Suchergebnisse

Soziokulturelle Länderkurzanalysen wurden Anfang der 1990er Jahre zum festen Bestandteil der "Länderkonzepte", dem neuen zentralen Managementinstrument der deutschen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Die Quintessenz dieses Ansatzes wurde in der Frage zusammengefaßt: Wollen und können die Zielgruppen das, was der Experte als Lösung für Probleme anbietet? Damit wollte man den bis dahin verbreiteten Tendenzen zu isolierten, sektor-spezifischen Lösungsansätzen gegensteuern: der Mensch und sein soziokulturelles Umfeld sollten in den Mittelpunkt rücken, und nicht wie bis dahin, technische und ökonomische Innovationen. Diese hehren Ziel stehen allerdings in Widerspruch zu überholten modernisierungstheoretischen Grundannahmen, die das Denken der Experten nach wie vor prägen. Gemäß den Vorstellungen des BMZ schlägt letztendlich doch wieder der Entwicklungsexperte "moderne Dinge" unseres westlichen "technischen Fortschritts" zur Implementierung vor. Die Hybris der Allwissenheit des Experten, der für jedes Problem eine Lösung parat hat, wird um so mehr zum Problem, je gezielter er sich denjenigen Bedürftigen widmet, denen gemäß den entwicklungspolitischen Leitlinien des BMZ am meisten geholfen werden soll, nämlich den Armen. Die Schwachstelle der gegenwärtigen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit liegt nicht - wie es das Rahmenkonzept suggeriert - darin, daß die Zielgruppen (oder Nehmerländer) die "Errungenschaften" moderner Zivilisation auf Grund soziokultureller Hemmnisse (noch) nicht übernehmen wollen oder können. Die Schwachstelle liegt vielmehr in dem mangelnden Können und Wollen der überwiegenden Mehrheit der entsandten Experten, mit dem Umdenken ernst zu machen, und tatsächlich Projekte (Problemdiagnose, Projektplanung und -Evaluation) in Bezug auf die Hauptzielgruppe deutscher Entwicklungspolitik, die Armen - vorrangig aus der Perspektive dieser Zielgruppe anzugehen. Die Zielgruppe der "afrikanischen Kleinbauern" beispielsweise ist keine homogene Masse, wie auch heute noch viel zu oft "Experten" leichtfertig in Berufung auf angebliche soziokulturelle Traditionen (z. B. die der .konfliktfreien Dorfgemeinschaft") behaupten. Selbst wenn ihre lokalen Führer von den Zielgruppen als legitime Vertreter angesehen werden, heißt das noch lange nicht, daß beispielsweise der Dorfchef auch weiß (oder ausspricht), was arme, Mittel- oder Großbauern in seinem Dorf wollen, geschweige denn, was sie realisieren können. Ein mindestens ebenso wichtiges Qualifikationsmerkmal für den Experten, wie gute Fachkenntnis, sind seine sprachliche und kulturelle Kommunikationsfähigkeit. Dazu ist jedoch in der Regel der bisherige Expertentypus weder von seiner Ausbildung, noch von seinen persönlichen Interessen und Erfahrungen her in der Lage. ; Author's version ; "Are the experts capable of doing what they should do? - Weaknesses of the socio-cultural framework concept of the BMZ": In the early 1990s sociocultural country proximate analyses became an integral part of the "Country concepts", the new strategic management instrument of the German development cooperation. The quintessence of this approach was summarized in the question: Do the target groups want and know how to do what they should do. The aim of this approach was to counteract the previously widespread tendencies towards isolated, sector-specific solutions: the human and its socio-cultural environment should be the focus, and not as hitherto, technical and economic innovations, spread within the framework of a top-down extension approach. However, the objective of the approach is still based on obsolete modernization-theoretical assumptions, which characterize the reasoning of the experts up to date. The hubris of the omniscience of the expert, who has a solution to every problem, becomes the more problematic the more he devotes himself to those in need according to the development policy guidelines of the BMZ, namely the poor. The weak point of current development cooperation is not - as the BMZ-framework suggests - that target groups (or recipient countries) are not able (or do not want) to take over the "achievements" of modern civilization due to socio-cultural barriers. Rather, the weakness lies in the inability and reluctance of the overwhelming majority of seconded experts to be serious about rethinking projects (including problem diagnosis, project planning and evaluation) in relation to the main target group of development policy, the poor, i.e. rethinking the project primarily from the perspective of this target group. The target group of "African peasants", for example, is not a homogenous mass. This false conclusion of experts even today is based on their recklessly claim to be relying on alleged socio-cultural traditions (e.g. those of the "conflict-free village community"). The fact that the target groups consider their ruler as legitimate representatives, that does not mean for example, that the village chief also knows (or pronounces) what poor, middle or big farmers in his village want, let alone what they can realize. At least as important a qualifier for the expert as good skill are his linguistic and cultural communication skills. However, as a rule, the aforementioned type of expert is not in a position to do this either because of his education or because of his personal interests and experience. ; RÉSUMÉ "Les experts sont-ils capables de faire ce qu'ils devraient faire? - Faiblesses du concept de cadre socioculturel du BMZ": Au début des années 1990, les analyses socioculturelles des pays en voie de développement sont devenues partie intégrante des « concepts pays », le nouvel instrument de gestion stratégique de la coopération allemande au développement. La quintessence de cette approche a été résumée dans la question : les groupes cibles, veulent-ils et savent-ils comment faire ce qu'ils devraient faire. L'objectif de cette approche était de contrer les tendances jusqu'alors répandues à des solutions isolées et sectorielles : l'humain et son environnement socioculturel doivent être au centre et non des innovations techniques et économiques, vulgarisées jusqu'ici dans le cadre d'une approche de vulgarisation descendante. Cependant, l'objectif de cette démarche est toujours basé sur des hypothèses théoriques de modernisation obsolètes, qui caractérisent le raisonnement des experts à jour. L'orgueil de l'omniscience de l'expert, qui a une solution à tous les problèmes, devient d'autant plus problématique qu'il se consacre davantage à ceux qui en ont besoin le plus, selon les lignes directrices de la politique de développement du BMZ, à savoir les pauvres. Le point faible de la coopération au développement actuelle n'est pas - comme le suggère le cadre du BMZ - que les groupes cibles (ou les pays bénéficiaires) ne peuvent (ou ne veulent) pas prendre en charge les « réalisations » de la civilisation moderne en raison des barrières socioculturelles. La faiblesse réside plutôt dans l'incapacité et la réticence de l'écrasante majorité des experts détachés à sérieusement repenser les projets (y compris le diagnostic des problèmes, la planification et l'évaluation des projets) par rapport au principal groupe cible de la politique de développement, les pauvres. Le groupe cible des « paysans africains », par exemple, n'est pas une masse homogène. Cette fausse conclusion des experts, même aujourd'hui, est basée sur leur prétention insouciante de s'appuyer sur de prétendues traditions socioculturelles (par exemple celles de la « communauté villageoise sans conflit »). Le fait que les groupes cibles considèrent leur dirigeant comme des représentants légitimes, cela ne signifie pas par exemple, que le chef du village sait aussi (ou prononce) ce que veulent les agriculteurs pauvres, moyens ou grands de son village, sans parler de ce qu'ils peuvent réaliser. Un qualificatif au moins aussi important pour l'expert que ses compétences techniques sont ses compétences en communication linguistique et culturelle. Cependant, en règle générale, le type d'expert susmentionné n'est pas en mesure de le faire, soit en raison de son éducation, soit en raison de ses intérêts personnels et de son expérience.

As President Obama's popularity numbers continue to drop, Republicans are still struggling to find the right candidate that can deliver the final blow to the incumbent and sweep the GOP back into the White House. Rick Perry was to be this man just three weeks ago, but after less than stellar performances in the last debates, and once his record had been scrutinized by his challengers and the press, he has fallen out of grace. The Texan governor was perceived as the man that could attract Tea Partiers and base primary voters, while at the same time satisfy deep-pocketed Republican donors with his solid conservative views on the economy and the role of government. However, the GOP establishment and its largest donors are uncomfortable with some of his public statements (for example, referring to Social Security as a Ponzi scheme, voicing his creationist and anti-science views, and his reactionary pro-gun position) which would make him less electable in the national race. Many of these rich donors and Wall Street executives are economic conservatives but quite liberal on social issues. Paradoxically, Mitt Romney, who is still first in all the polls, has the right mix for Wall Street, but his religious affiliation (Mormon), his lack of charisma and his "plastic" "salesman-like" persona raise questions about whether he can connect with the base and win the primary election.In this theater of the absurd that have been the candidate debates, Perry did well at first, but then stumbled last week in Florida, when confronted with his own record as governor of Texas. He has been severely criticized by Michelle Bachman for issuing an executive order to vaccinate middle school girls against HPPV in Texas, and in his second debate he was mobbed by his fellow candidates for allowing the children of undocumented immigrants to attend state universities paying the lower "in-state" tuition rate, just like any other Texan legal resident. Even though 70% of the national electorate supports Immigration Reform and the Dream Act (which includes a provision exactly like the one Perry took), and even though the Latino vote will be fundamental in the next election, he was pilloried over it. This is the kind of wedge issue that candidates on the Right can use successfully during the primary but will work against them in the national election.Perry's confidence seemed shaken for the rest of the debate: he dodged several questions, mumbled responses and looked down at his notes several times. In contrast, Romney, smooth, fresh- faced and articulate, seemed to be having a great time delivering sharp retorts that threw the Texan off balance. From Perry's demeanor one could tell he was unpleasantly surprised by the aggressive questioning of his policies and the mocking tone of his opponent. Clearly, he is a man of authority who is not used to having his decisions and beliefs openly criticized by others. He defended himself as best as he could, but the damage had been done. Consequently, Rick Perry, the GOP's "knight in shining armor" who was urged to run by the GOP establishment and was supposed to deliver the ultimate blow to Obama, lost his appeal overnight and is now struggling to keep his campaign alive. Aware of this great opportunity to win the White House, the GOP establishment continues second-guessing its own field, looking for perfect contender that can lead them into a new era. Romney, still the de facto front-runner, has become a much better candidate in the last four years, but his inner restraint, his lack of emotion, his failure to connect makes Republicans uneasy. He is a technocrat, the type of candidate the voters can't "fall in love with", and while he can take on Obama as an equal, it is not clear whether he can beat him. So the GOP moved ahead in its inexorable quest for the unbeatable candidate, all but destroying former favorites on its way. The new favorite last week was for a while Chris Christie, the first-term governor of New Jersey and a former state prosecutor. In deep contrast with Mitt Romney the "salesman", Chris Christie, the "Jersey big guy" had a certain quality of authenticity that heightened GOP expectations and made them dream of winning again. Some hefty figures in the party establishment (former statesman Henry Kissinger and conservative intellectual William Kristol among them) were putting enormous pressure on Christie to run. He quickly has become a favorite among conservatives because of his stunning achievements: a Republican governor in a "blue" state who managed to pass budget reform, take on the teachers' unions and reform the state pension system during his first two years in office. He is a big man who speaks bluntly, a terrific governor, a leader at a time when leadership is hard to find. But after ten days of high drama and speculation, Christie announced in a one-hour press conference last Friday that he was not running.There were three main reasons for his refusal to become a candidate for the highest office in the nation: First and foremost, his decision would have come too late. At the time, there were only ninety days until the first caucus in Iowa; Florida has set an earlier-than-expected date for its primary and with that, it has pushed back all other dates in the calendar so that voting may start even earlier than expected. The order of primaries is traditionally set and the privileged states (Iowa, New Hampshire and South Carolina) would be loath to change it. Governor Christie's campaign would have had to scramble to get his name on the ballot of all 50 states (each state has different procedures, from the very simple to the very complex). Most agreed that he would have been a very strong candidate, but such a late entry may have harmed future prospects for him. Second, Christie is still an unknown to most of the electorate, and probably would not have had the support of rural and Southern voters. Would the wealthy New Yorkers and party pundits who were promising him huge donations ultimately have delivered and stayed with Christie for the long-term if he lost some of the early caucuses and primaries? And finally, there was the question of whether he would ignite the primary base once some of his views became known. His record is clear on management of state finances and on standing up to public unions. But there has been scarcely any scrutiny about his views on immigration. Speaking to a Latino group in 2008, he said for example that undocumented immigrants should not be classified as "illegal" since: being in this country without proper documentation was not a crime." He is a moderate on abortion, he has banned drilling for oil off the coast of New Jersey, and his energy plan resembles Obama. These are all core concerns of the base which has been driven by mainly primordial instincts in the last four years. Would Christie's blunt leadership style and reform zeal, his sincerity about the depth of the challenges and the difficulties of the solutions have carried the day? Now, it seem we will never know, but it is the phenomenon itself that is worth pondering: the establishment is unhappy at the prospects of Perry in the national election, and worried about Romney's chances in the primary. In their quasi-irrational frenzy to find the perfect candidate they may be undermining their own chance to win.Republicans seem to be looking for the anti-Obama, and Chris Christie fitted the bill: he is a heavy, no nonsense guy (a lot has been said about his overweight condition, with one NBC journalist going as far as asking the question: "Should there be a weight limit for presidential candidates?") who speaks in a very direct way, does not shirk away from difficult decisions, is ready to take on opponents and do whatever is required to get the country's economy back on track. There is nothing Hamlet-like about him, except perhaps in his hesitancy about running for president. He is also a very bright policy wonk who completely "gets" New Jersey problems and knows what needs to be done to "fix" them. On the other hand, although flattered by all the attention and support for his candidacy, his decision was due to a sincere self-appraisal: he is not ready to be President of the United States in 2012, and prefers to wait until 2016 if his aura has not worn out by then.In the meantime, Obama is trying to persuade Congress to pass his jobs bill and to show that in spite of the seemingly insurmountable obstacles he has faced at every turn of the road, he has the strength to solve at least one problem, unemployment, and the courage to tax those that make over a million a year. His jobs bill includes many Republican ideas. It proposes a combination of shot-term tax cuts, investment incentives and job creation through infrastructure projects, with long-term strategy of tax reform including ending tax loopholes for corporations which would reduce the deficit by raising the government's revenue levels. He still strikes an optimistic note, but he has already recognized that, if the economy doesn't pick up by early next year, he will be running as the underdog. In other words, he has admitted that the solution is really out of his control and in the hands of what John M. Keynes called "animal spirits". Only by restoring confidence will investors start spending the 2 trillion dollars they are allegedly stashing away in wait of better times. But Obama has now a new challenge: the Occupy Wall Street protest movement that is expanding its base and spreading to other cities. It is the unemployed youth counterpart of the populist Tea Party on the right. Both are angry at Washington, but the reactionary Tea Party blames the government for everything gone wrong, while the radical OWS blames big banks and corporations, or said otherwise, it blames the 1% that have gotten richer even during the Recession, while the 99% got poorer. With its protest movement, the Young Left has declared its independence from the establishment Democratic Party. It is Obama's base delivering Obama himself an ultimatum to either take the side of the 99% or lose their support forever. Since Obama's dreams of bipartisanship are close to over, one hopes his campaign advisors will interpret the OWS movement as an opportunity to harness their energy towards support for real reform. But it is unclear whether OWS, a diverse, amorphous, leaderless movement, will allow itself to be organized by Washington insiders with clear policy goals.The GOP frustration must be disheartening. Its establishment saw the enormous potential of Governor Christie to win the center-right of the political spectrum and with it, the national election. His remarkable success at striking bipartisan deal to reform New Jersey's finances proves his bona fide credentials as a problem solver and a leader. His irreverent, unscripted yet incisive responses to the press and the public, his indubitable charisma and his authenticity all worked in his favor. However, his refusal to run is now a fact, and as the deadline looms nearer, the GOP will have to reconsider whether to anoint as its candidate Mitt Romney, the Mormon, affable yet one-dimensional former governor of Massachusetts, the most progressive state in the nation, or Rick Perry, the less articulate yet pragmatic and successful governor of Texas, the biggest and most conservative state. Of course, unexpected outcomes are always a possibility, as shown by Herman Cain's case. The African American candidate and former Godfather's Pizza executive who has never held public office, won the "straw" primary poll in Florida last week and saw his popularity soar in national polls after a very well-received debate performance in which he repeated over and over again his simplistic 9-9-9 tax reform program, his plan to privatize pension funds, and his anti-Washington mantra. "Salesmanship", then, is not a bad asset in politics, after all, unless you are also a Mormon millionaire.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

AbstractWomen in Nepal are primary users of water within and outside of their houses. Studies show that despite being a major stakeholder, women's voices are often absent in water management decisions. One of the effective ways of creating genderinclusive and empowering water management systems is through government policies and strategies. The objective of this paper is to examine whether Nepal's water‐related policies are gender inclusive and empowering. We review Nepal's major water‐related policies—the constitution and various acts and regulations—to assess whether these documents reflect women's interests and representation in various institutions that provide rights and controls over water in communities. Based on the review, we find that recent water policies of Nepal increasingly recognize the role of women as major stakeholders. This recognition is reflected in Nepal's policies such as the requirement to have at least 33% women represented in water user associations and the inclusion of women in executive positions at the community level. However, because of the lack of other strong implementation and monitoring arrangements such as allocation of budget and capacity‐building provisions, these policies are limited in their capacity to empower women to play decision‐making roles in water management. For women to have meaningful participation in water management, it is important that Nepal initiates provisions such as a strong implementation plan, adequate budget allocation for women's capacity building, and frequent monitoring.尼泊尔妇女是家庭内外用水的主要使用者。研究表明, 尽管妇女是主要的利益攸关方, 但在水管理决策中却常常缺少妇女的声音。创建性别包容和赋权的水管理系统的有效方法之一是通过政府政策和战略。本文旨在研究尼泊尔与水有关的政策是否具有性别包容性和赋权性。我们述评了尼泊尔与水有关的主要政策——宪法以及各种法案和法规——以评估这些文件是否反映了妇女在"提供社区水权和控制权的不同机构"中的利益和代表性。根据述评, 我们发现, 尼泊尔近期的水政策越来越认可妇女作为主要利益攸关方的作用。这种认可反映在尼泊尔的政策中, 例如要求用水者协会至少有33%的妇女代表, 以及让妇女担任社区一级的行政职务。然而, 由于缺乏其他强有力的实施和监督安排, 例如预算分配和能力建设规定, 这些政策在"对妇女赋权, 使其在水管理方面发挥决策作用"的能力有限。为了使妇女有意义地参与水管理, 尼泊尔需要启动"强有力的实施计划、为妇女能力建设分配充足的预算、以及经常监测"等规定。.Las mujeres en Nepal son las principales usuarias de agua dentro y fuera de sus hogares. Los estudios muestran que, a pesar de ser una parte interesada importante, las voces de las mujeres a menudo están ausentes en las decisiones sobre gestión del agua. Una de las formas efectivas de crear sistemas de gestión del agua empoderadores e inclusivos en términos de género es a través de políticas y estrategias gubernamentales. El objetivo de este artículo es examinar si las políticas relacionadas con el agua de Nepal son inclusivas en materia de género y empoderadoras. Revisamos las principales políticas relacionadas con el agua de Nepal (la Constitución y diversas leyes y regulaciones) para evaluar si estos documentos reflejan los intereses y la representación de las mujeres en diversas instituciones que otorgan derechos y controles sobre el agua en las comunidades. Según la revisión, encontramos que las políticas hídricas recientes de Nepal reconocen cada vez más el papel de las mujeres como partes interesadas principales. Este reconocimiento se refleja en políticas de Nepal como el requisito de tener al menos un 33% de mujeres representadas en las asociaciones de usuarios de agua y la inclusión de mujeres en puestos ejecutivos a nivel comunitario. Sin embargo, debido a la falta de otros acuerdos sólidos de implementación y monitoreo, como la asignación de presupuesto y disposiciones para el desarrollo de capacidades, estas políticas tienen una capacidad limitada para empoderar a las mujeres para que desempeñen roles de toma de decisiones en la gestión del agua. Para que las mujeres tengan una participación significativa en la gestión del agua, es importante que Nepal inicie disposiciones tales como un plan de implementación sólido, una asignación presupuestaria adecuada para el desarrollo de capacidades de las mujeres y un seguimiento frecuente.

Reducing early retirement and prolonging employees' working lives are goals that feature on social policy agendas across Europe. Active ageing has become the leading social policy response. Like many European countries, Norway has adopted a twofold active-ageing strategy consisting of 'passive' labour market policies and 'active' measures aimed at retaining older workers. The pension reform, implemented from January 1st 2011, represents the 'passive' part of Norway's strategy, and early retirement is discouraged through introducing a pension system based on actuarial neutrality, tightening the link between contributions paid and benefits received, and calculating benefits according to life expectancy. The second part of the Norwegian strategy, emphasising the use of 'active' measures, was formulated in 2001 at the national level with the signing of the Tripartite Agreement on an Inclusive Working Life (the IWL agreement). With the introduction of the IWL agreement, the Norwegian government and the social partners called for employers to assume greater social responsibility for keeping people in employment and preventing older workers from opting for an early exit. The agreement signifies that Norway, like many European countries, acknowledges that a significant change in retirement behaviour will come from changing employers' policies. The overarching research questions addressed in this thesis are: What are the preconditions for retaining older workers and what are the effects of measures offered by employers to alter early retirement? Five papers form the foundation of this PhD thesis. The 'active' part of Norway's strategy is based on employers' willingness to make use of retention measures and employers are key players in defining the opportunities for working longer. Thus, the individual company is the focal point for age management and adjustments to an ageing workforce, regardless of the actions of policymakers. The first paper in this thesis addresses the employer's perspective and the results show that the most common retention measures offered by Norwegian employers are "additional leave", "phased retirement" and "bonuses". Furthermore, the results show the retention efforts to be significantly more extensive in 2010 than in 2005, measured as the number of retention measures offered. The retention efforts of Norwegian companies seem to be part of a holistic approach to active ageing, focusing on prevention and retention throughout employees' working lives. Offering a number of different retention measures is more common among companies having initiated "measures to facilitate lifelong learning" and "measures to prevent health problems or reduced work capacity". The financial incentives embedded in the contractual early retirement scheme seem also to have a significant impact on retention efforts. Addressing the employee's perspective, the second paper in this thesis provides a descriptive picture of what characterises employees in the private sector who report to know their pension entitlements and what characterises those who report that they do not know. What employees know, or at least believe they know, concerning their own entitlements to early retirement benefits will be important for the choices they make regarding early retirement. I argue that if employees are imperfectly informed or are otherwise incapable of making informed choices, offering retention measures may not alter retirement behaviour. The results show that a large majority, and especially older employees, report to know their pension entitlements, which arguably reflects collection of information and that this retirement planning phase also involves the identification of possibilities offered by the employer, such as retention measures. The main body of this thesis, papers III, IV and V, links in a unique way the employer's and employee's perspective by investigating the effects of the most common retention measures as identified in the first paper on retirement behaviour. The analyses show that it is "additional leave" and "bonuses" which affect the early retirement behaviour of older employees and not measures involving an adaption of the work situation, in the form of phased retirement. Thus, the most commonly used measures that have an effect on early retirement behaviour are arguably purely external motivators, aimed at strengthening the desire to work and to a lesser extent enhancing the opportunities for continuing working or employee's belief in their ability to do so, through adapting the work situation. Many older workers retire on the disability pension before they reach the age of eligibility set for being offered these measures. Thus, measures such as phased retirement might be too late for enhancing the opportunity structure of these workers. As an alternative or an addition to these retention measures, I argue for a stronger emphasis on the prevention of health problems and reduced work capacity from an earlier age. Measures aimed at preventing health problems and reduced work capacity will also arguably be more complementary to the strong financial incentives embedded in the pension reform. ; En helt sentral målsetning på den sosialpolitiske dagsorden i Europa er å redusere tidligavgangen og forlenge yrkeskarrierer til eldre arbeidstakere, og 'aktiv aldring' presenteres som det sosialpolitiske svaret på denne utfordringen. I likhet med mange europeiske land har Norge implementert en todelt strategi for aktiv aldring bestående av 'passiv' arbeidsmarkedspolitikk og 'aktive' tiltak for å fastholde eldre arbeidstakere. Pensjonsreformen, innført fra 1. januar 2011, representerer den 'passive' delen av Norges strategi. Innføringen av et pensjonssystem basert på aktuariell nøytralitet, en sterkere kobling mellom innbetalinger og pensjonsytelser, og levealdersjustering av pensjonsytelsen, gir sterke insentiver for å velge arbeid fremfor tidligpensjon. Inngåelsen av avtalen om et mer inkluderende arbeidsliv (IA-avtalen) i 2001 representerer den 'aktive' delen av den norske strategien. Med IA-avtalen ble arbeidsgivere oppfordret til å ta et større ansvar for å holde folk i arbeid, herunder redusere tidligpensjoneringen gjennom å fastholde flere eldre arbeidstakere. IA-avtalen representerer dermed en erkjennelse av den sentrale rolle arbeidsgiverpolitikken og tiltak på virksomhetsnivå har for å oppnå målet om å forlenge eldres yrkeskarrierer; en erkjennelse Norge deler med mange europeiske land. De overordnede problemstillingene i avhandlingen er: Hva er forutsetningene for å fastholde eldre arbeidstakere, og har tiltak som tilbys av arbeidsgivere for å redusere tidligpensjonering effekt? Avhandlingen består av fem artikler. Utgangspunktet for den første artikkelen er den sentrale rolle arbeidsgivere spiller i forhold til å definere mulighetene for lengre yrkeskarrierer. Den 'aktive' delen av Norges strategi forutsetter at arbeidsgivere er villige til å ta i bruk fastholdelsestiltak for å redusere tidligavgangen. Den første artikkelen i denne avhandlingen har et arbeidsgiverperspektiv og viser at de vanligste fastholdelsestiltakene som tilbys av norske arbeidsgivere er "ekstra ferie", "redusert arbeidstid/gradert pensjonering" og "bonuser". Resultatene viser også at intensiteten i fastholdelse av eldre arbeidstakere har økt betydelig fra 2005 til 2010. Videre ser det ut til at fastholdelsestiltakene inngår i en holistisk tilnærming til aktiv aldring, med fokus på forebygging og fastholdelse gjennom hele yrkeskarrieren, da virksomheter som tilbyr fastholdelsestiltak i langt større utstrekning også tilbyr tiltak for livslang læring og forebygging av helseproblemer og redusert arbeidsevne. Analysene viser også at virksomheter med avtalefeste pensjon (AFP) i større utstrekning tilbyr fastholdestiltak, og at økonomiske insentiver dermed påvirker arbeidsgivernes innsats. Det å tilby fastholdelsestiltak vil ikke nødvendigvis endre pensjoneringsatferden, dersom de ansatte mangler kunnskap om egne rettigheter eller er ute av stand til å foreta informert valg. Den andre artikkelen i avhandlingen har derfor et arbeidstakerperspektiv, og beskriver hva som kjennetegner ansatte i privat sektor som oppgir å kjenne sine pensjonsrettigheter til forskjell fra dem som ikke gjør det. Hva ansatte vet, eller i det minste tror de vet, om sin rett til avtalefestet pensjon (AFP) er av betydning for valget om å gå av tidlig versus å fortsette i arbeid. Resultatene i denne artikkelen viser at et stort flertall, og da særlig eldre arbeidstakere, oppgir å kjenne sine pensjonsrettigheter. Jeg argumenterer for at dette gjenspeiler en innhenting av informasjon når eldre skal planlegge for pensjonering eller fortsatt arbeid, og at denne planleggingsfasen også består i å identifisere mulighetene som tilbys av arbeidsgiver, som for eksempel fastholdelsestiltak. Artikkel III, IV og V knytter sammen arbeidsgiver- og arbeidstakerperspektivet på en unik måte og utgjør hoveddelen av denne avhandlingen. I de tre artiklene undersøkes effektene av de tre vanligste tiltakene, henholdsvis ekstra ferie, redusert arbeidstid/gradert pensjonering og bonuser på tidligavgang blant eldre arbeidstakere. Analysene viser at det er tilbudene om ekstra ferie og bonuser som bidrar til å fastholde eldre arbeidstakere og ikke tiltakene som innebærer en tilpasning av arbeidssituasjonen, i form av redusert arbeidstid/gradert pensjonering. Jeg argumenterer for at ekstra ferie og bonuser er tiltak som vektlegger betydningen av ytre motivasjonsfaktorer. Formålet med disse tiltakene er derfor kun å bidra til å styrke insentivene til fortsatt arbeid, og i mindre grad å påvirke muligheten til fortsatt arbeid, eller troen på at det er mulig å fortsette, fordi arbeidssituasjonen tilpasses. Mange eldre arbeidstakere går av på uførepensjon før de fyller 62 år, og får dermed ikke muligheten til å nyte godt disse fastholdelsestiltakene. Det kan derfor være at redusert arbeidstid/gradert pensjonering tilbys for sent til å kunne påvirke muligheten for fortsatt arbeid for denne gruppen arbeidstakere. Som et alternativ eller supplement til disse fastholdelsestiltakene, argumenterer jeg derfor for at forebygging av helseproblemer og redusert arbeidsevne tidligere i yrkeskarrierer bør vektlegges sterkere om man ønsker lengre yrkeskarrierer for flere. Tiltak for å forebygge helseproblemer og redusert arbeidsevne vil også supplere de økonomiske insentivene i pensjonsreformen på en langt bedre måte. ; publishedVersion

From the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we've been told that the issue of NATO expansion is irrelevant to the war, and that anyone bringing it up is, at best, unwittingly parroting Kremlin propaganda, at worst, apologizing for or justifying the war.So it was curious to see NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg earlier this month say explicitly that Russian president Vladimir Putin launched his criminal war as a reaction to the possibility of NATO expanding into Ukraine, and the alliance's refusal to swear it off — not once or twice, but three separate times."President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement," Stoltenberg told a joint committee meeting of the European Parliament on September 7. "That was what he sent us. And [that] was a pre-condition for not invade [sic] Ukraine. Of course we didn't sign that.""He went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders. He has got the exact opposite," Stoltenberg reiterated, referring to the accession of Sweden and Finland into the alliance in response to Putin's invasion. Their entry, he later insisted, "demonstrates that when President Putin invaded a European country to prevent more NATO, he's getting the exact opposite."It's not clear if Stoltenberg was referring to the draft treaty Putin put forward in December 2021 and simply mixed up the seasons (the provisions of each are the same), or if he's referring to an earlier, as-yet-unreported incident. In any case, what Stoltenberg claims here — that Putin viewed Ukraine's NATO entry as so unacceptable he was willing to invade to stop it, and put forward a negotiating bid that might have prevented it, only for NATO to reject it — has been repeatedly made by those trying to explain the causes of the war and how it could be ended, only to be dismissed as propaganda.The only logical conclusion, if we're to listen to the hawks, is that the man in charge of the very alliance helping Ukraine defend itself from Putin is, in fact, working for the Russian leader and spreading his propaganda.This isn't the only instance from a member of the NATO establishment. Testifying to the Senate Armed Services Committee in May this year, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said, alongside Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, that "we assess that Putin probably has scaled back his immediate ambitions to ... ensuring that Ukraine will never become a NATO ally." Earlier in her testimony, Haines had said that Putin's invasion had backfired by "precipitating the very events he hoped to avoid such as Finland's accession to NATO and Sweden's petition to join."Likewise, in a March 2023 interview with the German newspaper Die Zeit, Russia expert Fiona Hill — who served as an intelligence analyst under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, as well as on the National Security Council under President Donald Trump — told the paper that "it was always obvious that NATO's enlargement to Ukraine and to Georgia was a provocation for Putin." Yet the opposite claim, that the invasion was entirely "unprovoked," has become such an article of faith in Western discourse that this word is ubiquitous in news reports and official statements on the war.On a similar note, an August 2022 Washington Post report based on "in-depth interviews with more than three dozen senior U.S., Ukrainian, European and NATO officials" reported four separate instances of high-ranking Russian officials telling their U.S.counterparts in the lead-up to the war that NATO expansion was a core part of the grievances motivating Moscow's threatening troop build-up. That included Putin himself, who told President Joe Biden in a December 2021 video call "that the eastward expansion of the Western alliance was a major factor in his decision to send troops to Ukraine's border," according to the report.To some extent, this isn't surprising. As the analysts, journalists, politicians, and others pointing to NATO expansion as a leading cause of the war have copiously documented, the decades before the invasion saw countless members of the Washington national security establishment, from famed Cold War strategist George Kennan and current CIA Director William Burns to a parade of diplomats, military officials, NATO leaders and even Biden himself, warn that the alliance's eastward creep was a fundamental source of Russian unhappiness and that it would provoke Russian hostility and aggression — or even spark war. But what was once uncontroversial and widely acknowledged before the invasion has become verboten since it started in February 2022, as debate or dissent on the matter of the war and U.S. and European policy toward it have been clamped down on, often via vicious McCarthyite tactics. The topic has become verboten, that is, unless you happen to be a U.S. or NATO official.It's not just individual officials, either. Elements of this supposedly Kremlin-originating argument also pop up in major U.S. government documents. Take, for instance, the Annual Threat Assessment put out by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence a year after the invasion started. Meant to reflect the "collective insights" of Washington's various intelligence agencies, the report states that it expects Moscow to continue "to insert itself into crises when it sees its interests at stake, the anticipated costs of action are low, it sees an opportunity to capitalize on a power vacuum, or, as in the case of its use of force in Ukraine, it perceives an existential threat in its neighborhood that could destabilize Putin's rule and endanger Russian national security." Yet today, anyone else saying that Putin or the Russian establishment genuinely view Ukraine's growing integration into NATO as a security threat is liable to receive all manner of scurrilous accusations.As with officials' words, you can find similar points in documents before the war. A 2020 U.S. Army War College paper states that "future admissions to NATO for states in Russia's near abroad will likely be met with aggression." A 2019 paper from the Pentagon-funded RAND Corporation — and sponsored by the Army Quadrennial Defense Review Office — states explicitly that the Kremlin's fear of a direct military attack by the United States is "very real," plus that "providing more U.S. military equipment and advice [to Ukraine in the war on the Donbas] could lead Russia to increase its direct involvement in the conflict and the price it pays for it," including by "mounting a new offensive and seizing more Ukrainian territory." The 2017 National Security Strategy states outright that "Russia views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) as threats."It's the central paradox of the current war discourse: What is widely acknowledged by Western policymakers and officials in the halls of power, who rely on an evidence-based understanding of the world to shape foreign policy, is unspeakable anywhere outside of them.What's at stake is more important than just finger-pointing and apportioning guilt. By steadfastly refusing to understand one of the foundational causes of the war and the U.S. and NATO role in it, we will continue to fail to end it and to secure a lasting peace, leading to many more Ukrainian deaths, and to many more years of living in the shadow of global catastrophe.

Jeffrey Miron and Jacob Winter


This article appeared on Substack on May 30, 2023, and an earlier version appeared under Jacob Winter's byline in the Harvard Undergraduate Law Review.
In a few weeks, the Supreme Court will announce its decision in two cases it heard last fall, one against Harvard and the other against the University of North Carolina. Both suits challenge race‐​based affirmative action in college admissions. In each case, a group called Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) argues that the universities' admissions policies unlawfully discriminate against Asian Americans.
The case against UNC rests on two issues. Under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, states may not "deny to any person within [their] jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." SFFA claims that universities are adopting de facto quotas by prioritizing minority applicants over Asian Americans who have stronger academic records. Furthermore, under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, no university receiving federal funds or student aid may discriminate based on race, color, or national origin. The case against Harvard, a private university, relies primarily on this second legal argument.
Perhaps the most well‐​known Supreme Court case addressing affirmative action is Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). In the case, a white applicant who was twice rejected from the UC Davis School of Medicine challenged the constitutionality of the school's racial quotas in admissions. The Court struck down the use of strict racial quotas, but ruled that the use of race as one of several criteria in university admissions is permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI. The justices found that fostering diversity is a compelling state interest because it improves the quality of education. This unique ruling made the permissibility of race‐​based affirmative action a legal gray area and cemented it as one of the most contentious issues in American politics.
The Court's ruling in today's cases is unlikely to end or even calm this debate. If the Court bars any consideration of race, universities will likely use other factors associated with race, such as socioeconomic status or geographic location. There is already evidence of this. Passed in 1996, California Proposition 209 prohibits state government institutions, including public education, from considering race, sex, or ethnicity. The University of California system has switched to proxies for race, such as family income and neighborhood circumstances, to continue promoting "diversity and equal opportunity."
If these practices become widespread, they will likely spur new lawsuits that challenge whether such practices are legal. Plus, history suggests that whenever the Court upholds the legality of race‐​based affirmative action, legal challenges will nonetheless continue. Furthermore, the Court's ruling will inevitably enrage one side or the other, generating further polarization over the issue.
This cycle of never‐​ending debate raises the question of whether, these cases aside, a better policy path exists. The answer is that instead of banning or regulating affirmative action, federal and state governments should eliminate financial support of higher education.
If states do not operate universities, the Equal Protection Clause has no bearing, since it applies only to state governments, not private universities. Absent federal funding for higher education, via research grants or financial aid, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act is similarly irrelevant. Use of affirmative action would become a decision for private institutions using their own funds. Such decisions would answer only to the market for higher education. Universities would be driven to employ admissions policies that align with the preferences of most of their constituents and potential applicants. Otherwise, to remain competitive in the higher education market, they would be compelled to change their policies if enough of their constituents or potential applicants found them objectionable.
This perspective on the current debate will strike some as nonsensical, since many believe government support of higher education is essential to ensure widespread access and a skilled labor force. That argument is disputable but the subject of another piece. This article argues instead that, regardless of any downsides, elimination of government support would have important benefits.
Many people believe affirmative action is valuable because diversity enhances the quality of teaching and research. Others believe higher education should practice affirmative action as a partial remedy to past racial injustice. In a free society, it should not matter for government policy whether one agrees with those views; if private institutions wish to act on them without using government funding, they should be free to do so.
Evidence from the higher education market suggests that many universities and their faculty, students, and parents value affirmative action immensely, or at least view it as an insufficient reason to avoid these institutions. Universities began using affirmative action before government pressure to combat discrimination. Harvard and similar institutions are both among the strongest advocates of affirmative action and the schools in the greatest demand by applicants. Thus, eliminating government support of higher education respects the freedom of universities and their constituents.
Reasonable arguments may exist for government support of higher education, whether via state universities or federal funding. But a full assessment should recognize that if the government funds education, then it must take stands on divisive issues, with all the anger and polarization this entails. If all universities were privately funded, many would practice affirmative action while others might not. People would attend institutions consistent with their beliefs and the factors that matter most to them.
This approach is also far less likely to polarize the nation than a sweeping Supreme Court decision. Affirmative action critics might not be satisfied, but their tax dollars would not support the practice. Plus, they can avoid such institutions so long as enough other people share their views.
Implementing this approach would require discontinuing funds to private universities and privatizing public universities. Developing a strategy for implementation is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is clear that discontinuing funds to private universities would be politically and logistically easier than privatizing public universities (but certainly not easy). Governments could discontinue funds gradually and make clear to universities when funds will cease.
An alternative perspective, in the Harvard case, is that private universities could avoid restrictions on affirmative action by forgoing government funding, as a few schools have done. Alternatively, the federal government could withhold funds from institutions whose admissions policies do not satisfy Title VI, rather than barring private use of affirmative action. These approaches would have a similar effect as eliminating funds entirely, and may even be better since universities would choose their own paths. The government would avoid the perception that it is backing away from promised funding, and universities would gain greater agency. Regardless of which plan is best, it is clear that government funds must be separated from higher education.
What does this mean for the Harvard and UNC cases? It is unclear. Rather, these cases are a teaching moment: government intervention often provokes polarizing debate over the goals, structure, and limits of that intervention. This does not render all government intervention undesirable, but it raises the bar at which the government should intervene. This lesson should enter policy debates in higher education, and beyond.

The political dimension in the discourse of communication directors on the corporate scene is a part of the research the discourse of the corporate communicator; and it is the result of an interpretation work of the data administered by the communicators of the twelve organizations that constitute the sample. Likewise, the title suggests a rectification which turns out to be indispensable and which has to do with the limits and reaches of the research, since the actors are, in their great majority, directors in the area of communication.This essay aims at delving into the thesis proposed through the text: "The constitution of the Individual in the Discourse of the Corporate Communicator", in which the political feature is sustained in the constitution of his identity as a strategist, as well as in the action he unfolds with the publics (internal and external) for the achievement of the organization's purposes.Now then, if in the aforementioned thesis, the emphasis was made on the building of the identity; in this case, the analysis is centered into the linguistic statements with which actions, purposes and strategic functions are expressed, which in turn acquire a political feature, as long as the strategist's position responds to the function of an ally which the organization confers to him. In his condition of an ally, the Communicator will have to harmonize the exercising of a power which is only exercised by those who really boast of it; and hence, he will put his know-how to the service of the institution, a fact which, in the sphere of communication management, is translated into the ability for the symbolic control of the publics with whom the organization is related.The aforementioned allows us to. argue that, although the communicator's political aspiration is the positioning of the communication area in the domain of the organization's high spheres which, in turn represents the acquisition of a prestige for him, the power that he reaches lies within his ability for: congregating wills, orientating the individuals actions, and positioning the organization in the business sphere; That is why it may be affirmed that the strategist communicator's political action fulfills the role of an absorber or an "earth pole" of the power effects exercised by those who boast of it; and thus, his political purpose is to diminish such effects and to achieve the adhesion of the social actors (publics) to the interests of the institution. Nonetheless, such an action, far from being plain, acquires attention modalities in variances related to the administration's style, as well as to that of the communicator. For the effects of sustaining the political dimension of the corporate communicator's discourse y, subsequently, the modalities his action adopts, the text presents the following structure: firstly, it is about contextualizing and delimiting the notion of politics, as well as its relation to power. Secondly, it analyzes, from the discourse perspective, a corpus of enunciations emitted by the communicators throughout the interview, having in mind the categories of: the action front, political reference, strategic function, and political purposes. Thirdly, an approximations is to the modalities of the communicator's political action, parting from the identification of common constants or features. Finally, the contingent feature of the political action is approached, under the supposition that such contingency is determined essentially by three variances: nature of the organization, managerial style, and the communicator's modality of administration. ; La dimensión política en el discurso del director de Comunicaciones en del escenario corporativo hace parte de investigación el discurso del comunicador corporativo y es el resultado de un trabajo de interpretación de los datos suministrados por los comunicadores de las doce organizaciones que constituyen la muestra. Así mismo, el título sugiere una rectificación que resulta imprescindible y tiene que ver con los límites y alcances de la investigación en razón de que los actores son, en su inmensa mayoría, directores del área de comunicación.Este ensayo se propone profundizar la tesis propuesta en el texto: "La constitución del sujeto en el discurso del comunicador corporativo"1 en la que se sostiene el carácter político, tanto en la constitución de su identidad como estratega, como en la acción que despliega con los públicos (interno y externo) para el logro de los propósitos de la organización.Ahora bien, si en la citada tesis el énfasis se hacía en la construcción de la identidad, en este caso, el análisis se centra en los enunciados lingüísticos con los que se expresan acciones, propósitos y funciones estratégicas que adquieren un carácter político en la medida en que la posición de estratega responde a la función de aliado que le confiere la organización. En su condición de aliado, el comunicador deberá matizar el ejercicio de un poder que ejercen quienes realmente lo ostentaren tal sentido pondrá al servicio de las institución su saber hacer que, en el ámbito de la gestión de la comunicación, se traduce en la capacidad para el control simbólico de los públicos con los que se relaciona la organización. Lo anterior permite argüir que, si bien la aspiración política del comunicador es el posicionamiento de área de comunicaciones en el dominio de las altas esferas de la organización que. a su vez representa la adquisición de un prestigio para él, el poder que alcanza reposa en la capacidad que demuestre para congregar voluntades, orientar la acción de los sujetos y posicionar a la organización en el ámbito del negocio. Es por ello que se puede afirmar que la acción política del comunicador estratega cumple las veces de amortiguador o "polo a tierra" de los efectos del poder que ejercen quienes lo ostentan en la organización, y en tal sentido, su propósito político es menguar dichos efectos y lograr la adhesión de los actores sociales (públicos) a los intereses de la institución. Sin embargo, dicha acción lejos de ser uniforme, adquiere modalidades en atención a variantes relacionadas con la naturaleza de la organización, el estilo de la administración y las modalidades de gestión del comunicador.Para efectos de sustentar la dimensión política del discurso del comunicador corpo­rativo y por ende las modalidades que adopta su acción, el texto presenta la siguiente estructura: en un primer momento se trata de contextuar y delimitar la noción de política, así como su relación con el poder. En un segundo momento, se analiza, desde la perspectiva del discurso, un corpus de enunciados emitidos por los comunicadores en la entrevista, teniendo, en cuenta las categorías de: frente de acción, referente político, función estratégica y propósitos políticos. En un tercer momento, se hace una aproximación a las modalidades de la acción política del comunicador a partir de la identificación de las constantes o rasgos en común. Finalmente, se aborda el carácter contingente de la acción política, bajo el supuesto de que dicha contingencia está determinada en lo esencial por tres variantes: naturaleza de la organización, estilo gerencial y modalidad de gestión del comunicador.

En la Constitución de 1991, se estableció en su Artículo 374 los mecanismos para reformarla, definiendo 3, ellos son: vía por el Congreso de la República, por una Asamblea Constituyente o por el propio pueblo mediante Referéndum. Precisamente en la primera opción se establece el Congreso de la República, al entenderlo como un escenario de la representación del pueblo. El trámite se da por medio de Actos Legislativos que es un mecanismo de reforma constitucional a uno o a varios artículos de la Constitución Política de Colombia.Precisamente el Gobierno nacional presentó un proyecto de Acto Legislativo para reformar la Constitución Política Nacional de 1991, en su Título XII del Régimen Económico y de Hacienda Pública, cuyo proyecto fue finalmente aprobado en el Congreso de la República, estableciendo el Acto Legislativo No. 3 de 2011, que establece el Principio Constitucional de la Sostenibilidad Fiscal, la reforma de rango constitucional aparece en el actual estado de cosas en el País como una estrategia que pretende que las diferentes decisiones que tienen impacto sobre gasto público nacional sean coherentes con la estabilidad macroeconómica. La realidad colombiana, luego de 21 años de entrada en vigencia de la Constitución Política Nacional, demuestra que los ingresos de la Nación y sus posibilidades reales de financiamiento para las complejas necesidades son cada vez más limitados, es así como las decisiones que implican esfuerzos fiscales avanzan por una senda insostenible de gastos y de incapacidad financiera para la obtención de recursos, poniendo en riesgo el cumplimiento de funciones del estado y con ello la materialización efectiva del modelo del Estado Social de Derecho, consagrado en la constitución de 1991.Los objetivos de la sociedad actual, se enmarcan en términos generales, en parámetros comunes como promover el desarrollo, la reducción de la pobreza, la eliminación de la desigualdad y la búsqueda de la justicia y la equidad generacional, ante lo cual los ingresos públicos, provenientes mayoritariamente de los tributos, no son suficientes para atenderlos, recurriendo por lo general, a endeudamiento tanto interno como externo, generando un modelo de desarrollo insostenible.En este esquema la insostenibilidad fiscal en un Estado de Bienestar, como el colombiano, reflejaría la imposibilidad de su Gobierno para cumplir con sus compromisos, conllevando a efectos indeseables en materia de crecimiento económico, desempleo y pobreza. Lo que significa que las generaciones futuras deberán hacer un mayor esfuerzo en materia de impuestos, con lo cual decisiones presentes que influyen en la tendencia futura de los gastos y del endeudamiento pueden faltar y fallar a la justicia intergeneracional que la sociedad demanda. De esta manera, resulta imprescindible que las decisiones en materia de gastos consulten las restricciones presupuestales presentes y futuras; es decir, que sean coherentes con el Principio de Sostenibilidad Fiscal.El Gobierno colombiano, con la expedición del Acto Legislativo No. 03 de 2011, que reforma la Constitución Política Nacional de 1991, involucró el Principio de rango constitucional de la Sostenibilidad Fiscal en Colombia, generando un amplio debate en torno a la estabilidad macroeconómica, la garantía y progresividad de los Derechos Fundamentales, en desarrollo del modelo constitucional vigente en el País del Estado Social de Derecho, un tema de controversia y actualidad que interesa a la comunidad académica, científica y general, por sus repercusiones frente al pacto social del 91.La Sostenibilidad Fiscal elevada a rango constitucional impactará las decisiones del devenir estatal, sus consideraciones y medidas determinarán la inversión pública y con ella la dinámica del desarrollo del País y sus ciudadanos, generando expectativa e incertidumbre; un tema que debe ser analizado desde diferentes áreas y perspectivas del conocimiento y del sentir social influenciado por la reforma constitucional más profunda y significativa que se ha hecho en ésta materia, a la Constitución de 1991. ; In the Constitution of 1991, was established in Article 374, to reform mechanisms, defining three, they are: track by the Congress, by a Constituent Assembly or by the people through a referendum.Precisely in the first option sets the Congress, to understand it as a setting for the representation of the people. The process occurs through legislative acts is a constitutional mechanism to one or more articles of the Constitution of Colombia. Precisely the national government introduced a legislative bill to amend the National Constitution of 1991, Title XII of the Economic and Public Finance, the project was finally approved in the Congress, establishing the Legislative Act No. 3 of 2011, which established the constitutional principle of fiscal sustainability, constitutional reform appears in the current state of affairs in the country as a strategy intended that the various decisions that impact on national public expenditure are consistent with macroeconomic stability . The situation in Colombia, after 21 years of enactment of the National Constitution, shows that the revenue of the nation and its possibilities of financing for the complex needs are increasingly limited, and decisions involving fiscal efforts advance on an unsustainable path of spending and financial inability to obtain resources, jeopardizing the fulfillment of state functions and thus the effective realization of the model of the rule of law enshrined in the constitution of 1991.The objectives of the society, are framed in general terms, on common parameters to promote development, poverty reduction, elimination of inequality and the pursuit of justice and generational equity, to which public revenues, mostly from taxes, are not sufficient to address them, often resorting to internal and external debt, generating an unsustainable development model.In this scheme the fiscal unsustainability in a welfare state, such as Colombia, reflect the inability of the Government to meet its commitments, leading to adverse effects on economic growth, unemployment and poverty. This means that future generations must make a greater effort in the area of taxes, which present decisions that influence the future trend of expenditure and indebtedness may be missing and fail to intergenerational justice that society demands. Thus, it is essential that decisions on expenditure consult the current and future budget constraints, ie, consistent with the principle of fiscal sustainability.The Colombian government, with the issuance of the Legislative Act No 03 of 2011, amending the National Constitution of 1991, involved the constitutional principle of fiscal sustainability in Colombia, generating a broad debate on macroeconomic stability, the guarantee and escalation of Fundamental Rights, in the current constitutional model development in the country's rule of law, a subject of controversy and news of interest to the academic community, and general science, by its impact against the social compact of 91.Fiscal Sustainability elevated to constitutional decisions will impact future state, its considerations and determine public investment measures and with it the dynamics of development of the country and its citizens, creating anticipation and uncertainty, an issue that should be analyzed from different areas and perspectives of knowledge and social feel influenced by constitutional reform and significantly deeper than has been done in this matter, the Constitution of 1991.

The political dimension in the discourse of communication directors on the corporate scene is a part of the research the discourse of the corporate communicator; and it is the result of an interpretation work of the data administered by the communicators of the twelve organizations that constitute the sample. Likewise, the title suggests a rectification which turns out to be indispensable and which has to do with the limits and reaches of the research, since the actors are, in their great majority, directors in the area of communication.This essay aims at delving into the thesis proposed through the text: "The constitution of the Individual in the Discourse of the Corporate Communicator", in which the political feature is sustained in the constitution of his identity as a strategist, as well as in the action he unfolds with the publics (internal and external) for the achievement of the organization's purposes.Now then, if in the aforementioned thesis, the emphasis was made on the building of the identity; in this case, the analysis is centered into the linguistic statements with which actions, purposes and strategic functions are expressed, which in turn acquire a political feature, as long as the strategist's position responds to the function of an ally which the organization confers to him. In his condition of an ally, the Communicator will have to harmonize the exercising of a power which is only exercised by those who really boast of it; and hence, he will put his know-how to the service of the institution, a fact which, in the sphere of communication management, is translated into the ability for the symbolic control of the publics with whom the organization is related.The aforementioned allows us to. argue that, although the communicator's political aspiration is the positioning of the communication area in the domain of the organization's high spheres which, in turn represents the acquisition of a prestige for him, the power that he reaches lies within his ability for: congregating wills, orientating the individuals actions, and positioning the organization in the business sphere; That is why it may be affirmed that the strategist communicator's political action fulfills the role of an absorber or an "earth pole" of the power effects exercised by those who boast of it; and thus, his political purpose is to diminish such effects and to achieve the adhesion of the social actors (publics) to the interests of the institution. Nonetheless, such an action, far from being plain, acquires attention modalities in variances related to the administration's style, as well as to that of the communicator. For the effects of sustaining the political dimension of the corporate communicator's discourse y, subsequently, the modalities his action adopts, the text presents the following structure: firstly, it is about contextualizing and delimiting the notion of politics, as well as its relation to power. Secondly, it analyzes, from the discourse perspective, a corpus of enunciations emitted by the communicators throughout the interview, having in mind the categories of: the action front, political reference, strategic function, and political purposes. Thirdly, an approximations is to the modalities of the communicator's political action, parting from the identification of common constants or features. Finally, the contingent feature of the political action is approached, under the supposition that such contingency is determined essentially by three variances: nature of the organization, managerial style, and the communicator's modality of administration. ; La dimensión política en el discurso del director de Comunicaciones en del escenario corporativo hace parte de investigación el discurso del comunicador corporativo y es el resultado de un trabajo de interpretación de los datos suministrados por los comunicadores de las doce organizaciones que constituyen la muestra. Así mismo, el título sugiere una rectificación que resulta imprescindible y tiene que ver con los límites y alcances de la investigación en razón de que los actores son, en su inmensa mayoría, directores del área de comunicación.Este ensayo se propone profundizar la tesis propuesta en el texto: "La constitución del sujeto en el discurso del comunicador corporativo"1 en la que se sostiene el carácter político, tanto en la constitución de su identidad como estratega, como en la acción que despliega con los públicos (interno y externo) para el logro de los propósitos de la organización.Ahora bien, si en la citada tesis el énfasis se hacía en la construcción de la identidad, en este caso, el análisis se centra en los enunciados lingüísticos con los que se expresan acciones, propósitos y funciones estratégicas que adquieren un carácter político en la medida en que la posición de estratega responde a la función de aliado que le confiere la organización. En su condición de aliado, el comunicador deberá matizar el ejercicio de un poder que ejercen quienes realmente lo ostentaren tal sentido pondrá al servicio de las institución su saber hacer que, en el ámbito de la gestión de la comunicación, se traduce en la capacidad para el control simbólico de los públicos con los que se relaciona la organización. Lo anterior permite argüir que, si bien la aspiración política del comunicador es el posicionamiento de área de comunicaciones en el dominio de las altas esferas de la organización que. a su vez representa la adquisición de un prestigio para él, el poder que alcanza reposa en la capacidad que demuestre para congregar voluntades, orientar la acción de los sujetos y posicionar a la organización en el ámbito del negocio. Es por ello que se puede afirmar que la acción política del comunicador estratega cumple las veces de amortiguador o "polo a tierra" de los efectos del poder que ejercen quienes lo ostentan en la organización, y en tal sentido, su propósito político es menguar dichos efectos y lograr la adhesión de los actores sociales (públicos) a los intereses de la institución. Sin embargo, dicha acción lejos de ser uniforme, adquiere modalidades en atención a variantes relacionadas con la naturaleza de la organización, el estilo de la administración y las modalidades de gestión del comunicador.Para efectos de sustentar la dimensión política del discurso del comunicador corpo­rativo y por ende las modalidades que adopta su acción, el texto presenta la siguiente estructura: en un primer momento se trata de contextuar y delimitar la noción de política, así como su relación con el poder. En un segundo momento, se analiza, desde la perspectiva del discurso, un corpus de enunciados emitidos por los comunicadores en la entrevista, teniendo, en cuenta las categorías de: frente de acción, referente político, función estratégica y propósitos políticos. En un tercer momento, se hace una aproximación a las modalidades de la acción política del comunicador a partir de la identificación de las constantes o rasgos en común. Finalmente, se aborda el carácter contingente de la acción política, bajo el supuesto de que dicha contingencia está determinada en lo esencial por tres variantes: naturaleza de la organización, estilo gerencial y modalidad de gestión del comunicador.

Paper presented at the Sixth Annual IWMI-TATA Partners? Meet. Institute of Rural Management, Anand (IRMA), 8-10 March 2007 ; Since the 1850s, the Krishna basin has seen an increasing mobilization of its water resources and a dramatic development of irrigation, with little regard to the limits of available water resources. This progressively led to the closure of the basin: surface water resources are now almost entirely committed to human consumptive uses; the increasing groundwater abstraction negatively affects the surface water balance by decreasing base flows, and the discharge to the ocean continues to decrease. The lower Krishna basin, located in Andhra Pradesh, is a deficit sub-basin; it depends highly on inflow from the upper basin and on upstream water uses. It is the first part of the Krishna basin to face the adverse consequences of any hydrological changes. It is also the region of the basin where most of the available water is depleted by human consumptive uses. In times of drought, it is the first region to face severe water shortages and to witness a spatial re-distribution or re-appropriation of water. Taking place on the basis of current political, institutional and geographical forces, this re-appropriation of water raises socio-political questions of sectoral and regional water apportionment within the lower Krishna basin and may be at the origin of conflicts between water users. This paper identifies two main drivers to the lower Krishna basin closure: (i) a long-term trend towards decreasing water availability with a declining surface water inflow due to water development in the upper basin and (ii) a local water over-commitment due to uncontrolled development of private groundwater abstraction and short term management decisions, both at the farmer and command area levels, in the large irrigation projects of the lower Krishna basin. In 1996/2000, 80% of the lower Krishna basin net inflow was depleted and discharge to the ocean amounted to 17.9 km3/yr, defining a moderately modified ecosystem. During the drought of 2001/2004, likely to forecast the future waterscape of the lower Krishna basin, all indicators point to further water resource commitment with a depleted fraction amounting to 98% of the net inflow, a lack of discharge to the ocean and the shrinkage of surface irrigated agriculture. This paper illustrates that local users and managers participate to a large extent in the shifting waterscape of the lower Krishna basin. At the basin scale, this paper shows that both the intra-agriculture and the inter- sectoral distribution of water are being reshaped. In the agricultural sector, the strong political divide among the three regions of Andhra Pradesh and the need to balance rural development among those regions are two of the main driving forces of a shifting agricultural water use. If surface water distribution among large irrigation projects tends to be to the advantage of the politically influent coastal region; the uncontrolled groundwater development mainly benefits the dry upland regions of Telangana and Rayalaseema and is tantamount to a spatial and social redistribution of water impinging surface water use in the lower reaches of the basin. The inter-sectoral distribution of water is also being modified. First, increasing power needs have led to the completion of hydro-power projects which do not yet impact other uses. Second, domestic and industrial needs of urban areas are increasing and are preferentially met. Currently, this is not affecting existing water uses as volumes considered remain marginal but in case of drought it could further deprive agricultural uses in the large irrigation projects located downstream. Third, environmental degradation has led to increasing awareness to recognize the environment as a water user in its own right. This has yet to be translated in formal allocation mechanisms and will point to further water commitment letting very little room for further water resources development. At the local level, this study highlighted a large range of adaptive strategies developed by both farmers and managers in the large irrigation projects of the lower Krishna basin. Strategies include: differential canal supply management, reduction of the cropping season, crops shift, development of groundwater use, etc. Strategies vary both temporally and spatially and reflect the particular political economy of the region studied To overcome the degradation of the resource base and the management difficulties linked to resource over- commitment, this paper underlines that the state has to play a central role in articulating a specific course among different available options through the definition and the implementation of formal effective and adaptive water allocation mechanisms, both in time and space, to allow transparent and sustainable use of available water resources. At present, calls for demand management by the State and international donors are strong but the consideration and implementation of mega inter-basin transfers perpetuates an unsustainable rush towards further resource mobilization and should not be taken as a justification for disregarding other management options that will allow regulating water use notably in the agricultural sector. Finally policies limited to the water sector are unlikely to ease the pressure on the water resources and there is a clear need for strategies and policies that would ensure the rural population to make a successful transition beyond agriculture.

Preface -- Introduction to the handbook on teaching and learning for sustainable development / Walter Leal Filho and Amanda Lange Salvia -- Part I. Teaching practices -- 1. International service-learning as a driver for sustainability competencies development / María Olga Bernaldo and Gonzalo Fernández-Sánchez -- 2. Information science and informational sustainability : A discipline in construction / Marli Dias de Souza Pinto and Genilson Geraldo -- 3. insights into early childhood students' interconnected learning in relation to education for sustainability through creative approaches and hermeneutics in higher education / Diane Boyd and Naomi McLeod -- 4. 'Bad plastics -- oceans free of plastic' : The role of education / Elisabete Linhares and Bento Cavadas -- 5. Sustainable higher education institutions : Promoting a holistic approach / Usha Iyer-Raniga and Karishma Kashyap -- 6. Student-led sustainability actions at Latin American universities : A case study from Chile / Claudia Mac-lean, Isabella Villanueva and Jean Hug -- 7. Understanding recycling behavior in the university : A case study from southern Chile / Rodrigo Vargas-Gaete, Paula Guarda-Saavedra and Javiera Eskuche -- 8. Sustainability in Finnish craft education : United Nations sustainable development goals of the 2030 agenda as a frame for an overview / Niina Väänänen and Sinikka Pöllönen -- 9. Infusing education for sustainable development (ESD) into curricula : Teacher educators' experiences within the school of education at the University of the West Indies, Jamaica / Carmel Roofe, Therese Ferguson, Carol Hordatt Gentles, Sharon Bramwell-Lalor, Loraine D. Cook, Aldrin E. Sweeney, Canute Thompson and Everton Cummings -- 10. Teaching leadership skills to sustainability professionals / R. Bruce Hull, David P. Robertson, and Michael Mortimer -- 11. Sustainability goals, mental health and violence : Convergent dialogues in research and higher education / Sonia Regina da Cal Seixas and João Luiz de Moraes Hoeffel -- 12. The sustainable development goals in the context of university extension projects : The Brazilian case of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) / Luan Santos, Victória Fernandes da Silva, Isabella Arlochi de Oliveira and Bruno Neves Amado -- 13. Teachers' training as a way of increasing sustainable traditional livelihoods in the coastal region of Paraty, Brazil / Marina Alves Novaes e Cruz, Ana Claudia Campuzano Martinez, Cecilia Maria Marafelli, Katherine Cilae Benedict, Maria Inês Rocha de S., Leonardo Esteves de Freitas and Edmundo Gallo -- 14. Field notes : Teaching sustainable business to environmental scientists / Diana Watts -- Part II. Innovation and new technologies -- 15. Innovations in curriculum and pedagogy in education for sustainable development / Hock Lye Koh and Su Yean Teh -- 16. Digital storytelling as OER-enabled pedagogy : Sustainable teaching in a digital world / Daniel Otto -- 17. Addressing the SDGS through an integrated model of collaborative education / Wendy Stubbs, Susie S.Y. Ho, Jessica K. Abbonizio, Stathi Paxinos and Joannette J. (Annette) Bos -- 18. Measuring transformative learning for sustainability in higher education : Application of an augmented learning activities survey / Elizabeth Sidiropoulos -- 19. The need to build the concept of environment within the framework of the sustainable development goals / Rocío Jiménez-Fontana, Esther García-González and Antonio Navarrete -- 20. Interdisciplinary training for the transformation of teaching in the context of sustainability / Osvaldo Luiz Gonçalves Quelhas, Sergio Luiz Braga França, Marcelo Jasmim Meiriño, Gilson Brito Alves Lima, Luís Perez Zotes and Nicholas Van-Erven Ludolf -- 21. Extra-curricular activities as a way of teaching sustainability / Gert-Olof Boström, Katarina Winka and Katarzyna Wolanik Boström -- 22. Fostering empathy towards effective sustainability teaching : From the food sustainability Index educational toolkit to a new pedagogical model / Sonia Massari, Francesca Allievi and Francesca Recanati -- 23. Making economics relevant : Incorporating sustainability / Madhavi Venkatesan -- 24. Towards sustainability as a frame of mind in higher education : Thinking about sustainability rhizomatically / Dzintra Iliško -- 25. Implementing a green co-learning center to support sustainable campus development / Cahyono Agus, Nur Aini Iswati Hasanah, Aqmal Nur Jihad, Pita Asih Bekti Cahyanti, Muhammad Sulaiman, and Suratman -- 26. An exploration of interdisciplinary settings as intellectual spaces for sustainability in higher education / Rudi W. Pretorius -- 27. Stepping toward a sense of place : A choreography of natural and social science / Michael-Anne Noble, Hilary Leighton and Ann Dale -- 28. Preserving sustainability : Activating the ecological university through collective food practice / Monica Dantas, Sherif Goubran and Nadra Wagdy -- 29. Taday's agrofestive calendar -- Ecuador : A methodology for creating a sustainability experience with a dialogue of knowledge approach / María Fernanda Acosta Altamirano, Verónica Gabriela Tacuri Albarracín and Erika Gabriela Araujo P.rez -- 30. Free online spaces for learning and awareness in the sustainability field : The Universidade da Coruña (Spain) project / María Alló, Carmen Gago-Cortés, Ángeles Longarela-Ares and Estefanía Mourelle -- 31. Sustainability in the workplace and the theory of planned behaviour : Norms and identity predict environmentally friendly intentions / Dennis Nigbur, Ana Fernández, Sharon Coen, Anke Franz and Ian Hocking -- 32. Challenges in sustainability teaching / Walter Leal Filho -- Index.

Renewed mobility policies have been developed since the mid-2000s in French rural areas, which are particularly car dependent. Local authorities have chosen to offer alternatives to automotive mobility. This thesis analyzes the emergence of public electric mobility policies, while national or European incentives encourage their development (cars, bicycles, charging stations). Do rural actors seize these incentives? And how? This study questions therefore the particular ways in which the incentive mechanisms related to electromobility in small rural communities are taken advantage of and how local authorities consent to this encouragement to change. The main hypothesis of this research is that the emergence of e-mobility in rural territories is elaborated and shaped by both local stakeholders and external actors, not always in consensual ways. With a multidisciplinary approach, we study the gradual deployment of e-mobility in two French territories, the Manche department and the Aveyron department. This study is based on the monitoring of several projects, and on interviews of local stakeholders.Our results show how e-mobility is used by local stakeholders to negotiate the turn toward a more sustainable rural transportation network and to reconsider the automobility system. It is seized, discussed, tested or rejected and might be integrated into a territorial strategy, depending on the resources and on the role of local actors.E-mobility is undertaken in several ways. First, it is implanted in a diversity of local public policies (tourism, social inclusion, environment), within smaller projects such as electric bike rental or electric car sharing system. It emerges through practical initiatives which stakeholders come up with in search of new mobility systems for the territory.Secondly, we show that e-mobility is a strategic tool, in larger projects (hydrogen, charging stations) in order to promote an energy system for the territory. In two territories historically shaped by electrical production (nuclear power and hydroelectric power), we demonstrate that e-mobility represents a powerful tool in the context of an energy transition, as it enables stakeholders to secure their role within these territories.The movement toward this innovation is made in the continuity of the rural and local policies, targetting isues such as tourism or local economy, and in connection with the national energy policies of energy transition. Finally, we hypothesize that these projects can also lead to discontinuities, to a reinvention of the rural, toward a new energy network, and new mobilities. ; Les sociétés rurales sont caractérisées par des modes de vie et de déplacement quotidiens particulièrement dépendants du mode automobile, et la mobilité est, depuis longtemps déjà, un enjeu central des politiques publiques qui leur sont destinées. Les collectivités rurales sont prises dans une tension entre l'injonction à adopter des mobilités plus diversifiées, plus économes, et, en même temps, un climat d'incertitudes et des contraintes politiques et budgétaires qui freinent les choix de rupture. La thèse analyse les conditions d'émergence d'une offre de publique en faveur de l'électromobilité alors qu'une multitude de dispositifs encouragent l'introduction de voitures électriques, de vélos à assistance électrique et de bornes de recharge. Les acteurs ruraux s'en saisissent-ils pour autant ? Et de quelle manière ? La recherche questionne donc les modalités particulières du saisissement des instruments d'incitation liés à l'électromobilité dans les petites collectivités rurales et étudie la manière dont celles-ci acceptent, en la reformulant, cette injonction à la modernité et au changement. L'hypothèse centrale de cette thèse est que l'émergence de l'offre électromobile dans le monde rural fait l'objet d'une construction et d'une mise en forme conjointe, mais loin d'être consensuelle, entre le monde local (usagers, élus, opérateurs privés) et les acteurs extérieurs. En mobilisant une approche pluridisciplinaire, le déploiement très progressif de l'électromobilité est analysé dans le cadre d'une démarche de recherche menée dans la Manche et en Aveyron. Après une contextualisation de l'émergence des politiques électromobiles dans les deux territoires étudiés, la thèse montre comment ce nouveau champ de l'action publique permet aux élus ruraux d'adopter avec prudence et sans renier l'automobilité auxquels ils restent attachés, un nouveau référentiel de mobilité durable. L'électromobilité est une proposition saisie ou détournée, discutée et expérimentée avant d'être éventuellement intégrée à une stratégie territoriale en fonction des ressources et du rôle de l'acteur local. Ensuite, après avoir constaté la très grande diversité des thématiques qui introduisent l'offre politique de l'électromobilité dans les territoires ruraux, la thèse propose une typologie pour mieux comprendre le foisonnement de micro-projets électromobiles et les visées auxquelles est censé répondre du point de vue des élus. L'appropriation de l'électromobilité est engagée via une pragmatique locale par des acteurs à la recherche d'un nouveau modèle d'aménagement rural. Nous montrons, à travers quelques projets de plus grande envergure visant à déployer des bornes de recherche ou des véhicules à hydrogène, que le déploiement électromobile est aussi un objet de pouvoir. Dans deux départements marqués historiquement par la production électrique (l'une d'origine nucléaire, l'autre hydroélectrique) et donc par les proximités historiques de l'industriel et du monde politique local, la thèse montre le saisissement stratégique de l'électromobilité par des acteurs locaux, comme les syndicats départementaux d'énergie. Il s'agit de promouvoir un nouveau modèle économico-énergétique territorial tout en maintenant les proximités politico-industrielles de toujours. L'un des principaux résultats est le constat de l'écart entre l'apparence d'intense renouvellement que relaient les discours et la mise en scène de l'offre politique et le saupoudrage presque anecdotique des projets réels. Ces démarches semblent porter les ferments d'une réinvention économique, territoriale et sociale du monde rural très ambiguë. D'un côté, l'électromobilité est utilisée au profit de stratégies de conservation de rapports de pouvoir, même si certaines formes d'appropriation de l'électromobilité reconfigurent discrètement les cadres de production des politiques publiques d'aménagement rural, débouchant sur une image de la transition mobilitaire rurale plurielle, sinon divergente

Renewed mobility policies have been developed since the mid-2000s in French rural areas, which are particularly car dependent. Local authorities have chosen to offer alternatives to automotive mobility. This thesis analyzes the emergence of public electric mobility policies, while national or European incentives encourage their development (cars, bicycles, charging stations). Do rural actors seize these incentives? And how? This study questions therefore the particular ways in which the incentive mechanisms related to electromobility in small rural communities are taken advantage of and how local authorities consent to this encouragement to change. The main hypothesis of this research is that the emergence of e-mobility in rural territories is elaborated and shaped by both local stakeholders and external actors, not always in consensual ways. With a multidisciplinary approach, we study the gradual deployment of e-mobility in two French territories, the Manche department and the Aveyron department. This study is based on the monitoring of several projects, and on interviews of local stakeholders.Our results show how e-mobility is used by local stakeholders to negotiate the turn toward a more sustainable rural transportation network and to reconsider the automobility system. It is seized, discussed, tested or rejected and might be integrated into a territorial strategy, depending on the resources and on the role of local actors.E-mobility is undertaken in several ways. First, it is implanted in a diversity of local public policies (tourism, social inclusion, environment), within smaller projects such as electric bike rental or electric car sharing system. It emerges through practical initiatives which stakeholders come up with in search of new mobility systems for the territory.Secondly, we show that e-mobility is a strategic tool, in larger projects (hydrogen, charging stations) in order to promote an energy system for the territory. In two territories historically shaped by electrical production (nuclear power and hydroelectric power), we demonstrate that e-mobility represents a powerful tool in the context of an energy transition, as it enables stakeholders to secure their role within these territories.The movement toward this innovation is made in the continuity of the rural and local policies, targetting isues such as tourism or local economy, and in connection with the national energy policies of energy transition. Finally, we hypothesize that these projects can also lead to discontinuities, to a reinvention of the rural, toward a new energy network, and new mobilities. ; Les sociétés rurales sont caractérisées par des modes de vie et de déplacement quotidiens particulièrement dépendants du mode automobile, et la mobilité est, depuis longtemps déjà, un enjeu central des politiques publiques qui leur sont destinées. Les collectivités rurales sont prises dans une tension entre l'injonction à adopter des mobilités plus diversifiées, plus économes, et, en même temps, un climat d'incertitudes et des contraintes politiques et budgétaires qui freinent les choix de rupture. La thèse analyse les conditions d'émergence d'une offre de publique en faveur de l'électromobilité alors qu'une multitude de dispositifs encouragent l'introduction de voitures électriques, de vélos à assistance électrique et de bornes de recharge. Les acteurs ruraux s'en saisissent-ils pour autant ? Et de quelle manière ? La recherche questionne donc les modalités particulières du saisissement des instruments d'incitation liés à l'électromobilité dans les petites collectivités rurales et étudie la manière dont celles-ci acceptent, en la reformulant, cette injonction à la modernité et au changement. L'hypothèse centrale de cette thèse est que l'émergence de l'offre électromobile dans le monde rural fait l'objet d'une construction et d'une mise en forme conjointe, mais loin d'être consensuelle, entre le monde local (usagers, élus, opérateurs privés) et les acteurs extérieurs. En mobilisant une approche pluridisciplinaire, le déploiement très progressif de l'électromobilité est analysé dans le cadre d'une démarche de recherche menée dans la Manche et en Aveyron. Après une contextualisation de l'émergence des politiques électromobiles dans les deux territoires étudiés, la thèse montre comment ce nouveau champ de l'action publique permet aux élus ruraux d'adopter avec prudence et sans renier l'automobilité auxquels ils restent attachés, un nouveau référentiel de mobilité durable. L'électromobilité est une proposition saisie ou détournée, discutée et expérimentée avant d'être éventuellement intégrée à une stratégie territoriale en fonction des ressources et du rôle de l'acteur local. Ensuite, après avoir constaté la très grande diversité des thématiques qui introduisent l'offre politique de l'électromobilité dans les territoires ruraux, la thèse propose une typologie pour mieux comprendre le foisonnement de micro-projets électromobiles et les visées auxquelles est censé répondre du point de vue des élus. L'appropriation de l'électromobilité est engagée via une pragmatique locale par des acteurs à la recherche d'un nouveau modèle d'aménagement rural. Nous montrons, à travers quelques projets de plus grande envergure visant à déployer des bornes de recherche ou des véhicules à hydrogène, que le déploiement électromobile est aussi un objet de pouvoir. Dans deux départements marqués historiquement par la production électrique (l'une d'origine nucléaire, l'autre hydroélectrique) et donc par les proximités historiques de l'industriel et du monde politique local, la thèse montre le saisissement stratégique de l'électromobilité par des acteurs locaux, comme les syndicats départementaux d'énergie. Il s'agit de promouvoir un nouveau modèle économico-énergétique territorial tout en maintenant les proximités politico-industrielles de toujours. L'un des principaux résultats est le constat de l'écart entre l'apparence d'intense renouvellement que relaient les discours et la mise en scène de l'offre politique et le saupoudrage presque anecdotique des projets réels. Ces démarches semblent porter les ferments d'une réinvention économique, territoriale et sociale du monde rural très ambiguë. D'un côté, l'électromobilité est utilisée au profit de stratégies de conservation de rapports de pouvoir, même si certaines formes d'appropriation de l'électromobilité reconfigurent discrètement les cadres de production des politiques publiques d'aménagement rural, débouchant sur une image de la transition mobilitaire rurale plurielle, sinon divergente

Kumemura Village, or Kuninda, has been known as the community of Chinese immigrants with a more than five-hundred year background of scholar-bureaucrat aristocracy in Lewchew, or Ryukyu. They supposedly originated from a group of 36 families from the Southern Chinese Min (閩) ethnic group since 1392. Although much research has been conducted on the subject matter throughout the years, there is almost no scholar who would tackle it on the concept of a "Chinatown." There are basically two reasons to account for such tendency in academics. Firstly, unlike most Chinese immigrant groups in other parts of the world, the 36 Min Families who had moved to Lewchew did not leave the country of their own accord, for neither private nor economic reasons, but in fact, were ordered by Emperor Hongwu to emigrate for political reasons. Furthermore, Kuninda-chu, the descendants of 36 Min Families, have almost, in the same way as other Okinawa people regard them over the years, never seen themselves as "overseas Chinese."However, this paper argues that there are still plenty of similarities between Kuninda-chu and other overseas Chinese in the world. The two main points for this paper are: firstly, Kuninda-chu relied excessively on the Chinese World Order and tributary system for its maintenance, so its survival rested primarily on the existence of this political structure, and was eventually disintegrated upon the collapse of the system. Secondly, Chinese culture was largely brought by Kuninda-chu to Ryukyu during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, but it is still kept alive and observed in Okinawa society to this day and in stark contrast with the Yamaonchu, the Japanese in the mainland of Japan, it directly helped shaping and forming the Okinawa people's self-identity as Uchinan-chu.Truly, Kuninda no longer exists in the Okinawa society today, but Kuninda-chu's descendants have been upholding their unique ethic image through various traditional activities organized by different groups, Kume-Sosekai notwithstanding. Moreover, Kuninda-chu is also one of the earliest overseas Chinese groups who had assimilated successfully into the local Okinawa community. It is clear that Kuninda is one of the most paramount alternative cases for the studies of overseas Chinese.過去有關琉球「久米村」的歷史研究,鮮有學者以「唐人街」的概念來探討它的歷史與社會形態。其原因係「久米村人」或稱「閩人三十六姓」擁有有別於一般認知的華僑特徵。其一、儘管「久米村人」來自於中國著名僑鄉福建,然而這些移民最初並非個人的意志,亦非家庭因素而來到琉球,因爲他們是「官派」移民。其二、早期第一代閩僑「出外」的目的,乃以經濟為主要誘因,然「閩人三十六姓」則是受明太祖洪武帝派遣,前來琉球以輔助王國之營運及維繫與中國的關係,其政治目的十分清晰。其三、「閩人三十六姓」的子孫之間幾乎不存在「華僑」意識,更多的視自己為琉球人的一部分,而其他琉球人亦如此視之。然而本文認爲「久米村人」與一般認知上的華僑、華人還是有許多共通之處。本文聚焦兩個主要面向,來探討「久米村」及「久米村人」在僑居地琉球的變遷與影響。兩大論點包括一、儘管「久米村」對琉球王國的發展功不可沒,然而過於仰賴「中華世界體系」的存在,故因該體制的興起而生,亦因該體制的衰亡而瓦解;二、「久米村人」是將中國文化大量帶進琉球的重要推手,中國文化至今仍在沖繩社會傳承,並在沖繩人形塑自我認同上發揮不可或缺的重要影響。儘管「久米村」已不復存在,然而擁有500年歷史的「久米村」留下了龐大有跡可尋的歷史紀錄,而「久米村人」的後裔至今仍透過許多聯誼組織,低調地繼續維繫著在琉球社會中獨特族群的形象,而「久米村人」也是歷史上華僑最早「落地生根」的族群之一,提供了華僑、華人研究不可多得的重要個案。 (This article is in Chinese.)

"La aprobación por parte del gobierno federal de siembras controladas de maíz genéticamente modificado (GM), permitió evaluar los híbridos con los eventos AgrisureTM 3000 GT, Agrisure® VipteraTM 3110 y Agrisure® VipteraTM 3111, con genes de Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), que codifican para las proteínas Cry1Ab, Vip3Aa20 y mCry3A, en cuatro localidades del estado de Sinaloa, durante el 2011-2013. Se evaluó la resistencia de estos híbridos al daño foliar por gusano cogollero Spodoptera frugiperda; al daño en mazorca por gusano elotero Helicoverpa zea; al daño en tallo por gusano barrenador Diatraea saccharalis; la incidencia y severidad de pudrición de mazorca provocada por Fusarium sp., y el efecto sobre la abundancia de artrópodos no blanco. Estos parámetros se compararon con su hibrido convencional y un tratamiento insecticida químico según correspondió en cada caso. Todos los tratamientos fueron analizados mediante un ANVA y comparación de medias, mientras que el efecto sobre artrópodos se determinó con los atributos de la comunidad; con el número de familias y abundancia de artrópodos se estimó la diversidad, riqueza y uniformidad. La abundancia se analizó con la prueba de Kruskal-Wallis y U Mann Whitney con el objetivo de detectar diferencias entre las poblaciones de maíz GM y convencional. La evaluación del daño foliar y daño en mazorca, demostró que la tecnologia con la inserción de genes de Bt es resistente al daño provocado por gusano cogollero y elotero. En el caso del barrenador del tallo se presento una baja incidencia de daño, observándose solamente en 2012 y 2013; sin embargo, en todos los casos, el daño fue menor en los híbridos GM con respecto a sus convencionales. La pudrición de mazorca durante los años 2011 y 2013 se presentó en mayor incidencia y severidad en los híbridos convencionales en comparación con los híbridos GM; sin embargo, en El Camalote en 2013, estas diferencias numéricas, no fueron estadísticamente significativas. Se encontró un gran número de artrópodos asociados al maíz, con mayor abundancia en el GM, principalmente fitófagos y depredadores, mientras que los parasitoides y saprófagos, se distribuyeron entre los híbridos evaluados; cuyo análisis no revelo diferencias significativas entre las parcelas de maíz GM y convencional en los tres años de evaluación. El manejo de las plagas del maìz evaluadas mediante hibridos GM, es una estrategia para ser incorporada en un manejo integrado de plagas; incrementando las posibilidades de obtener una mejor calidad y rendimiento de grano. Adicionalmente, aunque el maíz GM no fue desarrollado para el manejo de enfermedades, le confiere un beneficio adicional indirecto al de resistencia a insectos plaga, reduciendo la formación de puntos de entrada para fitopatógenos como Fusarium sp; que se desarrollan en el tejido susceptible, provocando pudrición de mazorca. No se encontraron efectos negativos sobre la abundancia de artrópodos no blanco, brindando una mejor oportunidad de uso a esta tecnología, al reducir los insumos de productos químicos. Por lo tanto esta tecnología puede contribuir a preservar la biodiversidad del agroecosistema en relación a otras opciones de manejo de plagas." ; "The approval of genetically modified corn (GM) by Mexican government under controlled conditions, allowed to evaluate corn hybrids with the AgrisureTM 3000 GT, Agrisure® VipteraTM 3110 and Agrisure® VipteraTM 3111 events, with the inclusion of several genes coding for proteins Cry1Ab, Vip3Aa20 and mCry3A of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), in four locaties at Sinaloa, during years 2011-2013. Resistance to foliar damage to fall armyworm Spodoptera frugiperda; ear damage to corn earworm Helicoverpa zea; stalk damage to sugarcane borer Diatraea saccharalis; incidence and severity of Fusarium sp. ear rot and the effect over non-target arthropods abundance was evaluated. These parameters are compared with their conventional hybrid, and an insecticide treatment as corresponded in each case. An ANOVA test and a mean comparison were conducted to evaluate all treatments, whereas the effect over arthropods was determined by the community attributes; with the number of families and arthropods abundance, diversity, richness and population uniformity were estimated. A Kruskal-Wallis and U Mann Whitney test was used to estimate abundance in order to detect differences between populations of GM and conventional corn. Foliar damage and ear damage evaluations, showed that corn with the Bt gene insertion was resistant to fall armyworm and corn earworm damage. In case of stalk borer, a low incidence of the pest was found, only in 2012 and 2013; however, in all cases, damage was lower in the GM hybrids tested as compared to their conventional hybrids. Cob rot during 2011 and 2013, showed higher incidence and severity in conventional hybrids than the GM hybrids; however, at El Camalote in 2013, these numerical differences, were not statistically significant. A large number of arthropods associated with maize were found, more abundant in the GM events, mainly phytophagous and predators, while parasitoids and saprophagous were evenly distributed among evaluated hybrids; where the statistical analysis showed no significant differences between the GM events and their respective conventional hybrids during the three year evaluation. Management of evaluated corn pests with GM hybrids is a control strategy to be incorporated into an integrated pest management program; increasing the possibility of obtaining better grain quality and yield. Although GM corn was not developed for disease control, they give an indirect additional benefit to insect pests resistance, by reducing points of entry for pathogens such as Fusarium sp, causing ear rot. No adverse effects on the abundance of non-target arthropods associated with corn was found; providing better opportunity to use this technology, as they have a considerable potential to reduce the use of chemical insecticides. Therefore this technology can help preserve agroecosystem biodiversity in relation to other pest management options."