'Ensayos sobre crecimiento económico en Colombia', editado por Adolfo Meisel y Hernando Vargas, es el resultado de una agenda de investigación del Banco de la República sobre el crecimiento económico en Colombia. Su objetivo principal es analizar algunas de las restricciones de carácter estructural que limitan el crecimiento económico en el largo plazo. Así mismo, pretende entender cuáles son las causas del lento crecimiento del país, indispensable para formular políticas públicas tendientes a lograr un mayor crecimiento económico, y analizar la relación entre el desempeño económico regional y el crecimiento de largo plazo para identificar políticas de desarrollo regional adecuadas. La obra analiza en profundidad seis temas de gran relevancia para el país: descentralización fiscal y crecimiento regional; capital humano y físico y crecimiento municipal; innovación y empleo; productividad y participación en el mercado exportador; capital humano y participación laboral, y desempeño de las exportaciones colombianas.
The Bretton Woods sisters, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (henceforth the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were set up in 1944. The original purpose of the former was to help post-Second World War reconstruction; the purpose of the latter was to help revive global trade while averting the 'beggar-thy-neighbor' exchange rate policies that characterized the interwar years. Over the years, the World Bank has refocused on helping poor countries grow while the IMF broadly attempts to foster country policies that ensure macroeconomic stability and limit adverse spillovers to the rest of the world. While these roles still remain, their nature has changed somewhat. In particular, given the development of financial markets around the world, the primary role of these institutions has moved to shaping, guiding, supplementing, and stabilizing the flow of private finance rather than substituting fully for it. This paper focuses on the new ways multilateral institutions may have to perform old tasks, as well as the ways they could perform new tasks such as slowing climate change. Critical to their transformation will be the attitudes of the countries that play the largest role in their governance, as well as reform of the governance process itself.
This draft of our contribution to "The politics and economics of change in European social models" book project, is focused on the relation between macroeconomic policies and social models in the EU 15 during the last two decades. It first describes the shift towards the Maastricht "culture of discipline", i.e. the effect of the implementation of rules governing macroeconomic policies management for euro area countries, assesses its consequence in terms of economic performance and evaluates how those rules are playing out so far in the current crisis. We then attempt at detailing the second shift towards "structural reforms" of social models to show how it has resulted in a weakening of "automatic stabilizers" that, therefore, can't fully play their role in the current crisis. Finally, we offer some analytical insights to make sense of those two shifts.
This note focuses on the deposit insurance scheme. An analysis of the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) is provided to the extent that it is relevant to the management of the deposit insurance scheme and no detail analysis of the other functions performed by the DIA, e.g. bank resolution, is included. Policy recommendations on the bank resolution are included in the Aide Memoire. DIA revenue sources are volatile and Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) related revenues are used to subsidize non-DIF related activities. The legal framework is ambiguous as to whether DIF resources can be used to cover running costs of the DIA. To improve transparency and ensure sustainability of the DIF, the legal framework should be amended to clarify the use of DIF resources and cap use for operating costs. The authorities should develop a medium term strategy for the DIA, including a funding strategy for non-DIF related activities
The Horn of Africa, which is situated in the north-east Africa, comprises mainly Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti which cover region of the Somali peninsula. It is one of the area of the world belonging to the most affected by natural disasters, poverty, famine, conflicts and crime. Due to its geographical location on point of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean as well the close position to the Arabian peninsula it is the most geo-strategically important regions of the world in terms of military and economic significance. That is why the world powers were and are still interested in it.The main topic of this article is the fragile state - Somalia. It was selected here in terms of its geographical location, high level of instability, civil war, famine and piracy problem or terrorist groups activities as an example of difficult political situation of the Horn of Africa and the attempts of the main economic competitors in Africa - The European Union, China and The United States of America - in order to achieve stabilization in the region.The prime aim of this analysis based on the source materials, subject reading matters and media news, is the presentation the most essential current activities of the above international actors that lead them to rise in the level of security in Somalia and neighbouring sea, straits, ocean and strengthening the Federal Government of Somalia and its security structure. The present condition of the Somali National Army and its future transformation are also presented in this work. Taking all above into consideration it was hard not to give attention to peacekeeping African Union Mission in Somalia AMISOM active since 2007 with approval of the United Nations Security Council. Despite the deep criticism of its activities by the nongovernmental organization Human Rights Watch, AMISOM has taken over most areas of central and south Somalia until now. What is more, the research points also the main legal framework that make possible foreign security aid in Somalia. In case of the EU - The Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (2016) and the Strategy for the Horn of Africa (2011). In the case of the US - the New National Security Strategy announced by president Trump in December 2017. Additionally, the article is focused on the growing presence of China in the Horn of Africa what is highly visible in the creation of the first foreign military Chinese base opened in July2017 in the neighbouring to Somalia - Djibouti.As a result of the analysis of the current activities of AMISOM, pointed American or Chinese actions and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in Somalia: European Union Naval Force ATALANTA (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Somalia), European Union Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) and European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Somalia) a few essential conclusions can be made:the regular trade competitors in the race for their impacts in modern Africa - EU, China, US - are able to cooperate in taking care about either own and the Horn of Africa benefits if it is necessary,the level of security and democracy in Somalia has risen significantly in the last decade and a threat of piracy has fallen definitely in region of the Aden Gulf, The Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as an effect of activities of AMISOM, the Combined Task Forces, the EU peace missions and separate states. Nevertheless, the level of security which has been reached is really fragile and it may be disturbed easily when international security aid services will be over,the foreign peace missions active nowadays will be continued but with the tendency to their limitation in the next few years,the tasks of the peacekeeping African Union Mission in Somalia AMISOM, that is step by step limited and it is planned to stop in 2020, will be taken over by the transformed Somali national Army and Police,it is highly impossible to become self-supporting and to reach full independence of the Somali security structure from foreign peacekeeping assistance just in 2 years so that Somalia itself can guarantee own security and take over the prior AMISOM tasks,the full security and saving the political and economic stability in Somalia in the future may be possible not only by temporary military and humanitarian aid but also by so called fundamental work. So both of them are necessary at this stage of development of Somalia;Key words: Somalia, the Horn of Africa, piracy, Al-Shabaab, international security, maritime security, peace missions, terrorism ; Znajdujący się w północno-wschodniej części kontynentu afrykańskiego Róg Afryki, obejmujący głównie położone na Półwyspie Somalijskim Etiopię, Somalię, Erytreę, Dżibuti, jest jednym z regionów w tej części świata należących do najbardziej dotkniętych naturalnymi katastrofami, ubóstwem, głodem oraz konfliktami i przestępczością. Region ten ze względu na swoje położenie geograficzne na styku Morza Czerwonego, Oceanu Indyjskiego i Zatoki Adeńskiej, jak również ze względu na bliskość Półwyspu Arabskiego stanowi strategicznie ważne miejsce pod względem gospodarczym jak i militarnym. Stąd znajdował się i znajduje wciąż w strefie zainteresowania światowych mocarstw. Tematem niniejszego artykułu jest państwo upadłe - Somalia, która ze względu na swoje położenie geograficzne, wysoki poziom niestabilności, wojnę domową, problem głodu i piractwa morskiego oraz aktywność grup terrorystycznych na jej terenie została wybrana jako przykład ilustrujący trudną sytuację polityczną Rogu Afryki i wysiłki konkurujących ze sobą o wpływy ekonomiczne w Afryce Unii Europejskiej, Chin i Stanów Zjednoczonych podejmowane w celu ustabilizowania sytuacji w regionie rogu Afryki.Celem niniejszego analizy opartej o dokumenty źródłowe, literaturę przedmiotu i doniesienia medialne jest zaprezentowanie najważniejszej bieżącej aktywności w/w międzynarodowych aktorów prowadzące do podniesienia poziomu bezpieczeństwa w Somalii i otaczających ją wodach oraz wzmocnienia Federalnego Rządu Somalii i jego struktur bezpieczeństwa. Zaprezentowano również stan bieżący Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych Somalii oraz plany ich restrukturyzacji w najbliższych latach. Analizując w/w kwestie nie pominięto również zaangażowania Unii Afrykańskiej w postaci operacji pokojowej AMISOM prowadzonej w Somalii od 2007 roku posiadającej autoryzację Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ. Operacji, która choć w ostatnich latach krytykowana przez pozarządową organizację Human Rights Watch za łamanie praw człowieka przejęła kontrolę nad znaczną częścią środkowej i południowej części Somalii. W artykule wskazano również ramy prawne, w oparciu o które opisywana pomoc pokojowa może być udzielana. W przypadku UE - Globalną Strategię na Rzecz Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej (2016) oraz Strategię dla Rogu Afryki (2011). W przypadku USA - Nową Strategię Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Stanów Zjednoczonych ogłoszoną przez prezydenta D. Trumpa w grudniu 2017r. Artykuł odnosi się również do rosnącej obecności Chin w tym rejonie Afryki wyraźnie widocznej przez otwarcie w lipcu 2017 roku pierwszej chińskiej zagranicznej bazy wojskowej w sąsiadującym z Somalią kraju - Dżibuti.Analiza bieżącej działalności AMISOM oraz aktywnych obecnie misji Europejskiej Służby Działań Zewnętrznych w Somalii: European Union Naval Force ATALANTA (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Somalia), European Union Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) czy European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Somalia) doprowadziła do kilku istotnych wniosków:rywale handlowi zabiegający o wpływy w Afryce - UE, Chiny, USA - potrafią w razie potrzeby współpracować dla dobra swoich interesów i krajów Rogu Afryki, w tym Somalii,poziom bezpieczeństwa i demokracji w Somalii w ostatniej dekadzie znacznie wzrósł a zagrożenie piractwem zdecydowanie zmalało w rejonie Zatoki Adeńskiej, Morza Czerwonego i Oceanu Indyjskiego w efekcie działań podejmowanych przez AMISOM, międzynarodowe siły zadaniowe, misje pokojowe UE oraz pomoc poszczególnych państw. Osiągnięty poziom bezpieczeństwa jest jednak bardzo kruchy i po zakończeniu wspierających działań międzynarodowej społeczności może łatwo powrócić do stanu poprzedniego,w najbliższych kilku latach zagraniczne misje pokojowe działające od wielu lat w Somalii będą kontynuowane z tendencją do ich ograniczania,zadania misji pokojowej Unii Afrykańskiej AMISOM, która jest stopniowo ograniczana i formalnie planuje się jej zakończenie w 2020r., zostaną przejęte przez zreformowane Narodowe Siły Zbrojne Somalii,wątpliwym jest by w ciągu najbliższych 2 lat struktury bezpieczeństwa Somalijskiej Republiki Federalnej były w pełni samodzielne i mogły przejąć w pełni zadania AMISOM oraz zapewnić krajowi bezpieczeństwo,do osiągnięcia pełnego bezpieczeństwa oraz zachowania stabilizacji politycznej w Somalii potrzebna jest nie tylko doraźna pomoc wojskowa i humanitarna ale tzw. praca od podstaw;Słowa kluczowe: Somalia, Róg Afryki, piractwo, Al-Shabaab, bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, bezpieczeństwo morskie, operacje pokojowe, terroryzm; ; Розташований в північно-східній частині африканського континенту Африканський Ріг, який охоплює розміщені на Сомалійському півострові Ефіопію, Сомалі, Еритрею, Джибуті, є одним з регіонів в цій частині світу, який належить до найбільш постраждалих від стихійних лих, убогості, голоду, конфліктів і злочинності. Цей регіон через своє географічне розташування на стику Червоного моря, Індійського океану і Аденської затоки, а також через близькість до Аравійського півострова є стратегічно важливим місцем з економічної та військової точки зору. З огляду на це даний регіон знаходився і продовжує знаходитися в зоні уваги світових держав. Предметом дослідження даної статті є неспроможна держава – Сомалі, яка через своє географічне положення, високий рівень нестабільності, громадянську війну, проблеми голоду і морського піратства та діяльність терористичних груп на своїй території була обрана в якості прикладу, що ілюструє складну політичну ситуацію в районі Африканського Рогу і демонструє зусилля щодо економічних впливів в Африці конкуруючих між собою Європейського Союзу, Китаю та Сполучених Штатів, спрямованих на стабілізацію ситуації в даному регіоні.Метою даного аналізу, який ґрунтується на основі первинних джерел, спеціалізованої літератури і повідомлень засобів масової інформації, є представлення найбільш важливих аспектів діяльності провідних міжнародних гравців, спрямованих на підвищення рівня безпеки в Сомалі та навколишніх водах і зміцнення федерального уряду Сомалі та його безпекових структур. Представлено також сучасний стан національних збройних сил Сомалі та плани їх реструктуризації на найближчі роки. Аналізуючи названі вище проблеми, не залишено без уваги участь Африканського Союзу у формі миротворчої операції AMISOM, яка проводиться з 2007 року відповідно до рішення Ради Безпеки ООН. Операції, яка в останні роки зазнала критики з боку неурядової організації Human Rights Watch через порушення прав людини, дала змогу взяти під контроль більшу частину центральної та південної частини Сомалі. У статті також вказується правова база, на підставі якої може бути надана описана допомога по встановленні миру. З боку ЄС це Глобальна стратегія зовнішньої політики і політики безпеки Європейського Союзу (2016) та Стратегія Африканського Рогу (2011). З боку США – Стратегія нової національної безпеки Сполучених Штатів, оголошена президентом Д. Трампом у грудні 2017 року. У статті також йдеться про зростаючу присутність Китаю в цьому регіоні Африки, що чітко видно через розміщення в липні 2017 року першої іноземної військової бази Китаю в сусідній з Сомалі країні – Джібуті.Аналіз поточної діяльності AMISOM та місій Європейської служби зовнішньої діяльності в Сомалі: European Union Naval Force ATALANTA (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Somalia), European Union Training Mission (EUTM Somalia) та European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Somalia) дав змогу зробити такі важливі висновки:• конкуренти, які прагнуть впливати на торгівлю в Африці – ЄС, Китай, Сполучені Штати Америки за необхідності можуть працювати разом на благо своїх інтересів і країн Африканського Рогу, включаючи Сомалі;• рівень безпеки і демократії в Сомалі за останнє десятиліття суттєво зріс, а загрози піратства в Аденській затоці, Червоному морі та Індійському океані значно зменшилися в результаті заходів, вжитих AMISOM, міжнародної цільової групи, миротворчих місій ЄС і допомоги окремих країн. Однак досягнутий рівень безпеки є дуже крихким і після завершення підтримуючої діяльності міжнародного співтовариства ситуація може легко повернутися до попереднього стану;• іноземні миротворчі місії, що діяли протягом багатьох років в Сомалі, будуть продовжені протягом наступних декількох років з тенденцію до їх обмеження;• завдання миротворчої місії Африканського Союзу АМІСОМ, яка поступово згортається і має бути офіційно завершена в 2020 році, будуть перейняті реформованими Національними збройними силами Сомалі;• викликає сумніви те, що в найближчі два роки безпекові структури Федеративної Республіки Сомалі стануть повністю незалежними і будуть здатними взяти на себе повністю завдання АМІСОМ і забезпечити країні безпеку;• для досягнення повної безпеки та збереження політичної стабільності в Сомалі необхідна не тільки екстрена військова та гуманітарна допомога, але так звана робота з початків.Ключові слова: Сомалі, Африканський Ріг, піратство, Аль-Шабааб, міжнародна безпека, безпека на морі, миротворчі операції, тероризм.
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Several European governments are considering the offshoring of illegal immigrants, including the British government. Can it be undertaken without breaking international and domestic law? Is it an effective answer to calls to curb illegal migration? The Israeli's tested offshoring in 2013 when they sent illegal migrants to Rwanda. Five years later, they closed the program because Rwanda failed to observe the terms of the agreement. Italy has announced a plan to offshore migrant processing centers to Albania, Germany has tightened its borders and Denmark has signed an agreement, similar to that in the United Kingdom (UK) to send illegal migrants to Rwanda. As the UK's Rwanda bill approaches its final stage in the legislative process, will it solve the problem it sets out to or set a dangerous precedent for the rest of Europe?Illegal immigration is one of five key concerns to the British electorate. The UK's Office for National Statistics reported net migration was 672,000 between 2022 and June 2023, slightly up from 607,000 over the same period a year earlier. Among these total numbers, most of whom arrive at ports of entry, asylum seekers arriving in small boats – rubber dinghies and kayaks - across the English Channel have alarmed UK citizens. According to the Migration Observatory latest report, 46,000 people were detected crossing the channel in small boats in 2022 and in the first half of 2023 the number was approximately 11,500, a decline of 10 percent compared to the first half of 2022. Historically, numbers rise in the second half of the year due to better weather. The flood of illegal migrants coming ashore became intolerable due to the risk of drowning and has become a political flashpoint in the country.In 2022, then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson proposed to offshore illegal immigrants to Rwanda. He entered a Migration and Economic Development Partnership (MEDP) with Rwandan President Kagame recorded in a Memorandum of Understanding and two diplomatic notes. However, both the United Nations and Human Rights Watch had reported on the Rwanda government's systemic use of torture while in police custody, use of child soldiers, and repression of political opponents. Their evidence showed that Rwanda was not a safe country for those seeking asylum or protection, and the uproar in Britain was thunderous. Consequently, offshoring was put on a back burner.Upon becoming Prime Minister in October 2022, Rishi Sunak declared that he would "stop the boats" by creating an effective deterrent policy. Upon becoming Prime Minister in October 2022, Rishi Sunak declared that he would "stop the boats" by creating an effective deterrent policy. He would resurrect the controversial offshore to Rwanda policy. In the government's opinion, this was the only deterrence which would effectively reduce illegal migration by cautioning both those who sought to cross the English Channel and those who overstayed their study or work visas. Sunak reached an agreement with French President Macron to reduce if not stop illegal cross Channel migration by beefing up patrols along the French coast and deploying both French and UK coast guards to turn the boats back to France. The agreement succeeded in reducing the number of Channel crossings by one-third. But that was still too many for a government facing strong opposition to its immigration policy as the 2024 general election approaches. This remains a contentious issue in British politics and a focus of the Conservative government, which faces staunch opposition and pressure to deliver at the same time It was recently reported those who had arrived and sought asylum were housed in hotels at a cost of GBP 8 million per day, and the average wait for a court hearing was 48 weeks. Many asylum seekers never appeared at their court date. Critics claimed that their presence resulted in lower wages and foreigners taking British jobs. A September survey by Ipsos/British Future found that 79 percent of UK voters, including 74% of Conservative supporters believe that their government was doing a "bad job" on immigration. The government proposed a number of measures to combat illegal immigration. They restricted visa rules by raising minimum salary requirements for foreign skilled workers (except for health and social workers), increasing in the annual immigration health surcharge, raising the minimum income for family visas, reducing employers' capacity to sponsor visas, and appointing 150 additional immigration judges to hear the backlog of 600,000 asylum cases. However, none of these measures created a startling deterrence. Sunak therefore brushed up Johnson's Rwanda offshore policy. It met immediate opposition from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) which declared the policy of sending asylum seekers to Rwanda was contrary to both EU and International law. The bill was also challenged in the UK Court of Appeals and then in the UK Supreme Court where a unanimous decision on December 5 found that the bill was unlawful. It concluded "there are substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers would face a real risk of ill-treatment by reason of refoulement to their country of origin if they were removed to Rwanda." A panel of four judges concluded that Rwanda was neither safe, nor could it assure the British authorities that it would not force migrants to a neighboring country which would have no compunction about sending them back to the country from which they had earlier fled. Refoulement, or sending back to the abusing country, is forbidden under the International Refugee Convention of 1951. To meet the legal problems, the Home Office redrafted much of the original bill which Sunak presented to the country on December 6 in legislation, named the Safety of Rwanda Asylum and Immigration bill. The amended legislation commits the Rwandan government to send 'Relocated Individuals' only back to the UK, and nowhere else. That met the Supreme Courts principal objection. The revised bill also states that Rwanda is safe despite the government's own publication, Human Rights and Democracy Report published in July 2023 which found serious abuses to those opposing President Kagame. Human Rights Watch also identified human rights abuses in Rwanda in its World Report 2024 published shortly after the Emergency Legislation on January 11, 2024. To ensure safety, a Monitoring Committee will be created, whose members shall be "persons independent of both Parties." They shall ensure that the migrants are properly housed, receive medical attention and are safe. Furthermore, an enhanced Monitoring Committee will be established for the first three months from the date the migrants first arrive. A Joint Committee will also monitor and review the implementation of the agreement and make non-binding recommendations. Finally, asylum seekers will also be able to petition the UK government from Rwanda and have their petitions heard in a timely manner. These commitments should ensure that migrants from the UK are protected, and their legal rights are respected. The revisions met the legal objections to the original bill but create serious problems of implementation. Could the revised version effectively deter new migrants seeking to cross the English Channel? Conservative MPs from the back benches were the first to criticize the revisions. Sixty of them threatened to rebel against the Prime Minister. They pointed out that individual asylum seekers could still seek an asylum hearing before UK judges prior to boarding the chartered flights to Rwanda. The critics anticipated that migrants would concoct a spurious physical or mental reason by which they could not be sent to Rwanda. If denied, they would still have the right of appeal. Furthermore Rule 39 of the ECHR offers the possibility to request suspension of removal orders. While the UK has left the European Union, it remains a member of the Council of Europe and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the ECHR. The Conservative critics howled but, in the end, supported the bill in its third reading to avoid political disarray with a general election expected in 2024. Approved, the bill now goes to the House of Lords. Other European governments considering offshoring illegal immigrants will watch closely to see how the UK government implements its Rwanda Safety & Immigration bill. Offshoring migrants is controversial. Eight countries have offered to house illegal migrants, but only Rwanda offered to accept the UK's proposal. Significant resources, the amount so far unpublished, have been given to Kagame's government although no migrants have yet arrived. Kagame also has the right to send illegal migrants from Rwanda to the UK and several have already been sent. The Lords will seek time to consider the legal, financial, and practical elements of this bill. The legal issues need to be examined to satisfy both domestic and international courts. The government needs to publish its estimated costs of sending thousands of migrants to Rwanda and housing them appropriately. What are the estimated costs of the Monitoring and Joint committees? What is the cost of returning migrants to the UK should UK judges decide that they have a valid claim? Finally, if costs are reasonable and the content of the bill is legal, is it feasible? Will migrant smugglers advise their customers to immediately seek asylum upon disembarking on English beaches? Will the goal of deterrence prove to be illusory and the economic cost far higher?In order to meet the legal challenges, the government has created a bill that respects the law, but its practical outcome is questionable. Other European governments considering offshoring illegal immigrants will watch closely to see how the UK government implements its Rwanda Safety & Immigration bill. Does it create a real deterrence, and by what percentage does it reduce asylum seekers entering the UK? These questions will be raised not only in the House of Lords, but in European legislatures who are tempted to offshore thousands of men, women, and children seeking safety and a better life. This debate will continue to be vigorous and lengthy.
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Several European governments are considering the offshoring of illegal immigrants, including the British government. Can it be undertaken without breaking international and domestic law? Is it an effective answer to calls to curb illegal migration? The Israeli's tested offshoring in 2013 when they sent illegal migrants to Rwanda. Five years later, they closed the program because Rwanda failed to observe the terms of the agreement. Italy has announced a plan to offshore migrant processing centers to Albania, Germany has tightened its borders and Denmark has signed an agreement, similar to that in the United Kingdom (UK) to send illegal migrants to Rwanda. As the UK's Rwanda bill approaches its final stage in the legislative process, will it solve the problem it sets out to or set a dangerous precedent for the rest of Europe?Illegal immigration is one of five key concerns to the British electorate. The UK's Office for National Statistics reported net migration was 672,000 between 2022 and June 2023, slightly up from 607,000 over the same period a year earlier. Among these total numbers, most of whom arrive at ports of entry, asylum seekers arriving in small boats – rubber dinghies and kayaks - across the English Channel have alarmed UK citizens. According to the Migration Observatory latest report, 46,000 people were detected crossing the channel in small boats in 2022 and in the first half of 2023 the number was approximately 11,500, a decline of 10 percent compared to the first half of 2022. Historically, numbers rise in the second half of the year due to better weather. The flood of illegal migrants coming ashore became intolerable due to the risk of drowning and has become a political flashpoint in the country.In 2022, then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson proposed to offshore illegal immigrants to Rwanda. He entered a Migration and Economic Development Partnership (MEDP) with Rwandan President Kagame recorded in a Memorandum of Understanding and two diplomatic notes. However, both the United Nations and Human Rights Watch had reported on the Rwanda government's systemic use of torture while in police custody, use of child soldiers, and repression of political opponents. Their evidence showed that Rwanda was not a safe country for those seeking asylum or protection, and the uproar in Britain was thunderous. Consequently, offshoring was put on a back burner.Upon becoming Prime Minister in October 2022, Rishi Sunak declared that he would "stop the boats" by creating an effective deterrent policy. Upon becoming Prime Minister in October 2022, Rishi Sunak declared that he would "stop the boats" by creating an effective deterrent policy. He would resurrect the controversial offshore to Rwanda policy. In the government's opinion, this was the only deterrence which would effectively reduce illegal migration by cautioning both those who sought to cross the English Channel and those who overstayed their study or work visas. Sunak reached an agreement with French President Macron to reduce if not stop illegal cross Channel migration by beefing up patrols along the French coast and deploying both French and UK coast guards to turn the boats back to France. The agreement succeeded in reducing the number of Channel crossings by one-third. But that was still too many for a government facing strong opposition to its immigration policy as the 2024 general election approaches. This remains a contentious issue in British politics and a focus of the Conservative government, which faces staunch opposition and pressure to deliver at the same time It was recently reported those who had arrived and sought asylum were housed in hotels at a cost of GBP 8 million per day, and the average wait for a court hearing was 48 weeks. Many asylum seekers never appeared at their court date. Critics claimed that their presence resulted in lower wages and foreigners taking British jobs. A September survey by Ipsos/British Future found that 79 percent of UK voters, including 74% of Conservative supporters believe that their government was doing a "bad job" on immigration. The government proposed a number of measures to combat illegal immigration. They restricted visa rules by raising minimum salary requirements for foreign skilled workers (except for health and social workers), increasing in the annual immigration health surcharge, raising the minimum income for family visas, reducing employers' capacity to sponsor visas, and appointing 150 additional immigration judges to hear the backlog of 600,000 asylum cases. However, none of these measures created a startling deterrence. Sunak therefore brushed up Johnson's Rwanda offshore policy. It met immediate opposition from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) which declared the policy of sending asylum seekers to Rwanda was contrary to both EU and International law. The bill was also challenged in the UK Court of Appeals and then in the UK Supreme Court where a unanimous decision on December 5 found that the bill was unlawful. It concluded "there are substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers would face a real risk of ill-treatment by reason of refoulement to their country of origin if they were removed to Rwanda." A panel of four judges concluded that Rwanda was neither safe, nor could it assure the British authorities that it would not force migrants to a neighboring country which would have no compunction about sending them back to the country from which they had earlier fled. Refoulement, or sending back to the abusing country, is forbidden under the International Refugee Convention of 1951. To meet the legal problems, the Home Office redrafted much of the original bill which Sunak presented to the country on December 6 in legislation, named the Safety of Rwanda Asylum and Immigration bill. The amended legislation commits the Rwandan government to send 'Relocated Individuals' only back to the UK, and nowhere else. That met the Supreme Courts principal objection. The revised bill also states that Rwanda is safe despite the government's own publication, Human Rights and Democracy Report published in July 2023 which found serious abuses to those opposing President Kagame. Human Rights Watch also identified human rights abuses in Rwanda in its World Report 2024 published shortly after the Emergency Legislation on January 11, 2024. To ensure safety, a Monitoring Committee will be created, whose members shall be "persons independent of both Parties." They shall ensure that the migrants are properly housed, receive medical attention and are safe. Furthermore, an enhanced Monitoring Committee will be established for the first three months from the date the migrants first arrive. A Joint Committee will also monitor and review the implementation of the agreement and make non-binding recommendations. Finally, asylum seekers will also be able to petition the UK government from Rwanda and have their petitions heard in a timely manner. These commitments should ensure that migrants from the UK are protected, and their legal rights are respected. The revisions met the legal objections to the original bill but create serious problems of implementation. Could the revised version effectively deter new migrants seeking to cross the English Channel? Conservative MPs from the back benches were the first to criticize the revisions. Sixty of them threatened to rebel against the Prime Minister. They pointed out that individual asylum seekers could still seek an asylum hearing before UK judges prior to boarding the chartered flights to Rwanda. The critics anticipated that migrants would concoct a spurious physical or mental reason by which they could not be sent to Rwanda. If denied, they would still have the right of appeal. Furthermore Rule 39 of the ECHR offers the possibility to request suspension of removal orders. While the UK has left the European Union, it remains a member of the Council of Europe and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the ECHR. The Conservative critics howled but, in the end, supported the bill in its third reading to avoid political disarray with a general election expected in 2024. Approved, the bill now goes to the House of Lords. Other European governments considering offshoring illegal immigrants will watch closely to see how the UK government implements its Rwanda Safety & Immigration bill. Offshoring migrants is controversial. Eight countries have offered to house illegal migrants, but only Rwanda offered to accept the UK's proposal. Significant resources, the amount so far unpublished, have been given to Kagame's government although no migrants have yet arrived. Kagame also has the right to send illegal migrants from Rwanda to the UK and several have already been sent. The Lords will seek time to consider the legal, financial, and practical elements of this bill. The legal issues need to be examined to satisfy both domestic and international courts. The government needs to publish its estimated costs of sending thousands of migrants to Rwanda and housing them appropriately. What are the estimated costs of the Monitoring and Joint committees? What is the cost of returning migrants to the UK should UK judges decide that they have a valid claim? Finally, if costs are reasonable and the content of the bill is legal, is it feasible? Will migrant smugglers advise their customers to immediately seek asylum upon disembarking on English beaches? Will the goal of deterrence prove to be illusory and the economic cost far higher?In order to meet the legal challenges, the government has created a bill that respects the law, but its practical outcome is questionable. Other European governments considering offshoring illegal immigrants will watch closely to see how the UK government implements its Rwanda Safety & Immigration bill. Does it create a real deterrence, and by what percentage does it reduce asylum seekers entering the UK? These questions will be raised not only in the House of Lords, but in European legislatures who are tempted to offshore thousands of men, women, and children seeking safety and a better life. This debate will continue to be vigorous and lengthy.
Esta tesis doctoral investiga la imagen exterior de España proyectada en el periodismo turístico y de viajes desde 1970 hasta 2015. En el desarrollo de la investigación, se ha seleccionado y analizado de manera sistemática, exhaustiva y comparada uno de los principales medios representativos de ese tipo de periodismo a nivel internacional y que forma parte esencial de lo que han venido a llamarse "geografías populares", como son las revistas de contenido geográfico dirigidas al gran público. En este sentido, la investigación planteada no pretende ni desdeñar la importancia de otros medios representativos de este género periodístico, tales como las guías de viaje, sitios web o canales de televisión especializados, ni las interfaces tecnológicas en las que en un plano más general se desarrollan las geografías culturales (véase Aguilar, 2014, Kinsley, 2015). En concreto, la tesis centra su atención en las revistas que para el período considerado han tenido mayor alcance y difusión en los Estados Unidos, el Reino Unido y Francia, tres países de especial relevancia para la política y el mercado turísticos españoles. Para el caso estadounidense se estudia el National Geographic Traveler en comparación con su revista matriz, el National Geographic Magazine1, para el británico The Geographical Magazine y para el francés la revista GEO en su edición francesa. Estas revistas se denominarán en adelante de la siguiente forma: National Geographic Magazine como NGM, National Geographic Traveler como NGT y The Geographical Magazine como TGM (aunque en la actualidad se llama Geographical, en esta investigación el acrónimo se ha planteado a partir del nombre inicial). Finalmente, la revista francesa GEO será identificada sin acrónimo, es decir, como GEO. Las revistas de geografía popular, así como otros medios análogos, surgieron al amparo de la creciente generalización social del fenómeno turístico, contribuyendo poderosamente a modelar la imagen pública de la geografía en sus respectivos países y, de manera más amplia, la forma de percibir el mundo, sus culturas y paisajes por parte de sus numerosos lectores. La gran mayoría de las revistas de geografía popular se inspiran en buena parte en el modelo seguido por el NGM, el ejemplo más conocido y difundido, así como el principal referente internacional desde hace más de un siglo, tanto en el campo del fotoperiodismo, como en el de la divulgación científica de carácter geográfico. El NGM y NGT se publican en los Estados Unidos desde 1888 y 1984, respectivamente. Sendas revistas se editan por la National Geographic Society (en adelante, NGS), cuya sede se encuentra en Washington D.C. Por su parte, el TGM (que desde 1988 pasó a llamarse Geographical), se publica en el Reino Unido desde su fundación en 1935 y se encuentra amparado por la Royal Geographical Society (en adelante, RGS), cuya sede se localiza en el barrio londinense de Kensington. Por último, la versión francesa de GEO se crea en 1979, aunque esta publicación se funda en Alemania tres años antes. Al contrario que los casos anteriores, GEO no cuenta con el respaldo de ninguna sociedad geográfica francesa. La presente tesis doctoral analiza las imágenes y representaciones de España que se han transmitido a través de las revistas de geografía popular señaladas, todas ellas de periodicidad mensual o bimensual. El análisis se focaliza en la retórica textual y visual sobre España comunicada fundamentalmente a través de textos y fotografías, pero también de mapas y gráficos. En sintonía con otros trabajos previos sobre este tipo de publicaciones (por ejemplo, García Álvarez et al., 2013 y García Álvarez y Marías, 2013), este estudio se realiza con dos objetivos fundamentales. De un lado, para contribuir al conocimiento del periodismo turístico y de viajes, así como al enriquecimiento de la historia de la geografía de carácter popular o divulgativo. Esta última ha sido mucho menos estudiada tradicionalmente que la llamada geografía académica y, sin embargo, ha sido notablemente más influyente que la anterior en la conformación de la imagen púbica de la disciplina geográfica en ciertos aspectos y territorios. De otro lado, y tanto o más importante que el anterior, para ampliar el conocimiento de la imagen reciente de España y de los españoles en el extranjero, particularmente en los Estados Unidos, el Reino Unido y Francia. Esta es una cuestión sin duda relevante a la hora de considerar y comprender determinadas visiones y estereotipos con consecuencias significativas en los terrenos ideológico, cultural, económico, e incluso geopolítico. Asimismo, la imagen exterior, geográfica y viajera de un país no solo refleja las ideas, los intereses y las percepciones dominantes en cada momento, sino que también influye significativamente en las actitudes ejercidas sobre ese país en el exterior. La tesis doctoral indaga en los procesos de continuidad y ruptura de los imaginarios exteriores sobre España en las citadas revistas desde una perspectiva geográfica. Es decir, analizando la génesis, pervivencia y evolución de estereotipos acerca de los paisajes, tradiciones y tipos humanos españoles a través de la mirada del extranjero. Estos estereotipos que atraen el interés del visitante, cuanto más simplistas, han resultado más efectivos. Aunque no son falsos sino incompletos, los estereotipos pueden actuar como reclamos de la industria turística, pero también dar lugar a simplificaciones y distorsiones que, por lo general, estigmatizan o idealizan en exceso a una determinada sociedad. En el terreno aplicado, y en especial en relación con la política turística, este tipo de investigación puede ser importante porque el conocimiento de las imágenes, tanto negativas como positivas, que sobre España mantienen los medios extranjeros, posibilita generar nuevas estrategias de posicionamiento en los mercados, sin dejar por ello de respetar plenamente la proyección y divulgación de la cultura española y de revalorizar los atractivos turísticos del país. En definitiva, ampliar el estudio de las perspectivas desde las cuales se imagina y se percibe España desde el exterior incrementa la confianza del país en determinadas esferas, como el ámbito político y económico, así como posibles flujos de inversiones extranjeras. ; This Ph.D. dissertation studies the external image of Spain depicted in the touristic and travel journalism from 1970 to 2015. In the course of the research, one of the most representative examples of that kind of journalism internationally has been systematically, exhaustively, and comparatively analyzed. That is to say, the so-called "popular geographies" magazines, which mainly target a general audience. In this regard, this research does not intend to discard the undoubted relevance of other representative examples within this journalist genre, such as travel guides, websites, or television channels specialized in travels, nor does it with respect to other generalist interfaces developing or reinforcing the so-called "cultural geographies" (see Aguilar, 2014, Kinsley, 2015). More specifically, this doctoral thesis focuses on those far-reaching magazines with a great diffusion within the period considered in the USA, UK, and France, three countries of special relevance for the Spanish tourist market and policy. As for the USA, the National Geographic Traveler is studied in comparison to its parent 20 magazine, the National Geographic Magazine2, while The Geographical Magazine and GEO are respectively examined for the case of UK and France. Hereafter, these magazines will be referred as follows: National Geographic Magazine as NGM, National Geographic Traveler as NGT, and The Geographical Magazine as TGM (though its current name is Geographical, this study uses the acronym raised from the original name). Finally, the French magazine, GEO, will be identified without any acronym as GEO. The popular geographical magazines, as well as other similar mass media, emerged in the frame of an increasing socialization or democratization of the tourism phenomenon, contributing this way to shape the public image of Geography respectively in each country and, more broadly, influencing the way many readers view and understand the world, its cultures, and environments. The majority of the popular geographical magazines were largely inspired in the model followed by the NGM, the best known and most divulgated, as well as the most prominent international reference for more than a century, both in the field of photojournalism and in the scientific dissemination of geography. The NGM and the NGT have been published in the USA since 1888 and 1984 respectively to nowadays. Both magazines have always been edited by the National Geographic Society (henceforth, NGS), whose headquarters are based in Washington D.C. For its part, the TGM (which came to be called Geographical since 1988), has been published in the UK since its foundation in 1935 and is operating under the umbrella of the Royal Geographical Society (hereafter, RGS), whose headquarters are located in the London neighborhood of Kensington. Finally, the French version of GEO was created in 1979, although this magazine had already been launched in Germany three years before. Contrary to the previous cases, GEO has never had the support of any French geographical society. In this regard, this doctoral thesis examines the images and representations of Spain transmitted through the aforementioned popular geographical magazines, all of them with a monthly or bimonthly frequency. The analysis focuses on the textual and visual rhetoric on Spain transmitted through texts and pictures, but also through maps and graphics. In line with previous papers on this topic (for instance, García Álvarez et al., 2013 and García Álvarez and Marías, 2013), this study seeks to fulfill two main objectives. Firstly, contributing to gaining an understanding of tourism and travel journalism, as well as enriching the history of the popular geography. The latter has traditionally been much less studied than academic geography and, nonetheless, it has exerted a greater impact than the scholarly one on the public image of geography in some respects, societies, and territories. Secondly, and equally important than the first point, enhancing the knowledge of Spain and the Spaniards recent image in the USA, the UK and France. This is an undoubtedly important question to address when it comes to considering, and better understanding, certain views and stereotypes that greatly influence the ideological, cultural, economic, and even geopolitical realm. Additionally, the outer geographical and travel images of a given country not only reflect the dominant ideas, interests, and perceptions in a specific moment, but they also influence the attitudes and policies toward that country from abroad. This research also goes deep into the processes of rupture and continuity of the Spanish external imaginary. That is to say, analyzing the genesis, the continued existence, and the evolution of those stereotypes concerning the Spanish environments, traditions, and human types through foreign viewpoints. The simpler the stereotypes for attracting the visitor's interest are, the more effective they proved to be. Although not false, but incomplete, these stereotypes might operate as tourist appeals, but they might also lead to simplifications and distortions that excessively stigmatize or idealize a given society. Furthermore, in the applied field, and specially in relation to the tourist policy, this research could be important because an accurate knowledge of both the positive and negative images about Spain conveyed by foreign mass media enables to assess and design new positioning strategies within the markets. At the same time, while fully respecting the Spanish culture projection and outreach, it also might help to revalue the tourism attractions of the country. In summary, by broadening the scope of analysis of the foreign perspectives from where Spain is imagined and perceived this research could increase the country's confidence in the political and the economic realm, as well as to pave the way for attracting future fluxes of foreign investments. ; Programa de Doctorado en Humanidades por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ; Presidente: Nicolás Ortega Cantero.- Secretario: Guillermo Morales Matos.- Vocal: João Carlos Dos Santos García
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On September 19 and 20, the armed forces of Azerbaijan advanced on Nagorno-Karabakh, ending, within 24 hours, a so-called "frozen" conflict, the origins of which hearken back to 1988.[1] The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over this mountainous territory in 1992–94, and the subsequent stalemate, punctuated by several flashes of violence, led to over 30,000 casualties on both sides and the forced internal migration of over a million Azerbaijanis. The recent flight of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia has put additional stress on that country. While such conflicts rarely end quickly and neatly—it will take decades to tie up loose threads—there are already some lessons we can learn from the conflict.Lessons from the ConflictMultilateral efforts to resolve conflict are important. They conveyed to the leaders of the conflicting parties that the world and regional powers were watching and would hold them accountable. A negotiated resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was added to various governments' foreign policy goals. Regular visits to the conflicting parties served to discourage or delay any military planning. The groups of leaders and officials from the conflicting parties in Nagorno-Karabakh were relatively small and challenged with many issues at the same time, so whenever they had to deal with special negotiators from the U.S., Russia, France, and other countries, they had to put down what they were doing at the time.Michael Keays (far right) in Stepanakert/Khankendi, with U.S., Russian, and French peace process negotiators, September 1998.Image CreditThe interest and involvement of several countries in the region ensured that the conflict would not fade away and be forgotten; this is a feature of human behavior often referred to as "compassion fatigue." Consider the fact that, as of this article's publication, over 50 conflicts are currently active in the world—and that number doesn't consider non-state conflicts. Counting those, the number is well over 80. Most of these are in Africa, and coverage of them in the mainstream media is rare.[2] In the U.S., what should have been an obscure conflict occasionally received press coverage so that Americans beyond just the Armenian diaspora knew about it. Public interest tends to have an impact on whether governments make an issue a priority or not."Frozen" conflicts can flash at any moment. This is true especially if mediators are distracted. Back in the late 1990s, there was a view that someday, Azerbaijan would probably retake the Nagorno-Karabakh region by force with a modern, appropriately sized army purchased with oil money. This concern was allayed by the sense that the conflict would have to be resolved before oil from the region could get out to Western markets, something that seemed distant. That sense of distance fell apart when the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was opened in 2006.[3] Once the oil started flowing, Azerbaijan's financial situation improved, and, not surprisingly, the country started working on building up its military capabilities. Seventeen years later, it found itself in a position to try to retake Nagorno-Karabakh militarily. It helped that it not only had the means but had the space, in the sense that Russia and the U.S. were focused on Russia's brutal war against Ukraine. What was considered by many experts a "frozen" conflict suddenly became hot, and then ended even more suddenly. The military resolution of the situation also reminds us that seemingly endless conflicts can actually end. Nagorno-Karabakh has gone the way of Tamil Tiger-occupied Sri Lanka, a conflict which also appeared irresolvable until 2009.[4]Money talks, and who your friends are matters. Azerbaijan slowly built up its army with the intent of taking back Armenian-occupied areas surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and the region itself. Azerbaijan's defense spending grew dramatically starting in 2004, from $144 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2008. In January 2009, Azerbaijan claimed it would increase its defense spending to $2.3 billion. It could do that because its economy was growing at an unprecedented rate. Smart spending is as important as being able to outspend your opponent. While Azerbaijan's armed forces decreased in terms of personnel from 2007 to 2019, its quality increased significantly, primarily due to assistance received from Turkey and Israel, but also the U.S. Azerbaijan Armed Forces 2007[5] 2019[6]Army: 85,000 56,000Air Force: 8,000 8,500Navy: 2,000 2,500Total personnel: 95,000 67,000In a war of attrition, numbers are significant, but in this case, the capabilities edge on the Azerbaijan side—largely due to training, military exercises, and technological force multipliers—proved to be the winning factor, even as it was on the offense and had to fight uphill. Turkey has been heavily involved in the modernization of Azerbaijan's military since 1992, and it started providing Azerbaijan more robust professional military education and access to joint training and exercises in 2010.[7] Israel also played a key role in Azerbaijan's military modernization. In 2012, Azerbaijan purchased $1.6 billion worth of weapons from Israeli Aerospace Industries, an additional $5 billion worth of weapons in 2016, and another $127 million worth of weapons in 2017.[8] Most of the purchases consisted of unmanned aircraft and satellite technology to improve battlespace awareness for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. All of this proved critical to Azerbaijan's victories on the battlefield in the fall of 2020, and then its retaking of Nagorno-Karabakh in September of this year. This also revealed the substantial weakness of Nagorno-Karabakh's defense forces and Armenia's political and logistical ties. Russia, Iran, and the worldwide Armenian diaspora—Armenia's allies and supporters and, through it, supporters of Nagorno-Karabakh—proved incapable of defending those trying to tear the region away from Azerbaijan. The wealth and generosity of your allies matter, and in this case, Azerbaijan had the better, more capable allies. President Ilham Aliyev has demonstrated that he is not as weak as observers once worried he was after the 2003 death of his father, Heydar Aliyev. Azerbaijan's security and negotiating position are much improved now.Occupying another country's land is costly and usually ends badly. Armenia had external support from its wealthy and politically influential diasporas located in the U.S. and France, among other places. These communities did a lot to keep up the dream of an independent so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic ("Artsakh," according to Armenians) alive—even at one point by financing the construction of an impressive highway linking Yerevan with Stepanakert/Khankendi—but enthusiasm, the leveraging of sympathetic politicians in important countries, and money to build roads and churches rarely change the conditions on the ground that matter in warfare. In fact, these factors can intensify the desire of refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homeland, and push for the chance to do so. Immediate LessonsBeyond the key takeaways above, we should consider three more ideas as we reflect on Azerbaijan's recent military operation in its Nagorno-Karabakh region.First, this is an opportunity for the U.S. and allies to reach out to Armenia to help it to process what just happened and support the displaced. Russia and its peacekeepers standing between the Azerbaijanis and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians clearly failed to stop Azerbaijan's offensive. Russia and Iran are increasingly becoming pariah states, given their aggression against Ukraine and Israel, respectively. They are on self-defeating trajectories. Armenia should be encouraged to further orient itself westward.Second, the inaction of Russia's peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani forces advanced might suggest to outside observers that Russia is distracted and stretched to the limits by Ukraine. In other words, Russia's ongoing occupation of parts of Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and its troops in Transnistria without the government of Moldova's consent, while long-standing, might be worth pushing against, as Russia may not be as strong as we have long believed. At least it could be perceived that way after what just transpired in Azerbaijan. This bears further analysis. In the meantime, if the U.S. and other Western countries have not yet done so, they might consider cautioning the Moldovans and Georgians not to test Russian resolve, given Mr. Putin's likely, unpredictable, and escalatory reaction to a testing of perceived Russian vulnerability. And the U.S. and others should keep an eye on Transnistria and the occupied territories Russia has been expanding in Georgia. Several recent and upcoming events concerning Moldova could provoke incidents, including the November 5 local elections, the potential parliamentary approval of Moldova's National Security Strategy (which lists Russia as its main external threat), the EU's decision about whether formal accession talks with Moldova can begin, and the renewal or expiration of the OSCE mandate in Moldova by the end of the year. It is worth remembering that Moldova is neither a member of NATO nor the EU and is not far from the Ukrainian port city of Odesa. Russia has been repeatedly targeting Odesa with missiles and drones, possibly as part of a larger effort to take Ukraine's entire Black Sea coast and link Russia up with Transnistria to Ukraine's west.Third, if the U.S. and its allies and partners have not yet done so, they should make it clear to Azerbaijan that they will be watching them in the post-conflict period. As the saying goes, they should "trust but verify." They should also warn Azerbaijan not to take military action to establish a land bridge between Azerbaijan proper and the exclave of Nakhchevan, an act which would require the seizure of Armenian territory.Michael C. Keays is a senior diplomatic fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center. While the author is on detail from the State Department to the Kennan Institute, the views are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government or the Wilson Center.[1] Vladimir Solovyov, "Azerbaijani Control of Nagorno-Karabakh Will Not Stop Conflict in the South Caucasus," Carnegie Politika, September 28, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90655[2] Anna Marie Obermeier and Siri Aas Rustad, Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2022 (Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2023), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/conflict-trends-global-overview-1946-2022#:~:text=Despite%20the%20increase%20in%20battle,in%2038%20conflict%2Daffected%20countries[3] bp Azerbaijan (website), "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline," https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/pipelines/btc.html[4] Jayshree Bajoria, "The Sri Lankan Conflict," Council on Foreign Relations, updated May 18, 2009, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sri-lankan-conflict[5] GlobalSecurity.org (website), "Azerbaijan—Introduction," https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/azerbaijan/intro.htm[6] Edward J. Erickson, "The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art?" Military Review, August 2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2021-OLE/Erickson/[7] Haldun Yalçınkaya, "Turkey's Overlooked Role in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War," GMF (German Marshall Fund), January 21, 2021, https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkeys-overlooked-role-second-nagorno-karabakh-war[8] Erickson, "The 44-Day War."
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Poland's opposition parties secured victory in the elections of October 2023, putting an end to the eight-year national-populist experiment led by the Law and Justice party (PiS). The incoming government, headed by former President of the European Council Donald Tusk, is expected to carry significant weight within the European Union and re-evaluate recent Polish alliances. However, the capacity of the new government to roll back backsliding measures, particularly regarding the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal and other judicial bodies, remains uncertain. A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of national populism. Far-right national populism currently holds power in Italy and Hungary, co-rules in Finland, and provides governmental support in Sweden. At the same time, it stands as the most popular political force in France and the option that won most votes in the recent Dutch elections. Leading democracy indexes confirm a decline in democratic quality, driven by the rapid ascent of national populism in Europe and beyond. The once celebrated waves of democratisation, as conceptualised by Samuel Huntington, appear to have given way to autocratic waves fuelled by people's resentment and anger arising from the crises within capitalist society, as articulated by Michael Sandel. Yet constitutional-democratic resurgences and resistances have countered these recent disruptive dynamics. In Poland, three opposition parties – the Civic Platform (PO) led by Donald Tusk, in cooperation with the party coalitions the Third Way and the Left – have secured enough seats in the Sejm (the Polish lower house and main legislative body) to replace the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party and bring an end to its eight-year-long national-populist experiment. Since its surprise win in 2015, PiS has capitalised on solid economic development to implement significant social transfers to more deprived segments of Polish society. These populist policies played a crucial role in its electoral success, leading to PiS's re-election in 2019 with the highest support in post-communist history. Under Jarosław Kaczyński's firm leadership, Law and Justice has championed a right-wing nationalist-conservative and religious-populist agenda with authoritarian undertones. PiS coupled its social policies with backsliding strategies, launching persistent attacks on the independence of the judiciary, gaining control over public media, and seeking influence over private outlets. The party engaged in a contentious conflict with the European Commission over the rule of law. Furthermore, the party's stance was reinforced by religious conservatism, emphasising criticism against Poles who "deviated" from the Catholic-nationalist mission advocated by the PiS government. Led by Kaczyński, who avoids travelling outside Poland and refrains from praising anything un-Polish, Law and Justice acted without clear foreign policy goals, heavily relying on two key partners in its external politics: Donald Trump in the United States and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. This approach suffered a setback when the US populist lost the 2020 elections, and Putin decided to invade Ukraine in February 2022. Confronted with the prospect of losing cheap energy from Russia, Orbán aligned himself with Putin, resulting in a freeze in the traditional Polish-Hungarian friendship and leaving the pro-Ukraine PiS without a key regional partner. Several factors contributed to the end of the PiS government in Poland. One crucial factor was the 2020 abortion verdict of the contested Constitutional Tribunal, which, by tightening the already strict abortion law, triggered the widely acclaimed "black protest" against the "Teheranisation" of Poland. Millions of women and younger Poles took to the streets in protest. Consequently, despite riding a wave of economic euphoria with stable support above 40% until then, PiS lost a quarter of its electoral backing in the polls. This decline was confirmed in the October 2023 elections, where women and younger voters turned out in large numbers at the polling stations and voted against PiS. Other internal factors played a role, including a smear campaign against Tusk aimed at polarising society and a "fixed" debate on public television with moderators praising the PiS party, both of which ultimately backfired. Additionally, EU politics undeniably influenced the electoral outcome. The ongoing rule of law conflict with the European Commission hampered PiS's efforts to unlock most of the EU funding frozen since 2020 when the EU linked the defence of its values with financial conditionality. Polls conducted after the elections indicated that European financial support was crucial for Polish voters, and leading PiS politicians confirmed that its absence contributed to their electoral defeat. The new government, led by Donald Tusk, is expected to bring notable changes to Polish external politics within the EU. With Tusk's experience as the former president of the European Council, Poland has a seasoned player at the helm. Since Tusk's last term as prime minister (2007-2014), Poland has made significant strides, earning the title of the EU's "growth champion". Tusk is likely to focus on revitalising the "Weimar Triangle" with Germany and France. This tripartite cooperation had previously faced challenges due to Poland's asymmetrical position, but under Tusk's leadership, there may be efforts to strengthen and harmonise relations within this framework. The Visegrad Group (V4), consisting of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, will likely freeze any substantive agenda. Founded in 1991 to serve European integration and act as a counterweight to a dominant West-EU axis, it has barely functioned recently. The protest against the migration quotas during the 2015 "migration crisis" was one of the few exceptions. Since Tusk's victory, the V4 countries sit on a spectrum ranging from pro-EU to Eurosceptic. Poland is now notably pro-EU, followed by the Czech Republic led by Prime Minister Petr Fiala from the mildly Eurosceptic Civic Democratic Party. Slovakia takes a leftist-populist stance under the leadership of Prime Minister Robert Fico, from the Direction-Social Democracy party (Smer). At the far end of the spectrum, Viktor Orbán stands out as a right-wing populist systematically undermining fundamental European principles and policies. The connections between most of those leaders are well-established. Tusk and Orbán, who once shared a liberal political background and openly celebrated their friendship, had a close connection that extended to playing football together. As a gesture of camaraderie, Tusk invited Orbán to the opening game of Euro 2012 in Warsaw. However, a notable divergence occurred in 2015 when PiS aligned itself with Orbán's illiberal stance. This alliance prompted Tusk to distance himself from the Hungarian leader. In a similar vein, the recently re-elected Robert Fico made a diplomatic gesture by attending a football match with Orbán in 2012, aimed at improving Slovakian- Hungarian relations, which suffer from unresolved issues concerning national minorities in both countries. At present, the two leaders are associated for similar reasons: they endorse Euroscepticism, advocate pro-Russian views, and oppose social liberalism and LGBTQ+ rights. However, despite their alignment in impeding EU influence and aid to Ukraine, the longstanding historical mistrust between Hungary and Slovakia could potentially act as an obstacle to deeper cooperation between the two states. Poland is poised to take a leading role in shaping the EU's agenda concerning Ukraine, aiming to strengthen strategic security ties with the Baltic states and Romania, all of which share borders with Ukraine or Russia. In the run-up to the 2023 election, in contrast to Romania, the PiS government did not endorse an EU solution for import quotas on Ukrainian grain. Under Tusk's leadership, and in response to Hungary's and Slovakia's anti-Ukrainian stance, Warsaw and Bucharest could potentially collaborate to develop a shared approach, emerging as a new focal point for Ukraine-related initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, Tusk's victory is anticipated to weaken the emerging "conservative" alliance in Europe, which had aligned PiS with far-right parties such as George Simion's Alliance for the Union of Romanians. The potential of the new government to reverse backsliding measures, particularly those related to the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal and other judicial bodies, remains uncertain. President Andrzej Duda is aligned with PiS, having received support from Jarosław Kaczyński to become president in 2015 and secure re-election in 2019. Duda retains veto powers in judicial affairs until 2025. The Commission's willingness to lift financial conditionality in this uncertain environment remains to be seen, despite assurances following Tusk's statements that funding would be granted before Christmas 2023. A critical challenge for Poland will arise from the shifting dynamics of the global situation. The 2024 US elections, marked by the global spectre of national populism represented by figures like Donald Trump, may compel local actors, including Poland, to adjust their policies regarding Ukraine as part of a broader "turn" in international affairs.
