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Concerning water issues, not only do Shreveport and Bossier City residents have to worry about the fiscal health of their city-run water utilities, but also many now must face an unfunded mandate in the hundreds of dollars annually despite the best efforts of the state senator who represents both cities, an issue that may impact elections this fall.
This week, the Louisiana Department of Health issued grades to water systems through 2022. Using an extensive rubric, all in the state received a score from 0 to 100 (technically 110, as bonus points were awarded to those systems with an asset management plan). Shreveport didn't fare that well, scoring only 75. It lost half of the 10 points available for fiscal sustainability, all 20 for infrastructure, and all 10 for customer satisfaction (a point off for each valid complaint about the system water quality or quantity). Without the bonus for the plan, it would have scored among the bottom 15 percent of systems in the state.
Its deficiencies don't surprise. Woefully behind on fixing long-identified shortcomings that led to a consent decree with the federal government about a decade ago, the city remains hundreds of millions of dollars away from finishing required repairs within the next four years, so far behind partially because elected officials hesitated in raising water and waste fees due to the political unpopularity of that response.
For its part, Bossier City scored 95, also losing the maximum for customer service but gaining that back from having an asset management plan. It also received just half credit for sustainability, which at first glance might seem odd as its utility's financial situation is much better than Shreveport's. But it might have been gigged over a recent water deal with the Port of Caddo-Bossier that could put ratepayers on the hook for an estimated $62 million without receiving any asset in return.
Even though its City Council approved of the deal only last month, by their rhetoric city officials admitted they had included the deal, despite its being months away from that approval, as supporting evidence in a grant application with the state last year, and thusly may have done the same in submitting data for the grading. The state may have included that potential future liability to dock the city points.
Water and sewerage rates in both cities may increase in the future, due to Shreveport's laxity in fixing problems and Bossier City signing on to a bad deal. Yet of immediate concern is a potential $150 to $350 charge homeowners in both cities with a fountain, swimming pool, or lawn irrigation system will have to foot annually.
Louisiana law requires adherence to the International Residential Code in its own construction code, unless exceptions are made. That code (Title 51: XII sec. 344), which actually defaults to Uniform Construction Code (Section 312.10.2) strictures in the state's administrative code (Title 17: I sec. 111), specifies that a number of individual connections to a water system, including underground to a fountain or pool or to subterranean sprinklers, must have backflow prevention device to keep cross contamination from external sources infiltrating the system. Further, testing of this must occur every year.
That has been promulgated for about two decades but the state hadn't thought to enforce it until last year, when LDH began informing systems they must require residents with any of the above appurtenances to follow this. When checking out new construction of this nature, a city will charge a builder an inspection fee; for example, Bossier City's is $35.
However, the going price in the private sector far exceeds that, and when Shreveport and Bossier City residents began receiving notices that they had to foot these bills within the next several months, according to Republican state Sen. Barrow Peacock his phone rang off the hook.
Peacock just as the regular session kicked off filed SB 211. Since state law required following the IRC unless carving out portions, the bill was worded to prevent the state from enforcing that specific annual inspection part of the IRC insofar as residences but allowing local governments to enforce that if they so chose.
At the hearing of the bill last month before the Senate's Commerce, Consumer Protection and International Affairs Committee, senators seemed a bit incredulous about Peacock's solution. As a whole, they claimed to have heard little if nothing about this, which may be due to geography and climate as in the state northwest Louisiana runs by a few degrees the hottest July temperatures and by a few inches the least amount of annual rainfall, thereby increasing the proportion of households there likely to have sprinkler systems.
Senators also appeared flummoxed at a solution. While understanding that backflow needed prevention but that the burden would be significant on homeowners who just wanted to keep lawns from withering, there seemed to be sentiment towards spacing out inspections by several years, but the all-or-nothing nature of state code – either it had to accept IRC standards or waive these – seemed to disallow that solution.
With only Peacock having any kind of in-depth knowledge about the issue, the panel decided to punt on the matter by deferring the bill. Peacock concluded by saying that this wasn't the last they would hear about the issue.
Whether the Legislature makes changes next year, a number of homeowners are stuck with a new significant bill for this year. For example, Bossier City is rolling out its enforcement starting in City Council District 1, represented by Republican Brian Hammons. He lives within the boundaries of a homeowners association of 100 houses where the organization requires an irrigation system. Failure to have the inspection, according to state code, requires the water system to cut off distribution to that location.
At the same time, plumbers will realize this is a gold mine of revenue and will push legislators not to change anything. Caught in the middle will be local elected officials, who will get blamed for this by constituents out hundreds of dollars each year but whom aren't responsible for that and can't do anything about it. It might be an issue that flows back into both legislative and parish commission or police jury contests this fall.
This investigation is based on a study of the recently emerging problems in certain Mediterranean cities due to the widening gap between their physical and historical context and their natural boundaries. The first approach has arisen with the transformation of the city's dimensional scale throughout the 20th century, giving rise to new urban models. The second approach is based on the city's morphological alterations which are reflected in the visible changes in the images and identities. The morphological study of the contemporary Mediterranean city has thus given rise to various questions, namely does a Mediterranean city systematically transform in less than one century? In the last decades, the ancient city of Jaffa possessed all the characteristics of a Middle Eastern Mediterranean city (port, direct contact with the sea, different types of markets, socio-cultural diversity, intermediate scale, etc.) but recently due to different religious, political and economic developments, the region underwent significant changes that entailed a turnaround in the way to perceive, plan and inhabit the city. Therefore, there is a substantial spatial difference between the East and the West. particularly in the urban planning of the new city (Tel Aviv). From then on, the most ancient part of Jaffa began coexisting with the more modern 20th century city, the Garden City of Tel Aviv. How did such a boundary between two visibly antagonistic cities form? Did the destruction of a large part of Jaffa entail this paradigm shift? Can a Mediterranean city become a global city? Is the image of a city a direct reflection of its socio-cultural identity? This study is divided according to three historical periods that directly reflect the city's typologies that emerged in the last century. The first part of this thesis analyzes the last period of the Mediterranean city at the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1917, describing the socio-cultural context in the region, in which we will examine the type of human scale in Mediterranean public spaces, the socio-cultural diversity between its different neighborhoods, as well as the direct relationship between the city and the sea following the destruction of the fortified wall of ancient Jaffa. The second part of the research describes the city's typology at the creation of the new urban plan of the Garden City (Geddes Plan) in the 1920s under the British Mandate of Palestine, which attempts to compare the disciplinary content of contemporary city plans in the 20th century -Brasilia, Chandigarh and Canberra- in relation to Tel Aviv. Finally, the third section examines the current typology of the city, with its Mediterranean-Garden past, through an urban project analysis describing the type of urban model that has seemingly consolidated in the 21 st century the "Linear City'', with transportation infrastructures as the predominating element, more solidly established by the 1960s due to the political alliance with the United States, and following which its reflection of widespread globalization consolidated in the 1980s. ; Esta investigación basa su estudio en los problemas que se estarían desarrollando actualmente en ciertas ciudades mediterráneas en relación al alejamiento de sus características físicas históricas con su contexto y con sus límites naturales. La primera aproximación está planteada mediante la transformación en la escala dimensional de la ciudad durante el siglo XX, y como los sucesivos cambios escalares generaron los nue-.us modelos urbanos. La segunda aproximación se basa en las alteraciones morfológicas que derivaron en los visibles cambios sobre las imágenes e identidades. A través del estudio morfológico de la ciudad mediterránea contemporánea fueron surgiendo diferentes interrogantes, como: ¿Puede una ciudad de origen mediterráneo transformarse casi sistemáticamente en un periodo menor a cien años? Hasta hace pocas décadas, la ciudad antigua de Yafo poseía las características de una ciudad netamente mediterránea de Oriente Medio (ciudad puerto. contacto directo con el mar. diferentes tipos de mercados. multi-diversidad sociocultural, escala intermedia, etc.) pero por diferentes cuestiones de índole religiosa, política y económica, la región padeció cambios sustanciales que produjeron un giro en el modo de entender. planificar y habitar la ciudad. Es por ello que se produjo una marcada diferencia espacial entre Oriente y Occidente justamente en el modo de planificar la nueva parte de la ciudad (Tel Aviv). De allí que la parte más antigua de la ciudad comenzaba a convivir con la parte más moderna de las ciudades del siglo XX, la ciudad jardín de Tel Aviv. ¿Cómo fue la configuración espacial en un área fronteriza conformada por dos ciudades tan antagónicas?, ¿la destrucción de una gran parte de la ciudad histórica de Yafo pudo haber producido un cambio de paradigma?, ¿una ciudad mediterránea se puede convertir en una ciudad global? ¿Es la imagen de la ciudad el reflejo directo de su identidad sociocultural? Este estudio se encuentra dividido en tres períodos históricos que reflejarían directamente las tipologías de ciudad que se identificaron en el último siglo: La primera parte analiza la última etapa de la ciudad mediterránea tras la calda del Imperio Otomano en 1917, describiendo el contexto socio-cultural en la región, y examinando el tipo de escala que se identificaba en el espacio público mediterráneo, la multi-diversidad sociocultural que se impartía entre los diferentes barrios, como a su vez, la relación directa que se producía entre la ciudad y el mar mediterráneo posterior al derribo de las murallas defensivas de la ciudad antigua de Yafo. La segunda parte de la investigación describe la tipología de ciudad conformada bajo la nueva planificación de la ciudad jardín (Plan Geddes) y desarrollada a mediados de la década de 1920 bajo el control y consolidación del Mandato Británico en Palestina, en donde se efectúa una comparación sobre el contenido disciplinar de los planes de las ciudades contemporáneas -Brasilia, Chandigarh y Canberra- en relación a Tel Aviv. Por último, la tercera parte examina la tipología actual de ciudad, con su pasado mediterráneo-jardín, a través de un análisis proyectual que describe un nuevo modelo que se estaría consolidando en el siglo XXI bajo el concepto de la "ciudad lineal", con las infraestructuras de movilidad como el elemento predominante. La misma se fue conformando a principios de la década de 1960 a través de la alineación política con los Estados Unidos. y su reflejo directo en la consolidación de la globalización a partir de la década de 1980. ; Postprint (published version)
This investigation is based on a study of the recently emerging problems in certain Mediterranean cities due to the widening gap between their physical and historical context and their natural boundaries. The first approach has arisen with the transformation of the city's dimensional scale throughout the 20th century, giving rise to new urban models. The second approach is based on the city's morphological alterations which are reflected in the visible changes in the images and identities. The morphological study of the contemporary Mediterranean city has thus given rise to various questions, namely does a Mediterranean city systematically transform in less than one century? In the last decades, the ancient city of Jaffa possessed all the characteristics of a Middle Eastern Mediterranean city (port, direct contact with the sea, different types of markets, socio-cultural diversity, intermediate scale, etc.) but recently due to different religious, political and economic developments, the region underwent significant changes that entailed a turnaround in the way to perceive, plan and inhabit the city. Therefore, there is a substantial spatial difference between the East and the West. particularly in the urban planning of the new city (Tel Aviv). From then on, the most ancient part of Jaffa began coexisting with the more modern 20th century city, the Garden City of Tel Aviv. How did such a boundary between two visibly antagonistic cities form? Did the destruction of a large part of Jaffa entail this paradigm shift? Can a Mediterranean city become a global city? Is the image of a city a direct reflection of its socio-cultural identity? This study is divided according to three historical periods that directly reflect the city's typologies that emerged in the last century. The first part of this thesis analyzes the last period of the Mediterranean city at the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1917, describing the socio-cultural context in the region, in which we will examine the type of human scale in Mediterranean public spaces, the socio-cultural diversity between its different neighborhoods, as well as the direct relationship between the city and the sea following the destruction of the fortified wall of ancient Jaffa. The second part of the research describes the city's typology at the creation of the new urban plan of the Garden City (Geddes Plan) in the 1920s under the British Mandate of Palestine, which attempts to compare the disciplinary content of contemporary city plans in the 20th century -Brasilia, Chandigarh and Canberra- in relation to Tel Aviv. Finally, the third section examines the current typology of the city, with its Mediterranean-Garden past, through an urban project analysis describing the type of urban model that has seemingly consolidated in the 21 st century the "Linear City'', with transportation infrastructures as the predominating element, more solidly established by the 1960s due to the political alliance with the United States, and following which its reflection of widespread globalization consolidated in the 1980s. ; Esta investigación basa su estudio en los problemas que se estarían desarrollando actualmente en ciertas ciudades mediterráneas en relación al alejamiento de sus características físicas históricas con su contexto y con sus límites naturales. La primera aproximación está planteada mediante la transformación en la escala dimensional de la ciudad durante el siglo XX, y como los sucesivos cambios escalares generaron los nue-.us modelos urbanos. La segunda aproximación se basa en las alteraciones morfológicas que derivaron en los visibles cambios sobre las imágenes e identidades. A través del estudio morfológico de la ciudad mediterránea contemporánea fueron surgiendo diferentes interrogantes, como: ¿Puede una ciudad de origen mediterráneo transformarse casi sistemáticamente en un periodo menor a cien años? Hasta hace pocas décadas, la ciudad antigua de Yafo poseía las características de una ciudad netamente mediterránea de Oriente Medio (ciudad puerto. contacto directo con el mar. diferentes tipos de mercados. multi-diversidad sociocultural, escala intermedia, etc.) pero por diferentes cuestiones de índole religiosa, política y económica, la región padeció cambios sustanciales que produjeron un giro en el modo de entender. planificar y habitar la ciudad. Es por ello que se produjo una marcada diferencia espacial entre Oriente y Occidente justamente en el modo de planificar la nueva parte de la ciudad (Tel Aviv). De allí que la parte más antigua de la ciudad comenzaba a convivir con la parte más moderna de las ciudades del siglo XX, la ciudad jardín de Tel Aviv. ¿Cómo fue la configuración espacial en un área fronteriza conformada por dos ciudades tan antagónicas?, ¿la destrucción de una gran parte de la ciudad histórica de Yafo pudo haber producido un cambio de paradigma?, ¿una ciudad mediterránea se puede convertir en una ciudad global? ¿Es la imagen de la ciudad el reflejo directo de su identidad sociocultural? Este estudio se encuentra dividido en tres períodos históricos que reflejarían directamente las tipologías de ciudad que se identificaron en el último siglo: La primera parte analiza la última etapa de la ciudad mediterránea tras la calda del Imperio Otomano en 1917, describiendo el contexto socio-cultural en la región, y examinando el tipo de escala que se identificaba en el espacio público mediterráneo, la multi-diversidad sociocultural que se impartía entre los diferentes barrios, como a su vez, la relación directa que se producía entre la ciudad y el mar mediterráneo posterior al derribo de las murallas defensivas de la ciudad antigua de Yafo. La segunda parte de la investigación describe la tipología de ciudad conformada bajo la nueva planificación de la ciudad jardín (Plan Geddes) y desarrollada a mediados de la década de 1920 bajo el control y consolidación del Mandato Británico en Palestina, en donde se efectúa una comparación sobre el contenido disciplinar de los planes de las ciudades contemporáneas -Brasilia, Chandigarh y Canberra- en relación a Tel Aviv. Por último, la tercera parte examina la tipología actual de ciudad, con su pasado mediterráneo-jardín, a través de un análisis proyectual que describe un nuevo modelo que se estaría consolidando en el siglo XXI bajo el concepto de la "ciudad lineal", con las infraestructuras de movilidad como el elemento predominante. La misma se fue conformando a principios de la década de 1960 a través de la alineación política con los Estados Unidos. y su reflejo directo en la consolidación de la globalización a partir de la década de 1980. ; Postprint (published version)
Diese Dissertation leistet einen neuen Beitrag, um zwei zentrale Fragen der Bewertung von Umweltbelastungen des Verkehrs zu beantworten: Was sind die wesentlichen Umweltbelas-tungen des Verkehr? Wie lassen sich die Belastungen insgesamt bewerten? Dazu werden erstmals Elemente der Umweltwirkungsanalyse mit einem multi-kriteriellem Entscheidungsverfahren verknüpft. Die Arbeit liefert Kriterien, Argumente und Verfahren, um bei hohen Unsicherheiten heterogene Effekte vergleichen, Zielkonflikte systematisch abwägen und Kompro-misse identifizieren zu können. Die Ergebnisse zielen auf eine Anwendung bei Strategischen Umweltprüfungen. Nach der theoretischen Analyse wird das untersuchte Verfahren auf einen real benutzten Indikatorensatz angewandt, die TERM-Indikatoren für Umwelt und Verkehr der Europäischen Umweltagentur. Damit wird hier die erste systematische Überprüfung dieses politisch relevanten Datensatz geleistet. Der Abgleich mit der Methodik der Ökobilanzen und den Vorgaben einer Strategische Umweltprüfung bestätigt die Vollständigkeit der betrachteten Umweltwirkungskategorien. Unter den ursprünglich vierundzwanzig Indikatoren werden sieben Schlüsselindikatoren identifiziert, die die wichtigsten Umweltbelastungen des Straßenverkehrs in Europa repräsentieren. Als Kriterien werden das Vorsorgeprinzip, die Erheblichkeit des verkehrlichen Beitrags, die Zuverlässigkeit und die Vergleichbarkeit der verfügbaren Daten angesetzt. Mit diesem systematischen Verfahren kann auf die erste Frage eine übersichtliche Antwort gegeben werden. Für eine Gesamtbewertung müssen die unterschiedlichen Umweltbelastungen und eventuelle Zielkonflikte abgewogen werden, wobei z.T. erhebliche Unsicherheiten zu beachten sind. In dieser Arbeit wird das ordinale, multi-kriterielle Bewertungsverfahren ELECTRE III erstmals für eine Umweltbewertung des Verkehrs eingesetzt. Das Verfahren wird hier adaptiert um zu untersuchen, wann differierende Einzelbewertungen zur gleichen Gesamtbewertung führen. Dies könnte erstmals Eingang in die Verkehrsplanung in Deutschland finden, um Interessenkonflikte durch die systematische Identifikation von Kompromissbereichen zu überwinden. Angewandt auf TERM wird hiermit erstmals eine methodisch abgesicherte Gesamtbewertung der Umweltbelastungen des Straßenverkehrs in Europa gegeben: Auf Grundlage der oben abgeleiteten Schlüsselindikatoren kann von einem Rückgang der Belastungen seit 1990 in Europa (EU 15) gesprochen werden, der voraussichtlich auch bis zum Jahr 2010 weitergehen wird. Zu dieser positiven Bewertung tragen die rückläufige Zahl der Verkehrstoten und die sinkenden Belastungen bei Flächeninanspruchnahme und Fragmentierung bei. Diese Gesamteinschätzung ist stabil, egal ob dem Oberziel "akuter Gesundheitsschutz"der "langfristi-gen Schonung von Ressourcen" oder dem "Schutz von Ökosystemen" Priorität eingeräumt wird. Nur, wenn den Umweltwirkungskategorien "Schutz des Klimas" und "Schutz der energetischen Ressourcen" ein dominantes Gewicht zugesprochen wird, kann diese positive Bewertung der Entwicklung umgekehrt werden. Damit ist das Feld des Kompromisses abgesteckt und win-win-Strategien aus unterschiedlichen Positionen identifiziert: Um die Umweltbilanz des Straßenverkehrs in Europa weiter zu verbessern, müssen vor allem die gegenläufigen Entwicklungen beim Treibstoffverbrauch und den CO2-Emissionen entkoppelt und zurückgeführt werden, zugleich die Inanspruchnahme neuer Flächen durch Verkehrsinfrastrukturen und die Zahl der Unfallopfer im Verkehr weiter gemindert werden. Die systematische Analyse hat verschiedene Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten bei Indikatoren und Daten aufgezeigt: Erstens, die Unsicherheit bei den tendenziell rückläufigen Schadstoff- und Lärmemissionen des Verkehrs sollte deutlich verringert werden; zur Zeit erlauben die Daten keine belastbare Interpretation. Zweitens sollten die Indikatoren für Fragmentierung und Flächeninanspruchnahme zeitlich sensitiv definiert werden, z.B. als Änderungsrate, wie hier vorgeschlagen. Wenn, drittens, die Auswirkungen des Flug- und Schiffsverkehrs einbezogen werden, die Daten stärker auf die Wirkungen abheben und die zukünftige Entwicklung antizipieren, kann TERM zu einem Instrument der vorausschauenden Umweltfolgenabschätzung weiterentwickelt werden. Die vorgelegte Arbeit bietet Verfahren und Kriterien, um Komplexität und Unsicherheiten sys-tematisch zu behandeln, mit Zielkonflikten transparent umzugehen und Kompromisse bei divergierenden Einzelbewertungen zu identifizieren. Das Verfahren empfiehlt sich besonders für Strategische Bewertungen, wenn tendenziell eine qualitative und keine quantitative Behandlung wichtig ist, und kann über den Umweltbereich hinaus angewendet werden. ; This PhD dissertation gives new answers to two questions central for the assessment of transport's environmental impacts: What are the relevant environmental impacts of transport? How to perform their integrated assessment? Here, elements of environmental impact analy-sis are combined with a multi-criteria evaluation scheme for the first time. This work provides criteria, arguments and procedures in order to compare heterogeneous effects under signifi-cant uncertainties, to treat conflict of interests systematically and to identify possible win-win-strategies. The results aim at an application for Strategic Environmental Assessment. After the theoretical analysis the procedure is applied to a real-world indicator set, the Trans-port and Environment indicators (TERM) of the European Environment Agency. This is the first systematic review of this politically relevant data set. The completeness of the environ-mental impact categories under question is verified by comparison with the methodology of Life Cycle Assessments and the requirements of Strategic Environmental Assessment. Seven key indicators are identified among the original twenty-four that represent the most important environmental pressures of road transport in Europe. As selection criteria serve the precau-tionary principle, transport's specific contribution as well as the reliability and comparability of the available data. The systematic selection procedure produces a comprehensive answer to the first question. The overall assessment has to trade-off the different environmental impacts and possible con-flicts of interest while taking into account the sometimes significant uncertainties. This analysis applies the ordinal, multi-criteria evaluation scheme ELECTRE III for the first time for an envi-ronmental assessment of transport. The procedure is modified here to identify when diverging individual assessments result still in the same overall assessment. Such a systematic identifi-cation of compromise might be introduced to overcome conflict of interest in national German transport planning for the first time. Applied to TERM here a methodologically sound overall assessment of road transport's environmental impacts is given for the first time. On the basis of the key indicators identified above, one can ascertain a reduction of the pressures in Europe (EU15) since 1990, that will probably continue until the year 2010. The positive assessment is driven by a falling number of traffic fatalities and the reducing pressure on land use and fragmentation. This overall as-sessment is stable regardless whether the "acute protection of human health" the "long-term conversation of resources" or the "protection of ecosystems" is given highest importance. Only if the two impact categories "climate protection" and "energy resources" receive a dominant weight, the positive assessment of the development can be reversed. Thus the area of com-promise is identified and win-win-strategies catering different positions can be designed: To improve the environmental performance of road transport in Europe, fuel consumption and CO2-emissions must be decoupled and reduced, while land take for extra-urban infrastructure and transport fatalities need to be reduced further. The systematic analysis has revealed several points for improvement for indicators and data: First, the reliability of transport's pollutant and noise emission data, apparently falling, need to be improved significantly. For the time being these data do not allow a reliable interpretation. Second, the indicators for fragmentation and land take should be reformulated to make them sensitive to temporal change, e.g. as the rate of change as proposed here. When, third, in particular the impacts of aviation and maritime shipping will be included, the data better cap-ture the final impacts and anticipate the future development, then TERM can be developed to become an instrument of anticipatory environmental impact assessment. This thesis presents procedures and criteria to systematically treat complexity and uncertainty, to transparently deal with conflicts of interest and to identify compromise despite diverging individual assessments. The procedure is particularly recommended for Strategic Assess-ments, when rather a qualitative and not a quantitative treatment is important, and can be transferred beyond environmental assessments. The dissertation was written at DLR - Institute for Transportation Research, Berlin/Germany, and was supervised by Prof. A. Grunwald, Fraunhofer-Institute for System Analysis and Tech-nology Impact Assessment, Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, and Chair for Technology Impact Assessment at University Freiburg im Breisgau.
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The growing presence of China in Africa has captured the attention of both Africa and the West. As Chinese trade and investments have eclipsed those of Europe and the United States, their leaders have warned that Beijing is exploiting African resources, threatening African jobs, buttressing African dictators, and showing general disregard for human rights, good governance, and sound environmental practices. While leveling the same criticisms, African civil society organizations have noted with irony that the West has long engaged in similar practices.Chinese interest in Africa—and Western concerns about Beijing's influence—are not new. Understanding the current standoff requires an understanding of its history. The most recent wave of Chinese interest in Africa began during the Cold War. In April 1955, representatives of twenty-nine Asian and African nations and territories, and numerous liberation movements met in Bandung, Indonesia at the Conference of Asian and African States. Participants resolved to oppose colonialism and imperialism and to promote economic and cultural cooperation throughout the global south—then called the "Third World." They voiced particular support for decolonization and national liberation in Africa. China played a key role in the conference and engaged with Africa in the Bandung spirit of African-Asian solidarity and cooperation. Between the early 1960s and the mid-1970s, China offered grants and low interest loans for development projects in Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, and Zambia. It also sent tens of thousands of "barefoot doctors," agricultural technicians, and solidarity work brigades to African countries that rejected neocolonialism and had been rebuffed by the West. In Southern Africa, where white minority rule persisted in settler colonies and Portugal resisted African demands for independence, Beijing provided liberation movements in Mozambique and Rhodesia with military training, advisors, and weapons. When Western countries ignored Zambian pleas to more effectively isolate the renegade regimes, China established the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) and built a railroad that permitted Zambia to export its copper through Tanzania, rather than white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa.During the Cold War, as China sought allies in the global arena, its policies were motivated primarily by politics. After the Cold War, however, China's priorities changed. Beijing had embarked on a massive program of industrialization and economic development that transformed the Chinese economy into one of the world's most powerful. Africa was no longer viewed as an ideological proving ground. Instead it was valued as a source of raw materials and a market for Chinese goods, ranging from clothing, cell phones and electronics to artificial intelligence systems. China' relationship with Africa was no longer one that showed sympathy for its plight, but instead mimicked those of the colonial and Cold War powers. Countries were valued according to what they could offer China materially and strategically.By the first decade of the twenty-first century, China had surpassed the United States as Africa's largest trading partner, and more recently as Africa's fourth largest source of direct foreign investment. In exchange for guaranteed access to energy resources, agricultural land, and strategic materials necessary to produce electronic devices and electric vehicles, China has spent billions of dollars on African infrastructure—developing and rehabilitating roads, railroads, dams, bridges, ports, oil pipelines and refineries, power plants, water systems, and telecommunications networks. Chinese enterprises have also constructed hospitals and schools and invested in clothing and food processing industries, agriculture, fisheries, commercial real estate, retail, and tourism. Recently, investments have focused on communications technology and wind and solar power.Unlike the Western powers and the international financial institutions they dominate, Beijing has not made political and economic restructuring a condition for its loans, investments, aid, and trade. Although it has required that public works contracts be awarded to Chinese companies and that Chinese supplies be used, the agreements have not required a shift in economic models, adherence to democratic principles, respect for human rights, or the implementation of labor and environmental protections. While Beijing's noninterference policies have been popular in ruling circles, civil society organizations have frequently criticized them. African labor, business, civic, and human rights organizations have observed that Chinese firms have driven African-owned enterprises out of business and employed Chinese workers rather than local ones. When they do hire African labor, Chinese businesses have paid poverty-level wages under conditions that have endangered worker health and safety. Moreover, the infrastructure projects have resulted in massive debts—although African countries still owe far more to Western powers and financial institutions than to China. Beijing's practices, like those of Western powers, have resulted in a new wave of African dependency. Most importantly, Beijing has backed corrupt African elites in exchange for unfettered access to resources and markets, strengthening regimes that have pilfered their countries' wealth, repressed political dissent, and waged wars against neighboring states. In its battle for global influence, China has found in contemporary Africa what Western powers discovered centuries ago. Beyond resources and markets, it has garnered much-needed diplomatic support in the United Nations and other international organizations. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it has frequently challenged Western-sponsored initiatives that focus on human rights and governance issues, turning a blind eye to human rights abuses, political repression, and corruption. Until recently, it has opposed political and military intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. However, as Chinese economic interests in Africa have grown, it has recognized the need for peace and stability. As a result, Beijing has expanded its involvement in UN disaster relief, anti-piracy, and counterterrorism operations. Its decades-long policy of noninterference in host country affairs has been replaced in recent years by interventionist policies aimed at protecting its economic interests. In the early 2000s, Beijing joined UN peacekeeping operations for the first time, focusing on countries and regions where it had valuable investments and export markets. In 2006, for instance, China pressed Sudan, an important oil partner, to accept an African Union-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, and in 2015 it worked with an East African subregional organization and Western powers to mediate peace talks in South Sudan. In 2013, Beijing joined UN peacekeeping efforts in Mali, motivated by its interests in the oil and uranium of neighboring countries. Initially, China refrained from military involvement in strife-ridden areas, preferring to contribute medical workers and engineers. In 2007, it provided a 315-member engineering unit to the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, but no troops. However, as Beijing's global stature and interests grew, so too did its military engagement. Chinese military presence was notable in UN peacekeeping missions in Burundi (2004–6) and the Central African Republic (2014–). In 2013, when Beijing supplied some 400 engineers, medical personnel, and police to Mali, it also provided combat troops, marking the first time Chinese combat forces had joined a UN operation. Similarly, in 2015, Beijing assigned 350 engineers, medical personnel, and other noncombatants to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. However, it also contributed an infantry battalion composed of 700 armed peacekeepers—the first Chinese infantry battalion ever deployed in a UN peacekeeping mission. By 2016, Beijing was contributing more military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations than any other permanent member of the Security Council. The trend toward heightened Chinese political and military engagement in Africa culminated in 2017 when it joined France, the United States, Italy, and Japan in establishing a military facility in Djibouti, which overlooks one of the world's most lucrative shipping lanes. The Djibouti base was China's first permanent military facility outside its borders. Strategically located on the Gulf of Aden near the mouth of the Red Sea, the base has allowed Beijing to resupply Chinese vessels involved in UN anti-piracy operations and to protect Chinese nationals living in the region. It has also enabled the monitoring of commercial traffic along China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which links countries from Oceania to the Mediterranean in a vast production and trading network. This alliance will help China to safeguard its supply of oil, half of which originates in the Middle East and transits through the Red Sea and Djibouti's Bab al-Mandeb Strait to the Gulf of Aden. Most of China's exports to Europe follow the same route.Although the United States decries Chinese imperialism, in reality it is fighting to maintain its role as the world's single hegemonic power. Nonetheless, a growing number of African states are refusing to take sides in the new Cold War, rejecting Washington's claim that it alone can protect their interests. Although Democratic and Republican administrations alike have promoted the notion that the U.S. must save the world from the "evil empires" that are threatening global security, it is the United States that has more than 750 bases in at least 80 countries, while China has only three. It is the United States that has joined at least 15 foreign wars since 1980, while China has joined only one. The U.S. security establishment favors containing or defeating China by bolstering military alliances abroad. It has established 29 military bases in Africa in resource-rich areas that have attracted the attention of both China and violent extremists. Jeffrey Sachs, a Columbia University professor who has advised three UN secretaries-general, has referred to the US view of global security as "dangerous, delusional, and outmoded." True security is not rooted in military ventures, he argues, but rather in the abandonment of hegemonic dreams and the building of alliances with other countries, large and small. Only then can the world begin to resolve the many environmental, energy, food, and social crises that threaten to devastate us all. This piece was republished with permission from the New Left Review
Depuis plus d'une décennie, le Rwanda a adopté une série de politiques et stratégies visant le développement économique et l'amélioration des conditions de vie de sa population majoritairement agricole. Dans le secteur agricole, la mise en pratique de ces stratégies et des programmes y relatifs s'est accompagnée d'une série de progrès en matière d'adoption de paquets technologiques et de l'augmentation de la production. Cependant, on remarque que l'économie du pays est toujours caractérisée par une agriculture de subsistance, et pour la filière maïs en particulier, le pays affiche une dépendance continuelle vis-à-vis des importations pour satisfaire la demande nationale, et les usines de transformation du maïs opèrent toujours en dessous de leur capacité installée. Cette recherche se propose de comprendre le niveau de compétitivité de cette filière dans les conditions actuelles de production et de commercialisation en vue d'inventorier les contraintes existantes et de formuler les stratégies pouvant améliorer le niveau de performance économique de la production et le système de commercialisation du maïs. Les données collectées pour étudier la performance économique de la production du maïs proviennent d'un suivi rapproché des activités de production du maïs sur un échantillon de 50 producteurs issus de cinq coopératives de producteurs de maïs choisies dans les districts de Huye, Rusizi, Gasabo, Burera et Bugesera pendant deux saisons culturales. Elles ont été complétées par l'observation directe, les entretiens avec les personnes ressources ciblées et les discussions de groupes focalisés. L'analyse a été faite à l'aide de l'analyse de groupe et des méthodes statistiques appropriées. L'étude de la chaîne de commercialisation a utilisé le modèle 'Structure-Comportement-Performance' avec des données collectées sur un échantillon de 150 producteurs et 17 collecteurs choisis dans les districts de Burera, Bugesera et Huye, et 15 transporteurs, 5 grossistes et 15 détaillants choisis au marché national de Kigali. Les résultats ont révélé que pour la plupart des producteurs, le rendement reste très faible comparativement aux rendements théoriques attendus, les prix de revient restent plus élevés et supérieurs aux prix de vente, la marge brute et le revenu du travail familial sont négatifs et la valeur ajoutée brute créée par les producteurs n'est pas élevée quand bien même elle est positive. L'analyse a montré que l'augmentation du prix de vente influence positivement la marge brute, la valeur ajoutée et le revenu du travail familial, et que l'usage rationnel des semences améliorées, des engrais chimiques et amendements contribuent à augmenter le rendement. Ce qui montre clairement que l'amélioration du prix de vente et de l'usage rationnel des intrants peut contribuer significativement à faire de la production du maïs une activité plus rentable et rémunératrice des facteurs de production. Cette étude a également mis au clair les défis qui entravent le processus de production du maïs. Ils englobent: la non-disponibilité et le faible accès aux intrants, l'insuffisance de l'encadrement technique, les ressources financières limitées et le faible accès au crédit agricole formel, le coût élevé de location des marais, le mode de fixation du prix plancher et manque de mécanismes assurant son usage par les acheteurs potentiels, le manque d'infrastructures de stockage, et la non-durabilité des subventions aux intrants octroyées par le gouvernement. Au niveau de la commercialisation, les résultats ont révélé que plusieurs acteurs participent dans la commercialisation du maïs. L'étude a également révélé que le maïs importé de l'Ouganda est vendu sur le marché domestique à des prix moins élevés que le maïs produit localement, ce qui atteste en même temps de la hausse du coût de production du maïs au Rwanda par rapport à l'Ouganda et du faible niveau de compétitivité du maïs local par rapport au maïs de l'Ouganda. L'état amélioré des routes de desserte et le niveau élevé d'accès à l'information sur les prix par les acteurs ont été soulignés parmi les innovations technologiques qui ont contribué à améliorer le système de commercialisation des denrées agricoles en général et du maïs en particulier, ce qui a également été témoigné par le niveau d'intégration observé entre les marchés de collecte de maïs et le marché national de Kigali. Toutefois, on note que le manque de capital suffisant et le faible accès au crédit formel ont été signalés comme contraintes majeures par la plupart des acteurs de la chaîne. A la lumière de tous ces résultats, il est clair que les conditions de production et de commercialisation du maïs ne sont pas bonnes à tous les niveaux. Ceci porte atteinte à la capacité de la filière à répondre convenablement à la demande domestique, à générer des revenus pour les acteurs et à s'intégrer sur les marchés tant domestiques que régionaux. Par conséquent, les stratégies visant à augmenter la production et améliorer les conditions de conduite de la filière ont été recommandées. Elles incluent la mise en place d'actions visant à améliorer l'accès au financement par les acteurs de la filière, à rendre disponibles et accessibles les intrants, à réorganiser le système de commercialisation surtout en matière de fixation et d'usage du prix plancher, à rendre disponibles les infrastructures de stockage dans les zones où elles sont en déficit, à améliorer le suivi, la formation et la sensibilisation des producteurs de maïs sur les techniques culturales et l'adoption des innovations, et à harmoniser au niveau national les coûts de location de la terre des marais. ; For more than a decade, Rwanda has adopted a series of policies and strategies aimed at economic development and the improvement of the living conditions of its predominantly agricultural population. In agriculture, implementation of these strategies and related programs has been accompanied by a series of advances in the adoption of farming technologies and increasing agricultural production. However, the country's economy is still characterized by subsistence agriculture, and for the maize sector in particular, the country is continuously depending on imports to meet domestic demand, and maize processing plants always operate below their productive capacity. This research aims to examine the level of competitiveness of this sector in the current production and marketing conditions in order to identify existing constraints and formulate the strategies that can improve the level of economic performance of maize production and maize marketing system. The data used to study the economic performance of maize production come from close monitoring of maize production activities on a sample of 50 producers from five maize producers' cooperatives selected in the districts of Huye, Rusizi, Gasabo, Burera and Bugesera during two growing seasons. They were supplemented by direct observation, interviews with targeted resource persons, and focus group discussions. The analysis was done using group analysis and appropriate statistical methods. The study of the maize marketing system used the 'Structure-Conduct-Performance' model with data collected from a sample of 150 producers and 17 assemblers selected in the districts of Burera, Bugesera and Huye, and 15 transporters, 5 wholesalers and 15 retailers selected at the national market of Kigali. The results revealed that for many producers, the yield is very low compared to theoretical expected yields, production costs are higher and exceed sales prices, gross margin and family labor income are negative, and the gross added value created by maize producers is not high even though it is positive. The analysis showed that the increase in the selling price positively influences the gross margin, added value and family labor income, and that the rational use of improved seeds, chemical fertilizers and soil conditioners improves the yield. This clearly shows that improving the selling price and rational use of inputs can significantly contribute to making maize production a more profitable and income-generating activity. The study also identified challenges that hamper the production process. These include non-availability of, and low access to inputs, inadequate technical support, limited financial resources and low access to formal agricultural credit, high marshlands rental fee, method of fixing the maize floor price and lack of mechanisms ensuring its use by potential buyers, the lack of storage infrastructure, and the unsustainability of inputs subsidies granted by the government. At the marketing level, the results revealed that several actors are involved in the marketing of maize. The study also revealed that maize imported from Uganda is sold on domestic market at lower prices than locally produced maize, which attests the increase in the cost of maize production in Rwanda compared to Uganda and the low level of competitiveness of the local maize compared to Ugandan maize. The improved status of feeder roads and the high level of access to price information by actors were highlighted among the technological innovations that helped improve the marketing system of foodstuffs in general and maize in particular, which was also evidenced by the level of integration observed between districts maize markets and the national market of Kigali. However, the lack of enough capital and low access to formal credit were noted as major constraints by most of the chain actors. In the light of all these results, it is clear that the production and marketing of maize are not done in good conditions at all levels. This in turn undermines the sector's ability to respond adequately to domestic demand, generate income for actors and integrate itself into both domestic and regional markets. Therefore, strategies aiming at scaling-up the maize production and marketing, and improving working conditions of the sector operators were recommended. These strategies include the implementation of actions to improve access to finance by farmers and other actors; making inputs avail and accessible; reorganizing the marketing system especially in terms of fixing and using the floor price; making available storage facilities where necessary; improving the monitoring, training and sensitization of maize producers on farming techniques and the use of improved technologies; and harmonizing the marshland rental fee at national level.
Technical Report 2018-08-ECE-141 Technical Report 2002-12-ECE-012 Defense Presentations (I) Ozgur Aktunc, Rajani Sadasivam, Urcun Tanik, Kazuhiro Abe, Praneet Deo This technical report is a reissue of a technical report issued December 2002 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Alabama at Birmingham August 2018 · . Technical Repm12002-12-ECE-012 Defense Presentations (I) Ozgur Aktunc, Rajani Sadasivam, Urcun Tanik, Kazuhiro Abe, Praneet Deo TECHNICAL REPORT Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Alabama at Birmingham December 2002 ' . Masters Thesis Presentation Ozgur Aktunc Thesis advisor: Dr. Murat M. Tanik The Role of Component Technologies on Enterprise Engineering Department of [locbi, 2002 Publications · ~1:~fk~c~srr~s~ lo:;;lu~i{lg:, ~;.~:~':Is~: .~ ~!,~ M. World Conference on Intcgr,lted Design & Process Technology, 2000, Proceedings co. • 2. o. Aktonc, P. Oeo, aniverslty of Alebllma at Blnninoham, september 2001, p.4L • • .}~·~.!.:~·. ~t1t~U!o~i.r8::e~we:~ at Birmingham, October 2001, p.47. • 3. o. Aklunc and M. M. Tanlk. ·p-SubmiSSion and Review ~;,~ • A component model defines a set of standards for component Implementation, cuslomization, composition, evolution, and deployment. • Component models set the standards for application developers, help the businesses to Implement the business logic Into their systems In a methodology. Current Component Models • There are numerous component models today. • The main component models are: "; Microsoft's .Net !. Sun Mlcrosystems' Enterprise Java Beans f. OMG's CORBA Component Model (CCM) Usage of components and objects • Objects - suitable to describe the problem domain of a system. • Components - suitable to describe the functionality of a system. • ";Objects vs. components" = ";identity vs. services". [6] • CBSE = components + objects Component Model Operation A component model operates on two levels; • Defines how to construct an Individual component. Microsoft's .Net Model, ! unknown interface. • Sets the communication and Interaction standards of the components. Component Model Implementations and Services • Standardizes the run-time environment. • Defines the specification of Interfaces to both general and domain-specific run-time services. • General services include user Interface management services, system management services etc. • Domain- specific services can Include financial, healthcare and telecommunication services. [ 4] 4 Services lniOJ!.11"1'''"' J i ,.,.,.;~.;, l lo"'"'"'O"i~ J ! Pa tltq) rmi'i.ep ).I.e N-Queens Problem • The domain was chosen the combinatorial N-Queens problem . • This problem has applications in • Communication. • VLSI testing. • Dead lock prevention. • Memory management. • Traffic control. Component Technologies • Component technologies have flourished surrounding the established component models such as Microsoft's COM and Sun's JavaBeans . • Component technologies and models have been the driving forces of each other. Research collaboration test-bed • We built a research collaboration test-bed using component technologies and utilizing enterprise engineering principles. • The prototype Is built on a Java three-tier architecture with an Oracle database storing a large number of N·Queens solutions. • We had the chance to apply several component technologies such as servlets, XML and Database Management. Our problem solving domain: NQueens research environment This soll« -ECE-012, Ur~verclly of Alabama at Olrmlnghe.m, October :>001. R. S. SadQSJvam, U. J . Tnnik, and M. M. Tanik 'A Tesi-Bed for llle Corrolallon Center lor Digital Servlcos,"; Technical R&port 2001 - 08-ECE-006, University ol Alabama 81 Blrmlngham, August U. T anlk, A framework lor lnlemet Enterprtso F.ng:J(Iij , , lffML Ole., May 2002. Future Work • To programmatically identify software components and assemble them in a structured manner by using late binding techniques • To build the Correlation Engine References P. Dao, Ernarprlse Dovck>flmont Using Java and XML Teehnologlos, Master's Thesis, UAB, BirrnlngMm. At2001. U. J. Tanlk. M.M Tanik, nrld L Jolo!ian, ";'nternet Enterprise Enginoorf11g: A Zero-limo rramewortc based on T Slmlegy.' Proc. cl IEEE SOOfC9 (CREC}, at the Un/119Jsity of Te- 17 Preliminary Consultations Pr-Ies: After COO>IAialion with Or. Ych, Or. Kozmetsky. and Or. Ramamoonlly, I continued to study and assimilate mei~k Aller discussion .;tt, 0ts and tecllnologles U$Od in EleCtronic Eolerprlse Eng(necMg (EEE) Aller d:.:ussion with 0.JeKMI(>Ie entOIJ)Iise prOIOIY1)C calfud F.ng!io;r.tex1doclor.oom using Olfolhtt-SileU leelrnology (bocame a case s!ud)? All above actMiios led me to unoersmr.d I he importance of mappff!Q l)uslnoss IJ(OCGSS to enterprise uo1o comp&lEII\CY tor Cho service inclllstry Personal Publications Relevant to lEE Thesis Jnh:t TnnLk. Murat Ttl'l{l:. and I,IX!f, Jdlllbit. l ntt mtt E 1U t'l)ri~ PAf:,JJlttrin~: A uz.m.Hult' . f'r:unt-.u·k based un ";'f -Sfr~ttCJ•''. l:Ef:.l1 S1lodiN.Stoo». 2001. John Tmk and KaR2dllro Abe, 11\Q Japlnes~Amefkan Handshak&: The Into mot CMmensfon, . SOPS T•a.nsacllon: Joumnl or lntegratod Design ood Process Sclence, VelA, No.1. PI> 57·72, 2000. Resulting Pressures Eootromle: 1o= E~1lny (Fklr, 2001} ~t-Bttsifle';$ & e-Ccmmtm:o. HOlY k> Progrsm {DeJa!, 0.1"' & Nie1o. 2001) !N'rocess E(fg9, Cte81/Jlg Cuslom/N Va:U• and ovsines:s Weall1> kl 1/le lnfi:mel Em {Kc'ell & Mc:Dona/0. 2(JQ()) Et>le !Jiil, 2000) Zero T"";"; (Kozme/slry & Yeh, 200(1) Cracking lito Value Clxlo, HJ.v Suct;esSfuiBvsli>esses Ate C'o~ealir>g W•am> Ill lf>e Nm• EcofiOtny (Arthur AndctSM, 2000) Drumbeal2000 (Macrorne 00fl1ic gtowth and kai\Siormalion allr'lbuled to new technOICokml to11:os shaping lll•wol ld ecOllO!IIy, cspeefally dueiO lhe lmf)QCI 01 me !nleJrlel[Price Waletho!>Sej. . Hyper-eompeHllon In o glObal ma1~01 Rapid tecmorogylran~lormatiOOS A vary ln~1conr.edcd oooaomic value chain EmergIJy on tho lnlemol. Resulting Internet Enterprise Needs As a rewlt, a need exfsls lor a : I. Formal a;scipline such as kllemot Enlerprise Engineering (lEE) - lor syarornalic construcUoo ol on nne onrorpfiSes • Reliollly • Cct·ol:.ctiYcty • Timely 2. Process-cenlrtc management - For baclcond automation of ptocess • lor elllly by focusing tnelf eiiOtiS on lll1fliC>Vo>g Ulelr process as lhelr chief core Clyplr.g and Development 9. Government Initiatives In Cytlemtntalion 14. Larg&-scale Enterprise Ooveloprnent Ellvtmrlments IS. Enabl'rl!J Tochnotogles and CO lont~ . =:.:.~r.~e Cosmos- Holistic Framework for Managing Change l:'lr~li'Uo;'t• ~ . l.o~fll UffMF. )In\,ltm~i\t• A•-tt\11)'~1n~ s""; iHI>· ,,., k~litr Process-Driven Service Software Thesis Presentation by Kazuhlro Abe September 19,2002 21 Acknowledgements ~ Dr. Leon Jololian t. Dr. Murat Tanik ~v Dr. Raymond Yeh I', Dr. C.V. Ramamoorthy I', Brian Young, CEO f,";~u~k,. .,.,;-_.~-:.:r-:,•;;•.-:.";!':t:~!'f~-.:'::·'1- :-•1.N -1 : Three-Tier Software I • _____A _r_c_h_i=~.~--J ifM&\BJ" ' ~hJ!tiif:~!fi~\mmJ ii)11-j§~ Three-Tier Software Architecture Da1a layer - Conceptual Procoss Logic laye.- Prii$Gnlatlon layer Outline ;o,. Three-Tier Software Architecture ~',. Service-Based Software . Process-Based Software We propose . ~ An Architecture and Infrastructure for Process-Driven Service Software Three-Tier Software Architecture -Physical •· Put a middle tier between client user interface and database management systems (DBMS) ";' Overcame many limitations of two· tier architecture • Pertormance, scalabllily, llexibility, _ • .,,~ ~••m••:~ ~---· . ·- Data Layer ~ Low-level manipulation of data ~Technologies: • DBMS • Directory I', Issues and Challenges: • Dialects in SOL • Stored Procedures 22 Process Logic Layer $ High-level manipulation of data ~Technologies: • Object Oriented Middleware (OOM) - ION A Orblx, Highlander VisiBroker • Message Oriented Middleware (MOM) - IBM MOSories, TIBCO Rendezvous Presentation Layer $ Construction and delivery of presentation ~; Technologies: • Thin-Client Browser-based Application, Citrix • Thick-Client- Stand-alone Apps., Java Apple!, Java Web Start Service-Based Software Process Logic Layer (Cont.) ~. Issues and Challenges: • Complexity of Development • Vendor Dependency • Difficulty of Integration • Difflcully of Maintenance Presentation Layer (ConL) ~ Issues and Challenges: • Thin-Client- Limited User Interface and Interaction • Thick-Client- Management of Code, Delivery Service-Based Software - Service Unit f> Examples • Stock Quote Service • Weather Service 23 Service-Based Software - Objective , Another abstraction layer on components - Characteristics (Cont.) & Compared to objects and components, services have higher abstraction and are more understandable by domain experts. 6o Unlike objects and components, services are platform independence. --- t---.'.-.- - +-- -- Service-Based Software - Characteristics fJ Developing services requires programming knowledge. $ Services are built to be used by each other and other applications. Service-Based Software - Sample Architecture f·.:· . ~· . :: . . ·.:)_._;. .· ::: t --- ·-- +-- - -··____;_· Process-Based Software G Process specifications executed on a process engine • A process specification describes llow of the process and the interaction between components. 24 Process-Based Software (Cont.) Typical CBS g ~ ~· Process-Based SofiNvare 1. By having a process engine, a process and component integration are separated. Process-Based Software - Example (Cont.) r:~=$!4j!:J:. ·n,.,.,.Mil:l!7i!£l/,.,.~t I Process-Driven ~::::~:::$] Process-Based Software -Example Process-Based Software -- ·- . bt-'VW---~ ";I"M~W'r.,._~t#O't> .-;~. '1.'1.(";. ~··v n·.,.re•~"";";";";'·.,. . -~ _,.,.,,. ___ . ~,.,. ._,.,._._ 'O. _ w. __,.-·--~~ . ·- __.-.,.,. -·.Jrol,. .~. -·-~. . ::::";";''~""; . \0-. ~·-~f'--~ ~---~ ~·"' . ~.,.,·r -.o._-~ --~···_.,.L'Dt_ ,.M'). - Example (Cont.) Process-Driven Service Software 6> A new kind of service that is constructed with process technologies Service-Based Software + Process-Based Software • Process-Driven Service Software 25 Process-Driven Service Software - Architecture Process-Driven Service Software - Composition 41 Example S1ock Quote E-mail Service !!zW::f~ l:l.\jif%~sa':'t6i~WMWE~ Process-Driven Service Software -Effect Process-Driven Service Software - Architecture (Cont.) Process-Driven Service Software 1, Process-Driven Service Editor 2. UDDI Registry 3. Process Registry - Composition (Con t , - Infrastructure 26 Process-Driven Service Software - Infrastructure (Cont.) 4. Dynamic Web Service Adapter 5. 6. 7. Process Engine UDDI Adapter Process Adapter .- · ;,. . ~@ Comparison -· - --.·.- .--· ";•' ~d:~)'l '"' . . --- Future Work ·~ . t4 Od. 2001). ~ 8/zTaJic Frame1W>rlt 2.0: DocumorJ and Msssage Spocillcailon, Microsoft Corporallon. Oec. 2000. 27 A THESIS DEFENSE ENTERPRISE DEVEWPMENT USING JAVA AND XML TECHNOWGJES BJ• Pmnrtl R. 0811 Pre.re11tatio11 Outiine • Ntw bnrintss tHJironnttNI. • En!erplist sol~rtions. o Thm-titr mrhiterfurr m()((fl }mm mvcr.sidc tcdJ!iologiu. o XML ttrh11olo!,J'· • NQIItt/IJ Jni!J/>It appiirotibJJ. Rwtlls '!/ J!Jt tbtsis work and j11tnrr uvmt. o DtJIIOHS!mlion '!/tiN tiNsir 11'/Jrk. Be11ejits ojE11tetp1ises lntegmtio11 Fa. t~' opm11io11ol mi.-. • Lo1m·prod11dion costs. UJI'fl' lilvtJIIO!)' (f)i/Y. Backgrom/(1 • Co11;p/rltd Doc/Jclor '![E 11gi11ttring 1i1 ]1111t, 1998 in Indio. • )oi11rd UllivmirJ• of AfobaJJJa at Bin11i11gho'" (UAB) for molltr's prugrrmt in Elutriral and C0111p111tr EJiflimnng in Srpttml~tr. 1999. o Fot· /aJI 12 months worki11g 1111rftrlbe gllidaJite oJDr.l~l(l'af To11iA1 for JJIOJiu'r tbrsis mtitltd ";Hnte1pn>-e De;.~lfJ/)JJtwl Usingjm'll ond XML Trdmologiu."; New .B11si11ess E11vironmenl o 1 llftl'lltf ond Ntfl/lfni. 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User perception of biophilic design patterns present in a workplace setting for mental wellbeing -- Developmental regulations to conserve catchment area of an urban water body: A Case of Upper Lake in the city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India -- Assessment of user's preferred activities and its correlation with landscape elements in urban green spaces -- Sustainability of traditional Rock-cut Water management system: Case of Kanheri Buddhist Caves, Mumbai, Maharashtra -- Economic and Social Impact of Modernization on a Local Marketplace; Case Study- Appa Balwant Chowk, Pune, India -- Exploring the land-use efficiency dynamics and improvement potential in the smart city mission -- A Sustainable approach towards the Sanitation for urban poor in India: A case of Bangalore -- Assessment of solar power sustainability in urban areas -- Multifunctionality: As an urban development tool for placemaking -- Environmental Assessment of Kakinada City, Andhra Pradesh, India -- Influence of urban form in maximizing solar energy utilization for better indoor air quality in the neighborhoods of Chennai -- Environmental Attitudes among architecture students in Kerala - Indian New Environmental Paradigm (I-NEP) Scale -- Sustainable Water Supply Infrastructure for Amritsar, India -- Framework for Implementation of Compact City Concept in Indian Cities -- Social Impact of Gujjar Kere Lake Rejuvenation -- Ecotourism Development in Pamban, a coastal Town of Tamil Nadu – a participatory approach -- Protection of Water Resources on Urban Hills from Building developments: A Case of Goa, India -- A systematic review of literature on major domains of Urban Heat Island studies -- Addressing SDG 11.7: A Review of Literature on Urban Open Spaces in India -- Urban strategies for cyclonic-flash flood resilience, Puri Odisha -- Designing our Urban Environments: Ecologically Sustainable Development in Residential Master Planning -- Pedagogical dimensions for sustainability in holistic architectural education -- Impact ofClimate Change on Tourism in Coastal Udupi -- Analysis of Energy Conservation Measures for Existing Residential Apartments in Composite Climate -- Bio-digital architecture systems for environmental sustainability -- Comparison of Thermal Performance of Different Earth Construction Techniques in a Warm-humid Climate -- Impact of Vegetation on Visual Comfort in Residential Intermediate Open Spaces Using Rhino-Grasshopper Case Study: Nagpur, India -- Seismic–Based Comparative Analysis of Existing Structures using P - ∆ Effect -- Vulnerability Assessment for Seismic Strengthening of An Existing School Building in The Region of High Seismicity -- Comparative Assessment of Vulnerability through Wind Analysis for a Multi-Storied Building -- What does urban sustainability mean? An overview of studies from 10 countries -- Thermal comfort study of a dining space in temperate climate using natural ventilation -- Integration of IoT for Sustainable Urban Development -- Energy Efficiency of Smart HVAC Systemswith respect to Occupants' Perceived Thermal Comfort -- Role of space layout and building envelope in hospital energy performance – A context of warm humid climate in India -- Experimental assessment of thermal comfort in the enclosed space of a residential building in Jammu region: A case study -- An innovative retrofittable manually operable smart shading apparatus for house windows (residential buildings) and method of working for same -- Design and Methodology for Automated Intelli-Smart Shading Apparatus for Commercial Building Fenestrations in India -- Classification of Sustainability assessment parameters for residential buildings materials using relative importance index -- Epistemological approach to ascertain human comfort in rural houses in the Indian context -- Kinaesthetics of a Staircase -- Structural Response of Concrete Flexural Members Reinforced with GFRP Bars: Sustainable Development Approach -- Living lab approach for Son La city, Vietnam, innovations for climate change solutions -- Analysing energy culture in high rise and low rise residences in hot and humid climate -- Exploring spatial arrangements in an office space through daylighting analysis of shading device: an experimental simulation model -- Optimizing building orientation, Window-to-Wall Ratio, and calculated solar shades and strategies to enhance the building's daylight performance and energy-saving potential -- The Influence of Socio-Cultural factors on open Space in Fisherman settlement, Udupi district Karnataka -- Urban Planning and Crime prevention in Public spaces -- Accessible spaces in urban placemaking -- Mapping Cyclone and Flood Hazard Vulnerability in Puri District, Odisha, India using Geoinformatics -- Community perceptions of engagement in sustainable building design/construction in rural context -- Investigating the Migrant Workers' Housing situation in Mangalore city: A Dialogue on Inclusive housing design -- Assessing Walkability of Nagpur city at Neighborhood Level using Walk Score Index -- Fire Safety of Urban Villages in Noida: Gap Identification in Policies and Building Norms -- Impact Assessment of Citizen Participation and Service Quality on Citizen Satisfaction in Smart Cities in India -- Reducing Disaster Risk and Reinstating Livelihood through an Ecosystem Approach -- Architectural Survey of University Leisure Spaces -- A Study of Rental Housings and its policies for the urban poor in India -- Nurturing inclusivity in the built environment education: A prerequisite to achieving sustainable social wellbeing -- Biophilic Design: A New Approach towards Sustainable and Restorative Environment -- Urban Restructuring through the Development of Underutilized Lands to Achieve Sustainable Compact City Model -- Assessing Urban Migrant Community for Socio–Ecological Resilience: A case of Ghata Village, Gurugram -- Role of spatial elements of an urban street that makes it vital -- Exploring the various attributes of public spaces enhancing social interaction -- Demonstratingthe triad – Built environment, Perception and neighborhood as tool to achieve urban resilience -- Assessing walkability near metro stations: a case in nagpur -- Brownfield development endowing urban resilience -- Spatial Planning Strategies for Reducing Crime In Urban Residential Areas: A case of Kollam -- Sense of Security in Urban Recreational Park – An Exploratory study of Cubbon Park, Bengaluru -- Lessons from Indian Traditional House Forms in achieving Sustainability -- Exploring Sustainability Aspects of Vernacular Houses in Contemporary Settings: Case Study of Kankumbi Village -- The Unbuilt Sacred Spaces of Indigenous Religious Practices in Coastal Karnataka -- Self-Sustainability framework for cultural heritage: A Case Study of Shekhawati, Rajasthan -- Influence of culture in architectural built form elements – Analysing the influence of culture on architectural built forms in Gaud Saraswat Brahmins and Gujarati community in Fort Kochi -- Perforated Screens of India: Learning from Traditional and Contemporary Reflections -- Sustainable adaptive reuse of Interiors in Iraq -- The Heterogeneous Layered Urbanism of the Old Port of Mangaluru: Its significance within the Cultural Land-scape of Tulunadu with a vision towards a sustainable urban future -- Identification and Selection of Parameters for the Value Assessment of Architectural Heritage: A Case of Odishan Temple Architecture, India -- Intangible as a driver for the Sustainability of Historic Cities -- Revitalization of the historic core of Srirangam, Tamil Nadu, India – a sustainable approach -- Preserving the architectural heritage in Kurdistan Region, Iraq - Akre city as an example -- An Investigation of Delhi's Landscape at Macro Level: A Systematic Study of the Censes Data to Expound Segregation and Segmentation -- Collective Identity and continuation of tradition : Sacred Groves of Kudase village in Sindhudurga -- 'Toad markets' as intermediary spaces -- Village Spatial Pattern of Kiadan Traditional Village in Badung Regency -- Vernacular architecture of weavers settlement-A case for creating resilient and sustainable environments for handloom cluster at Bargarh, Odisha -- Assessing the adaptive resilience of traditional built forms of villages in flood-prone zones: A case of two deltaic villages -- Restoration Practices in Heritage Conservation -- An interdisciplinary pedagogy for environmental design & community resilience during the pandemic -- Study on Impacts of Pandemic on Office Space and Work Culture -A Review -- Understanding the impact of crowding on covid-19 transmission -- Urban Heritage tourism in Fort Kochi; revival in Post Pandemic.
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Western countries have asserted since the beginning of hostilities in Ukraine that they would use sanctions as a critical tool to suppress Russia's economy and sever its ability to trade with the rest of the world. They have kept their promise by continually adding to the number of sanctions as Russia's war in Ukraine has stretched into it second year.As of January 2024, the Russian Federation was subject to over 28,000 sanctions and the majority of these occurred after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Approximately 16,000 of these sanctions were imposed against individuals, while nearly 10,000 were imposed against companies and 3,200 against institutions. Additionally, there have been sectoral sanctions such as general trade embargoes on gas and oil. The EU and the U.S. have imposed most of these but countries like Japan, South Korea and Switzerland have also participated. While these sanctions intended to hamper Russia's war effort and foment domestic economic and political instability, most have not achieved these objectives. Russia has maintained its military activities in Ukraine while recent IMF forecasts predict growth of 2.6 percent in 2024 — at a time when many EU countries are heading toward recession amidst significant political uncertainty in 2024 — a pivotal election year in many Western democracies.Perhaps the greatest achievement has been reinforcing Russia's trade pivot to the East and the Global South and away from the European Union. As a result, Russia's trade turnover reached $530.2 billion in the first nine months of 2023. Exports reached $316.9 billion, while imports reached $213.3 billion. Russian exports to Asian countries reached $226.6 billion, an increase of 10.3% year on year, while imports amounted to $139.7 billion, increasing 39.5%. China accounted for $105 billion during the same time period compared to $78 billion for all of 2021. And Chinese imports of fuels were $52.7 billion in 2021 compared to $77.0 billion in the first nine months of 2023. China comprised $81.8 billion in imports to Russia (almost 40%) in the first nine months of 2023 while imports were 54.5 billion in all of 2021. During that same time, Russia's exports to India were $52 billion versus $8 billion for 2021. Indian imports of Russian fuel increased from $4 billion in all of 2021 to $46 billion during the first nine months of 2023.In contrast, Russian exports to the EU were $47 billion in the first nine months of 2023, a significant decrease from $192.8 billion in all of 2021. Russian imports from the EU sunk below $32 billion in the first nine months in 2023 from $81 billion just 21 months earlier. Fuel imports from Russia to the EU collapsed from $120 billion in 2021 to less than $27 billion in the first 9 months of 2023. Lastly, sanctions greatly reduced the share of imports from Russia from 28% in 2021 to 3% in 2023.Building a new trade frameworkThe trade numbers clearly depict the momentous redirection in Russian trade flows during the nearly two years since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But they don't reflect the geopolitical activities underpinning this seismic change nor do they indicate recent initiatives that the Russian government has undertaken to solidify the direction of trade. In this respect, Russia has actively engaged in a wide array of diplomatic activities, ranging from bilateral talks with countries like India and Iran to efforts to expand the membership and geopolitical reach of the BRICS and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).Late last year, India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met in Moscow to discuss issues concerning the usual political, defense, and cultural partnerships. They also discussed more seriously, economic cooperation issues intended to buttress the strong growth in Russia-India trade that has occurred since 2022. The focus of these economic discussions centered on logistics, particularly those related to the establishment of the North-South International Transport Corridor (INSTC). All three segments of the corridor are now functional. These include the Western route (Russia-Azerbaijan-Iran-India), the Middle route (Russia-Iran-India) and the Eastern route (Russia-Central Asia-Iran-India). Russia hopes the increased use of the corridor will improve the infrastructure in Caspian ports and the ability to improve the status of Astrakhan and Makhachkala as transport hubs. Now that the Vladivostok-Chennai Sea route or Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC) is also operational, India and Russia will have a realistic opportunity to elevate economic cooperation going forward and this will only bolster bilateral relations.The corridor is beneficial to India as well, both economically and geopolitically. It reflects the Indian elite's desire for viable alternatives to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India is also confident the corridor will provide greater access to Central Asia bypassing Pakistan and continue to strengthen its economic ties with Iran and Russia. Another way that Russia is seeking to enhance regional trade is through the EEU. On December 25, EEU leaders met and signed an agreement with Iran. The agreement marked the end of two years of negotiations and will come into force after the ratification by the national parliaments. The Iran-EEU Free Trade Agreement eliminates tariffs of 87% of traded goods between the parties. It represents Iran's most extensive trade deal to date and it's an important deal for Russia as it solidifies another trade partner and underscores its leading role in the trade group and in Central Asia's economic development. Finally, in January 2024 the BRICS announced the expansion of the group by five new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The new membership will increase total BRICS GDP to $28.5 trillion or 28.1% of global output, compared to the G7 countries' 43.2% of global output. While the expansion of BRICS is notable from an economic perspective, it's more meaningful in a geopolitical context. The addition of Middle Eastern and more African countries gives the group a larger presence along key shipping and trade routes. It also increases the BRICS share of global oil production to 43% and 25% of exports. It's also important to note that BRICS accounts for 72% of global rare earth elements, which are key to high-tech weapons and consumer goods, including circuit boards and mobile phones.While many in the West only pay attention to the rhetoric about Russia's weak and collapsing economy and its economic isolation, Western policymakers need to follow closely Russia's continued initiatives in the geopolitical sphere. Russia's economic engagement may be complicated due to the joining of some difficult geopolitical realities, but the evolving framework has the potential to disrupt the traditional "rules-based global order" if not undermine it. Therefore, a policy of constructive and unrestricted engagement in trade and economic relations on a global scale needs to be a key tool of commercial diplomacy for Western policymakers going forward. This would include greater restraint from the heavy-handed sanctions policies that only reduce Western access to key goods and lead to higher global inflation, the brunt of which is borne by the middle- and lower-class consumer.
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Last month, the U.S. announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval coalition aimed at deterring Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Bahrain was the only Arab nation to join. The reasons why — and why other U.S. allies and partners in the region did not — should be of interest to us.Many countries have valid concerns about the Gaza war's further regionalization. The Houthis say they are targeting commercial vessels that are Israeli owned or heading for Israeli ports with missile and drone strikes, and have already hijacked a ship. They vow to continue these attacks until Israel agrees to a ceasefire.The U.S. has been thwarting most of these attacks with their naval-based missile defenses.Much is at stake economically with the Red Sea's security crisis. Separating the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa is the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which links the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Roughly 30 percent of all global containers transit the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, as does about 12 percent of all world trade. But since the Houthi attacks in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden began in October, major shipping carriers have stopped transiting the Suez Canal and have re-routed their vessels around Africa, threatening consumer prices hikes. This disruption to Red Sea trade can seriously harm economies across Europe, which were already contracting before this crisis.Operation Prosperity GuardianThat Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which were the two main states in the Arab military coalition that began fighting the Houthis in 2015, did not join Operation Prosperity Guardian is quite significant. Also notable is the fact that Egypt, a major Arab country with a 930-mile Red Sea coast, refused to join, too. Most Arab states avoided formally joining Operation Prosperity Guardian for several reasons. First, Arab societies are so enraged about Israel's indiscriminate bombing, forced starvation, and displacement of millions of Palestinians in Gaza, that the governments in the region do not want to be seen as complicit by openly siding with Washington, which is clearly funding and arming Israel's operations.Second, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member-states — particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE — want to avoid actions that could trigger a resumption of Houthi attacks on their energy and civilian infrastructure or further destabilize the Red Sea, where many of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 projects exist. Third, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi fear that joining this security initiative could upset their détentes with Tehran, which sponsors the Houthi movement.Bahrain's Unique PositionBahrain, which the George W. Bush Administration recognized as a Major non-NATO Ally in 2002, made a different calculation. An important factor to keep in mind is that Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet. Also, Bahrain and the U.S. signed the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, a strategic security and economic pact, in September."Bahrain has long perceived an existential threat from Iran that shapes its security stance, so by providing a home for U.S. assets, Bahrain gains protection and relevance which is another layer beyond the security protection it receives from Saudi Arabia and the UAE," said Steven Wright, an associate professor of international relations at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, in an interview with Responsible Statecraft."Other GCC members seem to have more complex calculations: for Saudi Arabia and UAE, existing efforts to climb down tensions with Iran explains their position," he added.Joseph A. Kéchichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, noted that Bahrain, which has a single guided missile frigate and two smaller guided missile ships called corvettes, has not sent these assets to join the task force, at least not yet."Manama's contribution may be similar to Amsterdam's and Canberra's, as The Netherlands and Australia announced that they would send military personnel, but no vessels," he said. "Yet, because Bahrain is the headquarters of the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, as well as the home of the Combined Maritime Forces that coordinate coalition operations in the area, it makes sense for the kingdom to join if only to provide and receive information of actual maneuvers."He suggested that other Gulf Cooperation Coalition (GCC) members would be sharing information vis-a-vis the new task force, although it is unclear how that would occur. "As far as it is known, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which could have deployed naval vessels, opted to stay out of Operation Prosperity Guardian because they disagreed with its narrow objectives," added Kéchichian.Post-Oct. 7 Blowback in BahrainHaving normalized with Israel in 2020, Bahrain has been in an awkward position since October 7. When it comes to relations with Israel, there is a major divide between the Bahraini leadership and its citizenry. This divide has deepened amid the Gaza war.As Gaza's Palestinian death toll steadily rises, Bahraini authorities must contend with increased risks of blowback at home given how unpopular the Abraham Accords are with Bahraini citizens across the country's political spectrum and among diverse civil society groups. As Human Rights Watch recently documented, Bahraini authorities have used oppressive tactics to repress Palestine solidarity protestors across the country."The Al Khalifa monarchy has proven adept historically at subduing dissent through a variety of tools. It seems clear that Bahrain has calculated that involvement in the Abraham Accords serves its overall economic, foreign policy and security interests despite criticism," offered Wright."The bottom line is that the economic perks and U.S. backing is outweighing public opinion objections from its domestic political groups," said Wright.Courtney Freer, a fellow at Emory University, noted to RS that Bahrain's elected lower house of parliament issued a statement in November claiming that the country's ambassador had left Israel and that economic ties between the two states had been severed."It is worth noting that this language is coming from a primarily loyalist parliament, which suggests that such feelings of animosity towards Israel are not just associated with opposition parties, which, in turn, may make it more difficult to ignore," said Freer. "Notably, citizens have become involved in pro-Palestinian protests, and so there is anger, but it is uncertain whether this anger will be translated into political risk for the regime."Bahrain's diplomatic relations with Israel and military alliance with the U.S. may subject the archipelago kingdom to blowback from Iran-aligned actors in the region. But Bahrain abrogating the Abraham Accords or fundamentally changing its relationship with Washington is highly unlikely. Ultimately, Bahrain's leadership seems to assess that such risks of blowback are worth the benefits of normalized relations with Israel and American support."The Al Khalifa monarchy has proven adept at managing domestic dissent through various means, so the risks from Iran within this context will be viewed as manageable. Any public concerns over cooperation with Israel/U.S. is unlikely to seriously challenge its stability and at most is likely to be limited in scale," Wright said."Basically, Bahrain is seeking to be relevant to the U.S. by backing its counter-Houthi maritime initiative," he added. "This allows it to further cement its relationship with both the U.S. and also Israel, given that this is part of an approach to counter Houthi and Iranian geopolitical reach."
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While the United States remains the dominant extra-regional superpower as the war between Hamas and Israel threatens to spread more broadly, China's growing presence across the Middle East raises important questions about how it conceives its response to the crisis.Enjoying close ties to Israel and decent relations with major Palestinian and Lebanese players, including Hamas and Hezbollah, Beijing's foreign policy in the post-Mao era has been quite balanced between Israel and Arab actors. But Israel's conduct of the war is pushing Beijing to take a stance that is increasingly pro-Palestinian, which risks harming its relations with Tel Aviv.China's main interestsUltimately, what China wants in the Middle East more than anything else is stability. The region is extremely important to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, which will face serious problems if wars continue to plague the region. To help stabilize the Gulf, in particular, China played a catalyzing role in the renormalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran almost eight months ago. Now, he escalating conflict in Israel/Palestine and along the Israeli border with Lebanon has raised growing concern in Beijing about the possibility of a wider war. Beijing has called for a ceasefire, followed by a lasting political settlement to the conflict based on the implementation of a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians as the best course.China and Israel's multifaceted and complicated bilateral relationship has evolved over the decades. Under Chairman Mao Zedong's rule (1949-76), China supported left-wing and "radical" Arab regimes — namely Algeria, Egypt, South Yemen, and Syria — as well as national liberation movements in the Middle East, including the Palestinian struggle. By contrast, Mao saw Israel as a base of Western imperialism in the Arab world. But since Beijing and Tel Aviv established diplomatic relations in 1992, economic relations between China and Israel have flourished across countless sectors, including technology, infrastructure, tourism, health, education, logistics, ports, and cosmetics. There is also a history of a military-tech exchange between the two countries going back to the 1980s. Sino-Israeli relations have deepened to the point where U.S. officials have pressured Tel Aviv to cool its ties with the Asian giant.Despite these deep economic relations, however, China has opposed Israel's occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territory outside its United Nations-recognized borders and criticized its past bombing campaigns against Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon. Unlike Israel, the United States and some other Western states, China has refused to designate Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations, instead viewing them as legitimate representatives of segments of the population in Palestine and Lebanon.Beijing reacts to Hamas' surprise attackIn response to Hamas' unprecedented incursion into southern Israel on October 7 and the Israeli bombing campaign of Gaza that followed, Beijing has stressed three main messages. First, it condemned all attacks on civilians. Second, it called for the reactivation of dialogue between the warring sides. Finally, it has called for the effective establishment of a Palestinian state based alongside Israel's 1949-67 borders."China has tried to maintain [neutrality], criticize attacks on civilians, and call for de-escalation and ceasefire," said Yun Sun, co-director of the China Program at the Washington-based Stimson Center, in an interview with RS. "Hamas's attacks on civilians are inexcusable. But for China, Israel's illegal occupation of Palestinian territory is also the origin of the attacks."China's response to October 7 was similar to the way Beijing positioned itself after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, according to some experts. "If in Ukraine there was talk of a 'pro-Russian neutrality,' in this case it is a 'pro-Palestinian neutrality,'" according to Enrico Fardella, Director of the Italy-based ChinaMED Project."Neutrality is functional to maximize [China's] diplomatic flexibility by presenting itself as the only major power capable of dialogue with both sides," he told RS. "This serves to win consensus at the center (among all those actors critical of the [Benjamin] Netanyahu government but at the same time disgusted by Hamas' brutalities), showing the superiority of its own diplomatic action in the face of the American one that is decidedly pro-Israel. The pro-Palestinian component, on the other hand, serves to gather support on the left, i.e., in the pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel (and therefore anti-American) area inside and outside the Middle East."Can China help de-escalate?Earlier this year, the Chinese offered to mediate between the Israelis and Palestinians. Now more than ever, the region could benefit from an outside actor playing an effective peacemaking role. But given Beijing's apparent inability to muster the leverage necessary to bring the Israelis and Palestinians toward a peaceful settlement, it is doubtful that China can succeed."We know that Beijing wants to prevent the escalation of the crisis, but I do not think that it has enough instruments to defuse the crisis," said Nurettin Akçay, of the Center for Global Studies at Shanghai University. He explained that China's limited leverage over Israel is a major obstacle to Beijing successfully de-escalating this conflict through diplomatic means. "It is my belief that China's position in the Middle East is somewhat overstated. Its actual power to shape events in the region is quite limited, despite its economic clout. The ongoing crisis has highlighted the fact that China lacks the necessary hard power to pursue its objectives," he told RS."I think all countries that call for de-escalation will help," noted Sun. "Beijing has relatively good relationships with both Israel and Palestine, as well as other regional players. But such good relationships do not necessarily translate into influence on such a major issue," she added. "To assume that Beijing can effectively help de-escalate is to assume that parties to the conflict are willing to change their course, which I do not see as probable at this point."Implications for U.S.-Israel tiesHow much the ongoing violence in Israel-Palestine and Lebanon will impact China's relationship with Israel is unclear. In recent years, China has become more vocal about the Palestinian cause, which serves to boost Beijing's standing among governments and societies across the Islamic world and much of the Global South. This has served to differentiate China from the U.S. and helps Beijing to depict Washington as the isolated player on this issue while countering Western efforts to use the Xinjiang human rights file to distance Muslim-majority countries from China.While the Chinese and Israelis have generally managed to separate their political disagreements from their economic ties in recent years, China's increasingly pro-Palestinian position has the potential to create considerable irritation in the bilateral relationship. And while Netanyahu was flirting earlier this year with the idea of traveling to China and meeting with President Xi Jinping in the face of Biden administration's criticism of the Israeli leader's far-right domestic agenda, such a show of defiance and independence seems highly unlikely given both Washington's strong backing for Israel in the current conflict and Beijing's more pro-Palestinian position.
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Ten years after Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, a new connectivity initiative was unveiled with great fanfare by the United States, India, and the Arab Gulf and European countries during the G20 meeting in New Delhi earlier this month.Since the announcement was made without the presence of the Russian and Chinese presidents, it has stirred conflicting interpretations. Some see it as a potential alternative to BRI, while others, pointing to the failure of similar projects backed by Western powers in the past, view it as a paper tiger.Details are still missing, but the project's ambition is enormous. It follows a transregional approach as noted by the White House statement: "Through the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), we aim to usher in a new era of connectivity with a railway, linked through ports connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia."The idea of this corridor dates back to 2021 and has also been discussed as part of the I2U2 group that includes India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United States. Like the BRI, its design vision follows the corridor's logic. This is no surprise. "Corridorization" is the most significant spatial manifestation of infrastructural capitalism and geo-economics since the beginning of this century.Corridorization, which is part of the thriving "minilateralism" space, could be viewed as contradictory because middle powers are trying to navigate between two hardening geopolitical blocs. But the ongoing process of reshaping the global supply chain connectivities created by decades of globalization could make it a viable proposition.The BRI and the IMEC seem to share many similar goals. But there are also critical geographical differences. Most importantly, the new initiative features India, which has never been part of the BRI, as a central cross-regional player amid rearranged geo-imaginations.Each of the parties to the new initiative comes with its own perspective and interest.For the United States, the I2U2 and IMEC serve as platforms for infrastructure investment, bringing together Middle Eastern and South Asian partners and providing an alternative to Chinese projects. Washington sees this approach as an opportunity to encourage its regional partners to take a more active and independent role in shaping the region's future, allowing the United States to reduce its own resource investment while maintaining its presence and influence.For the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the goal is to strengthen their increasingly diversified and multi-networked economic diplomacy covering a wider geography. Both countries are active members of the BRI, and their cooperation with China is growing. Apart from burgeoning trade, they are dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and will soon become full members of the expanded BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Both countries are trying to expand their strategic autonomy and vying to become influential regional and international players. Getting involved in multiple new minilateral groupings is a key ingredient of their approach to strengthening their middle power status.As Saudi Arabia opens to the world with a tilt towards China, the UAE has found its new unique selling point in connectivity and multi-alignment. While diverging approaches toward geostrategic and regional issues, particularly China's rising power and global influence, remain a concern, Gulf Arab countries' participation in U.S.-led initiatives reflects their new penchant for equidistance amid U.S.-China competition.Indeed, the United States might see the IMEC as a vehicle to counter China's growing influence in the region. In the Middle East, however, competition and convergence are mixed and less black and white than the increasing U.S.-China bipolarity would suggest. If the United States expects this to be a "counter BRI" move for the region, it will likely be disappointed. Competition in the Indian Ocean could escalate, but potential synergies and convergencies should allow for some degree of mutual accommodation.India, which the United States treats as an "indispensable partner," has been showcasing a good template of multi-alignment for others to follow. It is a member of the Quad and I2U2, both comprising the United States, and it's also a member of BRICS and SCO, with China in both, despite New Delhi's feud with Beijing over border issues. The IMEC adds another thread to its longstanding multi-alignment policy, as it highlights the other connectivity corridor that India is promoting — the International North South Transport Corridor — with Iran and Russia. Together, these projects add value to India's development story and its boast that it is the fastest growing economy in the world.The new economic corridor also envisions the potential addition of Israel. This should be seen as a step in the renewed U.S. efforts to expand the Abraham Accords by facilitating the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations. This form of regional engagement also allows Israel to manage tensions with the United States, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in the wake of the politics of a far-right coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.For Israel and the United States, expanding the Abraham Accords, especially to include Saudi Arabia, remains a top priority despite Riyadh's insistence on linking the normalization of relations to progress on the two-state solution. There are tentative indications that Netanyahu might agree to some concessions on the Palestinian front, even at the cost of his right-wing coalition falling apart, in order to capitalize and sustain Israel's broader regional integration.For China, which will soon host the first in-person BRI summit in Beijing after major COVID-19 shutdowns, IMEC throws up a challenge and an opportunity. It could dismissively treat the IMEC like the United States has done with the BRI. The other option, as indicated soon after the G20 meeting, is to demonstrate its openness to support multidirectional connectivity, even if it is not part of this corridor, as long as such projects are "open, inclusive, and form synergy," and do not become "geopolitical tools."The last piece in this new connectivity saga would be Europe, especially the Eastern Mediterranean countries. The IMEC is a welcome development because the "Global Gateway," the European Union's own connectivity project, has not gained adequate momentum because European diplomats in Brussels are hesitant about multi-alignment strategies and transregional corridors.While the IMEC is an economic-diplomatic-security interplay, its prospects will depend on its ability to promote connectivity and translate its economic potential into commercial success. Critics have already pointed out that the initiative may be unviable in terms of profit. However, it could also be argued that there are virtues other than economic efficiency. In a world of de-risking and politically induced supply chain shifts, the new corridor could be viewed as a tool for promoting strategic resilience, friendshoring, and tech cooperation, especially for middle powers.
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Politics in the Pacific Island nation of Vanuatu, located east of Australia, can be turbulent, with constant chessboard moves among parliamentary members with fluid party ties and frequent no confidence motions. But the strategic importance of the country to the U.S.-Australia alliance and China was a factor in the recent abrupt expulsion of the 10-month-old government led by then-Prime Minister Alatoi Ishmael Kalsakau.In late August, Kalsakau lost a vote of no confidence against him by opposition leader Bob Loughman, who has for years backed China's increasing influence in the Pacific nation. After disputes about the vote result, Loughman was appointed deputy prime minister in the new government under Prime Minister Sato Kilman, who took the helm on September 4. The sudden change in administration came a year after Loughman, a former prime minister, ceded his leadership after parliament was dissolved and he avoided a vote of no confidence against himself. The snap election which followed in October last year saw Kalsakau take the top job.While the government is contending with domestic issues, such as a struggling economy, unemployment and contentious debates about the minimum wage, the main trigger for the latest political crisis was a security agreement with Australia signed by Kalsakau in December last year and due for parliamentary ratification. Vanuatu is one of many Pacific Island states that do not have their own armed forces and depend on military assistance from bilateral partners when needed.For Loughman, the unratified bilateral pact, which would increase military and law enforcement, but also disaster and humanitarian relief and cybersecurity co-operation with Australia, could have risked Vanuatu's relations with China. New Prime Minister Kilman claimed there had been a lack of consultation about the pact with ministers. Yet it was not an unknown or hasty development. Discussions about the agreement had been occurring between Australia and successive governments in Vanuatu for five years. "Australia respects Vanuatu's sovereign decision-making processes, including in relation to the bilateral security agreement that began in 2018 and was signed in 2022," Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs responded. The signing of the pact followed deep concerns by the U.S. and its allies about China's security agreement with the Solomon Islands that was announced last April.Soon after taking office, Kilman vehemently denied any geopolitical reasons for the crisis, claiming that the country had always and will continue to be "neutral" in big power contests. "We are not pro-West and we are not pro-Chinese," he said. "We adopt a non-aligned policy." Indeed, Vanuatu has a spectrum of development and aid relations with Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan, and its mobile paramilitary police force has also received support from Australia, New Zealand and China.Yet, in being non-aligned, Vanuatu was swift in 2016 to declare its support for China's territorial claim to islands in the South China Sea that are at the center of a heated sovereignty dispute and military provocation between the East Asian powerhouse and several of its Southeast Asian neighbors. And, for U.S. commentators, a high-risk site for potential conflict.Despite the Pacific nation remaining outside of any direct military involvement in U.S.-China geopolitics, it has, under some political leaders, become increasingly receptive to China's political influence. Last year, Loughman signed an array of agreements with China on technology, energy, infrastructure, health and economic development and, the year before, a multi-million dollar bilateral grant agreement on economic and technical cooperation. In 2018, Chinese funding and construction of a massive port development in the provincial, but geographically strategic, coastal town of Luganville, attracted international attention. Security experts speculated that, due to its exceptional size, it could potentially be used as a warship base.In contrast, Kalsakau has been publicly critical of China's penetration of Vanuatu's political life for several years. In 2018, he told the Australian media there wasn't enough internal scrutiny of the massive inflow of Chinese loans, businesses and influence and "he feared China was pursuing its strategic interests by showering Vanuatu with largesse and deepening its influence in the country." Last year, Vanuatu's public debt totalled 40 percent of GDP. China, its largest foreign creditor, is owed more than one third of its total external debt, which totals about $314 million and constitutes 32 percent of GDP.French President Emmanuel Macron expressed additional concerns during a visit to Vanuatu in July. "There is in the Indo-Pacific, and particularly in Oceania, new imperialism appearing and a power logic that is threatening the sovereignty of several states; the smallest, often the most fragile,"Macron said.Vanuatu, like many Pacific Island states, is a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. But its statecraft is heavily influenced by norms of Melanesian customary governance that have prevailed for centuries. The power of traditional clan leaders in island societies is determined by their ability to acquire and distribute wealth and resources to their constituencies, rather than adherence to an ideology or party-driven policies. While political cultures in the Pacific are evolving, this legacy makes politicians particularly vulnerable to China's strategies of economic largesse and coercion which entails reciprocity.During his recent tenure as prime minister, Kalsakau attempted to broaden his country's international relations, bringing in other development partners, such as Saudi Arabia, and working for wide-ranging global support of its legal probe of climate justice at the UN General Assembly. He also took steps to reform Vanuatu's controversial citizenship-selling program in response to security concerns by the EU which has had a visa waiver arrangement with the nation.There is no doubt that Pacific Island leaders are opposed to being parties in the regional U.S.-China rivalry and are reasserting their rights of sovereignty above all else. At a meeting in August of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, an inter-governmental organization of southwest Pacific Island states, leaders emphasized their refusal to take sides in geopolitical battles.But regional analysts also point to Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and Samoa being located on a key geographical axis, which is crucial to maritime access into and across the Pacific Ocean by the U.S., Australia and China.Yet, despite the political upheaval, the new prime minister has not dismissed closer security ties with Australia; only that the pending agreement won't be ratified in its current form. "My view would be to revisit the agreement with both sides, the Australians and the Vanuatu government, and see if there's any sticking points and then address that," Kilman was quoted on September 4.Some Australian strategists support Vanuatu's greater scrutiny of the pact, claiming that it is a sign of democratic processes at work. But, in terms of a timeline, it is unlikely to be an immediate priority for the new leadership.
United States National Science Foundation (NSF) ; Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC) of the United Kingdom ; Max-Planck Society ; State of Niedersachsen/Germany ; Australian Research Council ; Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research ; EGO consortium ; Council of Scientific and Industrial Research of India ; Department of Science and Technology, India ; Science & Engineering Research Board (SERB), India ; Ministry of Human Resource Development, India ; Spanish Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad ; Conselleria d'Economia i Competitivitat and Conselleria d'Educacio Cultura i Universitats of the Govern de les Illes Balears ; National Science Centre of Poland ; European Commission ; Royal Society ; Scottish Funding Council ; Scottish Universities Physics Alliance ; Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) ; Lyon Institute of Origins (LIO) ; National Research Foundation of Korea ; Industry Canada ; Province of Ontario through Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation ; 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Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) ; Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) ; Ministerio da Ciencia, Tecnologia e Inovacao ; Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft ; Collaborating Institutions in the Dark Energy Survey ; National Science Foundation ; MINECO ; Centro de Excelencia Severo Ochoa ; European Research Council under European Union's Seventh Framework Programme ; ERC ; NASA (United States) ; DOE (United States) ; IN2P3/CNRS (France) ; CEA/Irfu (France) ; ASI (Italy) ; INFN (Italy) ; MEXT (Japan) ; KEK (Japan) ; JAXA (Japan) ; Wallenberg Foundation ; Swedish Research Council ; National Space Board (Sweden) ; NASA in the United States ; DRL in Germany ; INAF for the project Gravitational Wave Astronomy with the first detections of adLIGO and adVIRGO experiments ; ESA (Denmark) ; ESA (France) ; ESA (Germany) ; ESA (Italy) ; ESA (Switzerland) ; ESA (Spain) ; German INTEGRAL through DLR grant ; US under NASA Grant ; National Science Foundation PIRE program grant ; Hubble Fellowship ; KAKENHI of MEXT Japan ; JSPS ; Optical and Near-Infrared Astronomy Inter-University Cooperation Program - MEXT ; UK Science and Technology Facilities Council ; ERC Advanced Investigator Grant ; Lomonosov Moscow State University Development programm ; Moscow Union OPTICA ; Russian Science Foundation ; National Research Foundation of South Africa ; Australian Government Department of Industry and Science and Department of Education (National Collaborative Research Infrastructure Strategy: NCRIS) ; NVIDIA at Harvard University ; University of Hawaii ; National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Planetary Defense Office ; Queen's University Belfast ; National Aeronautics and Space Administration through Planetary Science Division of the NASA Science Mission Directorate ; European Research Council under European Union's Seventh Framework Programme/ERC ; STFC grants ; European Union FP7 programme through ERC ; 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JSPS: 15H02075 ; ERC Advanced Investigator Grant: 267697 ; Russian Science Foundation: 16-12-00085 ; Russian Science Foundation: RFBR15-02-07875 ; National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Planetary Defense Office: NNX14AM74G ; National Aeronautics and Space Administration through Planetary Science Division of the NASA Science Mission Directorate: NNX08AR22G ; European Research Council under European Union's Seventh Framework Programme/ERC: 291222 ; STFC grants: ST/I001123/1 ; STFC grants: ST/L000709/1 ; European Union FP7 programme through ERC: 320360 ; FONDECYT: 3140326 ; Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for All-sky Astrophysics (CAASTRO): CE110001020 ; USA NSF PHYS: 1156600 ; NSF: 1242090 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: Gravitational Waves ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/L000946/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/K005014/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/N000668/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/M000966/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/I006269/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/L000709/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/J00166X/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/K000845/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/K00090X/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/N000633/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/H001972/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/L000733/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/N000757/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/M001334/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/J000019/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/M003035/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/I001123/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/N00003X/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/I006269/1 Gravitational Waves ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/N000072/1 ; Science and Technology Facilities Council: ST/L003465/1 ; UK Space Agency: ST/P002196/1 ; This Supplement provides supporting material for Abbott et al. (2016a). We briefly summarize past electromagnetic (EM) follow-up efforts as well as the organization and policy of the current EM follow-up program. We compare the four probability sky maps produced for the gravitational-wave transient GW150914, and provide additional details of the EM follow-up observations that were performed in the different bands.