Suchergebnisse

Dirk Messner on the dynamics
of global change and the significance of international science and technology
cooperation in the post-Western world



This is the fifth in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich 





In recent years, the analysis of new emerging powers and shifting global order has become central to the study of international relations. While International Relations, aiming to evolve into a truly global discipline, is only just about to start opening up towards Non-Western perspectives, global power shifts have already led to a restructuring of global governance architecture in large fields of political reality and practice. Dirk Messner illustrates how far global power shifts have to lead to new patterns of international cooperation using international science and technology cooperation as a case in point. He argues that investment in joint knowledge creation and knowledge exchange is vital for managing the earth system. Messner also points to the multitude of tasks related to socio-technical systems which the political sphere is currently facing, particularly with regard to the challenge of managing the climate system. 




Print version of this Talk (pdf)




What is the most important challenge facing global politics that should be the central debate in the discipline of International Relations?



The biggest challenge of the next decades which we have to come to terms with is governing the big global commons. When I say global commons I do have in mind the atmosphere, the climate system, and other parts of the earth system, but also international financial markets and global infrastructures, such as the Internet – stability of these and other global commons is a public good much required. We need to stabilize the global commons and then manage them in a cooperative manner.



Three dynamics of global change make it specifically challenging to manage these global commons. The first wave of global change is the globalization wave; the economic globalization, cross-border dynamics, global value chains. It becomes evident that in many areas and especially when it comes to the global commons, regulation exceeds the capacity of individual nation states. The international community is required to institutionalize multilateralism and efficient global governance mechanisms in order to properly address issues arising from global dynamics. The second big global change is the shift from a Western to a post-Western world order. Global power shifts remaking the international system impede governing global commons. The third wave of global change is related to climate change, which adds a new dimension of global dynamics; human beings now have to learn how to steer, to stabilize, and how to govern the earth system as such. We are not only a species living on this planet, depending from resources and ecosystems of the earth systems. With the acceleration of economic globalization during the 1990s and the emergence of new, non-Western economic drivers of change, like China, humankind now significantly impacts the physical structures of the earth system. This trend is new. For the first 4,6 billion years of the existence of the earth system it was driven by the laws of physics, the dynamics of biology and bio-chemical processes. Homo sapiens appeared 220.000 years ago, and the impact of our species on the earth system has been marginal until the industrial revolution started 250 years ago. During the last decades human mankind became a major driver of change at a planetary scale.





How did you arrive in your current thinking about these issues?



I have always been interested in international relations, international policy dimensions, and the global economy. I started at the Free University of Berlin at the beginning of the 80's towards the mid-80's, studying Political Science and Economics. One among those professors who have been particularly important to me is Elmar Altvater. He was the supervisor of my diploma as well as of my Ph.D., and he sent me abroad. This resulted being a pivotal experience to me. I studied the last year of my first degree in Seoul, in South Korea. It was the period, the 80's, when the four Asian Tiger states emerged following Japan's example: South Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong, and Singapur. I had the chance to visit these countries, study there and learn a lot about Asia. I was fascinated by the dynamics of emerging economies and what this implied for the international arena. Somewhat later, the Latin American continent became the center of my interest. I did research in Nicaragua, Uruguay, Chile and some other Latin American countries, trying to understand liberalization-movements, how weaker actors come under pressure in Western-dominated global settings, but also how some countries managed it to become dynamic parts of the global economy (like the "Asian tigers" or Chile) and why others failed. I learnt that it is crucial to understand dynamics of global change in order to being able to build solid and inclusive economic structures and legitimate political systems at national levels. There has always been a political impulse that pulled me into certain fields I decided to work in.





What is your advice for students who would like to get into the field of global change research or international cooperation?



My first advice is: visit and work in different countries and different cultural and political settings. It is one thing to learn from scholars or books, but having studied and having lived in different contexts and countries is absolutely a key experience. This is the way to understand global dynamics, to get a feeling for differences and similarities. My second advice stems from my experience and conviction that we need much more interdisciplinary research than we currently have. We talk a lot about interdisciplinarity, however, we do not have career paths that systematically build interdisciplinary teams.



Looking particularly at global environmental changes and the future of the earth system, at the end of the day, social scientists and natural scientists need to learn how to work together and to understand each other. The future of the oceans, for example, is not a question that can be understood by ocean biologists only. They are the people studying how these elements of the earth system are actually working, the dynamics and drivers - focusing on physical, chemical, and biochemical processes. But when we look at the oceans towards 2100 from the perspective of global change, the most important drivers are now us human beings, our economies, our consumption patterns, our greenhouse gas emissions and their impacts on the oceans. And this implies that to understand dynamics of global change, we need to analyze the interactions, interdependences and feedback loops between three systems: the ecological system(s); social systems (our economies and societies) driven by humans; the technical systems and infrastructures. Therefore natural scientists, social scientists, and engineers need to interact very closely.  In the German Advisory Council on Global Change we call this approach: Transformation Research. Currently, we do not possess the appropriate university structures to adequately address this sort of problems. This is an immense institutional challenge. If I were a young scholar I would move into this direction, crossing disciplinary boundaries as much as possible.





What is the role of science and technologies in the dynamics of global change?



There are multiple important dimensions, but I would like to focus on some of them by moving through the aforementioned waves of global change. Technology is driving economic globalization, the first wave of global change. So we need to understand the dynamics of new technologies, especially the impact of ICTs, in order to understand the dynamics of economic globalization. The World Wide Web and social communication media are restructuring industrialization processes and global value chains. ICT infrastructure is also displaying a big potential for less developed regions. In Africa, for example, we saw many African countries jumping from the old telephone technologies to smartphones within less than a decade, because the old, maintenance and capital intensive communications infrastructure was no longer needed. Many African people now have access to smartphones, thus to communication- and information networks, and begin to reshape prize constellations and the global economy. Because of its restructuring effects, the impact of ICTs is relevant in all areas of the global economy. The global trend towards urbanization is similarly related to ICTs. Currently, we approach the global economy via data on national economies. But this might be about to change, as global mega-cities develop into global knowledge and financial hubs, building their own networks. In 2040, 80 percent of the global production, global GDP, global consumption, global exchange might be concentrated in 70 to 80 global cities or city regions.



Technology is also linked to the second wave of global change – the tectonic global power shift – in the way that investment in technology and knowledge in emerging economies are growing rapidly. We are not only facing economic and political power shifts, but also a remaking of the global science and research system itself. From my perspective, international cooperation in the field of science and technology research between "old powers" and "new powers", between Western countries and non-Western countries is extremely important for two reasons: First, we need to pool know-how in order to solve core global challenges and to develop patterns for managing the global commons. Interaction and cooperation in the field of science and technology is especially important for the creation of knowledge that is "better" in any way. For instance, in the field of adaptation policies to the impacts of climate change, most of the knowledge on how societies and local communities actually work or respond under these conditions exists in non-Western societies. The generation of knowledge is context dependent. We need to interact with colleagues from the respective countries for mutual learning and common knowledge improvement. My second argument is that, as an effect of the global power shift, traditional development cooperation is losing legitimacy. Many of these societies, from China to Peru, from Kenya to Vietnam, are no longer interested in our usual business, in our "aid-packages", our money, our experts or our concepts. What they are more interested in is true and reciprocal knowledge exchange and joint knowledge creation. Therefore, investments in respective forms and institutions of knowledge exchange and creation will be a central pillar of/for future oriented development cooperation or international cooperation and beneficial for all partners involved. Joint knowledge creation is a precondition for joint action and legitimate global governance initiatives.



The role of technologies with regard to the implications of climate change is crucial and multifaceted. In the German Advisory Council on Global Change we put forth suggestions concerning the transformation towards a low-carbon global economy. We are relatively optimistic in a technological sense. This statement is partly based on the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) research, which has been driven by Nebojsa Nakicenovic, one of our colleagues, who is working on energy modeling. The perspective there is that we know which kind of technologies we need for the transformation into a low-carbon or even zero-carbon economy. We can even calculate the investment costs and structures of different countries and regions. But we do know relatively little about the transformation processes of entire societies, economies and, eventually, the international system towards low-carbon systems. The transformation towards a low-carbon society is a "great transformation". In the entire history of mankind there might be only two examples for such a profound change: the industrial revolution 250 years ago and the Neolithic revolution 10.000 years ago, which induced the practices of agriculture. Today, we thus witness the third great transformation: the decoupling from fossil resources, from high-carbon to zero-carbon. To achieve the 2° Celsius goal, a complete decarbonization of the basic infrastructures of the global economy (the energy systems, the urban infrastructures and systems, the land use systems) is required – within a very limited period of time, until 2070. Comprehensive knowledge is key to achieve this. Let me emphasize once more the significance of international cooperation in the field of science and technology research, particularly in the IPCC context. I am sure that politicians from China, India, or Brazil only accept what the IPCC is presenting as objective knowledge, as the stand of the art knowledge, because their national scientists are deeply involved. If this were a classical western-based knowledge project it would have resulted in a lack of legitimacy. In the case of global climate policy, it is obvious that investment in joint knowledge creation is also about creating legitimacy for joint action.





What are the main obstacles of the low-carbon transformation?



The first two great transformations have been evolutionary processes. No one "planned" the industrial revolution, not to mention the Neolithic revolution.  These have been evolutionary dynamics. The sustainability transformation instead needs to be a governed process right from the beginning. In our institute, we looked at different transformation dynamics, not only the really big ones, the Neolithic, industrial, and the current sustainability transformation. We also examined structural adjustment programs in Latin America and Africa, the collapse of communism at the end of the 80s, the abolition of slavery, and similar other key transformations of human societies. Based on this historical perspective, we have identified four main drivers of transformation: The first one is crisis, this is the most important one. Confronted with strong crises, society and probably also individuals react and change direction. The second important driver is very often technology and scientific (r)evolution. The third driver is vision: If you are confronted with a problem but you do not know where to go to, transformation becomes very difficult. The European Union is the product of a fresh vision among elites after World War II; the United Nations is a result of the disasters of the first half of the 20th century. Advancing a vision is an essential means to move or to transform in a goal-oriented manner. Sustainability, of course, is also a vision. The fourth and last driver of transformation is "knowledge": you know that you have a certain problem constellation, and though the crisis is still not there, you react based on your knowledge in a preventive way.



For the low-carbon transformation, the fourth driver currently is absolutely key. We are able to address problems which would otherwise become much worse in the future, although the climate crisis is latent still – in contrast to, for example, the financial crisis, which is more visible in its effects. The impacts of a global warming of 4 or 5 degrees are still not visible. This makes for a huge difference. In fact, humans are not very good at acting and transforming significantly based on knowledge only. In combination with visible, tangible crises, knowledge is a strong driver of change, but without crisis, it is merely sufficient. Transformations based on knowledge and preventive action only are rare. The ozone hole is one positive example; solving the problem was possible because it required less complex technological change, affecting few industries only. Human beings are risk-averse in a sense, we are conservative, we do not like to change rapidly; we are path-dependent. John Maynard Keynes once said: "It is easy to develop new concepts and ideas. The difficult thing is to forget the old ones". Therefore, scientific tools are needed in order to sketch out future scenarios. Based on scientific knowledge, we need to convince our societies, our political decision-makers that it is necessary and possible to transform societies and economies towards sustainability – in order to avoid disruptive change in the earth system. Pushing towards sustainability at a point where the crisis has not yet materialized implies a specific and new role for science in managing global dynamics. Organizing a deep transformation towards sustainability avoiding significant crises driven by Earth system changes would be a cultural learning process – a civilizational shift.





What are the effects of growing multipolarity for global governance processes?



To start optimistically, I would argue that in contrast to historical situations in which this kind of tectonic power shifts led to conflicts or even wars, the current situation is different. The world is highly interconnected and economic interdependencies are stronger than ever. Charles Kupchan is differentiating between "war", "cold peace" and "warm peace". I think that a big "war" is not very probable, and "cold peace" is what we are in actually. "Warm peace" would be cooperative global governance: we identify our problems, have a joint problem analysis, and subsequently start acting cooperatively on them. But this does not describe the contemporary situation. While there are no severe global conflicts, we do not solve many of the global interdependency problems.



There are many barriers to global cooperation and I would like to mention two or three of those. The first one consists of power conflicts and power struggles. Hopefully realists such as John Mearsheimer are not right in claiming that "a peaceful rise of China is not possible". But the fundamental point remains that the re-organization and shuffling of power resources is rendering cooperation extremely difficult. The second point is that all the important global actors currently have severe domestic challenges to manage. The European countries are coping with the European dept crisis. Similarly, the United States is concerned with financial turbulences and rising social inequalities. China has to keep its annual growth rate of about 8 to 12 per cent and meanwhile stabilize its rapid modernization process. In India, there is still a large group of people suffering from poverty. So, managing that and trying to be a responsible global actor at the same time is not easy at all. In brief, all actors that we would like to see taking on a more responsible role on the global level are overcommitted domestically.



There is consensus among different disciplines on what cooperation is actually about. At the Centre for Global Cooperation Research we did a study on The Behavioural Dimensions of International Cooperation (2013) based on insights of very different disciplines – evolutionary biology, social anthropology, cognitive sciences, psychology, political sciences, behavioral economics – to find out what the basic mechanisms are which help human beings to cooperate at any scale towards global corporation in a world of nine billion people. Finally, we identified seven factors promoting cooperation: trust, communication, joint we-identities, reputation, fairness, enforcement – and reciprocity, which is the most fundamental prerequisite. These factors form an enable environment for cooperation and they are manmade. In contexts, actor constellations, systems, in which these basic mechanisms of cooperation are strong, they help to embed power dynamics, to solve social dilemma problems and to manage interdependencies. In contrast, contexts, actor constellations, and systems in which theses basic mechanisms of cooperation are weak, will be driven mainly by power dynamics and struggles. By looking at these factors one immediately understands why the G20 context is so difficult. We have been able to create and to well establish these factors in our old settings; in the European Union, the Western world, the transatlantic community. But now we are sitting together with new actors rather unknown. The G7/G8 world – the OECD driven and the western driven global economy and global politics – has moved towards G20 since it was acknowledged that one cannot manage any global turbulence without emerging economies. The G20 was created or rather called to meet in 2008, a few days after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers when many feared the collapse of the world's financial markets. Most western economies were highly indebted, whereas the emerging economies, especially China, were holding large currency reserves. From a behavioral perspective we have to invest in these basic factors of cooperation in the G 20 context in order to create the essential preconditions of joint action to solve the big global problems. This represents a long-term project, and unfortunately many of these global problems are highly challenging from the time perspective: a tension derives from the gap between time pressure in many of these areas and the time it probably needs to build up these basic mechanisms of cooperation. In fact, the major feeling is that international cooperation is even weaker now than a decade ago. I usually visualize the current situation of the G20 as a round table with 20 seats but no one is sitting there. Charles Kupchan's "No one's world" or Ian Bremmer's "The G0 world" deal with the same problem: international cooperation, global governance is currently so difficult, although all these interdependency problems rendered the problem of managing the global commons fully obvious. If you talk to our Foreign Ministers or Finance Ministers or Chancellors and Presidents, they of course all know exactly what is out there in terms of globalization impacts. But organizing the necessary global consensus and the governance and cooperation structures is tremendously difficult.





How far is the discipline of development research affected by global change?



This is a complex question, to which I do not have a definite answer. The whole field of development research is currently about to get redefined. In the past, the concept of development was clear: On the one side, there was the developed world, the OECD-world, consisting of 35-40 countries and on the other side, the "underdeveloped" part of the world, all other countries. Understanding the differences between developed and developing, along with thinking about the basic drivers of modernization and wealth creation in less developed countries was at the core of development research for a long period. How can poor countries become rich and as developed as OECD countries already are?



Today, it is highly questionable if even the broader categories of "development research" still serve to analyze the new realities. Do we currently still need "development economists", and how would they differ from classical "economists" doing research in those European countries suffering most from the debt crisis, high unemployment and weak institutions? Situations in many OECD countries nowadays look like what one would expect from a still developing or emerging economy, and the other way around. So, what distinguishes development research? This is an important question. Studying non-OECD countries, do we still need development research based governance theories or democratization theories – thus, theories that are systematically different from those we apply in our research on OECD countries? The discipline of development research is under immense pressure. This debate is linked to the second wave of global change we talked about: the post-western world order, emerging economies catching up, convergence trends in the global economy.



If you look at the role of international technology transfer, the same scenario arises: the North-South, donor-recipient categories have dissolved. Technology transfer has lost its distinct direction, and it is much more reciprocal and diffuse than it used to be. There are several studies currently pointing to the fact that investment rates in R&D and in technology creation are growing fast in several regions around the globe, whereas in many OECD-countries, investment is stagnating, or even decreasing. The whole map of knowledge, if you like to say so, is about to undergo deep changes. This implies that the common assumption that knowledge is based in OECD countries and transferred to the South via development cooperation is just not working any longer. We need new patterns of cooperation between different countries in this area. And we need research on global development dynamics which will be different from classical development research which has been based on the assumption of a systemic North-South divide for a long time.







How do institutions such as the World Bank react to the emerging and redefined agenda of development?



The current reorientation of the World Bank as a Knowledge Bank originates from the assumption that knowledge is just as important as money for global development. The second point is that more and more of their partners in non-OECD countries, classical developing and emerging economies, are more and more interested in the knowledge pools of the World Bank and less in their experts. And: dynamic developing countries and emerging economies are even more interested in investments in their own knowledge systems and joint knowledge creation with the World Bank. The old North-South knowledge transfer model is eroding. You might say that there currently are two contradictory global trends: on the one hand via social media and the Internet, knowledge is being widely distributed – broader than ever before and actually, theoretically accessible at any point in the world –, on the other hand the proliferation of knowledge is accompanied with access restriction and control, and the growing privatization of knowledge. Aiming to play a constructive role in collaborative knowledge generation, the World Bank invests a lot in building up freely accessible data bases and open research tools, including the provision of governance or development indicators of any kind. However, this is a difficult process that is developing slowly.



The World Bank is currently undergoing several basic re-orientations. The structures inside of the World Bank are about to become less hierarchical and more horizontal. Originally, the World Bank has been a much more western dominated organization as the Bretton Woods institutions were formed by the United States and its allies. If you look into the governance structures of the World Bank today, it is still largely dominated by OECD countries, but you can notice that this is changing. It is a global organization but 90 % of people working there have been studying at Anglo-Saxon universities. Actors especially from emerging economies have been criticizing that for long, claiming that the World Bank as a global organization should have to be represented by a global citizenship. Although this had slowly started to change already, all the knowledge and all the qualification procedures still remained very western dominated. So they asked the World Bank to diversify its partner structures, to reach out and cooperate with research institutions from around the world. This is what the World Bank is trying to do at the moment, which is really a break with its culture. Because even though the World Bank is a global organization, it has always been a very inward-looking organization. The World Bank was strong, with fantastic professionals and researchers inside, but without cooperating tools. Now they are trying to broaden their cooperation structures and to learn from and together with other institutions.





What are the opportunities and difficulties of big data analysis for global development?



Access to any kind of data is important for any kind of knowledge creation. It has been very limited for many developing countries over a very long time. So, thinking about how to assure access to serious data is significant. This would be my first point. My second point is that, when it comes to big data and the question of managing large amounts of indicators on, for example, cross-country or cross-sector modeling, I think the new technologies are opening up new research possibilities and opportunities. Big data provides the opportunity to identify patterns. Looking for similar dynamics in very different systems is a very interesting exercise, because you get deeper insights into the basic dynamics of systems. This is what I have learned from my colleague Nakicenovic, whom I have mentioned before, and who is working on the Global Energy Assessment, or from Juergen Kurths, from the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, who is studying basic structures and dynamics of very different complex systems like air traffic networks, global infrastructures and social media networks. Managing big data allows you to see patterns which cannot be seen if you only work with case studies. However, to understand the dynamics of countries and sectors, new actor constellations or communities, you need to go into detail and in this specific moment, big data is only the starting point, the background: you also need qualified, serious, very often qualitative data on the ground. Big data and qualified, specific data: they complement each other.



For sure, an important aspect of big data is that for the most part, it is gathered and stored by private businesses. We started this interview talking about global commons and we actually just defined a global commons: data on development should be a global commons, and we need standards and rules of managing those. Private actors could play a role, but within a set of rules defined by societies and policies, and not the private business sector.









Dirk Messner is the Director of the "German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)" since 2003 and teaches at the Institute of Political Science, University of Duisburg-Essen. He is Co-Director of the "Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation Research (KHK/GCR)", University Duisburg-Essen, which was established in 2012. He furthermore is Co-Chair of the "German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU)", member of the "China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development", member of the "Global Knowledge Advisory Commission" of the World Bank and member of the "European Commission's Scientific Advisory Board for EU development policy". Dirk Messner's research interests and work areas include globalisation and global governance, climate change, transformation towards low carbon economies, and development policy. He directed many international research programs and thus created a close international research network.



related links:


Profile at German Development Institute
Messner, Dirk / Guarín, Alejandro / Haun, Daniel (eds.) (2013): The Behavioural Dimensions of International Cooperation, Global Cooperation Research Papers 1, Centre for Global Cooperation Research (pdf)


Read Jing Gu, John Humphrey, and Dirk Messner's (2007) Global Governance and Developing Countries: The Implications of the Rise of China here (pdf)


Messner, Dirk (2007): The European Union: Protagonist in a
Multilateral World Order or Peripheral Power
in the »Asia-Pacific« Century? (pdf)


Print version of this Talk (pdf)

Bodenerosion durch Wasser ist ein ubiquitäres Problem, dass sowohl die landwirtschaftliche Produktivität vermindert, Bodenfunktionen einschränkt und auch in anderen Umweltkompartimenten schädliche Auswirkungen haben kann. Oberflächengewässer sind durch die mit Bodenerosion einhergehende Belastung durch Sediment, sedimentgebundenen und gelösten Nährstoffen sowie anderen Schadstoffen besonders betroffen. Das Wissen über Erosionsprozesse und Sedimentfrachten hat daher große Bedeutung für den Schutz der Güter Boden und Wasser und darüber hinaus eine ökonomische Bedeutung. Generell kann innerhalb eines Hanges oder Einzugsgebietes von einer Zone der Erosion, des Transports und der Sedimentation ausgegangen werden. Jedoch führen Abflussbildungsprozesse und rauhigkeits- bzw. topographiebeeinflusste Abflusskonzentration zu einer individuellen Differenzierung. Räumliche und zeitliche Prozessdiskontinuitäten oder Konnektivitäten und Schwellenwerte modifizieren die Erosions- und Sedimentaustragssituation in einem Einzugsgebiet darüber hinaus. Die Landschaftstrukturelemente Relief und Boden kontrollieren demnach über die Bodenfeuchtedifferenzierung im entscheidenden Maße die Abflussbildung und Sedimentfracht in einem Einzugsgebiet. Obwohl in den gemäßigten und kühlen Klimaregionen ein großer Teil der Abflussbildung im Winter stattfindet und von Bodenfrost sowie Schneeschmelzen geprägt sein kann, ist über die Prozesse und die Größe der Sediment- und Nährstoffausträge bei solchen winterlichen Randbedingungen nur wenig bekannt. Systematische Untersuchungen existieren vor allem für Norwegen und Russland. Dieses Defizit spiegelt sich auch in den vorhandenen Modellansätzen zur Abbildung der Bodenerosion und der Abschätzung von Sedimentausträgen aus Einzugsgebieten wider. Zum einen werden in der Regel weder Schneedeckenaufbau bzw. -schmelze noch die Veränderungen des Bodenwasserflusses bei Bodenfrost berücksichtigt. Zum anderen werden die Erosivität des Schneeschmelzabflusses und die Beeinflussungen der Bodenerodibilität, z.B. durch Frost-Tau Zyklen, nicht hinreichend wiedergegeben. Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es daher, auf der Analyse von Daten aus einem deutschen und einem russischen Untersuchungseinzugsgebiet aufbauend, die wichtigsten Prozesse und Größen der Abflussbildung und Stoffausträge bei winterlichen Rahmenbedingungen zu charakterisieren und in einem Modellsystem umzusetzen. Die weitergehende Anwendung dieses Modellsystems dient der Interpretation räumlicher Heterogenitäten und zeitlicher Variabilitäten sowie der Auswirkungen von klimatischen- und Landnutzungsänderungen auf den Sedimentaustrag der beiden Untersuchungseinzugsgebiete. Das 1.44 km² große Einzugsgebiet Schäfertal liegt im östlichen Unterharz. Über den Grauwacken und Tonschiefern haben sich aus einem periglazialen Decklagenkomplex Braun- und Parabraunerden entwickelt, die ackerbaulich mit einer Wintergetreide-Raps Fruchtfolge genutzt werden. In der Tiefenlinie dominieren hydromorph überprägte Böden mit Wiesennutzung. Das Klima weist bei einer Jahresmitteltemperatur von 6.8°C und 680 mm Jahresniederschlagssumme eine geringe kontinentale Überprägung auf. Neben langjährigen umfangreichen hydro-meteorologischen Messungen finden seit mehreren Jahren Untersuchungen zum Sediment- und Nährstoffautrag statt. Eine regelmäßige zweiwöchentliche Beprobung des Abflusses am Gebietsauslass wird durch eine automatisierte Hochwasserprobenahme vor allem bei Schneeschmelzen ergänzt. Neben der Sedimentkonzentration werden unter anderem Phosphor und gelöster organischer Kohlenstoff nach Standardmethoden bestimmt. Auch im russischen Zielgebiet Lubazhinkha liegt das Hauptaugenmerk auf der Charakterisierung der Abflussbildung und der Stoffausträge bei den jährlich auftretenden Schneeschmelzen. Das Einzugsgebiet liegt ungefähr 100 km südlich von Moskau im Übergangsbereich der südlichen Taiga zur Waldsteppe. Die insgesamt 18.8 km² werden zur Hälfte landwirtschaftlich und zu einem Drittel forstwirtschaftlich genutzt. Die aktuelle räumliche Differenzierung der Nutzung in diesem Gebiet wird durch die reliefbedingte Kappung und hydromorphe Überprägung der vorherrschenden grauen Waldböden bestimmt. Das Klima und die Hydrologie sind durch Schneedeckenaufbau und –schmelze, bei einer Jahresdurchschnittstemperatur von 4.4°C und einer Jahresniederschlagsmenge von 560 mm, geprägt. Zur Erfassung des Stoffaustrags werden Hochwasserprobenahmen am Gebietsauslass sowie an den beiden wichtigsten Zuflüssen genommen und neben Sediment- und Nährstoffkonzentrationen weitere physikalische und chemische Parameter bestimmt. Die Auswertung der Daten des Schäfertals zeigen für den Untersuchungszeitraum eine deutliche Dominanz der Hochwasserereignisse, die durch Schneeschmelzen hervorgerufen werden. Einzugsgebietsbedingungen mit gefrorenem Boden führen zu einer Modifizierung der Abflussentwicklung vor allem im ansteigenden Teil des gemessenen Hydrographen durch Auftreten von schnellen oberflächen- oder oberflächennahen Abflüssen. Der Spitzenabfluss bei den acht zur Interpretation herangezogenen Hochwasserereignissen variiert zwischen 30 und 270 l s-1, bei Abflussmengen von 1-50 mm. Die am Gebietsauslass ermittelten maximalen Sedimentkonzentrationen liegen für die beiden Ereignisse ohne gefrorenen Boden bei unter 650 mg l-1 und damit deutlich unter den bis zu 6000 mg l-1 bei teilweise oder ganz gefrorenen Böden im Schäfertal. Lediglich bei einem Ereignis mit Niederschlag und ungefrorenem Boden treten hohe Sedimentkonzentrationen auf, die auf Gerinnepflegemaßnahmen und dadurch leichte Mobilisierbarkeit von Material zurückzuführen sind. Dementsprechend schwanken die Sedimentfrachten der Einzelereignisse und erreichen bis zu 17 t. Die wichtigste Steuergröße ist dabei die Ausbildung erosiven Abflusses auf den Hängen durch eine Verminderung der hydraulischen Leitfähigkeit bei gefrorenen Böden. Der Vergleich der Sedimentkonzentrationen der Hochwasserereignisse mit der zweiwöchentlichen Grundbeprobung verdeutlicht, ebenso wie Hysteresekurven der Einzelereignisse, die unterschiedlichen Dynamiken der Austragssituationen. Während die durch Bodenfrost geprägten Ereignisse ein gegen den Uhrzeigersinn verlaufendes Abfluss-Sedimentkonzentrationsverhältnis aufweisen, das auf eine Sedimentquelle auf den Hängen hinweist, sind die Hysteresekurven bei nicht gefrorenen Böden im Uhrzeigersinn orientiert. Eine Sedimentherkunft in Gerinnenähe oder den Gerinneböschungen selbst ist daher wahrscheinlich. Diese Annahmen werden auch durch eine differenzierte Phosphoranreicherungsrate im ausgetragenen Sediment bestätigt. Darüber hinaus kann teilweise eine ereignisinterne Dynamik beobachtet werden, die auf zeitliche Variabilität in der Abflussbildung und damit zusammenhängend, eine räumliche Heterogenität der Sedimentquellen belegt. Während im Untersuchungsgebiet Schäfertal ein mehrmaliges Auftreten von Schneeschmelzen innerhalb eines Winters möglich ist, kommt es im russischen Einzugsgebiet zu einem regelmäßigen Schneedeckenaufbau über den Winter hinweg und einer Schneeschmelze in der Regel im März oder in der ersten Aprilhälfte. Die Auswertung mehrjähriger Datenreihen belegt die Bedeutung der Schneeschmelze für die Abflussbildung und den Sedimentaustrag aus dem Untersuchungsgebiet Lubazhinkha. Für die drei zur Interpretation herangezogenen Schneeschmelzen liegt die Sedimentfracht zwischen 50 und 630 t bei deutlichen Unterschieden in den hydrologischen Rahmenbedingungen. Die ereignisbezogene Sedimentfracht von mindestens 0.3 t ha-1 liegt zwar über der für das Schäfertal ermittelten, befindet sich aber im Bereich der Werte, die in anderen Studien bei vergleichbaren Böden und Nutzungsformen bestimmt wurden. Eine detaillierte Analyse der Messwerte der Schneeschmelze im Jahr 2003 belegt eine Dynamik innerhalb dieses Einzelereignisses. Bei Sedimentkonzentrationen im Abfluss am Gebietsauslass von 6 bis 540 mg l-1 kommt es zu einer Sedimentfracht von ungefähr 190 t. Während die maximalen Konzentrationen von Sediment und Phosphor mit der Spitze des Abflusses einhergehen, liegt für DOC eine Verzögerung vor, die durch eine langsamere Schneeschmelze und Mobilisierung von DOC aus dem humusreichen Oberboden der Waldflächen ausgelöst wird. Eine Differenzierung der Abflusskomponenten ermöglicht eine weitergehende Interpretation der ereignisinternen Dynamik der Stoffquellen und Eintragspfade. Bei geringen Abflussmengen (< 2,5 mm d-1) findet ein Stoffeintrag überwiegend in gelöster Form über die Bodenwasserpassage und langsame Abflusskomponenten in den Vorfluter statt. Bei höheren Abflussmengen dominieren schnelle Abflusskomponenten bzw. Oberflächenabfluss, der zeitlich dynamisch unterschiedliche Stoffquellen mobilisiert. Neben diesen ereignisinternen treten interanuelle Variabilitäten auf, die durch witterungsbedingte Faktoren bestimmt werden. Wie im Schäfertal spielt auch im Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet die Ausbildung von Bodenfrost und damit verbundene Veränderung der Infiltrationseigenschaften der Böden eine große Rolle. Das Schneewasseräquivalent, die Schneeschmelzdynamik und Bodenfrosteigenschaften, z.B. Eindringtiefe, sind die wichtigsten Steuergrößen. Die Variabilität dieser Randbedingungen führt zu einer hohen interannuellen Differenzierung der Abflussbildung und der Sedimentausträge. Für die Schneeschmelze 2004 kann so bei überdurchschnittlich hohen Wintertemperaturen und nur teilweise gefrorenen Böden sowie geringem Schneewasseräquivalent eine geringe Sedimentfracht ermittelt werden. Darüber hinaus verdeutlichen die Hysteresekurven der Sedimentkonzentrationen Unterschiede in der Sedimentquelle für die Einzeljahre, die von den oben genannten Rahmenbedingungen abhängen. Auf der Basis des Monitoring lassen sich für beide Einzugsgebiete die wichtigen abflussbildenden Prozesse charakterisieren und Einflussgrößen erfassen. Dem Bodenfrost und der Schneeschmelzdynamik kommen dabei übergeordnete Bedeutung zu. In beiden Gebieten werden bei winterlichen Rahmenbedingungen erhebliche Mengen an Sediment und Nährstoffen ausgetragen. Die Interpretation physikalischer bzw. chemischer Parameter des Abflusses ermöglicht darüber hinaus auch Aussagen über die zeitliche Variabilität und räumliche Heterogenität der Sedimentherkunftsräume. Aus den Erkenntnissen der Einzugsgebietsbeobachtung ergeben sich für einen Modellansatz verschiedenen Anforderungen, die vor allem die räumlich differenzierte Darstellung des Einflusses von Bodenfrost auf den Bodenwasserhaushalt sowie die Bodenerosion durch oberflächlich abfließendes Schneeschmelzwasser betreffen. Die Grundlage für das Modellsystem "IWAN" (Integrated Winter erosion And Nutrient load model) stellt das hydrologische Modell WASIM ETH Ver. 2 und das Stoffhaushaltsmodell AGNPS 5.0 dar. Die Verknüpfung dieser beiden auf Rasterzellen aufbauenden Modelle ermöglicht die Nutzung von kontinuierlichen, räumlich differenzierten Informationen zum Oberflächenabfluss für die Abschätzung der Bodenerosion. Durch diese Schnittstelle wird die sehr hohe Parametersensitivität des SCS-CN Verfahrens in AGNPS durch geringere Einzelsensitivitäten verschiedener Parameter des Bodenwasserhaushaltes in WASIM ersetzt und gleichzeitig eine plausible, prozessbasierte räumliche Abflussbildung berechnet. Durch die Implementierung eines Moduls zur Abschätzung der Bodentemperatur in WASIM ist zusätzlich die Grundlage für eine weitergehende Verbesserung der Abflussbildung bei winterlichen Randbedingungen gelegt. Durch das Modul wird die Oberbodentemperatur aus Werten der Lufttemperatur unter Einbeziehung der Exposition und der Landnutzung auf der Basis einer Polynomanpassung abgeschätzt. Bei einer modellierten Schneedecke von mehr als 5 mm Schneewasseräquivalent wird die berechnete Bodentemperatur des Vortages übernommen. Bei Bodentemperaturen unter dem Gefrierpunkt wird darüber hinaus die gesättigte hydraulische Leitfähigkeit des Bodens auf Null herabgesetzt, so dass im Zuge der Schneeschmelze zunächst das noch freie Porenvolumen aufgefüllt wird und danach Oberflächenabflussbildung beginnt. Für das Schäfertal liegt die Güte der Anpassung der Bodentemperatur bei Korrelationskoeffizienten von 0.62 bis 0.81 und für das Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet bei Werten von 0.82 bis 0.91. Die räumlich und zeitlich differenzierte Oberflächenabflussinformation dient als Grundlage einer neu entwickelten Berechnung der Rillenerosion bei Schneeschmelzen, die den dafür nicht geeigneten empirischen Ansatz in AGNPS ersetzt. Basierend auf der Grundannahme eines dreieckigen, nicht durch Frost in der Eintiefung beeinträchtigten Rillenprofils und, da wassergesättigt, nichtkohesiver Bodeneigenschaften wird für jede Rasterzelle eine Rille simuliert. Die Erodibilität des Bodens wird als Funktion von Wurzelparametern und des Durchmessers der wasserstabilen Aggregate erfasst. Die Scherkraft des Schneeschmelzeabflusses in der Rille wird in Abhängigkeit von der Oberflächenrauhigkeit und dem Aggregatdurchmesser betrachtet und darauf aufbauend in einem Impulsstromansatz die erodierte Bodenmenge berechnet. In Verbindung mit dem durch das modifizierte WASIM berechneten und gerouteten Oberflächenabfluss ergibt sich so ein räumlich differenziertes Bild der Bodenerosion. Das Modellsystem IWAN beinhaltet neben der Erosionsberechnung ein eingabefenstergesteuertes Menü zur Datenkonvertierung und zum Prä- sowie Postprozessing. Die Ergebnisse der Anwendung des Modellsystems für die beiden Einzugsgebiete belegen, dass sowohl die entscheidenden Prozesse der Abflussbildung als auch des Sedimentaustrags wiedergegeben werden. Für das Schäfertal wurde für die Kalibrierungsjahre 1994 bis 1995 eine Modellierungsgüte von R2 0.94 bzw. 0.91 erzielt. Mit Ausnahmen der Schneeschmelze im Jahr 1996 werden die Episoden hohen Abflusses in den Jahren 1996 bis 2003 mit dem kalibrierten Parametersatz gut wiedergegeben und das witterungsbedingte Trockenfallen im Sommer zufriedenstellend dargestellt. Auf dieser Basis wird für die experimentell erfassten und diskutierten Schneeschmelzereignisse das Gesamtabflussvolumen dieser Ereignisse mit hoher Güte abgebildet. Die räumlich differenziert berechnete Bodenfeuchte und Bodenfrostvorkommen bedingen einen variablen Anteil des Oberflächenabflusses am Gesamtabfluss. Für das Schneeschmelzerosionsmodul hat das Abflussvolumen ebenso wie die Hangneigung und Abflusslänge eine positive Sensitivität. Aufgrund von Parameterkombinationen und nichtlineare Algorithmen kann es jedoch vor allem für die Wurzelparameter und den Manning Koeffizienten zu differenzierten Sensitivitätsentwicklungen kommen. Für die Simulation der Erosion im Schäfertal wurde daher zunächst auf einen Parametersatz zurückgegriffen, der auf der Basis von Erosionsparzellenversuchen kalibriert wurde. Die Mittelwerte der berechneten Erosion liegen zwischen 0.0006 und 0.96 t ha-1 für die sechs gemessenen Einzelereignisse im Schäfertal. Die Medianwerte und hohen Standardabweichungen belegen jedoch, dass insgesamt Zellen mit geringen Erosionswerten überwiegen. Die Ereignisse mit gefrorenen Böden weisen eine signifikant höhere Erosion auf. Unterschiede in der Erosion treten bei gleichen Gesamtabflussvolumen wie z.B. bei den Ereignissen vom 20.01.2001 und 26.02.2002 durch differenzierte Abflusskonzentration auf dem nord- bzw. südexponierten Hang auf. Neben einer Überprüfung der Plausibilität der berechneten Werte, werden die räumlichen Verteilungsmuster durch Geländeaufnahmen bestätigt. Die Anpassung der berechneten Sedimentfracht an die gemessenen Werte erfolgte durch die Kalibrierung des Manning Koeffizienten für ein Ereignis. Die simulierte Sedimentfracht ist in einigen Hangfußbereichen aufgrund der Abflussakkumulation besonders hoch und erreicht für den Gebietsauslass Werte zwischen 0.0 und 13.84 t. Mit der Ausnahme des Ereignisses vom 26.02.2002 ist die Sedimentfracht leicht unterschätzt, so dass sich in der Summe für die drei Winterhalbjahre 2001 bis 2003 ein Gesamtfehler von 11 t ergibt. Die Differenz zwischen der simulierten und beobachteten Sedimentfracht ist für den 26.12.2002 am größten. Als mögliche Ursache für die Abweichungen der berechneten zu den gemessenen Werten, wird die zeitliche Variabilität und räumliche Heterogenität der Oberflächenrauhigkeit, vor allem in Hinblick auf Bodenbearbeitung und Bodenfrosteinflüssen, diskutiert. Die generelle Verteilung der Sedimentquellen, Transportwege und Übertrittstellen vom Hang ins Gewässer stimmt mit Geländebeobachtungen überein. Eine quantitative Überprüfung der räumlichen Ergebnisse auf der Einzelereignisebene ist für das Schäfertal jedoch nicht möglich. Für das Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet können zwei Parametersätze für das Kalibrierungsjahr 2004 identifiziert werde, die eine zufriedenstellende Modellierungsgüte für das hydrologische Modell erreichen. Obwohl einer dieser Parametersätze die Schneeschmelzsituationen und Maximalabflüsse gut darstellt, sind die Areale mit Oberflächenabflussbildung innerhalb des Einzugsgebietes nicht plausibel verteilt. Im Gegensatz dazu werden die lateralen Wasserflüsse und damit die prozessbestimmende Bodenfeuchteverteilung durch den anderen Parametersatz besser abgebildet. Es kommt jedoch zu einer Überschätzung der Spitzenabflüsse der Schneeschmelzhochwasser für die Validierungsjahre 2003 und 2005. Die auf der Basis der Messwerte erkannten Unterschiede zwischen den Einzeljahren werden ebenso dargestellt wie die differenzierte Abflussbildung innerhalb einer Schneeschmelzsituation. Neben Oberflächenabflussbildung auf den flachen Kuppenbereichen und auf Sättigungsflächen in den Talböden, wird auch die beobachtete verzögerte Abflussbildung unter Wald durch das Modell berücksichtigt. Bei zehn Tagen mit Oberflächenabfluss innerhalb der drei Schneeschmelzen 2003 bis 2005 mit Oberflächenabflussvolumen von 0.3 bis 24.1 mm d-1 werden durch das Modellsystem IWAN Erosionssummen von 10 bis 280 t d-1 simuliert. Bei einem variablen Flächenanteil von ca. 5 bis 46 % des Gesamtgebietes, auf dem Erosion stattfindet, bewegen sich die Werte der effektiven Erosion bei 0.1 bis 0.32 t ha-1 für die Einzeltage und 0.44 bis 0.92 t ha-1 für die mehrtägigen Schneeschmelzen. Die am Gebietsauslass simulierte Sedimentfracht liegt zwischen 6.7 und 365.8 t pro Tag und summiert sich auf 246.2 t für die Schneeschmelze 2003. Im Jahr 2004 werden 99.9 t und im Jahr 2005 sogar 757.9 t Austrag simuliert. Für das Kalibrierungsjahr 2004 kommt es zu einer Überschätzung der Sedimentfracht im Vergleich zur gemessenen von lediglich 10 t bzw. 12%. Für die Schneeschmelze im Jahr 2003 liegt die Abweichung mit diesem Parametersatz bei -9 %. Für das Jahr 2005 fällt die Berechnung mit einem Fehler von 33 % nicht so gut aus. Insgesamt führen Schneeschmelztage mit geringer simulierter Erosionsmenge zu einer zusätzlichen Mobilisierung von Sediment aus dem Gerinne und umgekehrt, hohe Erosionsmengen zu einer Deposition von Material auf den Wald- und Grünlandflächen und im Gerinne selbst. Hohe Sedimentfrachten werden daher vor allem für die Talflanken und die kerbtalähnlichen Talanfänge berechnet. Durch die räumliche Differenzierung der Abfluss- und Erosionsprozesse kommt es zu signifikanten Unterschieden bei der berechneten Sedimentfracht für die beiden Teileinzugsgebiete. Bei Schneeschmelztagen mit Abflussbildung unter Wald wird aufgrund des höheren Waldanteils im Lubazhinkhateilgebiet eine höhere Sedimentmenge ausgetragen. Die Unterschiede im Gerinneverhalten und zwischen den Teileinzugsgebieten verdeutlichen die insgesamt hohe Prozessrepräsentanz der Modellergebnisse. Das Modellsystem IWAN bildet für beide Einzugsgebiete mit hoher Plausibilität die räumliche und zeitliche Dynamik der Oberflächenabflussbildung während der Schneeschmelze und die damit verbundenen Erosionsprozesse ab. Der Modellansatz stellt somit eine Möglichkeit zwischen Modellergebnisaggregierung für den Gebietsauslass und aufwendiger Geländebeobachtung bzw. –messungen dar. Die prozessbeschreibende Modellierung mit zufriedenstellender Güte sowohl für das Schäfertal als auch für das Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet stellt die Grundlage für die Berechnung von Klima- oder Landnutzungsszenarien dar. Eine Auswertung der bestehenden langjährigen Datenreihe aus dem Schäfertal bestätigt zunächst den allgemeinen Trend zur Erwärmung vor allem im Winterhalbjahr. Demgegenüber lässt der instrumentenbedingte Fehler bei der Niederschlagmessung keine Ableitung eines Trends aus den vorhandenen Daten zu. Aus der meteorologischen Datenreihe des Schäfertals wurden insgesamt 13 Jahre mit definierter Abweichung von +2.5 bis -2.5 °C und fünfmal +0.5 °C von der durchschnittlichen Winterlufttemperatur (Jd 330-90) gegenüber dem langjährigen Wintermittel ausgewählt. Im Gegensatz zu Wettergeneratoren werden dadurch eine Kombinationen aus Lufttemperatur und Niederschlag erfasst, die typischen Witterungssituationen entsprechen. Die Niederschlagssummen für den Winterzeitraum dieser Szenariojahre liegen zwischen -45 % und + 75 % gegenüber den langjährigen Mittelwerten. Die Modellergebnisse belegen die große Bedeutung der Witterungssituationen für die Abflussbildung in der Art, dass eine erhöhte Niederschlagsumme nicht zwingend auch eine überdurchschnittliche Abflussmenge hervorruft. Schneedeckendynamik und Bodenfrost sind die prägenden Elemente. Die Anzahl der Schneetage und die Dauer einer Schneeperiode liegt bei negativen Temperaturabweichungen deutlich über den Szenarien mit positiver Abweichung. Insgesamt zeigen die Ergebnisse der hydrologischen Simulation für die Szenarien, dass sowohl eine starke Abweichung nach oben oder unten vom bisherigen Durchschnitt vermehrt zu Oberflächenabflussbildung führt. Die Erosionssummen der Szenariotage mit Oberflächenabfluss variieren zwischen 4 und 141 t d-1 und stehen aufgrund des nicht veränderten Parametersatzes in direkter Abhängigkeit zum Abflussvolumen. Die berechneten Erosionssummen für Situationen ohne Bodenfrost fallen generell geringer aus, befinden sich aber wie auch die Ereignisse mit Bodenfrost im Wertebereich der Referenzereignisse. Im Bereich der Referenzereignisse liegen auch die Sedimentfrachten mit 0.03 bis 13.15 t d-1. Eine erhöhte Variabilität ist zu erwarten, wenn die Veränderungen der Vegetationsperioden und der Fruchtfolgen in den Modellansatz aufgenommen würden. Eine Betrachtung der Erosionsummen und Sedimentfrachten nicht auf Basis von Tageswerten sondern von Schneeschmelzereignissen zeigt deutlich, dass die Klimaszenarien mit hohen Abweichungen von den Normwerten auch erhöhte Gesamtstoffausträge verursachen. Im russischen Lubazhinkhaeinzugsgebiet führen die Transformationsprozesse im Landwirtschaftssektor zu tiefgreifenden Änderungen der Landnutzung. Auf einer Analyse der Entwicklung in den letzten 15 Jahren aufbauend, kann für das Gebiet von einer deutlichen Modifikation im Verhältnis Grünland, Acker und Wald ausgegangen werden. Diese Dynamik spiegelt sich in den fünf Szenarien wider, die flächenspezifische Änderungen vorsehen. Die Variationen reichen von einem Szenario, in dem ein ausländischer Investor die landwirtschaftliche Nutzfläche auf alle geeigneten Böden ausdehnt, über eine Ausdehnung der Waldflächen in einem laufenden staatlichen Waldschutzprogramm bis hin zum Aufbau kleinbäuerlicher Strukturen und lokale Vermarktung der Produkte durch sich entwickelnden Tourismus. Die Gesamtabflussmenge der Szenarien liegt zwischen 276.4 und 293.3 mm für die Simulationsperiode 2003 bis 2005. In Abhängigkeit vom Waldflächenanteil und der damit verbundenen Evapotranspiration treten im Vergleich zum Ist-Zustands des Referenzszenarios nur geringe positive oder negative Abweichungen auf. Im Unterschied dazu treten bei der Betrachtung der Oberflächabflussentwicklung für die drei Schneeschmelzperioden relativ große Abweichungen bis zu über 20 mm auf. Diese Unterschiede sind am deutlichsten in den durch Bodenfrost und hohes Schneewasseräquivalent ausgezeichneten Jahre 2003 und 2005 für das Szenario mit dem größten Waldflächen- und Grünlandanteil. Mit wenigen Ausnahmen führen die Szenarien zu einer Erhöhung der simulierten Sedimentfracht am Gebietsauslass. Die Ergebnisse belegen darüber hinaus, dass eine Verminderung der Erosion auf den Hängen allein nicht zu einer Frachtreduzierung führen muss, da bei geringer Sedimentbelastung im Gerinne Material aufgenommen werden kann. Ein flächenspezifischer Vergleich zweier Szenarien belegt die Bedeutung der Verortung der Nutzungsänderungen innerhalb des Einzugsgebietes und der damit einhergehenden Konnektivität von abflussbildenden Arealen und Erosionsflächen zum Gerinne hin. Die Szenarioergebnisse weisen auf die steigende Bedeutung von Extremereignissen hin, die im Zuge des Klimawandels zu erwarten sind. Ebenso wird die Verknüpfung von Hang- und Gerinneprozessen als Attribut eines Einzugsgebietes unterstrichen, das bei Managementmaßnahmen beachtet werden muss. Insgesamt belegen die Ergebnisse für beide Untersuchungsgebiete, dass das Modellsystem IWAN nach einer Kabibrierung erfolgreich zur Abschätzung von möglichen zukünftigen Sedimentquellen und Sedimentausträgen eingesetzt werden kann. Weitergehender Forschungsbedarf besteht in der Frage der Übertragbarkeit des Monitoringansatzes in Naturräume mit anderen, zum Teil komplexeren hydrologischen Einzugsgebietsreaktionen und darauf aufbauenden Stoffausträgen und Austragspfaden. Darüber hinaus kann im Modellsystem IWAN eine Verbesserung durch eine Berechnung der Rillenausbildung auf dem Hang sowie eine Modifikation der Sedimenttransportberechnung erzielt werden. Bei einer Übertragung auf andere Einzugsgebiete sollte eine umfassende Sensitivitätsanalyse und Ergebnisunsicherheitsbetrachtung vor allem in Hinblick auf die Kopplung von Teilmodellen innerhalb des Modellsystems erfolgen.:Gliederung Gliederung V Liste der Abbildungen VII Liste der Tabellen XII 1 Einleitung und Fragestellung 3 1.1 Bodenerosion und Sedimentfracht in Einzugsgebieten 3 1.1.1 Abflussbildung, Bodenerosion und Sedimentaustrag 3 1.1.2 Winterliche Situationen 5 1.2 Modellierungsansätze 13 1.2.1 Modelle und Modellkopplungen 13 1.2.2 Probleme der Modellanwendung 17 1.3 Wissensdefizite und Zielstellung 23 2 Untersuchungsgebiete und Methoden 25 2.1 Schäfertal 25 2.1.1 Naturraum 25 2.1.2 Methoden 28 2.2 Lubazhinkha 31 2.2.1 Naturraum 31 2.2.2 Methoden 36 2.3 Datenverarbeitung 38 3 Ergebnisse und Diskussion des Monitorings in den Einzugsgebieten 41 3.1 Schäfertal 41 3.1.1 Abflussbildung 41 3.1.2 Stoffausträge bei Hochwasserereignissen 45 3.2 Lubazhinkha 54 3.2.1 Bedeutung der Schneeschmelze für den Stoffaustrag 54 3.2.2 Stoffdynamik während der Schneeschmelze 57 4 Modellentwicklung 69 4.1 Zielstellungen der Modellmodifikation und -entwicklung 69 4.2 WASIM-AGNPS 70 4.2.1 Wasserhaushaltsmodell WASIM 70 4.2.2 Stofftransportmodell AGNPS 72 4.2.3 Schnittstelle WASIM-AGNPS 74 4.3 Modifikation von WASIM für winterliche Abflussbildung 76 4.3.1 Grundlagen 76 4.3.2 Datenerhebung 77 4.3.3 Sensorauswahl 77 4.3.4 Ergebnisse 79 4.3.5 Empirisches Modell 82 4.3.6 Bodentemperaturteilmodul 83 4.3.7 Anpassung mit Daten aus dem Einzugsgebiet Lubazhinkha 85 4.4 Schneeschmelzerosionsmodell (SMEM) 87 4.4.1 Rillenprofil 87 4.4.2 Bodenerosion 90 4.4.3 Technische Umsetzung 96 4.5 Modellsystem IWAN 97 4.5.1 Schnittstelle SMEM-AGNPS 97 4.5.2 Graphische Benutzeroberfläche 99 5 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 105 5.1 Schäfertal 105 5.1.1 Bodentemperatur 105 5.1.2 Hydrologie 108 5.1.3 Schneeschmelzerosion 113 5.1.4 Sedimentfracht 120 5.2 Lubazhinkha 126 5.2.1 Hydrologie 126 5.2.2 Schneeschmelzerosion 133 5.2.3 Sedimentfracht 137 6 Szenariorechnungen 143 6.1 Klimaszenarien Schäfertal 143 6.1.1 Szenarienauswahl 143 6.1.2 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 148 6.2 Landnutzungsszenarien Lubazhinkha 158 6.2.1 Szenarienauswahl 158 6.2.2 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 163 7 Schlussfolgerungen 169 7.1 Einzugsgebiete 169 7.2 Modellsystem IWAN 172 7.3 Szenarien 176 7.4 Forschungsbedarf 178 8 Zusammenfassung 179 9 Summary 189 10 Literatur 199 Appendix 207 Abkürzungen Modellübersicht Quellcode (VBA) ; Soil erosion by water is a ubiquitous problem that impairs the agricultural productivity, diminishes soil functionality and may harmfully affect neighbouring environmental compartments. Surface waters are especially affected by the sediment, sediment bounded and soluble nutrients as well as pollutants mobilised by soil erosion. The knowledge about erosion processes and sediment loads is of high relevance for the protection of the soil and water and has moreover an economic dimension. Generally, a slope or catchment can be divided into three zones: erosion, transport and sedimentation. However, runoff generating processes and roughness or topography triggered runoff concentration lead to an individual differentiation. Furthermore, spatial and temporal discontinuities of processes or connectivities and thresholds modify the erosion and sediment characteristics. Relief and soil as structural elements of a catchment control accordingly the soil moisture differentiation and in an essential way the runoff generation and sediment load. In temperate and cold climates an important portion of runoff is generated in winter and can be affected by soil frost and snowmelt. However, only little knowledge exists about the processes and dimension of sediment and nutrient emissions under these wintry conditions. Systematic research exists particularly in Russia and Norway. The related deficits are also reflected in existing model approaches to estimate soil erosion and sediment fields from catchments. On the one hand neither the snow development or snow melt nor the modification of the soil water flow in case of frozen soil is considered. On the other hand the erosivity of the snow melt runoff and the modification of the soil erodibility through, for example frost-thaw cycles, is adequately reflected. It is the main focus of the presented work to identify, by analysing data from a German and a Russian catchment, the dominant processes and triggers of runoff generation and diffuse pollution under winter conditions. The results are implemented into a model system which is utilised to analyse spatial heterogeneity and temporal variability of processes and to estimate the effects of climate and land use change on sediment loads in the two target areas. The 1.44 km² catchment Schaefertal is located in the eastern lower Harz Mountains approx. 150 km SW of Berlin, Germany. Cambisols and Luvisolos have developed from periglacial slope deposits on greywacke and argillaceous shale. These slopes are utilised agriculturally with a crop rotation of mainly winter grain and canola. The thalweg is dominated by hydromorphic soils and pasture. The climate is slightly continental with an annual average temperature of 6.8°C and 680 mm total annual precipitation. In addition to long-time hydro-meteorological measurements, since several years research into sediment and nutrient emissions is conducted. A routine biweekly sampling of the runoff at the catchment outlet is supplemented by automatic high flow sampling especially during snow melt flows. Besides suspended sediment concentration, phosphorus species and dissolved organic carbon are sampled and analysed following standard methods. Also in the Russian catchment Lubazhinkha the main focus is the characterisation of runoff generation and sediment/nutrient transport during snowmelt events. The catchment is located about 100 km south of Moscow, Russia in the transition zone from southern Taiga to forest steppe. The area of 18.8 km² is utilised half by agriculture and one third by forestry. The recent spatial differentiation of this land use is triggered by the relief determined erosive shortening and hydromorphic characteristics of the dominant grey forest soils. Climate and hydrology are dominated by snow cover accumulation and snow melt; annual average temperature is 4.4°C and the annual precipitation sum is 560 mm. High flow samples are taken at the catchment outlet behind a small dam and at the two most important tributaries to characterise mobilisation processes and the sediment and nutrient concentrations. The interpretation of data from the Schaefertal demonstrate for the period of investigation the importance of high flow situations that are caused by snow melt. Catchment conditions characterised by frozen soils lead to a modification of the measured hydrograph, especially through the occurrence of fast surface or near-surface components. The peak flow of the eight high flow events which are employed for interpretation vary between 30 and 270 l s-1, with total runoff volumes in a range from 1 to 50 mm. The sediment concentrations that are observed at the catchment outlet are below 650 mg l-1 for the two events without frozen soil and therewith distinct below the maximum of around 6000 mg l-1 for events with frozen or partly frozen soil conditions. Solely, one event with rainfall on unfrozen soil is characterised by high sediment concentration which is caused by channel maintenances and easy mobilisation of material from the channel banks. According to this, the sediment yields vary for the single events and achieve up to 17 t. The most important trigger is the generation of erosive surface runoff on the slopes by reduction of the hydraulic conductivity of the frozen soils. The comparison of the sediment concentrations of high flow events and the biweekly sampling as well as hysteresis curves of the single events clarify the differing dynamics of sediment export situations. The soil frost affected events show an anti-clockwise direction of the discharge-sediment relationship which points to a sediment source on the slope, whereas the hysteresis curves of unfrozen soil conditions are oriented clockwise. For these events a sediment source near the channel or the channel bank is probable. These assumptions are also supported by a differentiated phosphorus enrichment ratio in the exported sediment. Furthermore, a dynamic in the progress of the single events can be observed which is caused by the temporal variability of the runoff generation and confirms the related spatial heterogeneity of sediment sources. Contrary to the Schaefertal with several snow melt events per year, in the Russian catchment the snow cover is accumulated over the entire winter and one snow melt flood occurs in March or during the first half of April. The interpretation of multiannual data document the importance of the spring snow melts for the runoff generation and sediment export from the catchment Lubazhinkha. The sediment yield of three observed snow melt events varies between 50 and 630 t in dependency on the hydrological conditions. The event related sediment load of at least 0.3 t ha-1 is above the values that were measured in the Schaefertal but in the range of other studies with comparable soils and land use. Detailed analyses of the measurements of the snow melt in spring 2003 document the dynamic within one event. A sediment concentration at the catchment outlet from 6 to 540 mg l-1 led to a total event sediment yield of 190 t. The maximum concentrations of sediment and phosphorus peak with the discharge. In contrast, the concentration of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) is delayed compared to the runoff peak due to the slow snow melt development under forest stands and mobilisation of DOC from the organic rich topsoil of these forest areas. A differentiation of runoff components allows a further interpretation of event specific dynamic of sediment sources and transport pathways. In case of low discharge (< 2.5 mm d-1) the material transfer is dominated by dissolved forms and enters the channel passing the soil as slow runoff. Fast runoff components or surface runoff dominate situations with higher amounts of discharge in which sediment and nutrient sources are mobilised with temporal dynamic. Besides this event internal dynamic inter-annual variability exists that is a result of weather conditions in the specific winter. Similar to the Schaefertal, the development of frozen soils and the related modification of infiltration characteristics of the soils play an important role in the Lubazhinkha catchment. Other important triggers are snow water equivalent, snow melt dynamic and specific soil frost characteristics, i.e. depth of penetration. The variability of these boundary conditions led to a high inter-annual differentiation of runoff generation and sediment loads. Thus, for the snowmelt 2004 with above average winter air temperatures and only partly frozen soils, as well as low snow water equivalent, a comparable low sediment load was observed. In addition, the hysteresis curves of the discharge-sediment concentration relationship indicate differences in the sediment sources for the single snow melt events which are in dependency of the abovementioned factors. For both catchments the established monitoring system and selected parameters provide an insight into runoff generating processes and relevant triggers. Occurrences of soil frost and snow melt dynamics are most important factors. Wintry conditions led to high sediment and nutrient yields in both catchments. The interpretation of physical and chemical parameters of discharge allows the identification of spatial heterogeneity and temporal variability of sediment source areas. Several demands for a model approach arise from these findings of catchment monitoring which are especially related to the spatial differentiated estimation of surface runoff generating areas and soil erosion through snow melt water. The basis for the model system "IWAN" (Integrated Winter erosion And Nutrient load model) is the hydrological model WASIM ETH Ver.2 and the nutrient load model AGNPS 5.0. The linking of these two raster-based models facilitates the utilisation of continuous, spatial differentiated information for surface runoff to estimate soil erosion. By this, the high parameter sensitivity of the SCS-CN approach in AGNPS is replaced with sensitivities distributed among different parameters of the soil water calculation in WASIM and the concurrent calculation of a plausible process based spatial differentiated runoff generation. The implementation of a module to estimate the soil temperature forms the basis for an improved calculation of soil water flows and runoff generation under winter conditions. This module calculates the topsoil temperature based on values of air temperature and considers exposition and land use. The calculated soil temperature of the previous day is assumed in case of a snow cover of more than 5 mm water equivalent. The saturated hydraulic conductivity of the soil is set to zero if the calculated soil temperature drops below freezing and surface runoff begins after the water free soil pore volume is filled up. The goodness of fit for the Schaefertal shows a correlation coefficient of 0.62 to 0.81 and for the Lubazhinkha catchment values in a range between 0.82 and 0.91. The spatial and temporal differentiated information of surface runoff is fundamental to a new developed calculation of rill erosion during snow melt situations which replaces the empirical erosion estimation of AGNPS. One rill for each raster cell is simulated on the assumption of a non-cohesive soil through water saturation and that soil frost does not hinder the deepening of the triangular rill profile. The soil erodibilty is a function of root parameters and diameter of water stable aggregates. The erosivity of the snow melt runoff in the rill is calculated in dependency of surface roughness and soil aggregate diameter. A spatial differentiated estimation of soil erosion is possible in combination with the routed surface runoff from the modified WASIM. In addition to the erosion estimation, the model system IWAN comprises a user interface for data conversion as well as pre- and post-processing options. The results of the model system application for both catchments demonstrate that the dominant processes of runoff generation as well as sediment loss are matched. For the Schaefertal a modelling agreement of r² equalling 0.94 and 0.91 is realised for the year of calibration 1994 and the year of validation 1995, respectively. With the exception of 1996 all periods of high flow and the falling dry of the channel in summer from 1996 until 2003 are represented satisfactorily with the calibrated set of parameters. On this basis, the total runoff volume of the observed and above discussed snow melt events has been modelled with a high degree of accuracy. The spatially differentiated calculation of soil moisture and soil frost occurrence results in a variable fraction of surface runoff on the total runoff for these events. Runoff volume, slope and flow length show positive sensitivities in the new snow melt erosion module. However, parameter combinations and non-linear algorithms, especially for root parameters and the Manning coefficient, may lead to more complex sensitivity properties. Thus, the simulation of soil erosion in the Schaefertal was first conducted with a set of parameters that was calibrated with results of erosion plot experiments. The average values of calculated erosion vary between 0.0006 and 0.96 t ha-1 for the six events from the Schaefertal. However, the median values and high standard deviations prove that most of the cells have low erosion values. The results for events with frozen soils are characterised by significant higher values of erosion. Despite similar total runoff volume i.e. of the events from 20.01.2001 and 26.02.2002 differences occur because of distinctions in runoff concentration on the north and south exposed slope. The spatial results are positively compared to field mapping in addition to a plausibility control of the calculated values. The adjustment of the calculated values for sediment load against the observations is done with calibration of the Manning coefficient for one randomly selected event. The sediment load in some footslope areas caused by runoff concentration is especially high and in the range of 0.0 to 13.84 t for single events. The event sediment yield is generally underestimated with the exception of the event on 26.02.2002. The total absolute error for the three winter seasons is 11 t. The difference between simulated and observed sediment load is highest for the 26.12.2002. This distinction may originate in the temporal variability and spatial heterogeneity of surface roughness against the background of soil frost influences and tillage operations. The general distribution of modelled sediment sources, transport pathways and connecting points to the channel are confirmed by field observations. However, a quantification of the spatial model results on the basis of the observed single events is not possible. For the Lubazhinkha catchment two sets of hydrological parameters are identified for the year of calibration 2004 which achieve satisfying results in comparison to the observed discharge. Although one of these set of parameters performed better in reproducing the peak flows of the snow melt situations, the spatial distribution of surface runoff generating areas was not plausible. Contrary, the second set of parameters characterises the lateral water flows and thus the important spatial soil moisture distribution in a more realistic way. However, the snow melt peak flows for the years of validation 2003 and 2005 are overestimated. The difference between the years, which was identified on the basis of the interpretation of the observations, is matched as well as the dynamic of runoff generation. Surface runoff generation on the flat interfluves areas and saturated areas in valley bottoms are modelled satisfactorily as well as the delayed runoff generation under forest stands. The model system simulates erosion sums of 10 to 280 t d-1 for a total of ten days with surface runoff in a range of 0.3 to 24.1 mm d-1 in the entire modelling period of three years. Considering the variable area of 5 to 46 % on which erosion takes place, the values of effective erosion vary between 0.1 and 0.32 t ha-1 for single days and between 0.44 to 0.92 t ha-1 for multi-day snow melts. The simulated sediment load at the catchment outlet range from 6.7 to 365.8 t per day and sums up to 246.2 t for the snow melt 2003. For the year 2004 99.9 t and for 2005 757.9 t are calculated. In comparison to the observations for the calibration year 2004, the sediment load is overestimated by 10 t or 12 %. The deviation for 2003 is -9 %, with the same set of parameters. The result for 2005 is with an error of 33 % not as good as in the two other years. Overall, the days of snow melt with a low amount of erosion cause additional mobilisation of sediment from the channel banks and contrary, high amount of erosion on the slopes result in deposition processes on the forest and pasture areas near in the valley bottom and in the channel itself. Thus, high sediment loads are estimated for the bottom slopes and the small V-shaped first order valleys. The sediment loads for the two sub-catchments differ significantly because of the spatially differentiated processes of runoff generation and soil erosion. For the days with runoff generation in forest areas higher sediment yields are calculated for the Lubazhinkha-subcatchment which is characterised by a higher degree of forested areas. Differences in slope-channel interaction and variations between the two subcatchments illustrated the overall high process relevance of the model results. The model system IWAN estimates for the Schaefertal and the Lubazhinkha catchment the spatial and temporal dynamics of surface runoff generation and the related erosion processes during snow melt episodes with high plausibility. The model approach demonstrates an option between model result aggregation at the catchment outlet and intensive spatial field observation and measurement within a catchment. The satisfactory modelling of processes for the Schaefertal, as well as for the Lubazhinkha catchment, forms the basis for the calculation of climate and land use scenarios. An analysis of the existing long-term dataset from the Schaefertal approves the general trend of warming, especially in the winter half year. Contrary, the instrument error for rainfall measurements disallows an identification of a trend in the present data. A total of 13 years with defined deviation of +2.5 to -2.5 °C and five years with a deviation of +0.5 °C from the average air temperature in winter (Jd 330-90) were selected from the data set. In contrast to the utilisation of weather generators, this selection provides a dataset with a combination of air temperature and rainfall/snow that is in accordance with typical atmospheric situations. The amount of rainfall for the winter period of the scenario years deviates -45 % to +75 % from the long term average of winter. The model results substantiate the role of weather situations such that an increased amount of rainfall does not automatically result in above-average runoff. Snow cover dynamics and soil frost occurrence are the controlling factors. The number of days with snow and the duration of each snow period are significant higher for scenarios with negative temperature deviation compared to the scenarios with positive deviation. Overall the results of the hydrological calculation of the scenarios show that extreme positive and negative deviations lead to increased surface runoff probability. The sums of erosion for single days with surface runoff varies between 4 to 141 t d-1 and are in direct relation to runoff volume due to the unchanged set of parameters. Generally the calculated sums of erosion for situations without soil frost are lower than with soil frost, but both types are in the range of values of the measured and modelled reference events. Also the calculated sediment yields from 0.03 to 13.15 t d-1 for the scenario days are in the range of the measurements. A higher variability could be expected when considering modifications to vegetation period or crop rotations. An interpretation of erosion and sediment yield on the basis of snow melt periods clarifies those scenarios with extreme deviations also tend to higher sediment export from the catchment. Transformation processes in the agricultural sector of Russia trigger fundamental changes in land use. Based on an analysis of the development of the past 15 years for the Lubazhinkha catchment a significant modification of the pasture, arable land and forest areas is probable in the future. This dynamic is reflected in five scenarios with area-specific changes in land use distribution. The variations range from scenarios with a foreign investor who extends the arable land to all suitable soils in the catchment, an expansion of forest areas in the frame of a governmental forest protection program to the development of small family farms with local market structures because of tourism. The calculated total runoff for the scenarios varies between 276.4 and 293.3 mm for the entire simulation period 2003 to 2005. Small positive or negative deviations occur compared to the as-is state in relation to the variable forest area and combined evapotranspiration. Contrary, the surface runoff shows large deviations of more than 20 mm for the three snow melt periods. These differences are pronounced for the scenario with highest portion of forest and pasture area in the years 2003 and 2005 that are characterised by soil frost and high water equivalent in snow. With only few exceptions the scenarios lead to an increase in simulated sediment yield at the catchment outlet. Moreover, the results document that a decrease of erosion on the slopes does not consequently result in a yield reduction. In the case of low sediment input from the slopes additional material from the channel bed and banks may attribute significantly to the sediment loading. An area specific comparison of two scenarios clarifies the importance of localisation of land use changes and the according connectivity of surface runoff areas and erosion areas to the channel. The scenarios document the increasing importance of extreme events that can be expected due to climate change. Additionally, the link of slope and channel processes, as attribute of a catchment, has to be considered in planning of management measures. The results prove for both catchments that the model system IWAN can be applied for estimating future potential sediment sources and sediment yield after successful calibration. Further research is needed in the question of transferability of the monitoring approach to other environments with a different, more complex hydrological catchment reaction and linked sediment sources and transport mechanisms. The model system IWAN can be improved by a dynamic calculation of rill network generation on the slope and a modification of the sediment transport algorithms. The transfer of the model system to other catchments has to be accompanied by a comprehensive sensitivity and uncertainty analysis especially respecting the model chain within IWAN.:Gliederung Gliederung V Liste der Abbildungen VII Liste der Tabellen XII 1 Einleitung und Fragestellung 3 1.1 Bodenerosion und Sedimentfracht in Einzugsgebieten 3 1.1.1 Abflussbildung, Bodenerosion und Sedimentaustrag 3 1.1.2 Winterliche Situationen 5 1.2 Modellierungsansätze 13 1.2.1 Modelle und Modellkopplungen 13 1.2.2 Probleme der Modellanwendung 17 1.3 Wissensdefizite und Zielstellung 23 2 Untersuchungsgebiete und Methoden 25 2.1 Schäfertal 25 2.1.1 Naturraum 25 2.1.2 Methoden 28 2.2 Lubazhinkha 31 2.2.1 Naturraum 31 2.2.2 Methoden 36 2.3 Datenverarbeitung 38 3 Ergebnisse und Diskussion des Monitorings in den Einzugsgebieten 41 3.1 Schäfertal 41 3.1.1 Abflussbildung 41 3.1.2 Stoffausträge bei Hochwasserereignissen 45 3.2 Lubazhinkha 54 3.2.1 Bedeutung der Schneeschmelze für den Stoffaustrag 54 3.2.2 Stoffdynamik während der Schneeschmelze 57 4 Modellentwicklung 69 4.1 Zielstellungen der Modellmodifikation und -entwicklung 69 4.2 WASIM-AGNPS 70 4.2.1 Wasserhaushaltsmodell WASIM 70 4.2.2 Stofftransportmodell AGNPS 72 4.2.3 Schnittstelle WASIM-AGNPS 74 4.3 Modifikation von WASIM für winterliche Abflussbildung 76 4.3.1 Grundlagen 76 4.3.2 Datenerhebung 77 4.3.3 Sensorauswahl 77 4.3.4 Ergebnisse 79 4.3.5 Empirisches Modell 82 4.3.6 Bodentemperaturteilmodul 83 4.3.7 Anpassung mit Daten aus dem Einzugsgebiet Lubazhinkha 85 4.4 Schneeschmelzerosionsmodell (SMEM) 87 4.4.1 Rillenprofil 87 4.4.2 Bodenerosion 90 4.4.3 Technische Umsetzung 96 4.5 Modellsystem IWAN 97 4.5.1 Schnittstelle SMEM-AGNPS 97 4.5.2 Graphische Benutzeroberfläche 99 5 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 105 5.1 Schäfertal 105 5.1.1 Bodentemperatur 105 5.1.2 Hydrologie 108 5.1.3 Schneeschmelzerosion 113 5.1.4 Sedimentfracht 120 5.2 Lubazhinkha 126 5.2.1 Hydrologie 126 5.2.2 Schneeschmelzerosion 133 5.2.3 Sedimentfracht 137 6 Szenariorechnungen 143 6.1 Klimaszenarien Schäfertal 143 6.1.1 Szenarienauswahl 143 6.1.2 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 148 6.2 Landnutzungsszenarien Lubazhinkha 158 6.2.1 Szenarienauswahl 158 6.2.2 Modellergebnisse und Diskussion 163 7 Schlussfolgerungen 169 7.1 Einzugsgebiete 169 7.2 Modellsystem IWAN 172 7.3 Szenarien 176 7.4 Forschungsbedarf 178 8 Zusammenfassung 179 9 Summary 189 10 Literatur 199 Appendix 207 Abkürzungen Modellübersicht Quellcode (VBA)

L'applicazione del principio di avidità in un mondo caratterizzato da incertezza, quale di fatto è quello su cui vengono scambiati i prodotti finanziari, implica la necessità che alla considerazione del possibile rendimento futuro di qualsivoglia portafoglio finanziario debba essere associata la considerazione del rischio finanziario concernente la variabilità del futuro valore del medesimo. All'interno delle diverse tipologie di rischio che concorrono alla formazione del rischio finanziario di un portafoglio, quelle sulle quali si è maggiormente incentrato l'interesse degli studiosi e degli operatori, anche in adempimento a precise normative legislative relative alle attività di vigilanza degli intermediari finanziari, sono costituite dal rischio di mercato e dal rischio di credito. Mentre il rischio di mercato si associa al rischio di prezzo di un dato portafoglio, incentrando così l'analisi sulle possibili fluttuazioni delle variabili di mercato rilevanti, il rischio di credito (credit risk) considera l'eventualità che il valore di un portafoglio sia influenzato dalla situazione finanziaria dei soggetti in esso coinvolti. La quarta fonte di rischio è il rischio internazionale (international risk). Un'impresa si trova a dover fronteggiare questo tipo di rischio quando la valuta nella quale sono misurati gli utili ed è espresso il prezzo del titolo azionario è diversa dalla valuta dei flussi di cassa del progetto, come accade nel caso di progetti intrapresi al di fuori del mercato nazionale. La principale innovazione introdotta da Markowitz nella misurazione del rischio di un portafoglio consiste nella considerazione della distribuzione congiunta dei rendimenti di tutti i titoli in esso presenti. Il modello media varianza, sebbene sia tuttora largamente utilizzato nella pratica, presenta limiti intrinseci dovuti alla considerazione esclusiva dei primi due momenti della distribuzione dei rendimenti. In primo luogo, deve tenere in debito conto la dispersione dei rendimenti effettivi attorno al rendimento atteso, misurata dalla varianza (o dallo scarto quadratico medio) della distribuzione; maggiore è la differenza fra rendimenti effettivi e rendimento atteso, maggiore è la varianza. 2.2.2. Rendimento e rischio: la frontiera efficiente Supponiamo che un investitore abbia delle stime dei rendimenti attesi, degli scarti quadratici medi dei singoli titoli e delle correlazioni tra i titoli. Nella scelta della migliore combinazione di titoli da detenere, un investitore cercherà ovviamente un portafoglio con un rendimento atteso elevato e un basso scarto quadratico medio dei rendimenti. Pertanto è opportuno considerare: la relazione tra il rendimento atteso dei singoli titoli e il rendimento atteso di un portafoglio composto da questi titoli; la relazione tra gli scarti quadratici medi dei singoli titoli, le correlazioni tra questi titoli e lo scarto quadratico medio di un portafoglio composto dagli stessi. Consideriamo un portafoglio composto da due titoli. Il titolo A ha un rendimento atteso di µA e una varianza dei rendimenti di σ2A, mentre il titolo B ha un rendimento atteso di µB e una varianza dei rendimenti di σ2B . Il rendimento atteso e la varianza di un portafoglio di due titoli può essere scritta come funzione di questi input e del peso che questi hanno sul valore del portafoglio. Dove e rappresentano la quota del titolo A e del titolo B nell'intero portafoglio. L'eliminazione di parte del rischio è possibile perché di solito i rendimenti dei singoli titoli non sono perfettamente correlati tra loro; pertanto parte del rischio viene "eliminata grazie alla diversificazione". Concettualmente, il rischio di un singolo titolo dipende da come il rischio di un portafoglio cambia quando quel titolo viene aggiunto. Come avremo modo di evidenziare in seguito, il Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) mostra che il rischio di un singolo titolo è rappresentato dal suo coefficiente beta che, in termini statistici, indica la tendenza di un titolo azionario a variare nella stessa direzione del mercato (per esempio, l'indice composito S&P): il beta misura la reattività del rendimento di un singolo titolo rispetto al rendimento del portafoglio di mercato. In generale, il numero dei termini di covarianza può essere scritto come una funzione del numero dei titoli. dove n è il numero dei titoli presenti nel portafoglio. Per motivi di semplicità, assumiamo che i titoli abbiano in media una deviazione standard dei rendimenti di , che la covarianza dei rendimenti tra coppie di titoli sia in media e che i tutti i titoli siano presenti nel portafoglio nella stessa proporzione: Il fatto che la varianza possa essere stimata per portafogli composti da un ampio numero di titoli suggerisce un approccio di ottimizzazione nella costruzione del portafoglio, nel quale gli investitori contrappongono rendimento atteso e varianza. Se un investitore può specificare l'ammontare massimo di rischio che è disposto a sopportare (in termini di varianza), il problema dell'ottimizzazione del portafoglio diventa la massimizzazione dei rendimenti attesi dato questo livello di rischio. Graficamente, questi portafogli possono essere rappresentati sulla base delle dimensioni del rendimento atteso e della deviazione standard come nella figura sottostante. Per passare dall'approccio tradizionale di Markowitz a quello del Capital Asset Pricing Model, dobbiamo considerare l'aggiunta di un titolo privo di rischio all'interno del mix dei titoli rischiosi. Il titolo privo di rischio, per definizione, ha un rendimento atteso che risulta sempre uguale al rendimento attuale. Mentre il rendimento dei titoli rischiosi varia, l'assenza di varianza nei rendimenti dei titoli privi di rischio li rende non correlati con i rendimenti dei titoli rischiosi. Per esaminare ciò che accade alla varianza di un portafoglio che combina un titolo privo di rischio con un portafoglio rischioso, assumiamo che la varianza del portafoglio rischioso sia e che sia la quota dell'intero portafoglio investita in questi titoli rischiosi. Il rendimento atteso cresce data la pendenza positiva della retta passante per il livello del tasso privo di rischio. Detta retta prende il nome di Linea del mercato dei capitali o Capital Market Line (CML). Piuttosto, combinerà i titoli di M con l'attività priva di rischio nel caso in cui abbia un'alta avversione al rischio. In un mondo in cui gli investitori tengono una combinazione di due soli titoli (titolo privo di rischio e portafoglio rischioso) il rischio di ogni titolo individuale verrà misurato in base al portafoglio di mercato. In particolare, il rischio di ogni asset diverrà il rischio aggiunto al portafoglio di mercato. Per giungere all'appropriata misurazione di questo rischio aggiunto assumiamo che sia la varianza del portafoglio di mercato prima dell'aggiunta del nuovo titolo, e la varianza del titolo individuale che verrà aggiunto a questo portafoglio sia . Il peso del titolo sul valore di mercato del portafoglio è e la covarianza dei rendimenti tra il titolo individuale e il portafoglio di mercato è . Conseguentemente, il primo termine dell'equazione dovrebbe essere prossimo a zero, e il secondo termine dovrebbe tendere a , lasciando così il terzo termine ( , la covarianza) come misura del rischio aggiunto dal titolo i. Dividendo questo termine per la varianza dei rendimenti del portafoglio di mercato si determina il beta del titolo: Beta del titolo = 2.2.3. Un esempio di diversificazione Supponiamo di fare le seguenti tre ipotesi : 1. tutti i titoli hanno la stessa varianza, che indichiamo con . Il rischio di portafoglio ( ), è il rischio corso anche dopo aver raggiunto la completa diversificazione. Il rischio di portafoglio è spesso chiamato anche rischio sistematico o rischio di mercato. Nel modello base si stabilisce una relazione tra il rendimento di un titolo e la sua rischiosità, misurata tramite un unico fattore di rischio, detto beta. Il beta misura quanto il valore del titolo si muova in sintonia col mercato. Matematicamente, il beta è proporzionale alla covarianza tra rendimento del titolo e andamento del mercato; tale relazione è comunemente sintetizzata tramite la Security Market Line (SML) , illustrata nel grafico sottostante. Figura 3.1. La Security Market Line: relazione tra rischio (beta) e rendimento atteso nel CAPM La SML, solitamente chiamata linea di "mercato degli investimenti", presenta come intercetta il tasso privo di rischio e come pendenza la differenza tra il rendimento del mercato e quello privo di rischio: la retta è positivamente inclinata se il rendimento atteso del mercato è maggiore del tasso privo di rischio ( È facile dimostrare che la linea della Figura 5 è retta. Questo aggiustamento dei prezzi farebbe aumentare i rendimenti attesi dei due titoli e continuerebbe finché i due titoli non si trovassero sulla linea di mercato degli investimenti. La linea del mercato rappresenta la frontiera dei portafogli efficienti formati sia da attività rischiose che dall'attività priva di rischio; ogni punto sulla retta rappresenta un intero portafoglio. Il portafoglio composto da ogni attività trattata sul mercato viene chiamato portafoglio di mercato (market portfolio). Seguendo tale impostazione ogni investitore sceglierà lo stesso identico portafoglio, cioè il portafoglio di mercato, quindi la diversa propensione al rischio di ciascun investitore nelle scelte di investimento emerge nella decisione di allocazione, vale a dire nella decisione di quanto investire nel titolo privo di rischio e quanto nel portafoglio di mercato. Investitori più avversi al rischio sceglieranno di investire gran parte o la totalità del proprio patrimonio nel titolo privo di rischio, mentre investitori meno avversi al rischio investiranno principalmente o esclusivamente nel portafoglio di mercato. Anzi, potranno investire nel portafoglio di mercato non solo tutto il loro patrimonio, ma anche fondi presi a prestito al tasso privo di rischio. La prima è che esista un titolo privo di rischio, ovvero un titolo il cui rendimento atteso sia certo. La seconda è che gli investitori, per ottenere la combinazione ottimale fra titolo privo di rischio e portafoglio di mercato (data la propria propensione al rischio), possano dare e prendere in prestito fondi al tasso privo di rischio. Come già ricordato in precedenza il rischio di ciascuna attività per un investitore corrisponde al rischio aggiunto da quell'attività al suo portafoglio. Nel contesto del CAPM, dove tutti gli investitori scelgono di detenere il portafoglio di mercato, il rischio di una singola attività per un investitore corrisponde al rischio che quest'attività aggiunge al portafoglio di mercato. Statisticamente, questo rischio addizionale è misurato dalla covarianza dell'attività con il portafoglio di mercato. Maggiore è la correlazione fra l'andamento di un'attività e l'andamento del portafoglio di mercato, maggiore è il rischio aggiunto da tale attività ( i movimenti non correlati all'andamento del portafoglio di mercato vengono invece eliminati quando si aggiunge un'attività al portafoglio). Possiamo tuttavia standardizzare la misura del rischio dividendo la covarianza di ciascuna attività con il portafoglio di mercato per la varianza del portafoglio di mercato. Otteniamo in questo modo il cosiddetto beta di un'attività: Dato che la covarianza del portafoglio di mercato con se stesso non è altro che la varianza del portafoglio di mercato, il beta del portafoglio di mercato (e quindi il beta di una ipotetica attività media) è 1. Quindi le attività più (meno) rischiose della media saranno quelle con un beta superiore (inferiore) ad 1. Il titolo privo di rischio avrà ovviamente un beta pari a zero. Il fatto che ciascun investitore possieda una combinazione del titolo privo di rischio e del portafoglio di mercato ha un'importante implicazione: il rendimento atteso di un'attività è strettamente correlato al suo beta. In particolare, il rendimento atteso di un'attività sarà una funzione dal tasso di rendimento del titolo privo di rischio e del beta dell'attività. Il nucleo del CAPM è una relazione attesa tra il rendimento di un qualsiasi titolo ( ) e il rendimento del portafoglio di mercato, che può essere espressa come: dove sono il rendimento lordo del titolo in questione e del portafoglio di mercato e è il rendimento lordo privo di rischio. Secondo questa formula il rendimento atteso di un'attività rischiosa è dato dal rendimento di un titolo privo di rischio maggiorato di un premio per il rischio, che sarà più o meno elevato a seconda del rischio aggiunto dall'attività al portafoglio di mercato. È chiaro quindi che per usare il CAPM sono necessari i seguenti tre input: Tasso di rendimento del titolo privo di rischio. Per titolo privo di rischio si intende il titolo il cui rendimento atteso nel periodo di riferimento sia noto all'investitore con certezza. Di conseguenza, il tasso di rendimento di un titolo privo di rischio da utilizzare nel CAPM varierà a seconda che il periodo di riferimento sia 1, 5 o 10 anni. • Premio per il rischio. Il premio per il rischio indica la remunerazione richiesta dai risparmiatori per investire nel portafoglio di mercato (che comprende tutte le attività rischiose) piuttosto che nel titolo privo di rischio. Il beta è l'unico input specifico del titolo analizzato (ad es. un'azione). Per esempio, abbiamo ipotizzato che investire nei Buoni del Tesoro sia completamente senza rischio. (Nel CAPM, tali portafogli sono i Buoni del Tesoro e il portafoglio di mercato.) Nei CAPM modificati i rendimenti attesi dipendono ancora dal rischio sistematico, ma la definizione di rischio sistematico dipende dalla natura del portafoglio di riferimento. Il CAPM ipotizza che un investitore richieda un rendimento atteso più elevato per un rischio maggiore, e non ammette che un investitore accetti un rendimento minore, o un rischio maggiore, ceteris paribus. L'ipotesi cruciale nella derivazione proposta sopra è che le preferenze degli investitori siano formulate esclusivamente in termini di media e varianza dei rendimenti dei titoli; l'ipotesi di normalità dei rendimenti (lognormalità dei prezzi) è una condizione sufficiente, ma non necessaria, affinché ciò sia verificato. Il CAPM ipotizza che il profilo rischio-rendimento atteso di un portafoglio possa essere ottimizzato, determinando un portafoglio ottimo, che presenti il minimo livello di rischio possibile per il proprio rendimento atteso. Nel secondo passo, si utilizzano le stime come osservazioni dei regressori nei modelli di regressione lineare, nella dimensione cross-section: Il CAPM risulterà non rifiutato se, sulla base della regressione sopra, il coefficiente a sarà pari al tasso d'interesse privo di rischio , e se il coefficiente b sarà pari al premio per il rischio del portafoglio di mercato. Usando dati dagli anni trenta agli anni sessanta, alcuni ricercatori dimostrarono che il rendimento medio di un portafoglio di azioni è una funzione crescente del beta del portafoglio , una scoperta coerente con il CAPM. In sostanza, qualunque test del CAPM sarebbe per Roll riconducibile all'ipotesi che il portafoglio di mercato, il cui rendimento è indicato da sopra, appartenga alla porzione efficiente della frontiera dei portafogli. Un test del CAPM si tradurrebbe di fatto in un test sull'appartenenza alla frontiera efficiente della particolare proxy del portafoglio di mercato utilizzata. La popolarità del CAPM è essenzialmente legata alla sua semplicità, nonché alla capacità di ricondurre il valore di un titolo a un singolo fattore di rischio, rappresentato dal rischio legato al portafoglio di mercato. Dunque, un investitore può creare un portafoglio abbastanza simile al portafoglio di mercato del CAPM combinando vari fondi indicizzati, ciascuno in proporzione al valore di mercato del mercato cui l'indice fa riferimento. Così, in questo periodo di 60 anni, i rendimenti sono davvero aumentati all'aumentare del beta. Come risulta dalla Figura 3.2, il portafoglio di mercato negli stessi 60 anni ha fornito un rendimento medio di 14 punti percentuali sopra il tasso risk-free e , è ovvio, ha avuto un beta pari a 1. Il CAPM sostiene che il premio per il rischio dovrebbe aumentare in proporzione al beta, in modo che i rendimenti di ciascun portafoglio si collochino sulla linea del mercato azionario inclinata positivamente delle Figure 3.4 e 3.5. Figura 3.4. Premio per il rischio e beta dei dieci investimenti nel periodo 1931-1965 Figura 3.5. Premio per il rischio e beta dei dieci investimenti nel periodo 1966-1991 Poiché il mercato ha fornito un premio per il rischio del 14%, il portafoglio dell'investitore 1, con un beta di 0,49, dovrebbe avere fornito un premio per il rischio leggermente inferiore al 7% e il portafoglio dell'investitore 10, con un beta di 1,52, dovrebbe avere fornito un premio leggermente superiore al 21%. Sia l'APT che il CAPM implicano una relazione crescente tra rendimento atteso e rischio. Inoltre l'APT considera il rischio in maniera più generale rispetto alla semplice covarianza standardizzata o al beta di un titolo con il portafoglio di mercato. Come il CAPM, anche l'Arbitrage Pricing Model scompone il rischio in rischio specifico d'impresa e rischio-mercato. In primo luogo, il rendimento normale o atteso del titolo, cioè la parte del rendimento che gli azionisti sul mercato prevedono o si aspettano. La seconda parte è il rendimento incerto o rischioso del titolo. Nella misura in cui gli azionisti avevano previsto l'annuncio del governo, tale previsione dovrebbe essere incorporata nella parte attesa del rendimento calcolato all'inizio del mese, cioè in . D'altro canto, se l'annuncio del governo è una sorpresa, nella misura in cui influenza il rendimento del titolo azionario farà parte di U, la parte non anticipata del rendimento. La parte non anticipata del rendimento, quella che deriva dalle sorprese, costituisce il vero rischio di ogni investimento. In termini statistici, 4.2. Le fonti del rischio-mercato Il fatto che le componenti non sistematiche dei rendimenti di due società non siano correlate tra loro non implica che anche le componenti sistematiche siano incorrelate. Nonostante il CAPM e l'APM facciano entrambi una distinzione fra rischio specifico d'impresa e rischio-mercato, essi si differenziano poi nell'approccio alla misurazione del rischio-mercato. Il coefficiente beta, β, indica la reazione del rendimento di un titolo azionario a un tipo di rischio sistematico. Nel CAPM il beta misurava la variazione del rendimento di un titolo a uno specifico fattore di rischio, il rendimento del portafoglio di mercato. Viene utilizzato questo termine perché l'indice impiegato come fattore è un indice dei rendimenti dell'intero mercato (azionario). Il modello di mercato può essere quindi espresso come M) + ε dove rappresenta il rendimento del portafoglio di mercato e β è detto coefficiente beta. Considerando Xi la proporzione del titolo i nel portafoglio, sappiamo che la loro somma deve essere pari a 1 e che il rendimento del portafoglio è la media ponderata dei rendimenti delle singole attività nel portafoglio Nel paragrafo precedente abbiamo visto che il rendimento di ciascuna attività è a sua volta determinato sia dal fattore F che dal rischio non sistematico rappresentato da . La prima riga è la media ponderata dei rendimenti attesi dei singoli titoli. Il rendimento di un portafoglio può essere rappresentato come la somma di due medie ponderate: la media ponderata dei rendimenti attesi delle attività nel portafoglio e al media ponderata dei beta associati a ciascun fattore. La componente dei rendimenti specifica della singola impresa (ε) scompare a livello di portafoglio per effetto della diversificazione. Se assumiamo infatti che il portafoglio sia composto da molti titoli tutti presenti nella medesima proporzione , possiamo notare che al crescere del numero dei titoli compresi nel portafoglio la componente del rischio idiosincratico si annulla: Per ogni singola azione ci sono due fonti di rischio. Il premio atteso per il rischio di un'azione dipende dai fattori macroeconomici di rischio e non è influenzato dal rischio specifico. Il portafoglio A ha un beta (rispetto a questo unico fattore) di 2,0 e un rendimento atteso del 20%; il portafoglio B ha un beta di 1,0 e un rendimento atteso del 12%; il portafoglio C ha un beta di 1,5 e un rendimento atteso del 14%. Si noti che investendo la metà del proprio patrimonio nel portafoglio A e la metà nel portafoglio B, si potrebbe ottenere un portafoglio con un beta (sempre rispetto all'unico fattore) pari a 1,5 e un rendimento atteso del 16%. Di conseguenza nessun investitore vorrà investire nel portafoglio C finché non scenderanno i prezzi delle attività in tale portafoglio, portandone così il rendimento atteso al 16%. In alternativa, un investitore può comprare la combinazione dei portafogli A e B, con un rendimento atteso del 16%, e vendere il portafoglio C, con un rendimento atteso del 15%, ottenendo così un profitto pulito dell'1% senza investire nulla e senza assumere alcun rischio. Per impedire tale "arbitraggio", il rendimento atteso di ciascun portafoglio deve essere una funzione lineare del beta. Ogni azione deve offrire un rendimento atteso coerente con il suo contributo al rischio del portafoglio. Secondo l'APM questo contributo dipende dalla sensibilità dei rendimenti dell'azione alle variazioni inattese dei fattori macroeconomici. 5.1. Il tasso di interesse privo di rischio La maggior parte dei modelli di rischio e rendimento in finanza partono da un investimento definito "privo di rischio" e considerano il rendimento atteso da quell'investimento come tasso privo di rischio . I rendimenti attesi da investimenti rischiosi vengono poi calcolati aggiungendo al tasso privo di rischio un premio per il rischio atteso. Abbiamo definito "investimento privo di rischio" un'attività della quale l'investitore conosce con certezza il rendimento atteso. Il rendimento atteso su di un portafoglio pienamente diversificato deve essere misurato in relazione al tasso di rendimento atteso su un titolo privo di rischio . Quando ci riferiamo ai rendimenti (yields) di un titolo di stato come titolo risk-free rate, ci riferiamo al fatto che esso sia privo del rischio di fallimento, riconosciamo però che esso incorpori il maturity risk: la sola parte del rendimento che risulta priva di rischio è dunque la componente degli interessi. Come risultato, l'evidenza empirica di lungo termine è che i rendimenti dei bond a lunga scadenza in media eccedono i rendimenti dei T.Bill. L'horizon premium compensa gli investitori per questo rischio di mercato. Nel primo caso, dovrebbe utilizzare come tasso privo di rischio il tasso di un Treasury Bond statunitense, nel secondo invece un tasso privo di rischio in pesos. Per calcolare un rendimento atteso in termini reali, è necessario partire da un tasso di rischio espresso in termini reali. La soluzione più comune in questi casi (sottrarre al tasso di interesse nominale un tasso di inflazione attesa) fornisce nel migliore dei casi soltanto una stima approssimativa del tasso privo di rischio in termini reali. Nell'approccio basato sul premio per il rischio realizzato, la stima dell'ERP è il premio per il rischio (rendimento azionario realizzato in eccesso rispetto al tasso privo di rischio) che gli investitori hanno, in media, realizzato su periodi di investimento passati. Se i rendimenti periodali dei titoli azionari (ad esempio rendimenti mensili) non sono correlati (i rendimenti di questo mese non sono stati adeguatamente predetti dai rendimenti dell'ultimo mese) e se i rendimenti attesi sono stabili nel tempo, allora la media aritmetica dei rendimenti storici fornisce un'adeguata stima dei rendimenti futuri attesi. Conseguentemente, la media aritmetica dei premi per il rischio realizzati fornisce una stima appropriata dei premi per il rischio futuri attesi (ERP). Differenze nell'approccio per la stima dell'ERP scaturiscono dalla misurazione dei rendimenti attesi sui titoli rischiosi (equity securities). Nell'applicare l'approccio basato sul premio per il rischio realizzato, l'analista seleziona il numero di anni dei rendimenti storici da includere nella media. L'SBBI Yearbook contiene il riassunto dei rendimenti delle azioni e dei titoli di Stato degli USA derivanti da questi dati . (Nel primo periodo, il mercato era composto quasi interamente da titoli bancari, mentre nella metà del diciannovesimo secolo, il mercato era dominato dai titoli delle ferrovie. ) Per questi periodi sono stati assemblati anche i rendimenti dei titoli governativi. La tabella 5.1 fornisce il premio per il rischio medio annuo realizzato da titoli azionari tratti da varie fonti con riferimento a differenti periodi fino al 2006. Si misura il premio per il rischio realizzato confrontando i rendimenti del mercato azionario realizzati durante il periodo con il rendimento dei titoli governativi di lungo termine (o lo yield to maturity per gli anni precedenti il 1926). Dall'osservazione del tabella quello che può risultare sorprendente è che il valore più grande della media aritmetica dei rendimenti annui è quello degli 81 anni dal 1926 al 2006. Per il calcolo dell'ERP viene impiegato il rendimento dei titoli governativi a lungo termine perché in ogni periodo rappresenta il rendimento atteso dei titoli al tempo dell'investimento. Tabella 5.1 Premi per il rischio storici: Rendimenti del mercato azionario – T.Bond 5.3. Il premio per il rischio (risk premium) Il premio per il rischio è un elemento essenziale nel contesto dei modelli di rischio e rendimento. Nel presente paragrafo esamineremo le determinanti fondamentali del premio per il rischio e diversi approcci pratici alla sua stima. Nel CAPM il premio per il rischio misura il rendimento addizionale richiesto in media dagli investitori per spostarsi da un investimento privo di rischio a investimenti rischiosi (il portafoglio di mercato). Ne consegue che il premio per il rischio dovrebbe essere una funzione di due variabili: L'avversione degli investitori al rischio: maggiore l'avversione al rischio, maggiore il premio richiesto dagli investitori. Tale avversione al rischio è in parte congenita, ma dipende anche dalla situazione economica (in un'economia in crescita, gli investitori saranno più propensi ad assumere rischi) e dalla recente performance del mercato (il premio per il rischio tende a salire in seguito a un significativo calo del mercato). Allo stesso modo, nell'APM e nei modelli multifattoriali, i premi per il rischio utilizzati per ciascuno dei fattori saranno pari alla media ponderata dei premi richiesti dai singoli investitori per ciascuno dei fattori. 5.3.1. Equity Premium Puzzle In finanza, l'Equity Premium Puzzle o enigma del premio azionario si riferisce all'osservazione empirica che i rendimenti osservati sui mercati azionari nell'ultimo secolo sono stati superiori a quelli dei titoli di stato; in particolare, il premio per il rischio medio per i titoli azionari nell'ultimo secolo sarebbe pari a circa il 6%, laddove il rendimento medio dei titoli di stato a scadenza breve (considerato una buona approssimazione del rendimento privo di rischio) sarebbe intorno all'1%. La teoria economica suggerisce che gli investitori dovrebbero sfruttare l'evidente opportunità d'arbitraggio rappresentata dalla differenza tra premio per il rischio azionario e rendimento medio dei titoli di stato. Una maggiore domanda provocherebbe a sua volta un aumento dei prezzi medi dei titoli azionari; essendo il rendimento nient'altro che una misura dello scarto tra il prezzo attuale e quello futuro, un aumento del prezzo attuale, ceteris paribus, riduce il rendimento atteso, e con esso il premio per il rischio (dato dalla differenza tra rendimento atteso e tasso di rendimento privo di rischio). In equilibrio, si ridurrebbe dunque lo scarto tra il premio per il rischio dei titoli azionari e il tasso di rendimento privo di rischio, fino al punto in cui tale scarto riflette il premio per il rischio che un investitore rappresentativo richiede per investire nei titoli azionari, caratterizzati da una maggiore rischiosità. Rovesciando questo ragionamento, lo scarto osservato tra i due rendimenti dovrebbe riflettere la valutazione del rischio da parte dell'investitore medio. Gli studiosi che negano l'esistenza del premio per il rischio fondano il proprio convincimento nelle seguenti considerazioni: L'evidenza empirica mostra che negli ultimi quaranta anni (1969-2009) non c'è stato un significativo premio per il rischio azionario sul mercato USA; - Errori di selezione (selection bias) del mercato statunitense: il mercato azionario di maggior successo nel corso del XX° secolo. 5.4.2. Premi storici Il metodo più comune per stimare il premio (o i premi) per il rischio nei modelli di rischio e rendimento è l'estrapolazione da dati storici. Nel CAPM il premio viene calcolato come differenza fra rendimenti medi azionari e rendimenti medi su titoli privi di rischio lungo un esteso periodo di tempo. Nella maggior parte dei casi, questo tipo di approccio consta di tre tappe successive: 1) definire un arco temporale per la stima; 2) calcolare il rendimento medio di un indice azionario e il rendimento medio di un titolo privo di rischio nel periodo in questione; 3) calcolare la differenza fra tali rendimenti e utilizzarla come stima del premio per il rischio atteso per il futuro. La rischiosità media del portafoglio "rischioso" (l'indice azionario nel nostro caso) non sia cambiata in modo sistematico nel tempo. 5.4.3. Premi azionari impliciti Esiste un altro approccio alla stima dei premi per il rischio che non richiede dati storici né correzioni per tenere conto del rischio-Paese. Sottraendo da tale rendimento il tasso privo di rischio, si ottiene un premio implicito per il rischio azionario. Inoltre affinché il premio per il rischio risultasse positivo , dovrebbe verificarsi che: Al fine di illustrare questo metodo, supponiamo che il livello attuale dell'indice S&P 500 sia 900, che il tasso di dividendo atteso sull'indice sia del 2%, e che il tasso di crescita atteso degli utili e dei dividendi nel lungo termine sia del 7%; risolvendo per il rendimento atteso sul capitale netto otteniamo: ; Dato un tasso privo di rischio del 6%, il premio implicito per il rischio azionario sarà pari al 3%. • Risolvendo l'equazione per r, si ottiene una stima del rendimento atteso sul capitale netto pari a 8,39%. Sottraendo da tale stima il tasso dei Treasury Bond (4,02%) si ottiene un premio azionario implicito del 4,37%. Da tali input emerge un rendimento azionario atteso del 10,70% che, se confrontato con il tasso dei Treasury Bond a quella data (4%), implica un premio azionario implicito del 6,70%. Questo fatto ha interessanti implicazioni per la stima del premio per il rischio. Allo stesso modo, il premio del 2% che abbiamo osservato alla fine della bolla speculativa delle società Internet (dot-com boom) degli anni '90 è tornato rapidamente ai livelli medi, durante la correzione del mercato del 2000-2003. Data questa tendenza, possiamo concludere con una migliore stima del premio per il rischio implicito, guardando non solo al premio corrente, ma anche alle linee di tendenza storiche. Tre motivi, tuttavia, spiegano l'esistenza di stime del premio per il rischio così diverse. Ad esempio, data una deviazione standard annuale dei prezzi azionari fra il 1928 e il 2003 pari al 20%, la Tabella 6.1 riporta l'entità dell'errore standard associato alla stima del premio per il rischio in funzione della lunghezza del periodo di stima. Tabella 6.1 Errori standard nelle stime dei premi di rischio La scelta del titolo privo di rischio La banca dati Ibbotson riporta i rendimenti si a dei Treasury Bill sia dei Treasury Bond, sicchè il premio per il rischio degli investimenti azionari può essere stimato rispetto a entrambi. Il tasso privo di rischio alla base della stima del premio deve essere coerente con il tasso privo di rischio utilizzato nel calcolo dei rendimenti attesi. Nella maggior parte dei casi, in finanza aziendale, il tasso privo di rischio rilevante è quello di lungo periodo. Le medie aritmetiche e geometriche Un ultimo elemento di controversia nella stima dei premi storici consiste nel modo in cui calcolare le medie dei rendimenti. La media aritmetica consiste nella semplice media dei rendimenti annuali, mentre la media geometrica si riferisce al rendimento composto. In effetti, se i rendimenti annui non sono correlati nel tempo, la media aritmetica rappresenta la stima più corretta del premio per il rischio atteso per l'anno prossimo. In primo luogo, studi empirici sembrano indicare che i rendimenti degli investimenti azionari sono negativamente correlati nel corso del tempo. Tabella 6.2 Premi di rischio storici (%) del mercato statunitense, 1928-2008 Tirando le somme, le stime del premio per il rischio possono variare a seconda delle differenze in termini di periodo di stima, scelta del titolo di Stato come tasso privo di rischio (a breve o lungo termine), e utilizzo di medie aritmetiche oppure geometriche. Se ci atteniamo al proposito di selezionare un premio basato sulla media geometrica a lungo termine rispetto al tasso dei Treasury Bond a lungo termine, la stima migliore del premio per il rischio sulla base di dati storici è 4,82%. 6.1. Periodicità dei dati storici Anche se accettiamo l'ipotesi che i rendimenti siano effettivamente indipendenti, la media aritmetica dei premi per il rischio realizzati basati su rendimenti di 1 anno potrebbe non essere la migliore stima dei rendimenti futuri. I tradizionali modelli dei rendimenti dei titoli (es. CAPM) sono generalmente modelli uniperiodali che stimano i rendimenti su orizzonti di tempo non specificati. Allora nell'utilizzare i rendimenti realizzati per stimare i rendimenti attesi, dobbiamo calcolare i rendimenti realizzati su periodi di due anni (media geometrica dei rendimenti annui di due anni consecutivi) e poi calcolare la media aritmetica delle medie geometriche dei due anni per ottenere una stima incondizionata dei rendimenti futuri. Gli autori mostrano che l'utilizzo della media geometrica dei rendimenti storici a un anno produce una stima dei rendimenti cumulati che approssima maggiormente la mediana dei rendimenti cumulati (il 50% degli investitori realizzerà un rendimento maggiore di quello mediano e il 50% un rendimento inferiore a quello mediano). Essi dimostrano che la differenza tra la mediana dei rendimenti cumulati ottenuta dall'impiego della media aritmetica rispetto alla media geometrica dei rendimenti storici a un anno aumenta poiché aumenta l'orizzonte d'investimento atteso. 6.2. Selezione del periodo di riferimento Il premio per il rischio realizzato medio risulta essere sensibile al periodo che viene scelto per calcolare tale media. I modelli di rendimento possono cambiare nel tempo. Concentrandosi sul recente passato si ignorano i drammatici eventi storici e il loro impatto sui rendimenti del mercato. Gli anni dal 1942 fino al 1951 furono un periodo di stabilità artificiale dei tassi dei bond statunitensi. Includendo questo periodo nel calcolo dei rendimenti realizzati equivale a valutare i titoli delle linee aere di oggi facendo riferimento ai titoli delle linee aeree prima della deregulation. Tabella 6.4 Premi per il Rischio realizzati sui rendimenti dei T.Bond Se il premio per il rischio medio è cambiato nel corso del tempo, allora la media del rischio realizzato utilizzare la più lunga serie dei dati disponibili diviene discutibile. A partire dalla metà degli anni '50 fino al 1981, i rendimenti dei bond hanno registrato un trend crescente, dettando una generalizzata diminuzione del prezzo dei medesimi. I rendimenti realizzati dai bond erano generalmente più bassi dei rendimenti attesi al momento della loro emissione (l'investitore che avesse venduto prima della scadenza avrebbe registrato una perdita). Dal 1981 i rendimenti dei titoli di Stato hanno iniziato a diminuire, provocando una generalizzata crescita del loro prezzo. Nella tabella 6.5 presentiamo statistiche riassuntive per i rendimenti dei titoli azionari, dei Treasury Bill a 6 mesi e dei Treasury Bond a 10 anni dal 1928 al 2008: Tabella 6.5 Statistiche riassuntive Utilizzando questa tabella possiamo iniziare a stimare un premio per il rischio facendo la differenza tra il rendimento medio delle azioni e il rendimento medio dei titoli di Stato: il premio per il rischio è del 7,30% per le azioni rispetto ai T.Bills (11,09% - 3,79%) e 5,64% per le azioni rispetto ai T.Bonds (11,09% - 5,45%). I premi per il rischio storici per i mercati emergenti possono fornire interessanti spunti di riflessione, ma non possono essere impiegati nei modelli di rischio e rendimento. Consideriamo per prima cosa l'assunzione fondamentale che il premio per il rischio per gli investitori non sia cambiato nel corso del tempo e che l'investimento rischioso medio (nel portafoglio di mercato) sia rimasto stabile nel periodo di tempo esaminato. Nel periodo compreso tra il 1926 e il 2000, gli investimenti in molti degli altri mercati dei capitali avrebbero prodotto premi molto più contenuti rispetto al mercato USA, e alcuni di essi si sarebbero tradotti, per gli investitori, in rendimenti più contenuti o negativi nel corso del periodo. Tabella 6.7 Premi per Rischio storici di differenti mercati: 1900-2005 Dall'analisi della tabella risulta che i premi per il rischio, risultanti dalla media dei 17 mercati, sono più bassi dei premi per il rischio degli Stati Uniti. Per esempio, la media geometrica del premio per il rischio tra i vari mercati è solo del 4,04%, più bassa del 4,52% del mercato USA. La figura 5.1 riporta i premi per il rischio – ossia i rendimenti addizionali – ottenuti investendo in azioni piuttosto che titoli di Stato a breve e lungo termine nel periodo in questione per ciascuno dei diciassette mercati. In Francia, invece, le cifre corrispondenti sarebbero state del 9,27% e del 6,03%. Nella prima parte di questa sezione, rimarremo all'interno del mercato statunitense tentando di apportare delle modifiche al premio per il rischio facendo riferimento a specifiche caratteristiche dell'impresa (la capitalizzazione del mercato rappresenta l'esempio più comune). Nella seconda parte, estendiamo l'analisi osservando mercati emergenti come Asia, America Latina e Europa orientale, provando l'approccio basato sulla stima del premio per il rischio Paese che aumenta poi il premio per il rischio statunitense. Il primo si riferisce a se ci dovrebbe essere un premio per il rischio addizionale quando si valutano i titoli in questi mercati, dovuto al rischio Paese. Il secondo quesito si ricollega invece alla stima del premio per il rischio dei mercati emergenti. L'altro è considerare i rendimenti eccedenti come l'evidenza che i beta sono misure inadeguate del rischio e come compensazione del rischio tralasciato. Per giungere a questo premio gli analisti fanno riferimento ai dati storici sui rendimenti degli small cap stocks e del mercato, aggiustato per il beta risk, e attribuiscono il rendimento eccedente allo small cap effect. Tabella 6.8 Excess Returns per classi del valore di mercato: titoli USA 1927-2007 Se si aggiunge al costo del capitale delle piccole imprese uno small cap premium del 4-5%, senza attribuire tale premio ad un rischio specifico, siamo esposti al pericolo di conteggiare doppiamente tale rischio. 6.5.2. Il Premio per il Rischio Paese Per molti mercati emergenti, sono disponibili pochissimi dati storici, e quelli che esistono sono troppo volatili per giungere a una stima sensata del premio per il rischio. In questi casi, il premio per il rischio può essere così calcolato: Il premio per il rischio-Paese riflette il rischio addizionale associato a un mercato specifico. Per determinare il premio base per un mercato azionario maturo è opportuno fare riferimento al mercato azionario statunitense che, oltre ad essere il mercato finanziario più efficiente, offre dati storici sufficienti a ottenere una stima ragionevole del premio per il rischio. 1. Gli analisti che utilizzano i differenziali per il rischio di insolvenza come misure del rischio-Paese di solito li sommano sia al costo del capitale netto sia a quello del debito di ciascuna impresa quotata nel Paese in questione. Per esempio, il costo del capitale netto di una impresa brasiliana, stimato in dollari statunitensi, sarà del 2,15% maggiore del costo del capitale netto di un'impresa statunitense simile. Dato un premio per il rischio per i mercati azionari maturi (Stati Uniti) del 4,00% e un tasso privo di rischio del 3,80% (Treasury Bond statunitensi), il costo del capitale netto di una società brasiliana con un beta di 1,2 può essere stimato nel modo seguente: Alcuni analisti sommano il differenziale per il rischio di insolvenza al premio per il rischio statunitense, moltiplicando la somma così ottenuta per il beta. Questo procedimento risulta in un maggiore (minore) costo del capitale netto per le imprese con beta maggiore (minore) di 1. Volatilità del mercato azionario rispetto a mercati azionari maturi Alcuni analisti ritengono che i premi per il rischio azionario dei mercati debbano riflettere le differenze in termini di volatilità fra i diversi mercati. Una misura convenzionale del rischio azionario è la deviazione standard dei prezzi azionari: deviazioni standard più elevate indicano di solito un rischio maggiore. Questa deviazione standard relativa, moltiplicata per il premio utilizzato per le azioni statunitensi, fornisce una possibile stima del premio per il rischio totale di un mercato. Se assumiamo una relazione lineare tra il premio per il rischio e la deviazione standard del mercato azionario, oltre alla possibilità di calcolare il premio per il rischio del mercato statunitense (utilizzando ad esempio dati storici), allora il premio per il rischio del Paese X è: Assumiamo, per il momento, di utilizzare per gli Stati Uniti un premio per il rischio del 4%. La tabella 6.9 elenca i dati della volatilità del Paese per alcuni mercati emergenti ed i risultanti premi per il rischio totale e Paese per questi mercati, basato sull'assunzione che il premio per il rischio degli Stati Uniti sia del 4%. Tabella 6.9 Volatilità del mercato azionario e Premi per il rischio Per esempio, il premio per il rischio della Cina è 5,52%, utilizzando questo approccio, ben al di sopra del premio per il rischio di Nigeria, Namibia e Egitto, ognuno dei quali dovrebbe essere un mercato rischioso quanto la Cina. Differenziali per il rischio di insolvenza + volatilità del mercato rispetto ai titoli di Stato I differenziali per il rischio di insolvenza del Paese associati ai rispettivi rating, pur rappresentando una prima tappa importante, misurano soltanto il premio per il rischio di insolvenza. Per capire di quanto, si può calcolare la volatilità del mercato azionario di un Paese rispetto alla volatilità dei titoli di Stato utilizzati per la stima del premio per il rischio azionario del Paese. A titolo illustrativo, prendiamo il caso del Brasile. Il premio addizionale per il rischio azionario del Paese che ne risulta per il Brasile è il seguente: Va notato che il premio per il rischio del Paese aumenterà al crescere del differenziale per il rischio di insolvenza del Paese e della volatilità del mercato azionario. Inoltre, va ricordato che esso va sommato al premio per il rischio azionario di un mercato maturo. I primi due approcci per la stima dei premi per il rischio del Paese tendono a risultare in una stima più bassa rispetto al terzo. Nel caso del Brasile, per esempio, i premi per il rischio del Paese vanno dal 2,76% (secondo approccio), al 6,01% (primo approccio), fino a un picco del 4,43% (terzo approccio). Va ricordato che l'unico rischio rilevante ai fini della stima del costo del capitale netto è il rischio di mercato, ossia il rischio non diversificabile. Se, al contrario, i mercati azionari dei Paesi si muovono nella stessa direzione, il rischio-Paese avrà una componente di rischio di mercato no diversificabile e per la quale è necessario un premio. 7. PARAMETRI DI RISCHIO Gli ultimi dati di cui abbiamo bisogno per mettere in pratica i nostri modelli di rischio e rendimento sono i parametri di rischio per una specifica attività. Nel CAPM il beta di un'attività deve essere stimato rispetto al portafoglio di mercato. Nel contesto del CAPM, il beta viene poi ottenuto esaminando la relazione fra questi rendimenti e i corrispondenti rendimenti di un indice del mercato azionario. Infine, nell'APM è l'analisi fattoriale dei rendimenti azionari a fornire i vari beta. 7.1.1. Procedura per la stima dei parametri del CAPM Il beta di un'attività può essere stimato come coefficiente di una regressione dei rendimenti di una singola azione (Rj) sui rendimenti del mercato azionario (Rm). L'intercetta della regressione fornisce una semplice misura della performance effettivamente ottenuta nell'arco temporale analizzato, rispetto alla performance attesa alla luce del CAPM. Dal punto di vista finanziario va interpretato come proporzione del rischio complessivo di un'azione (varianza) attribuibile al rischio di mercato; ne segue che la differenza (1-R2) indica invece la proporzione del rischio complessivo di un'azione attribuibile al rischio specifico d'impresa. Un ultimo dato statistico di interesse è l'errore standard della stima del beta. La prima riguarda la durata del periodo di stima. 7.1.2. Procedura di stima dei parametri di rischio nell'APM e nel modello multifattoriale Come il CAPM, anche l'APM considera solo il rischio non diversificabile; tuttavia, nella misurazione del rischio, a differenza del CAPM, l'APM tiene conto di una molteplicità di fattori economici. Sebbene il processo di stima dei parametri di rischio sia diverso, molti problemi legati alle determinanti del rischio nel CAPM si presentano anche per l'APM. La derivazione del beta dai fondamentali rappresenta un approccio alternativo alla stima del beta, in cui si dà minore rilievo alla stima basata su dati storici e maggiore rilievo all'intuizione economica. Intensità della leva finanziaria (financial leverage) Il beta delle attività dell'impresa è la media ponderata del beta del capitale netto (rischio a carico degli azionisti) e del beta del debito (rischio a carico degli obbligazionisti). A parità di condizioni, a un aumento della leva finanziaria (cioè del rapporto d'indebitamento ) seguirà un aumento del rischio a carico degli azionisti (e quindi del beta del capitale netto). Il beta dell'insieme di due attività è la media ponderata del beta di ciascuna attività, con i pesi proporzionali al loro valore di mercato. 1. Calcolare il beta unlevered dell'impresa come media ponderata dei beta unlevered delle varie attività, usando come pesi la percentuale del valore di mercato dell'impresa rappresentata da ciascuna attività.

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security.The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once.







1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.







3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.







In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.







A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.







And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "transitioning away from" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.







Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.







CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security. The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once. 1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "leave behind" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution