Suchergebnisse

To date, more than 100 countries have implemented some type of quota for women in their national legislatures, leading to one of the most significant developments in the global composition of legislative bodies in the past twenty-five years. One remaining puzzle in understanding the global diffusion of electoral gender quotas is the strong clustering of shared domestic quota policies by region. In this project, I examine the importance of dyadic relationships between countries, including shared membership in inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), regional organizations (ROs), and women's international non-governmental organizations(WINGOs) in explaining the timing and type of quota adoption. To do this, I employ a social network approach to quantitatively model global and temporal trends in gender quota adoption. Controlling for other possible domestic and transnational determinants, my results indicate that the strongest predictor of
quota policy adoption and design is the existence of similar policies in neighboring countries. These results suggest that, in the case of gender quota adoption, domestic policymakers see surrounding states as their most salient reference group when deciding both whether and how to implement new policy.

It's no accident that the collapse of Bossier City's
Charter
Review Commission coincided with the successful conclusion of a citizen
initiative to petition a city charter change introducing term limits. It leaves
the political establishment, especially the elected officials part of it who would
be devastated with subsequent enactment, clinging to lawfare as its only remote
chance to derail an almost-assuredly ratification of term limits prior to next
year's city elections.

Heading
into a scheduled Jun. 18 meeting after the previous meeting had seen the
four Commission representatives generally favorable towards limits take
advantage of two absences of establishment representatives, who were against
the idea, to gain commission approval of a term limits measure like the one on
the petition – three terms
retroactively applied immediately – the establishment
commissioners faced some tactical considerations in trying to reverse that
outcome at the meeting, which would depend upon how many of their numbers they
could muster. Apparently, they couldn't maneuver enough to have presumably the
last meeting of substance before forwarding all approved items to the City Council
as they appeared to boycott without warning the scheduled meeting, leaving in
attendance just three of the reform commissioners (one had announced previously
his intended absence) and no quorum. (Determining
whether the boycott was planned is now subject to a contested public records
request.)

The non-meeting devolved into an acrimonious exchange
between then-Chairman Preston Friedley and Assistant City Attorney Richard Ray
over the agenda-setting process – an important point because what appeared on
it would affect the numbers needed by the establishmentarians to try to
overturn a past vote. Of particular concern to that faction was the past typical
absences of one of them, Paderina Soumas, that if repeated would deprive them
under most scenarios of the votes needed for the overturning.

Days later, Friedley submitted his resignation
over the incident, putting the Commission into uncharted territory as the Charter
didn't address that contingency. Presumably, the councilor who had nominated
Friedley, Republican Chris Smith,
would make another selection, but no timeline to do so existed short of the 18-month
life the Charter granted the Commission. Nor
did the Charter address whether the Commission could operate if not at full
strength.

And the clock at this point was crucial. Essentially,
in order to meet a timeline to get on the Dec. 7 ballot, the Commission had to
forward its changes the week of Independence Day. Adding to the turmoil, that
week Soumas resigned, leaving no appointee from no party Councilor Jeff Darby.

Regardless, the panel's members, including its
majority establishmentarians, made no effort to meet. This only reinforced the
notion held by many observers that the Commission – formed by the votes of the
four graybeard councilors Republicans David Montgomery
and Jeff Free,
Democrat Bubba
Williams, and Darby plus newcomer Republican Vince Maggio,
all against term limits, opposed by Smith and Republican Brian Hammons
who both favored term limits – merely served as a tool to subvert the term
limits movement that had demonstrated it could gather enough signatures to
amend the Charter in its favor although that effort eventually was staved off
by the graybeards+ through litigation. If it couldn't be used as an instrument
to subvert term limits, then it was of further use to the establishment.

The strategy here was twofold. First, having a commission
could serve to dampen enthusiasm for the revised petition going around, with potential
signers not seeing a real need but especially depressing the morale of organizers
and volunteers, perhaps accomplished by fronting a largely-toothless version of
limits in the revision such as three terms but grandfathering in existing
officeholders that contradicted the spirit of the movement that three terms was
enough for anyone at any time. That would allow all of the graybeards to run
again.

Second, a theory floated by Ray was that the end product
would be considered a "new" charter, so that if the changes hit the ballot and
gained a voting majority, a rival petition would become invalidated because it asked
to amend an "old" and superseded charter. As long as the changes appeared on
the ballot no later than the petitioned amendments and passed, the
establishment was in the clear to prevent term limits, under this argument. While
this dodged a legal point that apparently the Commission
as constituted couldn't replace but only could amend the Charter, even if litigation
over that invalidated the panel's work, the discouragement effect still would
be in play.

Except it didn't work. Signature-gathering rumbled
along, although at first not at a great rate that could make a deadline of the
end of July, so perhaps for awhile the depressive impact did occur. But the campaign
received a shot in the arm when as a result of publicity surrounding the bitter
denunciations of term limits, particularly by Commissioner Julianna
Parks, a GOP Bossier Parish police juror, the reform commissioners succeeded
in passing the stringent term limits change. And then public support went on steroids
when the boycott occurred, revealing the Commission's mission to its majority
as a sham device, and driving subsequent publicity about that.

As a consequence, term limits organizers within
the span of a month gathered on the order of 2,000 signatures, well more than
half needed. And created the worst of all worlds for the establishment: with
the presentation of the petition for registrar certification this week, the
term limits measure absent extraordinary circumstances will appear on the Dec.
7 ballot where it's overwhelmingly likely to succeed and establishmentarians have
run out of time to rely on a backstop in the form of a rival document to counteract.

They would have to move extremely quickly to try
to put something out there. Aug. 20 is the State Bond Commission
deadline to approve non-candidate election ballot placement. In that time
span, the two replacements must be nominated by Smith and Darby separately and
then approved by the entire Council (which would be delayed if the Council
rejects one or more nominee); the Commission must meet and construct a final
list; city legal staff must vet the language, and the Council must pass a
resolution to send the matter to the electorate (whether in a special meeting).

Even if this happened, the doubt about whether the
product is legally authorized could lead to court action keeping it off the
ballot. The only real option to make such an aggressive schedule and avoid
legal pitfalls to sabotage the petition language would be for the reconstituted
panel to reverse all of its heretofore approved items and pass only a loose
term limits measure (such as grandfathering in the present councilors and mayor)
to compete on the ballot against the petitioned version (the Charter says in
this instance whichever draws a higher proportion of approval, if a majority,
takes precedence).

Absent that, this leaves just one option for them
to produce the extraordinary circumstances to keep the measure (and two others)
off that ballot: lawfare. Somehow, some way, the establishment will have to try
some legal high-stepping to delay it. It doesn't matter how bogus the reasoning
is and that regardless eventually the matter will go before the voters, because
the goal for it is to postpone term limits' appearance on the ballot this fall that
would have the effect of buying potentially one more term for the graybeards. It
knows that, in the close-knit world of Bossier politics, an elected judge can
be persuaded to do this bidding (City Attorney Charles Jacobs, back on the job
after extended medical leave, was once a 26th District judge), leaving
petition organizers needing to act quickly to counteract or miss the window.

Who knows what form this Hail Mary pass will take?
What is known is the Bossier political establishment faces desperate straits on
this and will try to pull any rabbit out of a legal hat that it can to stop this
expression of the will of the people. And perhaps even more interesting, if
they succeed how much more something like this would poison the well for the
graybeards' reelection chances?

Women's legal landmarks : an introduction / Erika Rackley and Rosemary Auchmuty -- Cyfraith Hywel (the laws of Hywel Dda), c. 940 / Carol Howells -- A vindication of the rights of woman, Mary Wollstonecraft, 1792 / Anna Jobe -- Gaols act 1823 / Ruth Lamont -- The Slave, Grace (1827) / Rosemary Auchmuty -- A brief summary of the most important laws concerning women, Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, 1854 / Joanne Conaghan -- Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 / Penelope Russell -- Married Women's Property Act 1882 / Andy Hayward -- First woman prospective parliamentary candidate, Helen Taylor, 1885 / Janet Smith -- Section 5(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 / Lois Bibbings -- Match women's strike, 1888 / Jacqueline Lane -- R v Jackson (1891) / Teresa Sutton -- A pageant of great women, Cicely Hamilton, 1909-12 / Katharine Cockin -- Representation of the People Act 1918 / Mari Takayanagi -- Maternity and Child Welfare Act 1918 / Hazel Biggs -- Article 7 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919 / Aoife O'Donoghue -- Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 / Mari Takayanagi -- First women justices of the peace, 1919 / Anne Logan -- First woman to be admitted to an inn of court, Helena Normanton, 1919 / Judith Bourne -- Committee on the Employment of Women on Police Duties, 1920 / Colin R Moore -- First woman law agent, Madge Easton Anderson, 1920 / Alison Lindsay -- Foundation of the Association of Women Solicitors, 1921 / Elizabeth Cruickshank -- First woman to practise as a barrister in Ireland and the (then) United Kingdom, Averil Deverell, 1921 / Liz Goldthorpe -- First woman solicitor in England and Wales, Carrie Morrison, 1922 / Elizabeth Cruickshank -- Matrimonial Causes Act 1923 / Penelope Russell -- First woman member of the Faculty of Advocates, Margaret Kidd, 1923 / Catriona Cairns -- First woman professor of law in Ireland, Frances Moran, 1925 / Emma Hutchinson -- DPP v Jonathan Cape and Leopold Hill (1928) / Caroline Derry -- Edwards v Attorney-General of Canada (1929) / Sarah Mercer -- Education Act 1944 / Harriet Samuels -- Family Allowances Act 1945 / Lucy Vickers -- British Nationality Act 1948 / Helen Kay and Rose Pipes -- Married Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act 1949 / Rosemary Auchmuty -- Life Peerages Act 1958 / Supuni Perera -- First woman to hold regular judicial office in England and Wales, Rose Heilbron, 1964 / Laura Lammasniemi -- Married Women's Property Act 1964 / Sharon Thompson -- First woman High Court judge in England and Wales, Elizabeth Lane, 1965 / Judith Bourne and Frances Burton -- Abortion Act 1967 / Nicky Priaulx and Natalie Jones -- National Health Service (Family Planning) Act 1967 / Leonora Onaran -- Dagenham car plant strike, 1968 / Dawn Watkins -- First woman professor of law in the United Kingdom, Claire Palley, 1970 / Fiona Cownie -- First women's refuge, 1971 / Felicity Kaganas -- Section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 / Anne Logan -- Sex Discrimination Act 1975 / Anne Morris -- First rape crisis centre, 1976 / Alison Diduck -- Section 4 of the Sexual Offences (amendment) Act 1976 / Clare McGlynn and Julia Downes -- Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 / Laura Binger and Helen Carr -- Davis v Johnson (1978) / Susan Edwards -- Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 / Máiréad Enright -- Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland (1980) / Rosemary Auchmuty -- Greenham Common women's peace camp, 1981-2000 / Elizabeth Woodcraft -- Gill and Coote v El Vino Co ltd (1982) / Anne Morris -- Women and the law, Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett, 1984 / Brenda Hale and Susan Atkins -- Warnock report, 1984 / Kirsty Horsey -- Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 / Phyllis Livaha -- Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1985) / Emma Nottingham -- Grant v Edwards (1986) / Joanne Beswick -- Section 32 of the Finance Act 1988 / Ann Mumford -- First woman Court of Appeal judge in England and Wales, Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, 1988 / Dana Denis-Smith -- Section 5 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (amendment) Act 1990 / Susan Leahy -- First woman president of Ireland, Mary Robinson, 1990 / Leah Treanor -- Foundation of the Association of Women Barristers, 1991 / Frances Burton -- R v Ahluwalia (1992) / Siobhan Weare -- Feminist legal studies journal, 1993 / Rosemary Hunter -- Barclays Bank v O'brien (1993) / Sarah Greer -- Webb v Emo Air Cargo (UK) ltd (no 2) (1994) / Debra Morris -- First woman to lead a top 10 law firm in England and Wales, Lesley Macdonagh, 1995 / Steven Vaughan -- Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act 1995 / Laura Cahillane -- St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S (1998) / Kay Lalor, Anne Morris and Annapurna Waughray -- Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 / Sonia Kalsi -- Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department, R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another, ex parte Shah (1999) / Nora Honkala -- White v White (2000) / Jonathan Herring -- Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002 / Susan Atkins -- Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 / Nikki Godden-Rasul -- National Assembly for Wales Election, 2003 / Catrin Fflur Huws -- Mental Capacity Act 2005 / Rosie Harding -- UK ratification of the optional protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (OP-CEDAW), 2005 / Meghan Campbell -- Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 / Pragna Patel -- First woman attorney general for England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Patricia Scotland, 2007 / Linda Mulcahy -- Section 14 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 / F Vera-Grey -- Radmacher v Granatino (2010) / Marie Parker -- Concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture, recommendation to Iireland regarding the Magdalene Laundries, 2011 / Maeve O'Rourke -- Birmingham City Council v Abdulla (2012) / Harini Iyengar -- Electoral (amendment) (Political Funding) Act 2012 / Ivana Bacik -- Protection of Life during Pregnancy Act 2013 / Fiona de Londras -- R v Nimmo and Sorley (2014) / Kim Barker -- Bishops and Priests (Consecration and Ordination of Women) Measure 2014 and Canon c2, "of the consecration of bishops", 2014 / Miranda Threlfall-Holmes -- In the matter of an application for judicial review by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (2015) / Marie Fox and Sheelagh McGuiness -- Violence Against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015 / Olga Jurasz -- Section 2 of the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 / Erika Rackley -- First woman president of the UK Supreme Court, Brenda Hale, 2017 / Erika Rackley -- Thirty-sixth amendment of the Irish constitution, 2018 / Fiona de Londras.

Even a less-demonstrative legislator can't return to
office without putting up a fight if he isn't part of the good-old-boy network
in the Bossier Parish.

Last month, Republican state Sen. Robert Mills received
a challenge from GOP School Board Member Adam Bass for his Senate District
36 spot. Mills joins Republican state Rep. Dodie Horton in drawing opposition, in
her case from GOP businessman Chris
Turner, while Republican state Rep. Alan
Seabaugh is looking to make the jump to the state Senate seat shared by Caddo
and Bossier Parishes, conceptually the same as that held by term-limited GOP
state Sen. Barrow Peacock, and
who faces opposition from retired basketball coach Mike McConathy from the GOP.

Horton drew the ire of the parish's political
establishment when she spearheaded efforts to bring accountability to the
Cypress Black Bayou Water Conservation and Recreation District, while Seabaugh's
sin was to back insurgent candidates in Bossier City elections. Yet Mills, by
contrast, has kept a low profile in parish politics, whose majority-Bossier
district after reapportionment will shift more decisively into the parish for
the next eight years.

The Bass candidacy seemed to come out of nowhere
and may have been sparked by Mills joining a unanimous Senate in voting last
month to bust the state's spending cap, contrary to the wishes of the local House
delegation also including Republican state Reps. Danny McCormick
and Raymond Crews,
who haven't drawn any opponents publicly. But from there it seems to have been
piled on by the parish political establishment, exacerbated by creating a more
urban district based in Bossier City.

Partly this may echo from his win in 2019 when he
defeated insider Republican incumbent Ryan Gatti who spent more than any legislative
candidate in history to keep his job. Since then, he has done little to
disappoint the majority of voters in his district, which perhaps is the most
conservative in the state. According to the Louisiana
Legislative Log voting scorecard, where 100 is considered a "perfect"
conservative/reform record, Mills averaged 95 over the first three years of his
term. (And by virtue of his replacing Gatti, a trial lawyer staunchly opposed to
genuine tort reform, he proved a crucial vote in passing modest reforms on that
account.)

And while Mills hasn't been as visible on high-profile
issues as has Horton – whose recent bill to prevent school employees from psychological
coaching of students about their gender identity inconsistent with state
instructional standards and to protect school employees and students from
confusion over pronoun use of students has been vetoed by Democrat Gov. John Bel Edwards but
which looks likely to survive by an override – or Seabaugh – who helped lead
the charge for tort reform and helped to scuttle a higher sales tax – Mills has
provided some leadership on tort reform and ballot security that made it into
law as well as having passed several narrower bills.

Probably the most publicity Mills has received has
come from his efforts for fair pricing on surface water sales, as
recommended by the Louisiana Legislative Auditor, where for the past couple
of sessions he hasn't been able to advance bills to do away with the artificially-low
statutory cap on pricing in favor of a market-based determination (which could
help Cypress Black Bayou out of its self-inflicted fiscal woes) and to open up a
process that otherwise abets insider dealing. In trying to do this, business groups
that almost always support Mills actually have opposed him while ideological
groups that typically are horrified by his voting record have backed him.

Bass, his opponent whose
only state campaign donation ever has been to Gatti (who has given his blessing to
Bass' candidacy), is serving his first full term on the School Board and is
deeply embedded among the good old boys. He has been a key organizer of campaigns
by GOP Bossier City Councilor David
Montgomery, whose insider politics and free-spending ways increasingly have
come under scrutiny. (Like Montgomery an insurance agent, unlike him at least
Bass hasn't reaped millions
of taxpayer dollars from Bossier governments for writing their insurance
policies.)

Even though he never has had to campaign on his
own – he initially
gained office when appointed to fill the place of Republican Mike Mosura
upon his drug-related conviction, then ran unopposed last year – his experience
campaigning for Montgomery city-wide should aid him with the somewhat-larger
and overlapping, but more rural, Senate district. But Mills proved to be a
formidable fundraiser and campaigner when he knocked off Gatti.

Not having been in office long, Bass also doesn't
have much of a record to vet. He managed to avoid going in on the enormous
property tax hike the Board endorsed in 2019, despite already having one of the
highest rates in the state, that voters decisively rejected, with his having
won appointment a few months later. But he has been part
of overseeing the District's deteriorating finances that threaten significantly
higher costs especially through 2029 that could send its cash balances into the
red, as well as its nickel-and-diming
other local governments over school security.

Although grumbling might arise about expansion of state spending he didn't
oppose, as
with Horton and Seabaugh overall Mills has a voting record so congruent
with district preferences that Bass can't make the case that Mills isn't
serving its policy desires. Given his demonstrated campaign prowess, like them that
also makes him a hard target to try to bring down although all will have to
deal with significantly different district lines. Nevertheless, the
establishment will try because it's the establishment and if it doesn't enforce
discipline, much less fail to win too many elections for too long, it ceases to
be the establishment.

* Tobacco control efforts in California during the 2001-2002 legislative session were hampered by the resurgence of the tobacco industry and a lack of commitment from the Davis Administration. * During the 2001-2002 legislative session, the tobacco industry spent a total of $5.95 million in political expenditures, which is an increase of $1.3 million over the previous legislative session. * Campaign contributions from the tobacco industry to legislators, legislative candidates, political parties and constitutional officers totaled $1.66 million, a 13% increase over the previous election cycle. * Tobacco industry to campaign contributions continue to favor Republicans over Democrats, although the divide is not as great as in previous years. Thus, of the $1,153,466 that was contributed to an identifiable party (including candidates, constitutional officers, legislators and political parties) during the 2001-2002 legislative session, $706,150 went to Republicans (61%) compared to $447,316 to Democrats (39%). This is an increase from the previous election cycle, when Republicans received 58% ($857,023) of the tobacco industry's contributions in California and Democrats received 42% ($613,587). * An additional $513,000 was contributed to non-partisan committees in 2001-2002. * The largest recipients of tobacco industry funds during the 2001-2002 legislative session were Assemblyman Tony Strickland (R-Dist.37), who received $63,000 and Senator James Brulte (R-Dist.31) who received $67,500. * On average, for every one point increase in a legislator's tobacco policy score, tobacco industry campaign contributions decreased by $3,270. This is a slight decrease from the 1997-1998 legislative session when a one point increase in the policy score resulted in a $3,690 decrease in tobacco industry campaign contributions *During the 2001-2002 legislative session, 74 candidates and elected officials did not accept contributions from the tobacco industry; 16 Republicans (23% of 69 Republicans) and 59 Democrats (59% of 100 Democrats). * Among the committees that review tobacco control policy, members of the Assembly Governmental Organizations Committee received the highest average tobacco industry campaign contribution among those recipients who accepted tobacco industry funding: $16,988 per member accepting tobacco funds. The Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee ranked a close second ($16,750 per accepting member), followed by the Senate Governmental Organizations Committee ($14,694 per accepting member) and the Assembly Health Committee ($12,778 per accepting member). With the exception of the Assembly Budget and Appropriations Committees, all of the Republican members of these committees accepted tobacco industry campaign contributions. * The tobacco industry spent $4.29 million on lobbying expenditures during the 2001-2002 legislative session, including $3.64 million paid directly to lobbying firms and an additional $649,076 on activities and other expenditures to influence policy making in California. Excluding activity and other expenditures, the tobacco industry increased its lobbying expenditures by $1.05 million (a 41% increase) between the 1999-2000 and 2001-2002 legislative sessions. * The tobacco industry has adopted a new strategy of using independent expenditure committees, which are not required to report political expenditures, to attack and discredit policy makers sympathetic to tobacco control in California. * Of the 10 tobacco-related bills that were enacted during the 2001-2002 legislative session, the tobacco lobbying firms reported lobbying against seven of them. The three bills not lobbied on included: a) AB2205 which increases the penalty for knowingly holding or selling tobacco products without having paid the appropriate tobacco tax, b) AB 1867 which expands the area around totlots in which smoking is prohibited and c) SB 322 which prohibits the sale of bidis. * Of the 17 tobacco-related bills that were not enacted during the 2001-2002 legislative session, the tobacco lobbying firms reported lobbying against 12. * The tobacco industry has also made efforts to gain legitimacy in the public's eye through youth prevention programs and image changes, such as Philip Morris changing its name to Altria and renewing its efforts to donate funds to community projects. The result is that policy makers, such as Carole Migden, are starting to state that the tobacco industry has changed as a justification for accepting tobacco industry campaign contributions. * The effectiveness of California's tobacco control efforts were recognized by the tobacco industry in September 2002 when R.J. Reynolds filed suit against the California Tobacco Education Media Campaign, claiming that the media campaign made it impossible for the tobacco companies to receive a fair trial with an unbiased jury. Judge Michael T. Garcia ruled against the tobacco company. * R.J. Reynolds made a second attempt at legitimacy in the court of public opinion, this time in conjunction with Lorillard, by returning to the California Courts in April 2003, filing allegations of vilification by the Media Campaign. * The tobacco industry spends more than $1.2 billion annually on advertising and promotions in California alone. At the same time, California's Tobacco Control Program was funded at only about 12% of the tobacco industry's expenditures on advertising and promotions. * The Tobacco Control Program's budget has continued to erode at the hands of the Davis Administration. The Governor's Proposal for the 2003-2004 Budget appropriates approximately $86 million for the program, which is a decrease from $108 million in 2002-2003 and $154 million in 2001-2002. The decline in revenues is due to a decrease in Proposition 99 revenues as a result of decreased tobacco consumption and a lack of new funds dedicated to the Tobacco Control Program. At the same time, inflation has reduced the purchasing power of the funds that are available. * In 2001, Governor Davis increased funding for the Media Campaign $19 million in FY1999-2000 to $45 million for FY2000-2001 and FY2001-2002. In 2001, Governor Davis also allocated $20 million from the state's share of MSA revenues for a youth anti-smoking campaign. However, this commitment to the Tobacco Control Program was short-lived, as Governor Davis withdrew the additional funds in 2002. * While rates of tobacco use in California have remained stable at about 17% between 2000 and 2001, the prevalence decreased to 16.6% in 2002. This drop may be a reflection of the additional funds provided in 2000 and 2001. * In 2002, there were three proposals introduced to increase the cigarette excise tax. Governor Davis introduced a 50 cent increase which was changed to a 63 cent increase in the Senate's revision of the budget, Senator Deborah Ortiz introduced a 65 cent increase, and Speaker Herb Wesson proposed a $2.13 increase. While Senator Ortiz intended the revenues from a tax increase to go to tobacco control and access to health care programs, neither the Governor nor Speaker Wesson earmarked any portion of the tax for tobacco control efforts. None of these proposals were enacted. * In January 2003, Governor Davis included a $1.10 cigarette tax increase in his 2003-2004 Budget proposal, but these funds were intended to bridge the $34.6 billion budget deficit and as of April 2003, none of the revenues were earmarked for tobacco control efforts. * In his May 2003 budget revision, Governor Davis proposed only a 23 cent tax increase in 2003-2004 and an additional 40 cent tax increase in 2004-2005. This decision was made despite a 61% public approval for a cigarette tax increase of $2.00 and a 68% approval for a cigarette tax increase of 75 cents. * While state officials decided to securitize $2.5 billion in Master Settlement Agreement revenues in January 2003, the Governor's May 2003 budget revision indicated that the state would not securitize its remaining share of funds. Instead, the $173 million expected for the next fiscal year would be used to cover General Fund expenditures for the Healthy Families Program. *. While the Governor's May revision of the 2003-2004 Budget did not reflect the Tobacco Education and Research Oversight Committee's funding recommendations, funding for the Tobacco Control Program was increased by 6% as opposed to a decrease or a diversion of funds as a result of a one time increase in the Proposition 10 backfill. * While the Davis Administration has not exhibited the hostility to the Tobacco Control Program evidenced during the Wilson years, it has also failed to give an effective program a priority. Progress only took place when the administration was faced with external pressures, either mounted by health advocates or, in one case, a legal challenge by the tobacco industry.

Recommended readings (Machine generated): Henry Hansmann (1988), 'Ownership of the Firm', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, IV (2), Fall, 267-304 -- Paul H. Rubin (1978), 'The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract', Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (1), April, 223-33 -- Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719 -- Jonathan Levin and Steven Tadelis (2005), 'Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120 (1), February, 131-71 -- Peter T. Leeson (2007), 'An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization', Journal of Political Economy, 115 (6), December, 1049-94 -- Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak (1996), 'Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (4), Fall, 139-58 -- L.S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (1954), 'A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System', American Political Science Review, 48 (3), September, 787-92 -- David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn (1989), 'Bargaining in Legislatures', American Political Science Review, 83 (4), December, 1181-206 -- Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Tonja Jacobi and Barry R. Weingast (2006), 'The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics', in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A.Wittman (eds), Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Chapter 11, New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 199-222 -- Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen (1983), 'Separation of Ownership and Control', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (2), June, 301-25 -- Neil Bruce and Michael Waldman (1990), 'The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (1), February, 155-65 -- Donald Wittman (2005), 'The Internal Organization of the Family: Economic Analysis and Psychological Advice', Kyklos, 58 (1), February, 121-44 -- Ronald Wintrobe (1990), 'The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship', American Political Science Review, 84 (3), September, 849-72 -- Daron Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier and James A. Robinson (2004), 'Alfred Marshall Lecture: Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule', Journal of the European Economic Association, 2 (2-3), April-May, 162-92 -- Donald Wittman (2013), 'Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions', British Journal of Political Science, 44 (4), October, 717-39 -- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz (1984), 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 28 (1), February, 165-79 -- James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich (1984), 'Probabilistic Voting and the Importance of Centrist Ideologies in Democratic Elections', Journal of Politics, 46 (2), May, 459-78 -- Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1996), 'Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics', Review of Economic Studies, 63 (2), April, 265-86 -- Donald Wittman (2009), 'How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median', Economic Journal, 119 (540), October, 1324-43

Recent revelations concerning data firm Cambridge Analytica's illegitimate use of the data of millions of Facebook users highlights the ethical and, relatedly, legal issues arising from the use of machine learning techniques. Cambridge Analytica is, or was – the revelations brought about its demise - a firm that used machine learning processes to try to influence elections in the US and elsewhere by, for instance, targeting 'vulnerable' voters in marginal seats with political advertising. Of course, there is nothing new about political candidates and parties employing firms to engage in political advertising on their behalf, but if a data firm has access to the personal information of millions of voters, and is skilled in the use of machine learning techniques, then it can develop detailed, fine-grained voter profiles that enable political actors to reach a whole new level of manipulative influence over voters. My focus in this paper is not with the highly publicised ethical and legal issues arising from Cambridge Analytic's activities but rather with some important ethical issues arising from the use of machine learning techniques that have not received the attention and analysis that they deserve. I focus on three areas in which machine learning techniques are used or, it is claimed, should be used, and which give rise to problems at the interface of law and ethics (or law and morality, I use the terms "ethics" and "morality" interchangeably). The three areas are profiling and predictive policing (Saunders et al. 2016), legal adjudication (Zeleznikow, 2017), and machines' compliance with legally enshrined moral principles (Arkin 2010). I note that here, as elsewhere, new and emerging technologies are developing rapidly making it difficult to predict what might or might not be able to be achieved in the future. For this reason, I have adopted the conservative stance of restricting my ethical analysis to existing machine learning techniques and applications rather than those that are the object of speculation or even informed extrapolation (Mittelstadt et al. 2015). This has the consequence that what I might regard as a limitation of machine learning techniques, e.g. in respect of predicting novel outcomes or of accommodating moral principles, might be thought by others to be merely a limitation of currently available techniques. After all, has not the history of AI recently shown the naysayers to have been proved wrong? Certainly, AI has seen some impressive results, including the construction of computers that can defeat human experts in complex games, such as chess and Go (Silver et al. 2017), and others that can do a better job than human medical experts at identifying the malignancy of moles and the like (Esteva et al. 2017). However, since by definition future machine learning techniques and applications are not yet with us the general claim that current limitations will be overcome cannot at this time be confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis of empirical evidence.

Los últimos años han significado el descubrimiento y la utilización de forma cada vez más profesionalizada de las redes sociales como una forma más de comunicación política y de influencia en los procesos electorales; tanto en la esfera social y electoral como por su capacidad de influir en la agenda política y mediática. El presente texto realiza un análisis de la evolución del número total de tuits que los principales líderes políticos españoles emitieron en Twitter en los meses previos a las dos últimas elecciones generales, específicamente los meses de noviembre y diciembre de 2015 y mayo y junio de 2016. En concreto el trabajo contabiliza las cuentas de los candidatos a la presidencia de Gobierno por parte de los cuatro principales partidos políticos españoles, mostrando la evolución del número de tuits publicados. Ello permite evidenciar la sobreabundancia comunicativa, en varios casos, de los líderes políticos españoles. Paralelamente el estudio recoge el número y el crecimiento de los seguidores en la red social de los líderes buscando la interrelación entre ambos factores. Utilizando una metodología cuantitativa se muestra que la reiteración comunicativa sin valor añadido en la red por parte de muchos líderes no significa necesariamente una comunicación eficaz ni una influencia relevante en las redes sociales. Como consecuencia, el estudio encuentra entre sus conclusiones iniciales la existencia de una sobreabundancia informativa por parte de los principales líderes políticos que no se materializa en términos de audiencia. ; Recent years have meant the discovery and use of increasingly professionalized social networks as a form of political communication and influence on electoral processes; both in the social and electoral sphere and for its ability to influence the political and media agenda. This text is an analysis of the evolution of the total number of tuits that the main Spanish political leaders issued on Twitter in the months before the last two general elections, specifically the months of November and December 2015 and May and June 2016. Specifically, the work counts the accounts of the candidates for the presidency of the Government by the four main Spanish political parties, showing the evolution of the number of tuits published. This allows to demonstrate the communicative superabundance, in several cases, of the Spanish political leaders. At the same time, the study gathers the number and growth of followers in the social network of the leaders looking for the interrelation between both factors. Using a quantitative methodology, it is shown that the communicative reiteration without added value in the network by many leaders does not necessarily mean effective communication or a relevant influence in social networks. Therefore, the study finds among its initial conclusions the existence of an informative overabundance on the part of the main political leaders that does not materialize in terms of audience.

У статті пропонується аналіз проблематики циркуляції політичної еліти України на прикладах депутатів Верховної Ради України 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 скликань. Для позначення членів політичної еліти використовується позиційний підхід. У роботі досліджуються особливості процесу циркуляції еліт, описуються основні канали інкорпорації, знаходяться особливості ротації у політичній еліті і аналізується процес екскорпорації з еліти. Основним методом аналізу є біографічний метод. ; В статье предлагается анализ проблематики циркуляции политической элиты Украины на примерах депутатов Верховной Ради Украины 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 созывов. Для обозначения членов политической элиты используется позиционный подход. В работе исследуются особенности процесса циркуляции элит, описываются основные каналы инкорпорации, находятся особенности ротации в политической элите и анализируется процесс экскорпорации из элиты. Основным методом анализа является биографический метод. ; In this article the author analyzes the characteristics of circulation of the political elite of Ukraine, at this stage of development of the country. The author considers, the political elite are a very important social group, because it can make decisions through the government that can affect a large number of the population. Biographical method was used as a method of research. The array 197 biographies. The object of studying were the individuals who were elected at 4-8 convocation of the Parliament of Ukraine and at the time of elections had been included in the top ten list of candidates from their political parties.Positional approach was used for the definition of elite. The author believes that if an individual takes the "high" post, it means this individual has a certain amount of power. Whereas in the absence of such a position arises the question of the affiliation of the individual to the political elite at all?The author identifies three main components of the process of circulation of political elite: transposition, rotation, excorporation. Incorporation is the process of entering into the political elite. If you use a positional approach, the indicator of incorporation is receiving post. Rotation is transferring from one post to another equivalent post. Excorporation from the elite is a process of exclusion of the individual from the political elite completely.In the research, the author planned to confirm or refute two hypotheses. The first: the circulation of the political elite in Ukraine is cyclical; one group of political elite replaces another. The second: at this stage of development of the country, the circulation of the political elite has accelerated. The article gives empirical data for each individual of the analyzed parliaments.In conclusion the author comes to the decision that the circulation of the political elite in Ukraine is cyclical and at this stage of development of the country the circulation of the political elite has accelerated. The author also notes the negative trend that excorporation of the elite is becoming more and more stringent. Losing the political battle will mean not only removal of financial flows, but it will be possible jail time and even more strict options.

Este estudio aborda los antecedentes del humor político a través de publicaciones satíricas en Ecuador del siglo XX, y su traslape a las redes sociales de internet en pleno siglo XXI. Detrás de estas manifestaciones sobresalen los humoristas digitales anónimos que se valen de un cuerpo digital para intervenir en las comunidades virtuales. Se plantean discusiones y prácticas del humor político en la virtualidad, su «significación social» en el marco del juego del poder y contrapoder, potenciado por los medios comunicacionales y las nuevas tecnologías. Se examinan estudios recientes del humor político desde las ciencias sociales en otros países hispanohablantes; y las relaciones entre poder, comunicación y sociedad que han encontrado en las redes sociales otros espacios de participación El análisis de caso, el humor político en las redes sociales en Ecuador, al término del gobierno de Rafael Correa, la campaña y elecciones presidenciales, y el inicio de otro periodo. Una etnografía online que utiliza herramientas etnográficas digitales y tradicionales para interactuar en la red. Se resalta la materialización de las expresiones humorísticas en formatos digitales que circulan por la red virtual. Se indaga sobre las tensiones y disputas alrededor del humor político en las redes sociales, la promoción y desacreditación de candidatos, las denuncias y señalamientos al gobierno; y la discusión en torno a una posible regulación a los contenidos de la red. ; This work deals the background of political humor in Ecuador at the end of the 20th century, and its overlap to social networks in the XXI century. Behind the satirical manifestations that circulate in social networks hide anonymous digital humorists who have recreated their digital body to intervene in virtual communities. It raises the discussions and practices of political humor in the virtual space, its "social significance" in the framework of the game of power and counterpower that has been strengthened by the communication media on the internet and new technologies. It also examines recent studies from the social sciences about political humor in other Spanish-speaking countries that contribute to discuss this phenomenon. The case analysis is the study of political humor in social networks in Ecuador, during the last months of Rafael Correa's government, the political campaign and elections of the new President, and the beginning of a new period. This is a "online ethnography" that implies the use of digital and traditional ethnographic tools to discover what happens on the network. At this point we also highlight the materialization of humorous expressions in digital formats that come to life while circulating through the virtual network. To finish, there is the question about the tensions and disputes surrounding political humor, the promotion and discrediting of candidates, and the accusations against the outgoing government, and a possible regulation to the contents that are published in the network is discussed. ; Magister en Antropología de lo Contemporáneo ; Cuenca

The paper describes the process of creating the Single Economic Space. The reasons for creating this association are disclosed and analyzed. It is said that the attempts to create the Single Economic Space were carried out in the 1990s as well. It is emphasized that it was not achieved during that period due to certain reasons. The author stresses that in the early 2000s when the new government, headed by V.Putin, came to power in Russia, the Russian Federation began to conduct two foreign policy lines in the post-Soviet space: new, Eurasian and old, non-Eurasian one. The first lies in the project to create effective integration scheme in the former Soviet Union without Ukraine, and the second was to engage Ukraine in all possible ways to integrate with Russia and other Russia's allies in the region. The project of the latest format should have become the SES. Particular attention in the paper is paid to the place and role of Ukraine in the signing of the Agreement on the creation of the SES. It is said that Ukraine was one of the first with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to begin the negotiation process on the SES. Attention is drawn to the fact that in September 2003, during the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine signed the Agreement on the formation of the SES. It is also said that the Orange Revolution seriously influenced Ukraine's participation in that pro-Russian integration project. Great attention is paid to the fact that, during the presidency of V.Yushchenko at the end of 2005, Ukraine rejected the SES negotiations. The reasons for Ukraine's refusal to participate in that project are analyzed in details. Also, attention is paid to the fact that Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan decided to continue integration and create a fully-fledged SES without Ukraine. The author emphasizes that even the victory of pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych in presidential elections in 2010 did not affect Ukraine's desire to revert to the negotiation process. It is noted that despite the attempts of some key members of Viktor Yanukovych team, (Prime Minister M.Azarov), Ukraine did not return to that post-Soviet integration project. The key events in the issue of the SES creation are presented chronologically. The main stages of creation and formation of the Single Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are also described. ; У статті подається процес створення Єдиного економічного простору. Розкриваються й аналізуються причини створення даного об'єднання. Особлива увага приділена місцю та ролі України у підписанні Угоди про формування ЄЕП і детально аналізуються причини відмови України від участі у цьому проекті. Також приділена увага тому, що Росія, Білорусь і Казахстан вирішили без України надалі інтегруватись і створити повноцінний ЄЕП. У хронологічному порядку подаються основні події в питанні створення ЄЕП, подаються основні етапи створення та становлення Єдиного економічного простору Росії, Білорусії та Казахстану.

Currently the Bedouin community in Israel is in very advanced stages of transition from a traditional to a modern society. The intersection between a traditional nomad population and a country with a modern Western lifestyle is a basic and material point of conflict. The Bedouin tribes that settled in the rainy and densely populated Galilee area were affected by their economic, social and geographic proximity to the surrounding agricultural rural region. This geographic proximity also directly affected the relatively rapid transition from nomadism to settlement. Beginning in the 1960s, Israeli government policy began regulating the Bedouins' spontaneous settlement. This step was designed to encourage trends toward social change and modernization in Bedouin society by means of urbanization. The initiative also stemmed from the desire to prevent spontaneous Bedouin settlement that was characterized by broad spatial dispersal and to concentrate the Bedouins in a limited number of towns. The transition to permanent residence forced the Bedouins living there to cope with cultural and social difficulties.On the one hand, the Bedouin tribal and clan structure strives to preserve itself, while on the other the selection of local leadership requires relinquishing tribalism in favor of the community structure. This research focuses on Zarzir, a Bedouin locality in the Galilee region of northern Israel comprising five tribes. The research revealed that the residents of this multi-tribal community demonstrated they were able to bridge between traditional values and modern values, contributing to the process of their adjustment to living in an urban residential environment. They slowly overcame their tribal pride and mutual suspicion and began to understand that it would be more beneficial to promote an independent municipal organization based on democratic elections according to candidates' management skills rather than based on tribal traditions. ; Beduini w Izraelu znajdują się obecnie na bardzo zaawansowanym etapie przejścia ze społeczności tradycyjnej do nowoczesnej. Zderzenie tradycyjnej wspólnoty wędrownej z krajem o nowoczesnym zachodnim stylu życia jest fundamentalnym i materialnym punktem zapalnym. Plemiona beduińskie, które osiadły w obfitym w opady oraz gęsto zaludnionym rejonie Galilei, odczuły gospodarczą, społeczną i geograficzną bliskość otaczającego je regionu rolniczego. To geograficzne sąsiedztwo spowodowało także względnie szybką transformację z nomadyzmu do osadnictwa. Począwszy od lat 60. XX w. władze izraelskie regulują spontaniczne osady Beduinów. To przejście do stałego pobytu wymusiło na zamieszkujących te tereny Beduinach radzenie sobie z trudnościami natury kulturowej oraz społecznej. Z jednej strony starają się oni zachować swoją strukturę plemienną i klanową, z drugiej jednak wybór lokalnych przywódców wymaga od nich porzucenia jej na rzecz organizacji społeczności. Niniejsze badania koncentrują się na miejscowości Zarzir (lokalnym samorządzie w rejonie Galilei w północnym Izraelu), w której zamieszkuje pięć plemion. Badania wykazały, że mieszkańcy tej wieloplemiennej społeczności stopniowo przezwyciężyli swoją dumę plemienną oraz wzajemną podejrzliwość, a także zrozumieli, że bardziej korzystne będzie promowanie niezależnej organizacji opartej na demokratycznych wyborach spośród kandydatów posiadających umiejętność zarządzania, a nie na tradycjach plemiennych.

The presence of the addressee and the image created by the use of explicit appellative markers are key elements in political discourse. In this regard, second person forms play a very important role as they often reinforce confrontation and contribute to creating the image of the political and discursive adversary, and hence that of the addressor as an alternative to him or her. This article focuses on the face-to-face debate between Rajoy and Rubalcaba prior to the 2011 election. It examines how the second-person pronouns 'usted'/'ustedes' and the vocatives 'señor' + surname 'Mr. + surname' do neither express politeness nor mitigate threatening acts, as it is the case in cooperative genres. On the contrary, they convey the attack and confrontation in this agonistic genre. The markers analyzed are frequent and significant in the debate as they strengthen the dialectical and argumentative nature of the utterances in which they appear. The results of this research are compared with previous studies of Spanish electoral debates. The comparison reveals that the number of second person markers has increased significantly on this occasion, which indicates that the confrontation is stronger. It also shows that the candidate of the party in government, Pérez Rubalcaba, exhibits a discourse behavior that typically characterizes someone leading the opposition. ; La presencia del interlocutor y la imagen que de él contribuye a forjar el emisor a través de marcas lingüísticas explícitas constituyen elementos clave del discurso político. En este sentido, las formas apelativas de segunda persona desempeñan un papel muy relevante, ya que a menudo refuerzan el enfrentamiento y participan en la creación de la imagen del adversario político y discursivo, y por extensión en la del emisor como contrapartida de este. A partir del debate electoral cara a cara entre Rajoy y Rubalcaba previo a las elecciones de 2011, en este artículo analizamos cómo los pronombres de segunda persona 'usted'/'ustedes' y los vocativos 'señor' + apellido, lejos de manifestar cortesía y utilizarse para atenuar actos amenazadores, como ocurre en géneros cooperativos, se convierten en elementos que vehiculan el ataque y la confrontación en un género no cooperativo. Así, las marcas estudiadas resultan frecuentes y significativas en el debate en la medida en que contribuyen a reforzar el carácter dialéctico y argumentativo de los enunciados en los que aparecen. Los resultados de este debate se comparan con estudios previos de otros debates entre candidatos a la presidencia de España, y ello permite observar que en esta ocasión ha aumentado el número de marcas de segunda persona, lo que indica que la confrontación es muy fuerte. Asimismo, muestra que el candidato del partido en el gobierno, Pérez Rubalcaba, tiene un comportamiento discursivo más propio de quien lidera la oposición.

Corruption in present-day Algeria has become so rife that it has gone from what Algerians once sardonically termed the 'sport of the elite' to being the 'national sport'. Not only has it reached epidemic proportions at all levels, it has become a culture unto itself, endemic to the country. Because most documented instances of major corruption and scandals have been linked to official branches, apparatuses and persons of the state, and because most have occurred and would not have been possible without some sort of official sanction, corruption in Algeria is ipso facto political. The mechanisms and networks of corruption are many and interlocking, revolving around and feeding on bribery, clientelism, tribalism, nepotism, webs of personal interest and loyalties. The crisis is multifaceted with international dimensions as well, given the collusion of multinational corporations and the intersection of power and vast revenues deriving from oil rent that has also permitted, through an overinflated and ineffectual state bureaucracy, a fertile environment for the pernicious phenomenon. Privatization; the opening of Algerian markets to direct foreign investment and liberalization of trade in response to structural reforms demanded by international monetary institutions during the 1990s; what was effectively a vicious and disastrous civil war in the wake of the suspension of the 1992 elections; as well as globalization have all factored in reinforcing old forms of corruption and promoting new ones. Elite coteries, crony capitalism, and a new generation of ambitious intermediaries and young opportunistic entrepreneurs, such as Rafiq 'Abd al-Mu'min Khalifa (convicted head of the al-Khalifa Group), have become the new players in billion-dollar schemes of graft, theft and embezzlement of unprecedented proportions. Furthermore, court cases and judicial proceedings have often taken on the aspect of farce when arrests are made and charges brought against minor officials, leaving those higher-up and known to have been party to illicit activities and dealings above the law in the realm of the 'untouchables'. Significantly, the road to reform, which must necessarily be political in the first instance, is fraught with obstacles, not the least of which is that favouritism is institutionalized in the letter of Algerian law. With good reason, Algerians in general have become highly circumspect with candidates and an electoral process that are open to every tactic of manipulation. This article provides valuable insider information into the specifics and mechanics of Algerian corruption, which even the ruling elite has been obliged to admit constitutes the primary threat to the stability and continuity of the state. The research and distillation of conclusions in this article are drawn from the full-length Arabic-language book by Muḥammad Ḥalīm Līmām entitled Ẓāhirat al-Fasād al-Siyāsī fī al-Jazāʾir: al-Asbāb wa al-Āthār wa al-Iṣlāḥ. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies (CAUS), 2011.