Suchergebnisse

At less than three weeks away from the national election, an Obama victory, even if not inevitable, seems today quite likely. Political scientist Larry Sabato of the University of Virginia, in his on-line publication Crystal Ball, has now put Obama over the magic number of 270 electoral votes (50% plus 1 of all electoral votes), with potentially many more votes to be added from close races in several states. Barack Obama leads John McCain in the polls by ten points, and the McCain campaign is in disarray. It has stopped campaigning in some states (i.e. Michigan) and is trying to hold on to other states that traditionally vote Republican but are about to be lost for the first time in decades (Virginia, North Carolina). Barring a huge end-of-October surprise, this trend will firm up and determine the result in favor of Obama. Democrats are also poised to win a majority of seats in the Senate and House of Representatives. The so-called "coattails effect" of the presidential race on the congressional election is starting to worry Republicans, who are becoming very critical of John McCain's campaign. Considering that the electoral race was at a continuous dead heat in the last two months, it is worth discussing what has determined the steady rise of Obama in the polls. First and foremost, of course, was the financial crisis. The astounding institutional banking crisis that originated from the meltdown of the real estate market, the resulting credit crunch, have created an anxiety not seen since the Great Depression of 1930. Historically, the Democratic Party has a better reputation for salvaging the economy in times of crisis. In addition to the historical record, several political scientists, Alan Abramowitz from Emory and Larry Bartels from Princeton among others, have developed models based on the correlation between economic growth and presidential election results, and have found that when the economy is not growing in the second quarter of the election year, the party in power almost without exception loses the election. But just as important as the economic disarray has been the reaction of each candidate to that crisis, and the style of leadership that emerged from it. One week before the Wall Street debacle, McCain had said that" the fundamentals of the economy were strong". That unfortunate statement immediately gave an unequivocal ring of truth to Obama's claim that his opponent was "out of touch" with the realities of the country, and it will probably be remembered in history books as the critical turning point of this election. In the first debate, both candidates were cautious about the rescue plan (which had not yet been fully developed by the Treasury) and answered the questions on the economy as if little had changed. However, two days earlier, McCain had suspended his campaign and announced he was needed in Washington to "help solve the crisis". He had also demanded that the debate be cancelled because "times were too serious for that type of exchange". This was a gamble taken by his campaign and it backfired badly, as Obama (who also flew to Washington and attended the same meeting at the invitation of Bush) insisted that because times were difficult, the debate had become even more important and should take place: Americans were now paying attention to who should be the one to lead them out of this mess. Ultimately, McCain backed down and attended the debate, after no agreement on the Rescue Plan came out of that White House meeting. Although he did very well, was energetic and on message, his erratic pre-debate behavior worked against him by providing ammunition to the opposition, who were thereby able to portray him as unpredictable and over excitable, not the steady hand you would want at the helm of a nation in turmoil. Still, most experts and observers considered the first debate a draw, with both candidates passing their respective tests: Obama proving he was presidential enough to hold the office, and McCain reminding the public of his experience and dedication to the country. However, the polls showed most voters had chosen Obama as the winner. The second debate was in a town-hall meeting format, but with strict control of time and of the questioning. Veteran journalist Tom Brockaw moderated it with a strong hand, but the questions were lame and it was a lackluster performance on the part of everybody involved. However, the body language proved an asset to Obama, who listened respectfully, did not take any notes, and when needed, moved comfortably around the set to approach the public. On the other hand, McCain had a nervous restlessness about him that put him at a disadvantage; he kept going back to his corner to make notes on his opponent's comments and at a certain point referred to Obama as "that one" in what was perceived by many to be an expression of slight contempt. This was compounded by his aimless wondering around the set, at times having to be called on by Brockaw for blocking the moderator's teleprompter. In comparison, Obama looked very relaxed and cool, exuding that kind of calm and self-confidence that most people seem to be yearning for during these difficult times. It paid off, and his numbers started mounting dramatically on the next day. Even before that debate, the McCain campaign had thrown all self-restraint overboard and was using every trick in the book of negative campaigning. Thus, the name of William Ayres has become very widely known across the country, as a "domestic terrorist" who organized a bombing campaign of the Pentagon in the 60s, and as a "close associate to Barack Obama". Ayres was the founder of the Weather Underground movement, which protested against the Vietnam War four decades ago. Today he is a university professor and an educational reformer who has worked with many politicians (both Republican and Democrat) to change the educational system in Chicago. The more McCain slips in the poll numbers, the more we hear allusions to Obama's radical "associate", even if their contacts have been sporadic, that they met only a few years ago, and that Obama was eight years old when Ayres was a radical anti-war activist. McCain, however, did not bring this up in the face-to-face debate, perhaps for fear of opening the door to his own connection to Charles Keating, the convicted Savings and Loan scandal figure of the 1980s, whose investigation by regulators McCain had tried to suppress. McCain's vice-presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, on the other hand, has at every opportunity mentioned Ayres' name at her rallies, working her base up to frenzy to the point of violent threats, with some yelling "off with his (Obama's) head". For good measure, she added underhanded allusions to his "foreignness" (read: race) by saying for example: "He is not a man who sees America the way you and I see it." This decision to play the "guilt by association" game and to associate Obama with terrorism (of any kind) has led to a violent escalation in the rhetoric and has roused the base, but does not seem to be working with the independent voters, as poll after poll continues to show. On the contrary, it seems to have hurt McCain: at last weekend rallies he had to "correct" several of his own supporters who in their questions to him claimed Obama was an "Arab", a terrorist, a criminal. After one of such claims, McCain very determinedly took the microphone away from a woman and told her: "No, Ma'm, that is not true. He is a decent family man with whom I just happen to have disagreements on policy." Surely this disappointed the base, which has been led to believe differently. In all fairness to Senator McCain, he is not a racist; in fact, he is a very moderate, middle of the road Republican who has taken on his own party on matters of campaign finance reform and immigration. Why, then, is he playing this self-destructive game? The only logical answer is: out of desperation, as his numbers slip and several senior Republicans have turned against him. The constant chasing of the headlines, the constant spewing of "rapid responses and frantic emails" has resulted in an incoherent message to the detriment of his own personal appeal. Yesterday Bill Kristol, political analyst and commentator of impeccable conservative credentials, and editor of the Weekly Standard, in an op-ed column in the New York Times, called for McCain to fire his campaign staff, "set himself free" and run as the "cheerful, open and accessible candidate" he was in the past. He said it is the "strategic incoherence and operational incompetence of his staff that has made his campaign dysfunctional…and toxic." To this, McCain retorted that "even Bill Kristol had bought into the Obama line" and that he himself was "exactly where he wanted to be, with the whole media establishment against him." However, Republicans are starting to distance themselves from McCain, who they think is dragging the whole party down and will be responsible for loss of Senate and House Republican races, too. To compound his plight even more, yesterday a bipartisan ethics report by the state legislature of Alaska found Sarah Palin abused her power when she fired the Police Commissioner over a family vendetta against a state trooper (an affair already nicknamed "Troopergate" by the media). Voters seem to have tuned McCain out; it is no longer a question of message. It is a question of leadership, of calm amid the turmoil, of whom Americans want to answer the proverbial three-in-the-morning phone call that rings in the White House. Confronted with the angst and fury of John McCain, his impulsive change of course and mixed messages at a time of enormous economic uncertainty, voters are turning in larger numbers to Obama, who has remained unflustered in the face of nasty accusations. Composed, focused on the economy, he dismisses the violent rhetoric of his opponents, and prefers to focus on the difficulty of the times and on the specifics of his policy solutions. He has sharpened his message, spoken directly to the issues and remained a sea of calm amidst the turmoil, a source of optimism amidst the gloom and doom of the headlines. In the meantime, his campaign has registered hundreds of thousands of voters in many states that have traditionally voted Republican, and that today are surprisingly in play for the Democrats (namely Virginia, North Carolina). The McCain campaign is financially weaker and had to pull out of Michigan, where he was down eight points, in order to concentrate more resources in Florida, where the race is still tight, but where the economy has been severely hit by the real estate bust and by the reduction in tourism due to the credit crunch, all of which may favor Obama. In spite of the 270 electoral votes that put him over the top, with potentially many more votes to be added from close races in several states, an Obama win is still not assured. McCain is defending states that went for Bush in the last two elections and which he absolutely must win in order to have a slim chance at the whole, and therefore he can't be on the offense as much in other states. If Obama wins Indiana, Virginia and North Carolina, he will be the first non-Southerner Democrat to carry these states since John F. Kennedy. That explains the frustration of Republican Party stalwarts with McCain, his irresponsible choice of running mate and the unraveling of his campaign. Ironically, in the first debate McCain accused Obama of not knowing the difference between a tactic and a strategy. It actually seems it is McCain who has confused the two. Populism as a political tactic is common, but as the main strategy it is ineffective and harmful for the country. At times like this, when people are worried about their jobs, their pensions and their health care, the populist message of anger and division is not what the average voter is looking for. They are looking instead for some measure of optimism and reassurance. That is why they have turned to Obama. To win, the McCain campaign should stop playing the race–and-terrorism card, and instead bring up a concept which surprisingly has been all but ignored in this election: that of Washington being swept up by a "one-party rule", with Democrats controlling not only the White House but also Congress. No checks and balances, no limits on government in this country of Lockean traditions? That is a scenario that few Americans would look forward too, even in difficult times. It may win McCain more votes than destructive insinuations about his opponent. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

After months of rumours and speculations, on 6 December 2023, the Italian newspaper of record, the Corriere della Sera, broke the news that Rome had finally withdrawn from China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), via a note sent to Beijing three days earlier.[1] In the absence of an explicit request to withdraw before the end of December, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) instrumental to Italy's participation in the BRI would have automatically been renewed for another five years starting from March 2024.
Italy's subdued withdrawal from the BRI marked the epilogue of a long, laborious, yet ultimately successful diplomatic process that reflected a reassessment of its bilateral relations with China. The origins of this reassessment can be traced back to the government led by Mario Draghi between 2021 and 2022. In June 2021, during the first post-pandemic, post-Trump G7 Leaders' Summit in Carbis Bay, Draghi stated that his government would "examine […] carefully" the MoU.[2] Draghi's words reflected a deeper awareness of the broader implications of Beijing's assertiveness in international politics and a close alignment with the Biden administration in Rome. This shift also reflected the absence of tangible economic benefits from BRI membership for Italy, although this was also due to the devastating effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the designed trajectory of Sino-Italian economic relations.[3] Furthermore, the security-driven decision of the Draghi government to repeatedly exercise its "golden power" to veto Beijing's investments in Italy's strategic sectors contributed to shaping the MoU's outcome.[4]
This course correction in Rome's China policy survived the fall of the Draghi government in July 2022 and the victory of the centre-right coalition led by Giorgia Meloni and her Fratelli d'Italia (Brothers of Italy, FdI) party in the legislative elections of September that year. After all, Meloni and her party had consistently opposed the MoU with China from the very beginning, a decision arguably also linked to the perceived need to bolster the party's credentials as a reliable partner in the eyes of Washington – as in the case of the clear support for Ukraine well before the September electoral victory.Finding the right moment
Meloni and her government began publicly discussing the possibility of an Italian withdrawal from the BRI only in the spring of 2023.[5] Archival research in the years to come may provide an exhaustive explanation of the "when" and "how" of Italy's withdrawal. Nonetheless, it is possible to advance a few informed guesses at this stage. First, the protracted timeframe of the withdrawal likely reflected Italian diplomacy's efforts to defuse any potential blowback from China. Close to the December deadline, behind-the-scenes diplomacy was thus coupled with high-profile contacts between the two sides. In September, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani's visited China, while Meloni met with Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang at the annual G20 Summit in India.[6] The possibility of a Chinese blowback against Italy was not remote, given the damage that Rome's decision inflicted on the international image of the BRI, and Beijing's own penchant for implicit economic coercion.[7]
A second potential reason for the delay may have been the necessity to handle domestic opposition to the withdrawal. As late as October, an unnamed high-level figure within FdI lamented on the Corriere della Sera the "strong pressure" exerted on the Meloni government by "certain industrial sectors", as well as by "cultural environments", "universities", and "foundations" to remain in the BRI. The FdI politician claimed that pressure from these environments be evidence of Beijing's capacity to effectively "penetrate" the fabric of Italian society,[8] even though the entity of the pushback and above all a causal link with a possible influence operation from Beijing are difficult to assess. Another probable reason for the delayed withdrawal could have been the scheduling of the Third Belt and Road Forum in October, and Rome's desire to avoid any potential source of embarrassment for Beijing in the period leading up to the event.
Ultimately, the efforts of Italian diplomacy appear to have paid off, with no visible repercussions for Rome. As Dalia Parete noted, Chinese state and state-adjacent media, along with the country's tightly managed social media, have simply ignored news of the Italian withdrawal – a stark contrast with the wave of criticism against Rome that emerged on the same media in the summer.[9] In fact, just days before news of the withdrawal became public, Italy was even included among a small number of EU countries now granted a 15-day visa-free entry to China.[10]The rise and fall of the MoU
To fully understand the relevance and implications of Italy's withdrawal from the BRI, one should look back to how the decision to join was taken in the first place in 2019. Drawing from extensive interviews and detailed process-tracing analysis, Giulio Pugliese, Francesca Ghiretti and I argued that this was not simply a disruptive move imposed by the then-populist "yellow-green" coalition government between the Five Star Movement and the League, led by Giuseppe Conte.[11] The decision to join was coherent with the previous, under-the-radar deepening of bilateral relations pursued with China under the centre-left Renzi and Gentiloni governments between 2014 and 2018. Furthermore, BRI membership was pursued within the framework of the 2015 EU-China Connectivity Platform; it featured – unlike other EU member states – a public MoU; and it was ultimately aimed at bringing Chinese foreign direct investments (FDIs) to Italy at levels comparable to those of the other major Western European countries.
However, the yellow-green government's tendency to conceive foreign policy in terms of political marketing profoundly damaged domestic and international perceptions of the MoU. Engaged in a confrontation with the EU and its key member states on budgetary matters and migration policies, the Italian government made use of the "BRI brand to repackage the engagement with China pursued by its predecessors with the aim of signalling Italy's supposedly new-found freedom of action".[12] The yellow-green government was willing to leverage Italy's status as the first G7 member state joining the BRI vis-à-vis a Chinese government intensively concerned with its international image. Crucially, however, Rome failed to perceive the shifting ground both in Washington and Brussels by the time the MoU was signed. The China policy of the Trump administration had become more confrontational, while engagement with Beijing in Europe had become more circumspect.[13] This shift, in turn, exposed Rome to diplomatic isolation and intense criticism.The weight of Chinese and international politics
The same wider undercurrents of international politics that damaged Italy's standing following the MoU signature also eased the country's efforts in negotiating its exit from the BRI. China finds itself in a much more complex position in 2023 than at the end of the 2010s. Domestically, Beijing has been affected by weak economic growth after the country's post-pandemic "re-opening", with long-standing structural issues never fully addressed in the past – such as the bubble in the real estate market and the indebtedness of local governments, as well as the impact of a steep demographic decline – now in full sight. The regime has also experienced severe political instability given the purges of former Foreign Minister Qin Gang, former Minister of National Defence Li Shangfu, and the upper echelons of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force.[14]
In the international arena, China has faced the strengthening of transatlantic relations under the Biden presidency after the Trump shock – an alignment to which Beijing arguably contributed with its pro-Russian neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war.[15] Moreover, in recent months, relations with the EU and its member states have been further complicated by an emerging row on Chinese electric vehicle exports to the EU, and the Commission launching an anti-subsidy investigation targeting Beijing.[16] Simply put, the Xi administration has been busy halting the freefall in bilateral relations with the US after the crisis that followed then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visit to Taiwan in 2022, while at same time attempting to resort to well-honed wedge strategies targeting Washington's allies and the EU-US relationship. [17]
The scenario outlined above may explain why Italy appears to have avoided repercussions for leaving the BRI. While the ebbs and flows of the triangular US-EU-China relations severely penalised Italy at the time of its BRI accession, these very same dynamics facilitated Italy's withdrawal from the Chinese flagship initiative. Against this backdrop, it remains doubtful that Rome will be able to effectively relaunch its bilateral relations with Beijing through the previous "strategic partnership" framework – as the Italian government claims. Beijing's diplomatic course correction in relations with the EU in 2023 has certainly improved the "atmospherics" of the relationship. However, broader geo-economic trends will continue to pose powerful constraints. The downward trajectory of Chinese FDIs in the EU, coupled with the emergence of firmer screening mechanisms on said FDIs in Europe, and a looming confrontation over the future of the automotive industry between Beijing and Brussels, could stifle any attempt to achieve that qualitative shift in Sino-Italian relations that the BRI failed to bring about.Aurelio Insisa is Senior Asia Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Marco Galluzzo, "L'Italia è uscita dalla Via della Seta: la nota d'addio consegnata a Pechino", in Corriere della Sera, 3 December 2023, https://www.corriere.it/politica/23_dicembre_06/italia-uscita-via-seta-caed5644-9423-11ee-bf17-27011c9bfd8d.shtml.[2] Italian Government, G7 Summit: PM Draghi's Press Conference, 13 June 2021, https://www.sitiarcheologici.palazzochigi.it/www.governo.it/ottobre2022/www.governo.it/en/node/17346.html; Stefano Polli, "Al G7 Biden detta la linea della sfida occidentale alla Cina", in AffarInternazionali, 14 June 2021, https://www.affarinternazionali.it/archivio-affarinternazionali/?p=88523.[3] For instance, 2020 was supposed to be the Italy-China Year of Culture and Tourism, kickstarting a new wave of Chinese tourism in the country.[4] Giuseppe Fonte and Ella Cao, "Italy's PM Draghi Vetoes Technology Transfer to China", in Reuters, 7 June 2022, http://reut.rs/3zovesV; Michelangelo Cocco, "Quinto 'golden power' di Draghi contro Pechino: i brevetti di Robox non andranno in Cina", in Domani, 9 June 2022, https://www.editorialedomani.it/politica/mondo/tecnologia-mario-draghi-brevetti-cina-golden-power-shanghai-newsletter-weilai-sfjjuzik.[5] Carlo Marroni, "Italia-Cina, l'incognita della 'Via della Seta': il dossier scottante sul tavolo di Giorgia Meloni", in Il Sole 24 Ore, 19 May 2023, https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/italia-cina-incognita-via-seta-dossier-scottante-tavolo-giorgia-meloni-AESm9TVD.[6] Federico Maccioni, "Italian PM Meloni, China's Li Qiang Discuss Closer Ties at G20 Summit", in Reuters, 9 September 2023, http://reut.rs/45OR32f.[7] Charles Miller, "Explaining China's Strategy of Implicit Economic Coercion: Best Left Unsaid?", in Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5 (2022), p. 507-521, DOI 10.1080/10357718.2022.2061418.[8] Francesco Verderami, "Via della Seta, l'Italia dirà addio. La spinta Usa per uscire, ma la crisi internazionale allunga i tempi", in Corriere della Sera, 27 October 2023, https://www.corriere.it/politica/23_ottobre_27/via-seta-l-italia-dira-addio-spinta-usa-uscire-ma-crisi-internazionale-allunga-tempi-1eb06afa-74fd-11ee-aa09-fdc5b793a6b9.shtml.[9] Dalia Parete, "As Italy Exits BRI, Radio Silence", in China Media Project, 13 December 2023, https://chinamediaproject.org/?p=57824.[10] Ethan Wang and Joe Cash, "China Offers Visa-Free Entry for Citizens of France, Germany, Italy", in Reuters, 24 November 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china-offers-visa-free-entry-citizens-france-germany-italy-2023-11-24.[11] Giulio Pugliese, Francesca Ghiretti and Aurelio Insisa, "Italy's Embrace of the Belt and Road Initiative: Populist Foreign Policy and Political Marketing", in International Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 3 (May 2022), p. 1033-1051, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac039.[12] Ibid., p. 1036.[13] Thomas Wright, "Europe Change Its Mind on China", in Brookings Reports, July 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/?p=905229.[14] Katsuji Nakazawa, "Inside Xi Jinping's Great Military Purge", in Nikkei Asia, 5 October 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Analysis-Inside-Xi-Jinping-s-great-military-purge.[15] Nien-Chung Chang-Liao, "The Limits of Strategic Partnerships: Implications for China's Role in the Russia-Ukraine War", in Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2023), p. 226-247, DOI 10.1080/13523260.2023.2174702.[16] European Commission, Commission Launches Investigation on Subsidised Electric Cars from China, 4 October 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4752.[17] Timothy W. Crawford, The Power to Divide. Wedge Strategies in Great Power Competition, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2021.

Us political scientists found ourselves another
teaching tool courtesy of northwest Louisiana election results this past weekend
that, despite this being the runoff balloting, still haven't been decided for one
contest.

Caddo and Bossier Parishes mostly had these for
state and local elections settled last month, if not a couple of months earlier
during qualification, Still, a half-dozen relevant contests remained to be decided.
Almost all of them were.

The one race confined to Bossier saw Democrat
Julius Daby, for many years a fixture on the parish School Board, edge out political
neophyte Democrat Mary Giles to succeed his brother on the Police Jury. Only
415 people voted, under 10 percent of the district electorate, a proportion
only somewhat lower than the 17 percent parish-wide who participated. Clearly without
compelling top-level races at either the state or parish levels Bossier turnout
suffered, and the District 10 runoff drew even fewer because parish governance
seems less important to residents in an urban district within Bossier City.

Yet this outcome proved interesting, for when any
of the Darby clan run for office – four have been elected to posts on the Bossier
City Council, Police Jury, and School Board starting 40 years ago – not only have
they won, but also almost always without a runoff, much less battling to a close
finish. This outcome might signal the beginning of the end of the Darby dynasty
– almost no black elected officials in Bossier City, the parish, or school district
in history has been anything but a Darby – that has dominated black electoral
politics in the parish.

Bossier also had a slice of the Senate District 39
race, which proved almost anti-climactic. Despite his almost three decades in
elective office, including a stint as mayor of Shreveport, the mostly-Caddo
district saw the end of Democrat state Rep. Cedric Glover's
career, going out with a whimper. Perhaps not surprisingly Democrat state Rep. Sam Jenkins triumphed
as during the campaign, and especially in the runoff that Jenkins led into but into
which Glover barely squeaked by a Republican, it had become clear that party
activists were coalescing into Jenkins' corner. More unexpected was the thumping
of nearly 2:1 that Jenkins delivered.

In retrospect, Glover perhaps should have stayed
put, as he could have served another term before limits kicked in. Instead, his
seat now will be held by Democrat Joy
Walters, who in a close three-way contest in the general election first knocked
out a Caddo Parish commissioner, then in the runoff narrowly bested a Caddo Paish
School Board member. This victory was significant in that Walters relied less
on a traditional strategy of shoe leather and making the endorsement rounds
while utilizing more aggressively social and electronic media strategies.

There was no predicted or actual closeness to the
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education District 4 race. Republican Stacey Melerine, aided by the campaigning
nexus of GOP state Rep. (soon to take a state Senate seat) Alan Seabaugh,
handily defeated her Democrat opponent.

The two topline Caddo races were a different
story. Despite leading into the runoff with 46 percent of the vote and the
expectation that enough of the 19 percent of the third place-finishing white
Democrat would push him to victory in the runoff, Republican former Assessor
employee Brett Frazier, who is white, finished 233 votes behind Democrat
college professor Regina Webb, who is black, out of over 40,000 cast and turnout
10 points higher than in Bossier. Remarkably, she spent through the general
election plus a couple of weeks only a few thousand dollars with little in the
way of advertising other than push cards and yard signs, devoting most effort
to canvassing and phone banks, while Frazier spent much more.

Voter
demographics in the parish, that revealed whites with a bare plurality over
blacks, but with a history that whites were twice as likely to cross over to
voter for a black candidate over a white than blacks were to vote for a white
candidate against a black may have helped her pull it out. Yet what probably
helped her more was the high-profile sheriff's race between white Republican
lawyer John Nickelson and black
Democrat former Shreveport police chief and chief administrative officer Henry
Whitehorn.

It generated a lot of heat, sending turnout five
points better than statewide for statewide contests. Nickleson, endorsed by
outgoing GOP Sheriff Steve Prator, grabbed 45 percent of the vote in the general
election while other Republicans picked up 11 percent more. This suggested that
he could hold off Whitehorn in the runoff, who had 35 percent, especially if
the pattern
of blacks disproportionately not turning out in the general election replicated
in the runoff.

Which didn't appear to happen as dramatically in
the runoff. For now, with the results unofficial, Nickelson appears to have
lost out of 43,231 cast by one vote. More in-depth analysis can follow after
results become official on Nov. 27, but a surface look shows that, even as
about 3,000 fewer people voted in the runoff or a drop of 2.4 percent, among
the precincts with at least 70 percent black Democrats registered, turnout
increased around 1.5 percent – voters highly likely to vote for Whitehorn by the
general election trend.

If things stand as is, or if Nickelson flips a
couple of votes, then political scientists can be taken seriously by their
students when they cover material discussing the incentives for people to vote
when they say that a single person's vote could make the difference even in a
large constituency.

Structures, actors and processes make up the unifying thread of the diversity of themes specific work on the articles that make up this issue of the magazine. Several texts point to federalism as a structuring dimension of the Argentine state in its three jurisdictional levels and the tensions that arise between the level national jurisdictional and sub-national levels. Niembro, Aristimuño and Del Bello subject to scrutiny the effective scope of the federalization objective in income to the career of scientific and technological researcher at CONICET; prove the uneven achievement of the same and the risks of a return to academicism that marked moments precedents of the organism. Fernando Rubino compares two experiences of associativism intermunicipal in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires and its effectiveness as management tool. Piana and Patiño Jaramillo focus on the organizational structures of the Public Administration of the province of Buenos Aires during the government of María Eugenia Vidal (2015-19), highlight the contrast between the official privatization discourse, anti-political, downsizing of the state and cutting expenses, the reality of growth of the resources and responsibilities of the agencies taken into account and the increase in political positions without specific functional involvement. The effective validity of the policy glacier protection in the provinces of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego allows Ana Paula Lucero to identify and explain the tensions that arise between a federal political norm of universal application and the provincial interests derived from their specific endowment of resources and their own development strategies. The coupling between federal political institutions and processes and provincial regimes is explicit in the analysis of the electoral coalition building strategy of the UCR in the province of Santa Fe ahead of the 2019 elections, carried out by Ariadna Gallo and Carolina Pérez Roux. Since the 1980s, organizations of unemployed workers and residents of precarious communities have witnessed rapid growth in magnitude organizational, assertive effectiveness and formulation of public policy proposals; they relativized the formal quasi monopoly of the articulation of interests by political parties and the trade union movement, contributed to reformulate the conventional articulation between state and civil society. Julia Nesprias explores the evolution of the villero movement in the City of Buenos Aires in its articulation with the predominant institutional policies. The article by Maneiro and Núñez describes the process of struggle of the organizations of workers of the popular economy around the Social Emergency law of 2016, their strategies for building alliances with a wide range of society and the system political, in an institutional political environment of ruling neoliberalism. Finally Feldman and Girolimo analyze the promotion policies of Industry 4.0 in a context of accelerated technological change, taking as a reference the experiences recent developments in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil in digitization and automation of Productive processes; draw attention to the need for peripheral economies and the need to face these challenges so as not to deepen the existing gaps with respect to to the core countries. An analysis of political and administrative capacities is published in the Documents section of the state, from the perspective of the State and Public Administration Commission of the Homeland. This document is included as a contribution to the political-academic debate around the role of the public sector in promoting development with social equity. With this number the RPPP reaches its first decade of existence. In these ten years 150 articles and 42 reviews were accepted and published, of the more than 600 originals received. 69 articles published are by female authorship (46%), 68 by authorship masculine (45%) and 13 of authorship gender sharing; one sixth comes from authors affiliated with academic institutions abroad. The variety of your content, according to the breadth of its call and the wide field of analysis of the State and public policies, combines academic quality according to standards with the commitment to the substantive values that inspire and guide the National University of Lanús. ; Estructuras, actores y procesos conforman el hilo unificador de la diversidad de temas específicos trabajados por los artículos que integran el presente número de la revista. Varios textos apuntan al federalismo como dimensión estructurante del estado argentino en sus tres niveles jurisdiccionales y a las tensiones que se suscitan entre el nivel jurisdiccional nacional y los niveles subnacionales. Niembro, Aristimuño y Del Bello someten a escrutinio el efectivo alcance del objetivo de federalización en los ingresos a la carrera de investigador científico y tecnológico del CONICET; demuestran el desigual logro del mismo y los riesgos de un retorno al academicismo que signó momentos precedentes del organismo. Fernando Rubino compara dos experiencias de asociativismo intermunicipal en el Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires y su eficacia como herramienta de gestión. Piana y Patiño Jaramillo enfocan las estructuras organizativas de la Administración Pública de la provincia de Buenos Aires durante la gobernación de María Eugenia Vidal (2015-19), destacan el contraste entre el discurso oficial privatizador, antipolítico, de achicamiento del estado y recorte de gastos, la realidad de crecimiento de los recursos e incumbencias de los organismos tomados en cuenta y el incremento de los cargos políticos sin afectación funcional específica. La efectiva vigencia de la política nacional de protección de glaciares en las provincias de Santa Cruz y Tierra del Fuego permite a Ana Paula Lucero identificar y explicar las tensiones que se suscitan entre una norma política federal de aplicación universal y los intereses provinciales derivados de su dotación específica de recursos y sus propias estrategias de desarrollo. El complejo acople entre instituciones y procesos políticos federales y regímenes provinciales se explicita en el análisis de la estrategia de construcción de coaliciones electorales de la UCR en la provincia de Santa Fe de cara a los comicios de 2019, llevado a cabo por Ariadna Gallo y Carolina Pérez Roux. Desde la década de 1980, las organizaciones de trabajadores desocupados y habitantes de comunidades precarizadas han dado testimonio de un acelerado crecimiento en magnitud organizativa, eficacia reivindicativa y formulación de propuestas de política pública; relativizaron el cuasi monopolio formal de articulación de intereses por los partidos políticos y el movimiento sindical, contribuyeron a reformular la convencional articulación entre estado y sociedad civil. Julia Nesprias explora la evolución del movimiento villero en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires en su articulación con las políticas institucionales predominantes. El artículo de Maneiro y Núñez describe el proceso de lucha de las organizaciones de trabajadores de la economía popular en torno a la ley de Emergencia Social de 2016, sus estrategias de construcción de alianzas con un amplio arco de la sociedad y del sistema político, en un ambiente político institucional de neoliberalismo gobernante. Finalmente Feldman y Girolimo analizan las políticas de promoción de la industria 4.0 en un contexto de cambio tecnológico acelerado, tomando como referencia las experiencias recientes de México, Argentina y Brasil en digitalización y automatización de procesos productivos; llaman la atención sobre la necesidad de las economías periféricas y la necesidad de afrontar estos desafíos para no profundizar las brechas existentes respecto a los países centrales. En la sección Documentos se publica un análisis de las capacidades políticas y administrativas del estado, desde la perspectiva de la Comisión Estado y Administración Pública del Instituto Patria. Se incluye este documento como un aporte al debate político-académico en torno al rol del sector público en la promoción del desarrollo con equidad social. Con este número la RPPP alcanza su primera década de existencia. En estos diez años fueron aceptados y publicados 150 artículos y 42 reseñas, de los más de 600 originales recibidos. 69 artículos publicados son de autoría femenina (46%), 68 de autoría masculina (45%) y 13 de compartición autoral de género; una sexta parte proviene de autoras y autores afiliados a instituciones académicas del exterior. La variedad de su contenido, acorde a la amplitud de su convocatoria y al amplio campo de análisis del Estado y las políticas públicas, conjuga la calidad académica de acuerdo a los estándares convencionales con el compromiso a los valores sustantivos que inspiran y orientan a la Universidad Nacional de Lanús. Carlos Vilas.

Women's legal landmarks : an introduction / Erika Rackley and Rosemary Auchmuty -- Cyfraith Hywel (the laws of Hywel Dda), c. 940 / Carol Howells -- A vindication of the rights of woman, Mary Wollstonecraft, 1792 / Anna Jobe -- Gaols act 1823 / Ruth Lamont -- The Slave, Grace (1827) / Rosemary Auchmuty -- A brief summary of the most important laws concerning women, Barbara Leigh Smith Bodichon, 1854 / Joanne Conaghan -- Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 / Penelope Russell -- Married Women's Property Act 1882 / Andy Hayward -- First woman prospective parliamentary candidate, Helen Taylor, 1885 / Janet Smith -- Section 5(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 / Lois Bibbings -- Match women's strike, 1888 / Jacqueline Lane -- R v Jackson (1891) / Teresa Sutton -- A pageant of great women, Cicely Hamilton, 1909-12 / Katharine Cockin -- Representation of the People Act 1918 / Mari Takayanagi -- Maternity and Child Welfare Act 1918 / Hazel Biggs -- Article 7 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919 / Aoife O'Donoghue -- Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 / Mari Takayanagi -- First women justices of the peace, 1919 / Anne Logan -- First woman to be admitted to an inn of court, Helena Normanton, 1919 / Judith Bourne -- Committee on the Employment of Women on Police Duties, 1920 / Colin R Moore -- First woman law agent, Madge Easton Anderson, 1920 / Alison Lindsay -- Foundation of the Association of Women Solicitors, 1921 / Elizabeth Cruickshank -- First woman to practise as a barrister in Ireland and the (then) United Kingdom, Averil Deverell, 1921 / Liz Goldthorpe -- First woman solicitor in England and Wales, Carrie Morrison, 1922 / Elizabeth Cruickshank -- Matrimonial Causes Act 1923 / Penelope Russell -- First woman member of the Faculty of Advocates, Margaret Kidd, 1923 / Catriona Cairns -- First woman professor of law in Ireland, Frances Moran, 1925 / Emma Hutchinson -- DPP v Jonathan Cape and Leopold Hill (1928) / Caroline Derry -- Edwards v Attorney-General of Canada (1929) / Sarah Mercer -- Education Act 1944 / Harriet Samuels -- Family Allowances Act 1945 / Lucy Vickers -- British Nationality Act 1948 / Helen Kay and Rose Pipes -- Married Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act 1949 / Rosemary Auchmuty -- Life Peerages Act 1958 / Supuni Perera -- First woman to hold regular judicial office in England and Wales, Rose Heilbron, 1964 / Laura Lammasniemi -- Married Women's Property Act 1964 / Sharon Thompson -- First woman High Court judge in England and Wales, Elizabeth Lane, 1965 / Judith Bourne and Frances Burton -- Abortion Act 1967 / Nicky Priaulx and Natalie Jones -- National Health Service (Family Planning) Act 1967 / Leonora Onaran -- Dagenham car plant strike, 1968 / Dawn Watkins -- First woman professor of law in the United Kingdom, Claire Palley, 1970 / Fiona Cownie -- First women's refuge, 1971 / Felicity Kaganas -- Section 25 of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 / Anne Logan -- Sex Discrimination Act 1975 / Anne Morris -- First rape crisis centre, 1976 / Alison Diduck -- Section 4 of the Sexual Offences (amendment) Act 1976 / Clare McGlynn and Julia Downes -- Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 / Laura Binger and Helen Carr -- Davis v Johnson (1978) / Susan Edwards -- Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 / Máiréad Enright -- Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland (1980) / Rosemary Auchmuty -- Greenham Common women's peace camp, 1981-2000 / Elizabeth Woodcraft -- Gill and Coote v El Vino Co ltd (1982) / Anne Morris -- Women and the law, Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett, 1984 / Brenda Hale and Susan Atkins -- Warnock report, 1984 / Kirsty Horsey -- Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985 / Phyllis Livaha -- Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1985) / Emma Nottingham -- Grant v Edwards (1986) / Joanne Beswick -- Section 32 of the Finance Act 1988 / Ann Mumford -- First woman Court of Appeal judge in England and Wales, Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, 1988 / Dana Denis-Smith -- Section 5 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (amendment) Act 1990 / Susan Leahy -- First woman president of Ireland, Mary Robinson, 1990 / Leah Treanor -- Foundation of the Association of Women Barristers, 1991 / Frances Burton -- R v Ahluwalia (1992) / Siobhan Weare -- Feminist legal studies journal, 1993 / Rosemary Hunter -- Barclays Bank v O'brien (1993) / Sarah Greer -- Webb v Emo Air Cargo (UK) ltd (no 2) (1994) / Debra Morris -- First woman to lead a top 10 law firm in England and Wales, Lesley Macdonagh, 1995 / Steven Vaughan -- Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act 1995 / Laura Cahillane -- St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S (1998) / Kay Lalor, Anne Morris and Annapurna Waughray -- Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 / Sonia Kalsi -- Islam v Secretary of State for the Home Department, R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and another, ex parte Shah (1999) / Nora Honkala -- White v White (2000) / Jonathan Herring -- Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002 / Susan Atkins -- Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 / Nikki Godden-Rasul -- National Assembly for Wales Election, 2003 / Catrin Fflur Huws -- Mental Capacity Act 2005 / Rosie Harding -- UK ratification of the optional protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (OP-CEDAW), 2005 / Meghan Campbell -- Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 / Pragna Patel -- First woman attorney general for England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Patricia Scotland, 2007 / Linda Mulcahy -- Section 14 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 / F Vera-Grey -- Radmacher v Granatino (2010) / Marie Parker -- Concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture, recommendation to Iireland regarding the Magdalene Laundries, 2011 / Maeve O'Rourke -- Birmingham City Council v Abdulla (2012) / Harini Iyengar -- Electoral (amendment) (Political Funding) Act 2012 / Ivana Bacik -- Protection of Life during Pregnancy Act 2013 / Fiona de Londras -- R v Nimmo and Sorley (2014) / Kim Barker -- Bishops and Priests (Consecration and Ordination of Women) Measure 2014 and Canon c2, "of the consecration of bishops", 2014 / Miranda Threlfall-Holmes -- In the matter of an application for judicial review by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (2015) / Marie Fox and Sheelagh McGuiness -- Violence Against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015 / Olga Jurasz -- Section 2 of the Abusive Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 / Erika Rackley -- First woman president of the UK Supreme Court, Brenda Hale, 2017 / Erika Rackley -- Thirty-sixth amendment of the Irish constitution, 2018 / Fiona de Londras.

Moldova's election result has left incumbent President Maia Sandu damaged. An EU referendum delivered only a wafer-thin vote in favor of membership of the bloc. And in the first round of a presidential vote that Western commentators predicted Sandu might edge narrowly, she fell some way short of the 50% vote share she'd need to land a second presidential term. She will now face a unified group of opposition parties in the second round with her chances of remaining in office in the balance.Where did it all go wrong?Sandu's mistake was in making the Moldovan election about a binary choice between Europe and Russia. Even before the final votes were counted, Sandu was claiming widespread electoral fraud sponsored by pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor. Reports that pro-Russian groups paid voters to come out to vote are credible. If that achieved anything, it was to mobilize voters in Moldova naturally inclined to want ties with Russia, rather than flipping votes of pro-Europeans. With a 33% turnout needed to legitimize the plebiscite, a final roll of just 50% hinted at widespread voter apathy in Moldova. In a country where only 9% of the population identifies as ethnically Russian, an almost 50% vote against EU membership illustrates wider concerns that the government in Chisinau has not addressed domestic issues important to ordinary people. For example, many Moldovans are worried about the race to EU membership undermining small farmers and local traditions. Sandu's claims of interference must also be set against a concerted effort by Moldovan authorities to make it harder for Moldovan voters in Russia and breakaway Transnistria, to vote. A mere 10,000 ballot papers were sent to Russia, where the Moldovan population is thought to number over 150,000 people. The population of Transnistria is 367,000, but they were only allowed to vote in Moldova itself. (For the record, Moldova insists that Transnistria is part of Moldova.) Meanwhile, Shor's political party was banned and media channels linked to him closed down. In the end, the pro-European referendum passed with a tiny majority, made possible by a large number of pro-European votes by members of the Moldovan diaspora, who don't live in Russia.This will make it difficult for Sandu to claim a resounding endorsement of future EU membership. It will almost certainly stoke anti-EU sentiment in the Russia-backed breakaway Transnistria where a majority of the ethnically diverse population wants closer ties with Russia. Pro-Russian sentiment will also be fueled in the autonomous status of Gagauzia in the south, where 95% of voters did not choose a European future in the referendum. Of course, the Transnistria question, nor, to a lesser extent, that of Gagauzia, shouldn't necessarily create a bar on possible future EU membership by Moldova, as Cyprus has shown. But by making the referendum about ethno-nationalist politics, Sandu will have stimulated the secessionist tendencies there, making the process of EU integration more problematic. She also exposes herself to the accusation of letting Moldova become a geo-strategic test-tube for Western influence, something that Russia will undoubtedly look to exploit. European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen was in Chisinau shortly before the vote exhorting Moldovans to express their free choice. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte chose to weigh in with concerns about Russian efforts to derail Moldova's European future. These pronouncements are imbued with notions that Moldovan membership of the EU would stabilize Europe's eastern border and strengthen security against Russia. But that ignores the lessons of history. Those same arguments were used in Ukraine in 2014. Making the Moldovan election a zero sum tussle between Europe and Russia — rather than a vote about what ordinary Moldovans want to see happen domestically — risks making Moldova a new, much smaller, more economically vulnerable, version of Ukraine. And the critical point is that Sandu has yet to make the economic case that EU membership, rather than Moldova maintaining balanced relations with all countries, including Russia, will provide the boost that the country needs. A pro-European report from 2014 shows that significant economic benefits accrue to countries in anticipation of possible membership, but that EU membership won't necessarily benefit every new member, mentioning Greece. The reality is that annual economic growth in Moldova since the signing of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU in 2014 has been significantly lower, on average, than in the first 10 years of the Millennium. That anticipation effect has not yet been seen in Moldova.A key reason is that Moldova's trade with Russia has fallen sharply since the DCFTA was signed. Sandu talks about 65% of Moldovan exports going to Europe as a triumph. In fact, Moldova imports twice as much from Europe, stoking a stubborn current account deficit. To some extent, that has been offset by inflows of foreign investment into Moldova. But it is nevertheless clear that strengthened relations with Europe haven't been enough to make up for the cutting of trading relations with a country — Russia — that had previously been a key trading partner with Moldova. The other key reason is demographic. Moldova has the fastest shrinking population in the world. Over a quarter of Moldova's population have taken advantage of EU citizenship, by virtue of their entitlement to Romanian passports. That has led to an emptying of talent from Moldova as young, talented workers seek better pay elsewhere, mostly in Europe, but also in Russia. The economy would need to be growing at a brisker rate than it is to entice the most talented Moldovans back to their country. But, making Moldova the next frontier state for the West's battle with Russia will place a heavy drag on encouraging diaspora Moldovans to return.Moldova is a country that I am deeply fond of and have visited many times. As it happens, I have always considered that it is a country that would benefit from closer economic ties with Europe. I also believe that a politically stable and economically prosperous future for Moldova rests on that beautiful country maintaining close relations with Europe and with Russia. Maia Sandu may come to rue her failure to make this election about Moldova itself.

Telegrams exchanged between Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles and the following people: Mayors, Presidents of Municipal Committees for the National Revolutionary Party, private citizens, the Chamber of Senators, the Federation of small retail vendors of the Federal District, the Mexican Sports Party, Governors, the Teachers League of the Estado de México, the League of Agrarian Communities and Unions of Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, the League of small property owners from Tamaulipas, Students of the National Law School and his personal secretary, Soledad González. The aforementioned telegrams concern requests for information about the wattage needed to run a diathermy device; appreciation for information provided; information about private citizens' health status, requesting to expel Congressmen due to administrative mismanagement; requests for appointments; endorsement of Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles' revolutionary work; an invitation to the Festival hosted by the Mexican Sports Party, a request for helping to release a Congressman; information about the social peace in Chiapas; reply about taking care of a matter with the Secretary of the Interior; information about Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles' health status, thank-you messages for expressing concern about Gen. Calles' health; a notice indicating that pending matters will be solved when Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles gets well, suspension of appointments, apologies for not being able to attend some events; requesting information of private citizens' arrival; Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles' endorsement of Nazario S. Ortiz Garza, Governor of Coahuila for his administrative work; a request to ship some movies; support of the State Committee led by Carlos Darío Ojeda in Veracruz; report on the closure of the Eighth Convention of the League of Agrarian Communities and Peasants Union from Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas; confirming the registration of B.A. Severiano Herrera's mayoral nomination of Córdova, Veracruz; support of the decision to expel Guillermo Rodríguez and Francisco González from the Municipal Committee of the National Revolutionary Party in Coatzintla, Veracruz; report on the expenses incurred during the administration of Gen. Carlos Leal, Governor of Durango; information about the departure of the Governor of Baja California Sur, Luis S. Rodríguez to the capital city to inform Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles about administrative matters; requests for appointments; a notice indicating that Mr. Elliot Roosevelt' instructions have been taken into consideration; a request to receive some packages; a request to deliver a new remittance to the Chapultepec Factory; a request to do some shopping for Soledad González' nieces; requesting information about the existence of the commission granted to Vice-consul Hill, a request for information about the delivery of violets; a request for approval of the passing of a line that will carry electricity to El Riego, Puebla; confirmation of Rodolfo Elías Calles' trip, a petition demanding the support not to build a penitentiary close to the Cuernavaca City; information about the election conflict in Michoacán; a request for money wire; an invitation to the Pro-Acercamiento Nacional Assembly in Morelos; information about the inauguration of the Cruz Gálvez School Center; a request for financial assistance to students of the Mechanical and Electric Engineering school; information of election results in Cohauila. / Telegramas entre el Gral. PEC, Presidentes Municipales, Presidentes de Comités Municipales del Partido Nacional Revolucionario, particulares, Cámara de Senadores, Federación Agrupación de Comerciantes en Pequeño del Distrito Federal, Partido Deportista Mexicano, Gobernadores, Liga de Maestros del Estado de México, Liga de Comunidades Agrarias y Sindicatos de Ciudad Victoria, Tamps.; Liga de Poseedores en Pequeño de Tamaulipas, Estudiantes de la Facultad Nacional de Jurisprudencia y Secretaria Particular Soledad González, acerca de: solicitud de informe sobre voltaje de luz para utilización de aparato de diatermia, agradecimiento por informes, informes sobre estado de salud de particulares, solicitud de expulsión de diputados por malos manejos, solicitudes de audiencia, adhesiones al Gral. Calles por su labor revolucionaria, invitación al festival del Partido Deportista Mexicano, solicitud de ayuda para liberar a diputado, informe sobre paz social en Chiapas, contestación acerca de estar tratando asunto con Secretario de Gobernación, notificación sobre estado de salud del Gral. PEC, agradecimientos por mensajes enviados, indicaciones sobre cómo debe tratarse el asunto de los plataneros en Monterrey, agradecimientos por el interés demostrado en la salud del Gral. PEC, notificación sobre resolución de asunto cuando el Gral. PEC se encuentre mejor de salud, suspensión de audiencias, disculpa por no poder asistir a eventos, solicitud de informe sobre llegada de particulares, adhesión del Gral. PEC a la labor desarrollada por el Gobernador de Coahuila Nazario S. Ortiz Garza, solicitud de envío de películas, adhesiones al Comité de Estado que preside Carlos Darío Ojeda en Veracruz, informe sobre la clausura de la Octava Convención de la Liga de Comunidades Agrarias y Sindicatos Campesinos de Ciudad Victoria, Tamps., notificación de registro de candidatura del Lic. Severiano Herrera para Presidente Municipal de Córdoba, Ver.; apoyo a la medida de expulsión de Guillermo Rodríguez y Francisco González del Comité Municipal del Partido Nacional Revolucionario en Coatzintla, Ver.; informe sobre gastos ejercidos durante la administración del Gobernador de Durango Gral. Carlos Leal, notificación sobre salida de Gobernador de La Paz, B.C.S. Luis S. Rodríguez hacia la capital para informar al Gral. PEC de asuntos administrativos, solicitudes de audiencia, notificación sobre que ya se están tomando en consideración las indicaciones del Sr. Elliot Roosevelt, solicitud de recepción de bultos, solicitud de nueva remesa para Fábrica Chapultepec, solicitud de compras para las sobrinas de Soledad González, solicitud de informe sobre si subsiste la comisión conferida al Vicecónsul Hill, solicitud de informes sobre recepcion de violetas, solicitud de orden para cruce de línea que llevará corriente eléctrica a El Riego, Pue., notificación del viaje de Rodolfo Elías Calles, solicitud de apoyo para que no se construya penitenciaría tan cerca a la ciudad de Cuernavaca, notificación sobre conflicto electoral en Michoacán, solicitud de envío de fondos, invitación a la Asamblea Pro Acercamiento Nacional en Morelos, informe de inauguración del Centro Escolar Cruz Gálvez, solicitud de ayuda económica a estudiantes de la Escuela de Ingenieros Mecánicos Electricistas, notificaión de resultados obtenidos en las elecciones verificadas en Coahuila.

Telegrams exchanged between Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles and the following people: private citizens, the Pro-Homeopathy Western Association, Governors, the Union of Cattle breeders from Vista Hermosa, the Francisco Tamayo Workers and Peasants Union from Vista Hermosa Negrete, Michoacán, the Secretary of Agriculture, Francisco S. Elías, the Chamber of Labor from Michoacán, Military staff, the Agrarian Community from El Encino in Tamaulipas, Michoacán, the Administrator of the Customs in Veracruz, Francisco D. González, presidents of municipal committees for the National Revolutionary Party; his personal secretary, Soledad González, the League of Agrarian Communities from Sinaloa, Severo O.Montero, President of the Livestock Pro-Expo Committee; the Commission of Military Engineers; the Labor Union Great Party; the Tres Estrellas Transportation Coop., and the Confederation of Workers' Unions. The aforementioned telegrams concern family matters; a request to support the national Homeopaths, information about the activities in El Mante; protests raised after attacks against the Governor of Michoacán, Benigno Serrato; requests for appointments; a request to support a candidate for Congress; a financial report about the budget deficit of livestock growers; news about Saturnino Cedillo's health status; news about the Third Financial Inter American Congress; requests for employment; a report about the social peace in Chiapas, gifts to Plutarco and Leonardo Elías Calles, a report on the low prices of beans in Puebla; a request to support the petition demanding the tax exemption for the Railroad Workers Limited Consumption Coop; a request for salary payments; a report on the Fourth Agrarian Congress hosted in Guerrero; reports on Gen. Calles' health status; a request to reform the constitution in order to recognize women's political rights, information about the negative response to the request for stopping deforestation in Aguascalientes, paperwork process of the Chapultepect Cotton Mill, a notice about the opening of a Campaign Headquarters in the state of Morelos to support Francisco Alvarez, who is running for governor and the establishment of the Pro-Gen. Benigno Abundez Committee, endorsement of Lázaro Cárdenas' nomination for presidential candidate, information about farmers' protests against accusations made against a congress representative from Guerrero; endorsements of the governor of Nuevo León, Cárdenas; information about support of pre-nominees to the Senate in Sinaloa in favor of Cristóbal Bustamante and Agustín del Castillo, birthday greetings; a report about having dispatched only 34 trucks of peas, information about ejidal work; a request to be appointed Justice of the Supreme Court, a report about the Sonora's government's support of the Six-year government plan; information about the work of mills in Tamaullipas; shipping of lemon seedlings; a request for releasing Odilón García from jail in Taxco; a report about issues to establish the Union of Associations of rice growers, a request to lower the quota of paper transported by train; a request to support the chauffeurs from Tehuacán, Puebla; a report about the possible impacts of the application of a new law on the Cooperative Associations of Workers and Peasants. / Telegramas entre el Gral. PEC, particulares, Sociedad Occidental Pro Homeopatía, Gobernadores, Sindicato de Ganaderos de Vista Hermosa, Sindicato Obreros y Campesinos Francisco Tamayo de Vista Hermosa Negrete, Mich., Secretario de Agricultura Francisco S. Elías, Cámara del Trabajo de Michoacán, Militares, Comunidad Agraria El Encino en Tlalpujahua, Mich.; Administrador de la Aduana de Veracruz Francisco D. González, Presidentes de Comités Municipales del Partido Nacional Revolucionario, Secretaria Particular Soledad González, Liga de Comunidades Agrarias de Sinaloa, Presidente del Comité Pro Exposición Ganadera Severo O. Montero, Comisión Ingenieros Militares, Gran Partido Sindicado del Trabajo, Cooperativa de Transportes Tres Estrellas y Confederación Sindicalista de Obreros, acerca de: asuntos familiares, solicitud de ayuda a homeópatas del país, informes sobre trabajos en el Mante, protestas contra ataques dirigidos al Gobernador de Michoacán Benigno Serrato, solicitudes de audiencia, solicitud de apoyo para candidatura a Diputado, informe financiero sobre déficit en criadores de ganado, noticias sobre el estado de salud de Saturnino Cedillo, noticias sobre Tercer Congreso Financiero Interamericano, solicitudes de empleo, informe de paz social en Chiapas, regalos a Plutarco y Leonardo Elías Calles, informe de bajo precio del frijol en Puebla, solicitud de ayuda para que no se cobren impuestos sobre rentas a la Cooperativa de Consumo Limitada de Ferrocarrileros, solicitud de pago de sueldos, informe de celebración de Cuarto Congreso Agrario en Guerrero, reportes de salud del Gral. Calles, solicitud de reforma constitucional que otorgue derechos políticos a la mujer, informe de negativa a la solicitud de explotación forestal en Aguascalientes, gestiones para Fábrica de Algodón Chapultepec, notificación de instalación de Centro Director de la Campaña Electoral para Gobernador a favor de Francisco Alvarez en el estado de Morelos y del Comité Pro General Benigno Abundez, adhesiones a la candidatura de Lázaro Cárdenas a la Presidencia de la República, informes de protestas de agraristas contra acusaciones que se le hacen a diputado guerrerense, adhesiones al Gobernador de Nuevo León Cárdenas, informe de apoyo a pre candidatos a Senadores en Sinaloa a favor de Cristóbal Bustamante y Agustín C. del Castillo, felicitaciones por onomástico, informe de sólo haberse despachado veinticuatro furgones de chícharo, informe de trabajo ejidal, solicitud de recomendación para ocupar cargo de Ministro de la Suprema Corte de Justicia, informe de adhesión del Gobierno de Sonora al Plan Sexenal, notificación de trabajos de molienda en Tamaulipas, envío de plantas de limón, solicitud de liberación de Odilón García de la cárcel de Taxco, informe sobre problemas para la integración de las Asociaciones Productoras de Arroz, solicitud de baja de fletes en ferrocarril a la transportación de papel, solicitud de apoyo a los choferes de Tehuacán, Pue.; informe de afectación a las Sociedades Cooperativas Obreras y Campesinas si se aplica la ley general que pretende regirlas.

Correspondence of President Adolfo de la Huerta, Mr. Edward C. Ryan, Mr. Miguel Alessio Robles, B.A., Secretary of the Presidency, Ltc. Col. A. Gaxiola Jr., Mr. Ramón P. Denegri, Consul of Mexico in New York, and Gen. Alvaro Obregón, related to the request made by Mr. Edward C. Ryan to Gen. Obregón so that the Mexican Army Band will perform in Laredo, Texas, before or after the Dallas Fair. Riots in Tampico, Tamaulipas, including arbitrary detention, coups, shootings, and penalties against supporters of Gen. Caballero. The abuse that Gen. Alvaro Obregón's comrades were subject to in Villahermosa, Tabasco. International Exposition in Juárez, Chihuahua, of great importance to friendly relations with the United States. Disagreement of merchants from Sonora and Sinaloa about governmental measures regarding suppression of direct flights. Gen. Obregón's trip to the Dallas Exposition invited by the Governor. Decree that consolidates the debts of the federal government which comes from the reductions made to the salaries of employees. Decree that establishes the tax of territorial extension of rural property. Association of Shipowners and Shipping Companies, Industrial Chamber, and Chamber of Commerce of Veracruz, requesting the revocation of the removal of Mr. Damián Alarcón, Customs manager in that district. Representative of Baja California, Enrique Von Vorstel, requests a decree that prevents emigration from Californians to the United States. Concepción Rosa and Mercedes Blanco y Pastor request help to solve a land conflict since portions of their land were conceded to the Catalina station in Durango, breaking the agreeement of the National Agrarian Commission. Election problems in Tamaulipas. Request for guarantees for municipal elections in the State of Mexico. Mr. Manuel Palacios Silva, Mr. M. García Calvo, and Mr. Genaro B. Esquivel, inform about the arrival of Gen. Manuel García Vigil to Oaxaca on due to the public riots and persecution of his supporters with the support of the Governor Carlos Bravo. Mr. A. Lozano Zambrano from Monterrey requests that Mr. Porfirio González not be appointed. The Agricultural Chamber of Yucatán asks Gen. Obregón to intercede so as to avoid disastrous agricultural consequences caused by the governor's arbitrary commands. Complaints from citizens of Oaxaca about the appointment of the candidate Gen. García Vigil, by the Governor Carlos Bravo. Resignation of the Consul of Mexico in New York, Ramón P. De Negri. Miguel Alessio Robles, B.A., Private Secretary of the President, responds that he will not accept his resignation. Ramón P. Denegri informs of a secret meeting of creditor bankers in New York. Mr. Luis García, Vicepresident of the National Chamber of the city of Puebla, requests help because of the situation that has arisen in response to the decree stating that the land possessions given by the military in 1915 and 1916 will remain. The Mayor of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, requests help so that his petition to build schools and import building materials be granted. Files H-27, H-012, and VD-12 / Correspondencia entre el Presidente Adolfo de la Huerta, los Srs. Edward C. Ryan, Lic. Miguel Alessio Robles, Secretario Particular de la Presidencia, Tte.Corl. A. Gaxiola Jr., Ramón P. Denegri, Cónsul de México en Nueva York y el Gral. Alvaro Obregón, relativa a la petición que le hace el Sr. Edward C. Ryan al Gral. Obregón para que la Banda del Estado Mayor de México se presente en Laredo, Tex. antes o después de la Feria de Dallas. Desórdenes en Tampico, Tamps. tales como detención arbitraria, golpes, balazos y multas contra los partidarios del Gral. Caballero. Atropellos contra correligionarios del Gral. Alvaro Obregón en Villahermosa, Tab. Exposición Internacional en Ciudad Juárez, Chih. de gran significación para las relaciones amistosas con Estados Unidos. Desacuerdo de negociantes de Sonora y Sinaloa con las medidas del gobierno respecto a la supresión de los fletes directos. Viaje del Gral. Obregón a la Exposición de Dallas por invitación del Gobernador. Decreto que consolida la deuda flotante del gobierno federal proveniente de los descuentos hechos a los sueldos de los empleados. Decreto que establece el impuesto de extensión territorial sobre fincas rústicas. Asociación de Armadores y Navieros, Camara Industrial y Cámara de Comercio de Veracruz, solicitan que se revoque la remoción del Sr. Damián Alarcón, Administrador de dicha Aduana. El Diputado por Baja California, Enrique Von Borstel, solicita decreto que impida emigración de californianos a Estados Unidos. Concepción, Rosa y Mercedes Blanco y Pastor solicitan ayuda por haberse dado posesión de tierras de su propiedad a la estación Catalina en Durango, incumpliendo orden de la Comisión Nacional Agraria. Problemas electorales en Tamaulipas. Petición de garantías para elecciones municipales en el Estado de México. Los Srs. Manuel Palacios Silva, M. García Calvo y Genaro B. Esquivel, informan que la llegada del Gral. Manuel García Vigil a Oaxaca ha ocasionado desórdenes públicos y persecusión a sus partidarios con el apoyo del Gobernador Carlos Bravo. El Sr. A. Lozano Zambrano de Monterrey pide que no se imponga al Sr. Porfirio González. La Cámara Agrícola de Yucatán pide al Gral. Obregón interceda para evitar desastrosas consecuencias en la agricultura debido a las disposiciones que ha tomado el gobernador arbitrariamente. Quejas de ciudadanos de Oaxaca por la imposición del candidato, Gral. García Vigil, por parte del Gobernador Carlos Bravo. Renuncia del Cónsul de México en Nueva York, Ramón P. De Negri. El Lic. Miguel Alessio Robles, Secretario Particular del Presidente, responde que no se aceptará su renuncia. Ramón P. Denegri informa de junta secreta a banqueros acreedores en Nueva York. El Sr. Luis García, Vicepresidente de la Camara Nacional de la ciudad de Puebla solicita ayuda por la situación que ha surgido ante el decreto dado para que subsistan las posesiones de tierra que dieron los militares en 1915 y 1916. El Presidente Municipal de Nuevo Laredo, Tamps. solicita ayuda para que se acepte su petición de construcción de escuelas e importación de materiales de construcción. Exps. H-27, H-012 y VD-12

The issue of minority rights protection has been actively implemented in international legal practice at the United Nations and the Council of Europe levels since the 1990s. The problem of political representation of minority interests began regulating at the level of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with the establishment of the High Commissioner on National Minorities office. At the level of this institution with international experts participation were developed the next documents: the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Political Life (1999), the Warsaw Guidelines to Assist National Minority Participation in the Electoral Process (2001), the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations (2008), the Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies (2012), the Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities (2017), etc.The purpose of article is to highlight the international legal framework for ensuring the effective political representation of minority ethnic groups and the practice of their implementation in European countries. The author has analyzed three levels of political representation of minority ethnic groups: 1) central (nationwide); 2) regional and local (self-government); 3) advisory (consultative).During the XX – early XXI centuries the institution of ethnic party became established from the multi-ethnic areas of Western Europe to the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. The electoral system should facilitate minority representation and influence. Where minorities are concentrated territorially, single-member districts may provide sufficient minority representation (Italy, Albania, etc.). Proportional representation systems, where a political party's share in the national vote is reflected in its share of the legislative seats, may assist in the representation of minorities (Finland, Slovakia, etc.). Some forms of preference voting, where voters rank candidates in order of choice, may facilitate minority representation and promote inter-communal cooperation (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Lower numerical thresholds for representation in the legislature may enhance the inclusion of national minorities in governance (Poland, Serbia, etc.). A number of European countries (Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, Hungary, etc.) use a reserved number of seats in one or both chambers of parliament or in parliamentary committees. Ethnic minority representation at the government level is realized through the establishment of specialized central executive bodies, which are usually represented in the structure of culture and education ministries. Representatives of ethnic minorities are involved in these government institutions. The Republic of Croatia has a positive experience of ethnic minority representation in the judiciary and law enforcement agencies.Effective ethnic minority participation is realized through the functional system of local self-governments, which are formed on territorial and non-territorial levels. A number of European ethnic communities have the territorial autonomies (Italy, Spain, France, Denmark, Finland, Moldova) owing to the processes of regionalization and decentralization. The corporative model of minority non-territorial autonomy is represented by so-called Sámi Parliaments in northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. The personal model of minority non-territorial autonomy is the most common in the world. It is provided through non-governmental organizations. Advisory (consultative) bodies functionate as a channel for dialogue between government and ethnic communities for protection of education, linguistic and cultural rights. They are formed at the Government (Austria) and President (Ukraine) levels as well.Given the European states experience, the following aspects of minority representation should be improved: 1) re-establishment Hungarian and Romanian single-member districts; 2) review of legislative norms regarding the principles of ethnic party institutionalization; 3) application of open-list proportional representation for minority parties in the regions of Ukraine with a multi-ethnic population. ; Починаючи з 1990-х років питання захисту прав етнічних, мовних і релігійних меншин активно впроваджується в міжнародно-правову практику на рівні ООН та Ради Європи. Однією з важливих постала проблема політичного представництва інтересів меншин, яка починає регулюватися на рівні ОБСЄ з запровадженням посади Верховного Комісара у справах національних меншин. На рівні цієї інституції за участі міжнародних експертів вироблені Лундські рекомендації про ефективну участь національних меншин у суспільно-політичному житті (1999), Варшавські рекомендації щодо сприяння участі національних меншин у виборчому процесі (2001), Больцанські/Боценські рекомендації щодо національних меншин у міждержавних відносинах (2008), Люблянські рекомендації щодо інтеграції різноманітних суспільств (2012), Грацькі рекомендації щодо доступу до правосуддя і національних меншин (2017) та ін.Метою статті є висвітлення міжнародно-правового формату забезпечення ефективного політичного представництва інтересів етнічних меншин та практики їх застосування в європейських країнах. Автор розглядає три рівні політичного представництва міноритарних етнічних груп: 1) центральний (загальнодержавний); 2) регіональний та локальний (самоврядування); 3) дорадчий (консультативний).У контексті аналізу політичного представництва етнічних меншин важливу роль займає інститут етнополітичної партії. Впродовж XX – початку XXI ст. він розширив свій ареал із поліетнічних регіонів Західної Європи до країн Центральної та Південо-Східної Європи. Справедливому представництву етнічних меншин у органах влади сприяє створення одномандатних округів (Італія, Албанія та ін.), пропорційна виборча система (Фінляндія, Словаччина та ін.), преференційне голосування (Австралія), зниження відсоткового бар'єру для проходження до парламенту етнополітичних партій (Польща, Сербія та ін.). Ряд країн Європи (Боснія і Герцеговина, Косово, Хорватія, Словенія, Румунія, Угорщина) застосовують практику резервування місць у парламенті для організацій етнічних громад. Представництво меншин на рівні уряду реалізується шляхом створення спеціальних органів центральної виконавчої влади, які зазвичай представлені в структурі міністерств культури та освіти. До роботи в цих урядових інституціях залучаються представники етнічних груп. Позитивний досвід репрезентації етнічних меншин у судових і правоохоронних органах має Республіка Хорватія.Ефективна політична участь та представництво у владі етнічних меншин реалізується через функціональну систему місцевого самоврядування, яка створюється на екстериторіальній та територіальній основі. Корпоративна модель екстериторіальної автономії меншин представлена так званими саамськими парламентами на півночі Норвегії, Швеції, Фінляндії та Росії. Найбільш розповсюджна у світі персональна модель екстериторіальної автономії етнічних меншин забезпечується шляхом створення неурядових організацій. Завдяки процесам регіоналізації та децентралізації ряд етнічних громад Європи мають статус національно-територіальних автономій (Італія, Іспанія, Франція, Данія, Фінляндія, Молдова). Дорадчі (консультативні) органи слугують каналами для діалогу між державною владою та етнічними громадами в питаннях використання земельних ресурсів, житла, захисту освітніх, мовних і культурних прав. Вони формуються як на рівні уряду (Австрія), так на рівні президентської влади (Україна).Враховуючи досвід цих держав, потребують вдосконалення наступні аспекти політичної репрезентації етнічних меншин: 1) відновлення адміністративних меж угорськомовного та румунськомовного виборчих одномандатних округів; 2) перегляд законодавчої норми щодо принципів інституціоналізації етнополітичних партій; 3) застосування на регіональному та локальному рівнях пропорційної системи відкритих списків із можливістю репрезентації партій меншин у регіонах України з поліетнічним складом населення. ; Починаючи з 1990-х років питання захисту прав етнічних, мовних і релігійних меншин активно впроваджується в міжнародно-правову практику на рівні ООН та Ради Європи. Однією з важливих постала проблема політичного представництва інтересів меншин, яка починає регулюватися на рівні ОБСЄ з запровадженням посади Верховного Комісара у справах національних меншин. На рівні цієї інституції за участі міжнародних експертів вироблені Лундські рекомендації про ефективну участь національних меншин у суспільно-політичному житті (1999), Варшавські рекомендації щодо сприяння участі національних меншин у виборчому процесі (2001), Больцанські/Боценські рекомендації щодо національних меншин у міждержавних відносинах (2008), Люблянські рекомендації щодо інтеграції різноманітних суспільств (2012), Грацькі рекомендації щодо доступу до правосуддя і національних меншин (2017) та ін.Метою статті є висвітлення міжнародно-правового формату забезпечення ефективного політичного представництва інтересів етнічних меншин та практики їх застосування в європейських країнах. Автор розглядає три рівні політичного представництва міноритарних етнічних груп: 1) центральний (загальнодержавний); 2) регіональний та локальний (самоврядування); 3) дорадчий (консультативний).У контексті аналізу політичного представництва етнічних меншин важливу роль займає інститут етнополітичної партії. Впродовж XX – початку XXI ст. він розширив свій ареал із поліетнічних регіонів Західної Європи до країн Центральної та Південо-Східної Європи. Справедливому представництву етнічних меншин у органах влади сприяє створення одномандатних округів (Італія, Албанія та ін.), пропорційна виборча система (Фінляндія, Словаччина та ін.), преференційне голосування (Австралія), зниження відсоткового бар'єру для проходження до парламенту етнополітичних партій (Польща, Сербія та ін.). Ряд країн Європи (Боснія і Герцеговина, Косово, Хорватія, Словенія, Румунія, Угорщина) застосовують практику резервування місць у парламенті для організацій етнічних громад. Представництво меншин на рівні уряду реалізується шляхом створення спеціальних органів центральної виконавчої влади, які зазвичай представлені в структурі міністерств культури та освіти. До роботи в цих урядових інституціях залучаються представники етнічних груп. Позитивний досвід репрезентації етнічних меншин у судових і правоохоронних органах має Республіка Хорватія.Ефективна політична участь та представництво у владі етнічних меншин реалізується через функціональну систему місцевого самоврядування, яка створюється на екстериторіальній та територіальній основі. Корпоративна модель екстериторіальної автономії меншин представлена так званими саамськими парламентами на півночі Норвегії, Швеції, Фінляндії та Росії. Найбільш розповсюджна у світі персональна модель екстериторіальної автономії етнічних меншин забезпечується шляхом створення неурядових організацій. Завдяки процесам регіоналізації та децентралізації ряд етнічних громад Європи мають статус національно-територіальних автономій (Італія, Іспанія, Франція, Данія, Фінляндія, Молдова). Дорадчі (консультативні) органи слугують каналами для діалогу між державною владою та етнічними громадами в питаннях використання земельних ресурсів, житла, захисту освітніх, мовних і культурних прав. Вони формуються як на рівні уряду (Австрія), так на рівні президентської влади (Україна).Враховуючи досвід цих держав, потребують вдосконалення наступні аспекти політичної репрезентації етнічних меншин: 1) відновлення адміністративних меж угорськомовного та румунськомовного виборчих одномандатних округів; 2) перегляд законодавчої норми щодо принципів інституціоналізації етнополітичних партій; 3) застосування на регіональному та локальному рівнях пропорційної системи відкритих списків із можливістю репрезентації партій меншин у регіонах України з поліетнічним складом населення.

How institutions shape the American presidencyThis incisive undergraduate textbook emphasizes the institutional sources of presidential power and executive governance, enabling students to think more clearly and systematically about the American presidency at a time when media coverage of the White House is awash in anecdotes and personalities. William Howell offers unparalleled perspective on the world's most powerful office, from its original design in the Constitution to its historical growth over time; its elections and transitions to governance; its interactions with Congress, the courts, and the federal bureaucracy; and its persistent efforts to shape public policy. Comprehensive in scope and rooted in the latest scholarship, The American Presidency is the perfect guide for studying the presidency at a time of acute partisan polarization and popular anxiety about the health and well-being of the republic.Focuses on the institutional structures that presidents must navigate, the incentives and opportunities that drive them, and the constraints they routinely confrontShows how legislators, judges, bureaucrats, the media, and the broader public shape the contours and limits of presidential powerEncourages students to view the institutional presidency as not just an object of study, but as a way of thinking about executive politicsHighlights the lasting effects of important historical moments on the institutional presidencyEnables students to grapple with enduring themes of power, rules, norms, and organization that undergird democracy

Correspondence of Mr. Myron M. Parker, American attorney and legal consultant; Mr. Roberto V. Pesqueira, Confidential Agent of the Mexican government; Senator Albert B. Fall; Mr. Fernando Iglesias Calderón, ambassador of Mexico in Washington, D.C.; Mr. J.H. Perestrejo; Mr. Ira Bennet, editor of the WASHINGTON POST, and Gen. Alvaro Obregón in which Mr. Parker informs Gen. Obregón that the Senator Albert B. Fall is awaiting victory in the elections to begin diplomatic relations between Mexico and the United States; he reports on the meeting Mr. Fernando Iglesias Calderón had with Mr. Norman Davis and sends him a newspaper clipping in which the rebellion of Gen. Francisco Villa in Tamaulipas is mentioned: "Envoy urges quick U.S. aid to Mexico. Another Revolt brews as Calderón asks recognition of Secretary Davis"; Mr. Parker also attaches a pamphlet that has a report from the President of the United States about the treaty signed in Bogota, Colombia, mentioning the policy nationalizing oil in that country; comments on the position of the Democratic Party respect to Mexico, stating that they will not recognize any president other than Gen. Obregón. Mr. Parker reports that Mr. Sherburne Hopkins claims to be the diplomatic representative of Mexico's interim government and regards him as a bad person; sends newspaper clippings: "Mexico will lift oil restrictions" THE EVENING STAR, U.S.A, July 9, 1920. Deals with the matter regarding petroleum concerning the application of Article 27 of the Constitution and the opinion of American Industrialists on the situation. "New Revolt in Mexico foreseen by Bonillas" THE EVENING STAR, U.S.A, July 9, 1920. Commentary by Engr. Ignacio Bonillas about the Agua Prieta Revolution against the government of Venustiano Carranza. "New Revolt plot bared in Mexico" THE WASHINGTON POST, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., July 10, 1920. Commentary about the organization that is being made by Mr. Luis Cabrera and Gen. Juan Barragán in the north of Mexico to rebel against the government of De la Huerta. Gen. Obregón's reply of acknowledgment and denying that Mr. Hopkins has any position within the Mexican government. Mr. Myron Parker sends Gen. Obregón a copy of the letter by former Ambassador in Mexico, Harry P. Fletcher, to Mr. Bainbridge Colby, Secretary of State, giving his opinion on the recognition of the provisional government; he attaches a newspaper clipping stating that the government of Adolfo de la Huerta could be recognized as "de facto" and some other proposals that must be concluded, among them, the pending issue of "Chamizal": "Urges caution Mexican Policy" THE WASHINGTON POST, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., July 12, 1920. Gen. Obregón informs that Mr. Ignacio Bonillas has gone to Washington and has made statements to the press about the murder of President Venustiano Carranza; he states that the candidacy of Engr. Alfredo Robles Domínguez is the representation of the clergy and informs about the recognition of the Mexican government by the United States; attaches newspaper clippings: "Text of Senator Harding's speech accepting the nomination" THE NEW YORK TIMES, New York, New York, July 23, 1920 **. COREY, Herbert "Villa dares not give up his role as bandit chief", U.S.A., July 19, 1920, in which it is detailed the steps for the demobilization of Gen. Francisco Villa's armed forces; sends a copy of the letter addressed to Mr. Fernando Iglesias Calderón commenting on the diplomatic relations between Mexico and the United States; comments on the mission of Gen. Salvador Alvarado to obtain a loan from some capitalists in New York and commentary about the political state of Mexico. Attached is a newspaper clipping about policy in Mexico and the issue of Col. Esteban B. Cantú, Governor of Baja California, who is attempting to rebel against the government of Mr. Adolfo de la Huerta: "Fear coup by Huerta" U.S.A., August 10, 1920. Mr. Parker sends Gen. Obregón a questionnaire from Mr. Ira Bennet asking him about the political measures that Gen. Obregón will employ when he is elected President; he sends a copy of the letter sent to Mr. Fernando Iglesias Calderón recommending that the government designate a joint commission to handle the differences between Mexico and the United States so that they might be resolved; attaches a newspaper clipping in which Senator Harding's opinion about Mexico is given: "Harding salvaging 'failed league' to build a tribunal" THE WASHINGTON STAR, Washington, D.C., August 20, 1920. "Honors George Washington Mexican special Ambassador places wreath on Mount Vernon tomb". THE WASHINGTON STAR, Washington, D.C., August 20, 1920. Mr.Myron M. Parker congratulares Gen. Obregón on his election victory. Mr. J.H. Perestrejo transcribes the same message to Gen. Obregón. Mr. Parker recommends Gen. Obregón to designate a joint commission to facilitate U.S. recognition of the Mexican government. (Go to Files G-19, G-09; P-23 and P-011 of the same series). (The newspaper clipping from the NEW YORK TIMES, from July 23rd of 1920 go to archive 1, box 1, folder 2, folder 8). Files P-5 and P-05 / Correspondencia entre el Sr. Myron M. Parker, abogado y consultor de leyes norteamericano; Sr. Roberto V. Pesqueira, agente confidencial del gobierno de México; Senador Albert B. Fall; Sr. Fernando Iglesias Calderón, Embajador de México en Washington, D.C.; Sr. J.H. Perestrejo; Sr. Ira Bennet, editor del WASHINGTON POST y el Gral. Alvaro Obregón, en la que el primero comunica al Gral. Obregón que el Senador Albert B. Fall espera su triunfo en las elecciones para que se inicien las relaciones diplomáticas entre México y los Estados Unidos; informa sobre la entrevista que tuvo el Sr. Fernando Iglesias Calderón con el Sr. Norman Davis y le envía recorte de prensa en el que se menciona la rebelión del Gral. Francisco Villa en Tamaulipas: "Envoy urges quick U.S. aid to Mexico. Another Revolt brews as Calderón asks recognition of Secretary Davis"; anexa un folleto que tiene un informe del Presidente de los Estados Unidos sobre el tratado firmado en Bogotá, Colombia, mencionando la política de nacionalización del petróleo en ese país; comenta sobre la posición del Partido Democrático con respecto de México, indicando que no reconocerán a otro presidente que no sea el Gral. Obregón; informa que el Sr. Sherburne Hopkins dice ser el representante diplomático del gobierno provisional de México y le considera como una persona negativa; envía recortes de prensa: "Mexico will lift oil restrictions" THE EVENING STAR, E.U.A., Jul. 9, 1920. Trata la problemática del asunto petrolero con respecto a la aplicación del Artículo 27 Constitucional y la opinión de los industriales americanos sobre esta situación. "New Revolt in Mexico foreseen by Bonillas" THE EVENING STAR, E.U.A., Jul. 9, 1920. Comentarios del Ing. Ignacio Bonillas sobre la revolución de Agua Prieta en contra del gobierno de Venustiano Carranza. "New Revolt plot bared in Mexico" THE WASHINGTON POST, Washington, D.C., E.U.A., Jul. 10, 1920. Comentarios sobre la organización que están haciendo los Srs. Luis Cabrera y Gral. Juan Barragán en el norte de México para rebelarse en contra del gobierno de De la Huerta. Respuesta del Gral. Obregón de enterado y negando que el Sr. Hopkins tenga algún cargo del gobierno mexicano. El Sr. Myron Parker envía al Gral. Obregón una copia de la carta que dirigió el ex-Embajador en México Harry P. Fletcher al Sr. Bainbridge Colby, Secretario de Estado, dando su opinión respecto al reconocimiento del gobierno provisional; anexa recorte de prensa indicando que el gobierno de Adolfo de la Huerta podría ser reconocido como "de facto" y algunas propuestas que deben concluirse, entre ellas está la cuestión pendiente del "Chamizal": "Urges caution Mexican Policy" THE WASHINGTON POST, Washington, D.C., E.U.A., Jul. 12, 1920. El Gral. Obregón comunica que el Sr. Ignacio Bonillas ha ido a Washington y ha hecho declaraciones a la prensa sobre el asesinato del presidente Venustiano Carranza; indica que la candidatura del Ing. Alfredo Robles Domínguez es la representante de los clericales y le informa acerca del reconocimiento del gobierno mexicano por parte de los Estados Unidos; anexa recorte de prensa: "Text of Senator Harding's speech accepting the nomination" THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nueva Yor, N.Y., Jul. 23, 1920 **. COREY, Herbert "Villa dares not give up his role as bandit chief", E.U.A., Jul. 19, 1920, en el cual se indican las gestiones para el licenciamiento de las fuerzas del Gral. Francisco Villa; envía copia de la carta que dirigiera al Sr. Fernando Iglesias Calderón comentando sobre las relaciones diplomáticas entre México y los Estados Unidos; comenta sobre la misión del Gral. Salvador Alvarado para obtener un préstamo de algunos capitalistas de Nueva York y comentarios sobre la política de México; anexa recorte de prensa sobre la política de México y el asunto del Corl. Esteban B. Cantú, Gobernador de Baja California, quien intenta rebelarse en contra del gobierno del Sr. Adolfo de la Huerta: "Fear coup by Huerta" E.U.A, Ag. 10, 1920. El Sr. Parker envía al Gral. Obregón cuestionario del Sr. Ira Bennet preguntándole sobre las medidas políticas que adoptará el Gral. Obregón cuando sea electo Presidente; envía copia de la carta que dirigió al Sr. Fernando Iglesias Calderón recomendándole que el gobierno designe una comisión mixta para que se traten las diferencias existentes entre México y los Estados Unidos a fin de que se resuelvan; anexa recorte de prensa en el que aparece la opinión del Senador Harding acerca de México: "Harding salvaging 'failed league' to build a tribunal" THE WASHINGTON STAR, Washington, D.C., Ag. 20, 1920. "Honors George Washington Mexican special Ambassador places wreath on Mount Vernon tomb", THE WASHINGTON STAR, Washington, D.C., Ag. 20, 1920. El Sr. Myron M. Parker felicita al Gral. Obregón por su triunfo electoral. El Sr. J.H. Perestrejo transcribe al Gral. Obregón el mismo mensaje. El Sr. Parker recomienda al Gral. Obregón que designe una comisión mixta para gestionar el reconocimiento del gobierno mexicano por los Estados Unidos. (Véanse Exps. G-19 y G-09; P-23 y P-011 de esta misma serie). ( El recorte de prensa del NEW YORK TIMES, del 23 de julio de 1920 pasó al planero 1, cajón 1, carpeta 2, folder 8). Exps. P-5 y P-05

The present report provides an overview of the main developments and debates in relation to migration and asylum in Luxembourg in 2017. The number of people applying for international protection remained high in 2017 (2.322 applications) compared to the levels registered pre- 'migration crisis' (1.091 in 2014). However, the number of registrations remained relatively stable if compared to the two preceding years (2.447 in 2015 and 2.035 in 2016). This relative stability in numbers also reflected on the general public and policy debate in the field of migration and asylum. Since 2016, its focus has continuously shifted from an 'emergency' discourse axed on the implementation of reception measures and conditions towards discussions on longer-term integration measures and policies. In this regard, the newly introduced Guided Integration Trail (parcours d'intégration accompagné - PIA) can be considered a flagship project of OLAI, the national agency responsible for the reception and integration of foreigners. This multidisciplinary package of measures aims to empower applicants and beneficiaries of international protection and to support them in developing their life project. The trail, compulsory for all adult applicants for international protection, consists of a linguistic component and a civic component and is split into three phases. Although increasing housing capacities for the reception of applicants for international protection was high on national authorities' agenda, housing remained a challenging aspect of the asylum system and triggered debate on a national scale. Alongside access to training, problems related to housing were among the issues most frequently raised by applicants for international protection in 2017. The lack of affordable housing on the private market, an increasing number of family reunifications as well as the increasing number of beneficiaries and persons who have been issued a return decision who remain housed in structures of OLAI were all identified as interplaying barriers for finding available accommodation for applicants for international protection. The difficulties with the construction of modular housing structures also persisted in 2017. A certain reticence of the population towards the construction of these so-called 'container villages, planned in response to the increasing influx that started in August 2015, was visible in the appeals introduced into Luxembourg's First Instance Administrative Courts to annul the land-use plans related to the projects. Living conditions in the various reception facilities were also one of the subjects of discussion in 2017. This included a debate on the (lack of) kitchen infrastructure in reception facilities and the varying systems for provision of food, the types of food available, as well as the availability of internet. As an answer to the resurgence of an increased influx of applicants of international protection from the Western Balkans in early 2017, a new 'ultra-accelerated procedure' was put in place for applicants of international protection stemming from the Western Balkans. According to the state authorities, the ultra-accelerated procedure was set up to take pressure off the reception facilities, but also as a deterrent to avoid creating false hopes for long-term stay. In April 2017, a 'semi-open return structure' (Structure d'hébergement d'urgence au Kirchberg – SHUK) was put in place, from which people are transferred to states applying the Dublin regulation. Due to home custody (assignation à résidence), the SHUK is considered to be an alternative to detention by national authorities. The newly created structure as well as the related conditions for assignment, were nevertheless criticised by civil society. The outcry among civil society was equally high during and after the adoption the Law of 8 March 2017, which endorses the extension of the permitted period of detention of adults or families with children from 72 hours to 7 days, in order to improve the organisation of the return and ensures that it is carried out successfully. A commission in charge of determining the best interests of unaccompanied minors applying for international protection was decided at the end of 2017. The commission is in charge of carrying out individual assessments regarding the best interest of the child with the aim of delivering an authorisation of stay or a return decision. Among the elements taken into consideration when the best interest of the child is evaluated in the context of a potential return decision is information provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The latter made an agreement with the Directorate of Immigration in 2017 to search for the parents of UAMs in the country of origin. With the focus of debates having slowly shifted towards long-term integration issues, the Council of Government also approved the elaboration of a new multiannual national action plan on integration. The plan will be based on two axes: (1) the reception and follow-up of applicants for international protection and (2) the integration of Luxembourg's non-Luxembourgish residents. Luxembourg's National Employment Agency (ADEM) set up a "cellule BPI" (beneficiaries of international protection cell) in its Employer Service in early 2017. This cell provides employers with information regarding job applications and evaluations of the competences of beneficiaries of international protection. A new law on the Luxembourgish nationality entered into force on 1 April 2017. Given the particular demographic situation of Luxembourg characterised by a significant increase in the total population and a decrease in the proportion of Luxembourgers in the total population, the reform intends to promote the societal and political integration of non-Luxembourgish citizens and to strengthen cohesion within the national community. The main changes introduced by the law include a decreased length of residence requirement for naturalisation (from 7 to 5 years), the right of birthplace (jus soli) of the first generation, a simplified way of acquiring Luxembourgish nationality by 'option', as well as new scenarios to avoid cases of statelessness. The law maintains previous linguistic requirements but makes some adjustments in order to prevent the language condition from becoming an insurmountable obstacle. Ahead of the local elections held on 8 October 2017, the Ministry of Family, Integration and the Greater Region launched a national information and awareness-raising campaign titled "Je peux voter" (I can vote) in January 2017. This campaign aimed to motivate Luxembourg's foreign population to register on the electoral roll for the local elections. The government's intention to legislate face concealment was arguably one of the most debated topics in the field related to community life and integration in the broader sense, both in parliament as well as in the media and public sphere. Bill n°7179 aims to modify article 563 of the Penal Code and to create the prohibition of face concealment in certain public spaces. The bill defines face concealment as the action of covering part of or all of the face in a way of rendering the identification of the person impossible and provides a wide variety of examples, such as the wearing of a motor cycle helmet, a balaclava or a full-face veil. Opposing views among stakeholders, whether political parties, public institutions, civil society or the media, emerged with regard to the necessity to legislate in the matter and if so, on the basis of which grounds and to what extent. The phenomenon of migration has also led to a more heterogeneous population in Luxembourg's schools. To face this situation, the education authorities continued to diversify Luxembourg's offer in education and training, creating for instance a bigger offer for youngsters and adults who do not master any of Luxembourg's vehicular languages, offering more alphabetisation courses or basic instruction courses. The Minister for National Education continued to develop and adapt the school offer to the increased heterogeneity by increasing the international and European school offer, introducing of a new mediation service and putting in place a plurilingual education programme. In the area of legal migration, the most significant changes concerned admission policies of specific categories of third-country nationals. In this respect, bill n°7188 mainly aims to transpose Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. The directive aims to make the European Union a world centre of excellence for studies and training, while favouring contacts between people and favouring their mobility, these two being important elements of the European Union's external policy. Bill N°7188 intends to facilitate and simplify the procedures for intra-European mobility of TCN researchers and students. Moreover, the proposed changes include incentive mechanisms to retain students and researchers. To this end, it proposes that students and researchers, once they have completed their studies/research, can be issued a residence permit for "private reasons" for a duration of 9 months at most in view of finding employment or creating a business. Finally, bill n°7188 also foresees provisions to regulate the family reunification of a researcher staying in Luxembourg in the context of short- and long-term mobility with his/her nuclear family. The legislator furthermore transposed Directive 2014/36 on seasonal workers and Directive 2014/66 on temporary intragroup transfer into national law, and adapted Luxembourg's immigration law to the needs to the economy, by introducing, amongst other things, and authorisation of stay for investors. Organising the admission of stay and the issuance of authorisations of stay was also a key component within the agreement between Luxembourg and Cape Verde on the concerted management of migratory flows and solidary development. Other objectives of the agreement include the promotion of the movement of people, detailing readmission procedures, fighting against irregular migration, strengthening the legal establishment and integration of the concerned nationals, as well as the mobilisation of skills and resources of migrants in favour of solidary development. ; Le présent rapport fait la synthèse des principaux débats et des évolutions majeures concernant les migrations et l'asile au Luxembourg en 2017. Le nombre de personnes demandant une protection internationale est resté élevé en 2017 (2 322 demandes) par rapport aux niveaux enregistrés avant la « crise migratoire » (1 091 en 2014). Toutefois, ce nombre est resté relativement stable par rapport aux deux années précédentes (2 447 en 2015 et 2 035 en 2016). Cette stabilité relative s'est également reflétée dans le débat public et politique dans le domaine des migrations et de l'asile. Depuis 2016, l'accent n'a cessé de se déplacer d'un discours « d'urgence » axé sur la mise en œuvre de mesures et de conditions d'accueil vers des discussions sur des mesures et des politiques d'intégration à plus long terme. À cet égard, le nouveau parcours d'intégration accompagné (PIA) peut être considéré comme un projet phare de l'OLAI, l'Office luxembourgeois de l'accueil et de l'intégration des étrangers. Le PIA vise à autonomiser les demandeurs et les bénéficiaires d'une protection internationale et à les soutenir dans le développement de leur projet de vie. Le parcours, obligatoire pour tous les demandeurs adultes de protection internationale, se compose d'une composante linguistique et d'une composante civique, et il est divisé en trois phases. Bien que l'augmentation des capacités d'hébergement des demandeurs de protection internationale (DPI) figure parmi les priorités des autorités nationales, le logement des DPI reste très problématique et a déclenché un débat à l'échelle nationale. Outre l'accès à la formation, les problèmes liés au logement des DPI ont été parmi les questions les plus fréquemment soulevées en 2017. La pression sur le logement des DPI et des bénéficiaires de protection internationale (BPI) est importante : le manque de logements abordables sur le marché privé, le nombre croissant de réunifications familiales et la progression du nombre de BPI et de personnes qui ont fait l'objet d'une décision de retour mais qui restent hébergées dans les structures de l'OLAI ont été identifiés comme facteurs de pression. Les difficultés liées à la construction de structures modulaires d'hébergement ont également persisté en 2017. Une certaine réticence de la population à l'égard de la construction de ces « villages conteneurs », prévue en réponse à l'afflux croissant qui a commencé en août 2015, était visible dans les recours introduits devant les tribunaux administratifs pour annuler les plans d'occupation des sols liés aux projets. Les conditions de vie au sein des structures d'accueil ont également fait l'objet de discussions. Elles portaient notamment sur l'absence d'équipement en cuisines de plusieurs lieux d'accueil, les différents systèmes d'approvisionnement en nourriture et les types de nourriture disponibles. Afin de répondre au nombre toujours important de DPI en provenance des pays des Balkans occidentaux, une procédure ultra-accélérée a été mise en place. Cette procédure a été instaurée pour diminuer les pressions sur les structures d'accueil et pour éviter de créer de faux espoirs pour les séjours de longue durée. En avril 2017, la structure d'hébergement d'urgence au Kirchberg (SHUK) a été mise en place, afin d'héberger les DPI pour lesquels le Luxembourg n'est pas compétent pour examiner les demandes en vertu de l'application du règlement de Dublin. Ce nombre a fortement progressé. Le placement à la SHUK correspond à une assignation à résidence, donc à une alternative à la rétention. La structure nouvellement créée ainsi que les conditions d'affectation ont néanmoins été critiquées par la société civile. Plusieurs acteurs de la société civile ont manifesté leur opposition face à une disposition de la loi du 8 mars 2017 qui a étendu la période de rétention des adultes ou familles avec enfants de 72 heures à 7 jours afin de rendre plus efficiente l'organisation du retour. Un premier bilan du fonctionnement du Centre de rétention a été publié en 2017. Une commission chargée d'évaluer l'intérêt des mineurs non accompagnés dans le cadre d'une décision de retour a été créé fin 2017. La commission est chargée de mener à bien des évaluations individuelles concernant l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant dans le but de prendre une décision de retour ou d'accorder une autorisation de séjour. Parmi les éléments pris en considération lors de cette évaluation et dans le contexte d'une éventuelle décision de retour figurent également les informations fournies par l'Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM). Cette dernière a conclu un accord avec la Direction de l'immigration pour rechercher les parents de mineurs non accompagnés dans le pays d'origine. Comme les débats s'orientent lentement vers l'intégration à long terme, le Conseil de gouvernement a également approuvé l'élaboration d'un nouveau plan d'action national sur l'intégration. Le plan sera basé sur deux axes : l'accueil et le suivi des demandeurs de protection internationale et l'intégration des résidents non luxembourgeois au Luxembourg. L'Agence pour le Développement de l'Emploi (ADEM) a créé une cellule BPI au sein de son Service employeurs. Cette cellule fournit aux employeurs des renseignements sur les demandes d'emploi et les évaluations des compétences des BPI. Une nouvelle loi sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise est entrée en vigueur le 1er avril 2017. Cette loi s'inscrit dans le contexte démographique particulier du Luxembourg, caractérisé par une augmentation continue de la population totale avec, en parallèle, une diminution de la part des Luxembourgeois dans la population totale. A travers cette loi, le législateur veut favoriser l'intégration sociétale et politique des citoyens non luxembourgeois et renforcer la cohésion au sein de la communauté nationale. Les principaux changements introduits par la loi consistent en la réduction de la durée de résidence pour la naturalisation (de 7 à 5 ans), l'introduction du droit du sol de la première génération, la réinstauration de voies simplifiées d'acquisition de la nationalité luxembourgeoise par « option », ainsi que de nouveaux scénarios pour éviter les cas d'apatridie. La loi maintient les exigences linguistiques antérieures tout en procédant à quelques ajustements afin d'empêcher que les exigences linguistiques ne deviennent un obstacle insurmontable. En vue des élections communales du 8 octobre 2017, le ministère de la Famille, de l'Intégration et à la Grande Région a lancé une campagne d'information et de sensibilisation intitulée « Je peux voter » en janvier 2017. Cette campagne avait pour but d'inciter la population étrangère du Luxembourg à s'inscrire sur les listes électorales pour les élections communales. L'intention du Gouvernement de légiférer sur la dissimulation du visage était sans doute l'un des sujets les plus débattus dans le domaine lié à la vie au sein de la société au Luxembourg et l'intégration au sens large du terme, tant à la Chambre des députés que dans les médias et la sphère publique. Le projet de loi n° 7179 vise à modifier l'article 563 du Code pénal et à créer l'interdiction de dissimuler le visage dans certains espaces publics. Il définit la dissimulation du visage comme le fait de couvrir une partie ou la totalité du visage de façon à rendre l'identification de la personne impossible. Des vues opposées entre les parties prenantes – les partis politiques, les institutions publiques, la société civile ou les médias – se sont exprimées au sujet de la nécessité de légiférer en la matière et dans l'affirmative, sur les motifs et l'étendue de l'interdiction de la dissimulation du visage. Le phénomène des migrations a eu aussi comme conséquence de renforcer l'hétérogénéité de la population scolaire. Pour faire face à cette situation, les autorités scolaires ont continué à diversifier l'offre en matière d'éducation et de formation. Parmi les mesures mises en place, on peut signaler notamment l'élargissement des offres de cours d'alphabétisation et de formation de base, l'extension de l'offre au niveau des écoles internationales et européennes et la mise en place d'un programme d'éducation plurilingue au niveau de la petite enfance. Dans le domaine de l'immigration, les changements les plus importants concernent la politique d'admission de certaines catégories de ressortissants de pays tiers. À cet égard, le projet de loi n° 7188 vise principalement à transposer la Directive européenne 2016/801 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 11 mai 2016 sur les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des ressortissants de pays tiers à des fins de recherche, d'études, de formation, de volontariat, de programmes d'échanges d'élèves ou de projets éducatifs et de travail au pair. La directive vise à faire de l'Union européenne un centre mondial d'excellence en matière d'études et de formation, tout en favorisant les contacts entre les personnes et leur mobilité, deux éléments importants de la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne. Le projet de loi vise à faciliter et à simplifier les procédures de mobilité intraeuropéenne des chercheurs et des étudiants qui sont des ressortissants de pays tiers. De plus, certaines modifications comprennent des mécanismes incitatifs pour retenir les étudiants et les chercheurs. À cette fin, il propose que les étudiants et les chercheurs, une fois leurs études ou recherches terminées, puissent se voir délivrer un titre de séjour pour « raisons privées » pour une durée maximum de 9 mois en vue de trouver un emploi ou de créer une entreprise. Enfin, le projet de loi entend réglementer le regroupement familial d'un chercheur séjournant au Luxembourg dans le cadre d'une mobilité à court et à long terme. Le législateur a par ailleurs transposé la Directive 2014/36 sur les travailleurs saisonniers et la Directive 2014/66 sur le transfert temporaire intragroupe en droit national, et a adapté le dispositif de l'immigration aux besoins de l'économie en introduisant entre autres, une autorisation de séjour pour les investisseurs. L'organisation de l'admission du séjour et de la délivrance des autorisations de séjour était également un élément clé de l'Accord entre le Luxembourg et le Cap-Vert relatif à la gestion concertée des flux migratoires et au développement solidaire. L'accord approuvé par la loi du 20 juillet 2017 poursuit en outre les objectifs suivant : promouvoir la mobilité des personnes, lutter contre l'immigration irrégulière, préciser les procédures de réadmission, renforcer l'intégration légale des ressortissants concernés, ainsi que mobiliser les compétences et les ressources des migrants en faveur d'un développement solidaire.

The present report provides an overview of the main developments and debates in relation to migration and asylum in Luxembourg in 2017. The number of people applying for international protection remained high in 2017 (2.322 applications) compared to the levels registered pre- 'migration crisis' (1.091 in 2014). However, the number of registrations remained relatively stable if compared to the two preceding years (2.447 in 2015 and 2.035 in 2016). This relative stability in numbers also reflected on the general public and policy debate in the field of migration and asylum. Since 2016, its focus has continuously shifted from an 'emergency' discourse axed on the implementation of reception measures and conditions towards discussions on longer-term integration measures and policies. In this regard, the newly introduced Guided Integration Trail (parcours d'intégration accompagné - PIA) can be considered a flagship project of OLAI, the national agency responsible for the reception and integration of foreigners. This multidisciplinary package of measures aims to empower applicants and beneficiaries of international protection and to support them in developing their life project. The trail, compulsory for all adult applicants for international protection, consists of a linguistic component and a civic component and is split into three phases. Although increasing housing capacities for the reception of applicants for international protection was high on national authorities' agenda, housing remained a challenging aspect of the asylum system and triggered debate on a national scale. Alongside access to training, problems related to housing were among the issues most frequently raised by applicants for international protection in 2017. The lack of affordable housing on the private market, an increasing number of family reunifications as well as the increasing number of beneficiaries and persons who have been issued a return decision who remain housed in structures of OLAI were all identified as interplaying barriers for finding available accommodation for applicants for international protection. The difficulties with the construction of modular housing structures also persisted in 2017. A certain reticence of the population towards the construction of these so-called 'container villages, planned in response to the increasing influx that started in August 2015, was visible in the appeals introduced into Luxembourg's First Instance Administrative Courts to annul the land-use plans related to the projects. Living conditions in the various reception facilities were also one of the subjects of discussion in 2017. This included a debate on the (lack of) kitchen infrastructure in reception facilities and the varying systems for provision of food, the types of food available, as well as the availability of internet. As an answer to the resurgence of an increased influx of applicants of international protection from the Western Balkans in early 2017, a new 'ultra-accelerated procedure' was put in place for applicants of international protection stemming from the Western Balkans. According to the state authorities, the ultra-accelerated procedure was set up to take pressure off the reception facilities, but also as a deterrent to avoid creating false hopes for long-term stay. In April 2017, a 'semi-open return structure' (Structure d'hébergement d'urgence au Kirchberg – SHUK) was put in place, from which people are transferred to states applying the Dublin regulation. Due to home custody (assignation à résidence), the SHUK is considered to be an alternative to detention by national authorities. The newly created structure as well as the related conditions for assignment, were nevertheless criticised by civil society. The outcry among civil society was equally high during and after the adoption the Law of 8 March 2017, which endorses the extension of the permitted period of detention of adults or families with children from 72 hours to 7 days, in order to improve the organisation of the return and ensures that it is carried out successfully. A commission in charge of determining the best interests of unaccompanied minors applying for international protection was decided at the end of 2017. The commission is in charge of carrying out individual assessments regarding the best interest of the child with the aim of delivering an authorisation of stay or a return decision. Among the elements taken into consideration when the best interest of the child is evaluated in the context of a potential return decision is information provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The latter made an agreement with the Directorate of Immigration in 2017 to search for the parents of UAMs in the country of origin. With the focus of debates having slowly shifted towards long-term integration issues, the Council of Government also approved the elaboration of a new multiannual national action plan on integration. The plan will be based on two axes: (1) the reception and follow-up of applicants for international protection and (2) the integration of Luxembourg's non-Luxembourgish residents. Luxembourg's National Employment Agency (ADEM) set up a "cellule BPI" (beneficiaries of international protection cell) in its Employer Service in early 2017. This cell provides employers with information regarding job applications and evaluations of the competences of beneficiaries of international protection. A new law on the Luxembourgish nationality entered into force on 1 April 2017. Given the particular demographic situation of Luxembourg characterised by a significant increase in the total population and a decrease in the proportion of Luxembourgers in the total population, the reform intends to promote the societal and political integration of non-Luxembourgish citizens and to strengthen cohesion within the national community. The main changes introduced by the law include a decreased length of residence requirement for naturalisation (from 7 to 5 years), the right of birthplace (jus soli) of the first generation, a simplified way of acquiring Luxembourgish nationality by 'option', as well as new scenarios to avoid cases of statelessness. The law maintains previous linguistic requirements but makes some adjustments in order to prevent the language condition from becoming an insurmountable obstacle. Ahead of the local elections held on 8 October 2017, the Ministry of Family, Integration and the Greater Region launched a national information and awareness-raising campaign titled "Je peux voter" (I can vote) in January 2017. This campaign aimed to motivate Luxembourg's foreign population to register on the electoral roll for the local elections. The government's intention to legislate face concealment was arguably one of the most debated topics in the field related to community life and integration in the broader sense, both in parliament as well as in the media and public sphere. Bill n°7179 aims to modify article 563 of the Penal Code and to create the prohibition of face concealment in certain public spaces. The bill defines face concealment as the action of covering part of or all of the face in a way of rendering the identification of the person impossible and provides a wide variety of examples, such as the wearing of a motor cycle helmet, a balaclava or a full-face veil. Opposing views among stakeholders, whether political parties, public institutions, civil society or the media, emerged with regard to the necessity to legislate in the matter and if so, on the basis of which grounds and to what extent. The phenomenon of migration has also led to a more heterogeneous population in Luxembourg's schools. To face this situation, the education authorities continued to diversify Luxembourg's offer in education and training, creating for instance a bigger offer for youngsters and adults who do not master any of Luxembourg's vehicular languages, offering more alphabetisation courses or basic instruction courses. The Minister for National Education continued to develop and adapt the school offer to the increased heterogeneity by increasing the international and European school offer, introducing of a new mediation service and putting in place a plurilingual education programme. In the area of legal migration, the most significant changes concerned admission policies of specific categories of third-country nationals. In this respect, bill n°7188 mainly aims to transpose Directive (EU) 2016/801 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing. The directive aims to make the European Union a world centre of excellence for studies and training, while favouring contacts between people and favouring their mobility, these two being important elements of the European Union's external policy. Bill N°7188 intends to facilitate and simplify the procedures for intra-European mobility of TCN researchers and students. Moreover, the proposed changes include incentive mechanisms to retain students and researchers. To this end, it proposes that students and researchers, once they have completed their studies/research, can be issued a residence permit for "private reasons" for a duration of 9 months at most in view of finding employment or creating a business. Finally, bill n°7188 also foresees provisions to regulate the family reunification of a researcher staying in Luxembourg in the context of short- and long-term mobility with his/her nuclear family. The legislator furthermore transposed Directive 2014/36 on seasonal workers and Directive 2014/66 on temporary intragroup transfer into national law, and adapted Luxembourg's immigration law to the needs to the economy, by introducing, amongst other things, and authorisation of stay for investors. Organising the admission of stay and the issuance of authorisations of stay was also a key component within the agreement between Luxembourg and Cape Verde on the concerted management of migratory flows and solidary development. Other objectives of the agreement include the promotion of the movement of people, detailing readmission procedures, fighting against irregular migration, strengthening the legal establishment and integration of the concerned nationals, as well as the mobilisation of skills and resources of migrants in favour of solidary development. ; Le présent rapport fait la synthèse des principaux débats et des évolutions majeures concernant les migrations et l'asile au Luxembourg en 2017. Le nombre de personnes demandant une protection internationale est resté élevé en 2017 (2 322 demandes) par rapport aux niveaux enregistrés avant la « crise migratoire » (1 091 en 2014). Toutefois, ce nombre est resté relativement stable par rapport aux deux années précédentes (2 447 en 2015 et 2 035 en 2016). Cette stabilité relative s'est également reflétée dans le débat public et politique dans le domaine des migrations et de l'asile. Depuis 2016, l'accent n'a cessé de se déplacer d'un discours « d'urgence » axé sur la mise en œuvre de mesures et de conditions d'accueil vers des discussions sur des mesures et des politiques d'intégration à plus long terme. À cet égard, le nouveau parcours d'intégration accompagné (PIA) peut être considéré comme un projet phare de l'OLAI, l'Office luxembourgeois de l'accueil et de l'intégration des étrangers. Le PIA vise à autonomiser les demandeurs et les bénéficiaires d'une protection internationale et à les soutenir dans le développement de leur projet de vie. Le parcours, obligatoire pour tous les demandeurs adultes de protection internationale, se compose d'une composante linguistique et d'une composante civique, et il est divisé en trois phases. Bien que l'augmentation des capacités d'hébergement des demandeurs de protection internationale (DPI) figure parmi les priorités des autorités nationales, le logement des DPI reste très problématique et a déclenché un débat à l'échelle nationale. Outre l'accès à la formation, les problèmes liés au logement des DPI ont été parmi les questions les plus fréquemment soulevées en 2017. La pression sur le logement des DPI et des bénéficiaires de protection internationale (BPI) est importante : le manque de logements abordables sur le marché privé, le nombre croissant de réunifications familiales et la progression du nombre de BPI et de personnes qui ont fait l'objet d'une décision de retour mais qui restent hébergées dans les structures de l'OLAI ont été identifiés comme facteurs de pression. Les difficultés liées à la construction de structures modulaires d'hébergement ont également persisté en 2017. Une certaine réticence de la population à l'égard de la construction de ces « villages conteneurs », prévue en réponse à l'afflux croissant qui a commencé en août 2015, était visible dans les recours introduits devant les tribunaux administratifs pour annuler les plans d'occupation des sols liés aux projets. Les conditions de vie au sein des structures d'accueil ont également fait l'objet de discussions. Elles portaient notamment sur l'absence d'équipement en cuisines de plusieurs lieux d'accueil, les différents systèmes d'approvisionnement en nourriture et les types de nourriture disponibles. Afin de répondre au nombre toujours important de DPI en provenance des pays des Balkans occidentaux, une procédure ultra-accélérée a été mise en place. Cette procédure a été instaurée pour diminuer les pressions sur les structures d'accueil et pour éviter de créer de faux espoirs pour les séjours de longue durée. En avril 2017, la structure d'hébergement d'urgence au Kirchberg (SHUK) a été mise en place, afin d'héberger les DPI pour lesquels le Luxembourg n'est pas compétent pour examiner les demandes en vertu de l'application du règlement de Dublin. Ce nombre a fortement progressé. Le placement à la SHUK correspond à une assignation à résidence, donc à une alternative à la rétention. La structure nouvellement créée ainsi que les conditions d'affectation ont néanmoins été critiquées par la société civile. Plusieurs acteurs de la société civile ont manifesté leur opposition face à une disposition de la loi du 8 mars 2017 qui a étendu la période de rétention des adultes ou familles avec enfants de 72 heures à 7 jours afin de rendre plus efficiente l'organisation du retour. Un premier bilan du fonctionnement du Centre de rétention a été publié en 2017. Une commission chargée d'évaluer l'intérêt des mineurs non accompagnés dans le cadre d'une décision de retour a été créé fin 2017. La commission est chargée de mener à bien des évaluations individuelles concernant l'intérêt supérieur de l'enfant dans le but de prendre une décision de retour ou d'accorder une autorisation de séjour. Parmi les éléments pris en considération lors de cette évaluation et dans le contexte d'une éventuelle décision de retour figurent également les informations fournies par l'Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM). Cette dernière a conclu un accord avec la Direction de l'immigration pour rechercher les parents de mineurs non accompagnés dans le pays d'origine. Comme les débats s'orientent lentement vers l'intégration à long terme, le Conseil de gouvernement a également approuvé l'élaboration d'un nouveau plan d'action national sur l'intégration. Le plan sera basé sur deux axes : l'accueil et le suivi des demandeurs de protection internationale et l'intégration des résidents non luxembourgeois au Luxembourg. L'Agence pour le Développement de l'Emploi (ADEM) a créé une cellule BPI au sein de son Service employeurs. Cette cellule fournit aux employeurs des renseignements sur les demandes d'emploi et les évaluations des compétences des BPI. Une nouvelle loi sur la nationalité luxembourgeoise est entrée en vigueur le 1er avril 2017. Cette loi s'inscrit dans le contexte démographique particulier du Luxembourg, caractérisé par une augmentation continue de la population totale avec, en parallèle, une diminution de la part des Luxembourgeois dans la population totale. A travers cette loi, le législateur veut favoriser l'intégration sociétale et politique des citoyens non luxembourgeois et renforcer la cohésion au sein de la communauté nationale. Les principaux changements introduits par la loi consistent en la réduction de la durée de résidence pour la naturalisation (de 7 à 5 ans), l'introduction du droit du sol de la première génération, la réinstauration de voies simplifiées d'acquisition de la nationalité luxembourgeoise par « option », ainsi que de nouveaux scénarios pour éviter les cas d'apatridie. La loi maintient les exigences linguistiques antérieures tout en procédant à quelques ajustements afin d'empêcher que les exigences linguistiques ne deviennent un obstacle insurmontable. En vue des élections communales du 8 octobre 2017, le ministère de la Famille, de l'Intégration et à la Grande Région a lancé une campagne d'information et de sensibilisation intitulée « Je peux voter » en janvier 2017. Cette campagne avait pour but d'inciter la population étrangère du Luxembourg à s'inscrire sur les listes électorales pour les élections communales. L'intention du Gouvernement de légiférer sur la dissimulation du visage était sans doute l'un des sujets les plus débattus dans le domaine lié à la vie au sein de la société au Luxembourg et l'intégration au sens large du terme, tant à la Chambre des députés que dans les médias et la sphère publique. Le projet de loi n° 7179 vise à modifier l'article 563 du Code pénal et à créer l'interdiction de dissimuler le visage dans certains espaces publics. Il définit la dissimulation du visage comme le fait de couvrir une partie ou la totalité du visage de façon à rendre l'identification de la personne impossible. Des vues opposées entre les parties prenantes – les partis politiques, les institutions publiques, la société civile ou les médias – se sont exprimées au sujet de la nécessité de légiférer en la matière et dans l'affirmative, sur les motifs et l'étendue de l'interdiction de la dissimulation du visage. Le phénomène des migrations a eu aussi comme conséquence de renforcer l'hétérogénéité de la population scolaire. Pour faire face à cette situation, les autorités scolaires ont continué à diversifier l'offre en matière d'éducation et de formation. Parmi les mesures mises en place, on peut signaler notamment l'élargissement des offres de cours d'alphabétisation et de formation de base, l'extension de l'offre au niveau des écoles internationales et européennes et la mise en place d'un programme d'éducation plurilingue au niveau de la petite enfance. Dans le domaine de l'immigration, les changements les plus importants concernent la politique d'admission de certaines catégories de ressortissants de pays tiers. À cet égard, le projet de loi n° 7188 vise principalement à transposer la Directive européenne 2016/801 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 11 mai 2016 sur les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des ressortissants de pays tiers à des fins de recherche, d'études, de formation, de volontariat, de programmes d'échanges d'élèves ou de projets éducatifs et de travail au pair. La directive vise à faire de l'Union européenne un centre mondial d'excellence en matière d'études et de formation, tout en favorisant les contacts entre les personnes et leur mobilité, deux éléments importants de la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne. Le projet de loi vise à faciliter et à simplifier les procédures de mobilité intraeuropéenne des chercheurs et des étudiants qui sont des ressortissants de pays tiers. De plus, certaines modifications comprennent des mécanismes incitatifs pour retenir les étudiants et les chercheurs. À cette fin, il propose que les étudiants et les chercheurs, une fois leurs études ou recherches terminées, puissent se voir délivrer un titre de séjour pour « raisons privées » pour une durée maximum de 9 mois en vue de trouver un emploi ou de créer une entreprise. Enfin, le projet de loi entend réglementer le regroupement familial d'un chercheur séjournant au Luxembourg dans le cadre d'une mobilité à court et à long terme. Le législateur a par ailleurs transposé la Directive 2014/36 sur les travailleurs saisonniers et la Directive 2014/66 sur le transfert temporaire intragroupe en droit national, et a adapté le dispositif de l'immigration aux besoins de l'économie en introduisant entre autres, une autorisation de séjour pour les investisseurs. L'organisation de l'admission du séjour et de la délivrance des autorisations de séjour était également un élément clé de l'Accord entre le Luxembourg et le Cap-Vert relatif à la gestion concertée des flux migratoires et au développement solidaire. L'accord approuvé par la loi du 20 juillet 2017 poursuit en outre les objectifs suivant : promouvoir la mobilité des personnes, lutter contre l'immigration irrégulière, préciser les procédures de réadmission, renforcer l'intégration légale des ressortissants concernés, ainsi que mobiliser les compétences et les ressources des migrants en faveur d'un développement solidaire.