Suchergebnisse

Представляем Вашему вниманию перевод доклада «Исполнение рекомендаций Руководящих принципов обеспечения качества в сфере трансграничного высшего образования»: где мы отстаем?», подготовленный Директоратом по образованию ОЭСР. «Руководящие принципы обеспечения качества трансграничного высшего образования» были разработаны для стимулирования международного сотрудничества по обеспечению качества высшего трансграничного образования. Целью «руководящих принципов» является защита студентов и других стейкхолдеров от недобросовестных поставщиков образовательных услуг низкого качества и развитие качественного трансграничного высшего образования, отвечающего гуманитарным, социальным, экономическим и культурным потребностям общества. Руководящие принципы не связывают страны юридическими обязательствами. Предполагается, что страны реализуют принципы в соответствии с национальным контекстом. Основываясь на результатах исследования, этот доклад анализирует степень исполнения рекомендаций странами ОЭСР и несколькими странами, не входящими в состав ОЭСР. В июне 2010 года опросник был разослан во все страны ОЭСР. Департамент по образованию ОЭСР также взаимодействовал с секретариатом ЮНЕСКО для проведения исследования в странах, не входящих в ОЭСР. Было получено 23 ответа от 22 стран (Австралия, Австрия, Бельгия (фламандские и французские сообщества), Чешская Республика, Дания, Финляндия, Германия, Венгрия, Израиль, Италия, Япония, Корея, Новая Зеландия, Норвегия, Польша, Словения, Испания, Швейцария, Нидерланды, Турция, Великобритания, США и 9 стран, не входящих в состав ОЭСР, Болгария, Колумбия, Фиджи, Индонезия, Иордания, Кыргызстан, Литва, Оман и Руанда). Представители правительств стран координировали заполнение опросника стейкхолдерами. Основной вывод исследования заключается в том, что все страны, участвующие в опросе, продемонстрировали высокую степень исполнения рекомендаций. В среднем, степень исполнения рекомендаций правительствами, вузами, аккредитационными агентствами стран, входящих в ОЭСР, составляет 72%. При включении студенческих организаций степень исполнения рекомендаций снижается до 67%, но возрастает количество пропущенных данных, и, следовательно, неопределенность результатов исследования. Степень исполнения рекомендаций вузами наиболее высока и составляет 80% (0,8). Степень исполнения рекомендаций правительствами и аккредитационными агентствами в среднем составляет 76% и 61% соответственно. Степень исполнения рекомендаций студенческими организациями равна 51% с учетом того, что опросник лишь отчасти затрагивает деятельность данной группы стейкхолдеров. К ключевым целям, отмеченным в руководстве, отностятся: 1) включение трансграничного образования в нормативно-правовую базу страны; 2) комплексный охват всех форм трансграничного образования; 3) защита студентов и потребителей услуг трансграничного высшего образования; 4) прозрачность процедур аккредитации для поставщиков услуг высшего образования; 5) доступность и распространение информации (для потенциальных студентов); 6) развитие сотрудничества между стейкхолдерами. По данным исследования, в среднем страны исполняют четыре из шести целей: отмечается наличие нормативно-правовых баз, обеспечение комплексного охвата всех форм трансграничного образования и прозрачности процедур аккредитации. Также отмечено сотрудничество стейкхолдеров на национальном и международном уровне. В настоящий момент слабыми сторонами исполнения рекомендаций остаются обеспечение легкодоступной информации и защита студентов и потребителей услуг трансграничного образования. В данный момент нет необходимости в доработке рекомендаций, и страны должны продолжать распространять лучшие практики и исполнять рекомендации. Необходимо укрепить меры по защите студентов и потребителей услуг трансграничного образования и повышению прозрачности процедур регистрации и лицензирования для поставщиков услуг трансграничного высшего образования. Также необходима дальнейшая работа по обеспечению легкого доступа к информации для студентов. Парадоксально, но степень исполнения рекомендации «Руководящих принципов» аккредитационных агентств ниже, чем у правительств и вузов стран, принявших участие в исследовании. ; The Guidelines for Quality Provision in Cross-Border Higher Education were developed and adopted to support and encourage international cooperation and enhance the understanding of the importance of quality provision in cross-border higher education. The purposes of the Guidelines are to protect students and other stakeholders from low-quality provision and disreputable providers (that is, degree and accreditation mills) as well as to encourage the development of quality cross-border higher education that meets human, social, economic and cultural needs. The Guidelines are not legally binding and member countries are expected to implement them as appropriate in their national context. Based on a survey of the main recommendations of the Guidelines, this report monitors the extent to which OECD countries and a few non-member countries comply with its recommendations. The Survey was sent out in June 2010 to all OECD countries. The Secretariat has also collaborated with the UNESCO Secretariat to have the questionnaire sent to all UNESCO non-OECD country delegations. Twenty-three responses were obtained from 22 Members: Australia, Austria, Belgium (Flemish and French communities), Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States; and 9 non-Members: Bulgaria, Colombia, Fiji, Indonesia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Oman, Rwanda. Government representatives were asked to co-ordinate with the other stakeholders covered to answer the survey. The main conclusion of the survey is that (responding) countries report a high level of compliance with the Guidelines recommendations. On average, responding OECD countries conform to 72% of the main recommendations made to governments, tertiary education institutions, and quality assurance and accreditation agencies. The level of compliance decreases to 67% when recommendations to student bodies are included, but the level of missing information, and thus uncertainty about actual compliance, increases significantly. Tertiary education institutions are the group of stakeholders that follow the most the recommendations of the Guidelines, with an average compliance index of 0.80 (80%). Governments and quality assurance and accreditation bodies comply on average with 76% and 61% of the guidelines, respectively. Student bodies only conform to 51% of the recommendations – with the caveat that information about their activities was generally scant in the survey answers. The objectives or desirable practices emphasised by the Guidelines are: 1) the inclusion of crossborder higher education in countries' regulatory framework, 2) the comprehensive coverage of all forms of cross-border higher education, 3) student and customer protection, 4) transparency in procedures (for providers), 5) information access and dissemination (for potential international students), 6) collaboration. Four of these objectives are largely met on average: countries have regulatory frameworks or arrangements in place, cover different forms of cross-border higher education comprehensively, are transparent in their procedures, and are engaged in national and international collaboration. The current main weaknesses in compliance lie in easy access to information and the level of student and customer protection. While there is probably no need for a revision of the Guidelines, countries should continue to disseminate and implement the recommendations. The main areas of improvement lie in measures to improve student and customer protection as well as the transparency in procedures of assessment, registration, and licensing for providers. Further progress in the ease of access of information for students would also be welcome. Paradoxically, quality assurance and accreditation bodies comply less with the Guidelines than governments and tertiary education institutions.

This paper broadly evaluates the role and performance of non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) in promoting social development before and since the 1995 World Summit for Social Development. Two kinds of analysis and recommendations are offered. The first concerns the practices of NGDOs and their relationships with other "partners in development". The second focuses on the deep-rooted pathologies of the aid system that condition the form and effectiveness of many development interventions not only by NGDOs but also by the larger universe of entities comprising civil society organizations (CSOs). This review concludes that, in the absence of thoroughgoing reform, the aid system will continue to hinder mobilization by the larger civil society with NGDOs to bring about genuine development in the Third World. The concept of civil society has altered development thinking and practice in the major donor countries. However, the Western image of civil society that donors employ does not necessarily apply to civil societies elsewhere. This has serious consequences for efforts to mobilize civil society organizations in developing countries. In practice, donors need to have a much deeper understanding of the configuration and capacity of civil society in the specific locations where they intend to intervene. Donors must also recognize that NGDO efforts, while useful, are limited, and that they cannot substitute for those of the wider civil society. The tasks NGDOs set for themselves, and the expectations of those that finance them, are complex and (probably too) demanding. They cover most facets of social development: reducing poverty and exclusion; improving access to basic services; conflict prevention; fostering democracy; influencing public policies, etc. NGDOs also function at multiple levels, from the individual, through households and intermediary institutions into the arena of international relations, conventions and commitments. In doing so, they may touch some 20 per cent of the world's poor. However, evidence suggests that the NGDO contribution to social change is less substantial and durable than imagined. NGDOs would like to do better and are doing something about it themselves. However, they are limited in this by the unfair, power-imbalanced and donor-serving framework of aid that they operate in. At the same time, NGDOs remain substantially aid-dependent and vulnerable, which can result in questionable motivations and behaviour. For NGDOs to improve their contributions in mobilizing for development, they must better learn to: understand and overcome the factors undermining their efforts; work differently with communities to ensure that change is sustained; develop an ability to cope with relative powerlessness within the "partnerships" that are possible in an unreformed aid system; improve relations between themselves; alter Northern NGDOs' roles vis-à-vis Southern partners and their own national constituencies, and work together with all kinds of NGDOs in coalitions and networks; broaden and bring enduring structure into interactions with wider civil society; interface more broadly with national and local government; operate in the international arena with downward accountability, while adopting advocacy strategies that do not undermine domestic governance or provoke a government "backlash". But structural features of the international aid system limit NGDOs' capacity for self-improvement. Under existing rules, most recipients of aid are relatively powerless and are kept that way. The distorted language of "partnership" is a current example of how rhetoric masks major disparities in power and the maintenance of dependency. And this power imbalance generates perverse incentives for aid recipients. It blocks their necessary ownership of and commitment to change. Six reforms are proposed to attenuate or remove the institutional dysfunctions of aid, and hence make feasible the possibilities for NGDOs to work with diverse CSOs on a larger scale. First, bring greater equity, co-responsibility and ownership into the aid process. Trust funds, or similar mechanisms, have often been proposed and should be implemented. These should create an appropriate distance between the giver and receiver of aid, set within a transparent governance framework. Second, recognize relationships other than "partnership". The aid community requires an array of relationships, named for what they are, each designed to serve different purposes. Different relationships require the open negotiation of different rights and obligations of the parties involved. Third, establish "honest brokers" along the lines of an Ombudsperson, as is now being considered by agencies working in humanitarian and emergency operations. Fourth, prevent "development mono-culture" by encouraging NGDOs to do what they should do best: work with local agents of change to understand and promote integrative, cross-cutting, thematic, participatory and innovative approaches to development, tailored to specific situations. This goes against the current trend of forcing NGDOs to conform to official standards and methods, often prescribed along technical, sectoral lines favoured by the donor. Fifth, improve social development practice by incorporating into interventions a deeper understanding of the interrelationships among social and economic change, the evolution of civic participation, the role and kinds of capacity building needed by CSOs, etc. The meaning of this is made clear by an example of a promising approach to capacity building. Finally, expand relations with civil society on the basis of dialogue and building effective relations between diverse actors at multiple levels. Institutional mapping is one way of identifying entry points for, and obtaining, this type of engagement. The aid system has not demonstrated an ability to reform its fundamental principles and structures. Should it continue this way, NGDOs' credibility when engaging with CSOs will be further compromised. It is not a question of not knowing what needs to be done. Necessary reforms are readily apparent. The problem is that failure to move as needed stems from a donor predisposition to prioritize domestic interests over those of recipients who remain in second place and second class. This may satisfy tax payers' need to see how they themselves benefit from their aid. Nevertheless, this stance is deficient when the same taxpayers ask what is actually being achieved on the ground. They want both home benefits and overseas results. Consequently, poor performance will eventually result in lost credibility at both ends of the aid chain. This must not be allowed to happen. People who are poor and marginalized, and in whose name the system operates, have a fundamental right that this not occur.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the World Bank's recent relations with civil society organizations (CSOs), that is, nongovernmental organizations and not-for-profit organizations, and to propose options for promoting more effective civic engagement in Bank-supported activities and managing associated risks in the future. The analysis in this paper points to four main issues and challenges for the Bank as it seeks to achieve more constructive and effective engagement with CSOs in the future: 1) Promoting best practices for civic engagement; 2) Closing the gap between expectations, policy and practice; 3) Adapting to changes in global and national civil society; and 4) Achieving greater Bank-wide coherence and accountability. To attain these objectives, the report proposes ten priority actions: Establishing new global mechanisms for Bank-CSO engagement to help promote mutual understanding and cooperation; establish a Bank-wide advisory service/focal point for consultations and feedback; piloting a new Bank-wide monitoring and evaluation system for civic engagement; Conduct a review of Bank funds available for civil society engagement in operations and policy dialogue, and explore possible realignment or restructuring. reviewing the Bank's procurement framework; instituting an integrated learning program for Bank staff and member governments as well as capacity-building for CSOs on how to work effectively with the Bank and its member governments; holding regular meetings of senior management and periodically with the Board to review Bank/civil society relations; developing and issuing new guidelines for Bank staff on the institution's approach, best practices, and a framework for engagement with CSOs; emphasizing the importance of civil society engagement in preparing Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) as well as in CAS monitoring and evaluation; and developing tools for analytical mapping of civil society.

La investigación se propuso analizar el "regreso" del Estado en la escena del desarrollo en los países latinoamericanos en medio de un persistente escenario capitalista global de raigambre neoliberal. Centrándose en la experiencia argentina reciente (2003-2015), el trabajo analiza la estructura y la implicación estatal en el ámbito industrial-pyme. Sistematiza los recursos institucionales que se pusieron en movimiento (financieros, humanos, organizativos) para dinamizar el desarrollo industrial, entendiendo a este como un proceso de transformación de la matriz productiva y de los actores dominantes. Este trabajo aborda al Estado, y a las políticas públicas que implementa, como un objeto disputado en un marco histórico y espacial amplio de hegemonía e intereses neoliberales. En ese carácter disputado se expresa la presencia de redes políticas y económicas globales que buscan deshabilitar y fragmentar las estructuras estatales y con ello el poder del Estado como actor estratégico para dinamizar el desarrollo industrial. La dinámica y trayectoria doméstica son importantes en su configuración, pero bajo la globalización los actores globales han ganado mayor influencia con el objetivo de ampliar la dinámica global de acumulación capitalista. Desde esta perspectiva, si bien el Estado condensa y estructura recursos (financieros, humanos, organizacionales) que resultan estratégicos para concretar el desarrollo industrial, la influencia de las dinámicas y actores globales se aprecia en la adopción de determinada la modalidad de implicación o posicionamiento estatal que configura esa estructuración. El análisis se propuso dos objetivos. Por un lado, uno de carácter teórico referido a analizar la estructura estatal y la implicación estatal en el desarrollo y la incidencia de las redes políticas globales. Como un área donde las reformas neoliberales afectaron con mayor profundidad, el ámbito industrial-pyme se presenta como una particular arena de política pública para estudiar el modo en que organismos internacionales tales como BM, BID, o PNUD, incidieron la modalidad de implicación y configuración estructural del Estado nacional. Por otro lado, como objetivo práctico referido al análisis empírico, se evalúa una de las experiencias neodesarrollistas latinoamericanas. Tomando la experiencia argentina como ejemplo, el período kirchnerista (2003-2015) (Néstor Kirchner y Cristina Fernández) fue un campo fértil para analizar las instancias estatales específicas, y buscar allí alguna explicación sobre la continuidad de ciertos rasgos heredados (concentrada, extranjerizada y centrada en los recursos naturales) que impidieron avances en materia de complejidad y densidad industrial y acentuaron las restricciones propias de la dinámica de desarrollo en los países periféricos. Desde el lente teórico planteado y frente a un regreso estatal que culminó resultando poco satisfactorio, ¿cuál fue la centralidad que asumió la el Ministerio de Industria para direccionar a los actores productivos industriales-pyme hacia dinámicas y sectores más avanzados y complejos? ¿cómo incidieron los organismos internacionales en su estructura o en alguno de sus componentes? Combinando una metodología cualitativa y cuantitativa en donde se analizaron fuentes documentales y se realizaron entrevistas a funcionarios y gestores estatales, la investigación se centró en examinar el Ministerio de Industria de la Nación creado en 2009, y los canales por los cuales los organismos internacionales incidieron en su configuración. El análisis giró en torno a la trayectoria del ministerio, sus competencias, su organización, los recursos financieros y humanos disponibles en sus secretarías, políticas y programas, así como en la implementación del Plan Estratégico Industrial 2020. Así mismo, se profundizó el análisis en dos programas pyme vinculados a organismos internacionales: el Programa de Acceso al Crédito y Competitividad (PACC) (BID), y el Programa Sistemas Productivos Locales (SPL) (PNUD). Los hallazgos de la investigación muestran que la jerarquización del ámbito industrial, no obstante constituirse en un acontecimiento institucional relevante, se presentó también como un proceso de ahuecamiento de competencias y recursos, lo que redundó en la ausencia de centralidad como instancia estratégica para el desarrollo industrial. Se observó la pérdida del control y coordinación de la gestión del comercio exterior en 2011, como un bajo nivel de financiamiento e incentivo al sector industrial, el cual tendió a reproducir la matriz sectorial y actoral preexistente. Además, fue el ministerio con menor cantidad de personal y un índice de contratación superior a otras instancias estatales. Al mismo tiempo, al focalizar en el ámbito pyme, se observó un proceso de fragmentación basado en la profundización de la modalidad de implicación por programas vinculada a los organismos internacionales, donde la implementación del Plan Estratégico Industrial 2020 en 2011 con su impronta de cadena de valor y con escasos recursos asignados, no introdujo cambios significativos. ; The research proposed to analyse the "return" of the State in the development scene in Latin American countries amid a persistent global capitalist scenario with neoliberal roots. Focusing on the recent Argentine experience (2003-2015), the work analyses the structure and state involvement in the industrial-SME sector. It systematizes the institutional resources that were set in motion (financial, human, organizational) to boost industrial development, understanding this as a process of transformation of the productive matrix. This work to examine the State, and the public policies it implements, as an object contested within a broad historical and spatial framework of neoliberal hegemony and interests. Under this contested character is expressed the presence of global political and economic networks that seek to disable and fragment state structures and with it the power of the State as a strategic actor to boost industrial development. The dynamics and domestic trajectory are important in their configuration, but under globalization, global actors have gained greater influence to expand the global dynamics of capitalist accumulation. From this perspective, although the State condenses and structures resources (financial, human, organizational) that are strategic to achieve industrial development, the influence of global dynamics and actors can be seen in the adoption of certain modalities of state involvement or positioning. that configures that structuring. The analysis proposed two objectives. On the one hand, one of a theoretical nature referred to analyse the state structure and the state involvement in the development and incidence of global political networks. As an area where the neoliberal reforms affected in greater depth, the industrial-SME sector is presented as a public policy arena to study the way in which international organizations such as the World Bank, IDB, or UNDP, influenced the modality of involvement and configuration structural of the State. On the other hand, as a practical objective referred to the empirical analysis, one of the Latin American neo-developmental experiences is evaluated. Taking the Argentine experience as an example, the Kirchner period (2003-2015) (Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández) was a fertile ground to analyse the specific state instances, and to find there some explanation about the continuity of certain inherited traits (concentrated, foreignized and focused on natural resources) that impeded progress in terms of complexity and industrial density and accentuated the constraints of the dynamics of development in peripheral countries. From this framework and in front of a state return that ended up being unsatisfactory, what was the centrality that the Ministry of Industry assumed to direct the productive industrial-SME actors towards more advanced and complex dynamics and sectors? How did international organizations influence its structure or any of its components? The research combining a qualitative and quantitative methodology in which documentary sources were analysed and interviews were conducted with officials and state managers. It focused on examining the Ministry of Industry of the Nation created in 2009, and the channels through which the international organizations had an impact on your configuration. The analysis focused on the ministry's trajectory, its competencies, its organization, the financial and human resources available in its secretariats, policies and programs, as well as the implementation of the Strategic Industrial Plan 2020. Likewise, the analysis was deepened in two SME programs linked to international organizations: Access to Credit and Competitiveness Program (ACCP) (DIB), and the Local Productive Systems Program (SPL) (UNDP). The research shows that the hierarchy of the industrial sphere, despite becoming a relevant institutional event, was also presented as a process of hollowing out competencies and resources, which resulted in the absence of centrality as a strategic instance for industrial development. The loss of control and coordination of foreign trade management was observed in 2011, as a low level of financing and incentive to the industrial sector, which tended to reproduce the pre-existing sector matrix. In addition, it was the ministry with the least amount of personnel and a hiring index superior to other state agencies. At the same time, by focusing on the SME area, a fragmentation process was observed based on the deepening of the program implication modality linked to international organizations. Here, the implementation of the Strategic Industrial Plan 2020 in 2011 with its chain value approach and with scarce resources allocated, did not introduce significant changes. ; Fil: Seiler, Cristhian Rubén. Universidad Nacional de Entre Ríos; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina

This paper discusses the current fintech regulatory development in the country, from fintech development policy, key fintech regulators, regulations on specific forms of fintech and fintech-enabling technologies. It also discusses personal data protection and data localisation requirement, which are important issues relevant to fintech companies and fintech-enabling technology developers. The key challenge for the local government is to design a regulatory framework that is well-balanced and that allows innovation while ensuring consumer protection as well as financial stability.

This article examines how disgruntled, harassed and vengeful borrowers express their discontent in Facebook groups that antagonize over digital subprime lending. It shows how, for mainly young and active working-age borrowers, participating in these groups constitute a politicisation from below of digital subprime lending. These borrowers' groups do not challenge dominant narratives about credit liberalisation as vectors for progress, neither do they promote the emancipatory ideology that anti-debt movements spread in Europe and North America in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Instead, they reflect the need for a newly formed community of borrowers to assist each other and share practical knowledge on how to navigate lending apps, express frustration about abusive practices, and beat 'predatory' lenders at their own game. Their posts and micro-actions make practical knowledge accessible to large communities of borrowers and lenders who monitor discussions, thereby encouraging collective action and reaction.

This Action Plan is based on the World Bank's Technical Note on Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy in Azerbaijan published in June 2009. The Action Plan focuses on the Legal and Regulatory Issues of the Technical Note's Key Findings and Recommendations, proposing specific actions for Azerbaijani authorities, financial institutions and consumer organizations so that consumer protection is strengthened and made more effective and efficient. The Action Plan should be the base upon which specific legal changes should be drafted and against which their implementation should be evaluated. Beside the Technical Note itself, the Action Plan draws on best international practices and experiences of regulators and supervisors that have tried to introduce improved consumer protection in their countries. It should also be noted that a well-balanced consumer protection regime serves also the interest of financial institutions as it provides them with better informed clients and also makes sure that clients understand their obligations under the contracts they signed. The Action Plan is divided into five parts that cover the key areas based on the recommendations of the Technical Note: (a) Legal Mandate, (b) Effective Supervision and Regulation, (c) Disclosure of Information, (d) Business Practices, and (e) Dispute Resolution.

Britain's counter-terrorism policies do not work. They do not work for the British people, who wish to live free of terrorism. They do not work for the various communities in the UK whose experience of counter-terrorism has been one of stigmatisation and criminalisation. And they do not work for the people of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, whose human rights have been systematically violated in the War on Terror. Just over two decades ago, the Irish and UK governments signed the Good Friday Agreement, the culmination of a negotiated peace process involving Republican and Loyalist armed groups in Northern Ireland. Principles of human rights, community consent and peace were key to achieving a dramatic reduction in lives lost to political violence. Indeed, by that measure, the Good Friday Agreement was the most successful instrument of counter-terrorism policy-making in recent history. But the lessons of this success were not registered. The year after the Agreement was signed, Tony Blair's government introduced the first of the fifteen new Terrorism Acts that have been passed since then in what has become a near-annual parliamentary ritual. Each Act ratcheted up the powers available to the police and intelligence agencies, creating a shadow criminal justice system in which legal principles applicable in other spheres were dispensed with. Alongside this legislative agenda, norms shifted in other ways: the use of surveillance and propaganda was expanded and deepened; military force and extra-judicial killing as counter-terrorist methods became routine; and complicity with torturers was normalised. Intelligence agencies, police forces and the military doubled or tripled their counter-terrorism budgets and held onto this funding even as other sectors were ravaged by austerity measures. The logic of counter-terrorism was spread into every sphere of public life in Britain as workers across government services were expected to become the eyes and ears of national security surveillance. The definition of the threat was itself transformed: no longer simply a matter of individual acts of violence but a much broader danger, understood in terms of clashes of culture, ideology and values, and informed by the Islamophobic principle that Muslim political organisation and dissent should be cast as forms of extremism. Concerns for human rights, for avoiding the stigmatising and criminalising of communities, or for basing policy on clear statements of goals and evidence of effectiveness were ignored. The number of civilian lives lost in ostenisbly fighting "jihadist" terrorism were many times greater than those that have ever been lost or could have been lost due to "jihadist" terrorism itself. Even on the narrowest measure of success – the reduction of terrorism – the record of UK counter- terrorism over the last twenty years is a poor one. The relentless expansion and proliferation of this War on Terror apparatus was underpinned by a consensus across the political class from the late 1990s. Central to that consensus were the claims that the UK faced an exceptional threat from "jihadist" terrorism, that this threat was the expression of an ideological rejection of British values among a generation of young Muslims and that, in response, the normal principles of domestic and international law should be suspended. Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn's Chatham House speech on the War on Terror in the 2017 general election campaign was the first sign of a crack in that consensus. In the days after the killing of twenty-two concert-goers at the Manchester Arena, Corbyn argued that "the war on terror is simply not working" and opinion polls suggested a majority agreed.1 This report offers an account of the failures of current counter-terrorism policies, an analysis of the reasons why they do not work and an outline of a progressive alternative that we hope will be the basis for a future Labour government's approach. We recognise the difficulty and complexity of the issue of terrorism and the various barriers that stand in the way of a different approach. But we believe the time is right to critically assess the legacy of the last twenty years and change course. At the heart of our argument is a question of democracy. Counter-terrorism policy-making has failed because its development is unmoored from any substantial process of democratic accountability. Instead, the aims and means of current counter-terrorism policy have been set by a security establishment according to its own interests and values. This security establishment has not sought to provide a consistent and precise definition of terrorism or to seek to counter terrorism in an evidence-based way, based on academic studies of how terrorism comes into existence. It has not sought to ground security policy in the actual problems of political violence that communities in the UK face. And it has repeatedly placed loyalty to elite interests above the need to uphold human rights, especially with respect to Muslim populations, both within the UK and abroad. The Labour Party has a particular responsibility to address the harms resulting from counter- terrorism as it was the Labour government led by Tony Blair that incorporated the War on Terror into British policy-making and his successor Gordon Brown who continued and extended the paradigm. Labour's 2017 manifesto already contained policies that align with our argument and can be built upon, such as the call to review Prevent, to address civil liberties concerns with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act and to hold public inquiries on past injustices. However, counter-terrorism policy has been one of the least discussed topics within the Labour Party, despite its deep impact on the lives of the over two million Muslims in the UK. We hope this report will help to initiate a more vigorous discussion. Clearly, any left-wing Labour government will be attacked by its opponents as weak on national security. The temptation will be to not rock the boat and allow counter-terrorism policy to remain unchanged, the better to secure political victories in the core economic policy areas Labour Party supporters are more focused on. We believe this would be a mistake. It would mean a Labour government failing to uphold principles of human rights and racial and religious equality. But as a political strategy, it would also likely be counter-productive. Conceding ground on security policy will not minimise the attacks from right-wing media organisations or Conservative politicians; and a Labour government would be left defending itself reactively and inconsistently within a policy framework not of its own choosing. In this way, a failure to develop a progressive approach to security could end up undermining the credibility of a Labour government's broader policy agenda. A better strategy, we believe, is to adopt from the outset a coherent, explicitly stated, progressive policy that can be defended consistently and confidently.

2-s2.0-85054527535 ; Measurements of azimuthal angular correlations are presented for high-multiplicity pPb collisions at sNN=5.02TeV and peripheral PbPb collisions at sNN=2.76TeV. The data used in this work were collected with the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) detector at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) Large Hadron Collider (LHC). Fourier coefficients as functions of transverse momentum and pseudorapidity are studied using the scalar product method; four-, six-, and eight-particle cumulants; and the Lee-Yang zero technique. The influence of event plane decorrelation is evaluated using the scalar product method and found to account for most of the observed pseudorapidity dependence. © 2018 CERN. for the CMS Collaboration. Published by the American Physical Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. ; ST/I003622/1, ST/I505580/1, ST/J004871/1, ST/J005479/1, ST/K003542/1, ST/L005603/1, ST/N000242/1, ST/N001273/1 National Science Foundation, NSF National Institutes of Health, NIH U.S. Department of Energy, USDOE Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Welch Foundation: C-1845 Hispanics in Philanthropy, HIP Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung Departamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación (COLCIENCIAS) Qatar National Research Fund, QNRF Secretaría de Educación Pública, SEP Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu, TAEK Horizon 2020 Framework Programme, H2020: 675440 Weston Havens Foundation Louisiana Academy of Sciences, LAS Missouri University of Science and Technology, MST CERN Thailand Center of Excellence in Physics Cosmetic Surgery Foundation, CSF Institute for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology, IPST Science and Technology Facilities Council, STFC: ST/F007434/1, ST/M004775/1 European Commission, EC European Research Council, ERC Department of Science and Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology, India, ?????? Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, India, CSIR Ministry of Education - Singapore, MOE Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, ???? Science Foundation Ireland, SFI Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft, HGF Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo, FAPESP National Natural Science Foundation of China, NSFC Research Promotion Foundation, ???? Ministerstvo Školství, Mláde?e a T?lov?chovy, MŠMT National Science Council, NSC Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej, FNP Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, FCT Russian Foundation for Basic Research, ???? Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior, CAPES Academy of Finland Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, BMBF Chinese Academy of Sciences, CAS Austrian Science Fund, FWF Fonds De La Recherche Scientifique - FNRS, FNRS Russian Academy of Sciences, ??? Belgian Federal Science Policy Office, BELSPO Chulalongkorn University, CU Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, FWO Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie, IWT Fonds pour la Formation à la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture, FRIA Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACYT Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, MINECO Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Wirtschaft, BMWFW Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, MBIE Hungarian Scientific Research Fund, OTKA Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, CNPq Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, MSIP National Research Foundation of Korea, NRF Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, JINR Instituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, INFN A.G. Leventis Foundation National Science and Technology Development Agency, ????: Thailand Narodowe Centrum Nauki, NCN: 2012/07/E/ST2/01406, 2014/13/B/ST2/02543, 2014/14/M/ST2/00428, 2014/15/B/ST2/03998, 2015/19/B/ST2/02861 Secretaría de Educación Superior, Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación, SENESCYT Universiti Malaya, UM Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wy?szego, MNiSW Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, FAPERJ Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan, MOST National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, NASU Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS Ministry of Education and Science, MES Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, IPM Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, BUAP Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, CEA Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación, SEIDI Horizon 2020 European Regional Development Fund, FEDER State Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM, ROSATOM Centro de Investigación y de Estudios Avanzados del Instituto Politécnico Nacional, CINVESTAV Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, PAEC State Fund for Fundamental Research of Ukraine, SFFR Institut National de Physique Nucléaire et de Physique des Particules, IN2P3 ; We congratulate our colleagues in the CERN accelerator departments for the excellent performance of the LHC and thank the technical and administrative staffs at CERN and at other CMS institutes for their contributions to the success of the CMS effort. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the computing centers and personnel of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid for delivering so effectively the computing infrastructure essential to our analyses. Finally, we acknowledge the enduring support for the construction and operation of the LHC and the CMS detector provided by the following funding agencies: BMWFW and FWF (Austria); FNRS and FWO (Belgium); CNPq, CAPES, FAPERJ, and FAPESP (Brazil); MES (Bulgaria); CERN; CAS, MoST, and NSFC (China); COLCIENCIAS (Colombia); MSES and CSF (Croatia); RPF (Cyprus); SENESCYT (Ecuador); MoER, ERC IUT, and ERDF (Estonia); Academy of Finland, MEC, and HIP (Finland); CEA and CNRS/IN2P3 (France); BMBF, DFG, and HGF (Germany); GSRT (Greece)GSRT (Greece); OTKA and NIH (Hungary); DAE and DST (India); IPM (Iran); SFI (Ireland); INFN (Italy); MSIP and NRF (Republic of Korea); LAS (Lithuania); MOE and UM (Malaysia); BUAP, CINVESTAV, CONACYT, LNS, SEP, and UASLP-FAI (Mexico); MBIE (New Zealand); PAEC (Pakistan); MSHE and NSC (Poland); FCT (Portugal); JINR (Dubna); MON, RosAtom, RAS, RFBR, and RAEP (Russia); MESTD (Serbia); SEIDI, CPAN, PCTI, and FEDER (Spain); Swiss Funding Agencies (Switzerland); MST (Taipei); ThEPCenter, IPST, STAR, and NSTDA (Thailand); TUBITAK and TAEK (Turkey); NASU and SFFR (Ukraine); STFC (United Kingdom); and DOE and NSF (USA). Individuals have received support from the Marie-Curie program and the European Research Council and Horizon 2020 Grant, Contract No. 675440 (European Union); the Leventis Foundation; the A. P. Sloan Foundation; the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation; the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office; the Fonds pour la Formation à la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium); the Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium); the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic; the Council of Science and Industrial Research, India; the HOMING PLUS program of the Foundation for Polish Science, cofinanced by the European Union, Regional Development Fund, the Mobility Plus program of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, the National Science Center (Poland), Contracts Harmonia No. 2014/14/M/ST2/00428, Opus No. 2014/13/B/ST2/02543, No. 2014/15/B/ST2/03998, and No. 2015/19/B/ST2/02861, Sonata-bis No. 2012/07/E/ST2/01406; the National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund; the Programa Severo Ochoa del Principado de Asturias; the Thalis and Aristeia programs cofinanced by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF; the Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University and the Chulalongkorn Academic into Its 2nd Century Project Advancement Project (Thailand); the Welch Foundation, Contract No. C-1845; and the Weston Havens Foundation (USA).

Regulatory frameworks on logistics regulations are often opaque, especially in developing countries, because of the complex nature of logistics services. World Bank client countries have faced difficulty finding the issues that hinder them from improving logistics competence. Therefore, it is beneficial to understand how the logistics service industry is regulated and what should be addressed in building the regulatory framework to improve logistics competence. This note proposes questions to be addressed for beneficial regulations by reviewing existing logistics service regulations in 14 countries, particularly regulations for the freight forwarding industry. These questions will help in assessing a regulatory framework and identifying regulatory weaknesses. This note suggests that the regulatory framework should take into consideration national recognition of freight forwarding business, an institutional arrangement with clear division of responsibility among stakeholders, and streamlined but flexible regulations adapted to the country context.

This paper identifies four primary drivers of proactive disclosure throughout history. The first is the need to inform the public about laws and decisions and the public's right to be informed, to know their rights and obligations. The second is the public's demand for the information needed to hold governments accountable both at and between elections. The third is the demand for information in order to participate actively in decision-making. The fourth is the provision to the public of information needed to access government services, which has expanded significantly in the past decade with growth of electronic access to services or 'e-government.' This paper attempts to advance the debate around that question by analyzing the multiple proactive disclosure provisions in national law and international treaties in order to identify the emerging global consensus on the classes of information which should be included in a proactive disclosure regime. The paper examines the practical challenges related to the implementation of proactive disclosure regimes and some of the lessons learned from which principles for making proactive disclosure work in practice can be derived. It concludes by identifying some future challenges and areas where additional research is needed.

If you consider for a second the radical technological evolution, you will realize that our everyday life has changed dramatically the recent years. Not only at the electronic level of evolution but also at the personal communication. A new era has already started and requires crucial reforms to our everyday life, and to the political, social, military, economical aspects. This sudden change of scene has affected significantly the way we work, we communicate and socialize, the way we inform ourselves about the news, and even when we do the housework. From this revolution, the existing structures cannot respond to these technological evolutions, our thoughts and actions should be adapted to the radical changes and create, for example, new political and economic norms. If someone cannot follow the way technology evolves, he or she will stay in the dark and lose the arsenal at the cyber war. Of course, the military security of a state could not stay aside from the technological route. From the 90's, electrical grids, data, malware, hardware and software are some vivid examples of the alterations that had been made in the military area. A state cannot concentrate only on the military's physical appearance, but should consider the intelligence and espionage part of a war. The attacker could be a terrorist, a hacker or maybe an activist that tries to spread his/ her ideas and create panic. It is crucial for a state's security to defend first its citizens and its critical infrastructures. The "sophisticated use of communications" (NATO Website) has altered the way an armed conflict flares. Cyber-attacks, cyber espionage, stealing governments' information are few examples of the new form of terrorism which, most importantly, hides a political motive. The weaponized malware introduces a new type of war, Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism. The attackers with their digital weapons, such as worms, viruses and Trojans can affect not only the defense of a state but also the civilians' life, their opinion on a matter. The leak of vital information to the public may cause panic and armed riots. If people think that the government has manipulated them, they will revolt against it. The attacker may not be limited to cyber-attacks or stealing information, but use public cameras or private ones from laptops for surveillance reasons. He could use the information recorded to threaten the victims with the videos going public. This big new game in cyberspace has many aspects, many that we have not discovered yet, and everyone, especially the states and academic community should plan and promote solutions and defense mechanisms. For the attacker, is not necessary to have a physical appearance in the arena of Cyber War but he needs only a computer for his offense, for his whole plan. Without risking his life and spending a large amount of money, he will offend his target and win the battle. His real identity will remain anonymous by using temporary nicknames and guest names, the Darknet and a variety of cryptography mechanisms, making difficult for the intelligence and security agencies to track down his location and his real personal information. Thus, it is important to address the arising problems of the new era as soon as possible, with the technological evolutions and threats. However, the weaponized malware is not the only aspect of Cyber Warfare that should notice. Social media have entered vividly to personal communications. In a matter of seconds, people can be informed from their mobile phone, their tablets or laptops while they work, walk or entertain. The rapid spread of information has revolutionized the cyber era and made people media consumers and victims of worthless information. Their personal identity and their desires are shaping according to the global trends that social media present. Mobile applications introduce people to national and international news, help them communicate and share their thoughts for a variety of subjects. Unfortunately, their identity is exposed to the internet, shaped from the desires that the international community presents and losing their real personal identity, without knowing the threats. It is well obvious that the variety and number of targets are enormous and the future victims are not aware of the cyber dangers and how vulnerable they are against the new cyber threats. As Brian Solis stated, "Social media is about sociology and psychology more than technology" (Brian Solis, "Social Media is About Social Science Not Technology", March 14, 2012). Because of the multiple audiences, the feelings of terror and the brand awareness, an information vacuum has been created to this new era. Social sciences are now in need to face the current and future challenges in cyberspace. The traditional social sciences will help promote innovative solutions and ideas, evolve the current political framework and improve the current governmental structure. They will be used as a theoretical basis for the analysts to promote their ideas and propose multiple solutions to the threat of cyber –attacks. With respect to human rights, the academic community must set an analytical framework, deepen her research and suggest ideas for the regulation problem in cyberspace. All levels of governance, political, economic, military, and social must be evolved according to the latest technological developments and in parallel with the technological modernization. With the alterations at the international and national framework, many states have emerged as the first cyber powers. States are trying to evolve technologically without losing their national identity and stay behind to the electronic weapon arsenal. In an international system where "war of all against all" dominates (Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan", 1651), the need for political and social recommendations is demanding. The emerging cyber powers and states trying to follow the technological evolution, in cooperation with the private sector, should share information upon the attackers, their methods and their targets. Secrecy concerning security issues will not help a unified cyber strategy against attackers and develop the necessary structure for the new cyber era of connectivity. Victims of cyber-attacks should go in public and share their experience upon the new threat, how it has affected its function and how the defenders could collaborate with other actors to retaliate against the terrorists. Often people say that those cyber threats are exaggerated and there is no risk for the state's and civilian's security. But who will take the risk and ignore the uprising threats? Who will ignore that these cyber-attacks gain access to many critical infrastructures, steal confidential information, take control and cripple of electronic systems? This ability to attack critical infrastructures such as military electronic documents, water supply infrastructures, banks and many more, in a terrorist's hand or a group of terrorists may have significant consequences to regional and national security - sovereignty. It is unavoidable that new vulnerabilities at electronic systems will be discovered constantly, but that does not mean that governments should stop promote their national defense strategy and build step by step cyber defense measures to prevent further consequences of the cyber-attacks. It is common that an actor (terrorist or hacker) will want to intrude military infrastructure, hack a bank or steal personal information of a well-known person for several reasons (political, religious, ideological reasons). A government cannot defend itself against cyber- attacks. But the damage caused could have irreversible results to the state and its bone structure. Thus, states must harden to the newly threats and prevent denial of services from taking national systems getting done to their knees, prevent the manipulation of national critical infrastructures and the spread of panic. No one can dare to ignore that if cyber weapons are in hands of a terrorist will have immeasurable results to the electronic function of a nation and letting the attacker succeed his target. No one knows how destructive an attack of cyber warfare could be.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Germany is one of the few industrialized nations in which the tobacco industry remains a legitimate force in business, government, science and society at large. Though Germany has been an international leader in environmental protection, the German tobacco industry has been successful in preventing the translation of knowledge of the dangers of pollution from secondhand smoke into effective public health policy through a carefully planned collaboration with scientists and policymakers and a sophisticated public relations program which it initiated in the 1970's and has been quietly running ever since. The tobacco industry in Germany founded the Verband der Cigarettenindustrie, a trade association, in 1948. Located in Germany's capital cities in order to as best as possible influence political decisions, the Verband includes all the multinational and national tobacco companies doing businessin Germany (7 in 2006). In Germany, secondhand smoke emerged as a political issue in the early 1970s, but the federal government failed to enact a proposed statutory law on protection from tobacco smoke. To date, there has been no passage of effective legislation for the protection against tobacco in public places. Understanding that secondhand smoke was the crucial issue for the tobacco industry's viability, the Verband engaged the issue long before the German government and the main voluntary health agencies, leading to the industry's continuing success in preventing government action to protect citizens from the toxic chemicals in secondhand smoke. The Verband influenced science and policy by challenging the scientific evidence linking secondhand smoke to disease by conducting or financing research, recruiting independent scientists, influencing high-level working groups and commissions, and by coordinating, sponsoring and participating in scientific conferences. In 1975, the "Research Council Smoking & Health" was created as an advisory body to the scientific department of the Verband to convey the impression that the tobacco industry was committed to objective exploration and further development of its product. Research that was deemed to be too sensitive to be contracted to outside researchers was conducted in a laboratory in Munich, headed by Franz Adlkofer. In 1992, the Research Council was replaced when the Verband created the VERUM foundation with Adlkofer as Scientific and Executive Director. The Medical Action Group on Smoking or Health, a small nongovernmental organization active in the protection of nonsmokers since the 1970s founded by medical scientist Ferdinand Schmidt, made numerous attempts to influence governmental health policy in Germany. The tobacco industry successfully responded by framing the Medical Action Group and Schmidt as out of the mainstream. Probably the most important health authority allied with the tobacco industry from the 1980s onwards was Karl Überla, President of the German Federal Health Office until 1985 and simultaneously head of a private research institute, the GIS, in Munich. In 1982, the Verband contracted with Überla's GIS for a study on "passive smoking and lung cancer." In 1983, a working group on smoking-related cancer risks was set up by the Federal Ministry of Health as part of Germany's contribution to the EU "Europe Against Cancer" program. Of the 24 members the Ministry invited to comprise this working group, at least five individuals, Franz Adlkofer, Dietrich Schmähl, Gerhard Lehnert, Klaus Thurau and Jürgen v. Troschke, had worked for or received funds from the Verband. Overall, the tobacco industry in Germany has been able to maintain a level of respectability that allowed it access to high-level authorities and scientists who either themselves held a policy-relevant office or served on political advisory bodies, including Karl Überla, President of the Federal Health Office, Dietrich Henschler, Chairman of the MAK-commission, and Helmut Valentin, President of the Bavarian Academy for Industrial and Social Medicine. Despite the fact that public attitudes in Germany were very supportive of government action to restrict smoking, the industry worked to cast tobacco control as a serious threat to the European culture that was portrayed as too open, modern and enlightened for such action. Secret tobacco industry polling showed even higher levels of support for smoking restrictions in Germany than in the United States; still, the German tobacco industry portrayed policies protecting workers from secondhand smoke as examples of US extremism. Several unsuccessful efforts to pass non-smoker protection legislation followed in subsequent years, and on October 3, 2002, a revised workplace ordinance took effect that nominally puts the duty on employers to protect their employees from secondhand smoke in the (non-hospitality) workplace; still, the ordinance overall failed to guarantee smokefree workplaces and as of January 2006, the German government had not established any meaningful program to promote implementation and enforcement of the ordinance. In 2003, approximately one-third (32.5%) of Germans were smokers. Recent data shows at least 9 persons die from passive smoking each day in Germany. As this calculation only takes into account frequent domestic exposure of nonsmokers, the actual death toll is likely to be much higher. Still, as of 2006, with few smokefree laws in place, none of the major voluntary health agencies in Germany had continuously made secondhand smoke a major topic. Public health policymaking in Germany remains dominated by tobacco interests. KURZFASSUNG Deutschland ist eines der wenigen industrialisierten Länder in denen die Tabakindustrie heute in derGeschäftswelt sowie vonseiten der Regierung, der Wissenschaft und der Gesellschaft im Allgemeinen noch als eine legitime Größe angesehen wird. Obgleich Deutschland im Umweltschutz international eine Führungsrolle einnimmt, hat es dieTabakindustrie in Deutschland erfolgreich verstanden, die Umsetzung der Erkenntnisse über die Schädlichkeit des Passivrauchens in wirksame Gesundheitspolitiken zu verhindern. Sie bediente sich hierzu einer sorgfältig geplanten Kollaboration mit Wissenschaftlern und politischen Entscheidungsträgern, und eines ausgeklügelten PR-Programms das in den 1970er Jahren eingeleitet wurde und seitdem still betrieben wird. Die Branchenorganisation, der Verband der Cigarettenindustrie (VdC, kurz "Verband") wurde im Jahr 1948 von der Tabakindustrie in Deutschland gegründet. Der Verband vertritt sowohl nationale als auch multinationale Tabakkonzerne, die in Deutschland ihre Geschäfte treiben und war bzw. ist in der bundesdeutschen Hauptstadt (Bonn, Berlin) ansässig, um politische Entscheidungen bestmöglich zu beeinflussen. Bereits in den frühen Siebzigerjahren wurde das Thema Passivrauchen in Deutschland zum Politikum, doch die Bundesregierung schaffte es nicht, einen damals existierenden Gesetzesvorschlag für eine Rechtsvorschrift zum Schutz vor Passivrauchen zu erlassen. Vielmehr hat die Bundesregierung es bis heute versäumt, eine wirksame Gesetzgebung zum Schutz vor Tabakrauch im öffentlichen Raum zu erlassen. Aufgrund der Einsicht dass Passivrauchen der entscheidende Faktor für Lebensfähigkeit der Tabakindustrie ist, hat sich der Verband bereits lange vor der Bundesregierung und den wichtigsten Organisationen im Gesundheitswesen und Interessengemeinschaften dieses Thema zu eigen gemacht. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass die Tabakindustrie Regierungshandeln zum Schutz der Bürger vor den giftigen Inhaltsstoffen des Tabakrauchs erfolgreich verhindert hat. Der Verband hat Einfluss auf Wissenschaft und Politik genommen indem er die wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse über den Zusammenhang von Passivrauchen und Krankheit bestritten hat, Forschungsarbeiten durchgeführt oder finanziert hat, unabhängige Wissenschaftler rekrutiert hat, Einfluss auf hochrangige Arbeitsgruppen und Kommissionen genommen hat sowie an wissenschaftlichen Tagungen teilgenommen, diese koordiniert oder finanziell gefördert hat. Im Jahr 1975 wurde der "Forschungsrat Rauchen und Gesundheit" gegründet. Er diente der Wissenschaftlichen Abteilung des Verbandes als Beratungsorgan und sollte den Eindruck vermitteln, dass die Tabakindustrie sich der objektiven Erforschung und Weiterentwicklung seines Produktes verschrieben hat. Untersuchungen die als zu heikel galten, um sie an externe Wissenschaftler zu vergeben wurden in einem Labor in München durchgeführt das von Franz Adlkofer geleitet wurde. Im Jahr 1992 wurde der Forschungsrat Rauchen und Gesundheit ersetzt durch die vom Verband gegründete Stiftung VERUM, deren Wissenschaftlicher und Geschäftsführender Direktor wiederum Adlkofer wurde. Der Ärztliche Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit, eine kleine Nichtregierungsorganisation, die seit den 1970er Jahren im Bereich Nichtraucherschutz aktiv ist und von Ferdinand Schmidt gegründet wurde, machte zahllose Versuche, die Regierungspolitik Deutschlands zu beeinflussen. Die Tabakindustrie reagierte darauf- erfolgreich - damit, dass sie den Ärztlichen Arbeitskreis Rauchen und Gesundheit und Schmidt als jenseits der politischen Mitte darstellte. Vermutlich die wichtigste Autorität im Gesundheitsbereich, die mit der Tabakindustrie seit den 1980er Jahren verbündet war ist Karl Überla, bis 1985 Präsident des Bundesamtes für Gesundheit und zugleich Leiter einer privaten Forschungseinrichtung in München, der Gesellschaft für Information und Statistik in der Medizin (GIS). Im Jahr 1982 nahm der Verband Überla's GIS unter Vertrag für eine Untersuchung über "Passivrauchen und Lungenkrebs". Im Jahr 1983 stellte das Bundesgesundheitsministerium eine Arbeitsgruppe über "Krebsgefährdung durch Rauchen"zusammen, als ein Beitrag vonseiten Deutschlands zum EU-Aktionsprogramm "Europa gegen den Krebs". Von den 24 Mitgliedern, die das Ministerium geladen hatte, hatten zumindest fünf Personen, Franz Adlkofer, Dietrich Schmähl, Gerhard Lehnert, Klaus Thurau und Jürgen v. Troschke für den Verband gearbeitet oder von diesem Finanzmittel erhalten. Im Großen und Ganzen ist es der Tabakindustrie in Deutschland gelungen, einen Grad der Angesehenheit aufrechtzuerhalten, die ihr Zugang zu hochrangigen Autoritäten und Wissenschaftlern verschaffte, die entweder selbst politikrelevante Ämter innehatten oder die als Sachverständige oder Mitglieder von wissenschaftlichen Beiräten direkten Zugang zur Politik hatten. Beispiele hierfür sind Karl Überla, Präsident des Bundesgesundheitsamtes, Dietrich Henschler, Vorsitzender der MAK-Kommission, und Helmut Valentin, Präsidentder Deutschen Gesellschaft für Arbeitsmedizin sowie der Bayrischen Akademie für Arbeits- und Sozialmedizin. Trotz der Tatsache, dass die Einstellung der deutschen Bevölkerung Einschränkungen des Rauchens deutlich unterstützt, war die Tabakindustrie bemüht, die Tabakkontrolle als eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die Europäische Kultur darzustellen, indem diese als zu offen, modern und aufgeklärt für derartige Aktivitätenporträtiert wurde. Ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass Umfragen die von der Tabakindustrie durchgeführt und geheim gehalten wurdenfür Deutschland sogar eine stärkere Befürwortung von Einschränkungen des Rauchens zeigten als in den Vereinigten Staaten, karikierte die Tabakindustrie in Deutschland Maßnahmen zum Schutz der arbeitenden Bevölkerung vor Passivrauch als US-amerikanischen Extremismus. Etliche erfolglose Anläufe zur Verabschiedung eines Nichtraucherschutzgesetzes folgten in den Jahren darauf und am 3. Oktober 2003 trat die novellierte Arbeitsstättenverordnung in Kraft, die die Arbeitgeber nominelldazu verpflichtet, ihre Angestellten am Arbeitsplatz vor dem Tabakrauch zu schützen (ausgenommen sind Arbeitsstätten mit Publikumsverkehr). Durch diese Verordnung werden jedoch übergreifend keine rauchfreien Arbeitsplätze geschaffen und bis Januar 2006 hatte die Bundesregierung noch kein bedeutsames Programm aufgelegt um die Umsetzung und Vollzug der Verordnung zu fördern. Im Jahr 2003 waren nahezu ein Drittel (32,5%) der deutschen Bevölkerung Raucher, neueste Daten zeigen, dass in Deutschland täglich mindestens neun Menschen an den Folgen des Passivrauchens sterben. Da dieser Berechnung lediglich die häufige Exposition von Nichtrauchern zu Hause zugrunde liegt, ist die wirkliche Zahl der Todesopfer wahrscheinlich deutlich höher. Dennoch garantieren bisher nur wenige Gesetze Rauchfreiheit und auch sonst hat bis heute keine der wichtigsten Gesundheitsorganisation in Deutschland sich kontinuierlich dem Passivrauchen angenommen bzw. dieses zu einem Hauptthema gemacht. Die Gesundheitspolitik wird in Deutschland bis zum heutigen Tag von Tabakindustrieinteressen dominiert.

This study provides an overview of Arab official development assistance (ODA) over the past four decades. Trends in volume, composition, and direction are discussed in chapter two and the institutional framework is discussed in chapter three. Over 90 percent of Arab development assistance is provided by three countries: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Unless developing countries embrace a corporate governance perspective, privatization is unlikely to provide the benefits of improved performance with accountability. This article introduces the concept of governance chains that can constrain the grabbing hands of public and private actors by providing information and accountability mechanisms to help investors monitor managers. Empirical data on established firms from 49 countries provide estimates of the relative importance and strength of private and formal chains of governance. The framework and empirical benchmarks help explain the outcomes of past privatizations and suggest certain steps that governments can pursue to be sure to get the most out of future privatization activity.