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On July 18, the European Parliament elected German conservative Ursula von der Leyen to a second five-year term as president of the European Commission. The only candidate running, she managed to cobble together a heterogeneous ad hoc coalition consisting of her fellow center-right Christian Democrats, center-left socialists, liberals and Greens. Despite the important gains made by the right-wing national-conservative forces in the EP elections in June largely at the expense of the liberals and the Greens, the parliamentary majority chose continuity in von der Leyen.In terms of foreign policy, this means doubling down on the "centrist" (read neoconservative-liberal) consensus on the war in Ukraine while isolating the war skeptics on the right and the far left. The first session of the newly elected Parliament has drawn clear lines and established what appears to be a clear-cut division for the next five years.First, the majority rejected a request by the far-right Patriots for Europe, led by France's National Rally and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's Fidesz party to place on the plenary agenda a debate on last weekend's assassination attempt on former U.S. President Donald Trump, currently running to regain the office as the Republican nominee in the November election. The Patriots are the main national-conservative group in the chamber and the third largest faction overall, behind only von der Leyen's center-right European People's Party (EPP) and the socialists. When the request was, predictably, rejected by the centrist parties (119 votes in favor, 337 against), the Patriots accused them of violating democratic norms and laying the groundwork for politically motivated violence against opponents.To highlight the Patriots' isolation, the main center-right group, the EPP, counterattacked by introducing a resolution on Ukraine. They were joined by other centrists — socialists, liberals, Greens — and the pro-Ukraine right from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, the assembly's fourth largest. The five political groups tabled a conventionally hardline joint text, demanding, among other things, the removal of any restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets on Russian territory. The lawmakers also "reiterated their belief that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to NATO" even though the European Parliament has no say over NATO and a number of the EU members (Austria, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus) are not members of NATO and have not shown, to date, any inclination to join it.Reflecting the Brussels meltdown over Viktor Orban's diplomacy that took him in recent weeks to Kyiv, Moscow, Beijing, Washington, and Trump's Mar-a-Lago in what he called a "peace mission," the resolution made a point of condemning him for "violating common EU positions" and failing to coordinate with other member states and EU institutions. Lawmakers demanded "repercussions for Hungary." While these repercussions are already being set in motion by attempts to boycott Hungary's rotating EU presidency, no interest has been shown in engaging with the substance of Orban's comments which he articulated in a letter to the president of the EU Council Charles Michel. Given the degree to which Orban chose to highlight what, to be meaningful, should have been a highly sensitive and discreet diplomatic initiative, there may be reasonable doubts about its effectiveness. The problem, however, is that he is the only EU leader left who enjoys open channels of communications with the Kremlin, while the mainstream, "respectable" European leaders mostly trade in maximalist rhetoric about Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat without defining those terms, much less offering credible paths to their achievement.The Patriots for Europe tabled an alternative motion on Ukraine that was substantially different from the majority's resolution. While they condemned Russia's aggression and expressed support for Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders (i.e. including Donbass and Crimea), they also recalled that every member state "is sovereign regarding its decisions on providing financial, military and diplomatic support to third countries." They also stressed their conviction that there is no military solution to the conflict and that peace is the only viable and sustainable solution. Accordingly, they urged that the parties "open diplomatic channels, with the aim of concluding a lasting peace agreement."The two motions exposed the unbridgeable differences in the two sides' approach to the war in Ukraine; thus, negotiations to find a compromise proved neither possible nor desired. Rather, political points were to be scored: the majority sought to portray the Patriots as Russian President Vladimir Putin's stooges, while the Patriots accused the majority of escalating the conflict in pursuit of unachievable goals and weakening European economies in the process.As anticipated, the majority text was adopted overwhelmingly: 495 votes to 137. Amendments tabled by the Left group, designed to open the way for a diplomatic solution to the hostilities, were all rejected. This is telling: while it may have been politically unpalatable for the centrists to vote for the Patriots' proposals, no such unofficial restrictions exist regarding the far left; thus, the rejection of diplomacy seems to be a matter of choice, not just political convenience.The "centrist" majority also rejected the Left's (relatively moderate) amendment that deplored the apparent double standards applied by the EU to violations of international law by Russia in Ukraine and by Israel in Gaza.While the leaders of the majority factions congratulated themselves on sending another "strong message" to Orban, not all of the lawmakers appear convinced. Michael von Schulenberg, a parliamentarian from Sahra Vagenknecht's left leaning party in Germany and a veteran U.N. diplomat, deplored that the majority's draft was based on "continuing and intensifying the war up to a military victory over Russia, which is now completely unrealistic." The rejection of attempts at finding a peaceful solution, in his view, will continue inflicting "immeasurable suffering on the Ukrainian people."As a recent survey from the European Council on Foreign Relations showed, such views are fairly widespread among Europeans, including the voters of the mainstream political parties. However, as the initial session of the new European Parliament has demonstrated, they are destined to remain isolated in an assembly that is supposed to represent them.Roughly the same coalition (except the majority of the ECR and some defections on the center-right, like the French Gaullists) that voted for the resolution on Ukraine also elected von der Leyen, a Russia hawk, for a second term. Add to this the designation of the former Estonian prime-minister Kaja Kallas, who once advocated for dismembering Russia, as the EU's high representative for foreign policy, and the alignment of EU institutions in favor of continuity on Ukraine becomes complete.These dynamics in the EU, however, can change if a possible Trump-Vance administration brings about a dreaded (or hoped for, depending on one's perspective) American retrenchment from Europe. In that case, the Europeans will either have to fight Russia in Ukraine with substantially less U.S. support or seriously consider how a negotiated end to the war can be achieved.
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As of this writing, the United States and UK have carried out nine rounds of strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, and Washington is mulling a response to the drone attack that killed three American soldiers in Jordan on Sunday. All of this has increased fears of further escalation in the Middle East and sparked a debate in Congress over the legality and strategic rationale of the U.S. response. Last week, four Senators — Mike Lee (R-Utah), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Todd Young (R-Ind.), and Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) — sent a letter to the president, telling him that under the Constitution, the Congress must deliberate and vote on whether to take the nation to war. Biden did not go to Congress for approval before launching the airstrikes in Yemen."We strongly condemn the repeated Houthi attacks against international cargo ships and U.S. military assets protecting those ships in the Red Sea," the letter reads. However, "while the Houthis and their backers, namely Iran, bear the responsibility for escalation, unless there is a need to repel a sudden attack the Constitution requires that the United States not engage in military action absent a favorable vote of Congress."The missive also lays out a series of questions for Biden to ensure that the American response to the situation in the Red Sea is "strategic and authorized," including whether the strikes fall into the administration's understanding of "self-defense," under which legal authorization the administration carried out the strikes, and on what date U.S. forces were "introduced into hostilities" in Yemen. Why is any of this important? RS asked Senator Lee about the letter, his response to the Jordan attacks, his concerns over a wider war with Iran, and whether other colleagues in Congress feel the same urgency to hold the administration to account.RS: Do you expect President Biden to come before Congress for authorization if the administration plans to respond to the drone attacks in Jordan?Sen. Lee: I do not know if President Biden will voluntarily ask Congress for authorization to retaliate following the drone attacks in Jordan, but he should. He is within his rights to conduct defensive strikes in cases of immediate threats to the United States and its military, but as we have already seen, the Biden administration already interprets this prerogative far too broadly in other areas of the Middle East. It is possible that retaliation is indeed the right move, but we cannot allow President Biden to sleepwalk America into an undeclared war with Iran in the process. RS: You recently sent a letter to President Biden urging him to go to Congress before pursuing further offensive U.S. military action against the Houthis. Why does the president have to go to Congress to authorize these strikes? Are there any plans to pursue a legislative vehicle that would authorize the use of force? Sen. Lee: Every military decision made by the executive branch must be within the bounds of what the Constitution allows and consistent with the War Powers Resolution. The Constitution deliberately vested the power to make war with Congress, in Article I — keeping this power with the branch closest to the people who will bear the costs. Absent specific authority from Congress, the President reserves the power to defend the U.S. and its forces from imminent attacks. The Biden administration's pattern of engaging in offensive airstrikes without authorization and calling such actions defensive is a warped understanding of the interactions between the legislative and executive branch powers in war making. RS: The letter had four signatories, two from each party. Do you see potential for more bipartisan buy-in on this issue? If not, why not? Sen. Lee: I have found great success in working with a serious group of members from both sides of the aisle in this space. The 2019 passage of the Yemen War Powers Resolution, which passed both chambers, was made possible by a bipartisan coalition. When the focus is kept on reasserting and restoring the role of Congress in the decision to declare war, a coalition of this kind can make history.RS: There are recent conflicting reports that the Biden administration is considering a withdrawal of troops from Syria. In the past, you have supported efforts to withdraw. Would you support a withdrawal of troops from Syria today?Sen. Lee: The first-order issue I had when U.S. troops were introduced into Syria remains the same today. Congress has never provided authorization for use of military force in Syria, nor has any administration provided a specific mission for U.S. presence that includes clear objectives and timelines on engagement. Strategic errors of this magnitude are how the United States ends up in endless wars, and it is exactly why the decision to make war was intentionally vested in the legislative branch and not in the hands of one, all-powerful but fallible executive.RS: You recently told The American Conservative that "We've been down this road before and we know it costs the U.S. blood and treasure for little gain." How concerned are you about the risk of escalation in the Middle East that could draw the U.S. in even further? What steps do you think could or should be taken to reduce these risks? Sen. Lee: I am deeply concerned about escalation in the Middle East. For President Biden to admit that airstrikes have not changed the strategic environment in favor of U.S. interests while announcing his intention to continue them is wildly reckless policy. Beyond that, it doesn't seem the administration is concerned about how any of this affects the strategic landscape broadly for the United States. Both the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies acknowledge that we cannot effectively engage in active military campaigns in two theaters at once, even by proxy, and yet the Biden administration seems perfectly content to ignore its own acknowledged limits. RS: Do you support the repeal of the 1991 and 2002 authorizations for the use of military force in Iraq? Do you expect that efforts to repeal these AUMFs will succeed this year? Sen. Lee: Keeping outdated AUMFs on the books creates an unnecessary risk of misuse. The 1991 and 2002 AUMFs should have been repealed years ago and I joined a number of my colleagues in cosponsoring bipartisan legislation to do this. The repeals passed the Senate last year and I continue to encourage my colleagues in the House to take action to complete the repeal. I also believe that Congress needs to begin a serious debate on the merits of maintaining the 2001 AUMF, which has become the fallback "authorization" cited for most military action in the Middle East.
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A mounting maritime dispute between China and the Philippines, underwritten by spiraling U.S.-China tensions, threatens to ignite the South China Sea. "China-Philippines relations are at a crossroads," Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned his Philippine counterpart Enrique Manalo in a call on Dec. 20 following a string of contentious encounters in the South China Sea, including allegations that Chinese boats rammed a Philippine coast guard ship and fired water cannons at a resupply vessel. China, Wang Yi told Manalo, will "definitely safeguard its rights" and "respond resolutely" if the Philippines "colludes with malicious external forces to continue causing trouble and chaos." Wang's warning comes on the heels of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr's announcement earlier this year that his government is mulling a tripartite security pact with the U.S. and Japan. The Philippines and its treaty ally, the United States, have repeatedly accused China of harassing Philippine vessels in the South China Sea. "We condemn, once again, China's latest unprovoked acts of coercion and dangerous maneuvers against a legitimate and routine Philippine rotation and resupply mission," said Jay Tarriela, spokesperson for the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS), on the heels of a confrontation earlier this month near the Second Thomas Shoal. "These actions reflect not only reckless disregard for the safety and livelihoods of Filipinos, but also for international law," State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said in a Dec. 10 statement."The United States stands with our Philippine allies in the face of these dangerous and unlawful actions. We reaffirm that Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea," Miller added.China, which claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, previously accused Philippine coast guard ships of trespassing in what it describes as Chinese waters. A 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling found China's maritime claims in the South China Sea — commonly referred to as the nine-dash line — to be legally baseless. Beijing, which rejected the court ruling as "ill-founded" and "naturally null and void," has persisted in vigorously defending its expansive claims as part of a larger delimitation dispute also involving Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Taiwan. What exactly is at stake for China in its intensifying dispute with Manila and, by extension, its U.S. ally? "I think a lot of people in southeast Asia are mystified by why China is so pushy on this question," said Sarang Shidore, Director of the Global South Program at QI, adding that the unresolved issue of Taiwan's status is far more important to Beijing. "The South China Sea, these tiny features and islands, their economic potential is relatively small, there's fishing, but none of this rises to the level where you'd think China would be risking so much by pushing a very expansive claim," Shidore added. There are fishing and maritime disputes across the world, even including between allies, noted Lyle Goldstein, Director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities. "We have a major maritime territorial dispute with Canada… France and Britain go at it all the time over fisheries. It's fairly normal activity even among friends," Lyle told RS. The China-Philippines squall is far from the only theater in Beijing's ongoing maritime disputes, but it has escalated to a greater degree than many of the others due to Manila's readiness to push back against China's pressure tactics. Beijing has not engaged in an escalatory spiral with Malaysia and Brunei, despite their conflicting maritime claims, because these two states "are unlikely to make an issue of Chinese incidents and they don't really even talk about them," said Shidore, adding that their desire to preserve economic ties with China makes them "willing to absorb some costs." The Philippines has taken a more strident approach vis-à-vis Beijing than others in the South China Sea, said Shidore, partly as a byproduct of American presence in the region. "I think U.S. involvement is a big reason —the fact that the U.S. is present in the theater, and there is an alliance commitment, makes the situation not just a China-Philippines issue but a China-U.S. issue, and that's when everything changes from the Chinese perspective," he added. "The Chinese, I think, are more concerned about the U.S., at this point, than the Philippines," continued Shidore, "the U.S. presence is making them see red and emboldening all the nationalist and hawkish forces in the Chinese structures." American obligations under the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty have raised concerns that Washington could find itself embroiled in a war in the South China Sea in the event of a direct military confrontation between China and the Philippines. "I think, unfortunately, all the signs are there for an escalating conflict," Goldstein said. "They [the Chinese] perceive that the stakes for them are very high," Goldstein explained. "I believe all this tension with the Philippines is an outgrowth of Taiwan tension," he said, noting that the Luzon strait, situated just south of Taiwan, has become an increasingly important fixture in U.S. preparations for a Taiwan contingency following the sharp spike in cross-strait tensions accompanying Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taipei. "The U.S. has been trying to put in place the groundwork to prepare for a day when they have to surge forces in a major way into Luzon," he said. Beijing, in reaction to these developments, has sought to dial up the pressure on Manila with threats and maritime shows of force. "The subtext is: if you are going to cooperate with the U.S. on the Taiwan scenario, your interests will suffer badly, and that, I think, is why this bullying is occurring," Goldstein said. Shidore said the White House, in light of growing regional tensions, should "pull back in being so frontal on this issue, whether rhetorically or materially, in terms of its presence in the theater." The U.S. has an active interest in exercising its substantial leverage over Manila "to nudge its more vulnerable partner to be more restrained in some of its actions," Shidore wrote in a piece published by The Diplomat last week. "We shouldn't be encouraging the Philippines to get into a fight with China — they are likely to lose that fight," said Goldstein. "We do have a treaty with the Philippines… but that treaty should be read very narrowly. It should be read as, we defend the main islands of the Philippines — if they are threatened acutely, we will be there," he added. "And if it means we need to put some defensive forces in those areas to reassure the Philippines, I'm okay with that. But my view is that we should not even consider going to war over rocks and reefs or different interpretations of the law of the sea. That would be extremely foolish and reckless, and it would be very hard to explain to American taxpayers." The China-Philippines maritime dispute does not, in of itself, reflect anything approaching an existential conflict. It has, however, become an increasingly dangerous proxy and potential flashpoint for underlying China-U.S. tensions in the South China Sea.
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On August 20, Guatemala's anti-corruption candidate Bernardo Arévalo of the center-left Movimiento Semilla party won a resounding victory against establishment favorite Sandra Torres of the National Unity of Hope party (Unidad Nacional para la Esperanza) in the presidential run-off. Arévalo secured a 58 percent to 37 percent victory over Torres, obtaining the majority of votes in 17 of the Central American country's 22 departments, including a number of rural and indigenous communities. The new president is expected to take office on January 14.Arévalo's unexpected rise and landslide victory were a strong repudiation of the corrupt and entrenched interests that have ruled the country for decades. His triumph is a major triumph for Guatemala's democracy and offers an opportunity to tackle widespread corruption and restore the rule of law. The vote in Central America's most populous nation also marks an important victory against the wave of authoritarianism that has swept the region in recent years.The road ahead, however, will be rough. The country's political establishment appears set on using everything in its arsenal to disqualify Semilla and annul Arevalo's victory to maintain their grip on power.Challenging Road to TransitionOn August 28, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal certified Bernardo Arévalo's victory proclaiming him Guatemala's next president, and the outgoing president, Alejandro Giammattei promised an orderly and transparent transition of power. But an orderly transition remains far from certain as Semilla and Arévalo continue to face a wave of legal battles in attempts to block his rise to power.Despite Arévalo's resounding victory, the country's attorney general, Consuelo Porras, who was named to a second term by Giammattei and has been the subject of U.S. sanctions due to corrupt and undemocratic activities, is determined to push ahead with spurious cases against Semilla and election officials. Following the presidential run-off, her office also requested that charges be brought against election officials and has demanded the list of election workers.The threats do not stop there. Hours before the August 28 certification of results, the electoral registry, under mounting threats of prosecution, suspended Semilla pending further investigation, in violation of court orders that ostensibly protected the party until October 31, when the electoral process officially ends. Two days later, the leadership in Congress, led by the governing party, stripped Semilla's legislators of their party status; the move bars the party's current and incoming lawmakers from serving on committees or as part of the leadership. Given several credible threats to their lives, including two assassination plots, one involving state actors, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued a resolution calling for protective measures on behalf of Arévalo and his running mate, Karin Herrera. The resolution also noted repeated threats presumably coming from individuals linked to the attorney general's office.Porras has not commented on the assassination plots but, instead, unsuccessfully filed a motion before the Constitutional Court asking for protection measures of her own and denouncing posts on social media calling for her resignation, including from journalists.At the same time, Arevalo's rival, Sandra Torres, has refused to concede, and has filed a complaint alleging fraud in the vote count. However, the electoral observation missions of the Organization of American States and the European Union have validated the results, and several countries, including the United States, have recognized Arévalo's victory.Post Inauguration ChallengesPresuming the establishment's efforts fail and Arévalo can assume office on January 14, he will face steep challenges.He will confront a strong opposition in Congress dominated by clientelist and hardline right-wing parties. Semilla obtained 23 out of 160 seats. If the establishment succeeds in permanently suspending Semilla's legal standing, Arévalo will be left without a party bloc in Congress to help advance his legislative agenda.Moreover, the establishment will continue to exercise power through the courts and the public prosecutor's office, both of which have been stacked with its allies. By law, Porras, the attorney general, will remain in office until 2026 and will likely remain hostile to the incoming administration. Those who have profited from the status quo will fight him tooth and nail.Despite these challenges, there are reasons to be hopeful. Arévalo and Semilla are genuinely committed to democratic values and tackling systemic corruption. The path forward will require careful collaboration and agreements with other sectors, including members of the private sector who share their goals and are open to supporting needed reforms, as well as with civil society.Addressing the country's deep inequalities will require working with indigenous organizations and leaders and ensuring they have a seat at the table. Arévalo will also need to rely on the support of the international community. More important, he enjoys the support of an important segment of the citizenry that is eager for change and a better future. Managing their expectations will be critical to his success.US PolicyTwo years ago, the Biden administration launched a five-point, $400-million strategy to tackle the underlying causes of irregular migration from the region, but Central American governments have been reluctant to cooperate. The independent journalists, civil society activists, and other independent actors the U.S. has supported through the strategy have been the target of attacks, threats, and spurious charges by the region's governments, forcing many into exile. The Biden administration's relationship with the Giammattei government has been difficult as, at times, it has felt the need to cooperate on immigration enforcement matters, while, at others, it has sanctioned Guatemalan public officials due to corruption concerns.Arévalo's victory opens up new possibilities for the Biden administration. The president-elect understands the deep ties between both countries and is keen on developing a shared agenda with the United States. The U.S. is Guatemala's most important economic partner, and an estimated 20 percent of the country's GDP comes from remittances.He has vowed to improve basic services — education, health, access to water, and infrastructure — as well as to purge state institutions coopted by corrupt interests. He has promised to focus development efforts on the rural areas that have been most abandoned by the government. Almost half of Guatemalans live in poverty, and that rate rises to 80 percent among indigenous peoples, who make up over 40 percent of the country's 14.9 million people. Child malnutrition is one of the highest in the world, with nearly half of children under five suffering from chronic malnutrition, 58 percent among indigenous children.The Biden administration is likely to continue pressing for border enforcement cooperation, an issue that Arévalo seems to acknowledge and has signaled an openness to working on with the U.S. government.The Biden administration should view Arévalo's victory as an opportunity to revamp its Central America Root Causes Strategy and offer its political, technical, and financial support to help him succeed. First, it must continue to work with other countries in the OAS Permanent Council to exert pressure on the current Guatemalan authorities, as it did after the first round in the elections in June, to ensure that the will of the Guatemalan people is respected and that Arévalo is able to assume office and carry out his democratic mandate.
International audience ; In an attempt to tackle not just youth crime itself, but also the causes of youth crime, the New Labour administration sought to combat social exclusion. It consequently set up a number of social intervention projects such as Sure Start in the most deprived areas of Britain, promised to abolish child poverty before 2010, invested heavily in education, and attempted to reduce the number of unemployed young people via its New Deal for Young People. For the first time, the Youth Justice Board, a special committee charged with overseeing the youth justice system and coordinating social and criminal justice services, was established. A social work approach was to be combined with punishment. Yet, despite these attempt to promote the social inclusion of British youths, in practice they have been 'demonised'. According to the British press, young people are out-of-control, antisocial and violent. The recent 'moral panic' (Cohen, 2001) concerning knife crime seemed to confirm the idea that young people are a threat to society. Even the former justice minister, Jack Straw, declared that most young people who find themselves in prison are not children but 'large, unpleasant thugs' who frighten the general public. Whilst young people have often been the focus of moral panics (Pearson, 1983), it is only recently that panic has been met with such a punitive response which has led to an 800% increase in the number of young people incarcerated since 1992. Despite attempts to adapt the system of juvenile justice to young people, they are increasingly treated like adults. Indeed, the New Labour government's first White Paper on the subject was entitled No More Excuses and the government pledged to eliminate the 'excuse culture' which supposedly dominated the youth justice system. Consequently, there has been a 'dejeuvenalisation' of youth justice policy (Pitts, 2001), marking a rupture with the policy of diversion of youths from the adult justice system which had dominated the criminal justice system since at least the middle of the 19th Century. Similar trends are identifiable in France where there has recently been an erosion of the ordonnance 1945 principle that young people cannot be help fully responsible for their criminal actions. A 2002 law (la loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la justice du 9 septembre) fixes the age of criminal responsibility at 13, leading some experts to speak of the notions of 'premajority'. As in the UK, the rhetoric of responsibilisation has been adopted by Nicolas Sarkozy who has described young people in the criminal justice system as 'black giants from the inner cities'. This paper seeks to determine if the hardening of attitudes to young offenders in France and England can be explained by the same factors. It is a knee-jerk response to moral panic of can it be explained by other socio-economic factors common to the two cultures? ; Dès son arrivée au pouvoir, l'administration néo-travailliste a reconnu que toute tentative pour s'attaquer à la criminalité des jeunes doit se concentrer sur le problème de l'exclusion sociale. Par conséquent, elle a mis en place de nombreux projets Sure Start dans les quartiers les plus défavorisés du Royaume-Uni, elle s'est engagée à éliminer la pauvreté des enfants avant 2020, elle a investi davantage d'argent dans l'éducation, et elle a cherché à réduire le nombre de jeunes au chômage par le biais du New Deal for Young People. Pour les jeunes considérés comme étant les plus susceptibles de sombrer dans la criminalité, le premier gouvernement Blair a créé des Youth Inclusion Programmes qui offrent aux enfants en difficulté un lieu de sociabilité où ils peuvent en outre bénéficier d'une aide scolaire. Pour la première fois, un comité spécial chargé de la justice juvénile, le Youth Justice Board, a été créé afin de coordonner le travail des services sociaux et des services judiciaires ; il a également pour mission de développer une stratégie commune capable de prévenir la criminalité et d'éviter ainsi aux jeunes d'être exposés au système de justice formelle. L'accent est mis tant sur le travail social que sur le châtiment des jeunes délinquants. Or, en dépit de ces tentatives pour favoriser l'inclusion sociale des jeunes britanniques, ces derniers ont souvent été « diabolisés », pour emprunter le terme du Comité des droits de l'enfant de l'ONU. D'après la presse britannique, les jeunes sont de plus en plus difficiles à contrôler, antisociaux et violents. La récente « panique morale » concernant l'apparente montée du nombre d'agressions à l'arme blanche perpétrées par des jeunes semble confirmer l'idée que ces derniers représentent un danger pour la société. Même le ministre de la Justice, Jack Straw, a déclaré que la plupart des enfants qui sont actuellement incarcérés ne sont pas des enfants mais des « gros voyous antipathiques » qui font peur au grand public. Il semblerait bien que la majorité des Britanniques ont peur de la jeunesse, constat confirmé par un rapport récent publié par l'Institute for Public Policy Research. Alors que la jeunesse a souvent fait l'objet de paniques morales dans le passé (Geoffrey Pearson), ce n'est que récemment qu'une telle panique a entraîné une réponse judiciaire aussi punitive, qui se traduit par une augmentation de 800 % du nombre de jeunes âgés de moins de 15 ans incarcérés depuis 1992. Malgré les tentatives d'adapter le système de justice pénale aux jeunes, leur traitement judiciaire est actuellement de plus en plus semblable à celui qu'on réservait autrefois aux adultes. En effet, dès ses premiers jours au pouvoir, le gouvernement de Tony Blair s'est engagé à éliminer la « culture d'absolution » en faveur d'un système judiciaire qui met l'accent sur la responsabilité individuelle des jeunes et de leurs parents. Par conséquent, on assiste actuellement à une « déjuvénilisation » de la politique pénale, se traduisant par une rupture nette avec l'orthodoxie pénale en vigueur depuis le milieu du XIXe siècle, d'après laquelle les jeunes délinquants doivent être soumis à un régime spécial, si possible en dehors du système pénal. Les mêmes tendances sont identifiables en France, où l'on a récemment constaté un durcissement de la loi à l'égard des mineurs et l'érosion de l'excuse de minorité instaurée par l'ordonnance de 1945. Tout particulièrement, la loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la justice du 9 septembre 2002 affirme la responsabilité pénale des mineurs à partir de l'âge de 13 ans, ce qui incite certains commentateurs à parler de l'invention de la notion de « prémajorité ». La rhétorique de responsabilisation est adoptée par Nicolas Sarkozy, à l'instar de ses homologues britanniques (sur le même ton que Jack Straw, il a déclaré qu'on n'a pas affaire ici à des mineurs mais à des « géants noirs des banlieues »). Cet article s'attache à déterminer si le durcissement à l'égard des jeunes délinquants en France et en Angleterre peut s'expliquer par les mêmes facteurs. Est-ce qu'il s'agit d'une réponse à la panique publique ou peut-il s'expliquer par la présence d'autres facteurs socio-politiques communs aux deux cultures ?
In response to a lawsuit by the ACLU under the Freedom of Information Act, the Obama administration released several memos by the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department between the years 2002-2005 that gave the green light for "harsh interrogation techniques" of detainees in the fight against terrorism, the euphemism du jour for the use of torture.Although from the beginning the Justice Department under present Attorney General Eric Holder assured that CIA officials would not be prosecuted for following orders, the lawyers in the OLC are under investigation and could be prosecuted for their recommendations to the Bush White House. When asked if members of the Bush administration may also be prosecuted for making the final decisions to use those procedures, Obama said a week ago that this was a time for "Reflection, not Retribution," thus implying that he would protect the disclosure from politicization. He might as well have called for immediate peace in the Middle East. The huge public outcry from both sides of the political spectrum was instantaneous, with Cheney accusing the President for jeopardizing national security, and human rights and other groups calling for an on-the-spot decision to prosecute former White House authorities for war crimes. In a visit to CIA headquarters at Langley on Monday, Obama tried to personally reassure CIA officers that they won't be prosecuted for carrying out orders and explained, in very rational terms as is his custom, his decision to release those memos and put an end to those practices:"Now, in that context I know that the last few days have been difficult. As I made clear in releasing the OLC memos -- as a consequence of a court case that was pending and to which it was very difficult for us to mount an effective legal defense -- I acted primarily because of the exceptional circumstances that surrounded these memos; particularly the fact that so much of the information was public, had been publicly acknowledged, the covert nature of the information had been compromised.I have fought to protect the integrity of classified information in the past, and I will do so in the future. And there is nothing more important than protecting the identities of CIA officers. So I need everybody to be clear: We will protect your identities and your security as you vigorously pursue your missions. I will be as vigorous in protecting you as you are vigorous in protecting the American people.Now, I have put an end to the interrogation techniques described in those OLC memos, and I want to be very clear and very blunt. I've done so for a simple reason: because I believe that our nation is stronger and more secure when we deploy the full measure of both our power and the power of our values –- including the rule of law. I know I can count on you to do exactly that."As more information trickles in, it is becoming clear there were deep internal divisions and intense infighting within the Obama White House over whether to disclose the information or not. But now that it is out, pressure is mounting for Obama to allow the appropriate institutions to deal with the issue and for the rule of law to be applied. At present, there are two courses of action being considered: for Congress to establish an independent bipartisan commission or for the Attorney-General to appoint a special prosecutor.An independent commission would be similar to the 9-11 one: it would conduct public hearings and issue a report. This is the less confrontational, more conciliatory approach, similar to the "Truth and Reconciliation Commissions" in other countries, and one that would not lead to criminal prosecutions. It is being advocated by moderates who do not want to shut out the past, but would like to move on with the new agenda. It is more in line with President Obama's dictum of "reflection, not retribution." But this is a very fluid situation and he now seems to be leaning toward the second option.The other possibility is for the Attorney General to designate a Special Prosecutor, a neutral, well-respected person to investigate suspected crimes by high ranking officials. This is the option preferred by those who insist that Truth and Reconciliation commissions are acceptable for those countries that are still in the stage of nation-building. But in the United States, there are strong institutions that can enforce the laws, and there is nothing to "reconcile". A Special Prosecutor would let the investigation go where the evidence leads it. He or she would uphold the rule of law and prosecute those responsible, according to evidence of crimes committed. In contradiction with President Obama's judgment, Jonathan Turley, Professor of Constitutional Law at George Washington Law School observes that "that would not be retribution, it would be justice."The problem for the President is that he cannot have it both ways, first authorizing a full disclosure of CIA harsh interrogation methods and then refusing to let justice take its course. Or worse yet, allowing half measures such as the prosecution of attorneys who gave the legal advise to proceed with the practices (perhaps on pre-ordained decisions from the White House), and not holding responsible the higher authorities who gave the final order. The use of torture in pursuit of national security by the US government is a grey legal and emotional area that this country has still not been able to figure out. The goal posts have constantly been moved depending on perceived fears, and the post 9-11 state of mind was conducive to excesses in proportion to the horrific event itself, as well as to its effect on the American psyche. The Bush White House, with its natural penchant for aggressive action, was moving into unchartered waters in a war against non-state actors, so it used this grey legal area to its full advantage. Having been asked by the White House whether these methods were lawful, lawyers in the OLC explicitly recognized in one of these memos that the techniques they were endorsing were the ones the United States condemned other countries for using. This obvious moral double standard notwithstanding, they explicitly stated that "the standards we impose on others do not bind us in any way…however…given the paucity of relevant precedent…we cannot predict with confidence whether a court would agree with his conclusion." This conclusion was informed by a blatantly narrow interpretation of both international and national laws, but was wholly embraced by the White House, in spite of a dissenting view by Condoleezza Rice and others at the State Department. At almost a hundred days into his presidency, Barack Obama is finding out that that no decisions can be taken "outside politics" and that the center of the political spectrum is an uncomfortable and lonely place to be. No president is an island and his hand will be forced in one direction or the other. By trying to square the circle between values and national security so early into his first term, the President is putting the tombstone on bipartisanship for good. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
International audience ; In an attempt to tackle not just youth crime itself, but also the causes of youth crime, the New Labour administration sought to combat social exclusion. It consequently set up a number of social intervention projects such as Sure Start in the most deprived areas of Britain, promised to abolish child poverty before 2010, invested heavily in education, and attempted to reduce the number of unemployed young people via its New Deal for Young People. For the first time, the Youth Justice Board, a special committee charged with overseeing the youth justice system and coordinating social and criminal justice services, was established. A social work approach was to be combined with punishment. Yet, despite these attempt to promote the social inclusion of British youths, in practice they have been 'demonised'. According to the British press, young people are out-of-control, antisocial and violent. The recent 'moral panic' (Cohen, 2001) concerning knife crime seemed to confirm the idea that young people are a threat to society. Even the former justice minister, Jack Straw, declared that most young people who find themselves in prison are not children but 'large, unpleasant thugs' who frighten the general public. Whilst young people have often been the focus of moral panics (Pearson, 1983), it is only recently that panic has been met with such a punitive response which has led to an 800% increase in the number of young people incarcerated since 1992. Despite attempts to adapt the system of juvenile justice to young people, they are increasingly treated like adults. Indeed, the New Labour government's first White Paper on the subject was entitled No More Excuses and the government pledged to eliminate the 'excuse culture' which supposedly dominated the youth justice system. Consequently, there has been a 'dejeuvenalisation' of youth justice policy (Pitts, 2001), marking a rupture with the policy of diversion of youths from the adult justice system which had dominated the criminal justice system since at least the middle of the 19th Century. Similar trends are identifiable in France where there has recently been an erosion of the ordonnance 1945 principle that young people cannot be help fully responsible for their criminal actions. A 2002 law (la loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la justice du 9 septembre) fixes the age of criminal responsibility at 13, leading some experts to speak of the notions of 'premajority'. As in the UK, the rhetoric of responsibilisation has been adopted by Nicolas Sarkozy who has described young people in the criminal justice system as 'black giants from the inner cities'. This paper seeks to determine if the hardening of attitudes to young offenders in France and England can be explained by the same factors. It is a knee-jerk response to moral panic of can it be explained by other socio-economic factors common to the two cultures? ; Dès son arrivée au pouvoir, l'administration néo-travailliste a reconnu que toute tentative pour s'attaquer à la criminalité des jeunes doit se concentrer sur le problème de l'exclusion sociale. Par conséquent, elle a mis en place de nombreux projets Sure Start dans les quartiers les plus défavorisés du Royaume-Uni, elle s'est engagée à éliminer la pauvreté des enfants avant 2020, elle a investi davantage d'argent dans l'éducation, et elle a cherché à réduire le nombre de jeunes au chômage par le biais du New Deal for Young People. Pour les jeunes considérés comme étant les plus susceptibles de sombrer dans la criminalité, le premier gouvernement Blair a créé des Youth Inclusion Programmes qui offrent aux enfants en difficulté un lieu de sociabilité où ils peuvent en outre bénéficier d'une aide scolaire. Pour la première fois, un comité spécial chargé de la justice juvénile, le Youth Justice Board, a été créé afin de coordonner le travail des services sociaux et des services judiciaires ; il a également pour mission de développer une stratégie commune capable de prévenir la criminalité et d'éviter ainsi aux jeunes d'être exposés au système de justice formelle. L'accent est mis tant sur le travail social que sur le châtiment des jeunes délinquants. Or, en dépit de ces tentatives pour favoriser l'inclusion sociale des jeunes britanniques, ces derniers ont souvent été « diabolisés », pour emprunter le terme du Comité des droits de l'enfant de l'ONU. D'après la presse britannique, les jeunes sont de plus en plus difficiles à contrôler, antisociaux et violents. La récente « panique morale » concernant l'apparente montée du nombre d'agressions à l'arme blanche perpétrées par des jeunes semble confirmer l'idée que ces derniers représentent un danger pour la société. Même le ministre de la Justice, Jack Straw, a déclaré que la plupart des enfants qui sont actuellement incarcérés ne sont pas des enfants mais des « gros voyous antipathiques » qui font peur au grand public. Il semblerait bien que la majorité des Britanniques ont peur de la jeunesse, constat confirmé par un rapport récent publié par l'Institute for Public Policy Research. Alors que la jeunesse a souvent fait l'objet de paniques morales dans le passé (Geoffrey Pearson), ce n'est que récemment qu'une telle panique a entraîné une réponse judiciaire aussi punitive, qui se traduit par une augmentation de 800 % du nombre de jeunes âgés de moins de 15 ans incarcérés depuis 1992. Malgré les tentatives d'adapter le système de justice pénale aux jeunes, leur traitement judiciaire est actuellement de plus en plus semblable à celui qu'on réservait autrefois aux adultes. En effet, dès ses premiers jours au pouvoir, le gouvernement de Tony Blair s'est engagé à éliminer la « culture d'absolution » en faveur d'un système judiciaire qui met l'accent sur la responsabilité individuelle des jeunes et de leurs parents. Par conséquent, on assiste actuellement à une « déjuvénilisation » de la politique pénale, se traduisant par une rupture nette avec l'orthodoxie pénale en vigueur depuis le milieu du XIXe siècle, d'après laquelle les jeunes délinquants doivent être soumis à un régime spécial, si possible en dehors du système pénal. Les mêmes tendances sont identifiables en France, où l'on a récemment constaté un durcissement de la loi à l'égard des mineurs et l'érosion de l'excuse de minorité instaurée par l'ordonnance de 1945. Tout particulièrement, la loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la justice du 9 septembre 2002 affirme la responsabilité pénale des mineurs à partir de l'âge de 13 ans, ce qui incite certains commentateurs à parler de l'invention de la notion de « prémajorité ». La rhétorique de responsabilisation est adoptée par Nicolas Sarkozy, à l'instar de ses homologues britanniques (sur le même ton que Jack Straw, il a déclaré qu'on n'a pas affaire ici à des mineurs mais à des « géants noirs des banlieues »). Cet article s'attache à déterminer si le durcissement à l'égard des jeunes délinquants en France et en Angleterre peut s'expliquer par les mêmes facteurs. Est-ce qu'il s'agit d'une réponse à la panique publique ou peut-il s'expliquer par la présence d'autres facteurs socio-politiques communs aux deux cultures ?
This study assessed the capacity for designing and implementing agricultural and rural development policies, strategies, and programs in Nigeria. Data for this study were derived from initial consultations at the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (FMAWR), Federal Ministry of Women affairs and Social Development (FMWASD), and the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMEnv) early in 2008. Two consultation workshops were also held, one for relevant staff in the ministries, parastatals, and NGOs; and the other for relevant university professors and researchers. This was followed by a review of relevant literature and a more detailed survey of institutions and individuals. A sample of relevant institutions and individuals were purposively selected from the Federal Capital, Abuja, Oyo, Kaduna, Enugu Ogun, Benue, and Abia States. At each location, trained data collectors compiled a list of state and federal agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and universities where 32 institutional questionnaires were administered, of which 29 were valid for further analysis. Similarly, 320 individual questionnaires were administered, of which 183 were valid for further analysis. The null hypothesis that job satisfaction and institutional incentive was independent of selected background information (gender, position, years spent on job, nature of institution, and level of formal education) of the experts was tested using the Chi square analysis. The respondents were mostly male (23 of 24) and were either heads of departments (10 of 24) or directors, their deputies and their equivalents (12 of 24). Most of the respondents (22 of 24) exhibited an indifferent perception to the general environment and processes involved in policymaking. Reported capacity- strengthening efforts (for 13 of the 24 institutions surveyed) amounted to an average cost of US$76.98 per person per day for the 1-3 weeks training provided. While the practice of strategic planning was widespread, mission statements were widely used in only two-fifths of selected institutions; near-term strategies were widely used in about one third; and long-term visions were widely used in a little more than one third. Even the practice of participation in planning from a broad range of personnel within the institution was only widely used in one third of the selected intuitions. Similarly, written guidelines were widely available (22 of 24), but fully disseminated in less than half of the selected institutions. However, respondents claimed that the financial guidelines were being followed strictly, but half of the respondents (12 of 24) did not know the frequency of receiving reports from the accounting system. Most of the selected institutions had both a human resource management unit (70.8 percent) and dedicated staff training centers (54.2 percent), but about half of the respondents neither knew the regularity of review of staff training needs nor when last staff training needs were assessed. The implication of this is that the extent to which the training exercises match the skill gaps of staff and capacity requirements of the institutions were unknown. Between 75–80 percent of the selected institutions engaged in some collaborative programs and linkages with other government institutions, relevant NGOs, international development partners, training institutions, and research institutions. These collaborative ventures worked mainly through cost sharing, exchange, joint engagements, and sharing of reports. Over 70 percent of the individual respondents (experts) had at least a Master of Science (MSc) or its equivalent. The majority (79.7 percent) were male who had spent more than 10 years on the job. About half of the experts worked with universities, compared to 13.1 percent in the ministries and 37.7 percent in parastatals. Their expertise cut across a broad range of subjects relevant for designing and implementing agricultural and rural development policies— more than one quarter were experts in agricultural economics, extension, communication, rural development, and rural sociology. The most frequently mentioned (51.4 percent) person responsible for agricultural and rural development programs, policies, and strategies was the officer-in-charge, but the list of stakeholders was long and varied. Over 60 percent of the respondents stated that at least some consultation was done with stakeholders through face-to-face communication at stakeholder fora, meetings, conferences, summits, and talks. According to the respondents, the major concerns of stakeholders about agricultural and rural development policies, programs, or strategies were the extent to which they achieve stated goals. More than half of the respondents claimed that research evidence such as the achievements of previous and on going programs, results of fresh surveys, and extension and On farm Adaptive Research (OFAR) reports were used to support the development of agricultural and rural strategies, policies, and programs. This evidence was obtained mainly from agricultural institutions and universities as well as available reports, journals, and publications. The respondents stated that the major sources of funds for the process of agricultural and rural development policy were the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), The World Bank, state and local governments, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). They also stated that the various agricultural and rural development policies, strategies, and programs largely benefited the poor (52.5 percent). It was noteworthy that respondents preceived that the number of women at the ministerial and research levels of agricultural and rural development was less than 1 percent. Even at the level of rural farming communities, only 15.3 percent of the respondents felt that there were more women. Furthermore, only 27.4 percent of the experts incorporated environmental issues in their work and only 20.4 percent undertook environmental analysis in their work. Finally, 91.3 percent were indifferent to their job, meaning that it would be difficult for them to perform to the best of their abilities without allowing them greater freedom in the performance of their jobs and work out a reasonable and acceptable reward package for the job done. The results of the Chi square tests showed that the experts' perception of job satisfaction and institutional incentives is independent of all the background variables considered. The main capacity gaps for designing and implementing agricultural and rural development policies in Nigeria included 1) the need to entrench democratic principles and transparent leadership and 2) to bridge the gap between universities, research institutions, and policymaking and implementing entities. There was also a limited understanding of the relationships between institutional, human, and material resources versus impact of policy on target end-users at every level in the policy design, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Finally, there was a need for the institutionalization of effective measures for tracking changes in the role of evidence in strategic, gender-sensitive planning, through regular monitoring and evaluation, impact assessment, adequate documentation, and commitment to utilize the results of the exercise. Efforts should also be targeted towards improving the quality, gender sensitivity, timeliness, and circulation of policy-relevant evidence. ; Non-PR ; IFPRI1; GRP37; GRP32; NSSP ; DSGD
It is possible to efficiently implement the systematic proclamation of human rights on a global scale that began in 1948, with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and in our times, among other places, expressed by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (United Nations Millennium Development Goals by the Year 2015, 2000), only through an orientation of the governments of certain states on the areas of education, preservation of health and an increase of income levels. Countries must construct partnerships on a global level, not to determine political and economic agendas so much, but to promote and protect human rights. The polarity between rights-freedoms and rights-claims has made relative the " original greatness of human rights, but at the same time, it has expanded the area of their types and meanings, and increased the social mass of those interested in the rights of life. It has made them an instrument of the developmental and social dynamic of the industrial society, through an argument of great clashes between democracy and totalitarianism, of the developed and undeveloped, etc." (Kalanj, 1996: 50). These tendencies are exacerbated by globalization, even though, seen as an ideal-type, globalization is meant to imply an ever widening implementation of the hypothesis of human rights, that is, their universality. However, we are unfortunately, witnesses of constant deviations in the process of their protection. " Institutions are necessary but not enough. They need to be filled with content, used for the improvement of all sectors of human rights. This content and this path will lead Croatia toward the European Union and its high standards in eliminating discrimination" (Šimunović, 2004: 10). Modern thoughts on the development of human rights move in the direction of linking social development with increasing the protection of human rights – the emphasis is on prevention (instead of late intervention), social participation, activities of self-organization and self-help, promotion of autonomy and development of social skills, and need for greater transparency of public policies. In this context, it is very important to work on affirmation, promotion and implementation of values and ideas of civil society, of the culture of non-violence and tolerance, human rights, dialogue, cooperation and trust, as well as awareness-raising about the opportunities for social change. It is also very important to inform and stimulate the youth to get engaged, to question and educate themselves on those values and opportunities of work and life based on them, in order to propel them forward and contribute to the realization of positive shifts in society. Youth in our analysis are perceived as a link, just being formed in a specific social system, thus making it one of the most important elements of a positive reception and implementation of the basic postulates of human rights. The results of the research on validating specific human rights and freedoms, indicate that the greatest number of young persons accept the right to an education, right to work, personal security, right to privacy, social protection of the elderly and those at risk, equality before the law, rights of women and ownership rights. The comparison of acceptance of the observed human rights and freedoms of the population of youth and adults in Croatia, demonstrates that adults accept most rights to a higher degree than the youth, which can be interpreted through their better social integration. The analysis has shown that the preference of Croatian youth for certain human rights and freedoms is not conditioned by their observed socio-demographic and socio-structural attributes, aside from education, which points to the significance of the education system as an agent in improving the condition of human rights. Approximately one third of youth participants, were not satisfied with the respect for human rights in Croatia today as well as five years ago, while the number of those undecided has decreased, which can probably be attributed to the positive effect of public campaigns and some changes occurring during that period of time. There has been an increase from 1999 to 2004 in the number of youth who believe that human rights in Croatia are mostly or completely respected. The youth, compared to adults, express a higher level of criticism toward the existing degree of respect for human rights and freedoms. The results of analysis according to the social attributes of youth, demonstrate that the capability of assessment and higher criticism for the status of human rights in Croatia, is related to living in more economically prosperous regions, as well as the left-wing ideological-political orientation and female gender. Through an insight into the assessment of the contribution of institutions, associations and distinguished individuals by the youth population in 1999 and 2004, we have determined that today's generation of youth perceives to a greater degree, the contribution of all institutions, associations and significant individuals (except for the opposition) to the protection of human rights and freedoms in Croatia. To be more precise, most young people assess that all the protagonists completely or partially contribute to the realization of human rights in the country. There has been a significant increase regarding the perception of the contribution of the highest institutions of power compared to 1999. The adults differ from the youth by emphasizing the contribution of all the observed protagonists even more. Regional status, religiousness, the father's education and political party affiliation, notably affect the perception of the contribution of the observed protagonists of the realization of human rights in Croatia. Summarily, our analysis indicates that the youth accept human rights and freedoms decidedly, when they are discussed on a level of principles, but that there is a certain disharmony where specific rights and practices in Croatia are concerned, which can partially be interpreted as their insufficient competence regarding certain elements of social and political processes. As human rights and freedoms constitute universally accepted international standards and criteria of democracy in the modern world and its institutions today, the relationship of youth toward them, represents an indication of its social awareness and a precondition for its democratic activity. Even though the level of acceptance of human rights and freedoms as values seems to be high, there is wavering, indicating a need for additional engagement of some agents of socialization, especially the education system and the political protagonists. Freedom and human rights in Croatia are normatively regulated and are given to the individual at birth. However, freedom is not just a right, but a permanent mission, put before each young person, making all the difference for those that manage to gain entry into the world of active citizens, capable of making good their own, and others resources in the best possible way, thus contributing to the development of the world we live in. The first step in this ambitious plight is for the youth to contribute as much as possible to the democratization of Croatia, which would prepare them, as well as the country, for joining the united Europe.
Publisher's version (útgefin grein) ; Background Achieving universal health coverage (UHC) involves all people receiving the health services they need, of high quality, without experiencing financial hardship. Making progress towards UHC is a policy priority for both countries and global institutions, as highlighted by the agenda of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and WHO's Thirteenth General Programme of Work (GPW13). Measuring effective coverage at the health-system level is important for understanding whether health services are aligned with countries' health profiles and are of sufficient quality to produce health gains for populations of all ages. Methods Based on the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study (GBD) 2019, we assessed UHC effective coverage for 204 countries and territories from 1990 to 2019. Drawing from a measurement framework developed through WHO's GPW13 consultation, we mapped 23 effective coverage indicators to a matrix representing health service types (eg, promotion, prevention, and treatment) and five population-age groups spanning from reproductive and newborn to older adults (>= 65 years). Effective coverage indicators were based on intervention coverage or outcome-based measures such as mortality-to-incidence ratios to approximate access to quality care; outcome-based measures were transformed to values on a scale of 0-100 based on the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of location-year values. We constructed the UHC effective coverage index by weighting each effective coverage indicator relative to its associated potential health gains, as measured by disability-adjusted life-years for each location-year and population-age group. For three tests of validity (content, known-groups, and convergent), UHC effective coverage index performance was generally better than that of other UHC service coverage indices from WHO (ie, the current metric for SDG indicator 3.8.1 on UHC service coverage), the World Bank, and GBD 2017. We quantified frontiers of UHC effective coverage performance on the basis of pooled health spending per capita, representing UHC effective coverage index levels achieved in 2019 relative to country-level government health spending, prepaid private expenditures, and development assistance for health. To assess current trajectories towards the GPW13 UHC billion target-1 billion more people benefiting from UHC by 2023-we estimated additional population equivalents with UHC effective coverage from 2018 to 2023. Findings Globally, performance on the UHC effective coverage index improved from 45.8 (95% uncertainty interval 44.2-47.5) in 1990 to 60.3 (58.7-61.9) in 2019, yet country-level UHC effective coverage in 2019 still spanned from 95 or higher in Japan and Iceland to lower than 25 in Somalia and the Central African Republic. Since 2010, sub-Saharan Africa showed accelerated gains on the UHC effective coverage index (at an average increase of 2.6% [1.9-3.3] per year up to 2019); by contrast, most other GBD super-regions had slowed rates of progress in 2010-2019 relative to 1990-2010. Many countries showed lagging performance on effective coverage indicators for non-communicable diseases relative to those for communicable diseases and maternal and child health, despite non-communicable diseases accounting for a greater proportion of potential health gains in 2019, suggesting that many health systems are not keeping pace with the rising non-communicable disease burden and associated population health needs. In 2019, the UHC effective coverage index was associated with pooled health spending per capita (r=0.79), although countries across the development spectrum had much lower UHC effective coverage than is potentially achievable relative to their health spending. Under maximum efficiency of translating health spending into UHC effective coverage performance, countries would need to reach $1398 pooled health spending per capita (US$ adjusted for purchasing power parity) in order to achieve 80 on the UHC effective coverage index. From 2018 to 2023, an estimated 388.9 million (358.6-421.3) more population equivalents would have UHC effective coverage, falling well short of the GPW13 target of 1 billion more people benefiting from UHC during this time. Current projections point to an estimated 3.1 billion (3.0-3.2) population equivalents still lacking UHC effective coverage in 2023, with nearly a third (968.1 million [903.5-1040.3]) residing in south Asia. Interpretation The present study demonstrates the utility of measuring effective coverage and its role in supporting improved health outcomes for all people-the ultimate goal of UHC and its achievement. Global ambitions to accelerate progress on UHC service coverage are increasingly unlikely unless concerted action on non-communicable diseases occurs and countries can better translate health spending into improved performance. Focusing on effective coverage and accounting for the world's evolving health needs lays the groundwork for better understanding how close-or how far-all populations are in benefiting from UHC. ; Lucas Guimaraes Abreu acknowledges support from Coordenacao de Aperfeicoamento de Pessoal de Nivel Superior -Brasil (Capes) -Finance Code 001, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnologico (CNPq) and Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Minas Gerais (FAPEMIG). Olatunji O Adetokunboh acknowledges South African Department of Science & Innovation, and National Research Foundation. Anurag Agrawal acknowledges support from the Wellcome Trust DBT India Alliance Senior Fellowship IA/CPHS/14/1/501489. Rufus Olusola Akinyemi acknowledges Grant U01HG010273 from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as part of the H3Africa Consortium. Rufus Olusola Akinyemi is further supported by the FLAIR fellowship funded by the UK Royal Society and the African Academy of Sciences. Syed Mohamed Aljunid acknowledges the Department of Health Policy and Management, Faculty of Public Health, Kuwait University and International Centre for Casemix and Clinical Coding, Faculty of Medicine, National University of Malaysia for the approval and support to participate in this research project. Marcel Ausloos, Claudiu Herteliu, and Adrian Pana acknowledge partial support by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNDSUEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P4-ID-PCCF-2016-0084. Till Winfried Barnighausen acknowledges support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation through the Alexander von Humboldt Professor award, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Juan J Carrero was supported by the Swedish Research Council (2019-01059). Felix Carvalho acknowledges UID/MULTI/04378/2019 and UID/QUI/50006/2019 support with funding from FCT/MCTES through national funds. Vera Marisa Costa acknowledges support from grant (SFRH/BHD/110001/2015), received by Portuguese national funds through Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia (FCT), IP, under the Norma TransitA3ria DL57/2016/CP1334/CT0006. Jan-Walter De Neve acknowledges support from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Kebede Deribe acknowledges support by Wellcome Trust grant number 201900/Z/16/Z as part of his International Intermediate Fellowship. Claudiu Herteliu acknowledges partial support by a grant co-funded by European Fund for Regional Development through Operational Program for Competitiveness, Project ID P_40_382. Praveen Hoogar acknowledges the Centre for Bio Cultural Studies (CBiCS), Manipal Academy of Higher Education(MAHE), Manipal and Centre for Holistic Development and Research (CHDR), Kalghatgi. Bing-Fang Hwang acknowledges support from China Medical University (CMU108-MF-95), Taichung, Taiwan. Mihajlo Jakovljevic acknowledges the Serbian part of this GBD contribution was co-funded through the Grant OI175014 of the Ministry of Education Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. Aruna M Kamath acknowledges funding from the National Institutes of Health T32 grant (T32GM086270). Srinivasa Vittal Katikireddi acknowledges funding from the Medical Research Council (MC_UU_12017/13 & MC_UU_12017/15), Scottish Government Chief Scientist Office (SPHSU13 & SPHSU15) and an NRS Senior Clinical Fellowship (SCAF/15/02). Yun Jin Kim acknowledges support from the Research Management Centre, Xiamen University Malaysia (XMUMRF/2018-C2/ITCM/0001). Kewal Krishan acknowledges support from the DST PURSE grant and UGC Center of Advanced Study (CAS II) awarded to the Department of Anthropology, Panjab University, Chandigarh, India. Manasi Kumar acknowledges support from K43 TW010716 Fogarty International Center/NIMH. Ben Lacey acknowledges support from the NIHR Oxford Biomedical Research Centre and the BHF Centre of Research Excellence, Oxford. Ivan Landires is a member of the Sistema Nacional de InvestigaciA3n (SNI), which is supported by the Secretaria Nacional de Ciencia Tecnologia e Innovacion (SENACYT), Panama. Jeffrey V Lazarus acknowledges support by a Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities Miguel Servet grant (Instituto de Salud Carlos III/ESF, European Union [CP18/00074]). Peter T N Memiah acknowledges CODESRIA; HISTP. Subas Neupane acknowledges partial support from the Competitive State Research Financing of the Expert Responsibility area of Tampere University Hospital. Shuhei Nomura acknowledges support from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology of Japan (18K10082). Alberto Ortiz acknowledges support by ISCIII PI19/00815, DTS18/00032, ISCIII-RETIC REDinREN RD016/0009 Fondos FEDER, FRIAT, Comunidad de Madrid B2017/BMD-3686 CIFRA2-CM. These funding sources had no role in the writing of the manuscript or the decision to submit it for publication. George C Patton acknowledges support from a National Health & Medical Research Council Fellowship. Marina Pinheiro acknowledges support from FCT for funding through program DL 57/2016 -Norma transitA3ria. Alberto Raggi, David Sattin, and Silvia Schiavolin acknowledge support by a grant from the Italian Ministry of Health (Ricerca Corrente, Fondazione Istituto Neurologico C Besta, Linea 4 -Outcome Research: dagli Indicatori alle Raccomandazioni Cliniche). Daniel Cury Ribeiro acknowledges support from the Sir Charles Hercus Health Research Fellowship -Health Research Council of New Zealand (18/111). Perminder S Sachdev acknowledges funding from the NHMRC Australia. Abdallah M Samy acknowledges support from a fellowship from the Egyptian Fulbright Mission Program. Milena M Santric-Milicevic acknowledges support from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia (Contract No. 175087). Rodrigo Sarmiento-Suarez acknowledges institutional support from University of Applied and Environmental Sciences in Bogota, Colombia, and Carlos III Institute of Health in Madrid, Spain. Maria Ines Schmidt acknowledges grants from the Foundation for the Support of Research of the State of Rio Grande do Sul (IATS and PrInt) and the Brazilian Ministry of Health. Sheikh Mohammed Shariful Islam acknowledges a fellowship from the National Heart Foundation of Australia and Deakin University. Aziz Sheikh acknowledges support from Health Data Research UK. Kenji Shibuya acknowledges Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Joan B Soriano acknowledges support by Centro de Investigacion en Red de Enfermedades Respiratorias (CIBERES), Instituto de Salud Carlos III (ISCIII), Madrid, Spain. Rafael Tabares-Seisdedos acknowledges partial support from grant PI17/00719 from ISCIII-FEDER. Santosh Kumar Tadakamadla acknowledges support from the National Health and Medical Research Council Early Career Fellowship, Australia. Marcello Tonelli acknowledges the David Freeze Chair in Health Services Research at the University of Calgary, AB, Canada. ; "Peer Reviewed"
La presente Tesis titulada "Modelo Metodológico de la Auditoría Financiera con Enfoque Integral para el Sistema Nacional de Control", es de carácter descriptivo y explicativo fundamentada en la experiencia profesional obtenida en el campo de la auditoría financiera y las investigaciones realizadas en torno a la labor de fiscalización y control que viene desarrollando el ente rector del Sistema Nacional de Control, en cumplimiento de lo establecido en los artículos 81° y 82° de la Constitución Política del Perú, y la atribución conferida en el artículo 22° literal f) de la Ley N° 27785 de 22.Jul.2002, Ley Orgánica del Sistema Nacional de Control y de la Contraloría General de la República. Actualmente, la Contraloría General de la República como ente técnico rector del Sistema Nacional de Control, viene modificando las normas de control gubernamental y procedimientos técnicos correspondientes al ejercicio del control gubernamental, de conformidad con el artículo 14° de la Ley N° 27785, Ley Orgánica del Sistema Nacional de Control y de la Contraloría General de la República; afectando directamente el enfoque metodológico de la auditoría financiera y otras auditorías, al haber aprobado las Normas Generales de Control Gubernamental (NGCG), a través del cual dejan sin efecto la aplicación de las Normas de Auditoría Gubernamental (NAGUs), el Manual de Auditoría Gubernamental (MAGU), la Guía de Planeamiento de Auditoría Gubernamental, y la Guía para la Elaboración del Informe de Auditoría Gubernamental. Posteriormente la Contraloría General de la República, aprobó el Manual de Auditoría Financiera Gubernamental, que es un documento normativo, de obligatorio cumplimiento, que define el proceso para el ejercicio de la auditoría a los estados financieros y presupuestales, y ha sido diseñado para su aplicación por las Sociedades de Auditoría, los Órganos de Control Institucional, así como la Contraloría General de la República en la ejecución de la auditoría financiera y presupuestaria, de conformidad con las normas de control gubernamental, concordado con las normas internacionales de auditoría vigentes. Sin embargo, pese a los cambios que viene realizando el ente rector del Sistema Nacional de Control, estos no resuelven el problema planteado en la Tesis titulada "Modelo Metodológico de la Auditoría Financiera con Enfoque Integral para el Sistema Nacional de Control", la misma que debe ser superado con el modelo metodológico que se propone en la Tesis, la misma que prioriza la validación integral de los actos y resultados de la gestión pública, el uso eficiente, eficaz y económico de los recursos y bienes del Estado, así como del cumplimiento de las normas legales y de los lineamientos de política y planes de acción establecidos por las entidades públicas en sus Planes Estratégicos. Por ello, señalamos que el Sistema Nacional de Control, no tiene un modelo metodológico de auditoría financiera que tienda a transparentar la información presupuestaria y financiera del Estado peruano, identificando los actos de corrupción y promoviendo la mejora continua de la gestión pública; asuntos que se superaría de aplicarse la metodología y herramientas modernas que proponemos, a través de la implantación y aplicación de la Auditoría Financiera Gubernamental con Enfoque Integral, la cual busca aplicar un control de advertencia o de prevención para que el administrador público conozca en tiempo real las inconsistencias detectadas en su gestión y proceda a subsanarlas, con lo finalidad de convertir a las entidades públicas en entes eficientes y eficaces, que cumplan con el fin último del control que es su mejoramiento continuo y modernización que asegure el cumplimiento de su misión, visión y objetivos en bien de los ciudadanos de nuestro país. Esta gran diferencia entre lo que se aplica en el Perú y lo que se aplica por ejemplo en Colombia, en materia de control gubernamental, ha conllevado a que se efectúe esta investigación que tiene por objetivo general, identificar y aplicar modernos enfoques de auditoría financiera integral que permita obtener resultados de la evaluación de gestión de las entidades públicas y promueva su mejora continua. Para llevar a cabo esta investigación se ha considerado tomar en cuenta el universo que conforman el Sistema Nacional de Control (empresas, entidades, ministerios y gobiernos regionales y locales) de los cuáles tomamos como muestra la información financiera auditada de 15 entidades: 05 Ministerios, 02 Universidades, 03 Gobiernos Regionales, 02 Gobiernos Locales, y 03 Empresas del Estado. Además, consideraremos entrevistarnos con 10 socios de firmas de auditores que auditaron esas entidades que representan la muestra de estudio, 10 funcionarios de entidades auditadas y 10 contadores públicos. Para cumplir con nuestro objetivo, se procedió a efectuar una encuesta a los participantes de nuestra muestra y cuyo principal dato obtenido es que el Sistema Nacional de Control actualmente no permite la evaluación integral de la gestión y sus efectos financieros y presupuestarios, plasmados en los estados financieros y estados presupuestarios; a fin de validar el uso eficiente, eficaz y económico de los recursos del Estado, por lo que es prioritario que la Auditoría Financiera Gubernamental con enfoque Integral, sea aplicada con prontitud, para lo cual deberá modificarse la normatividad actual vigente, que permita a la Contraloría General de la República, su modernización y aplicación herramientas tecnológicas y enfoques modernos de auditoría en las actividades y acciones de control que programe y ejecute en el ámbito del sector gubernamental. El enfoque de auditoría integral propuesto se fundamenta en el conocimiento integral de la entidad gubernamental a ser auditada en su entorno sistémico, el cual conlleva a evaluar la planificación de su gestión verificando el cumplimiento de su misión, visión y objetivos, a través de los documentos de gestión que generan, y su alineamiento con las políticas públicas del gobierno, asimismo, evaluar los resultados de la gestión a través de los procesos que desarrolla, identificando y proponiendo recomendaciones que superen los riesgos internos y/o externos que los hayan afectado. Este cambio metodológico se efectúa en cinco fases que explicamos ampliamente en este trabajo, el cual buscamos se formalice mediante normas que aseguren la reforma integral del Sistema Nacional de Control en el Perú. Palabras claves: Enfoque, Sistema, Auditoría, Integral, Control. ; --- This thesis titled "Model methodological of the audit financial with approach Integral to the National Control System", is character descriptive and explanatory grounded in professional experience obtained in the field of the financial audit and investigations around the work of control and control being developed by the governing body of the national system of Control in compliance with provisions in articles 81 ° and 82 ° of the Constitution politics in Peru, and attribution in article 22 literal ° f) of the Act N ° 27785 22.Jul.2002, organic law of the system National Control and the Comptroller General of the Republic. Actually, the General Comptroller of the Republic as a technical entity rector of the National Control System , it comes by modifying the rules of Government control and technical procedures for the exercise of Government control, in accordance with article 14 of the law N ° 27785, organic law of the system National Control and the Office of the Comptroller General; directly affecting the methodology of the financial audit and other audit approach, adopting general rules of governmental Control (NGCG), through which they leave without effect the application of the rules of audit Government (NAGUs) and Manual of governmental audit (MAGU), governmental audit planning guide, the Guide to the preparation of the report of audit Government. Subsequently the Office of the Comptroller-General approved the audit financial Government Manual, which is a normative, binding document, which defines the process for the exercise of the audit the financial and budget States, and has been designed for its application, audit companies, the institutional supervisory bodies, as well as the Comptroller General of the Republic in the implementation of the audit financial and budgetary in accordance with the rules of Government control, agreed with the international standards of audit. However, despite the changes being the governing body of the national system of Control, these do not solve the problem raised in the thesis entitled "Methodological model of auditing financial with comprehensive approach to national Control System", which should be overcome with the methodological model proposed in the thesis, which prioritises the comprehensive validation of acts and results of public management, the efficient, effective and economic use of the resources and assets of the State, as well as the compliance with legal norms and policy guidelines and action plans established by public entities in their plans Strategic. By this, we emphasize that the identified problems would be overcome to apply modern tools we propose, through the implementation and application of the governmental financial audit with Integral approach and methodology which it seeks to apply a warning or prevention control so the public administrator know real-time inconsistencies detected in its management and appropriate to remedy them, with the purpose of converting to public entities in efficient and effective, entities that comply with the ultimate aim of the control which is its continuous improvement and modernization that will ensure the fulfillment of its mission vision and goals for the good of the citizens of our country. This difference between what applies in the Peru and which applies for example in Colombia, in terms of Government control, has led to this investigation that general objective, identify and implement modern approaches to comprehensive financial audit that allows results of the evaluation of management of public entities and promote continuous improvement. To carry out this investigation has been considered taking into account the universe that make up the national system of Control (companies, institutions, ministries and regional and local governments) which we take as a sample 15 entities: 05 ministries, universities 02, 03 regional Governments, local government 02, and 03 State enterprises. In addition, we will consider interview 10 partners of firms of Auditors which trail those entities that represent the study sample, 10 officials from auditees and 10 public accountants. To achieve our objective, we proceeded to carry out a survey to participants in our sample and whose main retrieved data is that national Control system currently does not allow the comprehensive assessment of the management and their financial and budgetary, effects reflected in the financial statements and budget States; in order to validate the use of efficient, effective and economic resources of the State, so it is a priority that the governmental financial audit with Integral approach is applied promptly, for which need to modify the current regulations, which allow the Comptroller General of the Republic, its modernization and application technology tools and modern approaches of auditing activities and control actions that you schedule and execute in the scope of the sector government. The proposed comprehensive audit approach is based on the comprehensive understanding of the Government entity to be audited in their systemic environment, which leads to evaluate its management planning by verifying the fulfillment of its mission, vision and objectives, through documents management generated, and their alignment with the policies of the Government, also evaluate the results of management through processes that developed, identifying and proposing recommendations that exceed the internal and/or external risks that have affected them. This methodological change is carried out in five phases which widely explained in this work, which seek to formalize rules that ensure the comprehensive reform of the national system of Control in the Peru. Key words: approach, system, audit, comprehensive Control. ; Tesis
La presente Tesis titulada "Modelo Metodológico de la Auditoría Financiera con Enfoque Integral para el Sistema Nacional de Control", es de carácter descriptivo y explicativo fundamentada en la experiencia profesional obtenida en el campo de la auditoría financiera y las investigaciones realizadas en torno a la labor de fiscalización y control que viene desarrollando el ente rector del Sistema Nacional de Control, en cumplimiento de lo establecido en los artículos 81° y 82° de la Constitución Política del Perú, y la atribución conferida en el artículo 22° literal f) de la Ley N° 27785 de 22.Jul.2002, Ley Orgánica del Sistema Nacional de Control y de la Contraloría General de la República. Actualmente, la Contraloría General de la República como ente técnico rector del Sistema Nacional de Control, viene modificando las normas de control gubernamental y procedimientos técnicos correspondientes al ejercicio del control gubernamental, de conformidad con el artículo 14° de la Ley N° 27785, Ley Orgánica del Sistema Nacional de Control y de la Contraloría General de la República; afectando directamente el enfoque metodológico de la auditoría financiera y otras auditorías, al haber aprobado las Normas Generales de Control Gubernamental (NGCG), a través del cual dejan sin efecto la aplicación de las Normas de Auditoría Gubernamental (NAGUs), el Manual de Auditoría Gubernamental (MAGU), la Guía de Planeamiento de Auditoría Gubernamental, y la Guía para la Elaboración del Informe de Auditoría Gubernamental. Posteriormente la Contraloría General de la República, aprobó el Manual de Auditoría Financiera Gubernamental, que es un documento normativo, de obligatorio cumplimiento, que define el proceso para el ejercicio de la auditoría a los estados financieros y presupuestales, y ha sido diseñado para su aplicación por las Sociedades de Auditoría, los Órganos de Control Institucional, así como la Contraloría General de la República en la ejecución de la auditoría financiera y presupuestaria, de conformidad con las normas de control gubernamental, concordado con las normas internacionales de auditoría vigentes. Sin embargo, pese a los cambios que viene realizando el ente rector del Sistema Nacional de Control, estos no resuelven el problema planteado en la Tesis titulada "Modelo Metodológico de la Auditoría Financiera con Enfoque Integral para el Sistema Nacional de Control", la misma que debe ser superado con el modelo metodológico que se propone en la Tesis, la misma que prioriza la validación integral de los actos y resultados de la gestión pública, el uso eficiente, eficaz y económico de los recursos y bienes del Estado, así como del cumplimiento de las normas legales y de los lineamientos de política y planes de acción establecidos por las entidades públicas en sus Planes Estratégicos. Por ello, señalamos que el Sistema Nacional de Control, no tiene un modelo metodológico de auditoría financiera que tienda a transparentar la información presupuestaria y financiera del Estado peruano, identificando los actos de corrupción y promoviendo la mejora continua de la gestión pública; asuntos que se superaría de aplicarse la metodología y herramientas modernas que proponemos, a través de la implantación y aplicación de la Auditoría Financiera Gubernamental con Enfoque Integral, la cual busca aplicar un control de advertencia o de prevención para que el administrador público conozca en tiempo real las inconsistencias detectadas en su gestión y proceda a subsanarlas, con lo finalidad de convertir a las entidades públicas en entes eficientes y eficaces, que cumplan con el fin último del control que es su mejoramiento continuo y modernización que asegure el cumplimiento de su misión, visión y objetivos en bien de los ciudadanos de nuestro país. Esta gran diferencia entre lo que se aplica en el Perú y lo que se aplica por ejemplo en Colombia, en materia de control gubernamental, ha conllevado a que se efectúe esta investigación que tiene por objetivo general, identificar y aplicar modernos enfoques de auditoría financiera integral que permita obtener resultados de la evaluación de gestión de las entidades públicas y promueva su mejora continua. Para llevar a cabo esta investigación se ha considerado tomar en cuenta el universo que conforman el Sistema Nacional de Control (empresas, entidades, ministerios y gobiernos regionales y locales) de los cuáles tomamos como muestra la información financiera auditada de 15 entidades: 05 Ministerios, 02 Universidades, 03 Gobiernos Regionales, 02 Gobiernos Locales, y 03 Empresas del Estado. Además, consideraremos entrevistarnos con 10 socios de firmas de auditores que auditaron esas entidades que representan la muestra de estudio, 10 funcionarios de entidades auditadas y 10 contadores públicos. Para cumplir con nuestro objetivo, se procedió a efectuar una encuesta a los participantes de nuestra muestra y cuyo principal dato obtenido es que el Sistema Nacional de Control actualmente no permite la evaluación integral de la gestión y sus efectos financieros y presupuestarios, plasmados en los estados financieros y estados presupuestarios; a fin de validar el uso eficiente, eficaz y económico de los recursos del Estado, por lo que es prioritario que la Auditoría Financiera Gubernamental con enfoque Integral, sea aplicada con prontitud, para lo cual deberá modificarse la normatividad actual vigente, que permita a la Contraloría General de la República, su modernización y aplicación herramientas tecnológicas y enfoques modernos de auditoría en las actividades y acciones de control que programe y ejecute en el ámbito del sector gubernamental. El enfoque de auditoría integral propuesto se fundamenta en el conocimiento integral de la entidad gubernamental a ser auditada en su entorno sistémico, el cual conlleva a evaluar la planificación de su gestión verificando el cumplimiento de su misión, visión y objetivos, a través de los documentos de gestión que generan, y su alineamiento con las políticas públicas del gobierno, asimismo, evaluar los resultados de la gestión a través de los procesos que desarrolla, identificando y proponiendo recomendaciones que superen los riesgos internos y/o externos que los hayan afectado. Este cambio metodológico se efectúa en cinco fases que explicamos ampliamente en este trabajo, el cual buscamos se formalice mediante normas que aseguren la reforma integral del Sistema Nacional de Control en el Perú. Palabras claves: Enfoque, Sistema, Auditoría, Integral, Control. ; --- This thesis titled "Model methodological of the audit financial with approach Integral to the National Control System", is character descriptive and explanatory grounded in professional experience obtained in the field of the financial audit and investigations around the work of control and control being developed by the governing body of the national system of Control in compliance with provisions in articles 81 ° and 82 ° of the Constitution politics in Peru, and attribution in article 22 literal ° f) of the Act N ° 27785 22.Jul.2002, organic law of the system National Control and the Comptroller General of the Republic. Actually, the General Comptroller of the Republic as a technical entity rector of the National Control System , it comes by modifying the rules of Government control and technical procedures for the exercise of Government control, in accordance with article 14 of the law N ° 27785, organic law of the system National Control and the Office of the Comptroller General; directly affecting the methodology of the financial audit and other audit approach, adopting general rules of governmental Control (NGCG), through which they leave without effect the application of the rules of audit Government (NAGUs) and Manual of governmental audit (MAGU), governmental audit planning guide, the Guide to the preparation of the report of audit Government. Subsequently the Office of the Comptroller-General approved the audit financial Government Manual, which is a normative, binding document, which defines the process for the exercise of the audit the financial and budget States, and has been designed for its application, audit companies, the institutional supervisory bodies, as well as the Comptroller General of the Republic in the implementation of the audit financial and budgetary in accordance with the rules of Government control, agreed with the international standards of audit. However, despite the changes being the governing body of the national system of Control, these do not solve the problem raised in the thesis entitled "Methodological model of auditing financial with comprehensive approach to national Control System", which should be overcome with the methodological model proposed in the thesis, which prioritises the comprehensive validation of acts and results of public management, the efficient, effective and economic use of the resources and assets of the State, as well as the compliance with legal norms and policy guidelines and action plans established by public entities in their plans Strategic. By this, we emphasize that the identified problems would be overcome to apply modern tools we propose, through the implementation and application of the governmental financial audit with Integral approach and methodology which it seeks to apply a warning or prevention control so the public administrator know real-time inconsistencies detected in its management and appropriate to remedy them, with the purpose of converting to public entities in efficient and effective, entities that comply with the ultimate aim of the control which is its continuous improvement and modernization that will ensure the fulfillment of its mission vision and goals for the good of the citizens of our country. This difference between what applies in the Peru and which applies for example in Colombia, in terms of Government control, has led to this investigation that general objective, identify and implement modern approaches to comprehensive financial audit that allows results of the evaluation of management of public entities and promote continuous improvement. To carry out this investigation has been considered taking into account the universe that make up the national system of Control (companies, institutions, ministries and regional and local governments) which we take as a sample 15 entities: 05 ministries, universities 02, 03 regional Governments, local government 02, and 03 State enterprises. In addition, we will consider interview 10 partners of firms of Auditors which trail those entities that represent the study sample, 10 officials from auditees and 10 public accountants. To achieve our objective, we proceeded to carry out a survey to participants in our sample and whose main retrieved data is that national Control system currently does not allow the comprehensive assessment of the management and their financial and budgetary, effects reflected in the financial statements and budget States; in order to validate the use of efficient, effective and economic resources of the State, so it is a priority that the governmental financial audit with Integral approach is applied promptly, for which need to modify the current regulations, which allow the Comptroller General of the Republic, its modernization and application technology tools and modern approaches of auditing activities and control actions that you schedule and execute in the scope of the sector government. The proposed comprehensive audit approach is based on the comprehensive understanding of the Government entity to be audited in their systemic environment, which leads to evaluate its management planning by verifying the fulfillment of its mission, vision and objectives, through documents management generated, and their alignment with the policies of the Government, also evaluate the results of management through processes that developed, identifying and proposing recommendations that exceed the internal and/or external risks that have affected them. This methodological change is carried out in five phases which widely explained in this work, which seek to formalize rules that ensure the comprehensive reform of the national system of Control in the Peru. Key words: approach, system, audit, comprehensive Control. ; Tesis
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The European Union's recent decision to allocate extraordinary revenues derived from frozen Russian Central Bank assets towards military assistance for Ukraine represents not only a demonstration of strong political will but also a potential mechanism to circumvent existing limitations in EU decision-making processes.The Council's decision During a press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council on 24 June, High Representative Josep Borrell elucidated the Council's decisions, including the adoption of the fourteenth sanctions package against Russia. Notably, Borrell emphasised what he termed the "most important" agenda item: a political agreement on the legal framework for utilising revenues from immobilised Russian assets.[1] While specific details were not extensively elaborated upon, Borrell disclosed that the available funds were projected to reach 1.4 billion euros by July, with an additional billion euros anticipated by year's end. The High Representative further delineated the priorities for fund allocation, namely munitions, missiles, air defence systems and support for Ukraine's defence industry, indicating also a shift in acquisition methods from partial reimbursements to member states to direct purchases from the European and Ukrainian defence industries, while granting flexibility for the global marketplace. The crucial aspect of this decision, however, lies in the manner of its adoption. Borrell acknowledged that one member state – implicitly understood to be Hungary – opposed this decision, consistent with its opposition to various measures on this matter over the past 18 months, including the eighth tranche of reimbursements under the European Peace Facility (EPF), valued at approximately 6 billion euros. Nevertheless, Borrell asserted that the Council had identified a legal means to circumvent this "structural difficulty".The EPF and its structural limits To contextualise this development, a brief background may be helpful. The EPF, established in March 2021, was designed with two primary objectives: to enhance funding mechanisms for EU missions and to enable military assistance measures beyond the African continent, including direct arms supplies. Due to treaty constraints prohibiting the use of the EU budget for military purposes, the EPF is funded by member states in proportion to their respective GDPs. The pre-existence of this instrument at the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict enabled the Union to respond with unprecedented rapidity. On 28 February 2022, mere days after the commencement of Russian aggression, the Union was able to allocate the first 500 million euros in military support to Kyiv. The EPF regulation includes a prescient provision allowing member states to abstain from funding arms supplies, provided they commit to making additional contributions for other forms of assistance. This clause has enabled the EU to maintain unity despite some countries (Ireland, Austria and Malta) opting to support Ukraine without sending weapons, instead providing fuel, medical equipment and protective devices. Since the first allocation, through seven successive packages, the contribution to the Ukrainian Armed Forces has reached 6.1 billion euros (including "non-lethal" materials) that, let aside the tragedy of the war, represents a "success story" in terms of EU responsiveness and solidarity.[2] However, the eighth aid package has been obstructed for over 18 months by Hungary's veto. The rationale behind this veto has evolved, and it remains unclear whether and how this impasse can be resolved, casting doubt on the continued efficacy of the EPF in its current configuration. From this perspective, the decision regarding the profits from Russian assets appears as a fortuitous development – a financial windfall that presents an opportunity to be seized, both due to its nature as "fresh" money and because it potentially allows for the resumption of military aid through a novel approach.A long-awaited measure The Council decision to use the windfall profits for sending arms to Kyiv has not been an easy one. The third sanctions package, implemented shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, prohibited any transactions related to the management of Russian Central Bank reserves and assets within EU territory. European Commission estimates place the value of these assets at approximately 210 billion euros,[3] with the vast majority (191 billion) deposited with a single managing entity in Belgium and the remainder in Luxembourg. The freezing of profits has resulted in an accumulation of "extraordinary and unexpected" revenues for the depositary institutions, which are unable to utilise these funds.[4] Discussions regarding the potential utilisation of these profits began at the European Council in October 2022.[5] In March 2023, the Swedish presidency established a working group to evaluate various options. Based on the working group's report, at the Ukraine Recovery Conference held in London on 21 June 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced, somewhat surprisingly, an imminent legislative initiative.[6] However, despite a shared objective of utilising these funds to support Ukraine, at that time considerable caution persisted among member states, then supported by the European Central Bank, which expressed concerns about potential negative repercussions on the international role of the euro. Several months elapsed before the first concrete decisions were taken, following alignment with G7 countries, as evidenced by the communiqué issued after the 6 December 2023 summit.[7] On 12 February 2024, the Council imposed a requirement on depositaries of Russian assets above a certain threshold to account for and manage these assets separately from other activities. The Council also reiterated that, based on sanction measures, the revenues would not be made available to the Russian Central Bank even after the revocation of those measures, and "thus, they do not constitute sovereign assets".[8] This assertion implicitly suggests that norms of international law pertaining to state immunities are not applicable to these funds. On 21 May, the Council established that the majority of these profits (90 per cent) would be allocated to military support for Ukraine, with the remainder designated for the development of the country's defence industry capabilities and reconstruction.[9] Hungary did not take part in the vote on these decisions. The Council decisions stipulate that the portion allocated to military support will be paid into the EPF. However, they also point out that these new funding sources necessitate specific rules compared to ordinary procedures, which invariably require unanimity. The preamble of the decisions clarifies that it is not necessary for the additional contribution to be accepted by the Political and Security Committee and authorised by the EPF committee, as its destination has already been directly decided by the Council (without Hungary's vote). Furthermore, the document states that the countries that abstained will "continue not to be obliged to apply the decisions regarding EPF assistance measures".[10] Returning to the Foreign Affairs Council of 24 June, Borrell's reasoning stated that, given that Hungary did not participate in the previous Council decision regarding the use of unexpected profits in favour of Ukraine, Budapest "legally" no longer had the right to participate in the decision on how to allocate these funds.[11] This rationale applies because these funds do not originate from the EU budget or from member states (as is the case with EPF money), but rather from Russian assets. A first transfer of funds is expected by the end of July 2024 for an estimated amount between 1 and 1.4 billion. Once again, in the face of challenges, the "resilience" of EU institutions appears to prevail. Considering the situation just outlined, windfall profits seem to be a "godsend" for Kyiv's military assistance. However, it is widely acknowledged that one cannot consistently rely on help from heaven. Systematic problems such as defence funding need to be addressed at their roots, requiring comprehensive reforms of the European Union's decision-making scheme and long-term strategic planning.Federico Petrangeli is Senior Parliamentary Official of the Italian Senate.[1] EEAS, Foreign Affairs Council: Press Remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell after the Meeting, 24 June 2024, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/442997_en.[2] Council of the EU, European Peace Facility: EU Support to Ukraine, last reviewed: 12 July 2024, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-peace-facility/#ukraine.[3] European Commission, Commission Welcomes Council Decision on the Use of Proceeds from Immobilised Russian Assets for Ukraine, 21 May 2024, http://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_24_2732.[4] Council of the EU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/577 of 12 February 2024 Amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of Russia's Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine, point 16, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/577/oj.[5] European Council, European Council Conclusions, 20-21 October 2022, https://europa.eu/!fcCFn7.[6] European Commission, Keynote Speech by President von der Leyen at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2023, 21 June 2023, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/node/4499_en.[7] G7, G7 Leaders' Statement, 6 December 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100591757.pdf.[8] Council of the EU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/577 of 12 February 2024, cit., point 18.[9] Council of the EU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1470 of 21 May 2024 Amending Decision 2014/512/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of Russia's Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine, Article 1(11), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1470/oj; and Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1471 of 21 May 2024 on the Allocation of the Amounts of the Financial Contribution Paid to the European Peace Facility Pursuant to Decision (CFSP) 2024/1470, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1471/oj.[10] Council of the EU, Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/1471 of 21 May 2024, cit., point 4.[11] EEAS, Foreign Affairs Council: Press Remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell after the Meeting, cit.