95 MtCO2eq annually. The findings generally reveal a notable anticipated decrease in German energy emissions of regulated air pollutants. The results suggest that vehicular hydrogen demand is 1000 PJ annually, which would require between 446 TWh and 525 TWh for electrolysis, hydrogen transport and storage. When only the heavy duty vehicle segment (HDVs) is shifted to green hydrogen, the results of this thesis show that vehicular hydrogen demand drops to 371 PJ, while a deep emissions cut is still realized (-57 MtCO2eq), suggesting that HDVs are a low-hanging fruit for contributing to decarbonization of the German road transport sector with hydrogen energy. ; Energie ist der Kern der Klimakrise—aber auch der Kern jeglicher Bemühungen zur Eindämmung des Klimawandels. Der Energieverbrauch ist heute für ungefähr drei Viertel der weltweiten Treibhausgasemissionen verantwortlich. Grundlegend für einen ernsthaft gemeinten Plan eine Klimakatastrophe abzuwenden ist daher eine umfassende Umgestaltung des weltweiten Energiesystems von fossilen Brennstoffen weg in Richtung zukünftige Netto-Null-Emissionen. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass fossile Brennstoffe auch eine Hauptquelle für Luftschadstoffemissionen sind, hat die Energiewende wichtige Auswirkungen auf die Luftqualität und damit auch auf die Gesundheit von Mensch und Umwelt. Sowohl Europa als auch Deutschland haben sich zum Ziel gesetzt, bis 2050 treibhausgasneutral zu werden und zeigen darüber hinaus ihr tiefes Engagement für eine umfassende Energiewende. Zwei der wichtigsten Entwicklungen in der Energiepolitik im letzten Jahrzehnt waren das Interesse an der Ausweitung von Schiefergas und Wasserstoff, das entsprechend großes Interesse und große Diskussionen in der Öffentlichkeit, im Privaten und in der Politik erzeugt hat. In diesem Zusammenhang können fundierte wissenschaftliche Informationen eine wichtige Rolle spielen, indem sie Interessenvertreter und zukünftige Forschungsinvestitionen informieren und evidenzbasierte Entscheidungen unterstützen. Diese Doktorarbeit untersucht die Umweltauswirkungen möglicher, relevanter Veränderungen im europäischen Energiesystem, um wertvolle Erkenntnisse zu vermitteln und kritische Wissenslücken zu schließen. Insbesondere werden mögliche zukünftige Schiefergasentwicklungen in Deutschland und im Vereinigten Königreich (UK) sowie ein hypothetischer, vollständiger Übergang zur Wasserstoffmobilität in Deutschland untersucht. Darüber hinaus werden die Auswirkungen auf die Treibhausgas- und Luftschadstoffemissionen sowie auf die Luftqualität von troposphärischem Ozon (O3) bewertet. Die Analyse wird durch die Erstellung von Emissionsszenarien und die Durchführung von Luftqualitätsmodellen über die Chemie-Version des "Weather Research and Forecasting Model" (WRF-Chem) erleichtert. Die Forschung dieser Doktorarbeit wird in drei wissenschaftlichen Artikeln vorgestellt. Der erste Artikel beschreibt, dass die Methan (CH4)-Leckraten aus einer vorgelagerten Schiefergasproduktion in Deutschland und Großbritannien in einem gewöhnlichen Fall zwischen 0.35% und 1.36% liegen würden, während sie in einem optimistischen, streng regulierten Fall signifikant zwischen 0.08% und 0.15% niedriger wären, und zeigt damit die Bedeutung und das Potenzial von Maßnahmen zur wesentlichen Reduzierung der Emissionen auf. Obwohl der optimistische Fall technisch machbar ist, ist es aufgrund der Wirtschaftlichkeit und der begrenzten Überwachungsressourcen unwahrscheinlich, dass die angenommenen Praktiken und Technologien systematisch und regelmäßig angewendet und durchgeführt werden. Die in dieser Studie geschätzten realistischen CH4-Leckraten sind vergleichbar mit Werten, die in Studien in den USA und anderswo angegeben wurden. Im Gegensatz dazu ähneln die optimistischen Raten den offziellen CH4- Leckraten aus der vorgelagerten Gasproduktion in Deutschland und Großbritannien. In Anbetracht des Mangels an systematischen, transparenten und unabhängigen Berichten, die die offziellen Werte stützen, unterstreicht diese Studie die Notwendigkeit weiterer Forschungsanstrengungen in diese Richtung. Im Vergleich zu den Emissionen des nationalen Energiesektors deutet diese Studie darauf hin, dass die Schiefergasemissionen flüchtiger organischer Verbindungen (VOC) erheblich sein könnten, andere Luftschadstoffe jedoch relativ unbedeutend bleiben. Ähnlich wie bei CH4 könnten Maßnahmen zur Reduzierung der VOC-Emissionen wirksam sein. Der zweite Artikel beschreibt, dass VOC- und Stickoxidemissionen (NOx) einer zukünftigen Schiefergasindustrie in Deutschland und Großbritannien potenziell schädliche Folgen für die europäische O3-Luftqualität sowohl auf lokaler als auch auf regionaler Ebene haben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen einen Spitzenanstieg des maximalen täglichen 8-Stunden-Durchschnitts von O3 (MDA8) im Bereich von 3.7 µg m-3 bis 28.3 µg m-3. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Schiefergasaktivitäten zu zusätzlichen Grenzwertüberschreitungen des MDA8 bei einem erheblichen Prozentsatz der regulatorischen Messstationen sowohl vor Ort als auch in Nachbar- und entfernten Ländern führen können, wobei bei bis zu etwa einem Drittel der Stationen in Großbritannien und einem Fünftel der Stationen in Deutschland zusätzliche Überschreitungen auftreten. Darüber hinaus zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Auswirkungen von Schiefergas auf die kumulative gesundheitsbezogene Metrik SOMO35 (jährliche Summe des Ozonmittel über 35 ppb) mit einem maximalen Anstieg von ca. 28% erheblich sein könnten. Insgesamt deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass die VOC-Emissionen von Schiefergas eine entscheidende Rolle bei der O3-Erhöhung spielen könnten, während die NOx-Emissionen in geringerem Maße dazu beitragen würden. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen daher, dass eine strenge Regulierung der VOC-Emissionen im Falle einer künftigen europäischen Schiefergasentwicklung wichtig ist, um schädliche gesundheitliche Folgen zu minimieren. Der dritte Artikel beschreibt, dass ein hypothetischer, vollständiger Übergang der deutschen Fahrzeugflotte zur Wasserstoff-Brennstoffzellentechnologie wesentlich zu Deutschlands Klima- und Luftqualitätszielen beitragen kann. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass bei einer Erzeugung des Wasserstoffs durch erneuerbare Wasserelektrolyse (grüner Wasserstoff) die Emissionen des deutschen Kohlendioxidäquivalents (CO2eq) jährlich um 179 MtCO2eq sinken würden. Wenn die Elektrolyse jedoch mit dem aktuellen Strommix betrieben würde, würden sich die Emissionen stattdessen um jährlich 95 MtCO2eq erhöhen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen im Allgemeinen einen bemerkenswerten Rückgang der Luftschadstoffemissionen in Deutschland. Weiterhin legen sie nahe, dass der Wasserstoffbedarf von Fahrzeugen 1000 PJ pro Jahr beträgt, was zwischen 446 TWh und 525 TWh für Elektrolyse, Wasserstofftransport und -speicherung erfordern würde. Wenn nur das Segment der Schwerlastfahrzeuge (HDVs) auf grünen Wasserstoff umgestellt wird, zeigen unsere Ergebnisse, dass der Wasserstoffbedarf der Fahrzeuge auf 371 PJ sinkt, während immer noch eine tiefgreifende Emissionsreduzierung erzielt wird (-57 MtCO2eq). Dies zeigt, dass die Umstellung der HDVs auf grünen Wasserstoff einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur Dekarbonisierung des deutschen Straßenverkehrs leisten kann.
El Estado colombiano debe generar estrategias que le permitan prestar un servicio de salud de manera oportuna, eficaz y con calidad, en las regiones más apartadas del territorio, donde el acceso a este derecho es limitado. Pensando en este gran reto se propone un plan de negocios que tiene como misión implementar un sistema de asistencia sanitaria a través de un "Buque Hospital", aportando herramientas al Estado Colombiano para el cumplimiento de su deber constitucional establecido en el Artículo 49 de la Constitución Política de Colombia de1991 "La atención de la salud y el saneamiento ambiental son servicios públicos a cargo del Estado. Se garantiza a todas las personas el acceso a los servicios de promoción, protección y recuperación de la salud" y a lo establecido en la Ley Estatutaria 1751 de 2015 donde obliga al Estado a garantizar y proteger el debido cumplimiento del derecho a la salud de los colombianos, mediante la adopción de decisiones que no conlleven al deterioro de la salud de la población y de acciones que resulten un daño en la salud de los pacientes. Esta propuesta pretende a través de programas de prevención y promoción lograr apoyar la gestión del Estado Colombiano para mejorar la calidad de vida de las comunidades más alejadas que carecen de un servicio de salud adecuado, y pretende focalizarse inicialmente en las poblaciones costeras del departamento del Chocó como mercado objetivo; lo anterior teniendo en cuenta la crisis social que actualmente padece este departamento, así como sus condiciones geográficas y de infraestructura que limitan a nivel marítimo y fluvial el acceso a la mayoría de sus poblaciones. De igual forma, como lo destacan diferentes medios de comunicación (Revista Semana - 2016), el Chocó es uno de los departamentos con mayor cantidad de personas con necesidades básicas insatisfechas reflejadas en los altos índices de pobreza, sobre todo por el precario sistema de salud con el que cuenta. Ante esto, se requiere de manera urgente la intervención del Estado a través de un plan de choque, apoyado por todas instituciones del sector público y privado, pero además gestado desde el nivel central, para evadir los problemas de corrupción que abundan en esta región del país, buscando aliviar y solucionar en parte una de sus más grades falencias sociales: La salud. Se propone que este proyecto sea liderado y direccionado por la Armada Nacional de Colombia (ARC), institución que asumiría la responsabilidad de su puesta en marcha y ejecución, a través de un Buque Hospital diseñado con características especiales para llegar a estas zonas de difícil acceso y con capacidad de prestar atención medica hospitalaria hasta el Nivel II. Aunado a lo anterior, también se propone como parte del proceso de gestión para su financiamiento buscar el apoyo de los sectores públicos y privados, a fin de garantizar la sostenibilidad en el tiempo. En síntesis, este proyecto pretende desarrollar una propuesta de negocios que implemente un sistema de asistencia sanitaria a través de un Buque Hospital, que mediante un adecuado planeamiento tendrá la capacidad de atender de manera periódica y rotativa las poblaciones más necesitadas de este servicio en el departamento del Choco, contribuyendo a la satisfacción del derecho fundamental de la salud, en zonas actualmente inaccesibles. Ante este panorama, resultaría interesante apostarle a su viabilidad, la cual sin duda va a requerir una inversión significativa para su proceso de implementación, pero con el compromiso de aliados y la gestión de diferentes entidades, será fácil llevarlo adelante, para que a través de la prestación de un servicio de alta calidad ayude a evitar o disminuir la pérdida de vidas humanas por la carencia de un servicio de atención en salud.Para la elaboración del presente plan de negocios se utiliza la metodología propuesta por SCORE, que es una asociación sin ánimo de lucro, dedicada a ayudar a las pequeñas empresas a despegar, crecer y alcanzar sus objetivos a través de la educación y la tutoría. Tiene una red de 10.000 voluntarios que asesoran la administración de pequeños negocios en los Estados Unidos, y ha ayudado a más de 10 millones de empresarios, a través de sus mentores, talleres y recursos educativos desde el año de 1964. Esta metodología consiste en el diligenciamiento de plantillas que van direccionando paso a paso los aspectos que se deben tener en cuenta para el desarrollo del plan de negocios. ; The Colombian State must generate strategies that allow it to provide a health service in a timely, efficient and quality way, in the most remote regions of the territory, where Access is limited. Thinking about this great challenge proposes a business plan that has as a mission to implement a health care system through a "Hospital ship", Providing tools to the Colombian State for the fulfillment of its constitutional duty established in article 49 of the Political Constitution of Colombia of 1991 "health care and environmental sanitation are public services in charge of the state. All people are guaranteed access to health promotion, protection and recovery services "and to the provisions of statutory law 1751 of 2015 where it obliges the state to guarantee and protect the proper fulfillment of the right to the health of the Colombian people, by means of the adoption of decisions that do not lead to the deterioration of the health of the population and of actions that result a harm in the health of the patients. This proposal aims through prevention and promotion programs to support the management of the Colombian State to improve the quality of life of the remote communities that lack an adequate health service, and aims initially to focus on the Coastal populations of the Chocó department as the primary market; This is taking into account the social crisis currently suffered by this department, as well as its geographical and infrastructural conditions that limit the access to the majority of its populations to the maritime and fluvial level. Similarly, as highlighted by different media (Revista Semana-2016), Chocó is one of the departments with the largest number of people with unsatisfied basic needs reflected in the high rates of poverty, Especially because of the precarious health system that counts. In this way, the intervention of the State is urgently required through a plan of shock, supported by all public and private sector institutions, but also gestated from the central level, to avoid the problems of corruption that abound in this region of the Country, seeking to alleviate and partly solve one of its most social flaws: health. It is proposed that this project be led and directed by the National Navy of Colombia (ARC), institution that would assume responsibility for its start-up and execution, through a Hospital ship designed with special characteristics to reach these Difficult-to-access areas with the ability to provide hospital medical care up to level II. In addition to the above, it is also proposed as part of the management process for its financing to seek the support of the sectors Public and private, in order to ensure sustainability over time. In short, this project aims to develop a business proposal that implements a system of health care through a Hospital ship, which through adequate planning will have the capacity to serve periodically and rotary Populations most in need of this service in the Department of Choco, contributing to the satisfaction of the fundamental right of the health In areas currently inaccessible. In view of this panorama, it would be interesting to bet on its viability, which will no doubt require a significant investment for its implementation process, but with the commitment of allies and the management of different entities, it will be easy to carry it forward, So that through the provision of a high quality service it helps to avoid or reduce the loss of human life due to the lack of a health care service. For the elaboration of this business plan we use the methodology proposed by SCORE, which is a non-profit association, dedicated to helping small businesses to take off, grow and achieve their goals through education and mentoring. It has a network of 10,000 volunteers advising Small Business Administration in the United States, and has helped more than 10 Millions of entrepreneurs, through their mentors, workshops and educational resources since the year of 1964. This methodology consists in the diligence of templates that are directing step by step the aspects that must be taken into account for the development of the business plan.
Parker County proposes to build the eastern segment of a loop north of the City of Weatherford, in Parker County, Texas). This portion of the loop, designated East Loop, is approximately 6.65 miles long. It begins at the intersection of the eastern terminus of the Ric Williamson Memorial Highway (or West Loop) at State Highway 51 north of the city. The proposed route continues eastward for approximately 4 miles, crosses Farm-to-Market 730 before turning south for approximately 2 miles, crosses US Highway 180 at Center Point Road, and follows Center Point Road to terminate at Interstate Highway 20. The East Loop project is owned and funded by Parker County. As a political subdivision of the State of Texas, Parker County is required to comply with the Antiquities Code of Texas (9 Texas Natural Resources Code 191). A permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is also required for the proposed project. Therefore, the USACE, as a federal agency, has the responsibility for complying with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), as amended (Section 106). Section 106 requires consideration of the effects of the proposed project on properties listed in, or determined eligible for, the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP), and ultimately designation as a State Antiquities Landmark (SAL). Freese and Nichols, Inc., the design and environmental consultant to Parker County, contracted with Cox|McLain Environmental Consulting, Inc. (CMEC), to conduct the intensive archeological and reconnaissance historic resources surveys necessary for compliance with the Antiquities Code and Section 106. Melissa M. Green (Principal Investigator) and Brett Lang carried out the archeological survey for Parker County under Texas Antiquities Permit 8127, and Emily Reed and Izabella Dennis conducted the historic resources survey; all are staff of CMEC. Fieldwork was conducted in September 2017. Widths of the proposed roadway vary between 120 and 390 feet, but the average width is 200 feet. The archeological area of potential effects (APE) consists of the entire 195.39-acre footprint of new location roadway and a 600-foot long, 30-foot wide drainage ditch easement added to the project for a total 196.62-acre APE. The historic resources APE consists of a 300-foot-wide buffer area around the proposed project corridor. The APE is located primarily on uplands but crosses Willow Creek, Holder Branch, Underwood Branch, and a number of small intermittent channels. The land is mostly undeveloped with some residential/commercial areas, particularly near each terminus, that will be impacted. Ground surfaces within the APE were mostly covered in grasses, allowing for some limited visibility ranging from 0 to 30 percent, though ground visibility in forested areas and eroded pastures allowed for higher ground visibility at 70 to 100 percent. Existing impacts to the project corridor include residential and commercial development, buried utilities and other infrastructures associated with the developments, oil and gas production and storage, stock tank construction, livestock grazing or training, and erosion resulting from all of the above. A total of 48 shovel test units were excavated judgmentally across the area of potential effects; 36 were sterile for cultural materials and 12 were associated with sites. Initially, right-of-entry was not allowed on several individual parcels representing approximately 2.14 miles (48.29 acres) of the proposed corridor during the original survey in September 2017, but were investigated in June and July of 2018 once right-of-entry was granted. Potential for prehistoric archeological deposits in the area of potential effects is considered low, and the potential for historic deposits is considered moderate. The proposed roadway corridor partially impacts previously recorded sites 41PR163/41PR164, 41PR165, and 41PR166, as well as the NRHP-listed Byron Farmstead Historic District. The district comprises 85.5 acres with three recorded archeological sites (41PR163, 41PR164, now combined, and 41PR166), or contributing elements, within its boundary. All of these sites were revisited during the survey. Although located outside of the project corridor, site 41PR163, the original log cabin of the Byron Farmstead, and site 41PR164, the later bungalow on the farmstead were visited due to their close proximity to the project and to help assess the indirect impacts to these sites and contributing elements of the historic district. Based on the field visit, the boundaries of sites 41PR163 and 41PR164 have been adjusted and combined and now include a previously unrecorded dairy location, but contributing element to the district, within the new combined site limit (41PR163/41PR164). Since site 41PR163/41PR164 is already a contributing element of the Byron Farmstead Historic District, it is recommended for designation as a SAL. Site 41PR166 is the dairy operation owned by a separate family member and not originally a contributing element to the district. The site is mostly intact and retains most of its integrity. It has now been recommended as a contributing element to the historic district, and ultimately for SAL designation, demonstrating the long-time use of the larger property for and family commitment to cattle and dairying. Site 41PR166 will be partially impacted by the proposed road corridor. In addition to the archeological sites located on the Byron Farmstead Historic District, there are three contributing buildings, two contributing structures, one contributing site, and one noncontributing site. For unknown reasons, an additional 13 resources located within the historic district's boundary were not documented in the NRHP nomination form or assigned contributing/non-contributing status. As a result of this survey, eight of the previously undocumented resources are recommended as contributing and five are recommended as non-contributing to the Byron Farmstead Historic District. Due to the construction of the proposed roadway through the Byron Farmstead Historic District, there would be an adverse effect on the district by diminishing the integrity of feeling, setting, and association. Although previously recorded site 41PR165, remnants of a small farmstead, would be partially impacted by the proposed roadway corridor, the site as a whole was not investigated during this survey so it is unknown if any of the remaining components would add any additional information concerning cattle ranching in the area. Therefore, its NRHP eligibility or designation as an SAL is recommended as unknown. One additional historic site, 41PR185, was recorded during the survey. This site is a mid- to late twentieth century farmstead on a hilltop west of Holder Branch measuring 35 meters east/west by 55 meters north/south. The site is composed of a collapsed rock root cellar, rock and mortar pile, six fence posts, and large sections of sheet metal siding. The site will be entirely impacted by the proposed construction and is recommended as not eligible for listing in the NRHP or for SAL designation. All materials (notes, photographs, administrative documents, and other project data) generated from this work will be housed at the Center for Archaeological Studies at Texas State University in San Marcos, where they will be made permanently available to future researchers per 13 Texas Administrative Code 26.16-17. CMEC submitted the previous version of this report to the Texas Historical Commission (THC) on March 1, 2018, for review. In the response letter dated March 30, 2018, THC concurred with the eligibility recommendations for the historic resources and requested additional information regarding recorded archeological sites. THC also requested further review of the applicability of Section 106 in relationship to the USACE areas of jurisdiction (Appendix B). Since that time, USACE has indicated Section 106 is applicable to the Byron Farmstead Historic District, and CMEC has been granted access to previously inaccessible parcels to complete the archeological survey. This version of the report has been updated to provide additional information from the archeological survey and to reflect the applicability of Section 106, including an assessment of effects to historic properties and archeological sites. Continued coordination between the USACE, Parker County, the City of Weatherford, and the THC is anticipated in order to satisfy all Section 106 requirements associated with this project but is not detailed in this report. If any unanticipated cultural materials or deposits are found at any stage of clearing, preparation, or construction, the work should cease and THC personnel should be notified immediately. The THC concurred with the results and recommendations of this report on December 12, 2018.
Este documento titulado "Consideración del subsuelo en el ordenamiento territorial" es una propuesta metodológica para la gestión del ordenamiento territorial de las regiones, haciendo énfasis en el subsuelo. Se demuestra como éste ocupa un papel determinante dentro de los criterios de construcción de propuestas, escenarios y finalmente en el desarrollo humano. Tres casos de estudios son desarrollados. Se tienen varias metodologías e infinidad de casos dentro del estado del arte que se revisó para el ordenamiento territorial. Mucho de lo reportado hace hincapié en lo urbano, turístico, económico, legal, político, cultural, entre muchas variables. Sin embargo, el subsuelo, la geología, los recursos minerales y las restricciones naturales allí presentes, son poco considerados en la mayoría de planes, metodologías y sobre todo en los casos de estudio. Esas son razones para proponer una metodología que haga énfasis en el subsuelo y que no solo se quede en lo conceptual, sino que se muestre con ejemplos concretos. El subsuelo estaría conformado por los recursos minerales e hídricos subterráneos, y también por las restricciones naturales, como la sismicidad, los volcanes, y deslizamientos, entre otros. Ello a su vez tiene implicaciones con la edafología, con las geoformas, con la geografía, con lo biótico (flora y fauna) y lo antrópico (poblacionales, educación, salud y cultura). Así que podría evidenciarse que considerar el subsuelo es fundamental dentro de cualquier proceso de ordenamiento del territorio. El subsuelo debería estar siempre presente dentro de las variables a considerar, ya que representa el largo plazo. El hecho de que algunos proyectos, ciudades, y regiones hayan sido planificados u ordenados sin considerar el subsuelo, y no hayan tenido incidentes, no quiere decir que sean correctos. Se tiene el caso de ciudades o regiones planificadas que después de varias décadas han sido arrasadas por deslizamientos, flujo de lodos, actividad sísmica, o simplemente no dispongan de materiales para la construcción, agua para consumo o energía. El propósito de este documento es el de presentar una metodología de ordenamiento territorial integral, holística, soportada en el subsuelo, que involucre diversos componentes y variables como el medio físico, biótico y antrópico. En la metodología se presenta un dimensionamiento de cómo las diferentes variables puede ser medidas, correlacionadas e integradas jerárquicamente con el fin de ir construyendo indicadores del geopotencial, biopotencial y el sociopotencial. Posteriormente se puede estimar la capacidad de acogida de un territorio frente a diferentes usos y a sus potenciales. Se van generando indicadores integrados frente a los diferentes conflictos ambientales y con los conocimientos de las personas que intervienen en los procesos de planificación y desarrollo, se pueden construir diferentes escenarios de ordenamiento territorial. La metodología se aplica para tres regiones en Colombia. La primera es una región de carácter amplio y diverso en cuanto a los aspectos geográficos, humanos y culturales, como lo es el Departamento de Cundinamarca, con más de 20 mil km2 de área, donde el componente físico tiene una mayor consideración. Un segundo caso es considerado a nivel más local, donde los diferentes componentes del sistema son tratados, haciendo énfasis en lo social y cultural hasta construir escenarios de desarrollo a nivel del municipio de La Peña, Y el tercer caso, es una propuesta para el ordenamiento de la minería de arcillas en la ciudad de Bogotá, donde se trata de racionalizar el uso del recurso mineral, haciéndolo en las zonas con mayor potencialidad y sin tanta dispersión en el territorio, haciéndolo compatible con otras demandas de uso del suelo principalmente. En los tres casos se parte de información del territorio, se estiman los diferentes potenciales y las restricciones, se determinan las capacidades de acogida, involucrando los diferentes actores, comunidades, políticos, y profesionales interdisciplinarios; además, se proponen diferentes escenarios de ordenamiento territorial, acorde con principios de alto consumo, de conservación o de sostenibilidad de la naturaleza. Esta metodología presenta algunas limitaciones y requiere ciertos ajustes para que tenga un mayor impacto en la sociedad civil; las limitaciones son más que todo de carácter político, ya que por más planteamientos objetivos que se hagan, la toma de decisiones está influenciada por los sentimientos, las presiones, los compromisos, y el ego. Sin embargo, se espera que esta contribución mas técnica desde las geociencias y los recursos naturales tenga una mayor relevancia en el desarrollo de la comunidad humana mundial. / Abstract: This untitled document "Consideration of subsoil in the land use planning" is a methodological proposal for the regional management and planning for the regions with emphasis on the subsoil. It is demonstrated how subsoil has an important role when is used as a criteria to construct proposals, scenarios and human development. Three study cases are analyzed. There are several methodologies and infinity cases according to revised state of the art. Most of the reported does emphasis in urban, tourism, economy, legal and cultural among many variables. However subsoil, geology, mineral resources and natural hazards are few considered in most of plans, methodologies and study cases. These are reasons to propose a methodology with main emphasis in the subsoil, not only in conceptual terms, but with concrete equations and examples. Subsoil could be conformed by the mineral and groundwater resources and by the natural restrictions, such as the seismicity, volcanoes and landslides. AH of these features have also some implications into the edaphology, geoforms, geography, biota (flora and fauna) and the anthropogenic matters (population, education, health and culture). In this way, the subsoil is a fundamental aspect in any territorial management process. Subsoil should be included within the set of variables to be considered. It represents de long term. The fact than some projects, cities and regions have been planned and ordered without considering the subsoil and any incident has occurred; does not mean that this is correct. In spite of the previous considerations, the cases of planned cities or regions are know, and after several decades have been devastated by landslides, floods, seismic activity, or simply they do not have building materials, water to consumption or energy. The purpose of this document is to show an integral, holistic methodology based in the subsoil, whose involve several and diverse components and variables such as the environment, biota and anthropogenic. The methodology shows a background of how the different variables can be measured, correlated and integrated hierarchically with the purpose of build indicators of the geopotential, biopotential and sociopotential. Subsequent, the carrying capacity of the territory for the different uses and to their potentials can be estimated. Integral indicators commence to be generated to respect of the different environmental conflicts and with the knowledge of the people who takes part in the processes of planning and development, different scenarios of environmental land use planning may be constructed. The methodology is applied for three regions in Colombia. First region is of huge and diverse character in the geographic, human and cultural aspects, as the Department of Cundinamarca, with and area more than 20.000 km2, in which the physical component has a greater relevance. A second case is considered as a local level, which the different components of the system are treated, making emphasis in the social and cultural matters to construct scenario of development in the La Peña municipality. The third case is a proposal for the ordering of the clay mining in the city of Bogotá, to rationalize the use of the mineral resource, doing it in the zones with greater potentiality and without much dispersion in the territory, doing it compatible with other use demands of the soil. The existent information of the territory is used for the three cases. The different potentials and restrictions are assessed, the carrying capacity is also determined, involving the different actors, such as the communities, politicians, and interdisciplinary professionals. Different scenarios of land use planning are proposed, according to the high consumption, conservation or sustainability principles for the nature. This methodology presents some limitations and requires certain adjustments to have a greater impact in the civil society. The limitations are mainly of the political character, because besides to many clear proposals, the decision making is influenced by the feelings, the pressures, the commitments, and the ego. Nevertheless, it is hope that this technical contribution from the geosciences and natural resources has a greater relevance in the development of the world-wide human community. ; Doctorado
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Slowly but steadily, Europe is emerging from an energy crisis that threatened to stymie the post-pandemic recovery and plunge its economy into recession once more. After Russia's weaponisation of energy supplies left European governments scrambling to secure alternative fossil fuels for the better part of 2022, the energy outlook today has defied the most pessimistic expectations: supplies are ensured, storages are adequately filled,[1] and energy prices are returning to pre-crisis levels. Consequently, the focus in Brussels has shifted from navigating the crisis to ensuring that the transition to renewables, as enshrined in the European Green Deal, does not jeopardise European energy security once more. Yet the roadmap for doing so is complex. Drawing on the lessons learnt during the crisis, European energy security arguably rests on two pillars: secure supply chains and efficient energy use. Only the combination of the two can successfully emancipate Europe from energy dependency, and bolster the often-touted resilience of the European economy.Pillar one: Securing autonomous supplies The International Energy Agency defines energy security as "the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price".[2] It follows that the first milestone on the road to European energy security is the availability of an uninterrupted supply of energy. This requires both an independent generation capability and to satisfy the remaining demand through imports while remaining committed to a political vision that seeks, in the long run, to phase out the latter in favour of the former. In May 2022, in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission presented REPowerEU, its plan to wean the Union off its dependence on Russian fossil fuels by frontloading the roll-out of renewable power generation capacity. The plan targets a 42,5 per cent renewable energy share by 2030; the measures proposed to this end include investment worth 300 billion euro and proposals for fast-tracking the permitting processes for renewables.[3] Despite reservations on the EU's capacity to meet the 2030 target,[4] REPowerEU is undeniably a step in the right direction as regards energy security, since it will enable the Union to source a sizeable part of its energy requirements in house by the end of the decade. Yet in its execution the Union must avoid re-creating conditions analogous to those that allowed Russia to engineer last year's energy crisis.[5] The roll-out and sustainment of green energy generation capacity requires access to a host of minerals and rare earth elements (REEs). Today, European REE demand relies on third-country imports, and, given Europe's absence from the upstream part of most REE value chains,[6] this will remain the case for the foreseeable future. Moreover, China has positioned itself as "the kingpin of clean energy supply chains" thanks to a provident industrial policy of targeted, state-backed investment and, since 2010, increasing export restrictions.[7] Given the centrality that REE imports will have in the green transition, the risk of replacing one strategic dependency (Russian fossil fuels) with another (Chinese REEs) is therefore a real one. Against this backdrop, it is imperative for the Union to develop a strategy to initially navigate, but ultimately mitigate these dependencies. The Critical Raw Materials Act is a welcome start, in that it sets a maximum import quota of 65 per cent from a single third country for the Union's annual consumption of any strategic raw material. However, the 65 per cent ceiling should not be considered as an end goal; on the contrary, it should be continuously revised downward, leveraging the firepower of the Global Gateway to challenge China's quasi-monopolistic position in the REE value chains. Doing so requires protracted efforts to diversify the European supply chain, and ultimately engagement with China and the United States to create the conditions for open global supply chains. This outcome ought to be a target of the Union's international development policy in the years to come, as it will ensure a viable transition to autonomous energy generation and allow for its sustainment over time. With this target in sight, policymakers must nonetheless take into account that, in a context where all 27 member states are net importers of energy,[8] the transition to pan-European self-sufficiency in energy generation will be no rapid feat. Consequently, member states will have to backfill through imports of oil and gas, which, along with nuclear generation capacity, are likely to account for a substantial part of European energy consumption for the foreseeable future. If energy security is to be sustained throughout the transition, it is then crucial for member states to maintain the hard-earned diversification in the sourcing of fossil fuel imports. EU-wide coordination on this aspect can lead to many low-hanging fruits – for example, consistently pursuing the joint purchasing of gas via the recently established EU energy platform[9] would allow the Union to leverage its market weight as a major consumer to drive down gas prices. Ultimately, however, real energy security can only be achieved by reducing the EU's energy dependency rate to a level that would allow for the rapid substitution of imports with domestic energy production, should any economic or geopolitical contingencies arise. This "de-risking" approach should underpin the political vision that guides all EU energy policy choices in the upcoming years.Pillar two: Reducing demand by ensuring energy efficiency If energy security is to be achieved without jeopardising the 2050 climate targets, all these measures to ensure supply should be complemented by policies aiming to reduce demand for energy and raw materials by ensuring their efficient use. Doing so requires a multi-faceted effort across several policy areas, which builds on the lessons learnt in 2022. Fixes to the electricity market to reduce consumption at the margin,[10] by, for example, better linking wholesale and retail prices, should be the tip of the iceberg; in the long run, the Union requires a comprehensive industrial plan[11] that treats energy efficiency as a tenet of sustainable development. Recycling goals for raw materials should be constantly but realistically revised upwards, and investment both within and outside the EU in transition-enabling sectors, such as those identified in the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), should be geared to defined energy efficiency goals. Finally, the Union can do more to address the skill shortage that besets green industries today, by, for instance, better aligning its environmental policies with skill development strategies at the sectoral level. The American Inflation Reduction Act – which compels firms that wish to benefit from tax credits to allocate at least 15 per cent of the new labour hours required for the projects to newly-hired apprentices – offers interesting lessons in this respect. Strategies to foster energy efficiency at the industrial level should not spare ambition: the crisis has shown industry to be more prone to substitution of energy sources than it would admit itself.[12] Financing these efforts while maintaining a level playing field will prove difficult, as the sustainable finance strategy and the European Investment Bank can only go that far before distortive state aid will need to kick it. Yet if the Union wants to attain energy security and meet the Paris climate commitments enshrined in its own legislation, it will need to double down on demand reduction first of all.An ambitious but realistic approach Achieving European energy security in the era of decarbonisation will revolve around two pillars: pursuing an autonomous energy generation capacity, backstopped by imports, and fostering the efficient use of resources. To reach these targets, an ambitious but realistic approach to policymaking is required. Ambitious, in that member states should not hesitate to make use of the economic firepower and R&D capacity at their disposal to steer private industry towards well-defined but demanding sustainability targets. Realistic, in that it will have to take into account that the pool of resources that enable the transition is finite, and thus that both China and the United States will have agency in shaping Europe's ability to access the critical raw materials and related processing capacities that underpin the transition. A targeted, priority-based approach to investment should therefore be pursued; particular emphasis must be put on contingency planning, both at the European and member state level. Ultimately, pursuing ambitious energy generation and efficiency goals with a realistic approach is the shortest path to attain European energy security today, and thereby ensure that Europe doesn't repeat tomorrow the mistakes of yesterday.Tommaso Luisari is a young professional currently working as a consultant in Brussels after graduating from Bocconi University in April 2023. This is a winning article (3rd place) submitted to the 2023 edition of the IAI Prize contest.[1] European Commission DG Energy, EU Reaches 90% Gas Storage Target Ahead of Winter, 18 August 2023, https://energy.ec.europa.eu/node/5508_en.[2] International Energy Agency (IEA) website: Emergency Response and Energy Security, last updated 3 August 2023, https://www.iea.org/about/emergency-response-and-energy-security.[3] See the 2023 Flagship Technical Support Project "Accelerating Permitting for Renewable Energy" in the European Commission DG Reform website: https://reform-support.ec.europa.eu/node/437_en.[4] IEA, "Is the European Union on Track to Meet Its REPowerEU Goals?", in Renewables 2022. Analysis and Forecasts to 2027, Paris, IEA, 2022 (revised version January 2023), p. 117-128, https://www.iea.org/reports/is-the-european-union-on-track-to-meet-its-repowereu-goals. The IEA concludes that "in none of [our forecasts] are [the increase] levels consistent with the [targets in the] REPowerEU plan".[5] Jillian Ambrose, "Russia Is Orchestrating Europe's Gas Crisis, Says Energy Agency Boss", in The Guardian, 12 January 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/p/kadjk. For more details on how Russia engineered Europe's gas crisis, see Dmitri Alperovitch with Sergey Vakulenko, "How Russia Engineered the Perfect Gas Crisis" (podcast), in Geopolitics Decanted, episode 17 (29 July 2022), https://podcast.silverado.org/episodes/analysis-of-the-war-in-ukraine-july-28-2022-IzPM5ON9.[6] Jane Nakano, "The Geopolitics of Critical Minerals Supply Chains", in CSIS Reports, March 2021, p. 15, https://www.csis.org/node/60182.[7] IEA, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, Paris, IEA, May 2021 (revised version March 2022), p. 162, https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions; Ibid., p. 4-6.[8] Eurostat, "Energy Imports and Dependency", in Shedding Light on Energy in the EU – 2023 Interactive Edition, March 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/energy-2023#energy-imports-dependency.[9] See the EU Energy Platform webpage for more details: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/node/5060_en.[10] Michael Pollitt et al., Recommendations for a Future-Proof Electricity Market Design, Brussels, Centre on Regulation in Europe, December 2022, https://cerre.eu/?p=10904.[11] Pier Paolo Raimondi, "Walking out of the Woods: EU Industrial Policy between the Energy Crisis and Decarbonisation", in IAI Commentaries, No. 22|64 (December 2022), https://www.iai.it/en/node/16355.[12] Benjamin Moll, Moritz Schularick and Georg Zachmann, "Not Even a Recession: The Great German Gas Debate in Retrospect", in ECONtribute Policy Briefs, No. 48 (May 2023), http://hdl.handle.net/10419/273549.
"An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile - hoping it will eat him last"Winston Churchill Desde que –afortunadamente- Winston L. Spencer-Churchill tomó como tarea personal oponerse a la expansión nazi, el concepto de apaciguamiento ("appeasement") se transformó en anatema en la política internacional. De ahí en más, apaciguar supuso nada menos que ceder ante el mal, en los 1930s y 40s encarnado en Adolf Hitler y su aparato estatal. Los apaciguadores fueron aquellos inocentes –o irresponsables- que creyeron limitados los objetivos de política exterior de Hitler. Los acuerdos de Múnich de 1938, símbolo del apaciguamiento al Tercer Reich, son un ejemplo de historia viva: desde la mitad del siglo XX en adelante los usos y abusos de la categoría analítica "apaciguador o apaciguamiento" –directamente vinculados al fracaso de Múnich- han sido empleados para categorizar los más diversos fenómenos de la escena internacional.El profesor de historia en la Universidad de Yale, Paul Kennedy –conocido particularmente por su magistral The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers- ha escrito un importante artículo en The National Interest sobre el "appeasement" y su papel en la política internacional. Bajo el provocador título "A Time to Appease," Kennedy hace una reseña histórica del concepto, para luego esbozar una serie de hipótesis sobre su relevancia en el sistema internacional actual -explícitamente pensando en el futuro. Siendo uno de los historiadores vivos más importantes, la sección que discute los orígenes históricos es la más fuerte e interesante. Las conclusiones, por otro lado, son un tanto vagas, pero dan para la reflexión. Kennedy parte de la premisa de que la Historia ha condenado a la noción de apaciguamiento al campo de lo políticamente peyorativo, para luego vincular tal condición a la política internacional de todos los días: "…talk of someone being an Appeaser brings us to a much darker meaning, that which involves cowardice, abandoning one's friends and allies, failing to recognize evil in the world—a fool, then—or recognizing evil but then trying to buy it off—a knave. Nothing so alarms a president or prime minister in the Western world than to be accused of pursuing policies of appeasement."Tan certera es la apreciación del inglés, como equivocado el espíritu que mueve tales apreciaciones. Como ya he señalado en otro trabajo: el apaciguamiento es una estrategia de política exterior neutral, sin un resultado predeterminado, y que no se puede separar de la interacción siempre particular entre los estados involucrados. Las consecuencias del apaciguamiento británico -y en cierta medida francés- hacia Alemania en los años treinta ha manchado para siempre el nombre de este dispositivo político. Pero en concreto, su éxito o su fracaso dependen de las intenciones de quien es apaciguado. Robert Powell ilustra el punto: "Had German demands been limited, appeasement might very well have averted an unnecessary war. As it turned out, those ambitions were not limited, and Britain and France declared war on Germany."(1)Kennedy recurre a un ejemplo histórico escasamente comentado para refutar la expandida idea de que apaciguar es un error per se: las relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña en los albores del siglo XX. "Even as the great powers entered the twentieth century," comenta el historiador, "one of the most exceptional acts of appeasement, and repeated conciliation, was occurring—yet it is something that very few American pundits on appeasement today seem to know anything about. It was Great Britain's decision to make a series of significant territorial and political concessions to the rising American Republic." El dilema que vivió Gran Bretaña en los 1900s es un problema recurrente para las grandes potencias en proceso de declive relativo. A diferencia de lo que suelen pensar algunas corrientes teóricas demasiado encorsetadas –a las que un enfoque histórico à la Kennedy les haría mucho bien- una potencia en descenso no sólo tiene que vérselas con un contendiente en ascenso, sino que se ve obligada a hacer malabares entre varios estados que ascienden relativamente, mientras trata de sortear la aparición in crescendo de asuntos complejos por todo el globo -ante los cuales tiene cada vez menos capacidad para hacerles frente. Inmersa en la confusión del descenso relativo –pero pronunciado- Gran Bretaña tomó la decisión consciente de apaciguar a Estados Unidos, mientras se iba perfilando antagónicamente ante la Alemania Imperial de Guillermo. Estrategia digna de un Metternich o un Bismarck. El ejemplo derriba el mito, instalado por el comentario despistado y ahistórico de las relaciones internacionales, de una relación especial entre Gran Bretaña y Estados Unidos determinada de antemano. El vínculo particular que se generó entre las otrora colonias norteamericanas y Londres fue, más allá de variables culturales que lo facilitaron, una obra de ingeniería diplomática. El siglo XIX había estado plagado de situaciones tensas entre los dos países (e.g. el apoyo, aún si fue un tímido apoyo, de Gran Bretaña a la Confederación en la Guerra Civil estadounidense, entre otros). El verdadero cambio de rumbo fue el resultado de la nueva política de apaciguamiento británica, que luego resultaría en la alineación cuasi-incondicional del siglo XX. (2)Volviendo a Kennedy: "In this case, appeasement worked, and arguably played a massive role in helping to bring the United States to an official pro-British stance as the two great wars of the twentieth century approached."Eliminar automáticamente al apaciguamiento del menú de opciones de política exterior, solamente porque una iniciativa particular no funcionó (i.e. Múnich), es una postura miope y amateur. Más aún, refleja una manera de hacer política guiada por las emociones –siempre una de las peores influencias para llevar adelante una política exterior exitosa. La observación del sistema internacional sin recurrir a la historia desemboca en análisis desprovistos de pilares, y por tanto superficiales. Pero el uso apresurado y facilista de la historia puede terminar en tomas de decisión tan alejadas de la realidad como las que están faltas de ella. La historia es dinámica y cambiante -los Griegos lo llamaban flux-; una circunstancia del pasado no puede ser aplicada in totum para explicar otras que se presentan en coyunturas y contextos disímiles. Existen entonces apaciguamientos buenos y malos. La tarea del estadista es saber cuándo se está apaciguando inútil y peligrosamente a un Hitler, y cuando se apacigua efectivamente a un estado con intenciones limitadas –por ejemplo, Estados Unidos a comienzos del siglo XX. Desafortunadamente, como señala Kennedy: "Certainty about such matters only comes, I suspect, with hindsight; and there we are all wise, because we know what happened." Pero esto no es nuevo en la política internacional; esfera que está plagada de incertidumbre. Los motivos de terceros estados son siempre inciertos, y por ende, todas las estrategias diplomáticas –no sólo el apaciguamiento- corren el riesgo de no funcionar como se esperaba. Alejándonos un poco del debate histórico, las implicancias del entendimiento y el uso del concepto de apaciguar son profundos en la política internacional contemporánea y futura. Habiéndose banalizado hasta el paroxismo el ejemplo de Múnich, disímiles regímenes han sido vistos como resurrecciones del Tercer Reich: la URSS, el comunismo vietnamita, China, el Irán de Ahmadinejad, inter alia. Todos regímenes con facetas terribles, pero no por eso con objetivos ilimitados de política exterior.¿Dónde ve Kennedy la relevancia del uso y abuso del concepto en el mundo contemporáneo? Según él, apaciguar, entendido como una herramienta de política exterior neutral, es un dispositivo necesario en la política internacional. Particularmente para la administración del orden en los períodos de descenso de la potencia dominante. Ergo, Estados Unidos debería, en su visión, aceptar la posibilidad de que eventualmente tendrá que comenzar a usufructuar selectivamente de tal dispositivo. Esto no quiere decir que Washington deba ceder en todo y hacia todos de aquí en más. Sino que en algunas ocasiones, empezaría a hacerse necesario dejar escenarios que no afectan directamente la seguridad estadounidense (se puede pensar en Irak y Afganistán), y elaborar estrategias macro que permitan ceder en algunas cosas ante el ascenso de China: "This privileged nation [the U.S.] —one is tempted to say, overprivileged nation—possesses around 4.6 percent of the world's population, produces about a fifth of world product, and is, amazingly, willing to spend over 40 percent of all the globe's defense expenditures. At some time in the future, sooner or later, there is going to be what economists call a 'convergence,' that is, we are going to have to trim our sails and no longer try to bestride the world like a colossus. As we do so, we shall make a concession here, a concession there, though hopefully it will be disguised in the form of policies such as 'power sharing' and 'mutual compromise,' and the dreadful 'A' word will not appear."La preocupación subyacente en el planteo de Kennedy es que la estigmatización del concepto, por las consecuencias políticas que podría generar a un líder el ser clasificado de "apaciguador," limita seriamente la consideración de mismo como una opción más de política exterior. El argumento es lógicamente impecable. Pero tiene un problema, o mejor dicho, una sutileza temporal. Para cuando Gran Bretaña comenzó su política de apaciguamiento hacia Estados Unidos, la capacidad de poder estadounidense ya era superior a la británica en todos los aspectos. A su vez, la capacidad de la Royal Navy de cubrir el globo había disminuido sensiblemente. La posición actual de Estados Unidos es por cierto disímil.(3)El timing es aquí importante. La otra cara de la moneda puede ser tan nociva como la que presenta Kennedy: el apaciguamiento extendido como resultado de una errónea comprensión de la real estructura de poder en el sistema internacional puede generar potencias revisionistas y contribuir a la inestabilidad internacional.Sin embargo, a mediano y largo plazo, el análisis de Kennedy debe ser tomado muy en serio. Apaciguar y otorgar concesiones va a tener que estar cada vez más en el menú de opciones estadounidense (siempre junto a otras como el Soft Power o la fuerza militar). Según Kennedy: "It is not a crime, or a moral failing, to recognize where and when it may be best to withdraw from a battlefield and to reduce a commitment." La sabiduría del liderazgo estadounidense va a estar en saber discernir qué situaciones y qué actores pueden ser apaciguados, y qué otros deben ser contenidos. Esperemos que estén a la altura de la situación.(1) Powell, Robert, "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement," American Political Science Review, 90, p. 746.(2) Sobre las rispideces del siglo XIX y el giro diplomático véase: Bourne, Kenneth,Britain and the Balance of Power in North America: 1815-1908,Berkeley,University of California Press, 1967.(3) En la conclusión de su libro The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy había caído en el mismo error, argumentando de manera apresurada que Estados Unidos estaba sobre-expandido y que su descenso ante la URSS era un escenario esperable (irónicamente el libro fue publicado 1987, dos años antes de la caída del Muro de Berlín). *Profesor Universidad ORT.Maestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (Tesista)
Thank you Chairman I would like to extend a warm welcome to our keynote speakers, David Byrne of the European Commission, Derek Yach from the World Health Organisation, and Paul Quinn representing Congressman Marty Meehan who sends his apologies. When we include the speakers who will address later sessions, this is, undoubtedly, one of the strongest teams that have been assembled on tobacco control in Europe. The very strength of the team underlines what I see as a shift – a very necessary shift – in the way we perceive the tobacco issue. For the last twenty years, we have lived out a paradox. It isnÃ'´t a social side issue. I make no apology for the bluntness of what IÃ'´m saying, and will come back, a little later, to the radicalism I believe we need to bring – nationally – to this issue. For starters, though, I want to lay it on the line that what weÃ'´re talking about is an epidemic as deadly as any suffered by human kind throughout the centuries. Slower than some of those epidemics in its lethal action, perhaps. But an epidemic, nonetheless. According to the World Health Organisation tobacco accounted for just over 3 million annual deaths in 1990, rising to 4.023 million annual deaths in 1998. The numbers of deaths due to tobacco will rise to 8.4 million in 2020 and reach roughly 10 million annually by 2030. This is quite simply ghastly. Tobacco kills. It kills in many different ways. It kills increasing numbers of women. It does its damage directly and indirectly. For children, much of the damage comes from smoking by adults where children live, study, play and work. The very least we should be able to offer every child is breathable air. Air that doesnÃ'´t do them damage. WeÃ'´re now seeing a global public health response to the tobacco epidemic. The Tobacco Free Initiative launched by the World Health Organisation was matched by significant tobacco control initiatives throughout the world. During this conference we will hear about the experiences our speakers had in driving these initiatives. This Tobacco Free Initiative poses unique challenges to our legal frameworks at both national and international levels; in particular it raises challenges about the legal context in which tobacco products are traded and asks questions about the impact of commercial speech especially on children, and the extent of the limitations that should be imposed on it. Politicians, supported by economists and lawyers as well as the medical profession, must continue to explore and develop this context to find innovative ways to wrap public health considerations around the trade in tobacco products – very tightly. We also have the right to demand a totally new paradigm from the tobacco industry. Bluntly, the tobacco industry plays the PR game at its cynical worst. The industry sells its products without regard to the harm these products cause. At the same time, to gain social acceptance, it gives donations, endowments and patronage to high profile events and people. Not good enough. This model of behaviour is no longer acceptable in a modern society. We need one where the industry integrates social responsibility and accountability into its day-to-day activities. We have waited for this change in behaviour from the tobacco industry for many decades. Unfortunately the documents disclosed during litigation in the USA and from other sources make very depressing reading; it is clear from them that any trust society placed in the tobacco industry in the past to address the health problems associated with its products was misplaced. This industry appears to lack the necessary leadership to guide it towards just and responsible action. Instead, it chooses evasion, deception and at times illegal activity to protect its profits at any price and to avoid its responsibilities to society and its customers. It has engaged in elaborate Ã'´spinÃ'´ to generate political tolerance, scientific uncertainty and public acceptance of its products. Legislators must act now. I see no reason why the global community should continue to wait. Effective legal controls must be laid on this errant industry. We should also keep these controls under review at regular intervals and if they are failing to achieve the desired outcomes we should be prepared to amend them. In Ireland, as Minister for Health and Children, I launched a comprehensive tobacco control policy entitled "Towards a Tobacco Free Society". OTT?Excessive?Unrealistic? On the contrary – I believe it to be imperative and inevitable. I honestly hold that, given the range of fatal diseases caused by tobacco use we have little alternative but to pursue the clear objective of creating a tobacco free society. Aiming at a tobacco free society means ensuring public and political opinion are properly informed. It requires help to be given to smokers to break the addiction. It demands that people are protected against environmental tobacco smoke and children are protected from any inducement to experiment with this product. Over the past year we have implemented a number of measures which will support these objectives; we have established an independent Office of Tobacco Control, we have introduced free nicotine replacement therapy for low-income earners, we have extended our existing prohibitions on tobacco advertising to the print media with some minor derogations for international publications. We have raised the legal age at which a person can be sold tobacco products to eighteen years. We have invested substantially more funds in health promotion activities and we have mounted sustained information campaigns. We have engaged in sponsorship arrangements, which are new and innovative for public bodies. I have provided health boards with additional resources to let them mount a sustained inspection and enforcement service. Health boards will engage new Directors of Tobacco Control responsible for coordinating each health boardÃ'´s response and for liasing with the Tobacco Control Agency I set up earlier this year. Most recently, I have published a comprehensive Bill – The Public Health (Tobacco) Bill, 2001. This Bill will, among other things, end all forms of product display and in-store advertising and will require all retailers to register with the new Tobacco Control Agency. Ten packs of cigarettes will be banned and transparent and independent testing procedures of tobacco products will be introduced. Enforcement officers will be given all the necessary powers to ensure there is full compliance with the law. On smoking in public places we will extend the existing areas covered and it is proposed that I, as Minister for Health and Children, will have the powers to introduce further prohibitions in public places such as pubs and the work place. I will also provide for the establishment of a Tobacco Free Council to advise and assist on an ongoing basis. I believe the measures already introduced and those additional ones proposed in the Bill have widespread community support. In fact, youÃ'´re going to hear a detailed presentation from the MRBI which will amply illustrate the extent of this support. The great thing is that the support comes from smokers and non-smokers alike. Bottom line, Ladies and Gentlemen, is that we are at a watershed. As a society (if youÃ'´ll allow me to play with a popular phrase) weÃ'´ve realised itÃ'´s time to Ã'´wake up and smell the cigarettes.Ã'´ Smell them. See them for what they are. And get real about destroying their hold on our people. The MRBI survey makes it clear that the single strongest weapon we have when it comes to preventing the habit among young people is price. Simple as that. Price. Up to now, the fear of inflation has been a real impediment to increasing taxes on tobacco. It sounds a serious, logical argument. Until you take it out and look at it a little more closely. Weigh it, as it were, in two hands. I believe – and I believe this with a great passion – that we must take cigarettes out of the equation we use when awarding wage increases. I am calling on IBEC and ICTU, on employers and trade unions alike, to move away from any kind of tolerance of a trade that is killing our citizens. At one point in industrial history, cigarettes were a staple of the workingmanÃ'´s life. So it was legitimate to include them in the Ã'´basketÃ'´ of goods that goes to make up the Consumer Price Index. It isnÃ'´t legitimate to include them any more. Today, IÃ'´m saying that society collectively must take the step to remove cigarettes from the basket of normality, from the list of elements which constitute necessary consumer spending. IÃ'´m saying: "We can no longer delude ourselves. We must exclude cigarettes from the considerations we address in central wage bargaining. We must price cigarettes out of the reach of the children those cigarettes will kill." Right now, in the monthly Central Statistics Office reports on consumer spending, the figures include cigarettes. But – right down at the bottom of the page – thereÃ'´s another figure. Calculated without including cigarettes. I believe that if we continue to use the first figure as our constant measure, it will be an indictment of us as legislators, as advocates for working people, as public health professionals. If, on the other hand, we move to the use of the second figure, we will be sending out a message of startling clarity to the nation. We will be saying "We donÃ'´t count an addictive, killer drug as part of normal consumer spending." Taking cigarettes out of the basket used to determine the Consumer Price Index will take away the inflation argument. It will not be easy, in its implications for the social partners. But it is morally inescapable. We must do it. Because it will help us stop the killer that is tobacco. If we can do it, we will give so much extra strength to health educators and the new Tobacco Control Association. This new organisation of young people who already have branches in over fifteen counties, is represented here today. The young adults who make up its membership are well placed to advise children of the dangers of tobacco addiction in a way that older generations cannot. It would strengthen their hand if cigarettes move – in price terms – out of the easy reach of our children Finally, I would like to commend so many public health advocates who have shown professional and indeed personal courage in their commitment to this critical public health issue down through the years. We need you to continue to challenge and confront this grave public health problem and to repudiate the questionable science of the tobacco industry. The Research Institute for a Tobacco Free Society represents a new and dynamic form of partnership between government and civil society. It will provide an effective platform to engage and mobilise the many different professional and academic skills necessary to guide and challenge us. I wish the conference every success.