Background Having investigated avoidable deaths and other occurrences of harm to patients at Mid-Staffordshire Hospital, the Francis Inquiry made 290 recommendations for actions to reduce the likelihood of such events recurring. A prominent part of the government's response was to ask Don Berwick to chair a National Patient Safety Advisory Group to advise the government on a 'whole-system' Patient Safety Improvement Programme. The Group proposed establishing Patient Safety Collaboratives (PSC), drawing upon the experience of Quality Improvement Collaboratives, particularly the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 'Breakthrough Series' From 2014, Collaboratives in the NHS were implemented through the regional Academic Health Science Networks (AHSN). Most research about the effects of Collaboratives has been uncontrolled and fragmented across a range of activities and target outcomes, often self-reported. Few studies report clearly how Collaboratives carried their work out, making it hard to identify what the 'active ingredient' is. Few contained evidence about the determinants of 'success' (as opposed to abundant hypotheses and conjectures). Neither is it known what kinds of clinical work (e.g. for which care groups) may be more amenable than others to improvement by PSC methods, although Collaboratives based hospitals have been most widely reported. We evaluated how this action taken in response to the Francis Inquiry was implemented and some of the consequences, and used our findings as the evidence base to present some some policy implications and further research proposals. Research Questions (RQ) This study addressed six research questions: RQ1: How has PSC implementation varied across the 15 Academic Health Science Network (AHSN) regions? RQ2: What organisational changes have providers made? How have they done this and what have they learned from the PSCs? RQ3: How were resources used for PSCs' implementation activities? What are the costs of participation and implementation? RQ4: Have the PSCs made a detectable difference on rates of harm and adverse events involving patients as measured using routine data? RQ5: Has change in practice taken place on the front-line of services? RQ6: What generalisable knowledge can be shared about this? Methods We made a mixed methods observational comparison of PSC mechanisms, contexts and outcomes. We combined three methods each of which broadly corresponded to one stage of PSC implementation: 1. An Implementation study of how PSCs were set up, of AHSN roles in establishing and maintaining regional networks, and of how provider-level NHS managers and clinicians used PSC-initiated ideas and resources to influence clinical practice, monitor and improve clinical quality and safety. Our study looked at all 15 PSCs, studied three of them in greater detail, and within them selected different types of provider for in-depth study. 2. Patient safety culture surveys. The Francis and Berwick reports emphasised strengthening safety culture as a method for making clinical practice safer. Using the Safety, Communication, Operational Reliability and Engagement (SCORE) survey, we measured changes in patient safety 'culture' in six clinical teams undertaking PSC-initiated activities. We also analysed NHS Staff Survey data. 3. Analysis of routine administrative data. To assess how much patient safety and outcomes had changed we quantitatively analysed routinely collected administrative data relevant to PSCs' intended outcomes. Our data sources were 61 semi structured in-depth interviews of key informants: SCORE survey data from 72 sites (first round) and from the six of these sites which had also made a second-round (repeat) survey during the study period: and England-wide data on in-patient satisfaction, quality improvement, managerial support for staff, fairness and effectiveness of procedures for reporting errors, recommendation of one's own work-place, incident reporting and hospital mortality. Findings How PSC implementation varied across the 15 AHSNs (RQ1) Each AHSN applied elements of three strategies for improving patient quality and safety at provider level: • A facilitative strategy, which built where possible on existing QI and safety work in healthcare providers, but was constrained by the local history and resources – or lack of them – in these areas of work. A facilitative strategy made it harder to attribute any changes in working practices and outcomes unequivocally to PSC activities. • An educative strategy of educating, training and developing individual 'change agents' to implement changed working practices to improve patient safety at clinic level. • A national priority focussed strategy of adopting 'work-streams' from among the current national priorities, resulting in several PSCs developing similar work-streams (e.g. sepsis prevention). There were tensions between the facilitative approach and the national priority focus, which some informants thought was closer to a performance management approach. In general, PSCs and NHS staff favoured shifting from a 'blame' culture to learning culture focused on service development as more conducive to activities to improve patient safety. Where SCORE surveys were used (which was increasingly, but from a small base), they were implemented the same way everywhere. PSCs differed in terms of which elements and mechanisms of collaboratives they emphasised. Partly because the Francis report was a response to problems in hospital services, and because Collaboratives originated in (US) hospitals, participation was proportionately greater among acute hospitals than elsewhere, which partly reflected the technical challenges of making the Collaborative model relevant to non-hospital services. General practices apart, the only non-NHS providers participating were some care homes and pharmacies. Organisational changes that providers made and what they have learned from the PSCs (RQ2) Not all provider organisations participated in the PSCs. The willingness of NHS senior managers to engage with PSCs varied across setting. When they were willing, organisational upheaval including leadership changes made trusts' engagement harder to sustain. In providers that did participate, the main organisational factors reported to aid PSC implementation were: • Initial expenditure for start-up training and preparing management information systems to serve (also) as a measurement system for clinical teams' QI work • Recruiting trained QI and safety experts or 'champions' at all organisational levels, most critically at Board and clinical team levels; this was often done with PSC support and encouragement. • Ensuring that these champions had the leadership skills to motivate and empower clinical teams and to create safe spaces for staff to speak up or suggest changes. • Building structures and processes, at both whole-organisation and at clinical team levels, to sustain the changed working practices. • Allocating staff time not only to engage in QI and learning events, but so that they can subsequently utilise their learning at work. • 'Bottom-up' approaches to safety improvement promoted provider-level engagement and motivation by adapting the activities that PSCs were promoting to local needs. • Measurement support for front-line staff At the time of this study, the development and use of formal measurement systems to support QI activities had not yet materialised. The other change we had expected but did not observe was in safety climate, particularly at clinical team level. Although PSC activity, including the SCORE surveys, had impacts upon clinical teams' working practices in the sites we studied (see below) these changes occurred without measurable changes in workplace safety climate. In summary, we found: 1. Some qualitative evidence of safety climate change in the intended direction, including increased staff engagement and shifts away from a blame culture towards a more 'open learning culture'. 2. No significant change safety climate in six study sites by early 2018 on most of the SCORE survey domains. 3. Change in the intended direction in the relevant NHS staff survey data domains, but evidence that this change began before PSCs existed. To suggest that any safety culture changes in particular clinical teams are diluted within much larger NHS Digital data-sets might be valid for the NHS Staff Survey but is not applicable for the SCORE survey results, which were precisely localised to the relevant clinical teams. A possible explanation is that safety climate changes are as much a consequence as a cause of changes in working practices, in a virtuous circle of mutual reinforcement. Organisational changes do not occur straight away; sufficient time is required to implement a complex set of activities across all levels of the NHS: 1. At least 18 months for PSCs and then providers to establish themselves and start to change working practices. In practice this can take a lot longer before any impact is seen at the patient level. 2. Allowing individual staff members time at work to attend learning events and then put what they learnt into practice. 3. Continuing the PSCs long enough to engage 'late adopters' besides 'early adopters'. 4. Time for plan-do-study-act (PDSA) cycles and other QI activities be repeated and become institutionalised on an open-ended time-scale. Other major constraints surrounding the activities of PSCs we found were NHS providers' concurrent operational pressures and the concomitant resource and financial constraints, staff shortages and turnover. At an individual level the barriers included difficulties utilising expertise post training due to factors including a performance culture (i.e. conflicting priorities in the work-place), lack of time, high staff turnover (including shift rotations and moves between work locations), and psychological resistance to change. Costs of participation in and implementation of PSCs (RQ3) One of our study PSCs provided broad information how spending on PSCs had been allocated at AHSN level (to which programmes, and to broad categories such as support staff, training etc.). At the time of our fieldwork detailed information to account for; the training and network activity the PSCs provided, monetary flows from PSCs to providers, as well as indirect opportunity costs the provider organisations incurred was not completely available. The same applied to information about how these extra resources impacted on health benefits for the patients due to changes in working practices noted below, making it unfeasible to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the PSC programme. Have the PSCs made a detectable difference to rates of harm and adverse events involving patients as measured using routine data? (RQ4) We analysed routine administrative data about relevant safety outcomes and found that: 1. Qualitative evidence of changed working practices which one would expect (given their supporting evidence) to improve patient safety and service quality. 2. Quantitative analysis of administrative data showed no significant change by early 2018 that could plausibly be attributed to PSCs alone. 3. Longer-term changes in the intended direction were occurring. In our judgement the reasons for these paradoxical patterns are: 1. Dilution of any effects of PSCs upon service outcomes because the available datasets combine data about activities in which PSCs were involved with data about much larger activities in which PSCs were not yet involved,such as trust-level data. 2. PSCs' effects were constrained by countervailing factors: demand overloads, insufficient staffing relative to demand, staff turnover and financial constraints. 3. Time lags: when our fieldwork finished PSCs were about half-way through their initially-planned life-span and had spent much of it getting their activities started. This meant the period for which routine data could have captured any relevant effects was a year or less. We infer that PSC activity had many of its intended effects but they were too localised and diluted to be measurable in the larger-scale routinely-reported administrative datasets. Change in practice on the front-line of services (RQ5) In our case study sites we found evidence of changes in practice at front-line, clinical team level. In practice the participating clinical teams had become more multidisciplinary. They had also started to undertake what in effect was the Model for Improvement: collecting information about their working practices, changing the latter, reviewing the effects, then making further adjustments: the quality improvement cycle. The SCORE survey, and its practical impacts, can be understood as a special case of such activity, and one with a relatively quick impact upon working practices. SCORE surveys developed beyond measurement activity into a practical intervention on the part of PSCs. Changes in working practices were both clinical (e.g. falls reduction) and organisational (e.g. pathway re-design) and were reported in both hospitals and general practices. Conclusions: Policy and management implications The findings summarised above tend to support some of the policy-makers' original assumptions about how PSCs would work but suggests revisions to other policy assumptions that would lead to more effective PSCs and thus safer care for patients:- 1. PSCs have not yet had sufficient time to establish and sustain the clinical team-level safety improvement activities and outcomes that current policy intends. Our evidence suggests three years from the outset is in practice too short a time for that. In our opinion (albeit an opinion consistent with our findings so far) PSCs should continue in their current form for longer before any judgement can be meaningfully made about their impact on patients. 2. The PSCs are complex adaptive systems, reacting and responding to different local situations in varied ways. Attempts to manage PSCs uniformly and force them into particular directions (including work streams) are likely to hamper their ability to promote the locally-originating work that will ultimately lead to better patient care. In our opinion NHSI should study the emergent systems, support positive behaviours and resist the temptation to apply a 'one size fits all' managerial approach. 3. NHSI and the Department of Health need to provide clear and supportive timelines and financial arrangements for the PSCs. One disruptive aspect of the implementation of the PSCs was the lack of clear direction from the central NHS bodies, partly due to the perceived chaos surrounding the change from NHSE to NHSI, and to the financial uncertainly that PSC leads felt. At the time of writing there are suggestions that NHSI should review the PSCs. In our opinion it is too soon for that and it will again create an impeding uncertainty. 4. Recognition of the influence of the wider evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement and institutions (e.g. NICE) in promoting safety culture, something PSCs' activity reinforced and exploited. However development of EBM is uneven (for example, it is better developed in general medicine than mental health). Start-up support for Collaboratives may be especially important in domains where EBM remains less developed and embedded. 5. Culture change is too big for PSCs alone to achieve without a massive increase in their scale. Learning by clinical teams is a discrete step linking culture change to changed working practices and this has implications for the kind of training required. The necessary kernels for this training are quality improvement methodologies and the psychology of change ('human factors'). As PSCs have shown, clinical teams are the critical audience for this training. 6. If providers are to become 'learning organisations' for PSC purposes the requirements include: a 'bottom-up' approach to safety management; that provider managers allow clinical teams discretion to adapt QI activities to their local needs; that clinical teams are allowed to take ownership of a given project or changes in work processes, something our evidence suggests also promotes staff engagement and motivation. This is a different approach from the work-stream specific collaboratives; mandating clinical teams to work on areas they have not chosen will probably not have as effective outcomes for patient care. 7. NHSI is now addressing the absence of cross-provider measurement systems for PSC purposes (for clinical teams across different providers to compare activities and learn from each other). Caution will be needed in how these cross-provider data are used. The focus has to be on data for improvement; if the data are used for performance management (or even perceived as such) the benefits of the collaborative approach will diminish.
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This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic securityAgainst this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic securityThe new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union?In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead.ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.
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This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic securityAgainst this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic securityThe new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union?In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead.ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.
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This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.
Tese de doutoramento em Engenharia Mecânica (Controlo e Gestão) apresentada à Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade de Coimbra ; Domínio A capacidade de produzir bem é a chave da riqueza. Uma boa produção concretiza-se pela transformação competitiva de matérias-primas em produtos de qualidade para o mercado global. Tal transformação inclui uma série de operações coordenadas de modo a obter a produtividade que permite o aumento da competitividade. Embora algumas operações possam requerer pessoal especializado, a tendência é para uma crescente automatização. A coordenação das operações automatizadas é também automatizada (através de uma variedade de transportadores, comunicação digital, etc.). Contudo, e embora a produção seja automatizada, a configuração do equipamento é feita manualmente. Situação A necessidade de automatização foi inicialmente sentida e aplicada na produção de longas séries, como no caso da indústria automóvel. Com a necessidade de redução de custos e aumento de flexibilidade, a inclusão de máquinas/equipamentos controlados por computador, assim como de interligações por computadores/redes tem sido extensiva. O aumento de software nestes sistemas, as restrições físicas e as (indesejáveis) interconecções lógicas conduzem a um aumento da complexidade, que em empresas de produção em grande escala é obviado por especialistas. O aumento na procura de produtos personalizados e a rapidez para a sua comercialização determinam a necessidade de uma produção flexível. Contudo, a referida indesejável complexidade constitui um grande obstáculo para o recurso a soluções (semi)-automatizadas, e postos de trabalho (de alta qualidade) são deslocados para países de mão-de-obra mais barata. O caso mais difícil prende-se com a utilização de robôs (que é o tipo de máquina mais flexível) nas empresas mais flexíveis, como sejam as Pequenas e Médias Empresas (PMEs). Deste modo, as condições para a utilização de robôs (juntamente com outro tipo de equipamento) em PMEs (incluindo operações manuais e configuração) representam o maior desafio, uma vez que os sistemas técnicos têm de ser estruturados de forma a suportarem a desejada flexibilidade. À semelhança da incapacidade de uma boa gestão em compensar a falta de competência em actividades como a do comércio ou da investigação cientifica, as etapas de produção têm de ser apropriadamente construídas e mantidas. Estas últimas representam aquilo em que o produtor se deve concentrar e especializar. Assim, sejam quais forem os avanços que facilitem a produção, as práticas de produção competitiva deverão ser mantidas. Especificamente, processos de trabalho com conhecimentos valiosos não devem ser prejudicados por detalhes técnicos irrelevantes. Novas tecnologias que possam aumentar a competitividade e/ou melhorar as condições de trabalho são obviamente desejáveis. Contudo, estas deverão ser combinadas com princípios de utilização simples para os quais os sistemas de produção são construídos. Tópico A complexidade surge tanto na operação como na coordenação, mas também na sua configuração manual. Esta é parcialmente compreensível e gerenciável, uma vez que uma determinada máquina ou processo de fabrico pode ser bastante avançado e complexo. Assim, a complexidade será local. Contudo, e em particular com software envolvido, dependências adhoc acidentais entre operações e coordenação tornam a situação actual mais difícil. Adicionalmente, a configuração de cada máquina e subsistema envolve uma variedade de interfaces de utilizador e ferramentas de configuração/programação. Uma vez mais, as grandes empresas podem contar com engenheiros altamente qualificados para lidar com estes problemas, enquanto que nas PMEs a situação fica facilmente ingovernável. Consideramos que podemos referir o problema como uma questão de orquestração. Orquestração é então definida como o arranjo, coordenação e gestão (semi-) automatizada de complexos sistemas de produção, incluindo as suas interacções em termos de comunicação e os seus serviços em termos de controlo por computador. O tópico pode então ser formulado como a procura de princípios óptimos, ou pelo menos exequíveis, para a orquestração de processos produtivos de pequena escala. Na realidade, existem aspectos fundamentais envolvidos que não representam apenas uma questão de engenharia a ser solucionada. Ao contrário, a situação requer uma abordagem científica com especial atenção para a recente tecnologia de suporte proveniente de outras áreas. Abordagem cientifica - A procura de princípios apropriados a PMEs para a orquestração de processos de produção não se presta a uma análise teórica, que por sua vez requer a utilização de modelos formais e derivação das soluções (sub-)óptimas e suas propriedades. Embora tivesse sido preferível obter provas formais de uma solução óptima, a complexidade do equipamento, o envolvimento de humanos, a considerável desorganização das PMEs, a necessidade de aderir às práticas industriais, assim como a variedade de PMEs existentes, dificultam uma abordagem teórica. Deste modo, foi seguida uma abordagem empírica. A dificultar o teste e a avaliação de uma abordagem empírica estão as possíveis variações no software envolvido, juntamente com a constante mudança que ocorre na produção em sistemas de produção flexíveis. Adicionalmente, a experimentação não pode ser conduzida em ambientes industriais (onde esta iria perturbar a produção). Assim sendo, as experiências deverão ser cuidadosamente seleccionadas e conduzidas em laboratório com recurso a equipamento industrial. Ainda assim, dadas as condições e singularidade de algum equipamento, não é fácil reproduzir os resultados noutros locais, o que constitui um problema para a validação e aceitação dos mesmos. Contudo, caso a solução sugerida em termos de princípios técnicos possa ser encontrada ou confirmada por resultados publicados de investigação independente, ou se técnicas relacionadas derem origem a novos produtos, tal pode desejavelmente contribuir para a validação de resultados. Isto é, embora resultados semelhantes para outros laboratórios sejam válidos, as diferenças actuais vão revelar a existência de variações que merecem estudo detalhado. Abordagem técnica - Os sistemas de produção flexíveis consistem em equipamento distribuído do ponto de vista computacional. Tipicamente, os diferentes aparelhos não foram concebidos para operarem em conjunto, mas devem, no entanto, ser de fácil configuração no local de trabalho. Uma abordagem básica passaria pela utilização de plataformas de software que suportassem componentes distribuídos de uma forma flexível. Contudo, as plataformas computacionais existentes podem não satisfazer com eficiência a necessidade do equipamento integrado, podendo revelar falta de robustez, nomeadamente nas interconecções. Deste modo, é necessário combinar com algum cuidado a tecnologia existente e confrontar as soluções sugeridas com as necessidades actuais das empresas. A abordagem seguida encontra-se dividida em quatro partes: 1. Suportar o acoplamento fraco entre componentes de forma a obter simples composição quando o equipamento é instalado ou substituído. As interacções necessitam ser assíncronas e baseadas em eventos através de interfaces bem definidas e auto-explicativas, contendo serviços definidos em termos de operações de produção (e não em termos de software interno). 2. Produzir princípios unificados para interacção com utilizador e interfaces, permitindo que utilizadores não especializados possam (re)configurar e (re)programar o sistema de produção. Uma interacção com o utilizador que permita combinar operações básicas que resultem num novo serviço, o qual deverá idealmente estar facilmente acessível através de interfaces programadas e manuais. 3. As abordagens baseadas em modelos têm-se revelado eficazes para desempenho e reutilização. No entanto, os modelos consistem em elevado nível de conhecimento e são dispendiosos de obter no âmbito da flexibilidade e desorganização das PMEs. Uma melhor abordagem é permitir a visibilidade do conhecimento envolvido numa determinada etapa em termos do processo de produção, de modo a que o operador transmita inteligência através de uma interface simples. 4. O software é por defeito não descritivo, assim como a execução sequencial de código imperativo não se compõe. Conhecimento no metanível e descrições declarativas deverão ser utilizadas, se possível, sem comprometimento dos itens anteriores. O objectivo é gerar software ao nível de aplicação, partindo de descrições de alto nível. A avaliação experimental deverá verificar técnicas individuais como tal, e os resultados deverão ser comparados com investigação relacionada. A abordagem global consiste em combinar os resultados das diferentes partes em princípios aplicáveis a futuros processos de produção das PMEs. Resultados O uso de arquitecturas orientadas a serviços (SOA) nas redes empresariais resolveu as limitações das arquitecturas orientadas a componentes no que diz respeito ao acoplamento através da standarização das interfaces, protocolos de comunicação, gestão de transacções, e segurança, entre outros. SOA ao nível do dispositivo é o resultado da importação de princípios SOA para os sistemas embebidos com algumas importantes diferenças, nomeadamente: inclusão de padrões de mensagens publish/subscribe, descoberta e descrição directa entre dispositivos, e modelos descritivos genéricos. Numa primeira fase, este trabalho validou os inúmeros trabalhos realizados sobre a aplicação de SOA ao nível do dispositivo em ambiente industrial com o teste num protótipo de célula de trabalho. De seguida foi levado a cabo um trabalho de avaliação comparativa entre duas SOA ao nível do dispositivo com estilos de arquitectura diferentes, servindo como base aos restantes desenvolvimentos da tese. Ainda que os resultados desta avaliação tenham mostrado o grande avanço proporcionado pelo uso de SOA, nomeadamente no que diz respeito ao desacoplamento entre componentes atingido, alguns aspectos críticos para o seu uso efectivo ainda estavam por resolver, designadamente: 1. A geração e a especificação dos serviços ao nível da tarefa 2 A definição de uma linguagem de orquestração adequada às SOA ao nível do dispositivo. Uma abordagem baseada em tarefas, quando relacionadas com processos de manufactura, consubstancia-se na capacidade de disponibilizar um mecanismo flexível (e amigável para o utilizador de uma PME) para a especificação das interfaces de rede. Os programas de robô são um elemento chave na flexibilidade do robô e este trabalho mostrou que o seu uso para a definição de interfaces vai elevar a fasquia da flexibilidade para o nível das interligações. A natureza procedimental de muitas linguagens de robô encaixa-se perfeitamente com o padrão de mensagens definido nas plataformas SOA, com uma mistura de variáveis de estado definidas a partir de variáveis do robô, e com acções definidas a partir de métodos da linguagem robô. A definição de uma linguagem de orquestração preencheu uma lacuna nos padrões de orquestração: sistemas conduzidos a eventos. Estes sistemas definem estados e transições de uma forma clara, potenciando a capacidade do utilizador de acompanhar o estado do sistema. Statecharts constituem um par adequado para a arquitectura SOA, uma vez que as transições de estado são baseadas em eventos, que no nosso caso são eventos na rede, mas os estados (e também as transições) incluem igualmente acções, que podem ser mapeadas para operações. A avaliação empírica efectuada mostrou uma previsível boa curva de aprendizagem para estes sistemas, em parte devido às vantagens associadas à sua semelhança a técnicas de automação tradicionais, como os Sequential Function Charts. Os resultados desta avaliação são positivos e justificam esforços suplementares para efectuar testes em aplicações reais, o que neste caso implica utilizadores de PME reais. Conclusões Três conclusões devem ser retiradas desta tese: A estratégia proposta para a especificação de serviços é um elemento chave no futuro do uso de SOA ao nível dos dispositivos, devido à importância da definição das interfaces no sucesso destas arquitecturas. A programação ao nível da tarefa é desta forma transferida da programação dos robôs para o nível da rede. Uma linguagem conduzida a eventos foi definida para a orquestração. Testes revelaram o seu uso e compatibilidade com as necessidades das células de fabrico das pequenas e médias empresas, nomeadamente estados explícitos e transições baseadas em eventos. Esta abordagem preenche uma lacuna nos padrões de orquestração existentes na indústria e constitui uma excelente base de trabalho para o futuro. Finalmente, foram abordadas técnicas baseadas em conhecimento, e avaliada a sua integração com a arquitectura definida anteriormente. Estes estudos mostraram a importância das estratégias descritivas e as inúmeras possibilidades abertas quando a semântica é adicionada aos sistemas industriais baseados em software, especialmente quando suportados em bem estabelecidas tecnologias de rede, como as descritas anteriormente. ; Our ability to manufacture well is the key to our wealth. Obtaining a wider range of different (and better) products in a sustainable way in terms of labour and environment is the big challenge faced by modern manufacturing. In the last few decades, automation has played a key role in the enhanced productivity of mass-production industries, but there has been a paradigm shift: global consumers ask for customization, leading manufacturers to target mass customization and consequently requiring new levels of flexibility for automation. An industrial robot is usually considered to be a flexible machine, which is only true within the large plant scenario. Small enterprises, which are by nature the most flexible ones, do not make use of robot systems as they could, because robot flexibility, which relies on reprogramming and reconfiguring, cannot be taken on by the SME (Small Medium Enterprises) worker at the workshop, and hiring specialists is unacceptable in terms of costs. The easy reconfiguration of a robotic work-cell, which is a distributed environment with computation in different platforms that are coordinated by software, is hindered greatly by the dependencies between cell components. This thesis addresses the problem of dependencies by proposing principles and mechanisms for the orchestration of complex manufacturing systems, i.e., the (semi-) automated coordination of their interactions in terms of communications and computer control. The industrial environment, especially regarding robotics, does not lend itself to theoretical analysis due to the amount of work needed to reach formal models. This is exacerbated in the unstructured SME environment and when working with user-in-the-loop systems. Therefore, the approach used in this thesis was mainly empirical, with validation through laboratory prototypes used by some representative users. The approach consisted of the following parts: 1. supporting loose coupling between components to promote simple composition of services to enable an easier reconfiguration; 2. defining unifying principles in terms of user interaction, by taking into account current robot technologies and improvements from other scientific areas, namely enterprise level networking; 3. enabling a task-based view of knowledge in terms of the manufacturing processes to promote the reconfiguration of the system by process rather than robotics specialists; 4. proposing declarative techniques that support easy configuration of the work-cell in terms understandable by the SME user. The use of service-oriented architectures (SOAs) in the business world has tackled the limitations of component-oriented architectures in terms of coupling through the standardization of interfaces, communication protocols, transaction management, and security, among others. Device-level SOA are the result of the porting of SOA principles to the embedded level with the addition of several important features, namely: publish/subscribe messaging patterns, peer-to-peer discovery description and generic templates. At an initial stage, this work has validated the current trend of using device-level SOA in industrial environments by testing their use against a prototype work-cell. Following this, a comparison was made between device-level SOA platforms that embodied two different architectural styles. This served as a basis for the rest of the thesis. Although the results from this evaluation have shown the great advances brought about by the use of device-level SOA, for instance in terms of decoupling, some critical issues for their effective use remained unchallenged, namely: 1. The generation and the specification of task-level services (contracts), with transparent and easy-to-use techniques for the SME user. 2. The definition of orchestration techniques adapted to the device-level SOA, with adequate expressiveness and simplicity for the SME user. A task-based view of knowledge in terms of manufacturing processes relies on the ability to provide a flexible (SME user-friendly) mechanism for the specification of network interfaces. Robot programs are the key element for robot flexibility. This work has shown that their use in interface definition will feature flexibility also at the interconnection level. The procedural nature of many robot programming languages copes perfectly with the device-level SOA messaging style, with a mixture of evented state variables defined by robot variables, and with actions defined by robot methods. The definition of an orchestration language has addressed a missing pattern in service orchestration: event-driven systems. These systems define states and transitions in a clear way, thus enhancing the user's ability to predict the state of the system. Statecharts provide a perfect match for the device-level SOA since the state-transitions are event-based, but the states (and the transitions) embody actions, which can be mapped to operations. The empiric evaluation made with several types of users has shown the predictable steep learning curve of these systems, partly due to their resemblance to traditional automation techniques like SFCs. The results are therefore positive and justify the effort of testing the system against real applications, which in this case means with real SME users. Descriptive techniques for software are one of the keys to establish the bridge between humans and computer programs. Despite recent evolutions, these techniques are not yet ready for use, and supportive technologies and methodologies need to be tested. In this work, a cell specification language has been defined and software developed that configures a programming-by-demonstration robotic work-cell. In conclusion, there are three main outcomes from this thesis. The proposed strategy for the specification of services is a key enabler in the future use of device-level SOA in industrial robotics, due to the importance of interface definition in the success of these architectures. Task-level programming is in this way extended from the robot programming level to networked devices. An event-driven language has been defined for the orchestration. Tests revealed its ease of use and compatibility with the orchestration needs of SME work-cells, namely: explicit states and event-based transitions. This approach fulfils a missing orchestration pattern in the industry, and provides an excellent basis for future work. A descriptive robotic cell specification has been introduced that supports the automatic workcell (re)configuration. This work has shown the importance of descriptive knowledge in automation, especially when supported by the networking integration techniques described previously. ; Project SMERobot, Integrated project funded under the European Union's Sixth Framework Programme (FP6)
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According to the latest polls,[1] the Labour Party is expected to win the British elections scheduled for 4 July. Keir Starmer may therefore lead the first non-Conservative government in the UK since 2010 and, most importantly, since the decision to leave the European Union following the 2016 Brexit referendum. The activation, for the first time in the history of the EU, of the clause in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) regulating the withdrawal of one of its member states, was an unprecedented event, followed by long political negotiations to regulate the divorce between Brussels and London. During that phase, the UK attitude was driven by the 'Global Britain' approach that dominated the Leave Campaign, revolving around the notion of the UK as an international power no longer held back by EU rules and procedures. The EU-UK relationship deteriorated profoundly amidst tensions and mutual accusations, driving them apart despite sharing numerous strategic goals and common interests. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed with the government led by Boris Johnson in December 2020 deliberately excluded matters of primary importance, such as foreign policy, security and defence cooperation, which became a priority following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Moscow's actions prompted London and Brussels to establish an initial form of informal dialogue on these issues, but without ever institutionalising their coordination. Starmer and some leading Labour figures, however, have already publicly expressed their intention to negotiate a strong agreement with the EU on foreign and security matters.[2] The outcome of the July elections could signal a new start in the relationship between Brussels and London, ending the prolonged post-Brexit conflict.The Trade and Cooperation Agreement The EU-UK TCA sets out preferential arrangements in areas such as trade in goods and services (with limited mutual market access), digital trade, intellectual property, public procurement, aviation and road transport, energy, fisheries, social security coordination, law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, while simultaneously sanctioning the end of the free movement of persons between the EU and the UK and the exit from the European Single Market.[3] Most significantly, it excludes formal cooperation between the two parties in security and defence matters, although it encourages the establishment of regular dialogues on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Article 765), small arms and light weapons and other conventional weapons (Article 766), the most serious crimes of concern to the international community (Article 767), cyber issues (Article 703) and counter-terrorism (Article 768).[4] The choice by Boris Johnson's government to leave such sensitive matters out of the scope of the TCA was a political one. Indeed, the previous government, led by Theresa May, had begun negotiating a post-Brexit agreement with the EU on defence and foreign policy cooperation. Johnson's decision to exclude these areas from the TCA was linked to the original idea of Brexit: that is, to supposedly allow the UK to regain total control in matters most sensitive to public opinion, such as security and migration. Johnson's vision was to pursue bilateral relations with individual member states rather than with the EU to relaunch the image of a 'Global Britain' as an international player. The outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in 2022, however, demonstrated how short-sighted this calculation was.The war against Ukraine as a (partial) game-changer The invasion of Ukraine profoundly changed the scenario and put foreign and security policy back at the centre of the relationship between London and Brussels. The EU and the UK have actively contributed to supporting Kyiv militarily, economically and politically. Ad hoc UK-EU coordination in sanctions, intelligence and the training of the Ukrainian armed forces intensified, even though with mixed results. Cooperation on sanctions against Russia proved the most successful, thanks to continuous exchange of information, cooperation in drawing up sanctions lists and support in implementation. In light of such success, a recent report by the European Affairs Committee of the House of Lords, advised the UK government to make these mechanisms permanent and to create new formats of structured dialogue for cooperation on foreign policy issues.[5] In terms of military assistance, the EU and UK have provided extensive support to Ukraine both financially and in training. EU member states had allocated a total of 28 billion euros by mid-March 2024, 5.6 billion euros from the EU's European Peace Facility (EPF). According to the House of Commons, the UK had committed a total of 7.6 billion pounds by the beginning of May for the 2024-2025 financial year.[6] The direct cooperation between the EU and the UK in defence has, however, been complicated by the British preference for bilateral relations.[7] Moreover, London remains sceptical about the EU's criteria for regulating the participation of third countries in defence industrial projects, for example, membership of the single market in order to be eligible for funds from the European Defence Agency (EDA). To date, the UK has demonstrated a tepid interest in the Military Mobility project,[8] which forms part of the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence (PESCO). At the institutional level, coordination between London and Brussels also seems to have yielded modest results. Despite Liz Truss' participation in the EU Foreign Affairs Council in March 2022, there have been no subsequent direct high-level political interactions between the two sides. Cooperation developed on a purely informal basis or in the context of broader, US-dominated alliances, such as the G7 and NATO. In the case of the training of Ukrainian troops, for instance, the main forum has been the US-led Ukraine Defence Contact Group – the Ramstein group. Looking ahead, however, these fora do not seem fully adequate to replace a cooperation agreement between the EU and the UK, given the partial divergence of objectives between the two sides within them.[9] In the case of NATO, for instance, the EU used the Ukrainian crisis as a catalyst to boost its role in defence industrial initiatives and in the joint development of capabilities with the Atlantic Alliance; this approach, however, created tensions with London, which has always been interested in the development of European capabilities only within NATO. Another forum for dialogue has been the European Political Community (EPC), which was established in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and took its first steps as a multilateral diplomatic forum aimed at promoting political dialogue and cooperation on the European continent.[10] However, the EPC has not promoted any concrete steps toward more structured formal relations. Moreover, the next meeting will be hosted by the UK on 18 July, immediately after the Westminster election and while the arrangements for the new European Commission and European Parliament majority are underway, with the real risk of limited participation and an ill-defined agenda. As a forum without formal structures, the EPC is largely dependent on the active participation of the various leaders, which makes its future uncertain.What future for the Westminster-Brussels relationship The war against Ukraine undoubtedly represented a turning point for EU-UK relations in terms of foreign, security and defence policy, without, however, achieving a significant step change in the formalisation of their cooperation. In light of the challenges posed to European security by the recent wave of international crises, from Ukraine to Gaza, a structured agreement is most helpful to regulate cooperation between the EU and UK. While the Conservatives always preferred an informal approach, the Labour Party has already expressed its intention to negotiate a strong agreement with Brussels, seeking closer coordination on "military, economic, climate, health, cyber, and energy security issues".[11] This structured dialogue would be developed through regular access to EU Foreign Affairs Council meetings, while at the bilateral level, the stated aim is to develop closer bilateral relations with France, Germany, Ireland and Poland.[12] Such an agreement would primarily facilitate the resolution of the limitations that have already been identified in the informal cooperation mechanisms, facilitating the expansion of the scope of the areas covered, thereby reducing inefficiencies and cooperation problems.[13] Secondly, it would mitigate the influence of political contingencies. In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the urgency of the situation enabled effective ad hoc coordination. However, in the long term, the establishment of formalised agreements would be conducive to greater continuity and stability, providing clear direction and impetus to drive issues of shared interest. This is all the more necessary in light of the upcoming US elections. A possible new Trump administration could significantly change US engagement in major international crises, altering the balance in those forums that have been strategic for the EU and the UK. London and Brussels may be required to assume greater responsibility for European security, for which informal dialogue may prove inadequate. Despite the benefits, however, there remain some knots that need to be cleared up, especially on the defence side. Indeed, it must be remembered that, from the EU perspective, the UK is first and foremost a third country. If, on the one hand, the EU considers London as an important security partner with considerable capabilities, on the other hand, it cannot afford to grant a privileged relationship compared to what is offered to other (more) friendly third countries, as it would risk devaluing the Union's own membership. Brussels probably wants to avoid a repetition of what happened in the past when the British adopted non-dialogue positions on the integration process of defence policies. Notably, even the Labour Party is adopting a cautious approach on these matters. While it proposed "a more formal partnership agreement" on sanctions and "new mechanisms for cooperation on hybrid threats", energy security, organised crime, intelligence exchanges, and new technologies between EU and UK", vague statements have been included on defence such as a "properly bespoke relationship".[14] From London's perspective, the most significant challenge appears to be the EU regulations governing the involvement of third-party actors in defence integration projects. This is exemplified by the PESCO initiative, where the UK would be unable to influence strategic planning but would be obliged to align itself with the decisions of EU member states. These challenges notwithstanding, a structured agreement appears to be most beneficial for both parties, as demonstrated by the response to the war against Ukraine. The European Parliament has also recently welcomed a greater institutionalisation of the relationship, suggesting the participation of British representatives in the Foreign Affairs Committee on an ad hoc basis. After the election, the first political choice that will have to be made concerns the degree of formalisation of the relationship. The TCA is largely a technical agreement without substantial political input, which makes it difficult to solve issues that may arise. A more structured approach would require a minimum degree of political coordination. In this sense, the EU has experience in 'political dialogues' with third countries for cooperation on foreign and security policy that integrate trade deals with "varying degrees of formalisation" of political interaction.[15] A more agile alternative could be a joint statement which commits the two parties to regular political input and meetings. However this coordination will be framed, the outcome of the July election in the UK is likely to offer a window of opportunity for greater dialogue between the UK and the EU on foreign and security policy that should not be wasted.Luca Cinciripini is a Researcher in the EU, Politics and Institutions programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Economist, "How Will Britain Vote on July 4th?", in The Economist, 22 May 2024, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2024/05/22/how-will-britain-vote-on-july-4th.[2] George Parker, "Keir Starmer Pledges to Seek Major Rewrite of Brexit Deal", in Financial Times, 17 September 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/6bdc4e88-c2ed-44ad-aa7d-c70bc358e027.[3] European Commission website: The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, https://commission.europa.eu/node/4617_en.[4] Jannike Wachowiak, Richard G. Whitman and Joelle Grogan, "UK-EU Foreign, Security & Defence Cooperation", in UK in a Changing Europe Reports, 27 March 2024, p. 9, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/?p=56983.[5] House of Lords European Affairs Committee, "The Ukraine Effect: The Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine on the UK–EU Relationship", in HL Papers, No. 48 (31 January 2024), paragraph 302, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/43134/documents/214562/default.[6] Ian Bond and Luigi Scazzieri, "Working Hand in Hand? EU-UK Co-operation in Supporting Ukraine", in CER Policy Briefs, May 2024, p. 3, https://www.cer.eu/node/10918.[7] Cleo Davies and Jannik Wachowiak, "UK-EU Relations Tracker Q1 2024", in UK in a Changing Europe Reports, 9 May 2024, p. 9, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/?p=57362.[8] The project aims at standardising cross-border military transport procedures and the movement of military personnel and assets within the borders of the EU, avoiding long bureaucratic procedures. See PESCO website: Military Mobility (MM), https://www.pesco.europa.eu/project/military-mobility.[9] Richard G. Whitman, "The Role of the UK in a New European Security Architecture", in Heinrich Böll Stiftung Analysis, 26 January 2024, https://www.boell.de/en/node/76635.[10] Luca Cinciripini, "Virtues and Limitations of the European Political Community after the Granada Summit", in IAI Commentaries, No. 23|56 (October 2023), https://www.iai.it/en/node/17729.[11] David Lammy, "The Case for Progressive Realism", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 3 (May/June 2024), p. 125-135 at p. 131, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/node/1131579.[12] Ibid.[13] Benjamin Martill and Monika Sus, "UK-EU Security Cooperation after Ukraine", in Judy Dempsey's Strategic Europe, 25 January 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2024/01/uk-eu-security-cooperation-after-ukraine.[14] Jannike Wachowiak, Richard G. Whitman and Joelle Grogan, "UK-EU Foreign, Security & Defence Cooperation", cit., p. 14.[15] With the EU-Canada Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) "being a particularly developed example". Ibid., p. 17.
Editorial Editorial Welcome to this special doctoral workshop on Research Methodology which forms part of what is now a well-established support mechanism for researchers in the discipline of the Built Environment and more particularly construction management. The ARCOM doctoral series, around now for some seventeen years, has addressed many of the diverse research areas that PhD researchers in the discipline have chosen to focus on in their doctoral journey. This doctoral workshop has as an aim to offer an opportunity to explore and share research and the theoretical underpinnings facing PhD researchers within the construction and engineering sectors where the focus is on not just the topics of research but on the research approach underpinning that work. This workshop provides the opportunity for AEC researchers to come together in an environment where support for their approach to their research enquiry is offered by way of creating the correct conditions to share and discuss their journey. There is evidence to suggest there are many PhD students who would benefit from an environment where they can share their research phenomenon and this workshop session will allow for discourse and interaction to enable 'learning to take place' together. In these proceedings are the seven final papers selected from some fourteen abstracts presented for review. It is important to recognize that the papers selected offer the opportunity for participants to learn from each other but also learn from the guidance of academics in the community who have a depth of knowledge around different methodological approaches. The process of selection for the workshop, while closely aligned with the ARCOM conference proceedings, is such that it is aimed at selecting papers within the scope of the topic but very much directed to allowing doctoral researchers' the opportunity to present work in progress where formative and developmental review can be offered through a constructive support mechanism. The context of each paper is diverse which has added to the richness of this edition of the doctoral workshop series. All papers have been peer reviewed and each author has had the opportunity to receive feedback and update/ improve their paper. Alqatawneh's paper research through design as an approach to investigate design fiction insights and sees focuses on design fiction (DF) as an approach to speculation about the future using a combination of prototyping and storytelling, a type of scenario story telling if you like. They unpack the notion of DF through a link to its five criteria and principles, bringing together the notion of design - the capacity to imagine and make concrete products not yet in existence, and services for everyday life. This research employs research through design approach to investigate the functionality of fiction in design. Further, to explain the notion of design fiction and arising from using fiction in both design practice and design research the author defends the use of this methodology. Alqatawneh argues that the outcome knowledge is utilised to adapt and present fictional objects that suggest pathways to possible futures and sues the example of Self-Driving Vehicles to exemplify this.-.The author argues that DF offers the potential to consider far-reaching questions concerning the consequences of technological development while drawing attention to the social aspects and implications of techno-scientific solutions. Colley and Scott address the philosophical positioning of functional contextualism as an approach to research conflict of interest in the real estate sector in Ireland. In examining the research question of good practice for managing conflict of interest in the real estate valuation process within Ireland a number of research methodologies were engaged with and considered. The author's proffer that once a review of literature in the field has been accomplished a central question arises for the researcher, that of a philosophical position so that the research can be addressed in what they suggest is the 'correct way'. They offer an overall pragmatic approach to the central issues of the formation of an individual's ethical viewpoint and behaviours, the nature of the ethical challenges faced within the real estate 3 valuation process and the possible frameworks that may influence an individual's behaviour going forward. Within the pragmatic realm they argue for a more focused lens of Functional Contextualism. Functional contextualists they suggest seeks to predict and influence events using empirically-based concepts and rules and this they contend addresses the research question suitably. Emphasis is placed on highlighting the areas of the approach that fit and also those that require omission due to their lack of suitability to the subject under investigation. Overall they make the case for using the most appropriate methodological position through correct grounding with research methods that allow the researcher to progress without 'conflict'. Kelly in his paper addressing the impact of human cogitative behaviour and tacit judgement on the development and accuracy of cost estimates for pharmaceutical projects in Ireland and makes the strong case for researching this topic through the lens of 'more thoughtful research design'. He contends that 'more thoughtful research design' would get to the real reasons for cost overruns rather than using the convenient 'default responses' that continuously point in the wrong direction. He makes the case for a 'paradigm shift' towards the general use of the newer non-traditional types of building project contract price forecasting models and there is evidence that this has not been generally achieved. In considering his roadmap through the research topic he suggests the challenge with this proposed research is the adoption and justification of the research methodology. He argues for mixed-method research, methods that require positivist and interpretevist methods as well as multi-paradigm and multi-strategy approaches. The challenges, he contends, include the many different conflicts. For example how the researcher sees the world and the epistemological commitments needed which may cause confusion with the stated committed rules the research might follow and that will impact on the use of both positivism and interpretivism paradigms as well as qualitative and quantitative information. Mdaanayka and Egbu in their paper explore innovative solutions in consideration of exploring the possibilities for improving the utilisation of digital technologies via integrating BIM, Big Data Analytics and Internet of things (together aka BBI )which has the potential to give organisations the long awaited competitive advantage. The study follows a mixed methodological approach which leads to investigate the critical factors that impact on effective implementation and exploitation of BBI for competitive advantage and thereby develop a strategic framework for improved understanding of such critical factors at play. They argue for mixed methods based on epistemological, ontological and axiological perspectives. The factors associated with the research, they argue, fall in to four main themes inter alia; organisational size, culture, structure and skills-knowledge-training needs. The latter will be demonstrated as a separate skill-knowledge-Inventory (SKI). Their philosophical stance is a combination of interpretivist and positivist. They argue for an approach that holds a mixture of inductive and deductive means in different stages as the study starts from literature review to develop the strategic framework consisting of critical factors. Their data collection methods in this study will be the use of semi-structured interviews in pilot study phase and questionnaire surveys in the main study phase. Focus group approach is intended to be employed to validate the framework and SKI. They make the case for mixed methods as the multidimensional constructs/ variable implications demand such methods. O'Cleirigh deals with research within the construction industry which is primarily based on qualitative and quantitative methods but has the potential to include studies that combine both methodologies. The research review considers and outlines the various methods and the differing views of the purists from both traditions, while re-examines the 'war' between them 4 and thus proffers the arguments for and against using mixed-methods. O'Cleirigh also demonstrates that some commonalities and a relationship exist between quantitative and qualitative approaches to social science research and that his research explores that relationship in context to the construction industry. The author resolves to position mixed methods as a bridge between traditional qualitative and quantitative research. Discussion, he commends, centre on implications arising from the observation that, models upon which qualitative and quantitative methods are based, have differing philosophical views of real world research and consequently differing views of the research subject. O'Cleirigh strongly argues this positioning will aid advancement of industry knowledge by adapting methods used in academia through providing a robust framework, for construction managers, for designing and undertaking mixed methods research. He makes the point that mixed methods research will become increasingly successful as more construction managers study, use and spread the underpinning philosophy. Opiya and Chan, address the topic of the need for affordable housing and make the point that it has in recent times become a prominent policy issue for countries across the world. Among various challenges to affordable housing sector is the failure of supply to keep up with this growing demand. Consequently, they argue it is unsurprising to find a wealth of studies that focus on supply-side concerns of accommodating increasing demand for affordable housing. Through their research they have found studies tended to emphasize the role providers such as developers, contractors and government institutions can play to improve capacity and capability in the production of affordable housing. The point they do make, because of such emphasis has meant the relative neglect on the demand side. In their review, consideration of the problem of 'demand' to identify fresh perspectives on understanding the challenges associated with affordable housing is called for. They make the case for opening the complexities of studying 'demand' by researching a range of disciplines. The case for inter- disciplinary research aimed to understand a complex problem. They make the point that from an economic perspective, 'demand' is often framed in quantitative terms where balancing supply and demand results from rational, technological choices made by individual actors in the marketplace. They go on to make the point that a linear approach to 'demand' runs counter to a sociological understanding, where the realization is produced by complexes of social practices. They exemplify this making reference to a linguistic turn, the etymology of 'demand' stems from the Latin phrase de mandare, which means 'to formally order'. They proffer from this 'demand' is not simply defined by exogenous forces of the market, but also raises questions as to how society is brought to order. Relating this position to the context of affordable housing, they make the case understanding 'demand' also raises the need to examine ways in which vulnerable segments of society are excluded from formally ordering their requirements. In this review, we will reflect on various perspectives of 'demand' to raise questions about power relations and the problem of building a more inclusive society through housing. While the methodological approach is partly addressed in the paper the authors argue for a methodology that can be adaptable to deal with the complexity that surrounds the various perspectives of 'demand'. Abiodun and Egbu in their paper, Implementation of building information modelling (BIM) on construction projects, is increasing gaining global acceptance as government from various countries are becoming the driving force for its adoption. The purpose of this paper is to present the research methodology and method to be adopted for this research. They present the aim and the objectives of the research, a set of research questions and then propose an approach to move towards methodological positioning. The paper discussed the various 5 research paradigms and philosophical positions available to all researcher and position the research on one considered to be most suitable to achieve the stated aim and objectives of the study. The argument around their justification is well made and the paper further discussed the various research approaches, methods and strategies available. In each case, a position was adopted for the research and attempts were made to justify the position adopted. Abiodun and Egbu conclude by proposing a research design method to be followed that allows the researcher achieve the research aim and objectives but that is fit for purpose. The authors of the papers are to be commended for taking the courageous step in sharing their methodological and philosophical positioning, particularly as novice researchers it can be daunting to 'put on work out there'. It is a pleasure to be associated with this important aspect of the work of ARCOM and the continued support for this type of 'scaffolded experience' for the novice researchers, as they make their own personal research journey, should be supported into the future! Finally, there is a need to address the gaps in methodological approach and allow researchers flourish and blossom by allowing them the opportunity to experiment within their chosen research domain. "It is often necessary to take a decision on the basis of knowledge sufficient for action, but insufficient to satisfy the intellect." Attributed to Kant 1724 - 1804 Professor Lloyd Scott, 09th March 2018
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Many countries with scheduled elections this year face a difficult choice in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic: how to balance public health considerations with holding a free and fair election. Learn more from NDI Senior Associate and Director of Electoral Programs Pat Merloe and Program Director Julia Brothers as they talk about democratic back-sliding during this crisis, electoral integrity, and ways civil society organizations can still make a difference. Find us on: SoundCloud | Apple Podcasts | Spotify | RSS | Google Play Pat Merlow: In the public health crisis, especially where governments are weak or people are suspicious of governments, trusted voices are really important to get out accurate information. Julia Brothers: Hello, this is Julia Brothers. I'm the Program Director for Elections at the National Democratic Institute. Welcome to Dem Works. JB: Around the world, the COVID-19 pandemic is sewing insecurity among the public, which can be exploited by authoritarians to consolidate power in sideline democratic institutions. It also poses severe technical, political, and social threats to elections themselves. In many countries, the effects of the virus may strain citizen relationships with government and elected [inaudible] officials, intensify political tensions and the potentials for violence, disenfranchise voters and increase conditions for democratic backsliding. Today I'm joined by Pat Merlow, senior associate and director of electoral programs at NDI. Welcome to the podcast, Pat. Thank you for being here. Pat Merlow: Hi, Julia. JB: So the COVID-19 crisis is causing enormous challenges for every country, including those with scheduled elections this year. What are the biggest concerns deciding whether to hold or postpone elections? PM: Elections must be held in ways that safeguard public health and in ways that ensure genuine opportunities for the electorate to vote. Universal and equal suffrage, which is in every modern constitution, means inclusion, not exclusion. So we have to also hold elections in ways where the political parties and the candidates have a fair chance to compete for votes without a playing field that's being manipulated or intentionally or unintentionally tilted in one party's favor. So striking a proper democratic balance of public safety and credible election processes is different and really difficult in every country. Depends a lot on the level of economic and technological development in the country on the nature of social cohesion versus divisions in the country and political polarization. So in many countries where NDI works, the concern is whether authoritarians will rush through elections with undue public health risks in order to gain an electoral advantage or to postpone elections under conditions that advantage their attempts to gain and maintain more power. A second troubling circumstance in countries that are unstable or prone to various kinds of violence, where constrains of the public health crisis can be used by malign actors to flood the population with this information... I mean we're hearing this term infodemic; also hate speech and other means to scapegoat religious or ethnic minorities, LGBTQ people or women in order to gain political advantage. That's not all the countries where NDI works, but even those are neither authoritarian nor fragile states, the COVID-19 crisis is still posing gigantic challenges both on the public health and to electoral integrity. JB: Right. I mean these factors present themselves as challenges to electoral integrity, not just where there might be bad faith actors that are trying to utilize this crisis to consolidate power, but also just in addressing basic issues related to how to make sure that you're maximizing participation during a public health crisis. What are some of the factors that these countries would need to think about in terms of actually implementing elections either during a public health crisis or immediately after. PM: There really are a number of factors that have to be considered. So the first thing that comes to everybody's mind of course is what do you do? Can people actually go to polling places or should they be under some sort of the shelter in place lockdown-like circumstances. That doesn't just affect whether to vote. That really has to do with whether you can register to vote safely or not. In countries where there are not a high level of electronic engagement where the digital divide falls really widely across broad swipes of the population, gathering those people into places to register to vote or to vote is really the only means of doing it. So the question of a postponement becomes really an operative question. Then we're concerned with what are the conditions for the postponement and how does that interrelate with the declarations of states of emergency, whether they're being done properly with the kinds of constraints on limitations on powers or whether they're being done in ways that usurp power. JB: Yeah. I think one of the major concerns, especially thinking about citizens being able to participate in the process, is that during a pandemic, if voters are concerned about going out to vote, chances are that that's not going to be an equal distribution among the population, where there are a vulnerable populations that will be more impacted. You'll see disproportionate levels of low turnout among certain communities like senior citizens or persons with disabilities or women who disproportionately have the burden of childcare and are in a situation where you don't have options for even temporary childcare because of social distancing regulations. Well, this seems like a good place to take a short break. For more than 35 years, NDI has been honored to work with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help countries develop the institution's practices and skills necessary for democracy success. Welcome back. JB: So we talked a bit about the postponements that we're seeing around the world in terms of electoral timelines. Are election observers relevant during electoral delays, especially if there's restrictions on movement in the population if they're under some form of shelter in place or lockdown. PM: Yeah. So Julie, you mentioned that NDI works in more than 70 countries and in fact, working with nonpartisan citizen groups and coalitions and various organizations is one of the hallmarks of NDI's work over more than 35 years now and certainly the 25 years where I've been involved. There's a network of citizen election observers, there are nine of them in various regions of the world and they're amalgamated in more than 250 organizations from 90 countries. Those organizations have been sharing best practices and ideas about what can be done. So let me just quickly mention a couple of them. There are four areas where they have been able to focus. One are ways to assist; that is, to assist public health agencies and the electoral authorities to bring about safe elections and fair elections. The second is ways to address authoritarian opportunism and how states of emergency and various conditions are being used by those who would usurp the citizens of power. The third are ways to address disinformation, hate speech and attempts at hyperpolarization that influence and create unfair conditions for elections. The fourth way is to address, as you mentioned earlier, examples of where a health crisis can lead to disenfranchisement or further tilt the playing field so that it's an unfair circumstance. JB: Yeah, I mean you mentioned especially tracking the authoritarian leaders who are potentially taking advantage of the health crisis to grab power and subvert democracy and in some unstable countries, this can threaten heightened instability. What can election servers be doing to address that or what are they currently doing to address that? PM: The most important thing is citizen election observers in all kinds of countries have been time tested and over the series of elections cycles two, three, even four in many countries, they've built national networks and they've established themselves as trusted voices. In a public health crisis, especially where governments are weak or people are suspicious of government, trusted voices are really important to get out accurate information from the health authorities, accurate information from the electoral authorities about what to do, where to do things and so on. Also, they have networks that can collect information; even during lockdowns. You and I were in a conversation with one of the partner organizations with whom we work in Sri Lanka just last week. The head of that organization is working on a civil society task force. That task force is considering how to gain access to women's shelters, to older people's homes, to places where there's foster children's care, drug treatment centers, and so on because these are vulnerable populations that are being hit hard by the crisis. One of the things that he pointed out in our conversation is that the government is taking advantage of the postponement of the election for electoral advantage by handing out dry goods to citizens and even medical supplies through the political party rather than as an impartial governmental service to the people. So the question that he posed was, even during lockdown, is there a way that our network of over 1,000 people could begin to document this and report it so that we can lift up to the public the nature of this problem that's coming about and see if we can't get some accountability and get them to cut back. So even during a lockdown, it's possible for the citizen observer groups to do things that are extraordinarily relevant. JB: Yeah, I mean it seems like there are certainly opportunities for electoral observers to be monitoring the kinds of things that they would normally be looking at in a pre-election period when their elections are delayed... Issues related to is the government still helping to create conditions for a credible and competitive process in the midst of a public health emergency. Are conditions being put in place to ensure that marginalized populations are not sidelined from the process. But it also kind of expands it a little bit too in that there are these potentially other issues that that groups may consider looking at. Like you mentioned, how health resources are being distributed and what kinds of policy changes are being made and how were those being made? What's the decision-making process around things like delaying the elections, around emergency voting procedures? Are they inclusive? Are all the parties being brought in to them? Is civil society be brought into these discussions and taking a look at some of these new conditions that observers may otherwise not necessarily be monitoring in a pre-election period. I think the other issue here is there are constraints here in terms of potentially being able to deploy a bunch observers out into the field to collect information if you're in a lockdown situation. So it's been interesting talking with groups to see how they're thinking creatively about how they can collect some of this information remotely. What kind of data exists that you can collect whether it's open data sources from the government looking at budgets, looking at how budgets are changing and how resources are moving. You mentioned looking at disinformation, being able to monitor social media and seeing what data could be collected from that. It's been interesting to see how citizen election observers around the world are getting creative and still doing their jobs while being sometimes trapped at home. PM: Absolutely. You mentioned the disinformation... One of the things that we've been seeing is that in Russia for example, they have been making use of the COVID crisis to begin to track people even more carefully to introduce facial recognition technologies and cameras. The term that's been throwing around is cybergulags being created there. With China's facial recognition technologies and the way that's been used to suppress the weaker minorities, China has been introducing that working with governments and other places in the world to try to get that into voter registration so that you have biometric voter registration data that includes facial recognition technology. So in this era, getting access to government decision making, getting access even to the health data and disaggregated by gender, by vulnerable groups and so on is part of the work that election observers normally do. Demanding open electoral data can lead easily to the same kinds of advocacy around open health data. One of the other things I thought that you've touched on that's interesting is the states of emergencies and the relationships between that and postponement. There's more than 45 countries at this point that have postponed elections at the national and sub-national level. Not all of them are problematic by any means, but in a lot of countries, there have been extended states of emergency without any end date. The postponements have no end date on them. One of the things that election observers can do is to join with... And many of them are human rights organizations and bringing about the rules that have been established in the international arena for limiting the duration of states of emergencies, that the measures that are taken have to be proportionate to the nature of the threat to the nation to bring those issues up and do advocacy around them and to help those of us in the international arena be aware of where these problems are in various countries. JB: With that, I think we'll take a quick break. We'll be back after this quick message. One of the things that Secretary Albright has said is that it's absolutely essential for young people to understand that they must participate and that they are the energy behind democracy. You can hear more from other democracy heroes by listening to our Dem Works podcast. It is available on iTunes and SoundCloud. So before the break, we were talking about the role that citizen election monitors are playing in the COVID-19 crisis and its impact on electoral integrity. Are there other considerations that citizen election groups should be thinking about in the need for electoral integrity in their countries? I'm thinking especially related to how groups can make sure that their observers are safe while also being able to collect information and an advocate for critical processes and good governance. PM: That's really a critical question, Julia. A good example that comes to mind is in Mali, which has had very few reported cases of COVID-19, there was a parliamentary election just two weeks ago. The government, for national security reasons, has had to postpone those elections for almost two years and they were really in a phase of saying we need to push it ahead. In fact, there had not been a reported COVID-19 death until just a few hours before the election date. So it went forward and the citizen observers with which NDI has been working in that country in the weeks leading up to that advocated that the polling stations had to have masks for the staff; had to have gloves; had to have hand sanitizers or hand washing stations because hand sanitizer is hard to get in a lot of places in Mali. They made sure that their observers had those materials themselves. I think 1,500 observers went out to polling stations across the country. In their own headquarters and gathering data, there was social distancing that took place and they did a lot of checking in with their observers about how they were doing, how they were feeling over the course of the day. So one thing that the citizen observers can do is to join with organizations that are health advocates for those places where either voter registration is about to take place or voting is about to take place to ensure that the conditions minimize the risk. We just saw this over this past weekend in the elections that were held in South Korea. Whether or not you might think that the election should go forward, there was a country where there's a lot of public confidence in what the government has been doing and in the integrity of the election authorities and voter turnout was not terribly affected by this. So there is something that can be done immediately and as you have mentioned, there are numerous things that can be looked at by citizen observers without ever really leaving their homes or their headquarters. One of those, as you mentioned, is disinformation. Our partners in Georgia, for example, have uncovered a link between Russian propaganda, which has gone up around disinformation around COVID-19 and linking it to destabilizing public trust in Georgia's government. There's a really interesting report that they came out with just last week on that front. So how does COVID-19 and elections interface is something that can be explored in a number of dimensions. JB: We've talked mostly about the work of nonpartisan civil society organizations and their own countries that are confronting this challenge. Is there a role for international election observers on terms of electoral oversight during a public crisis, especially knowing that they will have some of the same if not even more constraints than citizen election monitors? PM: It's a very difficult role at the moment for international election observers. We've been in touch with our colleagues at the African Union and the European Union, at the United Nations and Organization of American States and so on. Many of them have been bringing teams home from countries. Some of them have been postponing or canceling sending teams out. At the same time, there are a number of things that international observers can do. As you mentioned, you can look at things from a distance. You can review the legal framework, which is part of what every international election observation and citizen observers do. You can compare what has been done over the past few cycles of elections, where recommendations have been made, whether those recommendations were acted upon or whether you find the same problem repeating in the next report and prioritize the issues that you might look to and even be able to inform diplomats and others about things that they should be raising with government. You can look at disinformation and other information disorder, hate speech and so on, from afar. Certainly you can tune in with what the critical people inside a country who are working on these issues have been doing. You can conduct some long distance interviews with key people in the citizen groups and in the election authorities and the political leaders to learn their opinions about what the state of play is in the country and their concerns going forward. But when it comes time to put people on the ground, we have to look at travel restrictions. We have to look at countries where foreigners have been seen as people who bring in COVID-19 and there's been violence against them; so security of observers is important. And the numbers of people who may go or where they may be deployed depending upon hotspots in the country and so on. So this is something that over the course of this year will be a challenge. And the next thing will be a challenge for international election observers is that as so many elections are being postponed, they're being postponed probably towards the end of this year or the beginning of next year, which already has many scheduled elections. So there may be an overwhelming demand for which the supply of financial and human resources runs short. JB: It does seem like at this point, especially knowing that international election observers in a lot of the places just can't deploy right now, one of the roles to play here is really trying to raise the voices of the citizen groups on the ground that are able to actually do some on the ground observation. Also keeping in mind, especially for the places we're concerned about authoritarian overreach, thinking about how we can use some of these international mechanisms to push back on democratic backsliding and mitigate tensions in places where it could potentially be a bit more unstable with the current situation. PM: You're right. That's the contribution that the international community can do, too... To really amplify the voices of the citizenry and to augment their efforts to bring about respect for civil and political rights. When you have a network of thousands of citizens who have taken the time and the effort to go out of their homes, into the street, to look at what the nature of the threats of violence or vote buying or intimidation to document how these things of disproportionally driven women or restricted women's political and electoral participation, would they have taken the time to go into polling stations, sometimes under threat or coercion? These people have become a solid core of citizen empowerment in so many countries around the world, and each of those citizens, of course, is using WhatsApp and other ways of talking and they're influencers within a country. They can gather information, they can give accurate information out, but as they report up through their networks, if there's good collaboration between the reputable citizen groups and the credible international election observers and the international community more broadly, we can use that cooperation that we've been working on over the years to try to bring attention, even when it's hard to shine a light directly on problems in countries that are being affected by this crisis and facing political challenges and stress. JB: Well, thank you again, Pat, for joining us. I think this has been a particularly relevant discussion. I'd also like to say thank you to our listeners. To learn more about NDI or to listen to other Dem Works podcasts, please visit our website@www.ndi.org PM: Thank you, Julia and thank you to the listeners.
10/28/2020 University Journal - March 2014 www.fresnostatejournal.com/vol17no6/index.html 1/8 March 2014 Vol. 17 No. 6 Arts | FYI | Newsmakers | Service | Sports FEATURE STORY: Diversity Forum addresses race relations A day-long forum to address the challenges in exploring the importance of diversity on campus was hosted Feb. 19 byPresident Castro and the President's Commission on Human Relations and Equity. See the full story with video here. Dr. Frank Lamas is new vice president for Student Affairs President Joseph I. Castro has appointed Frank R. Lamas as the new vice president forStudent Affairs effective July 1, 2014. Lamas, who has more than 30 years of administrativeexperience in higher education, has been vice president for Student Affairs and dean ofstudents at the University of Texas at Arlington for nearly nine years. A native of Havana, Cuba,and raised in Syracuse, N.Y., he is a first-generation college student. Read the full story. Provost search nets three finalists Fresno State's nationwide search for a provost and vice president for Academic Affairs hasresulted in three finalists who will visit the campus to meet with faculty, staff and students. The new provost will succeedDr. William A. Covino, who became president of California State University, Los Angeles in September. The candidates are: Dr. Christopher Ingersoll, dean of the College of Health Professions – Central Michigan University Dr. Scott Ryan, dean of the School of Social Work – The University of Texas at Arlington Dr. Lynnette Zelezny, associate provost – California State University, Fresno Construction begins on Campus Pointe retail phase, 'The Squ are' Construction of Fresno's newest retail center was formally launchedon Feb. 10 with groundbreaking for "The Square at Campus Pointe."The first 12 business tenants were announced for the project onChestnut north of Shaw, near the Save Mart Center and Highway168.10/28/2020 University Journal - March 2014 www.fresnostatejournal.com/vol17no6/index.html 2/8 The Square is the next phase of the 45-acre mixed-use developmentCampus Pointe project, a public/private partnership between theCalifornia State University, Fresno Association, Inc. and KashianEnterprises, the master developer of the project. Read the full story . President Castro, Chancellor White speak at African-American churches Chancellor Timothy P.White and PresidentJoseph I. Castro spoke atAfrican-American churchesSunday, Feb. 16, as part of CSU Super Sunday — the flagship event of the CSU African-American Initiative that focuses on closing the collegeachievement gap for African-American students. Throughout California, CSU campus presidents, trustees, the chancellor andother higher education officials spoke from the pulpit about college readinessand the possibilities for obtaining financial aid. Launched in 2005, CSU SuperSunday is an annual event where leaders throughout the 23 CSU campuseswork together in a united effort to give underrepresented students the toolsneeded to successfully enter college. To date, almost 500,000 churchgoershave received information about financial aid, been introduced to the 23 CSUcampuses and learned how to achieve academic success at the university. Read the full story and view photo gallery . FACULTY / STAFF SPOTLIGHT Madhusudan Katti's international research team uncovers urban biodive Can thriving urban areas support biodiversity in plants and birds?Surprisingly, yes, according to worldwide research findings ofFresno State Associate Professor Madhusudan Katti and aninternational team. The findings were published in the biologicalresearch journal Proceedings of the Royal Society B. Contrary toconventional wisdom that cities are a wasteland for biodiversity, thestudy found that overall the mix of species in cities reflects theunique biotic heritage of their geographic location. See the fullstory . Benjamin Boone takes music education to the masses Music Professor Benjamin Boone, a composer and accomplished jazzmusician, has been drawing headlines for his "Inside the Music" pre-concertlectures with the Fresno Philharmonic. The lecture series was recentlyfeatured in the Fresno Bee . See the full story . John Capitman appointed to air quality board Dr. John Capitman, executive director for the Central Valley HealthPolicy Institute, was appointed by California Governor Jerry Brown to theSan Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District GoverningBoard. See the full story . FYI 10/28/2020 University Journal - March 2014 www.fresnostatejournal.com/vol17no6/index.html 3/8 First Jensen Pistachio professor joins plant science faculty A $1.5 million pledge last year from the California Pistachio Research Board to the Jordan Collegeof Agricultural Sciences and Technology brings Dr. Timothy Spann to Fresno State conductadvanced research and education for the pistachio industry. Read the full story. Inventory of keys is coming; watch for email A campus-wide inventory of keys will be conducted in coming weeks. All administrators, staff andfaculty will receive an email from Bob Boyd, associate vice president of Facilities Management, asking you to logon to awebpage to report the physical keys you have. This information will be reconciled against the Lockshop records.Thisinventory process will also provide you a convenient opportunity to return any keys no longer needed. If you have anyquestions about this process, contact the Lockshop at 278.2172. View a short video on this project. On-site Employee Assistance Program counselor taking appointments Fresno State has selected an on-site, part-time Employee Assistance Program counselor, David Crabtree, throughEmpathia our current provider of EAP services. Appointment times are available 9 a.m. to 2 p.m. on Monday , Tuesday , Thursday and Friday . A licensed clinical social worker, Crabtree is available to provide counseling services to all activefaculty, staff and their family members. His direct phone is 278.1655 and email address is dcrabtree@csufresno.edu . Hisoffice is Lab School Room 185 (confidential side door entry for scheduled appointments). Advancement team wins four communications awards The Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE) Western district awarded four honors for excellence toFresno State's Division of Advancement. The university earned a silver award for a magazine insert on former universityPresident John D. Welty. Bronze awards were earned by the Fresno State Alumni Association for the "What Day Is It? It'sHump Day!" video, University Communications editor Eddie Hughes for a Fresno State Magazine story introducing newuniversity President Joseph I. Castro and photographer Cary Edmondson for a water image of Fresno State footballplayer Davante Adams . The awards were presented by the CASE District VII, which represents universities in Arizona,California, Guam, Hawaii, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands and Utah. Provost's Awards nominations due April 4 Nominations are being accepted through April 4 for the Provost's Awards for the 2013-2014 academic year. Students,faculty, and staff are encouraged to submit nominations of full-time tenured and tenure-track faculty, or an academicprogram for the Assessment of Learning award. Nominations may be submitted in the following categories: Excellence in Teaching Technology in Education Graduate Teaching and Mentoring Faculty Service Distinguished Achievement in Research, Scholarship, or Creative Accomplishment Promising New Faculty Award Distinguished Achievement in Assessment of Learning (Department award) Nomination forms and instructions are available online and in the Office of the Provost, Haak Administration CenterRoom 4116, Henry Madden Library, 4th floor. Peach Blossom Festival is March 13-14 The 56th annual Peach Blossom Festival of Oral Interpretation will be March 13-14 at various locations on campus withapproximately 6,000 children representing nearly 200 San Joaquin Valley elementary schools. The event is hosted by theDepartment of Communication. For more information call 8-4419 or go to www.peachblossomfestival.com . Secret Garden party and Leo Politi Garden rededication, April 13 The Arne Nixon Center Advocates (ANCA) invites you to attend the annual Secret Garden party and Leo Politi Gardenrededicationon April 13, from 3 to 5 p.m. at the Politi Garden on the east side of the Madden Library. The party is ANCA'smajor annual fundraising event, with all profits going to the Arne Nixon Center. Leo Politi was the Caldecott Award-winning illustrator and/or author of over three dozen books. A Fresno native whorelocated to Los Angeles, he was a good friend of Professor Arne Nixon often returned to Fresno to participate in Nixon'schildren's literature classes and festivals. The Politi Garden was created with funds raised by ANCA to honor the specialfriendship between the two men. Paul Politi and Suzanne Bischof, the son and daughter of the late Leo Politi, will attendthe rededication. For more information or to make reservations, please send email to jsanford@csufresno.edu . CLEAR launches a new peer-reviewed journal The Center for Leadership, Equity and Research (CLEAR) has launched " The CLEARvoz Journal ," a quarterly peer-reviewed journal focused on equity issues in education. The online, scholarly journal seeks to promote research in10/28/2020 University Journal - March 2014 www.fresnostatejournal.com/vol17no6/index.html 4/8 elementary, secondary and postsecondary schools with articles that address a range of topics including advocacy, equity,mentoring, diversity and engagement. Read the full story . STAR Day is May 29 The annual Staff Training And Recognition – STAR – Day will be held May 29 . STAR Day is designed to commemoratethe end of a successful year, promote staff development and recognize the accomplishments of our campus staff. Theevent will include a guest speaker, professional development workshops, a service recognition awards ceremony, staffluncheon and a vendor fair. Watch for upcoming email announcements about the event and visit the website for updates. Grants offer new opportunities for nurse practitioner students The College of Health and Human Services was awarded nearly $300,000 ingrants to help fill a regional void of primary health care providers. The grantswere awarded by the Song-Brown Commission, which encourages universitiesand health care professionals to provide quality health care in underservedareas. Read the full story . BRAND BULLETIN Social media and branding elements By Susan Hawksworth Continuing and Global Education Many departments and programs are activelycommunicating by using social media, such asFacebook, Twitter or LinkedIn. According to Dr. TamyraPierce, director of Social Media and IntegratedMarketing, there are nearly 100 Facebook pages andapproximately 50 Twitter accounts associated withFresno State. However, having a good social media presence is morethan just "having" a site. It's important to buildconnectionsand engagement. In addition, any site associated withFresno State should also include the correct use ofbranding elements. Pierce conducted an analysis of the known sites affiliatedwith Fresno State and found that some still feature the old Fresno State and no longer approved sunburst logo orthe university seal. Some sites are using the correct new logo, but it has been improperly condensed to fit theexisting space or cropped. The University Communications office has digital versions of the new logo, sized for use on the various socialmedia sites. They are available by emailing brand@csufresno.edu. "We encourage anyone who is theadministrator of a social media site to help promote our branding efforts by using the appropriate logo and thecorrect name of the university," Pierce says. The content analysis of various social media sites found that many of them are using the university nameincorrectly (CSUF, CSU Fresno, Fresno State University, FSU, for example). We encourage everyone to useFresno State in social media to increase search results. FS is permitted on Twitter and Instagram due to characterrestrictions. CSUF is now affiliated with Fullerton and should not be used (FYI, @CSUF is Fullerton's twitterhandle). "Through our Integrated Marketing Communications work over the past two years, we have designated the use ofeither Fresno State or California State University, Fresno for our name," Pierce said. "Consistency with our logoand name help strengthen our brand." It's a good idea to review your department's or unit's Facebook page(s) and website(s) to ensure the properbranding is used. If you're not sure whether the branding is correct, review the brand guidelines( www.fresnostate.edu/brand ) or contact Dr. Pierce at tpierce@csufresno.edu . S10/28/2020 University Journal - March 2014 www.fresnostatejournal.com/vol17no6/index.html 5/8 Spring into Service, March 22 The campus community is encouraged to participate in a Fresno State morning of service on Saturday, March 22 from 8-12:30 p.m. As part of the campus-wide "Spring into Service" event, volunteers are needed to complete service projectsincluding tree and shrub planting, and installation of a water wise demonstration garden. Families are encouraged tovolunteeer. Please fill out the Spring into Service 2014-Volunteer Registration Form . Volunteer space is limited and filledon a first come, first serve basis. For questions please contact Renee Delport at rdelport@csufresno.edu or 278.7063. STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT Lopez named campus first-ever Gates Cambridge Scholar Senior Stephanie Gabriela Lopez was awarded the Gates Cambridge Scholarship, afull-ride graduate scholarship to Cambridge University, making her the first FresnoState student to receive the prestigious academic honor. The scholarship is awardedto 95 students worldwide each year. Lopez is one of 40 United States studentsrepresenting 35 institutions. Read the full story. Student wins College Entrepeneur of the Year Award Student Roe Borunda, will receive the College Entrepreneur of the Year Award fromthe Greater Fresno Area Chamber of Commerce for her hatchery-assisted business,Roetography. Borunda is a senior, double major (Art and Mass Communication andJournalism) from Fresno whose company was one of four selected to be recognized atthe chamber's Valley Business Awards Luncheon in March. "If it wasn't for programs like the Lyles Center Student Hatchery and faculty and staffmembers at Fresno State to help push me in the direction of my dreams, I probablywould have never known the sky can be the limit," Borunda said. A Absurd Masterworks , March 14-22 The Theatre Arts Department presents three pieces by the masters of Absurdist theatre, Samuel Beckett and Eugene Ionesco, March 14-22 at the Dennis & Cheryl Woods Theatre. The style of theplays ranges from tragic to comic--from meditations on an adulterous affair to asatire of modern suburban living that morphs into a living puppet show. Other University Theatre productions: Experimental Theatre Company, April 4-6 For Young Audiences - The Velveteen Rabbit, April 5 University Dance Theatre, April 24-26 Othello, by William Shakespeare , directed by Brad Myers , May 2-10. All performances begin at 8 p.m., except for Sunday matinees, which begin at 2p.m. ID must be presented to claim discounted tickets. Tickets can be purchasednoon-4 p.m. Monday-Friday at the University Theatre Box Office at the northentrance of the Speech Arts Building, 278.2216. View ticket information . Other Music events in March: Wind Orchestra Concert, March 6 Keyboard Concerts -Sergei Babayan & Danil Trifonov, March 7 Jazz Bands, March 13 Orpheus Chamber Music Ensemble and El Cimarrón Ensemble present NOTHING and more, March 15 Saxes at Stage, March 18 The Frenso State Guitarists, March 28 Guitar Festival, March 28 Fresno State Symphonic Band Concert, April 210/28/2020 University Journal - March 2014 www.fresnostatejournal.com/vol17no6/index.html 6/8 See ticket information. 'Turning Pages: Intersections of Books and Technology' is March 24-May 30 The Arne Nixon Center for the Study of Children's Literature and the Special Collections Research Center will host"Turning Pages: Intersections of Books and Technology." The exhibition will be held in the Leon S. Peters Ellipse Gallery,March 24 - May 30. The Special Collections division has teamed up with the Center for Creativity and the Arts tocollaborate with this year's chosen theme of Data and Technology. Technologies new, old and reinterpreted have altered the paradigm of the book since its inception. From creation andcontent to format itself, the collective notion of the book, a benign object, is continually changing. "Turning Pages" willprovide a glimpse into some of the ways in which technology has radicalized books and bookmaking. Exhibition artistsinclude Thomas Allen, Su Blackwell, Brian Dettmer, Pamela Paulsrud, and Mike Stilkey. A reception to celebrate the exhibition's opening will be held on Friday, March 28, at 6:00 p.m. at the Madden Library2206. A presentation by book artist Mike Stilkey will begin at 7 p.m. The event is free and open to the public. Relaxedparking for the event in Lots P30 and P31. To RSVP email jsanford@csufresno.edu or call the Arne Nixon Center at278.8116. N Wade Gilbert (Kinesiology) will co-present on "Athletic Talent Development: Current Status and FutureDirections" at the U.S. Olympic Academy on April 15 in Los Angeles. The academy will togetherscholars and students, athletes and administrators, business experts and leading mediaauthorities to discuss important Olympic issues. Nitaigour "Prem" Mahalik (Industrial Technology) received a $500,000 grant from the Department of Defense to acquireequipment and instrumentation to further the university's ability to teach and research emphasizingsensing and control. Blain Roberts (History) and Ethan J. Kytle (History) were askedby the New York Times to write about the Central Valley drought. Withinhours of publication online, it was the third most-emailed, the ninth most-viewed and the 10th most-tweeted story. Read the column. A new book by Roberts (History)," Pageants, Parlors, andPretty Women: Race and Beauty in the Twentieth-Century South," was published by the University of NorthCarolina Press. Read more . Asao Inoue (English) won a 2014 Outstanding Book Award in the Edited Collection category for his book,"Race and Writing Assessment" from the Conference on College Composition andCommunication, a constituent organization within the National Council of Teachers of English(NCTE). The award honors books within the field of composition and rhetoric. 10/28/2020 University Journal - March 2014 www.fresnostatejournal.com/vol17no6/index.html 7/8 Nancy Akhavan (Kremen School) is the editor of the inaugural issue of CLEARVoz, the peer reviewed journal ofFresno State's Center for Leadership, Equity, and Research (CLEAR). Read the Journal. Steve Spriggs (University Development) challenged a $165 fine for using his cellphone map application whilestuck in traffic and has won an appellate court ruling that Californians can use cellpohnes to look atmap applications while driving. He does not encourage cellphone usage while driving, but hopesthat California legislators will now revisit the issue and fix it. Spriggs story has been widely carried inthe media. Read the USA Today story . S Baseball, softball, basketball and lacrosse are in store thisMarch Don't miss out on the Bulldog action as it offers plenty of opportunities forour veterans, faculty and staff, and your family. Baseball Tuesday, March 11 at 6:35 p.m. vs. Penn State - Season ticket holderappreciation. Wednesday, March 12 at 6:35 p.m. vs. Penn State - Season ticket holderappreciation Friday, March 14 at 6:35 p.m. vs. New Mexico - Alumni Night . Saturday, March 15 at 2:05 p.m. vs. New Mexico - Youth Jersey Saturday . Youth wearing jerseys receive free admission Sunday, March 16 at 1:05 p.m. vs. New Mexico - St. Patty's Kick Off/ Saluteto Sundays . Free admission for all active military and veterans . Kids runbases. Tuesday, March 18 at 6:35 p.m. vs. California - Staff and Facultyappreciation night. Free admission for all staff and faculty. Honor professors. Wednesday, March 19 at 6:35 p.m. vs. BYU Tuesday, March 25 at 6:35 p.m. vs. UC Santa Barbara - Greek night, Tankgiveaway. Softball Thursday, March 13 at 5 p.m. vs. Pacific. Social Media Madness - 2-1 Ticketdeal for fans following Fresno Athletics. Friday, March 14 at 6 p.m. vs. Ohio State - Dog Pound Night/Youth JerseyFriday - Youths wearing jersey receive free admission . Meet the Team post-game. Saturday, March 15 at 3:45 p.m. vs. Cal Poly - Throwback Night/AlumnaeNight Saturday, March 15 at 8:15 p.m. vs. New Mexico State - ThrowbackNight/Alumnae Night Sunday, March 16 at 3:45 p.m. vs. Saint Mary's College - Free Admissionfor all Veterans and active military. Kids run the bases . Friday, March 28 at 6 p.m. vs. Utah State . Strike Out Cancer/Youth JerseyFriday -Youth Wearing Jersey get free admission. First 5 Fresno Countybook drive. Saturday, March 29 at 6 p.m. vs. Utah State. Strike Out Cancer . Blood Drive - First 5 Fresno County Book Drive. Sunday, March 30 at 1 p.m. vs. Utah State - Strike Out Cancer. Freeadmission for all veterans and active military. First 5 Fresno County bookdrive . Kids run bases post-game. Freshman autograph signing post-game. Women's Basketball Friday, March 7 at 7 p.m. vs. San Jose State - Free Admission by Redeeming Voucher (Found at gobulldogs.com) to10/28/2020 University Journal - March 2014 www.fresnostatejournal.com/vol17no6/index.html 8/8 Ticket Office . T-Shirt In-Game Giveaway. Kids Fun Activity Zone-bounce house, face painting, and more . Mutts in Motionhalftime Performance. Lacrosse Wednesday, March 5 at 5 p.m. vs. Stanford - Dog Pound/Greek Night . Sunglasses giveaway. Saturday, March 8 at 12 p.m. vs. Colorado - Youth Day : Kids fun activity zone- bounce, face painting, and more . Autograph card giveaway . Team autograph session post-game Wednesday, March 19 at 2 p.m. vs. Columbia - Staff and Faculty appreciation day . Tote bag giveaway . HonoringProfessors. Friday, March 28 at 5 p.m. vs. USC - Alumnae Night. The Journal is published online by the Office of University Communications the first day of each month – or the weekday closest to the first – fromSeptember through May. The deadline for submissions to Journal is 10 days prior to the first of each month. Please e-mail submissions to journal@csufresno.edu . You may include digital photos, video clips or audio clips that are publishable online. Phone messages, PDFs, faxes, andprinted hard copies will not be accepted. President , Joseph I. Castro Vice President for University Advancement , Peter N. Smits Associate Vice President for University Communications , Shirley Melikian Armbruster Director of University Web Communications and Publications , Bruce Whitworth Editorial Coordinator , Margarita Adona • Photographer , Cary Edmondson • Videographer , Randy Haar • Contributor , April Schulthies Web Coordinator , Kevin Medeiros • Editorial Adviser , Angel Langridge Production Assistant , Leilani Esqueda Archives | Academic Calendar | FresnoStateNews | Journal Deadlines | University Communications Print this Page
Between 2000 and 2005 infrastructure made a contribution of 1 percentage point to Senegal's improved per capita growth performance, placing it in the middle of the distribution among West African countries during the period. Raising the country's infrastructure endowment to that of the region's middle-income countries (MICs) could boost annual growth by about 2.7 percentage points. Senegal has made significant progress in some areas of its infrastructure. In the transport sector, road standards are adequate and their quality average. Senegal has also strengthened the road institutional framework with the creation of the Second Generation Road Fund (FERA) and the Road Maintenance Executing Agency. It has also managed to have a toll road concession granted for the Dakar-Diamniadio Toll Highway. The tariffs in the railway sector are internationally competitive, and there has been improvement in the financial viability of ports. After Nigeria, the country stands as an emerging hub and a major player in air transport. Also, Senegal has managed to introduce private participation in electricity generation, and the unbundling of the electricity sector is under way even as the country actively participates in the regional power market. The country is on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in improved water. In the information and communication technology (ICT) sector there has been an impressive expansion of the mobile and Internet markets. Senegal already spends around $911 million per year on infrastructure, equivalent to about 11 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP). Almost $312 million a year is lost to inefficiencies of various kinds, associated mainly with under-pricing in the power and water sectors, poor financial management of utilities, and inefficient allocation of resources across sectors. If Senegal could raise tariffs to cost-recovery levels and reduce operational inefficiencies in line with reasonable developing-country benchmarks, it could substantially boost its infrastructure sector.
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The extreme climate events of 2023 summer[1] made the climate crisis all the clearer, further highlighting the urgency of a deep rethink of the dominant economic model towards more sustainable practices. Against this backdrop, two of the historically most important CO2 emitters, the United States and the EU,[2] have started discussing sustainability in their bilateral dialogues, as illustrated by the EU–US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) and the recently launched Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade (TIST). Within the TTC, the European Commission and the US Administration have tried to go beyond pre-existing disagreements on trade issues to achieve concrete results based on shared principles. When it comes to sustainability, however, the EU and the US still seem to be moving on slightly different tracks, with EU legislation being arguably more developed than the US', and lower reliance on incentives that might be deemed protectionist. How does this misalignment affect TIST's chances of success, especially with regard to jointly promoting the green transition beyond EU and US borders, and how could it be addressed?The TTC and TIST amidst trade tensions The TTC was launched in June 2021 to coordinate the EU's and US' approaches on key strategic issues and to reinforce transatlantic trade and economic relations.[3] While so far most attention has gone into aligning technology standards (especially on artificial intelligence) and building a common position towards economic coercion,[4] the TTC has also actively worked to foster the green transition through sustainable trade relations, notably through the Working Group 10 on Global Trade Challenges.[5] In the past two years, however, collaboration on the green transition has not always been easy.[6] In August 2022, the Biden administration adopted the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which was touted as "the biggest legislative climate investment in US history".[7] The act includes nearly 370 billion US dollars in tax incentives, grants and loan guarantees to accelerate the growth of the US clean energy sector and support eco-friendly consumer choices. Tax reductions and incentives are provided for manufacturers of solar panels, wind turbines and processors of rare earth minerals and batteries, as well as heavy manufacturing industries that reduce their carbon emissions. Bonus credits are given if components are "Made in America", that is, manufactured or assembled in North America or countries that are part of a free trade agreement with the US.[8] While a testament to the US commitment to the green transition, the IRA was seen on the other side of the Atlantic as a threat to the EU's competitiveness, potentially pushing Europe-based multinationals to relocate their green investments and production to the US.[9] In a seeming response to the IRA, in February 2023, the Commission announced a Green Deal Industrial Plan, which aims to support the development of net-zero technologies through open trade, among others. In fact, the plan emphasises global cooperation, fair trade and open trade agreements as a tool to actively promote the green transition.[10] Coupled with the lack of direct reference to local content requirements or other discriminatory measures, the Green Deal Industrial Plan stands in stark contrast with the IRA, suggesting a different approach to achieving similar environmental goals through trade. While the US seems to rely on economic incentives (subsidies) to promote the development of its green industry, the EU seems to prefer using legislative ones (binding regulations) to boost its competitiveness while upholding its core value of free trade. To overcome these differences and prevent the IRA from jeopardising the entire TTC, an ad-hoc Task Force was created in October 2022.[11] More recently, the aforementioned TIST was announced at the third TTC Ministerial in December 2022. Its goal is to "promote a more integrated and resilient transatlantic marketplace that will help accelerate the transition to a climate neutral and circular economy". Alongside a mutual commitment to greater policy transparency and alignment, as well as fair trade practices, TIST also sets out to advance "a global path for the green transition" as one of its pillars. To this end, the EU and the US aim to promote trade-related environmental and labour objectives both by bringing a common position to multilateral fora and by supporting trade partners in achieving those goals.[12] Transatlantic differences, however, are evident in this regard too, raising questions about how this chapter of TIST will be successfully implemented.Sustainability in trade: Different levels of commitment? Aligning US and EU approaches to sustainability in trade implies the incorporation of environmental and labour standards into the respective free trade agreements with partner countries. The trade and environment nexus has been discussed within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since GATT times, culminating in the multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that were negotiated during the Doha Round.[13] Even before that, the US had included trade-related environmental clauses in its free trade agreements in 1994 with NAFTA.[14] Similarly, in 2011, the EU introduced a Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapter in its free trade agreements. Both the US and European provisions emphasise the importance of adhering to and implementing International Labour Organisation (ILO) standards and other MEAs that each party has ratified, as well as effectively enforcing them.[15] Nonetheless, while both the EU and the US recognise the importance of environmental and social sustainability in their trade agreements, they seem to show a different level of commitment to the sustainability agenda from a broader trade policy perspective. The 2021 EU trade policy explicitly puts sustainability at the centre, giving equal relevance to the implications of its sustainability agenda for its trading partners and its own trade goals. The US Department of Commerce 2022–2026 Strategic Plan does include a strategic goal to "address the climate crisis through mitigation, adaptation, and resilience efforts", but its dimension seems to be rather domestic in scope.[16] More generally, the EU and the US have different reputations in the sustainability field. Taking climate action as a proxy, surveys have shown that the EU is perceived as a climate leader, the US as a follower.[17] True, the Biden administration has stepped up its commitment to the global climate agenda, as exemplified by the 2021 Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, coupled with the International Climate Finance Plan, which emphasise cooperation with partner countries for their climate adaptation.[18] Nevertheless, these efforts are quantitatively difficult to compare with the array of EU legislative tools and policies to tackle the climate crisis abroad too. The 2019 Green Deal has a specific external dimension,[19] which though smaller than other components, has been increasingly developed over the past three years in its trade dimension, as attested for example by the Regulation on deforestation-free products,[20] the corporate sustainability due diligence Directive[21] and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.[22] It is thus easy to understand why the EU was among the initiators of the Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate, while the US joined later with other interested countries.[23] Although the respective level of commitment may certainly change in the future, these fundamentally different approaches to sustainability might complicate the ambition of EU–US trade cooperation to make the green transition global, as enshrined in TIST.How to break the impasse? As European Commission officials have stated on multiple occasions, the goal of the TTC is to collaborate on actionable items, based on the shared principles that underlie the EU–US partnership. In this spirit, it should be possible to put the above differences in trade policy in the background, and capitalise on the key commonality: the environmental and labour provisions that both the EU and the US have integrated in their free trade agreements. One of the points of the TIST work programme focuses indeed on "deepen[ing] cooperation to support partner governments' implementation of labor and environmental provisions in EU and US respective trade agreements with those partners".[24] With such implementation likely lying with partner countries' legislative and policymaking power, however, translating those policies into practice may be a challenging feat. A key enabling role may thus be played by those policies that cover partnerships with third countries beyond trade, such as development policy. In this regard, the EU and the US can find greater alignment, though the scale of their efforts slightly differs. Both the EU and US international development departments are already active in supporting partner countries in the environmental sustainability sphere. The EU Green Deal's external dimension is being implemented by the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) too, which runs programmes aiming to preserve forests, wildlife and biodiversity, among others.[25] Similarly, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) follows a 2022–2030 Climate Strategy to guide its ecosystem management and climate mitigation efforts,[26] as well as working on forest protection as per the 2021 Presidential Plan to Conserve Forests.[27] Beyond these separate initiatives, the EU and the US have jointly discussed sustainable supply chains and labour in the TTC, especially through the Trade and Labour Dialogue (TALD). Moreover, they are part of several broader sustainability initiatives and fora that set the framework for action, such as the G7 and G20. To ensure the transatlantic partnership makes an actual dent in the global path towards the green transition, the EU and the US could launch a joint initiative, within or outside TIST, that complements their current efforts in the sustainability sphere, bridging the existing gap. For example, one way to ensure that trading partners do not destroy forests to build their economy could be to strengthen those partners' capacity to track the products they export to the EU and the US – a complex effort in itself, but necessary to comply with the EU and US sustainable trade legislation.[28] By addressing some of the immediate obstacles in partner countries' compliance with this type of legislation, the EU and the US could truly make strides in advancing the global green transition, and their trade alignment would finally show.Irene Paviotti is Junior Researcher in the Multilateralism and Global Governance programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Lucia Martin Moran is a graduate student in the double degree programme in European and International Public Policy and Politics at Università Bocconi and the London School of Economics, and former intern in the Multilateralism and Global Governance programme at IAI.[1] Noah Berman and Sabine Baumgartner, "The Weather of Summer 2023 Was the Most Extreme Yet", in CFR Articles, 18 September 2023, https://www.cfr.org/node/247907.[2] Hannah Ritchie, Max Roser and Pablo Rosado, "Annual CO2 Emissions", in Our World in Data, 2022, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/annual-co2-emissions-per-country?country=OWID_WRL~OWID_EU27~USA~CHN.[3] European Commission, EU-US Launch Trade and Technology Council to Lead Values-based Global Digital Transformation, 15 June 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_2990.[4] European Commission, Joint Statement EU-US Trade and Technology Council of 31 May 2023 in Lulea, Sweden, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_2992.[5] European Commission, EU-U.S. Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council, Paris-Saclay, 16 May 2022, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/56726/eu-u-s-joint-statement-of-the-trade-and-technology-council.pdf.[6] It is worth remembering that transatlantic trade tensions do predate the creation of the Trade and Technology Council – the Trump administration, for example, introduced tariffs on a wide range of EU products, aluminium and steel being the most contentious items. For an overview, see Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, "US–EU Trade Relations in the Trump Era. Which Way Forward?", in Chatham House Research Papers, March 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/node/23004.[7] Nilsen Ella, "Clean Energy Package Would Be Biggest Legislative Climate Investment in US History", in CNN, 28 July 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/28/politics/climate-deal-joe-manchin/index.html.[8] Melissa Barbanell, "A Brief Summary of the Climate and Energy Provisions of the IRA of 2022", in WRI Updates, 28 October 2022, https://www.wri.org/node/102614.[9] Philip Blenkinsop, "Fears of European Industry Exodus to U.S. May Be Overdone", in Reuters, 3 March 2023, http://reut.rs/3ZHLEGV.[10] European Commission, A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the Net-Zero Age (COM/2023/62), 1 February 2023, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52023DC0062.[11] European Commission, Launch of the US-EU Task Force on the Inflation Reduction Act, 26 October 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_6402.[12] European Commission, Joint Statement EU-US Trade and Technology Council of 31 May 2023, cit.[13] WTO website: Trade and Environment, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm.[14] Richard K. Lattanzio and Christopher A. Casey, "Environmental Provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)", in CRS In Focus, No. 10166 (1 September 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10166.[15] European Commission, Commission Unveils New Approach to Trade Agreements to Promote Green and Just Growth, 22 June 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3921.[16] US Department of Commerce, Strategic Plan 2022-2026, 28 March 2022, p. 40, https://www.commerce.gov/about/strategic-plan.[17] Sebastian Oberthür and Claire Dupont, "The European Union's International Climate Leadership: Towards a Grand Climate Strategy?", in Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 28, No. 7, (2021), p. 1095-1114, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1918218.[18] White House, Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, 27 January 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/27/executive-order-on-tackling-the-climate-crisis-at-home-and-abroad; White House, U.S. International Finance Climate Plan, 22 April 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/executive-summary-u-s-international-climate-finance-plan.[19] European Commission, The European Green Deal (COM/2019/640), 11 December 2019, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52019DC0640.[20] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 of 31 May 2023 on the Making Available on the Union Market and the Export from the Union of Certain Commodities and Products Associated with Deforestation and Forest Degradation, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1115/oj.[21] European Commission website: Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence, https://commission.europa.eu/node/5442_en. The proposal for this Directive is currently being discussed in the European Parliament.[22] European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of 10 May 2023 Establishing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/956/oj.[23] European Commission, Trade and Climate: EU and Partner Countries Launch the 'Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate', 19 January 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_248. The TIST work plan includes this multilateral forum among those where the EU and the US agreed to cooperate to foster the green transition globally.[24] European Commission, Joint Statement EU-US Trade and Technology Council of 31 May 2023, cit.[25] European Commission DG International Partnerships website: Climate, Environment and Energy, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/node/746_en.[26] USAID, USAID Climate Strategy 2022-2030, 21 April 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/policy/climate-strategy.[27] White House, Plan to Conserve Global Forests: Critical Carbon Sinks, January 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Plan_to_Conserve_Global_Forests_final.pdf.[28] Jen-Yi Chen, "Responsible Sourcing and Supply Chain Traceability", in International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 248 (June 2022), Article 108462, DOI 10.1016/j.ijpe.2022.108462.
NOTICIAS / NEWS ("Transfer", 2016) 1) CONGRESOS / CONFERENCES: 1. Languages & the Media – Agile Mediascapes: Personalising the Future, Hotel Radisson Blu, Berlín, 2-4 Nov. 2016 www.languages-media.com 2. Third Chinese Drama Translation Colloquium Newcastle University, UK, 28-19 Junio 2016. www.ncl.ac.uk/sml/about/events/item/drama-translation-colloquium 3. 16th Annual Portsmouth Translation Conference – Translation & Interpreting: Learning beyond the Comfort Zone, University of Portsmouth, UK, 5 Nov. 2016. www.port.ac.uk/translation/events/conference 4. 3rd International Conference on Non-Professional Interpreting & Translation (NPIT3) Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Suiza 5-7 Mayo 2016. www.zhaw.ch/linguistics/npit3 5. 3rd Postgraduate Symposium – Cultural Translation: In Theory and as Practice. University of Nottingham, UK, 18 Mayo 2016. Contact: uontranslation2016@gmail.com 6. 3rd Taboo Conference – Taboo Humo(u)r: Language, Culture, Society, and the Media, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona) 20-21 Sep. 2016. https://portal.upf.edu/web/taco 7. Postgraduate Conference on Translation and Multilingualism Lancaster University, UK, 22 Abril 2016. Contacto: c.baker@lancaster.ac.uk 8. Translation and Minority University of Ottawa (Canadá), 11-12 Nov. 2016. Contacto: rtana014@uottawa.ca 9. Translation as Communication, (Re-)narration and (Trans-)creation Università di Palermo (Italia), 10 Mayo 2016 www.unipa.it/dipartimenti/dipartimentoscienzeumanistiche/convegni/translation 10. From Legal Translation to Jurilinguistics: Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Study of Language and Law, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Sevilla, 27-28 Oct. 2016. www.tinyurl.com/jurilinguistics 11. Third International Conference on Research into the Didactics of Translation. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 7-8 Julio 2016 http://grupsderecerca.uab.cat/pacte/en/content/second-circular-1 12. EST Congress – Expanding the Boundaries or Strengthening the Bases: Should Translation Studies Explore Visual Representation? Aarhus University (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016 http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/panels/18-expanding-the-boundaries-or-strengthening-the-bases-should-translation-studies-explore-visual-representation/ 13. Tourism across Cultures: Accessibility in Tourist Communication Università di Salento, Lecce (Italia). 25-27 Feb. 2016 http://unisalento.wix.com/tourism 14. Translation and Interpreting Studies at the Crossroad: A Dialogue between Process-oriented and Sociological Approaches – The Fourth Durham Postgraduate Colloquium on Translation Studies Durham University, UK. 30 Abril – 1 Mayo 2016. www.dur.ac.uk/cim 15. Translation and Interpreting: Convergence, Contact, Interaction Università di Trieste (Italia), 26-28 Mayo 2016 http://transint2016.weebly.com 16. 7th International Symposium for Young Researchers in Translation, Interpreting, Intercultural Studies and East Asian Studies. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1 Julio 2016. http://pagines.uab.cat/simposi/en 17. Translation Education in a New Age The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, China 15-16 Abril 2016. Contact: Claire Zhou (clairezhou@cuhk.edu.cn) 18. Audiovisual Translation: Dubbing and Subtitling in the Central European Context, Constantine the Philosopher University, Nitra (Eslovaquia). 15-17 Junio 2016. https://avtnitraconference.wordpress.com 19. Cervantes, Shakespeare, and the Golden Age of Drama Madrid, 17-21 Oct. 2016 http://aedean.org/wp-content/uploads/Call-for-papers.pdf 20. 3rd International Conference Languaging Diversity – Language/s and Power. Università di Macerata (Italia), 3-5 Marzo 2016 http://studiumanistici.unimc.it/en/research/conferences/languaging-diversity 21. Congreso Internacional de Traducción Especializada (EnTRetextos) Universidad de Valencia, 27-29 Abril 2016 http://congresos.adeituv.es/entretextos 22. Translation & Quality 2016: Corpora & Quality Université Charles de Gaulle Lille 3 (Francia), 5 Feb. 2016 http://traduction2016.sciencesconf.org/?lang=en 23. New forms of feedback and assessment in translation and interpreting training and industry. 8th EST Congress – Translation Studies: Moving Boundaries, Aarhus University (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016. www.bcom.au.dk/est2016 24. Intermedia 2016 – Conference on Audiovisual Translation University of Lodz (Polonia), 14-16 Abril 2016 http://intermedia.uni.lodz.pl 25. New Technologies and Translation Université d'Algiers (Argelia). 23-24 Feb. 2016 Contacto: newtech.trans.algiers@gmail.com 26. Circulation of Academic Thought - Rethinking Methods in the Study of Scientific Translation. 11 - 12 Dec. 2015, University of Graz (Austria).https://translationswissenschaft.uni-graz.at/de/itat/veranstaltungen/circulation-of-academic-thought 27. The 7th Asian Translation Traditions Conference Monash University, Malaysia Campus, 26-30 Sep. 2016. http://future.arts.monash.edu/asiantranslation7 28. "Translation policy: connecting concepts and writing history" 8th EST Congress – Translation Studies: Moving Boundaries Aarhus University (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016 http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/panels/13-translation-policy-connecting-concepts-and-writing-history 29. International Conference – Sound / Writing: On Homophonic Translation. Université de Paris (Francia), 17-19 Nov. 2016 www.fabula.org/actualites/sound-writing-on-homophonic-translationinternational-conference-paris-november-17-19-2016_71295.php 30. Third Hermeneutics and Translation Studies Symposium – Translational Hermeneutics as a Research Paradigm Technische Hochschule, Colonia (Alemania), 30 Junio-1 Julio 2016 www.phenhermcommresearch.de/index.php/conferences 31. II International Conference on Economic Financial and Institutional Translation. Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières (Canadá), 17-18 Agosto 2016. www.uqtr.ca/ICEBFIT 32. International Congress - liLETRAd 2016-Cátedra LILETRAD. Literature Languages Translation, Universidad de Sevilla, 6-8 Julio 2016. https://congresoliletrad.wordpress.com 33. Transmediations! Communication across Media Borders Linnæus University, Växjö (Suecia), 13–15 Oct. 2016 http://lnu.se/lnuc/linnaeus-university-centre-for-intermedial-and-multimodal-studies-/events/conferences/transmediations?l=en 34. Translation Education in a New Age, 15-16 Abril 2016. School of Humanities and Social Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. Contacto: chansinwai@cuhk.edu.cn 35. Translation and Time: Exploring the Temporal Dimension of Cross-cultural Transfer, 8-10 Diciembre 2016. Departamento de Traducción, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Contacto: translation-and-time@cuhk.edu.hk. 36. Du jeu dans la langue. Traduire les jeux de mots / Loose in Translation. Translating Wordplay, 23-24 Marzo 2017, Université de Lille (France) https://www.univ-lille3.fr/recherche/actualites/agenda-de-la-recherche/?type=1&id=1271. Contacto: traduirejdm@univ-lille3.fr, julie.charles@univ-lille3.fr 37. Translation and Translanguaging across Disciplines. EST Congress 2016 "Translation Studies: Moving Boundaries", European Society for Translation Studies, Aarhus (Dinamarca), 15-17 Sep. 2016 http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/panels/12-translation-and-translanguaging-across-disciplines/ Contacto: nune.ayvazyan@urv.cat; mariagd@blanquerna.url.edu; sara.laviosa@uniba.it http://bcom.au.dk/research/conferencesandlectures/est-congress-2016/submission/ 38. Beyond linguistic plurality: The trajectories of multilingualism in Translation. An international conference organized jointly by Bogaziçi University, Department of Translation and Interpreting Studies, and Research Group on Translation and Transcultural Contact, York University, Bogaziçi University, 1-12 Mayo 2016. Contacto: sehnaz.tahir@boun.edu.tr, MGuzman@glendon.yorku.ca 39. "Professional and Academic Discourse: an interdisciplinary perspective". XXXIV IConferencia Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Lingüística Aplicada (AESLA), 14-16 Abril 2016. Interuniversity Institute for Applied Modern Languages (IULMA) / Universidad de Alicante. http://web.ua.es/aesla2016. Contacto: antonia.montes@ua.es. 2) CURSOS, SEMINARIOS, POSGRADOS / COURSES, SEMINARS, MASTERS: 1. Seminario: Breaking News for French>English and English>French Translators King's College Cambridge, UK, 8-10 Agosto 2016 Contacto: translateincambridge@iti.org.uk 2. Curso on-line: Setting Up as a Freelance Translator Enero – Marzo 2016. Institute of Translation & Interpreting, UK https://gallery.mailchimp.com/58e5d23248ce9f10c161ba86d/files/Application_Form_SUFT_2016.pdf?utm_source=SUFT+December+Emailer&utm_campaign=11fdfe0453-Setting_Up_as_a_Freelance_Translator12_7_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6ef4829e50-11fdfe0453-25128325 3. Curso: Using Interpreters for Intercultural Communication and Other Purposes (COM397CE) http://darkallyredesign.com/what-we-do/using-interpreters-for-intercultural-communication 4. Workshop: How to Write and Publish Your Scholarly Paper In cooperation with the European Association of Science Editors (EASE) New Bulgarian University, Sofia (Bulgaria), 21-23 Marzo 2016 www.facebook.com/events/1511610889167645 http://esnbu.org/data/files/resources/ease-nbu-seminar-march-2016-fees.pdf 5. Posgrado: II Postgraduate Course on Spanish Law Taught in English "Global study". Universidad Internacional de Andalucía / Colegio de Abogados de Málaga. www.unia.es/cursos/guias/4431_english.pdf 3) CURSOS DE VERANO / SUMMER COURSES: 1. STRIDON – Translation Studies Doctoral and Teacher Training Summer School, Piran (Eslovenia), 27 Junio – 8 Julio 2016 www.prevajalstvo.net/doctoral-summer-school 2. Training in Translation Pedagogy Program School of Translation and Interpretation, University of Ottawa (Canadá), 4-29 Julio 2016. https://arts.uottawa.ca/translation/summer-programs 3. 2016 Nida School of Translation Studies. Translation, Ecology and Entanglement, San Pellegrino University Foundation, Misano Adriatico, Rimini (Italia), 30 Mayo – 10 Junio 2016. http://nsts.fusp.it/Nida-Schools/NSTS-2016 4. TTPP - Intensive Summer Program in Translation Pedagogy University of Ottawa (Canadá), 4-29 Julio 2016. http://arts.uottawa.ca/translation/summer-programs-2016/ttpp 5. CETRA Summer School 2016. 28th Research Summer School University of Leuven, campus Antwerp (Bélgica), 22 Agosto – 2 Sep. 2016. Contacto: cetra@kuleuven.be. http://www.arts.kuleuven.be/cetra 4) LIBROS / BOOKS: 1. Varela Salinas, María-José & Bernd Meyer (eds.) 2016. Translating and Interpreting Healthcare Discourses / Traducir e interpretar en el ámbito sanitario. Berlín : Frank & Timme. www.frank-timme.de/verlag/verlagsprogramm/buch/verlagsprogramm/bd-79-maria-jose-varela-salinasbernd-meyer-eds-translating-and-interpreting-healthcare-disc/backPID/transued-arbeiten-zur-theorie-und-praxis-des-uebersetzens-und-dolmetschens-1.html 2. Ordóñez López, Pilar and José Antonio Sabio Pinilla (ed.) 2015. Historiografía de la traducción en el espacio ibérico. Textos contemporáneos. Madrid: Ediciones de Castilla-La Mancha. www.unebook.es/libro/historiografia-de-latraduccion-en-el-espacio-iberico_50162 3. Bartoll, Eduard. 2015. Introducción a la traducción audiovisual. Barcelona: Editorial UOC. www.editorialuoc.cat/introduccion-a-la-traduccion-audiovisual 4. Rica Peromingo, Juan Pedro & Jorge Braga Riera. 2015. Herramientas y técnicas para la traducción inglés-español. Madrid: Babélica. www.escolarymayo.com/libro.php?libro=7004107&menu=7001002&submenu=7002029 5. Le Disez, Jean-Yves. 2015. F.A.C.T. Une méthode pour traduire de l'anglais au français. París: Ellipses. www.editions-ellipses.fr/product_info.php?cPath=386&products_id=10601 6. Baker, Mona (ed.) 2015. Translating Dissent: Voices from and with the Egyptian Revolution. Londres: Routledge. www.tandf.net/books/details/9781138929876 7. Gallego Hernández, Daniel (ed.) 2015. Current Approaches to Business and Institutional Translation / Enfoques actuales en traducción económica e institucional. Berna: Peter Lang. www.peterlang.com/download/datasheet/86140/datasheet_431656.pdf 8. Vasilakakos, Mary. 2015. A Training Handbook for Health and Medical Interpreters in Australia. www.interpreterrevalidationtraining.com/books-and-resources.html 9. Jankowska, Anna & Agnieszka Szarkowska (eds) 2015. New Points of View on Audiovisual Translation and Media Accessibility. Oxford: Peter Lang. www.peterlang.com/index.cfm?event=cmp.ccc.seitenstruktur.detailseiten&seitentyp=produkt&pk=83114 10. Baer, Brian James (2015). Translation and the Making of Modern Russian Literature, Londres: Bloomsbury. Translation and the Making of Modern Russian Literature is the inaugural book in a new Translation Studies series: Bloomsbury's "Literatures, Cultures, Translation." 11. Camps, Assumpta. 2016. La traducción en la creación del canon poético (Recepción de la poesía italiana en el ámbito hispánico en la primera mitad del siglo XX). Berna: Peter Lang. 5) REVISTAS / JOURNALS: 1. JoSTrans, The Journal of Specialised Translation, nº especial sobre Translation & the Profession, Vol. 25, Enero 2016. www.jostrans.org 2. Translation and Interpreting – Nº especial sobre Community Interpreting: Mapping the Present for the Future www.trans-int.org/index.php/transint. 3. inTRAlinea – Nº especial sobre New Insights into Specialised Translation. www.intralinea.org/specials/new_insights 4. Linguistica Antverpiensia NS-Themes in Translation Studies, 2015 issue, Towards a Genetics of Translation. https://lans-tts.uantwerpen.be/index.php/LANS-TTS/issue/view/16 5. Quaderns de Filologia, Nº especial sobre Traducción y Censura: Nuevas Perspectivas, Vol. 20, 2015. https://ojs.uv.es/index.php/qdfed/issue/view/577 6. The Translator – Nº especial sobre Food and Translation, Translation and Food, 2015, 21(3). www.tandfonline.com/eprint/ryqJewJUDKZ6m2YM4IaR/full 7. Current Trends in Translation Teaching and Learning E, 2015, 2 www.cttl.org/cttl-e-2015.html 8. Dragoman Journal of Translation Studies. www.dragoman-journal.org 9. Current Trends in Translation Teaching and Learning E. Edición especial sobre Translation Studies Curricula Across Countries and Cultures. www.cttl.org 10. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, Nº especial sobre Translation Policies and Minority Languages: Theory, Methods and Case Studies http://fouces.webs.uvigo.es/CallForPapersIJSLTranslationPolicies.pdf 11. Nº especial de The Interpreter and Translator Trainer 11(2) – Employability and the Translation Curriculum www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1750399X.2015.1103092 12. InTRAlinea. Nº especial sobre Building Bridges between Film Studies and Translation Studies www.intralinea.org/news/item/cfp_building_bridges_between_film_studies_and_translation_studies 13. Nº especial de TranscUlturAl: Comics, BD & Manga in translation/en traduction https://ejournals.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/TC/announcement/view/290 14. The Journal of Translation Studies 2015, 16(4) Nº especial sobre Translator and Interpreter Training in East Asia Contacto: Won Jun Nam: wjnam@hufs.ac.kr, wonjun_nam@daum.net 15. TRANS Revista de Traductología, 19(2), 2015. www.trans.uma.es/trans_19.2.html 16. Between, 9, 2015 – Censura e auto-censura http://ojs.unica.it/index.php/between/index 17. Translation Studies, Nº especial sobre Translingualism & Transculturality in Russian Contexts of Translation http://explore.tandfonline.com/cfp/ah/rtrs-cfp3 18. Translation & Interpreting, 7:3, 2016 www.trans-int.org/index.php/transint/issue/view/38 19. "The translation profession: Centres and peripheries" The Journal of Specialised Translation (Jostrans), Nº. 25, Enero 2016. The Journal of Translation Studies is a joint publication of the Department of Translation of The Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Chinese University Press. Contact: jts.tra@cuhk.edu.hk, james@arts.cuhk.edu.hk 19. Nuevo artículo: "The Invisibility of the African Interpreter" por Jeanne Garane, Translation: a transdisciplinary journal http://translation.fusp.it/. Contact: siri.nergaard@gmail.com.
