Suchergebnisse

Spatial inequality is an important feature of many developing countries that seems to increase with economic growth and development. At the same time, there seems to be little consensus on the causes of spatial inequality and on a list of effective policy instruments that may foster or reduce spatial inequality. This paper examines the theoretical and empirical literature on spatial inequality to learn what we know and do not know about the causes of spatial inequality, to investigate what policies may or may not ameliorate spatial inequality, and to determine whether policy makers can identify and implement policies that promote or reduce spatial inequality.

Since 2005, a growing number of vulnerable communities and nations have used the human rights lexicon to argue their case for an urgent and ambitious response to climate change. The purpose of this Social Development Department Working paper is to examine the emergence of a new discourse linking climate change and human rights, and to assess its social and political implications, particularly as they relate to development practitioners. The scope of this paper is to explore what relevance this new discourse has on what David Kennedy calls the 'vocabularies, expertise, and sensibilities' of development practitioners (Kennedy 2005). The methodology for this paper involved interviews with academics and policy practitioners who have shaped this emerging discourse; a wide-ranging literature review of texts relevant to the fields of development, climate change and human rights; discussions with development professionals who have the daily responsibility of operationalizing approaches to reducing vulnerability and building resilience; and finally drawing upon the author's own experience leading the Maldives' government's initiative on the Human Dimensions of Climate Change and as a consultant within the Social Dimensions of Climate Change Cluster of the World Bank's Social Development Department. It is important to stress that this paper is not a legal piece. Human rights are as much about ethical demands, calls for social justice, public awareness, advocacy, and political action as they are concerned with legal norms and rules. Sen has pointed out a 'theory of human rights cannot be sensibly confined within the juridical model in which it is frequently incarcerated' (Sen 2004, 319). Consequently this piece will focus on the wider, political economy aspects of the interface between human rights and climate change. It is further appropriate to state that this is not an advocacy piece. The paper deliberately avoids being normative or prescriptive in recommending a human rights-based approach to developing climate change operations. It does examine why vulnerable populations chose to embrace this approach, why they continue to view it as a transformative strategy, and what some of the successes and challenges have been.

Disinformation has a damaging impact on both the European Union enlargement process and the internal image the EU has of itself, and the external image it conveys to the world. This CIDOB Briefing presents the main conclusions of the seminar "Disinformation in Enlargement Countries: Sowing Instability, Distorting EU's Perception", which was organised by CIDOB on 4 October 2024 and funded by the CERV (Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values) Programme of the European Commission. Bringing together researchers and journalists, the seminar analysed the problem of disinformation on two key EU fronts, namely the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. In both these zones, disinformation affects local realities while also being part of regional trends. These include a noticeably greater interaction between domestic and external actors, strong discursive connections with new global antiliberal narratives, and the use of local and regional divisions for the benefit of domestic and external political stakeholders.







The problem of disinformation has been identified by the European Union as one of the greatest challenges facing the continent's democratic governments and civil society. While there is a tendency to speak of disinformation primarily as an external threat, fuelled inter alia by the Russian government in an attempt to destabilise the European project and its support for Ukraine, the issue of fake news does not have clearly defined internal-external boundaries. The campaigns of external governments interact with the messages of domestic actors in such a way that disinformation becomes a phenomenon that is both international and local. The methodologies, tools, and strategies of manipulation are employed on a global scale, while the messages are tailored to fit local realities. These dynamics are clearly observable in the two geographical areas of the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans.Battle of narratives in Russia's shadowIn the Eastern Neighbourhood of the EU, the disinformation phenomenon is set against the background of the war in Ukraine. Since the Russian invasion in 2022, the main objective of the Kremlin's disinformation strategies in neighbouring countries has been to weaken diplomatic, economic, and military support for the Ukrainian government. This occurs in addition to Russian efforts of previous years to undermine the European project in countries deemed by Moscow to be in its "sphere of influence", among them Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine itself. Russia's disinformation project also targets key EU member states with more Kremlin-friendly governments, among them Slovakia and Hungary, as well as European political forces at the extremes of the political spectrum.Russia's disinformation strategies in the Eastern Neighbourhood have undergone changes in recent years, in particular when giving a more important role to local actors in disseminating fake news and pro-Kremlin stories. In discussions about disinformation, the role of foreign governments is especially singled out, but it is important to remember that by far the greatest part of the disinformation that is circulating is produced at the local level. Within this domestic production of false content, the Kremlin can benefit by amplifying information that strategically favours it. In this regard, local channels are not only a mechanism for unilateral dissemination of Russian-generated content. Furthermore, there are domestic stakeholders with an autonomous political agenda who are producing their own disinformation and, if it creates instability and division, it is further disseminated by the Russian propaganda system. And in order to counter the effects of news verification services, new agents like "alternative fact checkers" are being promoted in efforts to discredit factually correct news. In addition to this dynamic of interaction between internal and external actors is the use of transnational tools and channels, among them social networks with Russian links like Telegram. At the international level, Russia's increasing disinformation activity in the Global South, by means of generating content in European languages like Spanish in Latin America, and French in West Africa, is also affecting the EU. For example, in Mexico, Nicaragua, and Colombia, Russia has produced disinformation that seeks to influence local perceptions of Russia and discredit the Ukrainian government. The reach of this content goes beyond national borders as it aims to be reproduced in Latin American communities in the United States and in the diaspora communities of European countries like Spain.At the local level, Russian disinformation seeks to aggravate existing political, ethnic, and social divisions, and to spread home-grown narratives that are favourable to Russia. Political polarisation, for example, simultaneously benefits certain local political stakeholders like the Slovakian and Hungarian governments, and external actors like Russia. Political use by local politicians of the war in Ukraine and the arrival of Ukrainian refugees has meant that in Slovakia, for example, a majority of citizens (51%) blames the West or Ukraine rather than Russia (41%) for the war. Only 30% supports Ukraine's EU and NATO membership, while 36% is positively disposed to the establishment of an authoritarian regime in Slovakia. In a situation of increasingly illiberal European governments like those of Slovakia and Hungary, Russia further benefits from the erosion of critical media systems and civil society. It is important to emphasise, nonetheless, that low levels of freedom of expression affect not only the more pro-Russian countries like Slovakia (which dropped from 17th to 29th place in the World Press Freedom Index) and Hungary (in 67th place) but also countries that are more aligned with EU foreign policy like Greece (88th place), Bulgaria (59th), and Poland (47th). Apart from the benefits that Russian might accrue from disseminating disinformation, the problem of declining freedom of expression in the EU is also due to internal causes.Finally, political exploitation of ethnic divisions is one of the factors that explains instability in Moldova, where the Russian disinformation machinery has also taken advantage of the presence of a significant Russian-speaking community. One way of attacking pro-European politicians like the current Moldovan president, Maia Sandu, is accusing them of being anti-Russian and of trying to marginalise this community and its language. This story was being pushed by the Kremlin even before its attack on Ukraine.Russian activity in the Eastern Neighbourhood also engages with battles to dominate global narratives, for example by means of the current trend of global antiliberal traditionalism and nationalist historical revisionism. In the former case, Russia has sought to present itself as an upholder of traditional, conservative values, while promoting a story of a decadent, globalist, and "woke" European Union. Conservative governments and religious institutions in the Eastern Neighbourhood also use this traditionalist discourse as a legitimising tool, thus presenting themselves as protectors of the essence of the motherland, tradition, and national interests. To return to the case of Maia Sandu, there has been a proliferation of content emphasising the fact that she is not married, or claiming that she is secretly Muslim, or from a sexual minority, in order to discredit her among the more traditionalist voters. This antiliberal wave has had an impact in other countries of the region, including Slovakia where 50% of citizens see their national identity and values threatened by the western way of life. In these circumstances, conservative stakeholders like the Orthodox Church have also played a key role in spreading rhetoric that opposes principles upheld by the European Union. One notable case is the Orthodox Church of Georgia.In the domain of historical narratives, Russia has made attempts at historical revisionism to improve its own image and undermine that of Ukraine in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In its efforts to legitimise its influence-seeking manoeuvres, Russia has been pushing pan-Slavic narratives in order to foster ties with countries like Slovakia. Furthermore, it has taken advantage of numerous occasions to present itself as the sole liberator of these countries in the Second World War by means of an "anti-fascist" story that defines its opponents as Nazis or fascists, as in the case of the Ukrainian government. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has identified traumatic historical experiences linked to the Soviet past and turned them into revisionism against Ukraine. For example, some disinformation campaigns accuse the Ukrainians of being responsible for the repression of the 1956 Hungarian revolution and for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.Against European enlargement into the BalkansIn the Western Balkans, disinformation campaigns by both internal and external actors are exploiting the divisions and structural weaknesses of these societies to propagate their narratives. In this region, disinformation significantly appears as a project of a government in power, as is the case of Serbia, the most economically and militarily powerful state of the Western Balkans. Using strategies similar to those employed in Hungary and Slovakia, the Serbian government is promoting its own disinformation discourse, which is having divisive social and ethnic effects, as well as fuelling scepticism about European integration, all of which well suits Russian interests in the region. In Serbia, Russian disinformation activity is scant as the Belgrade government itself contributes to the Kremlin's strategic objectives. However, besides the Serbian case, there are two structural factors that enable disinformation campaigns in the Western Balkans. First, there are deep divisions and serious ethnic tensions in the individual countries of the region, and between them and certain EU member states, for example Bulgaria and Greece. In this situation of many stakeholders with nationalist agendas, historic grievances, and revisionism of the past, the presence of disinformation is, in good part, a symptom of these existing divisions and their exploitation by political actors.Second, the Western Balkans media establishment is underfunded, politicised, and linked to economic powers with interests that are sometimes associated with agents of disinformation. Although there are exceptions of high-quality investigative journalism like the Balkan Insight network, journalists in the Western Balkans generally work in precarious conditions with little time to check content in the general context of a business model in crisis where funding from non-transparent sources is accepted. In addition, after the 2008 economic crisis, the Balkans experienced major structural changes in funding from external media groups, with a significant withdrawal of western companies and an inflow of oligarchs with economic interests in Russia.Russian media outlets including Russia Today, TASS, Ria Novosti, and Sputnik have taken advantage of this media crisis to increase their presence by offering free content in local languages to be reproduced by the region's media in their portals. In the Balkans, countries like Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia stand out for the number of local news items that cite Russian media sources. This Russian influence in the sphere of information is achieved not only by means of content placement but also through the movement of capital for "strategic corruption", which manages to gain influence over, or ownership of the local media. In this regard, Bulgaria and Croatia stand out as the countries with the highest incidence of "illegal financial flows" coming from Russia.All these factors have ensured that the Western Balkans becomes a big loser in the process of European enlargement. It is important to note that disinformation has not caused the stalling of European enlargement. In this case, too, fake news and manipulative narratives exploit already-existing grievances and feelings of discontent. For years now, the process of European enlargement into the Western Balkans has been paralysed by European elites that are wary of the costs and risks of further enlargement, together with a European populace that is increasingly in favour of a "fortress Europe" that is closed to the outside world. Existing anti-immigration trends in the EU are used to reinforce anti-enlargement messages. For example, Islamophobia and rejection of refugees by some European citizens is used to promote the idea that "Europe does not want more Muslims". The aim is to mobilise a majority or a significant percentage of Muslims in countries of the Western Balkans—among them Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia—against EU enlargement.Given this indefinite postponement of future accession to the EU, and awareness of the EU's lack of credibility, there is a growing feeling of discontent among the region's citizens, and a search for alternatives beyond the European project. All of this creates a breeding ground where anti-EU domestic and external stakeholders can simply intensify existing concerns and misgivings in order to further undermine the enlargement process.In the midst of this crisis of credibility of pro-EU voices, increasing numbers of authoritarian-leaning governments are offering "alternative" political and geopolitical projects. These governments are wielding a nationalist narrative claiming that joining the EU would mean a loss of national identity and traditional values. As an alternative to submission to a globalist, ultraliberal, and technocratic agenda, they hold out a protective response to globalising processes and increasing risks in the international arena. In this regard, governments like those of Serbia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Georgia are looking for "alternative" international relations in which the EU would no longer be the main partner, but just one alongside others like the United States, Russia, China, and Turkey. The weakening of the enlargement process and intensifying relations with these alternative powers are especially beneficial for the more autocratic Western Balkan states because they can forget about the democratising and liberalising reforms they need to complete if they are to join the EU without losing the economic benefits of world trade which they can now access through alternative markets. Imperfect solutions, necessary pluralismIn this situation of a faltering EU enlargement process, increasing Russian activity, strengthening of the local authoritarian stakeholders who are disseminating disinformation, and attacks on civil society and the media domain, what measures might reduce the impact of disinformation campaigns in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Western Balkans?First of all, it is important to distinguish between having a robust, pluralistic media system and having a pro-EU integration stance. Although both leanings tend to come together, being pro-EU does not necessarily mean being more democratic. In the Western Balkans, a more pro-European agenda and a more plural media system are factors that tend to be linked, but there are social movements, independent media, and civil society organisations that tend to be critical of some EU policies. For example, there have recently been protests over mining agreements between the EU and Serbia, with the result that these associations were labelled "anti-European". Cases like this one are important reminders that acritical agreement with European policies is not equivalent to more pluralism and more democracy. However, a civil society and media that are active and rigorous in public debate do mean more pluralism and more democracy. Within the European Union itself, there are critical views regarding certain EU policies, but they are not labelled as "anti-European" because of this. This critical pluralism is seen as part of European values, and it should be a mainstay of campaigns against disinformation. Contributing to this pluralism would help to counter social division, authoritarianism, and the weakness of media systems.While there is broad agreement on the structural factors that should be favoured when attempting to build a society that can better resist disinformation, there is greater divergence with respect to specific actions aiming to counteract its general influence and particular campaigns. One of the most important debates concerns sanctions imposed on Russian media outlets like Russia Today and Sputnik, which are accused of promoting disinformation aimed at instigating instability in the EU and undermining efforts to support Ukraine. Beyond disagreements over whether these sanctions are legitimate—due to precedents they may set and the symbolic impact of the fact that a leading liberal power like the EU should be sanctioning media outlets—the most common debate today is about the real usefulness of such measures. On the one hand, some observers consider that imposing these sanctions is not very effective because the content can easily be replicated on new websites, in what is known as "information laundering". There is an additional argument that outlets like Russia Today are easy to identify as Russian, while with pages that replicate content it is more difficult to identify the origin of the information. One the other hand, others believe that imposing these sanctions is better than doing nothing since, whatever the case, they do inflict administrative costs on the Russian disinformation bureaucracy as well as sending a signal to Moscow and its European allies that the EU is not just passively acquiescing. Finally, still others have the view that censorship of Russian media outlets should be accompanied by broader sanctions extending to the Russian energy sector, which still receives European revenue through indirect distribution conduits via third countries like Turkey.In the field of countermeasures against disinformation, there is further debate about the effectiveness of debunking and of the work of fact-checking bodies. A first problem is asymmetry in the resources and capacity for reaction of these organisations when compared with those of the agents that are promoting disinformation. Deciding priorities when countering fake news and manipulative discourse in a situation of meagre resources, when there is a need to react quickly, is a major challenge. Furthermore, offering factual data and a rigorous version of the events in question is no guarantee that citizens will stop believing "alternative facts" or conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, some commentators argue that discontinuing fact-checking efforts would entail the risk of leaving existing disinformation without a factual journalistic response. In this case, the debate is not so much about whether or not debunking activities should exist, but about the quantity of resources that should be allocated to them in contrast to alternatives that might be more effective. Although not presented as a strategy that opposes verification, other ways of countering foreign disinformation, such as that proposed by the EU's European External Action Service (EEAS), suggest a change of paradigm. The EEAS plan for tackling FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) is less concerned with the narrative and content of disinformation than with the actions and tactics employed to magnify them. The aim is to cut off high-impact disinformation campaigns by quantitatively and quantitatively identifying patterns and strategies, for example coordinated action through bots for disseminating fake news in the social networks.Finally, there is also heated debate about whether the priority response should be to shore up the strategic communication of European governments and institutions. This would entail creating their own narrative that would seek to have an emotional impact on European citizens, as a way of opposing the information being sent out by Russia and other purveyors of disinformation. This strategy would be in the framework of a pre-bunking stance that considers it necessary to go beyond reactive responses or merely countering disinformation with data and facts. From this standpoint, it is believed that the EU is caught up in a clash of narratives to which it must respond forcefully. While accepting the existence of this discursive competition, other observers consider that there is no clear boundary between strategic communication and propaganda. Certain more emotional stories that define the existing conflict mostly from a "security" standpoint, or a heavy-handed friend/enemy dialectic can be detrimental to pluralism in the public debate while also imposing a framework that excludes critics of European institutional policy.In both the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, the European Union is moving in a scenario of tension between countering the influence of external actors while keeping the enlargement process at a standstill; wanting to foster a stronger, pluralist, civil society while opting for a more homogenous discourse that might robustly counteract the Russian discourse; and taking actions against disinformation while guaranteeing freedom of expression in a context of scarce resources and the protracted nature of the military conflict in Ukraine.Co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Education and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA). Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.DigiDem-EU - Digital Democracies: At the intersection between technology, democracy and rights in the EU (Grant Agreement 101140646)Keywords: Disinformation, enlargement, EU, Western Balkans, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Serbia, FIMI, narratives, Kremlin, fact-checkers, Slovakia

Z uporabo socialno-konstruktivističnega koncepta preteklosti, kot ga je uvedel Maurice Halbwachs (Assmann, 2008, str. 55) in spojem politične znanosti ter kulturno-spominskih študij, se moje delo osredotoča na interdiscplinarno raziskovanje nostalgije. Disertacija tako konceptualizira nostalgijo kot enega izmed izrazov spornosti, na podlagi ovrednotenja pomena čustev (Nussbaum, 2013 ; Hassner, 2015) v političnem polju in priznavanja vzpona politik spornega (Tilly, 2006 ; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001 ; Tilly, 2008) v svetu, kjer uradni spominski diskurzi konstruirajo in rekonstruirajo zgodovino. Zanimanje za zgodovino obdobja socialistične Jugoslavije se je v zadnjem desetletju povečalo. To zanimanje, še posebno vsaka pozitivna refleksija o jugoslovanski izkušnji, je bila nemudoma označena za jugonostalgijo ; to vsezajemajočo frazo za vsakršno nenegativno sklicevanje na Jugoslavijo. Ob razpadu države je tisto, kar je bilo nekdaj hegemona socialistična spominska pripoved Jugoslavije, zamenjana z novo "demokratično", postsocialistično in antijugoslovansko spominsko pripovedjo: revizionističnim mainstream javnim diskurzom. S koncem drugega desetletja 21. stoletja v (post)jugoslovanskem prostoru, znotraj generacije zadnjih pionirjev, postane spominjanje se Jugoslavije subverzivno ter jugonostalgija izvor kognitivne disonance2 postsocialističnih subjektov. Na osnovah razumevanja jugonostalgije kot večsmerne (post)jugoslovanske pripovedi v iskanju prihodnosti skozi preteklost, sem glavno raziskovalno vprašanje oblikovala takole: Kaj pomeni jugonostalgija politično aktivnim zadnjim pionirjem in v kakšnem odnosu je z njihovimi političnimi identitetami? Moj glavni predmet raziskave so pripovedi generacije zadnjih pionirjev (rojenih med letoma 1974 in 1982) v treh (post)jugoslovanskih državah: Sloveniji, Hrvaški in Srbiji. Začenši s temo mojega zanimanja – jugonostalgija politično aktivnih zadnjih pionirjev – sem se poglobila v zbiranje podatkov, skozi politično etnografijo, intervjuje in opazovanja z udeležbo. Z namenskim vzorčenjem sem tekom leta 2017 in leta 2018 intervjuvala 62 političnih akterjev, upoštevajoč naslednje parametre: razumevanje koncepta "političnega aktivizma" čimbolj široko in razumljivo, ob čemer sem ga opredelila kot udejstvovanje pri konkretnih aktivnostih znotraj organizirane skupine za obdobje 6-ih mesecev oz. dlje. Obenem sem se izogibala metodološkemu nacionalizmu (Wimmer & Schiller, 2003), ki trdi, da so nacionalne države edine enote analize in naravne oblike skupnosti. Ne glede na to, sem s podatkovno analizo v okviru pristopa Constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2014) upoštevala specifične kontekste držav, ko so rezultati pokazali na divergenco, s tem, da sem omogočila oris konvergenčnih rezultatov, po generacijski in politični črti. Spomini na otroštvo zadnjih pionirjev so bili izhodišče za analizo, na podlagi katerih razkrijemo, kaj zanje pomeni biti otrok socializma. Očitno politično bolj socializirani znotraj 2 Kognitivne disonance je prvič konceptualiziral ameriški psiholog Leon Festinger (1957), ko je opisal situacijo, v kateri se soočamo s protislovnimi stališči, prepričanji in vedenji – v naših poskusih doseganja skladnosti vpeljujemo različne strategije za zmanjšanje mentalnega neugodja, ki se pojavi s spreminjanjem nekaterih od teh stališč, prepričanj in vedenj, njihovih družin kot znotraj šol, zadnji pionirji razumejo koncept jugoslovanske družine veliko bolj širše od "mešanega" zakona, ki ne zajema zgolj etnonacionalne raznolikosti, bodisi znotraj nuklearne ali razširjene družine, temveč tudi religiozne in politične raznolikosti ter družbene mobilnosti. Za desničarske intervjuvance je lastna politična socializacija bolj očitno povezana z dediščino staršev – vključno z zavedanjem o posameznikovi etnonacionalni pripadnosti. Razen teh nekaj primerov, se intervjuvanci ne spominjajo niti lastnega zavedanja etnonacionalnosti, niti medetničnih napetosti med skupnostmi. Zadnji pionirji, poleg tega, da soglasno priklicujejo spomine srečnega otroštva, kot največjo vrednoto izpostavljajo tudi raznolikost in bogastvo izkušenj, skupin in skupnosti, s katerimi simbolizirajo varno okolje možnosti in obilja, ki ni zgolj osredotočeno na potrošništvo. Koncept normalnega življenja je obarvan z idejo invero v napredek in varnost, ki jo zagotavlja funkcionalnost države. Razpad države zadnje pionirje sooči z občutkom nenadne izgube, kar vodi v nepredvidljivo zarezo v njihovih življenjih in vseobsegajoč trop, ki se pojavlja v vseh pričevanjih. Počasi se pojavljajo pripovedi o medetničnih odnosih ; diskriminacija zoper predpisane etnonacionalne skupnosti ali vsled političnim zvezam z JLA (Jugoslovansko ljudsko armado) postane resnična, še posebno v šolah. Skupne spomine v vseh treh državah zaznamuje odhajanje: intervjuvanci v številnih primerih zapuščajo svoje domove in postajajo begunci. Vojna travma je prinesla zmedo in poskuse »ovinkarjenja« intervjuvancev, da bi razumeli identitetne premike, pogosto z družinskimi prepiri, razdeljenimi družinami in načetimi prijateljstvi. Živo se spominjajo nove normalnosti nasilja, ki zaznamuje spomine v devetdesetih letih, pri čemer razlika med konteksti znotraj treh držav pridobiva na pomenu. Spomini na desetletje v Sloveniji se nanašajo na preostale jugoslovanske vojne, na Hrvaškem se poistovetijo z vojno ; v Srbiji se celotno desetletje iz devetdesetih označuje z vojnami ter političnim in ekonomskim propadom obeh držav ; s hkratnim minimaliziranjem travmatičnih izkušenj s trditvami, kot da 'ni bilo tako slabo'. Skozi razpravo o razpadu in vojnah so zadnji pionirji bolj naklonjeni temu, da se držijo revizionističnih hegemonih diskurzov. Ko premišljujejo o ideologijah sprave in rehabilitacije, ki jih vodijo mainstream diskurzi, zadnji pionirji prepoznavajo potrebo po dialogu in debati, a obenem zahtevajo uravnoteženo razpravo, ki ne bi vodila niti k revizionizmu niti k banalni nostalgiji, kot jo razumejo sami. Za generacijo zadnjih pionirjev so bili etnonacionalizmi in vojna vsiljeni od zgoraj navzdol s strani političnih elit, omogočale pa so jih številne vrste faktorjev, vključno s svetovnimi okoliščinami, kot so padec komunizma in interesi zunanjih sil v regiji. S priznavanjem novih politik spomina, ki so bile uvedene z etnonacionalizmi, zadnji pionirji ubirajo dve poti. Prva se nanaša na, razrešitev kognitivnih disonanc in ambivalentnosti skozi pripovedi o singularnosti – njihove izkušnje kot izjemne, posebne in edinstvene. Druga pot pa sledi priznavanju politično strateške in instrumentalizirane uporabe izraza jugonostalgija. Naposled zadnji pionirji (re)konstruirajo jugoslovanski prostor, ki ga še naprej doživljajo kot njihov (edini) dom, z Jadranskim morjem kot najprepoznavnejšim simbolom. Vendar je občutek doma močno vpet v jezikovno bližino, pri čemer se Kosovo večinoma pojavlja zunaj njihovega občutka doma. Brez dvomov o kulturnih ali ekonomskih aspektih (post)jugoslovanskega prostora, si skupno dojemanje negativne sedanjosti in posledic tranzicije delijo vse tri države vzdolž političnega spektra, četudi se med sredinskimi in desničarskimi političnimi akterji nekatere razlage naslanjajo na koncepte balkanizma in antikomunizma. Medtem ko se jugonostalgija dojema hkrati kot tista, ki ustvarja in zavira ustvarjalnost v sedanjih političnih bojih, se jugoslovanstvo razume kot pomemben element pri (ponovnem) zamišljanju političnega prostora današnjega sveta – brez zadržkov pri priznavanju njegovih prostorskih in kulturnih elementov. Jugonostalgija zadnjih pionirjev predvsem služi namenu upora zoper vsiljene diskontinuitete, s tem, ko postaja kolektiven in politični fenomen ; pionirjem generacijsko spreminja lokacijo ter novim levičarskim gibanjem in političnim strankam ustvarja politični potencial. Vzpon levičarskih gibanj širom (post)jugoslovanskega prostora in njihovega okrepljenega sodelovanja je vpeto v raziskovalno refleksijo tega, kar 'je enkrat bilo', z namenom vzpostavljanja nove politične ideje tistemu, kar 'bi enkrat lahko zopet postalo'. Rehabilitacija socialističnega ideološkega pozicioniranja se pogosto znajde vzporedno s skoraj avtomatičnim zanikanjem jugonostalgičnih pogledov, hkratnem repolitiziranju nostalgije, ter obenem tudi z emancipacijo odnosa do ideološke dediščine Zahoda ter s sprejemanjem jugoslovanske. Kljub vsemu nostalgija oblikuje generacijske skupnosti, ki se preoblikujejo v politične generacije ; s preoblikovanjem spomina za jugoslovanski namen v spomin z (post)jugoslovanskim namenom (Rigney, 2016) ter povratkom ideje o napredku in upanju v politično polje (post)Jugoslavije. Ker desničarske in sredinske politične izbire ostajajo vpete v koncepte nacionalnih držav in etnonacionalnistične vizije sveta, se novo levičarsko pozicioniranje obrača v smeri jugoslovanskih internacionalističnih refleksij. Z razumevanjem generacije kot ključne spremenljivke sem ugotovila, da generacija zadnjih pionirjev deli občutek za skupno razumevanje generacije in s tem prikazuje obstoječo skupno zavest v vseh treh državah ter kaže svoj večji vpliv na spominske pripovedi kot na politično pozicioniranje. Pripovedi o izgubljeni generaciji in skupen občutek nemoči, v preteklosti in sedanjosti, se pojavljajo v vseh mojih intervjujih. Intervjuvanci se jasno razmejujejo od generacije svojih staršev, za katere verjamejo, da so jim bila dana najboljša leta jugoslovanske preteklosti, ter od svojih otrok, za katere verjamejo, da ne delijo istih jugoslovanskih vrednot. V prostorskem smislu verjamejo, da njihova generacija vsekakor obstaja onkraj meja novonastalih nacionalnih držav, kar predstavlja še vedno obstoječi (post)jugoslovanski prostor. V danih prelomih med osebnimi spomini in mainstream spominskimi politikami se politično premika v (neslutene) prostore vsakdanjega življenja, kulturne nezavezanosti, intimnih prijateljstev in odnosov. S prikazom moči politične socializacije znotraj družin vsled izkušnjam vojne in vsakodnevnih izkušenj onkraj meja nacionalnih držav in etnonacionalnih skupnosti, pričujoča disertacija pomaga nadalje razumeti pomen vplivov na naše spominske pripovedi in našo politično pozicioniranje znotraj sprtih regij in zgodovin. Disertacija brez dokončne definicije jugonostalgije pokaže, kako instrumentalnost omenjenega termina in njegova uporaba v diskurzivnih strategijah zakriva jugoslovansko preteklost in kakršnokoli jugoslovansko prihodnost, posebno z ozirom na levičarske ideologije. Jugonostalgične spominske pripovedi zadnjih pionirjev zahtevajo identitetno kontinuiteto ter preoblikovanje heterogene skupnosti v zopet zamišljene, pri čemer sočasno iščejo lastno resnico o razpadu Jugoslavije. Politično produktivne kategorije se kažejo skozi različne aktivnosti – prenos osnovnih vrednot na posameznikove otroke predstavlja element aktivnega političnega življenja ; prav tako z vzpostavitvijo mrež sodelovanja med političnimi strankami v Sloveniji, na Hrvaškem in v Srbiji, ki temeljijo na ideološki orientiranosti tozadevnih strank in gibanj in ne na osnovi etnonacionalnih skupnosti. Ti novi solidarnostni kanali predstavljajo pomembno politično intervencijo v (post)jugoslovanskem svetu. Še en pomemben element aktivizma se pojavlja v nasprotovanju hegemonim diskurzom skozi obeleževanja dogodkov ali z javnimi diskurzi političnih akterjev. Pričujoča disertacija pokaže, kako neuspešen je vsak poskus kategorizacije nostalgije ; ne zato, ker se izogne našim zmožnostim, da bi razumeli multitude pomenskih slojev in pomene, ki jih vsebuje, temveč zato, ker se trudimo zanikati njen politični značaj. Ravno skozi politično subjektiviteto nostalgika oz. nostalgičarke, ki s svojimi vsebinami obarva nostalgijo, lahko prepoznamo naravo le-te. Namesto, da zavržemo nostalgijo kot apolitično, jo je potrebno repolitizirati ter s tem razširiti naše lastno razumevanje političnega polja v 21. stoletju. (Post)jugoslovanske spominske pripovedi zadnjih pionirjev nam dajejo vpogled v nove in še neraziskane politične imaginarije (post)jugoslovanskega prostora, ki bi jih lahko povzeli kot »Brez države, brez nacije – en prostor, ena identiteta«. ; Embracing the social-constructivist concept of the past, as introduced by Maurice Halbwachs (Assmann, 2008, p. 55), my research takes an interdisciplinary approach to nostalgia, bringing together political science and cultural memory studies. Valuing the importance of emotions (Nussbaum, 2013 ; Hassner, 2015) in the political field and acknowledging the ascent of contentious politics (Tilly, 2006 ; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001 ; Tilly, 2008), in a world where official memory discourses are constructing and reconstructing history, this thesis conceptualizes nostalgia as another contentious expression. The last decade has seen an increase in interest in the history of the socialist period in Yugoslavia. This interest in Yugoslavia and in particular, any positive reflection on the Yugoslav experience, was immediately marked as Yugonostalgia: a catch all phrase for any non negative reference to Yugoslavia. With the dissolution of the country, what was once the hegemonic socialist Yugoslav memory narrative was replaced with a new "democratic" post-socialist anti-Yugoslav memory narrative: the revisionist mainstream public discourse. In the (post)Yugoslav space, within the generation of the last pioneers, reminiscing about Yugoslavia became viewed as subversive, and Yugonostalgia as a refuge for post-socialist subjects' cognitive dissonances.1 Understanding Yugonostalgia as a multidirectional (post)Yugoslav narrative searching for the future through the past the main research question is as follows: What does Yugonostalgia mean for politically active last pioneers and how does it dialogue with their political identities? My primary object of research are the narratives of the generation of the last pioneers (born between 1974 and 1982), in three (post)Yugoslav countries: Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. Starting with a topic of interest – Yugonostalgia of politically active last pioneers – I dived into the data collection, through political ethnography, interviews and participant observation. Through purposive snowball sampling, over the course of 2017 and 2018, I interviewed 62 political actors within the following parameters: understanding "political activism" as wide and comprehensive as possible, whilst drawing a line at taking part in concrete activities within an organized group for 6 months or longer. Methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003), which asserts that nation-states are the only units of analysis and a natural form of community, was avoided. Nevertheless, data analysis within the Constructivist Grounded Theory approach (Charmaz, 2014) took into account the specific country context whenever results showed divergences, while allowing us to outline the convergences, along generational and the political lines. Departing from the analysis of the childhood memories of the last pioneers, we unravel what it means for them to be children of socialism. Apparently more politically socialized within their families than within schools, the last pioneers depict a concept of a Yugoslav family, understood in a much larger sense than the "mixed" marriage: encompassing not only the ethno-national diversity, within both nuclear and larger families, but also religious and political diversity, and social mobility. For the right-wing interviewees, their political 1 Cognitive dissonances were first conceptualized by Leon Festinger (1957), an American psychologist, describing a situation when we face contradicting attitudes, beliefs and behaviors – in our attempts to achieve consistency we implement various strategies to lower the mental discomfort that appears through altering some of those attitudes, beliefs and behaviors, socialization is always evidently linked with their paternal heritage, including the awareness of one's ethno-nationality. Other than afew examples, the interviewees have recollection of neither their own awareness of ethno-nationality nor any interethnic tensions between the communities. Their childhood memories, besides being unanimously depicted as happy childhoods, paint the diversity and the richness of various experiences, groups and communities as the biggest value ; symbolizing a secure environment, providing possibilities and abundance, not solely focused on consumption. The concept of 'a normal life' is colored by the idea and the faith in progress and security, provided by the functionality of the state. The dissolution of the country confronts the last pioneers with a sense of a sudden loss, leading into the unforeseen overnight rupture of their lives, an overarching trope appearing in all narratives. The narratives on the interethnic relations slowly appear. Discrimination against assigned ethno-national communities or parents' professional association with JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) becomes a reality, most notably in schools. Shared memories in all three countries are marked by everybody leaving and, in a number of cases, with the interviewees leaving their homes and becoming refugees. The war trauma brought confusion and meandering attempts by the interviewees to understand these identitarian shifts, often within family quarrels, familial divisions and disrupted friendships. A new normality of violence is recalled vividly, marking the memory on the 1990s. The difference in contexts within the three countries gains traction. As memories of the decade in Slovenia refer to the rest of the Yugoslav wars, for Croatia they are identified with the war and, in Serbia, the whole decade of the 1990s is a marker for wars and the political and economic destruction of the country. Still, all the interviewees were minimizing the traumatic experiences through assertions that, 'it was not that bad'. Discussing the dissolution and the wars, the last pioneers become more prone to adhering to the revisionist hegemonic discourses. Reflecting upon the reconciliation and rehabilitation mainstream discourses, the last pioneers recognize the need for dialogue and debate but also demand a balanced discussion, which avoids both revisionism and banal nostalgia, as they understand it. For the generation of the last pioneers, ethno-nationalisms and the war were imposed top-down by the then political elites and made possible by a large number of various factors, including the global circumstances of the fall of communism and foreign powers' interests in the region. Acknowledging the new memory politics that were introduced with ethno-nationalisms, the last pioneers take upon two paths: first, resolution of cognitive dissonances and ambivalences through the narratives of singularity, with understanding their experience as exceptional, particular and unique ; second, recognizing the political strategic and instrumental use of the term Yugonostalgia. Finally, the last pioneers (re)construct the Yugoslav space, which they continue to feel as their (only) home with the Adriatic Sea being its most prominent symbol. Yet, the feeling of home is largely embedded in the linguistic proximity, leaving Kosovo mostly outside. Without questioning the cultural and economic aspects of the (post)Yugoslav space, a shared perception of the negative present and the consequences of transition transpires in the three countries and across the political spectrum, even if among the center and right-wing political actors some of the explanations relay on the concepts of Balkanism and anticommunism. While Yugonostalgia is perceived as equally producing and obstructing creativity in the present political struggles, Yugoslavism is understood as an important element of the re-imagining of the political space in today's world - acknowledging without hesitation its spatial and cultural elements. Yugonostalgia of the last pioneers primarily serves the purpose of resisting the imposed discontinuity, becoming a collective and a political phenomenon. Generationally changing the location, it finds itself engendering the political potential notably for the new left-wing movements and political parties. The rise of the left-wing movements throughout the (post)Yugoslav space, and their enhanced cooperation, is embedded in investigative reflection into how 'it was once' in order to establish the new political ideas for how it 'can be once again'. Rehabilitation of the socialist ideological positioning often finds itself in parallel with the almost automatic denial of Yugonostalgic views, simultaneously repoliticizing nostalgia, whilst also emancipating from the Western ideological heritage through embracing the Yugoslav one. Nostalgia forges generational communities who are transforming into political generations, transforming the memory of the Yugoslav cause into a memory with a (post)Yugoslav cause (Rigney, 2016), bringing back the idea of progress and hope into the political field of (post)Yugoslavia. As the right-wing and center political choices remain embedded in the concepts of nation-states and ethno-national vision of the world, the new left-wing positionalities turn to internationalist Yugoslav reflections. Understanding generation as a key variable, I have established that the generation of the last pioneers shares a sense of a generation, displaying an existing shared consciousness in all three countries and showing stronger influence on memory narratives than political positionality. The narratives of a lost generation, and the shared sentiment of helplessness in the past and in the present appear in all of my interviews. They clearly delineate themselves from the generation of their parents, for whom they believe that they were given the best years of the Yugoslav past, and their children, whom they believe, do not share the same Yugoslav values. In spatial terms, they believe their generation indeed exists beyond the borders of the newly created nation-states, representing the still existing (post)Yugoslav space. Given the fractures between personal memories and mainstream memory politics, the political shifts into (unsuspected) places of everyday life, cultural attachments, intimate friendships and relationships. Showing the strength of political socialization within families over the experience of war and, further on, the strength of the everyday experience across the borders of new nation-states and ethno-national communities through stable emotional networks and connections, within and outside the families – friend or professional networks and traveling. This thesis helps further understand the important influences on our memory narratives and our political positionality within contentious regions and histories ; without providing a final definition of Yugonostalgia, this thesis shows the instrumentality of the term and its use as a discursive strategy for obscuring the Yugoslav past and any Yugoslav future, especially regarding left-wing ideologies. The Yugonostalgic memory narratives of the last pioneers demand an identitarian continuity and make the heterogeneous communities again imaginable, while searching for their own truth about the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Politically productive categories manifest through numerous activities: transmission of basic values to one's children as much asthrough establishment of cooperation networks between political parties in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, based on the ideological orientation of the parties and movements in question, rather than on the basis of ethno-national communities. These new solidarity channels represent an important political intervention in the (post)Yugoslav world. Another important element of activism appears as opposition to the hegemonic discourses through commemoration events or the public discourses of the political actors. The thesis shows how any attempt to categorize nostalgia fails ; and not because it evades our capacity to understand the multitude of layers and meanings it comprehends, but because we try to deny its political character. It is precisely through the political subjectivity of the nostalgic, who colors his/her nostalgia by its contents, that we can identify the nature of nostalgia. Instead of discarding nostalgia as apolitical, we need to reinstate it as the political and thus expand our own understanding of the political field in the 21st century. The (post)Yugoslav memory narratives of the last pioneers give us an insight into new and unexplored political imaginaries of the (post)Yugoslav space that could be summarized as "No state, no nation – one space, one identity" and the future possibilities of the left-wing imaginaries.

Il lavoro prende in considerazione i principali avvenimenti che hanno influenzato l'evoluzione economica finanziaria del nostro Paese nella crisi del cambio 1992,ho voluto concentrare l'attenzione sugli avvenimenti a partire dal 1979 e analizzando l'intervento delle autorità monetarie. Allora non esisteva l'Euro, esisteva il Sistema Monetario Europeo con una sorta di valuta di riferimento, l'ECU, a cui le varie valute nazionali aderenti al sistema dovevano stare agganciate, entro una percentuale di scostamento non superiore al 2,25% per alcune e al 6% per altre, fra cui la lira. La Germania vantava di un'economia più solida di altri, con un sistema produttivo di avanguardia e con una moneta forte che faceva da riferimento per tutte le economie. L'Italia aveva un' economia che si doveva adattare continuamente alle conseguenze di una gestione del paese sconsiderata, miope e orientata al breve termine, frutto di una incompetenza della classe politica. Nel marzo 1979, l'Italia aveva aderito al Sistema Monetario Europeo, una decisione orientata, insieme con la politica estera, al rafforzamento dei vincoli comunitari nell'intento di dar luogo alla creazione di un'Europa Unita; consapevoli che questa sarebbe stata una scelta più di carattere politico che economica. L'adesione allo Sme avvenne in un clima di divergenza, Paolo Baffi allora governatore della Banca d'Italia, faceva infatti presente che una valuta debole come la lira, avrebbe trovato difficoltà ad abbandonare il regime delle svalutazioni facile. diversi economisti, oltre a Baffi,al di là di dove sedessero, se in Parlamento come Luigi Spaventa o alla direzione della Banca d'Italia o ancora all'interno del governo come Rinaldo Ossola, sostenevano la loro contrarietà all'ingresso nel Sistema Monetario Europeo, esponendo motivazioni tra loro eterogenee. Tutti si attendevano che il vincolo esterno dei cambi stabili costringesse il paese a seguire una politica di rigorosa stabilità monetaria. L'Italia aveva ottenuto il privilegio di una banda di oscillazione del 6%, contro il 2,5% degli altri paesi, ma tutti intendevano che l'adesione all'accordo di cambio avrebbe imposto una politica di rientro all'inflazione. Contro le aspettative generali, l'inflazione proseguì invece più violenta di prima. Il tasso di cambio, assunse con l'avanzare del progetto unitario una significatività crescente, aggiungendo alla sua funzione di strumento di orientamento, quella di fattore di credibilità. Le autorità monetarie italiane non accettarono mai una svalutazione esterna della lira pari a quella interna. Fra il 1980 e il 1987, i riallineamenti di parità nell'ambito dello Sme si susseguirono numerosi e coinvolsero numerose valute. Ogni riallineamento segnò una svalutazione della lira rispetto al marco. Dopo il 1987, i riallineamenti vennero sospesi e il corso della lira subì un solo ritocco al ribasso, in occasione del rientro della banda stretta. La politica di fatto seguita fu dunque quella di una graduale rivalutazione della lira, in termini reali, rispetto al marco. All'inizio degli anni novanta venne firmato il trattato di Maastricht, il contenuto degli accordi si inseriva in un contesto politico- sociale interno altamente critico, nel quale le energie politiche a lungo represse dalla guerra fredda si erano liberate, grazie al crollo del Muro di Berlino, spingendo quindi gli equilibri del sistema politico e economico con una rottura che si verificò del tutto nel 1992. Se il processo d'integrazione europeo era stato spesso rappresentato dalla classe politica come una sorta di panacea alle tare italiane, a Maastricht, si celebrò l'innocenza dell'europeismo italiano che vide stravolgere e crollare la visione retorica con la quale aveva guardato alla costruzione europea a partire degli anni '70. Per la storia dell'integrazione europea, il trattato di Maastricht rappresenta una pietra miliare, anche se con l'entrata in vigore ha creato ancora più instabilità, in quanto caratterizzato da uno scarso realismo degli obiettivi di convergenza delle variabili macroeconomiche, da mancanza flessibilità e insieme da asimmetrie dei comportamenti possibili delle banche centrali. La scena economica internazionale era segnata da: tendenze divergenti dei tassi di interesse, al ribasso negli Stati Uniti per rilanciare l'economia, al rialzo in Germania per gli effetti dell'unificazione tedesca, con conseguenti indebolimenti del dollaro, rafforzamento del marco, tensione nello Sme; le incertezze circa il completamento della unificazione monetaria in Europa, quale è stata sancita nel trattato di Maastricht. Questi sviluppi esterni coglievano l'economia italiana in una fase di attività produttiva debole, inflazione in lenta discesa, squilibri irrisolti nella finanza pubblica. Tra gli accadimenti che sono susseguiti, sono da richiamare i seguenti: l'esito negativo del referendum danese sul trattato di Maastricht del 2 giugno, infatti il referendum di Copenaghen si conclude al fotofinish (50,7%) di no contro il (49,3%) di si; mancata riduzione dei tassi di interesse in Germania; voci di svalutazione della lira; rialzo dei tassi ufficiali in Germania. Nel corso dell'anno 1992 si assiste a una piena recessione, infatti con il debito pubblico al 105,5 del Pil, con un fabbisogno attorno al 10,4 del Pil, con il passivo della bilancia dei pagamenti di parte corrente in crescita, la crisi era alle porte. Il 6 giugno la Banca d'Italia aumenta il tasso sulle anticipazioni a scadenza fissa di mezzo punto percentuale, irrigidendo così la politica monetaria, Moody's mise sotto controllo l'Italia per la sua incapacità nella riduzione del debito pubblico. Il 29 giugno il cambio contro il marco arrivò a 756,54 a fronte di una sostanziale stabilità nei confronti della sterlina e della peseta, Amato per effettuare un risanamento economico annunciò il 5 luglio la manovra da 30000 miliardi di lire, e con quella successiva di 100000 miliardi dà inizio al risanamento finanziario del Paese. Le vicende relative alle turbolenze che hanno sconvolto le parità valutarie dei paesi aderenti allo Sme hanno avuto inizio con la svalutazione del 7% della lira, la quale appariva quasi un riallineamento da manuale. Il 21 settembre, la Banca d'Italia, annunciò che le autorità monetarie si sarebbero astenute all'effettuare la quotazione ufficiale della lira. Questo fu un colpo durissimo per l'Italia che fino a quella data, aveva fatto del cambio della lira l'architrave della sua politica economica e finanziaria, sostenendo pesanti oneri in termini di riserve valutarie, infatti tra il giugno e il settembre vennero impiegate 53000 miliardi di riserve; colpo durissimo anche per la Comunità, colpita al cuore proprio nello strumento fondamentale, lo SME, investito nel ruolo di preparare e garantire le condizioni di stabilità, generalizzata e consolidata, che avrebbero dovuto, poi consentire quel salto di qualità dell'Europa, con il decollo della Unione Economica e monetaria, la moneta unica e il sistema delle banche centrali europee. Successivamente le tensioni speculative investono la lira , la sterlina e la peseta: momento in cui Italia e Gran Bretagna annunciano di uscire dagli Accordi europei di cambio. Subito dopo la svalutazione del 1992, si aprì un periodo di svalutazione generale della lira rispetto alle altre monete, periodo che si protrasse all'incirca fino al marzo 1993. Tra il 1992 e 1993 vennero firmati due accordi triangolari il protocollo Amato 31 luglio 1992 che abolì il sistema di scala mobile, completato da Ciampi nel luglio 1993, con la quale si fissarono gli obiettivi comuni di politica di reddito. Dopo di allora la lira rimase agganciata al dollaro. Il legame fra lira e dollaro potrebbe essere frutto dell'agire spontaneo dei mercati, ma potrebbe anche essere scaturito dalla decisione delle autorità monetarie italiane di ritornare alla vecchia linea di cambio differenziato, già seguita negli anni prima del 1979, fino all'ingresso dello Sme. Il problema essenziale delle autorità di governo era quello di evitare che la svalutazione esterna della lira si traducesse in inflazione importata, l'aver agganciato la lira al dollaro può essere inteso come una misura ragionevolmente coerente con l'obiettivo della stabilità monetaria. Di certo che la svalutazione della lira non ha contribuito alla soluzione del problema economico italiano, ha rischiato di aggravarlo producendo perdita di credibilità per il Paese. La crisi del sistema monetario europeo ha favorito una ripresa dei dibattiti teorici sui modelli di crisi valutarie, che si distinguono tra prima e seconda generazione, quelli di prima collegano l'emergere della crisi all'incompatibilità tra politiche macroeconomiche e stabilità del cambio; quelli di seconda, il cui sviluppo è stato stimolato dagli stessi fatti del 1992, nella quale l'emergere di una crisi appare come una scelta endogena, effettuata dalle autorità in base alle proprie preferenze e all'interazione con gli agenti economici privati. Analizzando i modelli si può concludere che mentre la rappresentazione di un regime di cambio fisso per mezzo di un livello puntuale del cambio non rappresenta un limite interpretativo rilevante, le ipotesi relative al processo di espansione del credito e all'esistenza di un livello di soglia delle riserve, nei modelli di Krugman, non sembrano dar conto adeguatamente della realtà dei fenomeni economici. I modelli di prima generazione danno una spiegazione "fondamentalista" delle crisi nel senso che fanno risalire la crisi allo sfasamento dei fondamentali macroeconomici dell'economia, in particolare l'esistenza di politiche fiscali espansive e prolungati deficit di bilancio incompatibili con un impegno di cambio fisso. I modelli di seconda generazione sottolineano il comportamento ottimizzante del policy-maker che non subisce più la crisi, ma decide di avviarla perché tale scelta minimizza i costi, nel senso che i costi in termini di reputazione a cui il governo va incontro uscendo dall'impegno sono comunque minori dei costi di rimanere in termini di incremento dei tassi di interesse e riduzione delle riserve valutarie. I modelli di terza generazione pongono enfasi sulla presenza di squilibri di natura finanziaria con la conseguenza che delle crisi valutarie non sono più viste come fenomeni a sé stanti ma come parte di una crisi sistemica in cui le crisi valutarie e bancarie si autoalimentano. Le ipotesi di perfetta previsione, d'altra parte, implicano che la razionalità degli agenti sia tale da non permette il realizzarsi di peso problem, i quali invece vengono osservati nella realtà. (Riassunto tradotto in inglese) Labour takes into account the main events that influenced the financial economic development of our country in the 1992 exchange rate crisis, I wanted to focus on the events since 1979 and analysing the intervention of the monetary authorities. At that time there was no euro, there was the European Monetary System with a kind of reference currency, the ECU, to which the various national currencies participating in the system had to be hooked, within a variance rate of no more than 2.25% for some and 6% for others, including the lira. Germany boasted of an economy stronger than others, with a state-of-the-art production system and a strong currency that was the benchmark for all economies. Italy had an economy that had to adapt continuously to the consequences of a reckless, short-sighted and short-term management of the country, the result of an incompetence of the political class. In March 1979, Italy had joined the European Monetary System, a decision aimed, together with foreign policy, at strengthening EU ties in order to create a united Europe; aware that this would be a more political than an economic choice. The accession to the Sme took place in a climate of divergence, Paolo Baffi then governor of the Bank of Italy, in fact, pointed out that a weak currency such as the lira, would find it difficult to abandon the regime of devaluations easy. several economists, in addition to Baffi, beyond where they sat, whether in Parliament as Luigi Spaventa or at the management of the Bank of Italy or even within the government as Rinaldo Ossola, argued their opposition to entry into the European Monetary System, exposing heterogeneous motivations among themselves. Everyone expected that the external constraint of stable exchange rates would force the country to follow a policy of strict monetary stability. Italy had obtained the privilege of a 6% swing band, compared with 2.5% in the other countries, but all wanted that accession to the exchange agreement would impose a policy of returning to inflation. Against general expectations, however, inflation continued more violent than before. The exchange rate, as the unitary project progressed, became increasingly significant, adding to its role as a guideline, that of a credibility factor. The Italian monetary authorities never accepted an external devaluation of the lira equal to the internal one. Between 1980 and 1987, the realignments of parity within the Sme followed numerous and involved numerous currencies. Each realignment marked a devaluation of the lira against the mark. After 1987, the realignments were suspended and the course of the lira underwent only one downward adjustment, on the occasion of the return of the narrow band. The policy followed was therefore that of a gradual revaluation of the lira, in real terms, with respect to the mark. At the beginning of the 1990s the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the content of the agreements was part of a highly critical internal political-social context, in which political energies long repressed by the Cold War had been freed, thanks to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, thus pushing the balance of the political and economic system with a break that occurred entirely in 1992. If the process of European integration had often been portrayed by the political class as a kind of panacea to the Italian tare, in Maastricht, the innocence of Italian Europeanism was celebrated, which saw the rhetorical vision with which it had looked to the construction of Europe since the 1970s, overturned and collapsed. For the history of European integration, the Maastricht Treaty represents a milestone, although with the entry into force it has created even more instability, as it is characterized by a lack of realism in the convergence objectives of macroeconomic variables, lack of flexibility and at the same time as asymmetries of the possible behaviour of central banks. The international economic scene was marked by: divergent trends in interest rates, downwards in the United States to boost the economy, up in Germany due to the effects of unification Germany, resulting in a weakening of the dollar, a strengthening of the mark, tension in the SME; The uncertainty about the completion of monetary unification in Europe, as enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, is. These external developments caught the Italian economy in a period of weak production activity, slow-falling inflation, unresolved imbalances in public finances. Among the events that have followed, the following are to be recalled: the negative outcome of the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty of 2 June, in fact the Copenhagen referendum ends at photofinish (50.7%) no versus (49.3%) yes; failure to reduce interest rates in Germany; rumours of the valuation of the lira; official interest rates in Germany. During the year 1992 there is a full recession, in fact with public debt at 105.5 of GDP, with a requirement around 10.4 of GDP, with the passive of the current account balance growing, the crisis was upon us. On 6 June, the Bank of Italy increased the rate on fixed-term advances by half a percentage point, thus tightening monetary policy, and Moody's brought Italy under control for its inability to reduce public debt. On 29 June, the exchange rate against the mark reached 756.54 in the face of substantial stability against the pound and the peseta, Amato to carry out an economic recovery announced on 5 July the maneuver of 30000 billion lre, and with the next one of 100000 billion begins the financial consolidation of the country. The events surrounding the turmoil that have disrupted the currency parities of the SME member countries began with the devaluation of 7% of the lira, which appeared to be almost a textbook realignment. On 21 September, the Bank of Italy announced that the monetary authorities would refrain from making the official listing of the lira. This was a very serious blow for Italy, which until that date had made the lira change the backbone of its economic and financial policy, bearing heavy burdens in terms of foreign exchange reserves, in fact between June and September 53 trillion reserves were used; It is also a very serious blow for the Community, which has been struck at the heart by the fundamental instrument, the EMS, which has been invested in the role of preparing and guaranteeing the conditions of stability, generalised and consolidated, which should have allowed Europe to jump in quality, with the take-off of the Economic and Monetary Union, the single currency and the system of European central banks. Subsequently, speculative tensions hit the lira, sterling and peseta, when Italy and Great Britain announced they were leaving the European Exchange Agreements. Immediately after the devaluation of 1992, a period of general devaluation of the lira against the other currencies opened up, which lasted approximately until March 1993. Between 1992 and 1993, two triangular agreements were signed, the Amato protocol on 31 July 1992, which abolished the escalator system, which was completed by Ciampi in July 1993, which set common income policy objectives. After that, the lira remained pegged to the dollar. The link between the lira and the dollar may be the result of the spontaneous action of the markets, but it could also have stemmed from the decision of the Italian monetary authorities to return to the old differentiated exchange line, which was already followed in the years before 1979, until the entry of the Sme. The main problem of the government authorities was to prevent the external devaluation of the lira from translating into imported inflation, the having pegged the lira to the dollar can be understood as a measure reasonably consistent with the objective of monetary stability. Certainly the devaluation of the lira did not contribute to the solution of the Italian economic problem, it risked aggravating it, producing a loss of credibility for the country. The crisis in the European monetary system has encouraged a resumption of theoretical debates on currency crisis patterns, which stand out between the first and second generations, those of first generation link the emergence of the crisis to the incompatibility between macroeconomic policies and exchange rate stability; Second, the development of which was stimulated by the same events of 1992, in which the emergence of a crisis appears to be a choice "It's not just a way of using private economic agents," he said. By analysing the models, it can be concluded that while the representation of a fixed exchange rate regime by means of a timely exchange rate does not represent a relevant interpretive limit, assumptions about the credit expansion process and the existence of a level of reserve threshold, in Krugman's models, do not seem to adequately account for the reality of economic phenomena. First-generation models give a "fundamentalist" explanation of crises in the sense that the crisis is traced back to the shift in macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy, in particular the existence of expansionary fiscal policies and prolonged budget deficits incompatible with a fixed exchange rate commitment. The second-generation models emphasize the optimising behaviour of the policy-maker who is no longer suffering from the crisis, but decides to start it because this choice minimizes costs, in the sense that the reputation costs that the government faces by exiting the commitment are still lower than the costs of staying in terms of raising interest rates and reducing currency reserves. Third-generation models place emphasis on financial imbalances, with the consequence that currency crises are no longer seen as stand-alone phenomena but as part of a systemic crisis in which currency and banking crises feed themselves. The hypotheses of perfect prediction, on the other hand, imply that the rationality of the agents is such that it does not allow the realization of weight problem, which instead are observed in reality.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic securityAgainst this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic securityThe new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union?In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead.ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic securityAgainst this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic securityThe new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union?In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead.ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

This summary report is based on the main conclusions of two panel discussions on foreign policy held at CIDOB on September 21st, 2023, as part of the project "Japan and the EU: Global partners for a secure and open Indo-Pacific". The document assesses the changing international environment and its impact on relations between the European Union (EU) and Japan. It goes on to highlight two new forms of security – economic and information security – that are a cause of concern for both partners and which open up new possibilities for joint action. It concludes by noting the new cooperation dynamics between Tokyo and Brussels and what the future holds for them.I. IntroductionThe current international order is under challenge from a confluence of enduring trends the pace of which has been quickened more recently by a series of critical events that only underline the international system's shortcomings and contradictions.The first of these events was the COVID-19 pandemic, which provided multiple examples of the fragility of global supply chains and the dependence on manufactured goods imported from China, often essential goods. The pandemic acted as an accelerator for at least three major long-term trends that were already underway. The first of these was the confrontation between the major international powers, the United States and China. They went from being partners for development to considering themselves competitors and, on certain matters, systemic rivals. Some commentators say there was already an underlying trend towards decoupling prior to the pandemic, acknowledging that the Chinese market was looking to replace imports with local products (increasing the US or German trade deficit) and two independent digital spheres were forming, tethered to two diverging socio-political models (García-Herrero, 2023). The pandemic, however, saw the strategic contest over international ascendancy and shaping norms and alliances step up a notch.The trend towards the securitisation of technology and innovation has also gained momentum in the wake of the pandemic. This was clear during the race to create and produce a vaccine against the coronavirus. Nonetheless, both before – with the disputes over 5G networks or industrial espionage – and after – in the framework of what has been called the "chip war" – we witnessed the rise of an increasingly strategic association between big tech corporations and the security of states. Taiwan is a prime example. One single firm, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), acts as a deterrent to any potential invasion of the island because it alone dominates the global market for the most advanced chips. Recent international conflicts, first in Ukraine and more lately in Gaza, have hastened this trend towards the technologisation of economic, political and social relations. Cyberwarfare, drones, satellites and grassroots innovation (or lack thereof) are elements that can make the difference between victory and defeat. We are witnessing the new nature of "hybrid wars", those that combine physical military operations with cybernetic action. They are not only fought on the battlefield, rather they involve the mass use of disinformation or cyberattacks that seek to undermine the values of the adversary and the legitimacy of their political systems; or in the case of a war, undermine their confidence and operability. In this type of conflict, the aim is not so much victory but destabilisation (Bargués and Bourekba, 2022).As well as this technological offshoot, the two conflicts are reinforcing the self-image of what are termed the Global North and South, which resonates through the main debates on economic development, international justice or the fight against climate change. Several votes at the United Nations and the imposition of sanctions on Russia have revealed greater coordination of agendas around the narrative of the "decline of the West" and the realisation that there is scope to increase the gains of middle powers and transnational corporations.While Japan and the EU are different in nature (one is a regional actor, the other a state) they share common ground: democracy, respect for a multipolar, rules-based international order that is peaceful and prosperous, plus many of the challenges mentioned at the start of this paper.II. New security dynamics: disinformation and economic security Against this backdrop of transformation of the international system and acceleration of the geopolitical competition, new forms of (in)security have appeared on the agendas of Japan and the EU, but also of other international powers like China, the United States or India. We are talking about disinformation and economic security, two increasingly central elements of Japan and the EU's conception of security.DisinformationThe rapid succession of technological breakthroughs of recent years, along with the growing development of artificial intelligence (AI), the digital transition and the rise of disinformation have laid bare the exploitation of new technology and the challenges it poses to the security and the future of states. In times of crisis, we have seen how disinformation becomes a "weapon of mass infoxication" on the margins of international law, which comes at a relatively low cost and prevents effective governance. Though not a new phenomenon – propaganda was crucial during the Cold War, for instance – viral media and the current porousness of social networks have amplified their potential as a weapon in the narrative war in the hands of external actors. The emergence of generative AI, moreover, not only raises the possibility of an "alternative account" of the facts, but rather enables credibly recreating the facts and even replacing them in people's perception of reality (through deep fakes). This threatens notions of truth and trust, which are essential to democratic governance and election processes.Unlike the EU and the United States, Japan has not been significantly exposed to outside interference in the shape of disinformation. But Tokyo considers this phenomenon a potential threat to national security and democratic health. Namely, the rise of generative AI could quickly break down some of the barriers, such as the language factor, which certain analysts had identified as having put a brake on the proliferation of this phenomenon on the archipelago (Kuwahara, 2022). Thus, in the framework of the National Security Strategy launched in late 2022 by the Kishida administration, Japan identified the challenge of the manipulation of information in situations of conflict and announced the adoption of countermeasures. The government is the chief instigator (top-down action) through coordination with its counterparts in other countries (government-to-government) and non-governmental actors.In the case of the EU, the destabilising effect of disinformation reached new heights during the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. It is the reason why, nearly a decade ago now, its greater exposure to this type of campaign prompted Brussels to begin to pursue strategies to respond to this hybrid threat. Since then, Brussels has tried to tackle disinformation via a consumer-based rather than security-centred approach. Initially, the European Commission focused its efforts on controlling content rather than trying to regulate tech companies and the major platforms. That approach has shifted, however, with the realisation that the problem of disinformation is not so much the message as its replication and amplification. This shift in focus also counters one of the main risks of focusing on the message, which is that it jeopardises the right to freedom of expression. It is with this rationale that the Digital Services Act (DSA) entered into force in January 2024. It contains specific provisions to control algorithms, which are responsible for "clustering" potentially like-minded social media users, which in turn is key for the propagation of the message through information bubbles and echo chambers.Action that is limited exclusively to algorithmic governance, however, falls short in the face of the complexity of the sociopsychological processes involved in disinformation (Colomina, 2022). With that in mind, the EU has adopted a whole-of-society approach that recognises that it is essential to combine online action with offline measures – in the real world – that mitigate the inequalities, divisions and social fractures that disinformation thrives on. Thus, while the Japanese approach has prioritised government-to-government exchange, a more decentralised strategy prevails in Brussels, where other social sectors, such as journalists, fact checkers, researchers and civil society, play an extremely important role in lockstep with the efforts at the highest level. The EU's decentralised approach to confronting disinformation suits the fragmented media landscape of the 27 member states, which differs from the high degree of concentration in the case of Japan, where large print and television media are the main channels of information. Economic security The new dynamics of reglobalisation, coupled with a return to protectionist measures, the exploitation of interdependencies and economic coercion, are shaping a new global economic landscape in which open economies and interdependence have come to be seen as risks rather than factors of mutual security. Consequently, "economic security" is gaining ground in the national strategies of countries like Japan, one of its chief proponents. While there is no one single definition of economic security, nor of the areas it encompasses, in general terms it seeks to protect a national economy from external interference, minimising the impact of supply chain disruptions, dependence on certain products or the capacity for economic coercion in the hands of others to bring pressure to bear or influence domestic political decisions.Japan has been an early advocate of this concept, which, aside from its habit of putting forward terms that then become all the rage in strategic thinking, can be put down to its insular nature and its heavy dependence on imported commodities and natural resources. Starting in 2020, Tokyo has begun a process of institutionalising economic security through the creation of government positions assigned to this task, as well as the adoption of various legislative packages to ensure its defence. One of the main ones is the Economic Security Promotion Act of 2022, which rests on four key pillars: 1) strengthening supply chains, especially of critical raw materials, 2) security of critical and core infrastructure, 3) developing advanced technology and 4) a patent non-disclosure system. At the same time, Japan has transferred the concept to its bilateral relations – with the United States, South Korea or the United Kingdom – and the fora in which it participates, like the G7 or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The G7 statement on economic resilience and economic security during the Hiroshima summit in May 2023 was particularly important. It was the first ever reference to the concept in the multilateral sphere, which is a measure of its consolidation on the agenda and in international cooperation.At the same time, these economic security initiatives are indirectly linked to Tokyo's proposal for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), a strategy unveiled in 2016 that aims to safeguard the rules-based international order, promote peace and shared prosperity, maritime and air security, and develop connectivity in the region. It is hard to disassociate this approach from Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and the need to preserve freedom of navigation through this vital artery for Japan and the rest of the world, as approximately a third of global trade flows through it. Although the FOIP's principles of openness and inclusivity could be seen to be at odds with economic security – particularly given the economic rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo in the region – cooperation in this field depends on a free and open region, and vice versa. What is more, it is through greater development of connectivity and exchange with the countries of the region (including the ASEAN members and India) that Tokyo can diversify its trade portfolio and boost its economic resilience.The EU too has adopted the principle of economic security in the last year. Supply chain disruptions during the pandemic, the closure of the Russian gas tap after the invasion of Ukraine and the restriction on imports that China imposed on Lithuania following the opening of a representative office in Taiwan in 2021 are powerful incentives for the adoption of instruments to safeguard the EU's economic security. Among the various measures adopted, four types of mechanism stand out: 1) the revitalisation of industrial policy and the adoption of political initiatives to improve EU production capacity and productivity; 2) diversification and stockpiling efforts to reduce dependence on products and natural resources; 3) the adoption of measures to counter external mechanisms that give competitors the edge, such as anti-subsidy measures; and 4) tools devoted to strategic competition, like the anti-coercion instrument or controls on exports of certain products (Burguete, 2023). More recently, in January 2024, Brussels launched new initiatives aimed at reinforcing its Economic Security Strategy, put forward for the first time in June 2023. With a more geopolitical approach akin to that of Washington, Brussels is seeking tighter control over investments, greater coordination in the control of exports, investment for research into advanced technologies and the protection of innovation. It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the different member states will accept this new legislative package.We can say that Japan and the EU are adopting different, though complementary, mechanisms that can boost domestic capacities to address the challenges ahead of them. Yet, while we can note progress in the field of economic security – as we shall see below – cooperation in the field of disinformation remains at an earlier stage. There is, however, huge potential for bilateral cooperation, and there are powerful incentives for it.III. A new era of cooperation between Japan and the European Union? In the last two decades relations between the EU and Japan have been marked by a considerable degree of mutual understanding, with a predominance of economic matters, despite the trade tensions and conflicts towards the end of the 20th century. Yet this has yielded limited results in terms of joint initiatives and plans (Tanaka, 2013). In 2022, Japan was the EU's second biggest trading partner in Asia, behind China, and the seventh globally. That same year Japanese imports into the EU came to nearly €70bn, while EU exports the other way amounted to over €71.6bn (European Commission, 2023).As far as security is concerned, progress has been slow, fettered by Japan's constitutional constraints, which place restrictions on its military capabilities, and, on the European side, owing to its complex security framework and its partial overlap with NATO. Until a few years ago, cooperation in this area had been limited to "softer" forms of security such as antipiracy operations off Somalia. It is worth recalling that in the case of both the EU and Japan traditional security (the military aspect) falls to the United States, since both actors are eminently economic powers but lacking in comparable military might. They are, then, relations that on security matters are triangular rather than bilateral and cannot be understood without Washington.This has been no impediment to Brussels and Tokyo strengthening ties over the last few years, primarily on political and trade matters. In 2019, the two parties adopted the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement, which lifted most of the tariffs existing between the two economies, and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, based on cooperation and the defence of shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights or free trade. In the latter agreement, Japan and the EU identified the common threats of cybersecurity, natural disasters, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and maritime (in)security. The two agreements established a framework that would cement political, security and development cooperation cast in liberal values to jointly uphold the rules-based international order.In this new phase of cooperation, security issues have gained importance because both actors perceive a greater interdependence and interconnection in their security. According to the Joint Statement of the Japan-EU Summit of July 2023, "the security of Europe and that of the Indo-Pacific are closely interlinked". And the facts appear to bear it out. Japan was one of the countries that did not hesitate to show its support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion of 2022, taking part in the international sanctions regime, as well as dispatching arms to Kyiv. Coordination with the EU in this field has been remarkable.If we look at the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific released in 2021, Brussels also aspires to greater involvement in the security of the region in four main areas: maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity and crisis management. However, despite European ambitions, there are differences over the commitment (economic and/or military) that the various member states would be willing to make in the Indo-Pacific. As often happens, European policy towards the region is the sum of the convergences and divergences of the member states. According to a survey by the European Council for Foreign Relations, 23 out of the 27 member states point to security as an important element of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy. Yet only 12 would be interested in contributing to freedom of navigation operations and just 4 would commit warships to the region (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain). It will also be important to consider NATO involvement in this area. In 2023, it submitted a proposal to open a civilian liaison office in Tokyo, an idea that was dropped largely due to French reluctance in the face of a possible response from China.Japan welcomes even limited European involvement in the region and this is in step with the growing interconnection between Europe's security and that of the Indo-Pacific. However, more coordination and communication among the various European and international actors in the region, especially in the military field, will be essential in order to avoid undesired tensions.Lastly, cooperation on economic security has acquired a more central position in recent months. In June 2023, this was a particularly important matter during the High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and the EU, especially with regard to cases of economic coercion, non-market access policies and control over investments and exports, as well as action aimed at making supply chains more resilient. In a subsequent joint statement, the two actors identified multiple areas of cooperation in this field, with a clear reference to de-risking, as well as cooperation on semiconductors and protecting critical infrastructure like submarine cables. This first reference reveals a complementary approach to economic security conceptions and strategies for the two actors, which makes for a more holistic approach.However, one of the future challenges in order to guarantee this cooperation is related to two fundamental contradictions of economic security. For one thing, it is an area where economic interests and national security may collide. For another, owing to the long list of issues it encompasses – security, trade, tech or industrial policies – economic security has a cooperative side, but also a competitive one. The predominance of security issues may come at the expense of economic interests for the two actors, both in their relations and in their own domestic dynamics, and vice versa. Thus, careful and respectful communication and coordination between them, as well as within them, in the EU's case, will be key in order to guarantee effective cooperation between Japan and the EU. IV. ConclusionsOver the last two decades, bilateral relations between the EU and Japan (which on security matters become triangular on account of the simultaneous presence of the United States) have been marked by stability and ongoing outreach. There are those who say that this is the main problem: the lack of problems. Three factors, however, have brought about a more recent revitalisation and strengthening of relations:(1) The situation of "permacrisis" and the speeding up of dynamics of geopolitical competition and fracture.(2) The new balances of power in the international system thanks to the consolidation of China as a global player with the capacity to influence in any part of the world, plus the rise of the Global South as a new "imagined community" on the geopolitical map. Despite their diversity, they share a growing interest in exploring alternatives to a Western-led international order.(3) The acceleration of new international dynamics such as digitalisation, the emergence of hybrid threats or reglobalisation, which, together with the COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of war in Ukraine, have alerted states to new dimensions of national security.As a result, in the face of future uncertainties and the prospect of greater rapport between Tokyo and Brussels, three main issues stand out. First, as democracies committed to the liberal, rules-based multilateral system, Japan and the EU are natural partners – "like- minded" allies– that share values and principles, as well as a vital interest in maintaining peace and prosperity in their regional environments.Second, although together they are the world's first and fourth biggest economies, they do not wield political and military power to match their economic might. However, after three decades of prioritising the economy and trade, they now see the need to invest in their defence, with a view to preserving their "strategic autonomy" and not being dragged into a conflict against their will or against their interests. Moreover, despite the triangular relationship in the military sphere, both actors are moving forward on cooperation in new forms of security, such as economic security. These new dynamics have enabled closer exchange and coordination between Tokyo and Brussels, though there is still room for improvement. Namely, cooperation on tech, including cybersecurity and disinformation, offers new opportunities to strengthen Japan-EU ties and common defence in the face of these challenges.Third, there is a growing sense thatEuropean and Asian security scenarios are increasingly connected,and that the security of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan also depend, more and more so, on what happens in Ukraine. In such a scenario, the United States' allies aim to be active players – not just a battleground – in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.Despite that, there are still multiple areas for greater cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels and the 27 member states. The challenge is to ensure the agenda of the two actors keeps in step with the tempo of the systemic changes the international order is undergoing and to play a role in them that is commensurate with their economic, cultural and human power. Just months away from a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House, who could renege on his international commitments and threaten security alliances, the ties between the EU and Japan may offer a necessary foothold for facing the turbulence ahead. ReferencesBargués, Pol and Bourekba, Moussa. "War by all means: the rise of hybrid warfare", in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 11-16. Available online.Benson, Emily; Steinberg, Federico and Álvarez-Aragonés, Pau. "The European Union's Economic Security Strategy Update". CSIS Commentary, 2024. (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.Burguete, Víctor. "Contribución de la UE a la reglobalización: de la búsqueda de la autonomía a la estrategia de seguridad económica". Notes Internacionals CIDOB, 298, 2023.Colomina, Carme. "Words as weapons: from disinformation to the global battle for the narrative" in Bargués, Pol, Bourekba, Moussa, and Colomina, Carme. (eds.), Hybrid threats, vulnerable order. Barcelona: CIDOB Report no. 8, 2022, pp. 17-24. Available online.European Commission. EU trade Relations with Japan (online) accessed February 23rd, 2024. Available online.García-Herrero, Alicia. China-EU roller-coaster relations: Where do we stand and what to do? Text of testimony to the US Congress, June 2023. Available onlineTanaka, Toshiro. "EU-Japan Relations" in Christiansen, Thomas; Kirchner, Emil and Murray, Philomena (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, pp. 509-520.Tirado, Carmen. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Una iniciativa japonesa de política exterior para la cooperación global", Global Affairs Journal 2, 2020.Kuwahara, Kyoko. "Disinformation Threats during a Taiwan Contingency and Countermeasures". Research Report, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, March 22, 2022. Available online.Vidal, Lluc. "Beyond the Gaiatsu Model: Japan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Neoclassical Realism", Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2022, 9 (1), pp. 26–49.

In this dissertation I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyse the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. Despite attempts by developing countries to alleviate this imbalance through the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a multitude of soft law initiatives and the reluctance to address human rights issues in MNCs at the level of the United Nations failed to make MNCs incorporate human rights standards in their operations. The merging of the two concepts became increasingly more challenging throughout the 70s and 80s when the world was faced with the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism. This shift in the global legal architecture forced the Third World to take a new approach to tackle the conceptual gap, this resulted in the emergence of the Third generation of human rights and ultimately, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. CSR presented a platform for global soft law initiatives to minimise the conceptual gap they had created over throughout the preceding decades. This allowed people such as John Ruggie to develop the Guiding Principles, the most successful initiative to date. This dissertation will provide its readers with a fruitful understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and further, what implications this had on the political and economic level. - Introduction In the words of Sundhya Pahuja and Anna Saunders, the second half of the twentieth century staged a 'series of encounters between rival practices of world making, each of which travelled with rival accounts of international law'.[1] Anti-colonial disputes, the Cold War, the rise of developmental issues and the increasing popularity of neoliberalism are only some of the events that generated these competing views of the international legal order. These events brought different coalitions across the Global North and Global South, and different 'alliances of interest between 'public' and 'private' actors'.[2] At the heart of the system that emerged lie two fundamental elements: the modern multinational corporation and human rights. How to conceptualize multinational corporations (MNCs) and how to define their relation to the law and the State was part of these rival stories. In this paper I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyze the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. In particular, I examine how this encounter, which became evident as calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were being advanced within the UN, came to produce the idea of 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (CSR). I show that CSR emerged from the failure of the NIEO, particularly in relation to the roles and responsibilities of private actors in the global economy and how this can be traced to the limits of initiatives addressing the tensions between human rights claims and the interests of multinational corporations. In so doing I provide an understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and the implications this had at the political and economic level. The first section of this essay examines the lack of direct use of human rights language in the UN literature focusing on MNCs and their role in world development from the 1960s to the 1970s. This includes an analysis of the report entitled 'Multinational Corporations in World Development'.[3] I demonstrate the emphasis and enthusiasm for multinational corporations displayed at the level of the United Nations and how the concepts of the corporation and human rights were kept separate due to their respective supporters during the Cold War. I then focus on the attempts by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 'Group of 77' (G77) to bridge this conceptual gap through the imposition of policies and initiatives, though without major success. The second section analyzes the influence of the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism on the shift of the global legal architecture, ultimately promoting the birth of the new developmental state. Here concern is with the new legal structures' attempt to merge the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights through a third generation of human rights, [4] and I engage in theoretical approaches by legal scholars such as Samuel Moyn and Antonia Darder. In the third section investigates the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and analyzes its application and limitations. CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. I demonstrate how CSR aspired to close a gap between human rights and corporate action in a way that would harmonize them through a multitude of soft law initiatives. This leads to the question of whether direct regulations can apply to MNCs under international law and a discussion of the UN Global Compact, at the time the world's largest and most far-reaching CSR initiative.[5] Finally, this paper closes with the most recent developments in the global legal order designed to tackle the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights, namely through the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises[6] and the development of the Guiding Principles. Dawn of co-existence The United Nations lies at the heart of the international regime with its normative, institutional and procedural human rights activities.[7] By adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN created a milestone document in the history of human rights. The Declaration has had an enormous influence on the world both in terms of 'spreading the philosophy of human rights, and in terms of inspiring legal texts and decisions'.[8] New states have used the Declaration as a basis for their constitutions, while domestic and international courts have invoked the Declaration in their judgments.[9] As human rights law developed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, were both drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Together, these three instruments make up the 'International Bill of Human Rights'.[10] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the world became a stage for global changes that altered the legal order. The end of colonialism dawned in the Global South, and during the height of the Cold War the West faced the Soviet Bloc and its mission of 'exporting revolution'.[11] Leaders of nationalist resistance movements received military as well as financial aid from the Soviet Bloc which intensified anti-colonial mobilization for self-determination.[12] Simultaneously, globalization was increasing rapidly, with multinational corporations emerging onto the global scene with heightened awareness of their existence as an entity with legal personality. As outlined by Sornarajah, their distinct bases of power allowed them to assert their interests through the law. With economic resources often exceeding those of their host state, MNCs had the ability to sculpt and manipulate legal outcomes through arbitration processes concerning foreign investment protection. This was done by exerting lobbying pressure on a host state which might be reluctant or even unable to object to the activities of MNCs.[13] The 'Multinational Corporations in World Development', report drafted by the UN Secretariat's Department on Economic and Social Affairs in 1973, considers 'the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process of development, especially that of developing countries [.] [and] international relations'.[14] From the outset, the Report identifies the emerging phenomenon of the MNC in international economic affairs, how its size and spread has increased, and identifies the wide array of its activities and its use of natural resources which 'rival traditional economic exchanges between nations'.[15] It is surprising therefore, that a Report from the Department on Economic and Social Affairs, does not contain the term 'human rights' throughout the entire document. In the Report's introduction the UN makes a clear distinction between the differing views of impacts MNCs have on host countries. While 'depicted in some quarters as key instruments to maximizing world welfare, [they] are seen in others as dangerous agents of imperialism'.[16] The fact the United Nations recognized the potential neo-colonial nature of multinational corporations further highlights the need for guidance on human rights violations by MNCs. Yet the Report's reluctance to engage in the area of human rights provides a first glimpse into the divergence of the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. An explanation for this can be identified by analyzing the Conventions, on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the UN's reluctance to avoid tensions between the supporters of both Conventions, respectively the United States and the Soviet Union. The US pushed for the development of civil and political rights, reflecting the protection of the freedom and liberties of individuals. Stemming from a Western philosophy, John Locke identified that in a 'state of nature' humans had 'natural rights' including the right to life, liberty and property. Similarly, French legal philosophers such as Rosseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire argued that such rights emerge from the inherent nature and virtue of man.[17] As Joseph and Castan argue, 'natural rights theories were highly influential [.] particularly in the revolutionary fervor of the United States'.[18] The advancement of civil and political rights reflects the capitalist ideology of the United States, conforming to the libertarian nature of Western capitalist societies.[19] In contrast, the Soviet Union pushed for the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights. These included the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to physical health. Contrary to the civil and political rights, these rights were based on the idea of equality, one deeply rooted in the political ideology of socialism. As the US would not commit to a proposition that there is a right to social goods, the US has never ratified this Convention.[20] The Soviet Bloc promoted the right of self-determination by providing military and financial aid to indigenous political activists in their fight for independence; an idea enshrined in Article 1 of the Covenant which states that: 'All peoples have the right to self-determination'.[21] For the Soviets 'national self-determination was an adjunct to revolutionary communism'.[22] They envisioned self-determination as the tool for the transition from dismantling a colonial empire to establishing a socialist state.[23] However, while the United Nations was reluctant to adhere to human rights in the framework of multinational corporations, other international institutions were motivated to develop this area. The OECD attempted to impose human rights on MNCs by adopting the Guidelines for MNCs (hereinafter 'OECD Guidelines') in 1976.[24] These were 'voluntary recommendations for business practices relating to human rights, disclosure of information, anti-corruption, labour relations, taxation, the environment and consumer protection'.[25] The Guidelines were intended to strengthen the international investment climate by improving the relationship and confidence between MNCs and host countries. National Contact Points (NCPs) were created that bore the responsibilities of enforcing and promoting the Guidelines, and any natural person could make a claim related to the violation of the Guidelines.[26] This aspect of the Guidelines provided an enforcing mechanism accessible to the public. But although the Guidelines were formally adopted by member states as a corporate responsibility instrument, they were subject to widespread criticism in the international legal order. As explained by Cernic, the Guidelines are ambiguous while the NCPs are limited in their influence on host states. Even though they outlined the need to respect human rights, the obligations were not framed in mandatory terms.[27]. Since the Guidelines lacked legal basis, the OECD was unable to assert sanctions on non-compliant corporations, and critics labeled them weak and ineffective. However, it was the intention of the OECD to guide rather than to legislate, because they saw voluntary versus legally binding standards as less of a dichotomy and more a continuum.[28] Although voluntary, corporations would be under scrutiny and potentially harm their reputation if they violated the Guidelines.[29] Yet, the Guidelines were hardly successful in the international legal order. A year later, in 1977, the ILO attempted to bridge this gap by adopting the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning MNCs and Social Policy. These also attempted to 'encourage the positive contribution the MNEs can make to economic and social progress'.[30]. Article 8 emphasizes the respect for the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants. However, its voluntary and non-binding nature, as well as its weak monitoring process made this instrument as frail as the OECD Guidelines.[31] The lack of responsibility and perseverance stemming from international organizations and their disappointing attempt at bridging the gap between multinational corporations and human rights forced national and regional change. On the one hand, developing nations began taking matters into their own hands. To portray unity and solidarity throughout the 'Third World' the G77 coalition, formed in 1964 by developing member countries with the primary intention of promoting its members' economic and humanitarian interests through cooperation at the level of the United Nations, took a strong initiative. In the late 1970s the Group expressed its concern at the 'imbalance of negotiating power between TNCs [transnational corporations] and their host countries and inability on the part of the latter to control the activities of the TNCs within their territories'.[32] Simultaneously, home countries wanted to ensure their investments abroad would be protected, 'specifically from expropriation without a commitment to compensation based on international law'.[33] In accordance with the principles and concerns of the freshly adopted NIEO, developing countries raised the issue of the dominance of MNCs over natural resources and strongly urged the UN for a reaffirmation of their sovereignty over their resources. The NIEO was an attempt by Third World developing states, in the wake of decolonization, to deploy international law to achieve economic justice and improvements in the areas of development and socio-economic rights.[34] Pushed by the G77, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) member states devised a set of NIEO proposals in 1974 including (1) that developing states are entitled to control and regulate all activities of MNCs within their territory; and (2) that international trade must be based on equitable, stable and remunerative prices for raw materials.[35] Despite its impressive aims and careful compilation, the NIEO was unsuccessful. It failed 'to displace the power and advantage held by influential states', it failed to alter international law which favoured the economic interests of capital-exporting states and, most importantly, it demonstrated the Third World's acceptance of the economic ideology of the capitalist mindset, inflating the value of foreign capital including the exploitation of local labour in developing countries.[36] Consequently, the UN set up the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations which drafted a code of conduct for TNCs, one of the first formalized instruments drafted by the UN that set an obligation upon MNCs to respect human rights in host countries.[37] However while developing countries insisted on the idea of adopting an international instrument that was binding on MNCs, developed countries were not prepared to go beyond the voluntary sets of guidelines already in place.[38] On the other hand, due to the ineffectiveness of the international institutions, some MNCs that sought to abide by human rights law attempted to create some provisions themselves. An example is the Sullivan principles designed by Leon Sullivan, former member of the General Motors' Board of Directors. These principles included the elimination of discrimination based on race, and the concept of equality in the workplace. The objective was that by engaging in human rights concepts like dignity and respect, MNCs could be a lever for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. However, like the previously established soft law on obligations on multinational corporations, these principles were voluntary and unlike the OECD Guidelines which had the NCPs, there was no enforcement mechanism. The great majority of MNCs that adopted his principles did so with the sole motive of being able to continue to prosper in South Africa.[39] In summary, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there were attempts at a variety of levels to bring together the concepts of human rights and multinational corporations. Though it was largely absent on the level of the United Nations until the late 1970s there were many first steps by international institutions to bridge this gap. The NIEO was the first set of concrete economic principles that were prescribed in international law 'articulating a form of justice based not on domination of one people over another'.[40] It was an 'effort to assert the sovereign autonomy of the non-western world',[41] exemplifying the importance of linking human rights and development, and the fundamental values of duties of international cooperation. However, there was still much to be done as the new decade of the 1980s saw a drastic restructuring of the global trade and investment system - ultimately ending in massive international debt and a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment. A Change in the Global Legal Architecture An accumulation of capital obtained by the main oil producing states in the Middle East led to the establishment of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Cartel in 1972. With the intention of creating a monopoly and obtaining major profits, OPEC raised the price of oil by approximately 400%, with its members keeping revenue in US or European banks, from which developing countries regularly borrowed in the form of aid and loans.[42] However, banks were now lending at higher interest rates to these countries as they were deemed less creditworthy. As a result of sovereign debt and the surplus problem in the international banking system, developing states were forced to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI), as opposed to private borrowing. The very principle that developing states wanted to control with the establishment of the NIEO was now negated by Western states selling MNCs to the developing world as necessary for their survival.[43] Simultaneously to the effects of the oil crisis, the political ideology of neoliberalism emerged on the global scene. Conservative governments gained power in western countries, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe with a move towards market economics, and Latin America implemented stabilization policies to boost their economies.[44] This process saw neoliberalism became an enemy for structural equality, political inclusion, economic access and human rights.[45] Prior to the implementation of neoliberal policies, the relationship between multinational corporations and their host state was formed through the conflict between the host country's national developmental interests as opposed to the corporation's global investment interests. The state being the more powerful actor, attempted 'to channel its private investments to serve its own developmental objectives'.[46] However, as Michael Peters argues, neoliberalism provides 'a universalist foundation for an extreme form of economic rationalism'[47], which according to Paul Haslam, was a re-forming of the modern state rather than the perceived notion of the state 'unambiguously withering away'.[48] As a result, power shifted from host countries towards multinational corporations as the era was characterized by liberalization of foreign investment rules.[49] As the United Nations World Investment Report of 2000 showed, out of the 1035 changes made in national legislation regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1991 to 1999, only 5.9% were directed at restricting FDI.[50] Now more than ever before, the existence and nature of human rights were jeopardized in the sphere of multinational corporations led by neoliberal politics. Yet when analyzing human rights and neoliberalism, the two concepts have a plethora of similarities that run counter to this assertion. Samuel Moyn states that human rights and neoliberalism share (1) a predecessor and (2) a target, namely the welfarist West and the post-colonial nation state seeking economic autarky respectively.[51] Both concepts emerged and were formalized in the West. As a target, developing countries need both economic (neoliberalism) and social (human rights) elements to establish economic control. Furthermore, the two concepts share key foundational building blocks. Firstly, the principle of prioritizing the individual 'whose freedoms matter more than the collectivist endeavours' and secondly, their shared antipathy toward the state due to their rejection of its moral credentials.[52] As described by Darder, neoliberalism is characterized by a rampant greed that subsumes any notions of equality and public responsibility.[53] At the heart of this lies the ultimate subversion of human rights. When faced with the powers of global capitalism, human rights struggle to maintain themselves in the Third World. A prime example countering this thesis is the idea that human rights are a handmaiden to neoliberal policies. The argument follows that human rights are so tightly related to the role of a freely functioning market that there could be no socio-economic rights without extreme capitalism.[54] Unfortunately under this notion, human rights fall victim to being seen as dependent upon the capitalist order, creating the illusion that multinational corporations enhanced and promoted human rights in the developing World. What Wolfgang Streeck termed as 'non-market notions of social justice' became impossible to secure. Any attempt to place social commitments over economic ones were expelled, leaving market pressures to form human obligations and be governed by the dictatorship of neoliberalism.[55] The World Bank and the IMF, backed by the United States and other western states, became key in the project for liberalization, privatization, and market-friendly policies, known as the Washington Consensus. MNCs were given the protection they needed to flourish, be it proprietary or intellectual property rights. The interests of human rights on the other hand were not regarded. Though excelling and growing more than ever before, human rights had done so 'on a discrete track spearheaded internationally through the UN'.[56] Directed by developing states, human rights were intentionally dealt with by the United Nations while international economic law was being dealt with by the international institutions where they hold the balance of power.[57] Simultaneously, the developing world saw the third generation of human rights emerge as a result of anti-colonialist movements in the post-Second World War era. Newly born independent nations voiced their concerns over repeating their colonial past and demanded a new set of rights. These included the right to self-determination, the right to a healthy environment and the right to participation in cultural heritage. These are reflected in Declarations and Conventions such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968 and the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.[58] What makes this generation of human rights exceptional however is that while they reflect neither the traditional individualistic approach of the first generation, nor the socialist tradition of the second generation, they simultaneously demand certain recognitions from the state while being able to be invoked against the state. Most importantly though, as articulated by Vasak, the third generation of human rights 'can be realized only through the concerted efforts of all the actors in the social scene: the individual, the State, public and private bodies and the international community'.[59] In other words, these rights belong to the community as a collective, rather than to an individual.[60] Drafted in 1986 by the UNGA, the Declaration on the Right to Development [61] (DRD) calls for effective international cooperation towards development objectives through the enhancement of human rights and the distribution of benefits.[62] The DRD gained inspiration from the NIEO as it relied on providing equal national opportunity through measures of fair distribution of natural resources and income. Alongside neoliberal policies, the two contradicting concepts were forced to work in tandem. Foreign investment in the developing world could proceed under the neoliberal ideology as long as it did not infringe the DRD. Interestingly, the right to development was coined by the former UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Arjun Sengupta, as 'growth with equity'. Growth should not only focus on the economic aspect, but also emphasize human rights and the principles of justice. This focus on equity, would require a 'a change in the structure of production and distribution in the economy to ensure growth was equitable', including the required international cooperation and not having to rely on the market.[63] Though the United Nations are promoting and enhancing the development of human rights, they are disregarding the fact that their work should be focused more on the human rights aspects entailed in the market, rather than solving human rights issues outside of the market framework. The development of human rights and the regulatory frameworks supporting multinational corporations attended very different interests. The new global legal architecture born of the oil crisis and rise of neoliberalism reorganized the relations between the Global South and Global North. At this point human rights and the regulation of corporations, with their distinctive genealogies, were forced to come together, but the failure of this exercise could not be challenged until the late 1980s when the third generation of human rights provided another opportunity for the merging of the two concepts. The outcomes of these new sets of discussions produced a more clearly defined relationship between human rights and multinational corporations which, although more sophisticated, was still unable to produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, the right to development began to take root in the corporate world. For the sake of their reputations, corporations were forced to appreciate the power held by vulnerable individuals that could act together as a strong collective.[64] As Claire Dickerson argues, multinationals became more aware of their relationship with human rights not only in regards to the individual, but rather to the society as a collective.[65] These were the first formalized steps to the recognition of what came to be known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The Heterodox Approach What became apparent in the sphere of business and human rights were two situations, (1) that states were either unable or unwilling to implement human rights; and (2) that multinational corporations acting in such states were unprepared to deal with the risks of harming human rights through their activities. This was seen especially in the private extracting sector, such as oil, gas and coal, using aggressive means to exploit remote areas and leaving large physical and social 'footprints'. Local communities began resisting the activities by the multinationals and the language of human rights became increasingly popular in challenging corporate norms.[66] Some of the world's largest MNCs had become culprits of violating human rights standards, including Nike, Shell or Yahoo. Nike was guilty of using child labour, while Shell misused public funds to practice corruption and theft at all levels.[67] The effects were reflected in local communities that resorted to violence and criminal behaviour, significantly affecting the living conditions of these areas. In the early 1990s, some corporations began adopting measures to comply with responsible business conduct. CSR was a voluntary form of business self-regulation that attended the current societal goals. It involved the creation of monitoring schemes that regulated the workplace standards and policies of the global supply chains. However, what caused CSR to emerge, was not only pressure exerted by nations that felt their human rights had been impinged, but also a wider global political ethos. With its emphasis on privatization and deregulation, neoliberalism promoted CSR initiatives in order for corporations to gain self-control and rely less on direct government initiatives. Due to its voluntary nature, CSR was not conceived as a regulatory instrument but as a learning forum to promote strategies that enhanced socially responsible policies. This included the enhancement of human rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption efforts. [68] CSR had now progressed to the forefront of the global business scene by morphing out of corporate philanthropy.[69] Corporations began adopting voluntary schemes that not only adhered to social policy, but at times even went beyond the standard set by local requirements, which occasionally created conflict between the two.[70] Unilateral corporations produced company codes, with companies such as Gap and Nike adopting theirs in 1992. This involved internal audit teams and ethics officers to be established, verifying that contractors were complying with their company's codes of conduct. Gradually, social audit teams emerged onto the global scene. As one of the most prominent, the Fair Labour Association (FLA) monitored the working conditions for some of the top athletic brands such as Nike, Puma and Patagonia. In the food industry, the label of Fair Trade emerged, ensuring for local farmers the social, economic and environmental standards they deserved. Corporations adopted CSR measures mainly to improve their reputation. However, perhaps a greater incentive for corporations to adopt CSR measures lies in the financial risks posed by community pushback as a result of human rights violations. These pushbacks cause delays in design, operation, construction, siting, granting of permits etc. Further, they can create problems and relations with local labour markets, higher costs for financing, insurance and reduced output.[71] In a study of a large multinational company that wished to remain anonymous, Goldman Sachs found that it had accrued $6.5 billion in such costs over a two year period.[72] A great percentage of these costs could be related back to the staff time in managing conflicts that arise in communities as a result of human rights violations. In some instances between 50% and 80% of an assets manager's time can be devoted to these issues. Thus, it is clear that in this lose-lose situation, where MNCs violate human rights and thus incur losses, it makes sound corporate sense to adopt some sort of CSR measures.[73] Despite the improvements and the clear step forward the business world took in addressing human rights, CSR involved limitations and fragmentations that challenged its success. It was built on the assumption that it is an effective mechanism for a corporation to positively reconnecting with the community it is based in. Thus, in practice, CSR operates under the presumption that society has granted authority to corporations with naturally applying legal responsibilities.[74] In 2000 John Ruggie conducted research in the Fortune Global 500 and a wider range of corporations to assess the extent and success of voluntary initiatives promoting human rights. Staff monitoring schemes had evolved, demands by socially responsible investors had grown, and large public sector funds all aided in this development. However, the research also found 'company-based initiatives fell short as a stand-alone approach'.[75] Most companies still did not have the capabilities of managing human rights risks and instead were acting on a reactive based notion. Moreover, it was within the company's discretion to decide which human rights the company would address and furthermore how to define its measures. Thus, their voluntary nature could often be used as a camouflage to delay real reform.[76] A logical response to such a broad limitation would be to impose direct obligations under international law upon MNCs. Though only states and international organizations have legal standing in international law, the general view on this contention is that it would be possible to impose obligations upon MNCs due to their major economic and political influence as explained earlier, and their capabilities of influencing the enjoyment of human rights.[77] However, as explained by Zerk, the challenge lies in 'developing jurisprudence which refines and makes precise the vague aspirational statements [.] in the CSR debate'.[78] However, as the law stands, the most promising and efficient method for applying obligations on multinational corporations remains to be the national courts. Yet the fact that claims must be raised as a tort-based litigation proving a violation of domestic tort principles rather than claiming a violation under international human rights casts doubt over this method. An interesting exception to this is the US Alien Tort Statute of 1789. The tort states that district courts 'have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States'.[79] The original intention of the statute was to establish a civil remedy for violation of international law norms such as piracy, mistreatment of ambassadors and the violation of safe conducts.[80] This piece of legislation lay dormant until the 1980s when human rights lawyers discovered its potential for foreign plaintiffs to raise a claim for certain human rights abuses against an individual of any nationality, or a corporation as long as they had a presence in the United States. The question whether the Act could be enforced against a corporation was considered in 2012 in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Kiobel.[81] The court held that there was a presumption against extraterritoriality applying to claims under the Statute. There is therefore no application of the statute abroad unless it is explicitly stated in the international law which is the subject of the claim.[82] As stated by John Ruggie in his advice to the Human Rights Council in 2007 'no single silver bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge. A broad array of measures is required, by all relevant actors.'[83] Ultimately, as a measure to seek guidance on the matter, this led to the UN Global Compact in 2000, the largest global CSR initiative.[84] The UN Global Compact was a strategic policy initiative posed by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that aimed at improving corporate conditions in areas such as human rights, environmental protection and labour rights.[85] It was a prospective and hopeful initiative that was designed as a learning forum to develop, implement and disclose sustainability principles among corporate actors.[86] At its time, the Global Compact was the most far-reaching, non-governmental set of policies aimed at catalyzing the voluntary nature in the corporate citizenship movement.[87] Legal scholars such as Meyer and Stefanova felt the Global Compact could shape the relationship between MNCs and human rights through 'rewarding responsible TNCs [MNCs], while shaming at least some of the irresponsible TNCs [MNCs] into better promoting human rights'.[88] Their only concern about the extent of the success of the Global Compact lay, in the Global Compact's voluntary nature. Comparing it to the OECD Guidelines implemented 25 years earlier, an initiative like the Global Compact will only be successful if there is commitment to the initiative at all levels of the international system. Thus, the main task is to put a human face on globalization through the values and principles shared by the people, the corporation and the state.[89] However, Aravalo and Fallon dispute this. Published in 2008, their Report uses the Compact Quarterly and UNGC Annual Review to critique the Global Compact's activities and practices throughout its eight years of existence. Published by local networks and the UN respectively, they evaluate new businesses adhering to the Global Compact, as well as Global Compact practices and responses. Aravalo and Fallon found that after evaluating the various progress reports, the Global Compact falls short of being a successful initiative. According to the UNGC Annual Review, there are a multitude of gaps existing in the Global Compact framework. Research instruments for instance, under the principles of human rights and labour protection, have been deemed as inadequate as participants have failed to voice their concern over the protection of such rights within their corporation. The Global Compact has solely used online surveys to administer data, which smaller businesses are often unwilling or unable to provide. The methodology applied by the Global Compact was ambiguous and did not show the extent of the success of CSR initiatives.[90] Alavaro and Fallon argue that it would be highly beneficial for the Global Compact to re-think its methodology process of evaluating its success by introducing a chronological component into its future research models. [91] It would allow for a clearer comparison not only for participants of the Global Compact, but also for the comparison with non-Compact companies in the area of corporate responsibility.[92] As a result of this poor research methodology, the Global Compact has difficulty assessing its direct influence on the broad and voluntary concept of CSR. There are key principles of CSR that fail to receive the attention they deserve in the scope of the Global Compact. However, this is not to say that the Global Compact has been an outright failure. The Annual Review, though lacking quantifiable data, has provided a wide array of case studies providing evidence for the practical influence of the Global Compact on participants. These include programs in education and working relationships the Global Compact has encouraged and facilitated. It can be said therefore, that the Global Compact is making a difference, even if only in these cases. Until shortly after the turn of the millennium, neither company codes nor multilateral initiatives such as Global Compact, successfully achieved the necessary, concrete obligations in regard to human rights and environmental protection demands. This was set to change with the arrival of the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Norms). Drafted in 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights attempted to merge the concepts of MNCs and human rights and transform these newly developed principles into hard law. The intention was to impose human rights obligations upon companies through the domestic legal systems of their host countries. The Norms clearly express that 'states retain primary, overarching responsibility for human rights protection' and that corporations are identified as 'Duty-bearers' based on that expectation of following human rights principles.[93] The expectations expressed by the Norms are supported by enforcement mechanisms for their implementation which address the requirements that MNCs must adopt in terms of their internal practice. Furthermore, there are a multitude of rights that go beyond what is traditionally accepted as international human rights law. Examples include rights associated with consumer protection, the environment or corruption which are covered by different areas of the law.[94] However, the Norms failed to achieve promising results. Described as a 'train wreck' by John Ruggie, the Norms fell under heavy criticisms for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, the Norms fall under heavy scrutiny for attempting to impose obligations upon corporations, while simultaneously imposing parallel obligations on the state. The intention was to address the fact that MNCs operate in a legal vacuum due to their status of acting as a multinational. To alleviate this issue, it was thought that binding MNCs to hard international law would be the best option. On the one hand, minimalists argue that binding multinational corporations to international law is not an appropriate method as this would go beyond the concept of soft law initiatives such as Global Compact. This argument is developed by stating that binding corporations to international law would 'privatise human rights'. The Norms would be placing obligations on an entity that was never democratically elected, nor eligible to make reasonable decisions in regard to human rights at the level of international law.[95] On the other hand, maximalists lobby for a judicial body solely focused on the practice of multinational corporations and argue that corporations should be bound by international law.[96] Secondly, there was severe backlash against the Norms from states, corporations and businesses who argued that there was a lack of consultation from the Sub-Commission when drafting the Norms. However, this argument has since been disputed by institutions such as the Corporate Europe Conservatory or the scholars Weissbrodt and Kruger.[97] In regard to the discontent presented by states, many argued that there was a lack of involvement on their behalf in the Norms' development. As stated by Kinely, Nolan and Zerial, it is of vital importance that in issues revolving around CSR and their wide variety of stakeholders, everyone's voice must be heard when protecting human rights.[98] Thirdly, issues were raised regarding the language used by the Norms. Terms like 'sphere of influence'[99] and 'complicity' were deemed as vague and unclear.[100] It is agreed upon, even by supporters of the Norms, that such terms must be defined more definitively and where possible, draw definitions from more grounded areas of the law like criminal law, tort or contract law. This attitude towards the Norms from corporations shows the extent of their distrust and the scare factor used to attempt to dismantle the Norms.[101] However, even though the Norms failed as a concept, as Kinley, Nolan and Zerial maintain, 'the Norms have been a beneficial and fruitful initiative, reinvigorating debate on business and human rights'.[102] Previous to the imposition of the Norms, CSR had found itself in a position that was stagnant, focusing solely on codes of conduct that should be implemented by corporations using a bottom-up approach. The Norms altered the position of CSR to now provide a top-down approach and provided human rights activists with hope that human rights protection in regard to multinational corporations was now in the hands of the United Nations. However, the reactions to the Norms from the CSR community varied. CSR had been a newly emerging concept which was still unclear when fitted into the international legal order. It was still in its early years of development with highly broad-reaching initiatives in the fields of both soft and hard law. The playing field for CSR was simply too big for such an underdeveloped concept to handle. Further, it was attempted to implement CSR through domestic laws and quasi-legal initiatives raised to the level of international law. It is therefore often perceived that the implementation of the Norms were an attempt to remedy CSR by uniting these various aspects into one document at the level of the United Nations. The Norms conjoined national and international levels of CSR while maintaining that states continued to hold the primary responsibility of ensuring that businesses protect human rights. The world was a 'deeply divided arena of discourse and contestation lacking shared knowledge, clear standards and boundaries; fragmentary and often weak governance systems concerning business and human rights in states and companies alike'.[103] A range of governments still expressed their demand for further attention to be given to the relationship between human rights and the practices of multinational corporations. Thus, the United Nations appointed a team led by John Ruggie to establish the Guiding Principles. Rather than establishing a new international framework as was previously attempted with the Norms, Ruggie was 'urged [.] to focus on identifying and promoting good practices and providing companies with tools to enable them to deal voluntarily with the complex cluster of business and human rights challenges'.[104] Ruggie moved away from the traditional 'mandatory approach' which involved the compliance of national laws in correspondence to a corporation's voluntary measures and practices, to a heterodox approach. This heterodox approach was devised to create an environment of mixed reinforcing policy measures that provided cumulative change and large-scale success. The Guiding Principles lay on three foundations: (1) the state duty to protect against human rights abuses; (2) the responsibility by corporations to respect human rights and the implied obligation of acting in due diligence; and (3) the need for greater access to remedies for victims. However, there are two things that the Guiding Principles fail to accomplish. Firstly, to create binding international law and instead rely on normative contributions which further elaborate the implications of existing standards. Secondly, the Guiding Principles 'fail to ensure the right to an effective remedy and the need for States' measures to prevent abuses committed by their companies overseas'.[105] Amnesty International goes further by reiterating that aside from lacking accountability measures, the Guiding Principles should mandate a due diligence approach rather than only recommending it, as this would solve internal as well as extraterritorial accountability issues. Alongside Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch criticized the Guiding Principles for not adopting a global standard in corporate responsibility, and instead resort to a 'sliding scale' based on a corporation's size and geographic location.[106] However, when compared to other governance regimes in the past and present, the Guiding Principles seem to be a robust framework. Although various human rights organizations and NGOs identify neglect of human rights in the framework of MNCs, the Guiding Principles reiterate business as an instrument to contribute to societal welfare.[107] Thus, it acts as a basis for the empowerment of society and a benchmark to judge practices and conduct of corporations and governments.[108] Conclusion The discourse of the co-emergence of multinational corporations and human rights took the world by storm. The ongoing globalization of multinational corporations and the evolution of the concept of human rights were born attending different aims in the global legal order. Their greatest challenge however was not necessarily their harmonization and co-existence, but more importantly co-existing under the intentional gap created through the world's largest and most influential actor, the United Nations. This was clearly visible in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the various Reports and Declarations that were passed through the international institution, the two concepts were kept separate. While the United Nations was enthusiastic for the growth of both MNCs and human rights, it intentionally avoided discussing the harmonization of both concepts. Due to the underlying pressures imposed on the United Nations by the tensions from the Cold War, the UN was left in a legal vacuum unable to merge the two distinctive genealogies. The global international legal order was unaware of the extent of the importance of such a gap being eradicated before adopting a resolution as complex as the NIEO. Thus, from this point onwards, the NIEO was therefore already bound to be unsuccessful. Not only had international law not developed enough to impose such obligations upon MNCs, the corporations themselves were not aware of the ramifications and necessity for abiding human rights obligations as I showed in the third section of this dissertation. Enthusiasm for further initiatives such as the push by the G77 or the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations was only short lived. The events of the 1980s greatly disrupted the already turbulent environment of the global international legal order creating a greater gap between the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. The 1980s became a stage which saw a great change in the global legal structure. The NIEO was an already broken concept from the outset as the conceptual gap had already created a disparity in the relationship between MNCs and human rights. This meant that although they were not aware of it at the time, the Global South could not rely on the imposition of the NIEO. Fostering the Western neoliberal policies, the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights was now well established. For human rights to become a globally instructed concept, MNCs are a useful tool to spread, promote and enhance human rights across the globe. This of course is under the condition that the MNC does not violate human rights. From the other perspective MNCs rely on human rights in terms of their societal and financial risks. It becomes clear that when this is not realized by the proponents of both concepts, it can lead to major discrepancies and disparities as was proven in the Global South during this period. If there had not been this conceptual gap, and instead there had been a clear and devised relationship between MNCs and human rights, the effects of the oil crisis and neoliberalism would not have left the detrimental mark in developing countries that they did, potentially allowing the NIEO to prevail. However, the ongoing persistence of developing countries and their call for the third generation of human rights to gain prominence forced MNCs to catch up with their relationship to human rights. What emerged, were essentially the first initiatives and practices of CSR. CSR was heavily affected by the fact that it relied on the voluntary nature of businesses to adhere to as well as practice CSR. Even though corporations had an incentive to adopt CSR measures, weak monitoring systems allowed violations to still occur on a grand scale. The issue was that the multinational corporation as a concept was still unclear and lacked definition and that tying MNCs down with hard international law was not possible due to the diversity of MNCs. CSR allowed for too large a divergence from the issue at hand and required to approach human rights at a different angle. This was the key reason for the partial success of the Guiding Principles. Ruggie's unconventional, heterodox approach provided clarity and distinct concepts that individuals, business and states could adhere to. Although the conceptual gap has still not vanished, the UN has after an array of various attempts, managed to narrow the gap that it had created almost sixty years ago by continuously forcing society to rethink and redefine the relationship. What exactly lies in the future is uncertain and impossible to foresee. It can be said with great certainty however, that if initiatives such as Global Compact or the Guiding Principles are enhanced and given more attention, the world will be faced with a much clearer and concise relationship between multinational corporations and human rights. Focusing on monitoring mechanisms, methodological research and greater transparency and accountability among all actors involved will undoubtedly seal the conceptual gap that has caused the international legal order to experience such unsettling times. [1] Pahuja, Sundhya. Saunders, Anna. Rival Worlds and the place of the Corporation in International Law in Dann and Von Bernstorff (eds). Decolonisation and the Battle for International Law (OUP, 2018) p.1 [2] Ibid. [3] UN, Multinational Corporations in World Development ST-ECA/190 [4] Linarelli, John. Salomon, Margot. Sornarajah M. The Misery of International Law. (OUP, 2018) p.245 [5] Ruggie, John. Just Business. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) p.70 [6] United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [7] Alston, Philip. Mégret, Frédéric. (eds) The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Second Edition, OUP, 2020) p.1 [8] Clapham, Andrew. Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2007) p.42 [9] (n.8) p.108. [10] ibid . p.109 [11] Allina, Eric. Imperialism and the Colonial Experience in Paul A. Haslam, Jessica Schafer and Pierre Beaudet, Introduction to International Development (3rd Edition, OUP, 2017), pp. 24-42. p.39 [12] Ibid. p. 40 [13] Sornarajah M. International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP, 2010) p.5 [14] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, 1973 ST-ECA/190 p.VI [15] ibid. p.1 [16] ibid. [17] Joseph, Sarah. Castan, Melissa. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials. (3rd Edition, OUP, 2013) p.4 [18] ibid. p.5 [19] ibid. [20] Alston, Philip. U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy. The American Journal of International Law Vol.84, No.2 (CUP,1990) pp.365-393, p.4 [21] UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Article 1 [22] Simpson, Gerry. The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age (Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p.266 [23] Ibid. [24] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976 [25] Carasco, Emily. Singh, Jang. Towards Holding Transnational Corporations Responsible for Human Rights. European Business Review Vol.22, No.4, (Emerald Publishing Group, 2010). p.4 [26] Cernic, Jernei. Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Hanse Law Review, Vol.4, No.1, (2008). p.16 [27] Ibid. p. 12 [28] Sanchez, Juan Carlos Ochoa. "The Roles and Powers of the OECD National Contact Points Regarding Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by a Transnational Corporation." Nordic Journal of International Law (2015) Vol.84, No.1, pp: 89-126 p. 18 [29] Bolt, Cassidy. "Leveraging Reputation in Implicit Regulation of MNEs: An Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises' Capacity to Influence Corporate Behavior." Corporations and International Law, 20 Jan. 2018, Available at: sites.duke.edu/corporations/2018/01/20/leveraging-reputation-in-implicit-regulation-of-mnes-an-analysis-of-the-oec

Беневич Г. И. Логос Мелхиседека. Экзегеза и парадигма обожения у прп. Максима Исповедника В этой статье рассматривается один из сложнейших вопросов библейской экзегетики образ Мелхиседека и его связь с образом Христа. На материале ряда сочинений прп. Максима Исповедника показывается значение этого вопроса для восточного богословия VII в. Ключевые слова: Максим Исповедник, Мелхиседек, Христос, экзегетика. Benevich G. I. Logos of Melchizedek. The Учупуышы and Paradigm of Deification in the Works of Maximus the Confessor In the article, there is regarded one of the most complex matters of the Bible exegesis, i. e. image of Melchizedek and its relation to the image of Christ. The meaning of the matter for Eastern Theology of the VII century is shown through a set of writings of St. Maximus the Confessor. Key words: Maximus the Confessor, Melchizedek, Christ, exegesis. Бирюков Д. С. Николай Мефонский и его полемика с учением Прокла в контексте византийского проклренессанса Статья посвящена особенностям полемики византийского церковного писателя XII в. Николая Мефонского с учением Прокла. Указано на платонизирующих византийских авторов современной Николаю эпохи, с которыми он мог неявно полемизировать. На примере преломления Николаем платонического учения об иерархии причин сущего и учения об универсалиях показано, что Николай склонялся к номинализму и расходился в этом как с неортодоксальными, так и с некоторыми ортодоксальными авторами, а также с распространенной в Византии позицией, характерной для Александрийской школы Аммония, предполагающей троякий способ существования универсалий. Ключевые слова: византийская философия, проблема универсалий, платонизм, Александрийская школа философии, византийский проклренессанс. Birjukov D. S Nicholas of Methone and His Polemics Against Proclus in the Context of the Byzantine Proclosrenaissance The article is concerned on the features in polemics of the Byzantine Church author Nicholas of Methone with the authorities who kept the doctrine of Proclus in XII century. We have suggested the names of the authors in Nicholas' epoch, with whom he could maintain his latent dialogue in his writings. On the example of interpreting the Platonian notion concerning the hierarchy of causes of Being and the notion of Universals we show that Nicholas whose more inclined to Nominalism, fallen into divergence both with Non-orthodox and same Orthodox authors on that point. So that the analysis of his writings reveals the difference with the widespread position in Byzantium, characteristic to the Alexandrian school of Ammonius, which supported the Doctrine of Universals' existing in three modes. Key words: Byzantine philosophy, the problem of universals, Platonism, Alexandrian school, Proklosrenaissance. Бурановская Н. А. Сакрализация камня в культуре Средневековой Индии Сакрализация камня как наиболее долговечного материала, способного запечатлеть ценностные доминанты и духовные смыслы культуры, характерна для большинства цивилизаций Востока. В данной статье рассматривается космологическая символика индуистских храмов, являвшихся в своей исторической эволюции развитием идеи жертвенного алтаря. Ключевые слова: Индия, индуизм, каменное храмовое зодчество, сакрализация камня. Buranovsky N. A. Stone Sacralization in Culture of Medieval India The stone sacralization as the most durable material, capable to embody valuable dominants and spiritual senses of culture, is characteristic for the majority of civilisations of the East. In given article the cosmological symbolism of Hindu temples which were development of idea of a sacrificial altar in the historical evolution. Key words: India, Hindu, stone temple architecture, a stone sacralization. Бурмистров С. Л. Эстетика неоведантизма и принцип dhvani В статье на примере философии искусства С. Дасгупты рассматриваются некоторые особенности неоведантистской эстетики и ее связи с эстетическими представлениям древней Индии и с западной эстетической мыслью (Г. В. Ф. Гегель). Анализируется роль понятия dhvani (намек, скрытый смысл) в индийской эстетике и особенности восприятия неоведантистами гегелевского учения об искусстве как образном воплощении идеи. Ключевые слова: эстетика, прекрасное, неоведантизм, Гегель, dhvani. Burmistrov S. L. Esthetics of Neo-Vedantism and the Dhvani Principle In the paper specific features of neo-vedāntist aesthetics (S. Dasgupta's philosophy of art) are considered and its relations with aesthetic theories of ancient India and with Western aesthetic thought (G. W. F. Hegel) are examined. The main topic of the paper are the role of the concept dhvani (hint) in Indian aesthetics and specific features of neo-vedāntist reception of Hegel's theory of art as an embodiment of an idea. Keywords: Aesthetics, beauty, neo-vedāntism, Hegel, dhvani. Гольцев Д. В. Образ Храма в истории и современной культуре евреев Единство языка, традиций, культуры, которые еврейский народ сохраняет на протяжении более четырех тысяч лет покоятся на религиозном фундаменте иудаизма. Желание иудеев жить в чистом и святом мире, который был утерян прародителями после грехопадения, воплотилось в Храме. Идея Храма укоренена в самих истоках истории еврейского народа. И вся история евреев по сей день неразрывно связана с Храмом. Ключевые слова: культура, религиозное сознание, Храм, синагога. Goltsev D. V. Image of the Temple in the History and Contemporary Culrure of Jews The unity of language, traditions, and culture preserving by the Jewish people throughout more than four thousands years base on the religious foundation of Judaism. The desire of Jews to live in the clear and holy world lost by progenitors after the Fall had been embodied in Temple. The idea of the Temple is grounded in the very origins of Jewish history. And the whole history of Jews is intimately connected with the Temple to the present time. Key words: culture, religious consciousness, the Temple, synagogue. Воробьева-Десятовская М. И. Мечников Л. И. и русская цивилизация XIX в. Статья посвящена страницам биографии Л. И. Мечникова. Автор анализирует его жизненный путь, чтобы выяснить, когда ученый задался вопросом о причинах зарождения цивилизаций. Он считал ошибочным усматривать причину зарождения древних цивилизаций в благоприятных климатических условиях, поскольку климатические условия, в которых зарождались цивилизации, не были идентичны. Л. И. Мечников первым в русской науке сделал шаг к выявлению роли географического фактора в историко-цивилизационном процессе. Ключевые слова: первобытная культура, географический фактор, изменения климатических условий Vorob'yova-Desyatovskaya M. I. L. I. Mechnikov and the Russian Civilization of the XIX Century. This article is devoted to crucial points of L. I. Mechnikov's biography. The author analyzed his life story in order to explain how he conceived the idea of civilizations' origin. Mechnikov rejected auspicious climatic conditions as the main cause of the ancient civilizations' arising. He proved the exceptional role of geographical factor of historical-civilizational process. Mechnikov was the first Russian scientist who represented this mode of thinking. Key words: primitive culture, the geographical factor, changes of environmental conditions. Джибраев А. Ю. Судан-2011: грядущая религиозно-иделогическая реструктуризация До референдума 2011 г. о разделении Судана на южное и северное государства осталось менее года. В контексте столкновения западного, американского образца, и исламского проектов глобализации актуальным представляется и обсуждение, и прогнозирование геополитических последствий референдума. Cтатья посвящена анализу суданского узла пересечения интересов Запада и стран исламского мира: социально-политической и экономической ангажированность Судана, внутрисуданских политических противоречий, позиций Евросоюза и США в разделении Республики Судан. Ключевые слова: геополитика, суданский референдум, исламистские национальные движения Dzhibraev A. Y. Sudan-2011: Сoming Religious & Ideological Restructurization Less than one year has been left prior to the Referendum-2011, targeted to divide Sudan on the South and North states. In the context of clash of the Western, American and Islamic Globalization Projects, to discuss and forecast the geopolitical implication of the Referendum seem to be actual. This article is designated for analyzing the Sudanese intersection node of the Western and Islamic countries' interests and meaning the social & political involvement and commitment of Sudan, internal Sudanese political contradictions, and the EU & EC positions on division matters of the Republic of Sudan. The attention is focused to discussing the forthcoming reaction to the Referendum results in the conditions of a potential local East Africa's conflict transplantation into the ideological fields of challenge for various Globalization Projects and with the view of preventing the negative consequences for the neighboring regions regarding formation of two independent states. Key words: geopolitics, Sudanese Referendum, islamist national movements. Ермакова Т. В. Вклад монголоведа А. М. Позднеева в исследование буддийской культуры Статья посвящена анализу вклада монголоведа А. М. Позднеева в исследование буддийской культуры. Проанализированы результаты двух его поездок в Монголию (1876, 1892): описание буддийских монастырей в аспекте управления, религиозных практик, архитектуры и повседневной жизни, восстановлена его концепция историко-культурной уникальности центральноазиатской региональной формы буддийской культуры. Ключевые слова: буддизм, Монголия, российские экспедиции. Ermakova T. V. Personal contribution of mongolist A. M. Pozdneev into Buddhist culture research This article is devoted to the evaluation of the personal contribution of the Russian mongolist A. M. Pozdneev into Buddhist culture research. Notable results of his two expeditions into Mongolian region were analyzed: complex description of the Mongol Buddhist monasteries in various aspects: management, religious practices, architecture and everyday life. Pozdneev's conceptualization of Mongol regional form of Buddhist culture was analyzed. Key words: Buddhism, Mongolia, the Russian expeditions. Касаткина З. А. Дирижерско-хоровая педагогика и образование в России на современном этапе Статья посвящена проблемам теории хорового дирижирования, методике преподавания дирижирования, а также вопросам полифункциональности данной профессии. Рассматривается проблема качественной подготовки и воспитания хорового дирижера высокой квалификации, выявление специфических дирижерских способностей, раскрытие понятия дирижерско-хоровая школа, определение основных методологических и теоретических аспектов основ системы хорового образования и исполнительства. Ключевые слова: теория хорового дирижирования, дирижерско-хоровое образование, педагог, музыкант, дирижерско-хоровая школа. Kasatkina Z. A. Choir Conducting Pedagogy and Education in Russia at Present Days The article is dedicated to theoretical questions of choir conducting, choir conducting teaching methodology as well as to questions related to multifunction of this profession. The author contemplates such issues as: education of highly qualified choir conductor, revelation of specific conductor skills, academic detailing of meaning for choir conducting school, determination of basic methodological and theoretical aspects of choir and performance educational system and its basis. Key words: theory of choir conducting, choir conducting education, pedagogue, musician, choir conducting school. Климов В. Ю. Светские власти, Рэннё, восьмой иерарх буддийской школы истинной веры Чистой Земли, и ее адепты в средневековой Японии В XVI в. крупные феодалы сэнгоку-даймё законодательными мерами стремились запретить деятельность адептов буддийской школы дзёдо синсю. Школа была основана Святым Синраном (1173-1263). Рэннё (1415-1499) в XV в. сумел создать мощную религиозную организацию. Он отстаивал основные положения Учения школы, борясь с искажениями и ересями. Ключевые слова: религиозное движение икко-икки, буддистская школа дзёдо синсю, Синран, Рэннё, буддистский храм Хонгандзи. Klimov V. J. In the XVI-th century feudal lords sengoku daimyo tried to prohibit the activities of religious followers of Buddhist school jodo shinshu by law The Buddhist school was founded by Saint Shinran (1173-1263). In the XV-th century Rennyo (1415-1499) managed to create a powerful religious organization. He was supporting main statements of the religious doctrine, and was fighting against its misinterpretations and heresies. Key words: Religious movement ikko-ikki, Buddhist school jodo shinshu, Shinran, Rennyo, Buddhist temple Honganji. Ларионова Д. Г. Лингвокультурные предпосылки формирования концепта родина Статья посвящена формированию концепта родина на фоне американской лингвокультуры. Анализируются типологические особенности русской и американской культур, обусловившие различия в значимости концепта для языкового сознания русских и американцев. Исследуются лингвокультурные предпосылки формирования концепта родина как базового концепта русской культуры. Сопоставляются переводные соответствия концепта в русском языке и американском варианте английского языка. Ключевые слова: родина, концепт, русская культура, американская культура, лингвокультура, Larionov D. G. Lingual-Cultural Premises of Formation of the Motherland Concept The article is dedicated to the formation of the motherland concept against the background of the American lingual culture. The typological features of the Russian and American cultures that cause different meaning of the concept in the lingual consciousness of the Russian and American people are analyzed. The lingual cultural premises of formation of the motherland concept as a basic concept of the Russian culture are considered. The translated equivalents of the concept in the Russian and American English are compared. Key words: motherland, concept, Russian culture, American culture, lingual culture. Марахонова С. И. Выдающийся исследователь японской художественной культуры Сергей Елисеев и его петроградское окружение Статья посвящена деятельности С. Елисеева в области искусств, которое было его центральным интересом, что дает повод историкам считать его, прежде всего, специалистом в области дальневосточной культуры и искусств. Елисеев начал свои исследовательские изыскания, обучаясь в Японии. Позже, в 1915-1920 в Петрограде он подготовил лекции по дальневосточному искусству для Государственного университета и других институтов. Елисеев прожил первое десятилетие в эмиграции в Париже, где он работал как хранитель японской коллекции в музее Гиме. Парижский период был самым плодотворным для научной деятельности. С 1934 по 1958 С. Елисеев профессор Гарвардского университета США и директор Института Гарварда. Ключевые слова: востоковедение, Сергей Елисеев, дальневосточное искусство, культура Японии и Китая. Marakhonova S. I. The Outstanding Far Easten Fine Arts'scholar Serge Elisseeff and His Petrograd Environment The article deals with Serge Elisseeff 's activities in the field of fine arts. This was one of his most great interests and he is considered by some people the history of Far Eastern culture and fine arts scholar first of all. Elisseeff began his fine arts studies when a student in Japan. Later in 1915-1920 in Petrograd he prepared a lot of lectures on Far Eastern fine arts at the state university and some other institutes. Elisseeff spent the first decade of his emigration from Russia in Paris where he worked as the Japanese collection keeper in the Guimet museum. The Paris period was the most productive for Elisseeff 's scientific publications most part of which belonged to fine arts' problems. From 1934 to 1958 Serge Elisseeff spent in the USA as the Harvard University professor and director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. Key words: Oriental studies, Sergey Yeliseyev, Far East arts, culture of Japan and China. Матюшкина Е. Н. Тип героя в исторических романах Б. Окуджавы В статье делается попытка создания типологии героя в исторической прозе Б. Окуджавы. Для этого рассмотрены произведения Бедный Авросимов, Похождения Шипова или Старинный водевиль, Свидание с Бонапартом, Путешествие дилетантов. В романах Окуджавы происходит трансформация героя середины XX века, наблюдается своеобразная модификация образов маленького человека (Авросимов, Шипов, Опочинин), лишнего человека (Мятлев). Ключевые слова: историческая проза, типология героя, маленький человек, лишний человек. Matyshkina E. N. Type the Hero in Historical Novels B. Okudzhava The seeks to make a typology of the hero in historical prose B. Okudzhava. To do this, consider the product Poor Avrosimov, The Adventures Shipova or old vaudeville, Rendezvous with Bonaparte, Journey dilettantes. In the novels there is a transformation of the hero Okudzhava mid XX century, there has been a kind of modification of images of the little man (Avrosimov, Shipov, Opochinin), superfluous man (Myatlev). Key words: historical prose, the typology of the hero, little man, superfluous man. Махлина С. Т. Значение Эдварда Саида в современной культуре и культурологи Доминантным аспектом современной культуры является глобализация. Конечно, это явление имеет черты двойственности. Основные особенности глобализации очень ярко воплотились в судьбе и творчестве Эдварда Вади Саида (1 ноября 1935 г. 25 сентября 2003 г.). И жизнь, и творчество, и политическая, и общественная деятельность его настолько двойственны, что отражают все противоречия глобализации. Фигура Эдварда Саида весьма 320 показательна для современной эпохи и, несомненно, значима для современной культуры и культурологии. Ключевые слова: глобализация, культура, культурология, Запад, Восток, ислам. Mahlina S. T. Edward Said's Value in Modern Culture and Cultural Science Globalisation is a dominant aspect of modern culture. This phenomenon is surely of dual nature. Main features of globalization are embodied in the art and life of Edward Wadie Said (1.11.1935-25.09.2003). His art and life, his political and social activity, are so ambiguous that reflect all controversies of globalization. Edward Said is a representative figure of the modern times and is definitely significant for the modern culture and culture studies. Key words: globalization, culture, culture studies, West, East, Islam. Микитюк Ю. М. Категории органической теории в идеологии почвенников В статье рассматриваются основные положения органической теории, раскрывается ее место в идеологии почвенничества. Анализ таких понятий, как народность, нация позволяет раскрыть решение почвенниками проблемы соотношения национального и общечеловеческого. Ключевые слова: органическая теория, нация, народ, почва, Григорьев, Страхов, Достоевский. Mikityuk Y. M. The Organic Theory in Ideology of Pochvenniks This article discusses the basic statements of the ''organic theory', it also reveals its place in the ideology of Pochvennichestvo. The analysis of such concepts as nation, nationality, nation may allow to solve the problem of the relationship between national and universal by representatives of this ideology. Key words: the organic theory, nation, people, national, soil, Grigoriev, Strahov, Dostoevsky. Михайлова М. В. Классический текст как личное бытие Классический текст рассматривается с позиций онтологической эстетики как один из видов личного бытия. Метафизическая потребность, лежащая в основе искусства, особенным образом реализуется в литературе. Благодаря совершенному тексту, гармонично соединяющему стратегии значения и присутствия, становится возможным эстетическое событие встречи автора, читателя и языка, имеющее важнейшим своим следствием перенастройку личности в согласии человека и мира. Ключевые слова: классика, текст, бытие, язык, автор, читатель. Mikhailova M. V. Classical Text as a Personal Being The article deals with the problem of classical text considered from the point of view of ontological esthetics as a kind of personal existence. The metaphysical requirement underlying art, is realized in literature in a special way. Thanks to the perfect text harmoniously connecting meaning and presence strategies, an esthetic event of a meeting of the author, the reader and the language become possible. Key words: classics, text, being, language, author, reader. Муравьев К. В. Два модуса триадологии А. Ф. Лосева В статье рассматривается триадология известного русского философа Алексея Федоровича Лосева, которая соединяет в себе диалектические начала античной философии и христианское православное богословие. Ключевые слова: триадология, ипостась, онтология, неоплатонизм, диалектика. Muravyev K. V. Two Modi of A. F. Losew's Triadology In the article triadology of noted Russian philosopher Alexey Losew which unites the dialectic principles of an ancient philosophy and Christian orthodox divinity is considered. Key words: triadology, hipostasis, ontology, Neo-platonism, dialectics. Островская Е. А. Теория традиционных религиозных идеологий: методологические возможности и горизонты применимости Статья посвящена презентации принципиально нового подхода к социологическому исследованию процессов институционализации религиозных систем. Методологическое ядро разработанного автором подхода составляет теория традиционных религиозных идеологий, содержащая в себе концептуальный инструментарий для изучения религиозных идеологий Запада и Востока. Авторское рассмотрение сфокусировано на теоретико-методологическом разъяснении таких ключевых концепций этой теории, как традиционные религии, религиозная модель общества, аналитическая схема институционализации религиозных систем. Особый интерес представляет предложенная в статье демонстрация методологических возможностей теории в аспекте преодоления эпистемологической ограниченности постхристианских академических моделей изучения религий. Ключевые слова: религиозные идеологии, социология религии, эпистемологические основания научного изучения религий Ostrowskaya E. A. Theory of Traditional Religious Ideologies: Methodological Capabilities and Horizons of Applicability The article presents a new approach to sociological study of religious systems institutionalization processes. In the core of this approach there is a theory of traditional religious ideologies, as providing a methodological tool for analysis of religious ideologies in the context of Western and Asian societies. The focus is brought to the theoretical and methodological clarifications to three key concepts of the theory that are traditional religions, religious model of society and analytical scheme of religious systems institutionalization. The demonstration of their methodological applicability is of great importance for comprehending epistemological limits of post-Christian scientific models for studies of religion. Key words: religious ideologies, sociology of religion, epistemology of scientific studies of religion. Островский А. Б. Категория замирщение в нормативных документах беспоповцев XIX начала XX в. Термин замирщение, употребленный впервые в конце XVII в. федосеевцами, в течение двух столетий прошел эволюцию: первоначально он выражал противостояние христиане (федосеевцы) / (отлученные, новожены, мирские), а во второй половине XIX в. уже служил мерой для оценки степени утраты благочестия конкретным членом беспоповской общины ввиду недозволенных контактов с иноверными в трапезе, совместной помывке в бане и др. ситуациях общения. Ключевые слова: старообрядцы, межконфессиональные отношения, федосеевцы, поморцы, замирщение. Ostrovsky A. B. The Category of Zamirshenie in Bespopovtsian (a Priestless Sect of Russian Old Believers) Regulations of the 19thand Early 20th Century The evolution of the term zamirshenie first used by the Fedoseetsy in the late 17th century: originally representing the opposition between Christians (Fedoseevtsy) and excommunicates, Novojeny (unionists recognizing marriage), and laity, and in the second part of the 19th century censuring imperfect piousness of individual members of priestless community found guilty of inadmissible contacts with adherents of different creed at meals, in a bathhouse or in other communicative situations. Key words: old believers, inter-confessional relations, fedoseevtsy, pomortsy, zamirshenie. Плебанек О. В. Цивилизационная матрица как категория геополитики Современные направления научных исследований глобалистика, геополитика потребовали и нового категориального аппарата. Традиционные понятия, такие как цивилизация, наполняются новым смыслом, на их базе возникают новые категории, такие как геоцивилизация, цивилизационная матрица, алгоритмы цивилизационной динамики и др. Использование новых и относительно новых понятий в новом контексте требует научного обоснования. Нестрогое, многозначное понимание научных категорий снижает их методологическое значение. Ключевые слова: глобалистика, геополитика, цивилизация, геоцивилизация, цивилизационная матрица, алгоритмы цивилизационной динамики. Plebanek O. V. Civilizational Matrix as the category of geopolitics Modern directions of scientific researches global studies, geopolitics have demanded also new categorial the language. Traditional concepts, such as a civilization, are filled with new sense, on their base there are new categories, such as a geocivilization, civilizational a matrix, algorithms civilizational dynamics, etc. Use new and concerning new concepts of a new context demands a scientific substantiation. Not strict, multiple-valued understanding of scientific categories reduces their methodological value. Key words: global studies, geopolitics, a civilisation, a geocivilization, civilization a matrix, algorithms civilizational dynamics. Прокуденкова О. В. Роль географического фактора в культурологической концепции Л. И. Мечникова В статье рассматривается культурологическая концепция выдающегося русского ученого Л. И. Мечникова. Отмечается особое внимание к проблеме географического детерминизма и роли природных условий в генезисе и развитии цивилизаций. Показано, что Мечников обосновывал своеобразие историко-культурного развития географическим фактором, главным из которых была гидросфера водное пространство, ставшее общим объединяющим признаком классификации мировых цивилизаций: речные, морские и океанические. Ключевые слова: географический фактор, гидросфера, цивилизация, географический детерминизм, культурогенез. Prokudenkova O. V. Role of Geographical Factor in the L. I. Mechnikov's Culturological Concept In the article, the culturological concept of outstanding Russian scientist L. I. Mechnikov is considered. Special attention to the problem of geographical determinism and role of environment in genesis and development of civilizations is paid. It is shown that Mechnikov saw the reason of originality of historical and cultural development in geographical factor, mainly, in hydrosphere, as water space is general uniting sign of classification of world civilizations: those of river, sea, and ocean. Key words: geographical factor, hydrosphere, civilization, geographical determinism, genesis of culture. Регинская Н. В. Александр Невский как символ национальной идентичности в современном искусстве Повышенное внимание, уделяемое Александру Невскому сегодня, связано как с незаурядной личностью Благоверного князя, так и с потребностью восстановления национальных символов новой России. Святому Александру Невскому принадлежит роль выдающегося русского героя. Закономерно обращение современного искусства к героике Благоверного князя Александра Невского, изображение которого своеобразно своей двойственностью: сакральноиконографичным содержанием и экспериментально-светской манерой исполнения. Ключевые слова: иконография, традиция, экспериментальное искусство, духовноиконологическое течение, иконная драматургия Reginsky N. V. Alexander Nevsky as a Symbol of National Identity in the Modern Art An increased attention is paid nowadays to Alexander Nevsky owing to the remarkable individuality of the Blessed Knyazh as well as to the need of renewal of New Russia's national symbols. Saint Alexander Nevsky has a role of an outstanding Russian hero. Modern Art logically addresses the heroic stories of the Blessed Knyazh Alexander Nevsky, whose image is peculiar due to its ambivalence: its sacral-iconographic content and experimentally secular manner of fulfillment. Key words: Iconography, Tradition, Experimental Art, Spiritually-Iconological Trend, Iconic Drama. Рысаков А. С. Основные тенденции в конфуцианстве эпохи Цин Статья посвящена аналитическому рассмотрению истории конфуцианского учения в XVII-XIX вв. Рассматриваются различные аспекты трансформации конфуцианства каноноведение, психотехника, доктрина, ритуальные практики. Восстанавливается политический контекст функционирования конфуцианских школ и направлений. Исследуются доктринальные позиции наиболее значимых конфуцианских ученых цинского времени. Ключевые слова: китайская философия, история конфуцианства, история Китая Нового времени. Rysakov A. S. Major Trends in the Qing Dynasty Confucianism The article is devoted to analytical consideration of the history of Confucian teachings in XVII-XIX centuries. Various aspects of the transformation of Confucianism: canon studies, psychotechnique, doctrine, ritual practice are considered. The political context of functioning of Confucian schools and directions is analyzed, as well as the doctrinal position of the most important Qing time Confucian scholars. Key words: Chinese philosophy, the history of Confucianism, Chinese History. 324 Рысакова П. И. Социокультурная специфика женского образования в традиционном китайском обществе Настоящая статья посвящена выявлению социокультурной специфики женского образования в традиционном китайском обществе. Основное внимание уделено анализу конфуцианских доктринальных предписаний, в соответствии с которыми выстраивались ценностно-нормативные представления о социальном статусе и роли женщины в китайском обществе. Рассматривается педагогический идеал традиционного женского образования. Ключевые слова: конфуцианство, женское образование, четыре женские добродетели, талант. Rysakova P. I. Socio-Cultural Specifics of Women Education in Traditional Chinese Society The article deals with the problem of specific features of female education in Chinese traditional society. It primarily focuses on analysis of the doctrine of Confucianism which regulated the normative expectations of women's social status and role in Chinese society. The aim of women's traditional education is considered. Key words: Confucianism, female education, four women's virtues, talent. Свиридова Л. О. Олицетворение ада в Чине погребению священническому В статье изложены результаты наблюдений над постканоническими восточнохристианскими гимнографическими памятниками на церковно-славянском языке. В центре рассмотрения отличительная черта гимнографической образности: олицетворение не только ада, но и рая, космологических уровней, природных объектов и стихий. В образной системе гимнографического текста выявляются космологический и антропоморфический семиотические коды. Ключевые слова: гимнография, книги церковного обихода кирилловской печати, Потребник, семиотические коды, космологические представления. Sviridova L. O. Embodiment of Hell in theOrder of Priestly Burial The results of observation of Eastern Christian post-canonical hymnographic memorials in the Old Church Slavonic language are given in the article. The central idea of the research is the main feature of the hymnographic imagery the embodiment not only of Hell, but of Heaven, cosmological levels, natural objects and elements. In the system of hymnographic texts cosmological and antropomorphic semiotic codes are presented. Key words: hymnography, church books of Cyril print, Potrebnik, semiotic codes, cosmological views. Селивановский В. В. Сциентистские элементы вероучения Движения Веры Сциентизм в теистической религии парадоксален. Этот феномен вероучения неопятидесятнического Движения Веры побуждает обратиться к анализу его генеалогических корней, теологии и эпистемологии. Крайний фидеизм и далёкое от научной рациональности отрицание чувственного опыта позволяет говорить не о сциентистской ориентации сознания, а о квазинаучном флёре, прикрывающем магический характер практики. Ключевые слова: сциентизм, Движение Веры, метафизическое движение, Новое Мышление, закон веры. Selivanovskiy V. V. Scientistic elements of the Word-Faith Movement's doctrine A claim for scientism in theistic religion is paradoxical. This doctrinal phenomenon of the neo-Pentecostal Word-Faith Movement encourages analysis of its genealogical beginnings, theology and epistemology. Extreme forms of fideism and rejection of the sentient experience, which is foreign to the scientific rationality, do not reveal a scientistic orientation of consciousness but rather a quasi-scientific fleur, employed to disguise the magical nature of the movement's practices. Key words: scientism, Word-Faith Movement, metaphysical movement, New Thought, law of faith. Скоморох Олег А., протоиерей. История тюремного служения христианской церкви в связи с пенитенциарными реформами XVIII-XIX вв. Статья касается вопросов, относящихся к истории тюремного служения христианской Церкви в период пенитенциарных реформ США, Великобритании и России XVIII-XIX веков, когда определялась позиция государств и общества, направленная на христианизацию и гуманизацию тюремного заключения вообще и нравственного исправления заключенных, в частности. Цель статьи ознакомить миссионеров Христианской Церкви, совершающих тюремное служение, с развитием и становлением тюремной миссии, как части государственных систем исполнения наказания. Ключевые слова: тюремное служение, миссия, пенитенциарные реформы, капелланство, Церковь и общество. Skomorokh Oleg A. History of Prison Service of Christian Church in Connection with Penitential Reforms during XVIII-XIX Cent. The article touches upon some questions concerning the history of prison ministry of the Christian Church during penitential reforms in the USA, the Great Britain and Russia in the course of XVIII-XIX centuries, when humanizing and Christianizing position towards the Penal Executive System in general and moral correcting of prisoners in details was taking its shape in those states and societies. The objective of the article is to acquaint the Christian Church's missionaries, carrying out prison ministry, with the progress and development of prison mission, as parts of state Penal Executive Systems. Key words: prison ministry, mission, penitential reforms, chaplaincy, Church and society. Фадеева Т. Ф. Повседневные элементы духовной средневековой культуры. Искусство квадрвиума: Музыка В статье предполагается предварительный обзор культурологических аспектов средневековой системы образования. Автор рассматривает некоторые аспекты формирования хоральной культуры как многоступенчатой духовно-музыкальной системы. Ключевые слова: Средние века, образование, музыка, церковная культура, искусство. Fadeeva T. F. The Everyday Elements of the Spiritual Medieval Culture. Art of Quadrivium: Music The article assumes a tentative review of the culturological aspects of the medieval educational system. The author distinguishes some aspects of forming of choral culture as many-staged spiritual-music system. Key words: Middle Ages, education, music, church culture, art. Федорова М. В. Семиотика свадебных украшений бурят В статье рассматриваются украшения бурят как предметный код свадебного ритуала, на широком этнографическом материале анализируется синкретичная структура их семиотических функций. Свадебные украшения несли в себе продуцирующую, апотропейную символику, были связаны с представлениями о жизненной силе, являлись маркерами обретения невестой нового социально-возрастного статуса. В качестве основных источников использованы вещевые коллекции Российского этнографического музея, Музея антропологии и этнографии им. Петра Великого РАН, научные публикации. Ключевые слова: украшения, свадебный наряд, семиотический, символ. Fedorova M. V. Semiotics of Buryats'wedding jewelry The subject of the report is the jewelry as an objective code of the wedding ritual. The author analyses the syncretic structure of their semiotic functions on a broad ethnographic material. The wedding jewelry have productive, protective symbolism, were associated with notions of vitality, and were the markers of a bride new-age social status. As the main sources, the author used the collections of objects of the Russian Museum of Ethnography, the Peter the Great's Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (Kunstkamera), and scientific publications. Key words: jewelry, wedding dress, semiotic, symbol. Филиппова Ю. В. Мифологические аспекты в понятии сознания В статье рассматриваются мифологические аспекты сознания, их влияние на возникновение новой формы познания философии, онтологические предпосылки структур времени и памяти, а также сновидение как компонент мофопоэтического сознания и постепенный переход к рефлексии. Ключевые слова: сознание, миф, рефлексия, время, память, реальность, сновидение. Philippova J. V. Mythological Aspects of the Notion of Consciousness The article deals with mythological aspects of consciousness, their influence on genesis of a new form of cognition philosophy, also ontological suppositions of temporal and memorable structures, and dreaming as an element of mythopoetical consciousness and gradual conversion to reflection. Key words: consciousness, myth, reflection, time, memory reality, dream. Чистякова Э. Э. Скандинавское влияние в русской художественной культуре XIX-XX веков Переломная эпоха XIX-XX веков изменила представление о взаимодействии русского и западноевропейского искусства. Для преодоления изоляции русской культуры было необходимо познакомить русских художников и общество с состоянием искусства за рубежом. Выставки скандинавских художников, организованные в конце XIX века, открыли национально-романтическое искусство северных соседей России и дали пример вступления на общеевропейский путь развития без утраты национальных особенностей. Скандинавское влияние оставило заметный след на русской архитектуре рубежа веков, особенно в северной столице. Знакомство с достижениями скандинавского искусства расширило творческие возможности и позволило русским художникам оказаться причастными к наиболее значительным событиям художественной жизни рубежа веков. Ключевые слова: скандинавское влияние, русские художники, северный модерн, С. П. Дягилев, А. Галлен-Каллела, А. Эдельфельт, Мир искусства. Chistjakova E. E. Scandinavian Influence in the Russian Artistic Culture of XIX-XX Centuries The turning age of the XIX-XX centuries changed the idea about Russian and West European Art interaction. To bridge the Russian culture isolation it was necessary to introduce the status of the foreign culture to Russian artists and the society. The exhibitions of Scandinavian painters arranged at the end of the XIX century showed National Romanticism of Nordic neighbours to Russia and gave an example of entering European way of development with no national peculiarities losses. Scandinavian Influence had a visible affect on Russian architecture at the turn of the century especially in the North Capital of Russia. Making the acquaintance with Scandinavian Art achievements enhanced creative opportunities and made Russian artists participate in more significant artistic life events of the turn of the century. Key words: Scandinavian influence, Russian artists, Nordic Art Nouveau, Sergey P. Diaghilev, Akseli Gallen-Kallela, Albert G. Edelfelt, The Art World. Шомахмадов С. Х. Космография Южной Азии в письменных памятниках вишнуитской и буддийской традиций В статье дан сравнительный анализ вишнуитской и буддийской космологических систем. Отмечается, что радиально-кольцевая морфология земной поверхности характерна как для буддийской, так и для вишнуитской традиции. Числовая семантика материков, представленная в космографии Южной Азии, демонстрирует, что ойкумена осмыслялась как совершенная, идеологически отражающая непрерывность двух традиций. Общим для обеих традиций является признание человеческой формы рождения как единственно благой, дающей возможность достижения окончательного освобождения (мокша, нирвана). Ключевые слова: космография, буддизм, индуизм, Индия, сакральные центры Shomakhmadov S. H. The South Asia's Cosmography in the Texts of Vaishnavist and Buddhist Traditions The comparative analysis of the Vaishnavist and Buddhist cosmological systems is given in this article. It is noticed that the radially-ring morphology of a terrestrial surface is characteristic both for Buddhist, and for Vaishnavist traditions. The numerical semantics of continents presented in the Southern Asia's cosmography shows that ecumena was comprehended as the perfect, ideologically reflecting continuity of two traditions. The general for both traditions is the acceptance of the human birth form as a unique good, giving the chance for achievements of definitive clearing (moksha, nirvana). Key words: cosmography, Buddhism, Hinduism, India, sacral centers.

The Mercury December, 1908 HEEP THOSE WHO HEEP US. The Intercollegiate Bureau of Academic Costume. Cotrell & Leonard, ALBANY, N. Y. 2**£™°I CAPS AND GOWNS TII Gettysburg College. Lafayette, Lchigh. Dickinson, State College, Univ. of Penn s> Ivani i. Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Wellesley, Bryn Mawr and the others. Class Contracts a Specialty. Correct Hoods _»»■ Degrees. The College Man's Opportunity. We offer the Surest Means of finding your right place. Hundreds of good positions open in business, in teaching and in technical work. Offices in 12 cities. Write us to-day. TUB JYMTJOJVJZ, OB»^JVIZJlTIOJV Of BXAIJV BHOXBJtS. Commonwealth Trust Building, Philadelphia, Pa. HOTEL GETTYSBURG, Headquarters for BANQUETS. Electric Lights, Steam Heat, All Conveniences. Free Bus to and from station. Convenient for Commencement Visitors. BATES $2.00 PEB DAY. £iver-y Cttad-ied. Jotin P. M^tifl- Proprietor. DEALERS IN All kinds of Fresh and Smoked Meats Chambersburg St., Gettysburg, Pa. WE RECOMMEND THESE FIRMS. Established 1867 by Allen Walton. ALLEN K. WALTON, Pres. and Treas. ROBT. J. WALTON, Supt. Hummelstown Brown Stone Company, QUARRYMEN and Manufacturers of BUILDING STONE, SAWED FLAGGING and TILE. WalioTwille, 33a.-LiprT.-Ln. -&o., Pa,. CONTRACTORS FOR ALL KINDS OF CUT STONE WORK. Telegrapn and Express Address, Brownstone, Pa. Parties visit-ing quarries will leave cars at Brownstone Station on the P. & R. R. R. For Artistic Photographs Go To TIPTOJV The Leader in PHOTO FASHIONS Frames and Passapartouts Made to Order. PATRONISE OUR ADVERTISERS Come and Have a Good Shave or Hair Cut —AT— Harry B. Sefton's BARBER SHOP. 35 Baltimore St. Barber's Supplies a Specialty. Also choice line of Cigars. SHOES REPAIRED -BY-Charles Hartdagen, Middle St., Opp. Court House, GUARANTEE ALL WORK. GETTYSBURG DEPARTMENT STOKE. Successors to the L. M. Alleman Hardware Co., Manufacturer's Agent and Jobber of HARDWARE, OILS, PAINTS AND QUEENSWARE, GETTYSBURG, PA. Vke only Jobbing House in Adams County. PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. 2 * * » | Seligniqi] I * % 1 ^ B^etim | !t ** 2 Are Gettysburg's Most * * * aV * « v. « «» V* t- * * * * -3 Reliable TAILORS #»»**###*#**#*****»*** PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. i^l^^^^i^^^^^^i^i^^i^^r'i^M^l^.y^yi^-^i^^i^: as ;!. .1.1I ■>!•■ II IIfI Essentially the instruments for criti-cal and discriminating- buyers. Super-ior in every detail of construction and superb instruments for the production of a great Variety of musical effects and the finest shades of expression. Close Prices. Easy Terms. Old Instruments Exchanged. WEAVER ORGAN AND PIANO CO., MANUFACTURERS, YORK, PA , U S A. \&i^iAtt%zi&Zfc5%'i$te*&*&M$',?¥:&& s Headquarters —FOR-HATS, SHOES, A*TD GENT'S FURNISHING. Sole Agent lor WALK-OVER SHOE EGBERT'S STORE. Prices Always Right Itje Lutheran Mlieirtloji Society No 1424 Arch Street, PHILADELPHIA, PA Acknowledged Headquarters for anything and everything in the way of Books for Churches, Colleges, Families and Schools, and literature for Sunday Schools. PLEASE REMEMBER That by sending your orders to us you help build up and develop one of the church in-stitutions with pecuniary ad-vantage to yourself. Address HENRY 8. BONER, Supt, THE KAERCURV The Literary Journal of Gettysburg College. VOL. XVI GETTYSBURG, PA., DECEMBER, 1908 No. 7 CONTENTS. A CHRISTMAS POEM 2 E. J. BOWMAN, '11. JUSTIFICATION OP THE BOYCOTT 3 E. E. SNTDER, '09. CONSTITUTION OP THE KEYSTONE DEBATING LEAGUE 7 IS THE GOVERNMENT COSTING US TOO MUCH?. 9 P. S. DENGLER, '09. OUR LITERARY SOCIETIES II.—PHRENA 11 WHY IS GETTYSBURG NOT WEALTHY? 13 ST. G. PHILLIPY, '09. THE JUNIOR "PROM" SOCIALLY CONSIDERED. .15 BIOGRAPHY OF SCHILLER 17 MISS BAUSCH, '11. CULTURE'S DISTRESSING FOE 20 G. E. WOLF, '09. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE LINCOLN ROAD.22 G. L. KIEFFER, '09. THE "INDIAN STEPS." 23 E. C. STOUFFER, '11. THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FARMER; WHAT IS IT LIKELY TO BE WORTH? 25 MISS HELEN H. BRENNEMAN, '08. EDITORIALS 27 BOOK REVIEWS 29 EXCHANGES 30 THE MERCURY A CHRISTMAS POEM. E. J. BOWMAN, '11. .Behold the earth in solemn stillness lies! Again, his course traversed, the king of day Has sunk beneath the distant mountain tops. No longer glows in radiance the sky, But silent night enshrouds the wearied earth. No sound of man or beast comes forth to break The charm that over all has cast its spell. And far above from out the folds of heaven's Aetherial dome, the stars innumerable and Sublime are smiling on the earth below. All nature bows her head in reverence, thus- The God of Peace to laud and magnify. 'Twas such a night when from far Eastern lands, O'er mountains high, through valleys deep, Wise Men? Their way were tracing, guided by a star Outshining all the innumerable host That spangled all the heaven's majestic dome- When lo o'er Judah's city, Bethlehem, It stopped, and there, within a lowly hut, Behold, asleep within a manger lay The Holy One, the Buler of the Wise, By seers announced and prophets long before- 'Twas such a night when on the rolling hills O'erlooking David's City, Bethlehem, The humble shepherds, holy and devout, Their flocks were guarding from the hostile foe That roamed o'er hill and plain in quest of prey- When lo, the glory of the living God Around them shown, and, standing in their midst They saw the form of One divine in robe Of heavenly light, and in a tender voice The Messenger addressed the shepherds thus: "Fear not, I bring you tidings of great joy, THE MERCURY. To you, I bring them and to all mankind: In yonder Bethlehem is born this day A child, who is your Saviour and your Lord." Then while the shepherds filled with awe, o'er this Mysterious scene were meditating deep, Their gaze beheld a heavenly host in robes Of shining white around the Messenger Of love. Then forth upon the hallowed night The mellow strains of heavenly music broke, And there alone by God's own chosen few "Was heard the anthem of the Christmas-tide: "To God on high be glory evermore And upon earth goodwill and peace to men." JUSTIFICATION OF THE BOYCOTT. E. E. SNYDER, '09. JHE justification of the boycott is by no means an easy task. Its practice and its underlying principle have always been questioned and in view of the advanced and radical ground taken by both its advocates and its opponents, a careful study of the boycott, its history, its develop-ment, its modern forms, and its ultimate object, is necessary to enable us to pass judgment upon it, either favorable or unfavor-able. The term originated in 1880 when Captain Boycott, an Eng-lishman, who was the agent of Lord Barne in the Connemara district of Ireland, became so obnoxious because of his harsh treatment of the tenants, that they retaliated by inducing the people for miles around to have nothing whatever to do with him. They would neither speak to him, work for him; buy from him, sell to him, or in any way connect themselves with him. More than this they resorted to violence and even blood-shed, to prevent others from doing so. But this was not the ori-gin of the practice although it gave rise to the term. The prac- 4 THE MERCURY. tice extends almost as far back as history itself. In 1327 the citizens of Canterbury, England, boycotted the monks of Christ's Church. They refused to inhabit the houses of the prior, and passed an ordinance that no one should buy, sell, or exchange drink or victuals with the monastery. A severe punishment was provided against the disobedience of the order. The first use of the boycott in America was during the period just preceding the Eevolution, when the colonists boycotted several articles of British make. This culminated in the Boston Tea Part}', which was advocated and supported by our best and most patriotic citizens. Thus the advocates of the boycott claim that it was born in the cradle of American liberty. It was a great weapon, used by the Abolutionists against slavery, and it has often been used by ministers and others prominent in the social world against intemperance, immorality and other social evils. It has been used by the Manufacturer's Association against the work-ingmen, but here it is known as the "black list," and in this form it has ruined thousands of poor laborers. It has also been used by the laborers, in retaliation against the capitalists and it is this use which represents what we today recognize as the boy-cott. Thus from its history we might define boycott in its original usage, as meaning a combination of many to cause loss to one person by refusing to have any relations with him and by influ-encing and coercing others to treat him in like manner. In re-taliation for some wrong either real or imaginary, they withdraw from the victim all beneficial intercourse and even resort to force, in order to persuade others to do likewise. Today the term boy-cott means a combination of many usually organized working-men against an individual or a combination, through which they seek by withdrawing their support and services to secure redress for some infringement upon their rights. It,is this use that we would attempt to justify. The boycott, as has been mentioned, is but another name for the "black list," although it is usually practiced with a nobler end in view. The boycott usually seeks redress for wrongs, while the "black list" disregards the justice of its object and seeks only additional advantages by this coercive means. Yet the capital-ists raise a great cry of injustice when the boycott appears,, and shall be defined by the college that submits the question. THE MERCURY. lose no time in making their appeal to the courts for injunction and protection, although they are daily and yearly practicing the same principle against the laborer who can seek justice through no other means. But in this case it is the poor man's ox, that is gored instead of the rich man's, and if he would resist or seek redress, he is pointed out as dangerously affected by socialistic principles, and often suffers for trying to maintain a right guar-anteed to all by our Constitution. In practice, also, the boycott has changed, and few of the ob-noxious and injurious characteristics of the ancient boycott re-main. The boycott, as practiced at present, as has been stated, is simply the ostracism of an individual or organization, by an organization in order to secure, what they believe to be their rights. It may result in great pecuniary loss to the victim and because of this fact has often been restrained by injunction, but ■no violence attaches to it; no personal harm or injury, and in many cases individual bitterness has been eliminated. No force or coercion is used outside the obligations of membership in the contending organization, although, this fact is often changed, .and it is true that many organizations do take up the fight in sympathy. It is, when rightly used, but an effective weapon in the hands of the laborer by the use of which he is able to secure consideration and justice, when other means have failed, and as such its use is justifiable. From the laborer's standpoint its use possesses considerable economic importance, for it is only by its use, through the me-dium of his organization that he can battle, with any degree of success against the oftimes higher intelligence and more perfect organization of his employers, the capitalists. In this age, the tendency of each class, seems to be to gain wealth regardless of the loss, they may occasion. To the laborers, the boycott, is one of the few barriers that stand between him and a lower standard of living, which would be the inevitable result, were these barriers removed. Our eco-nomic welfare depends upon progress in every class. If the laborer is to share this progress he must advance and not recede. He must raise his standard of living, his culture and his edu- •cation instead of lowering them. To do this he must be in con-tinual conflict with the capitalist, who is his superior in educa- THE MERCURY. tion, and had an additional advantage because of his capital. The boycott has proved to be one of the few things which the •capitalists have not been able to overcome, and as its use enables the laborers to maintain his ground in the conflict for advance-ment, it is certainly justifiable. The boycott can also be regarded, as simply the practice of the right guaranteed to each citizen by our government, to say, write, or publish, anything he wishes, on his own responsibility. This is what the laborer claims for the boycott. He certainly has the right to govern his own words and dealings and to use his influence with others so long as he advocates a just cause and uses no coercive measures to secure adherents. This represents the workingman's idea of the boycott, and while it must be ad-mitted that it is here pictured in its most favorable form, and •that it is seldom practiced within the prescribed limits, yet the argument is founded upon a basis of justice and many decisions of higher courts have recognized this fact. As a last claim, we would advance the boycott, as the only ef-fective weapon against the "black list." No man has a right to work permanent ruin to another because of individual difference of opinion nor has an organization a similar right, and since the employer often uses this means against the employee, the laborer has a right to defend himself by the boycott. It is a hard and bitter solution to the problem. It is the Old Testament dispen-sation, "An eye for an eye." but when we consider that the con- 'ditions, from an ethical standpoint are far from normal, we must be satisfied if they do require abnormal means. Thus would we justify the boycott, from an economical view-point, but when we turn on our question the light of an ethical culture, we find it again questionable and we are compelled to ask ourselves the question, "Is there in the business activity of today, as represented by the masses on both sides, a point where ;an individual can retain pure ethical ideals and secure true eco-nomic good?" Perhaps in the masses there is not, but it is pleasing to note that here and there in the great business hustle of our age, we see sturdy advocates of a higher principle emerg-ing from the ranks of both contestants and when these shall have gained a majority the justification of the boycott will be impos-sible, but not until then. THE MERCURY. 7 CONSTITUTION OF THE KEYSTONE DEBATING LEAGUE. ARTICLE I. NAME AND MEMBERSHIP. This organization shall be known as the Keystone Inter-Colle-giate Debating League and shall have the following members: Bueknell, Lafayette and Gettysburg Colleges. ARTICLE II. PURPOSE. The purpose of this organization shall be to increase interest in debating in each of the colleges represented and to encourage inter-collegiate debating. ARTICLE III. ORGANIZATION. The executive committee shall consist of one undergraduate from each college represented and shall meet annually at the time and place of the final debate to transact all business of the League. ARTICLE IV. CONTESTANTS. Each college shall send to the contest in which it participates three representatives. Contestants shall be regularly enrolled students in the collegiate department taking at least ten hours of recitation or lecture work per week. The names of the de-baters and alternate shall be submitted to the opposing team at least ten days before the debate. No college shall protest the-eligibility of a debater later than five days before the debate. ARTICLE V. SELECTION OF QUESTION. The question for debate shall be submitted not later than six weeks and returned not later than five weeks before the debate is to be held. The college that receives the question shall select sides. No college shall submit the question to the other college twice in succession. Terms in the question, if not understood. THE MERCURY. ARTICLE VI. JUDGES. The college at which the debate is held shall submit to the visiting team at least four weeks before the debate the names of prospective judges. The visiting team may strike from the list any of "the names and shall return the remainder within one week designating the order of preference. No personal friend of any contestant and no one having had student of official relations with either of the colleges involved, shall be eligible for appoint-ment as judges. At the close of the contest, without conference-with his associates, each of the three judges, deciding for him-self, shall give his vote duly signed and sealed to the presiding officer who shall announce the decision. The judges shall base their decision on argument and composition and delivery; argu-ment to count sixty per cent., composition and delivery forty per cent. ARTICLE VII. CONTEST. The college at which the debate is held shall select the presid-ing officer. Each debater shall have fifteen minutes; ten min-utes for his opening speech and five minutes for rebuttal. The first speech in rebuttal shall be made by the negative, and the-affirmative shall close the debate. The order of speakers in re-buttal shall be left to the discretion of the respective teams. No> new material shall be introduced in rebuttal speeches. ARTICLE VIII. EXPENSES. At the annual meeting of the Executive Committee, each col-lege shall present an itemized statement of its expenses necessary for the year. This expense shall be born equally by the colleges-of the League. TIIE MERCURY. IS THE GOVERNMENT COSTING US TOO MUCH. F. S. DEX3LER, '09. F wo except the most active period of the Civil War, the total drafts upon the Treasury of the U. S. during the past Congresshavebeengreater than at any period in our history. The total appropriations made by Congress dur-ing the Civil War were $1,309,000,000 of which $1,030,000,000 was spent upon the army. The appropriations for the fiscal year 1909 reached a total of $1,007,000,000. In these days, when private fortunes sometimes run up to a hundred million dollars we are liable not to realize how large a sum a billion dol-lars really is. It would take an expert counter, working eight hours a day, over one hundred years to count a billion silver ■dollars. A billion dollars in twenty dollar bills would make a pile 13,750 feet high. What is all this money used for? The expenditures may be classed under three general heads: Postal Service, $225,000,000. Military Service, $500,000,000. Other Government Service, $225,000,000. The largest appropriation for a single department was that for the post office. The postal service is one of the greatest utilities which the government gives to the people and one which the peo-ple can appreciate every day. The post offices scattered all over the land turn into the postal department a large revenue each year but it is not sufficient to run the service. The quarter of a billion dollars is disbursed through many channels. The sal-aries of postmasters, clerks, carriers and messengers total in the millions. The railroads come in for a large amount for carrying the mail. The rural delivery was established in recent years at a cost of about $25,000,000. A bill was proposed at the last Congress to establish a rural parcels post, but it was not passed. The most significant feature of the appropriations during the year is the great amount of attention that has been given to the building up of the military branch of the government. The ex-penditures for the army and navy, if we leave out of account the years when the country was engaged in war, have been the larg-est in the history of the country. The army was granted $95,- 10 THE MERCURY. 000,000; the navy, $123,000,000; the amount $163,000,000 for pensions should be included. The remainder of the half billion dollars is spent for fortifications, military and naval academies, soldiers' homes, arsenals, armories,'navy yards and numerous other things of a similar nature. The total expenditures for military purposes, direct or indirect, is truly a colossal sum when we bear in mind that our standing army today is not over 70,000. The sending of our fleet around the world is an event in history—an event which cannot fail to have a good influence. While we may be a peaceful nation, it will show that we have strength enough to protect ourselves in time of trouble. Some people think that our navy is too large. They say that our ships have nothing to do and then they get into trouble as in the cap-turing of the Philippine Islands. The remaining quarter of a billion dollars goes for a great number of things. The Agricultural Department, the Diplo-matic and Consular service, the Indian Bill, the different bu-reaus and public works are all included. We have seen where the money goes. Now, where does it come from? The revenues of the government amount to about $800,000,000 and this will leave a deficit of about $200,000,000. The treasury has a surplus of $250,000,000 to meet this. If this is not sufficient bonds can be sold. The Speaker of the House and the House itself keep restrain-ing hands on the extravagant tendencies of the varioifs commit-tees. The tendency of Congress to spend money is increasing at an appalling rate. The money appropriated by last Congress would have run the government during the decade ending 1896. These periods are both far enough removed from the Spanish War not to be materially affected by it. The world has advanced and moved forward since 1896, but not to such an extent as to warrant the rate of increase of running the government. There seems to be a leakage somewhere. Congress should remember that even a million dollars does not flow into the treasury of its own accord but it is pushed in and that as a result of the sweat of many brows. This does not mean that a narrow-minded policy should be adopted. The American people are willing to pay well to keep their country in the front ranks of the army of THE MEKCUEY. 11 progress. The last Congress has made a record in appropriating, public money and it is up to Congress to make a record in the-spending of it. OUR LITERARY SOCIETIES II—PHRENA. N the account of Philo which was published last month we find much that is very similar to the history of" Phrena The Phrenakosmian Literary Society was founded Feb. 4th, 1831, in Linwood Hall. At the second regular meet-ing a constitution and by-laws were presented and adopted. We are fortunate in having the original copy in an excellent state of preservation. Although frequently modified and amended, this historic document retains its original and noble spirit. The whole aim of its authors and zealous defenders is admirably ex-pressed by this, the motto of the Society: Kocr/m T/iv peva. There also exists the minutes of all the meetings that have been held since the Society was organized. These also have been well cared for and may be found among the treasures of the li-brary. As for Phrena's library, it can be said that it contains 5,845 volumes, which are the results of the energetic exertions of our members. Various catalogues of these books have been made for the use of our members, but most of them are not suitable for reference work. The Society is now indebted to George Heintz. '09 for a complete card index of the library. This not only en-hances the value of the present, collection of books but insures to us the proper recognition, care, and usefulness of any works we may add. Other property of value has accrued to the Society. In 1837r when Phrena was given a large and convenient room in the new college building (Old Dorm.), efforts were immediately made to secure suitable furniture. Here again the characteristic as-siduity of Phrena's members was triumphant. Improvements have been made from year to year, and the present beautiful ap-pearance of our hall furnishes sufficient evidence of the energy 12 THE MERCURY. as well as the taste of those by whom it was accomplished. The-present apartment in Eecitation Hall is elegantly furnished. Busts of Franklin, Webster, Cicero and Demosthenes have appro-priate places on the walls. The walls are also decorated with portraits of those Phrenakosmians who have done honor to their Alma Mater by becoming capable to hold professorships in our college. The Society has helped men individually, and has contributed much to the health of college spirit. A literary contest in which much spirit is shown, is held each year, with our sister society, Philo. Formerly it was the custom of the two societies to join at commencement time and be addressed by an honorary mem-ber of each society, alternately. In earlier years, of those be-longing to Phrena, and Eev. E. J. Breckenridge, D.D. officiated in 1842, Eev. T. H. Stockton, D.D. in 1844, and Eev. George B. Cheener, D.D. Much time and labor could be spent in arranging the inter-esting events of Phrena's history, but the space on these pages-does not permit the presentation in detail of very much con-tained in the Society's records. Suffice it to say, the work of those who have gone before should be gratifying to us as presag-ing that like privileges and honors are in store for their succes-sors. With the same noble aspirations and unalterable determi-nation let us be true to our literary societies as were those who have gained so much by supporting them. At present, Phrena is wide awake, doing excellent work and living true to the spirit of her fathers. THE MEECUEY. 13 WHY IS GETTYSBURG NOT WEALTHY ? N. G. PHILLIPY, '09. N" treating this question we will consider the people as a whole, taking as broad a view as possible under the cir-cumstances. According to Webster, wealth means large possessions, opulence, riches. Of course we could not compare Gettysburg with a large city and expect the same amount of wealth, but should more properly compare it with smaller towns of its own size. One of the foremost reasons why Gettysburg is not wealthy is the lack of industries conducted on a large scale. We find no shops or anything of a like nature whereby the owners or entre-preneur can amass a fortune. The ordinary workman cannot collect a fortune as nearly all his wages are used to support his: family. As a rule where there are no large enterprises located we find little wealth. It is true the location of the town geo-graphically may be accountable for the lack of industries, but this does not demand consideration under the present question. The lack of employment for men accounts for the slow in-crease in population. An increase in the value of land and property depends largely upon an increase in population and as the values of each remain nearly the same from year to year, speculation and investments in this line are unprofitable and unremunerative in Gettysburg. The country surrounding the town is not so very fertile and agriculture is not as productive as we find in many other locali-ties. Very few agricultural products are put on the market by the farmers near the town in any great quantity. We do not find minerals profitable for mining in the neighboring localities so very little shipping is carried on. 'Eailroads depend on freight for their profits and when there is little transportation railroad facilities are usually poor. Being located inland the people have not the opportunity to carry on markets or any other pursuit which water affords. The people themselves, have a great influence on any town. If we make a careful study of the people and their pursuits we have partly, at least, the solution of our problem. In our study 14 THE MERCURY. we must take into account their likes and dislikes, their desires,, their ambitions and their doings. The people as a whole are of a retiring nature. There seems: to be little greed for money and little ambition to amass a great, fortune. Each individual is actuated by a desire to live com-, fortably and save enough to keep himself and family during old age. Judging from appearances everybody is contented and happy, a condition which is proof of the statement that the de-sire for riches is lacking. We find the population as a body, industrious, being em-ployed at different occupations. An unusual number are en-gaged in educational work who labor more for knowledge and the pleasure afforded thereby, than for the money received for their work. It is natural in a college town to have cultured people. Peo-ple of culture and refinement have their surroundings fashioned after their ideas and influence the whole community. This class has certainly added much to the community. The battlefield also attracts many well-to-do people who come here to. live a retired life and to enjoy the beautiful surroundings. In Gettysburg, if a man is not engaged in educational work, he is in sympathy with it and usually formulates his opinions accord-ingly. In conclusion, the people are interested in their personal welfare, mentally as well as physically, and do not have the de-. sire for great wealth as their sole ambition. THE JIEUCURY. 15 THE JUNIOR "PROM" SOCIALLY CONSIDERED. CLL consideration of the social significance of the Junior Prom naturally involves a taking into account the general social life of the college community. For it is obvious that the character and tone of this annual function must, to a large extent, be determined by the social life as it is developed throughout the year. And since the Junior Prom is just in its infancy,—in its formative period,—this pa-per shall be both critical and suggestive. The social life of our college seems to be the characteristic so-cial life of colleges in general. It is very different from the so-cial life that existed in earlier years of the college. New condi-tions in the social structure at large, together with the increased number of students, have all contributed to the existent social status in the college community. The present exclusive tenden-cies in modern family life, unknown to our forefathers, cannot fail to produce like tendencies among a body of students; the social product developed in our college is, in short, but an out-growth of the existing trend of home life. Though the number of students in any one college is really small, when compared with the number enrolled in a modern university, yet it has grown so that no longer can the authorities of even the small college boast that theirs is the privilege of easily acting in loco parentis, and of forming with the student body a well regulated family. Instead of one united family, thoroughly democratic in its workings and with a reasonably common purpose and as-piration, the student body has been organized by the fraternity into many little families, each with its distinctive membership making of paramount importance the promotion of its own inter-ests and those of its individual members. The college authori-ties have, in other words, failed to meet new conditions by their failure to provide a sane and invigorating college family atmos-phere for the student to grow in, and it should not be surprising, therefore, that the students have themselves provided their own substitute, inferior though it may be. The fraternity is not lacking in provsions for the diversion of 16 THE MERCURY. its members. Numerous social events are held during the year, and occasionally an inter-fraternity function is arranged. Be-tween the members of this organized portion of the student body, who are thus frequently brought together, there naturally is formed a rather strong attachment. But how about the unorga-nized portion, which is comprised, for any one of several reasons, of the men whom the fraternity has not attracted? The social opportunities of most of these men are not only more limited, they are also more individualistic. That there should be a cer-tain divergence, therefore, between the fraternity and non-fra-ternity element is not to be wondered at. The Junior Prom is a step in the direction of preventing this divergence. Every element in the student body is to be repre-sented as far as possible on a common basis. The possibilities of general good fellowship are on this occasion to be fully pre-sented and fostered. Men who are seldom to be found in com-pany of their fellows in a purely social way are to find in the Junior Prom an opportunity of seeing what such commingling means for a man and for the community. Men to whom this is not a new experience are to find pleasure in assisting the unini-tiated over the stony places. The realization of all this could not, of course, be expected in the two times in which the Junior Prom has been held. Indeed it may require several more years to accomplish the desired re-sults. It seems very apparent, however, that tendencies point in the right direction. Last year's Prom marked an improvement over the first, in that dancing was not the exclusive feature of the occasion. Provision was made, though not of a sufficiently definite and attractive character, for those who do not dance. This is not passing judgment upon dancing as a means of di-version; it does mean to imply, however, that to allow dancing or any other form of diversion to become the exclusive feature of a social event indicates a distortion that cannot fail to prove exceedingly narrowing. It implies, too, that it is altogether un-fair to expect those who do not dance to attend an affair which provides definitely only for those who do dance, and which gives dancing such predominant or exclusive place that real com-mingling is impossible. Dancing has become such a mighty factor in the social life of young people everywhere that it is not THE MERCUttY. 17 surprising that it has gained a considerable foothold in our col-leges, but to permit it to have the ascendency at an event, such as the Junior Prom, which contemplates the presence of a large number who do not dance, shows great inconsiderateness and means the blasting of the real significance of the Prom. The far-reaching influence of the Junior Prom, properly regu-lated, can hardly be appreciated at this early stage in its evolu-tion, but to behold its possibilities along the lines indicated should be sufficient to impel us to assist in its proper develop-ment. A. ± A BIOGRAPHY OF SCHILLER. MISS- MARY BAUSCH, '11. JOHANJST Christoph Frederick Schiller was born at Mar-bach, in Wurtemburg, Germany, Nov. 10, 1759. He was the only son of Johann Casper Schiller, an officer in the Wurtemburg army, who held an inferior position in the Duke of Wurtemburg's household. The elder Schiller is was a man of great strength of character. To him Schiller is indebted for his firm and positive traits. His mother, Elizabeth Dorothea Kodweis, the daughter of an innkeeper at Marbach, was just the opposite of her husband in temperament, of strong yet gentle demeanor, full of simple charm and wisdom. We can see deep traces of this mother's sweetness and gentleness in the life of the gifted poet. Schiller did not find it easy to choose a profession. He first attended school at the village of Loech, where influenced by Par-son Moser, his teacher, he prepared himself for the clerical pro-fession. These plans were thwarted by the Duke of Wurtem-burg. He next entered the public school at Ludwigsburg. At the age of fourteen, he became a student at the military academy near Solitude Park, Ludwigsburg, the Duke wishing to have his services for the state. There he pursued the study of law, which was very repugnant to him. After two years had passed he 18 THE MERC PET. gave this up, and began the study of medicine, and was subse-quently appointed regimental surgeon. During this time, however, he was engaged in. the study of lit- 'erature. He was especially fond of the classics and became very proficient in Greek. His knowledge of Greek philosophy is ap-parent in his writings. His first work of note, "The Eobbers," he completed before he was twenty-two years old. Schiller pro-tested in this work against the restraints which he felt the Duke had unjustly forced upon him. Fearing the Duke whose wrath he had thus kindled, he fled to Mannheim. There he passed through many hardships, one reverse of fortune followed an-other. But still he continued to write. Schiller's first play in verse was "Don Carlos,'"' which was pre-sented at Hamburg in August, 1787. The Duke of Weimar, whose interest had been aroused in the young poet, made him one of the counsellors of his court. Upon his arrival at Weimar, Schiller was introduced to Goethe. This acquaintance subse-quently ripened into a close friendship. Early in December, 1788, Schiller's "History of the Eevolt of the Netherlands" was published. This work brought the best results, financially, which he had yet received. It not only had a rapid sale but it aroused the attention of the intellectual world. Through the influence of Goethe, he was offered a professorship in history at the University of Jena which after some hesitation he accepted. On Feb. 22, 1790, he was married to Charlotte von Lengefeld, a most admirable woman who aided him greatly in his life work. A very busy life opened to Schiller while at Jena. It was not unusual for him to spend fourteen hours daily in lecturing and writing. But the strain of such heavy work was too great for a man so delicately constituted as Schiller. A dangerous pulmonary dis-ease overtook him so that he was forced to give up his position as instructor in the university. Then through a generous gift he was enabled to revisit Wurtemburg, where he remained almost a year. In May 1794, he returned to Jena much improved in health although never again entirely well. The period between 1796 and 1800 was especially rich in lyrical productions, of which "Der Taucher," and "Das Leid von THE MERCURY. 1$ der Glocke " aTe prominent. The latter has been considered the best known of Schiller's poems. It deals with the most dra-matic events in the life of man. His great works, "Wallenstein" and "Maria Stuart" followed in close succession. Next came "Die Jungfrau von Orleans" in 1801, "Die Brant von Messina" in 1803, and "Wilhelm Tell," the last and perhaps greatest of his works, in 1801:. In this last great tragedy, Schil-ler portrays with wonderful power the Swiss resistance to tyr-anny. He causes the leader, Wilhelm Tell to stand elevated as a national hero. In all his writings, Schiller's love of liberty and hatred of despotism is manifest, but in none so much as in Wilhelm Tell. Schiller had now reached the zenith of his glory. His man-ners and appearance had improved. The timidity and conscious-ness of youth was replaced by the dignity and ease of more ma-ture years. He was overwhelmed with public honors and enthu-siastically received everywhere he went. But alas, when prosperity and fame seemed permanently se-cured to him, the dread disease which had undermined his health again overtook him. He endured this last trouble with great fortitude; though he had to pass through many trials yet his spirit seemed as it were to soar above them all. He continued to work until at last, his weakened powers being overcome, he passed away on May 9,, 1805, at the age of forty-five. The news, of his death brought universal grief to Germany. 20 TKE MEKCURY. CULTURE'S DISTRESSING FOE. G. E. WOLFE, '09. UST as men err in making happiness a distinct end, so do they err by putting culture in a similar position. And just as they deceive themselves by trying to pro-cure happiness as they would some commodity, so they deceive themselves by like attempts to gain culture. Life would indeed be a barren thing, if it were not enriched by our capacity for happiness and culture, but it is worse than barren where there is a false conception of these enrichments. That culture should be perverted to such an extent that men would make it a fad, seems almost inconceivable, yet that is what the intellectually curious and the socially idle made it some twenty years ago. What abhorrence must have been aroused in all who possessed true cultural instincts! For a fad is always a sham—a gross perversion—and a sham in the world of art ox-literature begets a peculiar offensiveness and hatred. The short-cut, superficial methods employed in pursuing this culture fad must have been entirely detestable to all serious-minded and sin-cere people. Could it be otherwise, with genuine culture possess-ing the rich qualities of ripeness and maturity in taste, intellect and culture ? How crude and defective the sham in the presence of the real! But this perversion, while more pronounced at certain periods, lias not been confined to one or two decades. Haste and arti-ficiality have always been employed by men, in their eagerness to possess the charming ripeness and greatness of soul which mark the truly cultured man. Recent years, however, have de-veloped a new condition, the recognition of which requires no unusual insight. There has developed a foe to culture which is distressing, not simply because it is aiming at culture by per-verse methods, but because it is entirely at variance with true cul-ture and lias so widely disseminated its influence that one may rightly inquire whether the true cultural instinct will not even-tually be quenched on account of it. "Smartness" is not a modern product by any means, but never has it captivated a people as it has the present generation; never THE MERCURY 21 has it held such predominant sway. Strictly speaking this spirit belongs to the world of mediocrity, but so important has it be-come that it claims recognition as the "real thing" from alL We have our so-called "smart sets," but the spirit of smartness in these days finds fruitful soil among all classes—as well among the wealthy as among the not-rich, as well among the intelligent as among the unlettered. And it is this, we believe, that today constitutes culture's distressing foe: it is this that makes impera-tive the loud calls, "Let Us Go Back"—in the direction of "The Simple Life." Not that there are no more who possess true culture, or who are eager to possess it. There are such indeed, but so effectually has the "sporty" microbe been doing its work in the rising gen-eration, that quiet people have well-nigh been driven to despera-tion, those with undeveloped cultural instincts have been tainted or entirely diverted and others never get a desire for cultural pursuit at all. One does not have to be a pessimist to be conscious of the fact that it is the fashion for everybody to be gay; that we are all called upon to persevere in a gala atmosphere. From the ex-treme solemnity of bearing that characterized our forefathers we have swung clear to the opposite extreme. It is impossible not to come in contact constantly with the cheap jargon that is everywhere afloat; with the lightness, cyni-cism and insinuation of immoral sentiment which marks the con-versation of popular young people. Fashionable clothes and jaunty manners never played as prominent a role as today. Plain, unassuming people, to whom this pertness and super-, ciliousness is extremely repulsive, are wondering when there will \ be a reaction toward the sane and rational. Surely the reaction-must come, and parents and educators have no more important duty before them than to seek to obliterate this spirit of sm^rt-. ness. THE MEECUEY. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE LINCOLN ROAD. G. L. KIEFFEK, '09. JJST order to consider this subject properly, we must first inquire into the nature of the proposed "road." There-fore, briefly, "The Lincoln Eoad" is a proposed na-tional memorial to Abraham Lincoln. The "road" is to be a grand boulevard joining Washington, D. C, with Gettysburg, Pa. Its two hundred feet of width are to be occupied by green-sward plots, hedges, and trees, a speedway for automobiles, a driveway for carriages and wagons, two double-tracked electric railways, the one for express trains and the other for local trains. The very nature of the proposed "road" declares that it shall be equally open to both the rich and the poor. This being true it will be the means of bringing to Gettysburg, for at least a day, many of the hundreds of thousands of tourists that annually visit Washington. Hence with all this traffic, the very "road" itself might become an economic asset to the United States gov-ernment. To accommodate these people appropriate hotels would have to be maintained in Gettysburg. The present hotels and restau-rants would have to be renovated and enlarged. New ones also would have to be erected. A higher standard would be the order of the day for all Gettysburg hotels when official Washing-ton would be in the habit of paying them a visit at almost any hour. To meet this increase of business occasioned by the influx of people, Gettysburg herself would have to grow and increase the number of and enlarge all her business places in whatever line they might be. Naturally all property in Gettysburg would increase in value as would also all the property along the "road" from Washington to Gettysburg. To compete with the travelling facilities which would be af-forded by the proposed "road," the facilities of the present rail-roads would have to be bettered and new roads would be built— both electric and steam. All eyes would naturally be turned towards Gettysburg, which THE MERCURY. 23 with its historic surroundings, beautiful scenery, and medicinal springs, would naturally be expected to become the greatest sum-mer resort in the United States. The character and number of tourists would necessitate gov-ernment control of all guides. Thereby would undoubtedly be obliterated the blot of blots found upon the world. With gov-ernment control of all guides the tourists would be guaranteed just and equal treatment. For the guides themselves, better days would result. To Gettysburg's educational institutions would come greater publicity and a better appreciation of these institutions' rare sur-roundings. The result would naturally be manifested by an in-crease in the student bodies and an enlargement of the institu-tions themselves. All this resulting from the proposed "Lincoln Way?" Yes, more. With it connected to Gov. Stuart's proposed highway from Philadelphia to Pittsburg, "The Lincoln Way" naturally would become the backbone of a national highway system extend-ing all over the country. Then would all roads lead to Gettys-burg, which would be, in fact, the shrine of American patriotism, the Mecca for all Americans. THE "INDIAN STEPS." E. C. STOUFFER, '11. HE immense dam of McCalPs Ferry Power Company is nearing completion. As a result the slowly rising waters of the Susquehanna river are gradually cover-ing up one of the oldest and most noted landmarks of south-eastern Pennsylvania. The old "Indian Steps" are artificial shelves, cut no doubt, by means of stone hatchets into the face of a large round-pointed rock, which juts out from the west bank of the Susquehanna river. They were cut by the North American Indians possibly centuries before the discovery of America. These steps were used by the dusky inhabitants as a place on which to stand and dip the shad as they crossed the rapids on their annual journey 24 THE MERCURY. to the spawning grounds in the upper Susquehanna. Since the settlement of the country the white man has for generations used them for the same purpose. So far-famed were these steps that the Indians from the North, South, East and West came here to fish. Only the strong, vigorous and daring could fish from this rock for only such were able to endure the chill damp night winds which frequent the lower Susquehanna. As each contestant ap-peared a chalk mark or number was placed on his hat to desig-nate his turn. When his name was called he took his place, tied himself to a ring in the rock and cast the net. Each one was ■compelled to take his catch and be content. If there were a goodly number of shad, all was well; but if it proved to be a small catch he had to go away heavy hearted and take his place in the waiting line again. Year after year from these rocks hundreds of these daintiest ■of all fishes have been caught, some to grace the humble board of ■a poor riverman, some to please the fastidious taste of a city epicurean. The land around the "Indian Steps" was originally occupied by the Conestoga Indians and was preserved for them by the first proprietors of the state. Even Maryland, which was attempting to push her lines farther and farther north, respected the rights of the natives and made no attempt to appropriate this section. 'The land was held for the Indians until August 26, 1786, when a deed was granted to Joseph Eeed on condition that the "Indian Steps" should be preserved for a fishing place for the poor of the community. This charge has been faithfully kept until now. A few months more and the old landmark will have passed away and forever this curious specimen of Indian art will be lost to Pennsylvania. THE MERCURY. 25 THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FARMER; WHAT IT IS LIKELY TO BE WORTH. MISS HELEN H. BRENNEMAN, '08. EVEEAL months ago when President Roosevelt ap-pointed a committee to investigate the condition of the farmers throughout the country, it provoked quite a little amusement on the part of some people, while on the part of others it aroused sarcasm and anger. Many people regarded the President as a "busy-body" and failed to recognize the real aim in his interest in the farmers' condition. Never before has there been a man at the head of the nation with such broad and liberal views and one who has put forth such strenuous efforts in behalf of all kinds and classes of peo-ple. And it was such a motive that prompted him to take this action. The scope of this committee's work is not to ascertain the technical methods of farming and to inquire into personal matters, but to find out what are the general sanitary, social, educational and economic conditions of country life, to find out what is needed, what improvements can be effected, and in what way the government can help them. The commission was confronted with a task not only wide in its scope but comprising a large territory, and many people were to be dealt with. The President suggested that the farmers be called together in convenient meeting places for discussions, and that the members of the commission try to get in the closest touch possible with them and find out their needs. The commission has sent out circulars to professional men, business men, farmers and many others. These circulars con-tain a list of twelve questions with respect to the public schools in the vicinity and their efficiency; whether the farmers get rea-sonable returns from the sale of their products; whether they have good railroads, highway, telephone and rural postal service-accommodations ; whether there is a sufficient supply of labor in the neighborhood. These questions show what the commission are seeking to find out. It is their desire not only to ascertain the conditions but to get opinions and suggestions as to what needs to be done. Now the question arises, "What is the investigation likely to 26 THE MERCURY. be worth ?" In the first place it is very evident that almost the entire success depends upon the attitude of the people. If they continue to take it as a joke or with a feeling of animosity, cer-tainly the progress of the commisison's work is going to be checked and its ultimate success doubtful. However Dr. Bailey of Cornell University, the chairman of the commission, says that the public interest is increasing as the people come to under-stand the commission and its work. These words are encourag-ing and indicative of a very likely success. If this investigation is going to amount to anything, there must be co-operation of the people, especially of the farmers for whose benefit these efforts are being exerted. In a recent mes-sage to the commission the President said, "It is esssential that the farmers, the men who live on the soil should feel a sense of the ownership in this commisison, should feel that you gentle-men in very truth represent them and are responsive to their de-sires, no less than to their needs." If this committee receives the support of the people, it should effect some good results. There is a larger percentage of per-sons engaged in agricultural pursuits than in any other occupa-tion and it is only just that more attention should be given to their needs. The demands for better highways, better railway and trolley service are being universally agitated, and surely the commis-sion will concentrate, its efforts towards their accomplishment thus increasing the facilities of the farmer for better profits. At the Farmers' Convention held in Madison last October scientific crop raising and the need of teaching agriculture in the schools were among the principal topics approved by that orga-nization. It is just as essential that agriculture be taught in the rural schools as manual training and trades in the city schools. Here again if such a desire could be met by the gov-ernment it would not only benefit the farmers economically but the nation also. It remains to be seen just what this investigation will amount to, but nevertheless we can surmise that the educational advant-ages in some districts will be improved, that there will be bet-ter facilities for the transaction of business and that the social, educational and economic conditions will be bettered. T H E HERCURV Entered at the Postoffice at Gettysburg as second-class Matter. VOL. XVI GETTYSBURG, PA., DECEMBER, 1908 No. 7 Editor-in-Chief Assistant Editor P. F. BLOOMHARDT, '09 CHARLES F. V. HESSE, '09 Exchange Editor Associate Editors H. REY WOLF, '09 SAMUEL FAUSOLD, '10 Business Manager EDWARD N. FRYE, '10 CHABLES L. KOPP, '09 Advisory Board Ass't Bus. Managers PROF. C. F. SANDERS, A. M. G. U. KNIPPLE, '10 PROF. P. M. BIKLE, PH.D. PAUL S. MILLER, '10 PROF. C. J. GRIMM, PH. D. Published each month, from October to June inclusive, by the joint literary societies of Pennsylvania (Gettysburg) College. Subscription price, one dollar a year in advance ; single copies 15 cents. Notice to discontinue sending THE MERCURY to any address must be accompanied by all arrearages. Students, Professors and Alumni are cordially invited to contri-bute. All subscriptions and business matter should be addressed to the Business Manager. Articles for publication should be addressed to the Editor. Address THE MERCURY, GETTYSBURG, PA. such is often the case. EDITORIALS. THE question has often been asked how a small college, with a limited number of students and a corresponding limitation of tal-ent can successfully conduct nearly as many student enter-prises as the larger univeristies— and conduct them, too, in such a way that they frequently rival similar organizations in their larger sister institutions. But Our own college may be taken as suffici- "28 THE MERCURY. ent proof. Our five varieties of athletic teams, our three publi-cations, two literary societies, debating and oratorical teams, musical clubs, and dramatic society, etc., have often been re-spected rivals to similar teams of other and larger schools. But the mere fact of the numbers of these enterprises does not neces-sarily have to affect the quality of the results accomplished. We are inclined to think that men with just as great ability and as large capacity for work are to be found in the smaller college as in the larger ones,—not as many, to be sure, but the ratio is about the same. Furthermore, the smaller college offers oppor-tunities to every one of such calibre, while in the larger schools, •only a comparatively few can take part. LAST year Gettysburg was disappointed in not being enter-tained by her dramatic society, the Mask and Wig. Presumably this was due to the lack of time for rehearsals. Nevertheless the loss was felt. This year it has been decided that no musical club trip will be taken. It has been suggested that the time, talent, and energ}', usually devoted to this organization be turned into another channel; that is, into the perfecting of a good play or minstrel show which might be allowed to take a trip, similar to the Triangle Club of Princeton. IN a few days the first term of the present collegiate year will be closed. After an arduous week's work in examinations, the Christmas vacation will be the more appreciated and enjoyed. Its rest and pleasure has been anticipated by all, but especially has it been longed for by the Freshmen. Christmas has been written about so often, and from so many different viewpoints, that little that is new is left to say. To the college student it is a joyous season to be looked forward to, but in its actual enjoy-ment, he no longer thinks of college and its surroundings for it is a vacation season at home. So, with its last issue for 1908, the MERCURY wishes all its readers a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. THE MERCURY-. 29 BOOK REVIEWS. INDER the Crust, by Thomas Nelson Page, Phrena. This volume is composed of original stories. Each story has a philosophical side. They were evidently written to stimulate thought and the author has succeeded admirably. One of the stories, "A Brother of Diagones" is especially commenda-ble. In this story, great wealth is pointed out as a stumbling block rather than an aid to happiness. The simple life, too, is contrasted to the hustle and bustle of the metropolis. Other stories of the volume effectively contrast altruism and egoism. The Biography of Thomas Jefferson, by John T. Morse, Phrena. This biography is very impartially written. The au-thor gives us the facts indulging in neither unmerited praise nor criticism. He seems to have an insight into the man's very nature and thus vividly portrays the actions of the statesman both at home and in the blaze of public life. The biography not only enumerates the achievements of Mr. Jefferson with their causes and effects but also those of contemporary statesmen. The biographer shows Mr. Jefferson as a visionary, shrewd politician and a far-sighted statesman. The book is very readable and valuable. Tides of Bamegat, by P. Hopkinson Smith, [Philo 11:6.] This is a book which one can scarcely afford not to read. It presents a very impressive picture of life. It is an account of how one member of a noble and respectable family brought shame and disgrace to the family name There is seen the secret sufferings of the sister through false modesty. Her life would have been made happy indeed, if she had only opened her heart to her lover. It shows how one sister may give advantages and culture to another and instead of receiving gratitude, have her head bowed in shame while the other, seemingly soulless, is not af-fected. There is also brought out the yearning and love of a father for his son whom he has driven from home in a fit of anger for the evil he has done when he refuses to do right. The story is somewhat overdrawn, but otherwise one can find no fault. It is nevertheless very instructive. Although somewhat tedious at times it is generally interesting. The language is clear and wholesome. The Brass Bowl, by Louis Joseph Vance, [Philo, 11:8.] The so THE MEECURY. title of the book is somewhat fanciful as the bowl has practically the least connection with the story. Anyone wishing to read a book for entertainment and recreation will find this romance suited to his purpose as it is very interesting, simple and full of action. The thread of the story seldom breaks and the climax is near the end. The reader will be pleased with the happy ter-mination. No characters are used except those which are neces-sary to the plot. The principal parts are played by persons of high social rank, and they seem to be somewhat magnified. There is no place in the book that is tedious. The narration is clear, animated and well balanced. The language is simple and vigorous. The author has handled 'the plot very well. He shows broadmindedness, independence, the possession of a vivid imagination and a pleasant sense of humor. He has an ac-quaintance with high social life. The reader will be very much pleased with "Mad Maitland's" spirit as he makes his wild flights and also with Miss Sylvia Graeme who comes into Mait-land's life in a very peculiar way. EXCHANGES. JE are glad to have with us again most of our old ex-changes. There are a few that have not arrived yet. We trust that all will soon respond. It seems necessary again to call attention to the con-tent of the MERCURY. The MERCURY, we are trying to make a literary journal, and not a paper combining literary, athletic and the other departments of college activities. The "Gettysbur-gian," our weekly publication, contains the news of the various departments of college life. Among the good things in the "College Student" we would call attention to "Lowell's 'Biglow Papers'" and "Eelation of Diction to Character." The former is a critical essay which brings to notice many interesting facts concerning this import-ant contribution to American literature. The latter shows how the ideals and characteristics of the individual are reflected in hie writings. THE MERCURY. 31 We are glad to welcome "The Thielensian" to our exchanges. In the article entitled "Greek and Eoman Influences" the writer reminds us of some of the beauties of Athens and Borne. The beginning of philosophy was in Greece. Then from the Eomans we can learn the lesson of patriotism. Their motto was, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori." The Eomans understood mili-tary matters, and we can also learn much from their sculpture and architecture. "Luther in the Eeformation" is also worthy of perusal. The character sketches of Taft and Bryan in the "Otterbein Aegis" are brief but very interesting. We all admire the teachings and doctrines of Socrates, the great Greek philosopher. He busied himself by trying to teach men the truth, and even though he greatly emphasized truth, he was especially eager that men should become happy and useful citizens. To be a good citizen he regarded the "summum bonum" of the individual's life. Indeed in our present age of political corruption, we can not over-emphasize high ideals of citizenship. "Making an American Citizen" in the'Thiloma-thean Monthly" presents this subject in a forceful manner. The writer gives some qualifications of the ideal American citizen. First, he must exercise the right of franchise. It is not only his right, but his duty, to vote. Secondly, he must vote intelligently and not allow himself to be bribed by a paltry farthing. Again, he must be a doer, and not depend upon party leaders. And lastly he must have strong moral convictions. As to the prob-lem of attaining this ideal, the author says, "If I were to offer a solution of this vital problem, it would be: the continual, untir-ing moral and civic training in home and school." All scholars have more or less knowledge of epic poetry. They all know something of Homer's Iliad and Odyssey, Virgil's Aeneid and Milton's Paradise Lost, but often the epics of less renown are neglected. "The Sketch Book" contains an article entitled "Sita," which tells us of India's epics. The Eamayana and the Mahabharata are India's chief epics. "Sita" is the im-portant character in the Eamayana. She is to the Eamayana what Helen of Troy is to Homer's Ilaid. The article gives a brief summary of the epic and closes with a few ethical com-ments on the character of "Sita." 32 THE MEKCUKT. We wish to comment on two articles in the "Albright Bulle-tin." "The Character of Satan in 'Paradise Lost,'" and "Work; Man's Opportunity." The writer regards Satan as the princi-pal character of the epic, and speaks of him from that stand-point. In the latter essay, we have a very practical exposition on work and its blessings to the individual. Lovers of German literature will find pleasure in reading "Two Representatives of German Epic and Lyric Poetry" in the "Lesbian Herald." Of our High School exchanges, the "Eed and Black" (Read-ing High School) deserves special mention. The departments are well represented and as a whole the paper makes a pleasing appearance. We gratefully acknowledge the usual exchanges. "PXYK iKT2« r>rv. M3VSUT13ER5. There's no pen that gives such all-round satisfaction i Conklin's Self-Filling Fountain Pen. It's the best pen for College Men. When an ordinary fountain pen runs dry in the middle of a word, it means you've got to stop right there, hunt up a rubber squirt gun, fill your pen to overflowing, clean both pen and dropper, wash your hands, and then endeavor as best you can to collect your lost Crescent f'f train of thought. It's different with Filler Jr-l 9 FILLING "THE PEN WITH THE CRESCENT-FILLER" To fill, iust dip it in any ink, press the Crescent-Filler, and the Conklin is filled and ready to write instantly. You can't over-fill it. Hence no inky fingers, no loss of time, no ruffled temper. The feed of the Conklin is No waiting for ink to come—no jerking—no slips, blots. ng dealers handle the Conklin. IE yours does not, order direct. Look tor the Crescent-Filler and refuse substitutes. Prices, $3.00 and up. Send at once (or handsome new catalog. T3E OOHZLIH PEH CO., 31 Itiahattsn Bnildiag, Toledo, Ohio. PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. FUfOTTUfjE Mattresses, Bed Springs, Iron Beds, Picture Frames; Repair Work done promptly. Under-taking a specialty. - Telephone No. 97. 3=3L ZB_ 23eri-d.ex, 37 Baltimore Si., *-tttt/xhurg;, FA EDGAR C. TAWNEY BAKER West Middle Street. J. B. WINEMAN, DEALER IN CHOICE FAMILY GROCERIES, PROVISIONS AND FRUITS, BOARDING CLUBS A SPECIALTY. SUNDAY SCHOOL LESSON HELPS AND SUPPLIES, P. ANSTADT & SONS, Publishers, Book and Job Printing of all Kinds ttrtte for Prices. YORK, PA. ■> PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. EMIL ZOTHE ^MEMS ENGRAVER, DESIGNER, AND MANUFACTURING JEWELER 722 Chestnut St., Phila. SPECIALTIES : MASONIC MARKS, SOCIETY BADGES, COLLEGE BUTTONS, PINS, SCARP PINS, STICK PINS AND ATHLETIC PRIZES. All Goods ordered through G. F. Kieffer, CHARLES S. MUMPER, MtKALER MJV TTTTTS "KFTTTTT? 15! PICTURE FRAMES OF ALL SORTS * W *■*" * * *» *fc*Hf REpA|R WORK DONE PROMPTLY I WILL ALSO BUY OR EXCHANGE ANY SECOND-HAND FURNITURE NO. 4 CHAMBERSBURG STREET, GETTYSBURG, PA D. J. SWARTZ DEALER IN COUNTRY PRODUCE, GROCERIES, CIGARS AND TOBACCO. GETTYSBURG. SHOES KEPA1UHI> —BY— 115 Baltimore St., near Court House. GOOD WORK GUARANTEED. -IS-Your Photographer ? If not, why not? 41 BALTIMORE ST., GETTYSBURG, PA. 8EFT0N I FLEMMING'S LIVERY, Baltimore Street, First Square, Gettysburg, -Pa. Competent Guides for all parts of the Battlefield. Arm »» Filbert St. A convenient and homelike place to stay while in the city shopping. An excellent restaurant where good service combines with low prices. ROOMS §1.00 PER DAY AND UP. The only moderate priced hotel of reputation and eonsequenee in > 3Pla.ila.cLe2pla.ISL • » J 1 i SQ *. • • » ,atindry . . OF YORK . . Offers tfte COLLEGE STUDENTS first-dass work; at Special Low Prices. E. C. STOUFEER, Local Agt. C. D. SMITH, Prop. MEANS TASTY WOEK SAEEFULLY DONE. MfcNU CARDS. LETTER HEADS, WINDOW POSTERS ENVELOPES, DANCE CARDS TICKETS, Programs of all kinds. Everything the College Man wants in Paper and Ink. Specially designed work. Latest Effects in Paper, clone in Colors along lines of College Men's Associations. Catalog and Book work. The Gettysburg Compiler will keep old and new students in touch with town and college life. HELP THOSE WHO HELP US. The Intercollegiate Bureau of Academic Costume. Cotrell & Leonard, ALBANY, N. Y. ™2li2^! CAPS AND GOWNS To Utttyi-buri? College Lafayette. Lehigh. Dickinson. State College, Univ of Penn sylviinin, Hnrviird, Yale. Princeton. Wellesley, Bryn Mnwrnnd the others. Class Contracts a Specialty. Correct Hoods i. Degrees. Mr. College Man We are already lining up our clients for nextSpring. With our National Organization of 12 offices we will need over 2000 college men for technical, office, sales aud teaching positions throughout the United States. We can also use at any time college men who are in the market for a position. Let us explain to you NOW. Write for the "College Man's Opportunity." It tells how Hapgoods, a great organization built up by college men has placed many thousand youngmen, has raised the standard of college meu as a business factor throughout the world. State age, education, location desired. THE JV\iTIOJVJIZ, OBGjrjVTZJlTjrOJV OF BIlJlIJV BHOHKBS. Commonwealth Trust Building, Philadelphia, Pa. HOTEL GETTYSBURG, Headquarters for BANQUETS. Electric Lights, Steam Heat, All Conveniences. Free Bus to and from station. Convenient for Commencement Visitors. RATES $2.00 PER DAY. -livery CLi'ta.c'ked. Jot]i] P. JV^tH Proprietor. BECKER & CO., DEALERS IN All kinds of Fresh and Smoked Meats Chambersburg St., Gettysburg, Pa. WE RECOMMEND THESE FIRMS. Established 1867 by Allen Walton. ALLEN K. WALTON, Pres. and Treas. ROBT. J. WALTON, Supt. flummelstown Brown Stone Company, QUARRYMEN and Manufacturers of BUILDING STONE, SAWED FLAGGING and TILE. Wa/l/fcoTwille, ]£)a.-u,pT-vlr\, ^o. Pa. CONTRACTORS FOR ALL KINDS OF CUT STONE WORK. Telegrapn and Express Address, Brownstone, Pa. Parties visit-ing quarries will leave cars at Brownstone Station on the P. & R-R. R. For Artistic Photographs Go To T{PTON The Leader in PHOTO FASHIONS Frames and Passapartouts Made to Order. PATRONISE OUR ADY$RTI$$RS Come and Have a Good Shave or Hair Cut -AT-Harry B. Sefton's BARBER SHOP. 35 Baltimore St. Barber's Supplies a Specialty. Also choice line of Cigars. SHOES REPAIRED —BY— Charles Hartdagen, Middle St., Opp. Court House, GUARANTEE ALL WORK. GETTYSBURG DEPARTMENT STORE, Successors to the L. M. Alleman Hardware Co., Manufacturer's Agent and Jobber of HARDWARE, OILS, PAINTS AND QUEENSWARE, GETTYSBURG, PA. Tb.p only Jobbing House in Adams County. PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS. s * * » ** *»« * ft * «« « «»* ** « « * »* « * * « **«* ***« aa »« « ***** a »*« »* * *** Seligrqciq Are Gettysburg's Most Reliable TAILORS «* And show their appreciation of your patronage by giving- you full value for your money, and closest attention to the wants of every customer. ■ T' ■,f T &.WirX'z?&/&teM$&^.'^*fc?ttvte*&^ Students' Headquarters —FOR— HATS, SHOES, AVD GENT'S FURNISHING. Sole Agent for WALK-OVER SHOE EGBERT'S STORE. Prices Always Right T|e Lutheran PubliGOlioii Society No 1424 Arch Street, PHILADELPHIA, PA. Acknowledged Headquarters for anything and everything in the way of Books for Churches, Colleges, Families and Schools, and literature for Sunday Schools. PLEASE REMEMBER That by sending your orders to us you help build up and develop one of the church in-stitutions with pecuniary ad-vantage to yourself. Address HENRY 8. BONER, Supt

This thesis deals about jūdō, with jūdō as the transcription of the Japanese word 柔道 and the abbreviation of Kōdōkan jūdō講道館柔道 the method founded in 1882 by Kanō Jigorō嘉納治五郎(1860-1938). More specifically, it comes to exploring and analyzing how he defined judo, without involving other contemporary or later interpretations. We explored the intimate connection between the creation and the creator, trying to understand what was the motivation of this man, how he structured his method, why he did it this way. We also analyzed its speech – should we say speeches – about judo. In other words, we focused on judo as the work of a man driven by his ideas, ideals and. character!In three parts, the first devoted to the process, the second on method and the third on the Discourse on Method, as well as the evolution during about sixty years, we attempted to clarify the process of creation, to distinguish between the legacy and contributions, the discourse and practice, to enable the historian, the sociologist, the educator, the philosopher, to better observe how the experience of a young idealist man (Kano Jigoro was 21 years old when he created Judo) became a global discipline. ; Cette thèse traite du jūdō, où jūdō est la transcription du mot japonais 柔道 et l'abréviation de Kōdōkan jūdō 講道館柔道, la méthode fondée en mai 1882 par Kanō Jigorō 嘉納治五郎 (1860-1938). Plus précisément, il est question d'explorer et d'analyser comment ce dernier définit le jūdō, sans y mêler les interprétations autres, contemporaines à cette création ou postérieures. Il s'agit de creuser le lien intime entre la création et le créateur, d'essayer de comprendre quelle a été la motivation de cet homme, la façon dont il a structuré sa méthode, les raisons pour lesquelles il l'a fait de cette manière, ainsi que d'analyser le – ou plutôt les – discours dont il l'a entourée ; en d'autres termes, il s'agit de se concentrer sur le jūdō comme l'œuvre d'un homme poussé par ses idées, ses idéaux et… son caractère !Il ne s'agit pas, en revanche, d'aborder cette étude sous l'angle du jūdō comme fruit d'un contexte social, historique et culturel particulier, dans un Japon dont la situation intérieure comme internationale connaît sur cette période de profonds changements, ou dans un contexte qui voit la mise en place, en Occident, de l'éducation physique, du sport, des Jeux Olympiques ou d'initiatives de méthodes de formation globale pour la jeunesse. Le judo est aujourd'hui mondialement connu et pratiqué. Au travers de sa diffusion, c'est un peu de la culture japonaise, réelle ou fantasmée, qui s'est répandue.Mais qu'est-ce que le judo ? Quelle est – était ?– son ambition réelle ? Ce sont là des questions sur lesquelles personne ne semble s'être encore réellement penché et à laquelle nous avons essayé de répondre.Apprécié des savants de renommée internationale – c'est ainsi qu'en France il s'impose au travers de la fascination qu'il exerce dans les années 1930 sur des gens comme Frédéric Joliot –, qui y voient une science de l'exploitation des principes physiques et mécaniques, tout autant que des forces de police (qui y trouvent un facteur de leur sécurité), des éducateurs et pédagogues (qui y voient pour leurs élèves un bon moyen d'apprendre à se confronter sans grand danger, ainsi qu'à gagner en maîtrise de soi et en confiance), des passionnés d'arts martiaux (qui y recherchent un message ésotérique ou simplement une attitude « traditionnelle »), des sportifs (qui s'intéressent à l'activité physique et aux compétitions sportives), des férus de self-défense ou de combat dit « réel » (qui y recherchent les clés de l'efficacité), le judo apparaît multi-facettes. Il jouit, auprès du grand public, d'une image positive et nombre de parents souhaitent y inscrire, au moins un temps, leurs enfants, pour toutes les raisons évoquées et pour cette aura globalement « éducative » qui l'entoure.Ainsi, ceux qui se rendent dans un dōjō de judo, et y revêtent un « kimono » font bien en apparence la même chose, y mettent parfois la même énergie, souvent la même passion, mais leurs mots pour décrire le judo/jūdō et leur recherche diffèrent tant qu'il semble parfois impossible de concilier leurs discours. Le judo apparaît alors sans unité, sans identité.Répertorier et croiser ces différentes conceptions d'une même activité constituerait un passionnant ouvrage sociologique, mais pour comprendre ce qui les unit au-delà des divergences apparentes, il est une question non encore résolue : qu'était le jūdō à l'origine ? Comment a-t-il été conçu ? Pour répondre à cette question, il faut remonter dans le temps, plus précisément d'un peu plus de 120 ans.120 ans, c'est peu. Pourtant la recherche, le voyage aux sources du judo n'est pas sans difficulté. Ainsi le judo appartient-il, d'une certaine manière, à la sphère dite des « arts martiaux », un domaine qu'il s'agit d'aborder avec beaucoup de précautions, avec objectivité (et donc distance) mais sans en laisser échapper les éléments essentiels (ce pour quoi l'intimité peut être un atout).La formation universitaire m'a ouvert les clés de la langue japonaise, de la compréhension des textes, et surtout de la méthode et de l'attitude du chercheur. La fréquentation assidue des dōjō (depuis 25 ans), un 4e dan [au moment de la soutenance de la thèse] et des responsabilités dans la vie du judo au niveau local (secrétaire général de la ligue de Paris) m'ont offert de porter un regard particulier et prolongé sur la discipline.En trois parties, la première consacrée à la démarche, la deuxième à la méthode et la troisième, au discours de la méthode, ainsi qu'à l'évolution de celui-ci sur presque soixante ans, il s'agira de clarifier le processus de formation, de faire la part entre l'héritage et les apports, le discours et la méthode, afin de permettre à l'historien, au sociologue, au pédagogue, au philosophe, de mieux observer comment l'expérience d'un jeune homme (Kanō Jigorō a 21 ans lorsqu'il crée le jūdō) idéaliste est devenu une discipline planétaire.EXPLICATION DES RECHERCHES PREALABLES A LA REDACTION Il était essentiel, devant la multitude des discours qui entourent le judo, d'aller chercher au plus près des sources, dans le temps comme dans l'espace, les indices laissés par Kanō Jigorō, le but étant d'offrir la vision la plus claire possible de l'ambition première du jūdō au travers d'une démarche universitaire fondée sur l'étude des écrits des générations précédentes. En 1999, lorsque j'ai débuté cette étude, je ne savais pas si Kanō Jigorō avait écrit ou non. Non seulement aucun texte de sa main ne circule en Occident – il y a bien, en annexe de Le jūdō, école de vie 4 , un texte, présenté comme étant la transcription d'un discours prononcé par Kanō Jigorō mais il est absolument inexploitable d'un point de vue scientifique puisqu'on ne sait ni dans quelle langue, ni à quelle date, ni dans quelles circonstances, il aurait été prononcé – mais, au Japon même, tous les professeurs interrogés semblaient l'ignorer ou, du moins, ne pas savoir comment y avoir accès. Il m'est ainsi vite apparu que le problème des sources représenterait la plus grosse difficulté technique de ce travail. J'ai donc commencé par essayer de me constituer un corpus réunissant témoignages et études sur l'histoire du jūdō. En langues occidentales, du moins dans celles qui me sont accessibles – français et anglais – je n'ai rien trouvé. Il y a bien sûr quantité de livres techniques, mais aucune étude sur la démarche de Kanō Jigorō. Une première bonne surprise toutefois : la découverte à la Bibliothèque nationale de France de deux écrits de Kanō Jigorō rédigés en anglais : le premier, Jiujutsu (柔術), the old samurai art of fighting without weapons , et le second Judo (Jūjutsu). Restaient les documents en langue japonaise. Laisser de côté toutes les publications techniques pour se concentrer sur les études historiques est un travail décevant : la plupart des livres historiques sur le jūdō sont des biographies de Kanō Jigorō et non des études de sa démarche, de son discours ou de la méthode. Néanmoins désireux d'approfondir cependant ma connaissance de l'homme, je passai de longs mois à étudier la vie de Kanō. J'hésitai même alors – faute de trouver les sources qui m'étaient nécessaires – à concentrer et réorienter mon travail sur l'homme plutôt que sur sa création. Leur lecture consciencieuse m'a cependant permis une découverte inattendue : l'unité des discours, jusque dans la formulation, laissant deviner qu'ils avaient puisé à la même source, qu'il devait exister un texte original, probablement écrit de la main de Kanō Jigorō. J'ai d'abord découvert un premier recueil de textes, organisé par thèmes et composé de trois tomes pour environ 1500 pages. Récent, mais au tirage confidentiel, il est difficile à trouver. Il est l'une des sources essentielles de mon travail de DEA consacré aux combats pour l'éducation menés par Kanō Jigorō dans les années 1882-1898. Par la suite, la bibliothèque de la Diète et surtout les librairies d'occasion du quartier Jinbochō à Tōkyō m'ont livré leurs trésors, et j'ai pu constituer un corpus de 575 textes de la main de Kanō Jigorō pour un total de 5000 pages. La découverte, dans un carton non déballé en provenance directe de l'éditeur, sous les étagères poussiéreuses d'une de ces fameuses librairies, d'un recueil en quinze tomes, dont je connaissais l'existence mais que je n'avais jamais pu consulter, a été déterminante !La plupart sont des articles, d'autres des transcriptions de discours ou encore des préfaces, certains font une page, d'autres plus de 200. La période couverte va de 1888 à 1938 et les thèmes abordés sont très larges : le jūdō, bien sûr, mais aussi sa vie, l'éducation, la politique, les relations internationales, des impressions de voyage… PRESENTATION DES PRINCIPES METHODOLOGIQUES A partir du corpus finalement constitué, j'ai pu me concentrer sur les textes en rapport avec le jūdō, et proposer une analyse de la façon dont Kanō le conçoit, de manière non à en explorer tous les aspects, mais en m'efforçant de constituer un socle sur lequel appuyer les recherches futures dans le domaine. De prime abord, la lecture de ces différents textes est source de confusion. En effet, les définitions du jūdō se succèdent, les explications concernant son rôle, ses buts et objectifs ne cessent d'être modifiées. Ainsi, si dégager des thèmes fut ma première tentation, ce ne fut pas la plus fructueuse. C'est pourtant l'exercice auquel se prêtent tous les auteurs et éditeurs. Or, j'avais pu noter que tous ne retiennent qu'une part de ces définitions et toujours la même. Mon hypothèse a donc été qu'il devait s'agir là d'une sorte d'état final de la pensée du fondateur. Pour m'en assurer, j'ai comparé trois textes : le plus ancien texte de présentation complète du jūdō par Kanō Jigorō – une conférence de 1889 9 – et le plus récent, une autre conférence datant de 1938 10 , soit quelques semaines avant sa mort. J'en ai ajouté un troisième, d'une part parce qu'il était à peu près à égale distance dans le temps des deux autres (publié en série entre 1915 et 1916), d'autre part parce qu'il se veut une présentation complète du jūdō. La comparaison de ces textes, tant dans le fond que dans la forme s'est révélée éclairante, l'évolution de la pensée apparaissant nettement. Classer les textes dans leur ordre chronologique permet de démontrer que le jūdō n'a pas, pour Kanō Jigorō, plusieurs définitions à la fois, mais bien une en fonction des périodes et qu'il ne revient (pratiquement) jamais sur l'une d'elles une fois passé à une nouvelle formulation, pas plus qu'il n'explique comment et pourquoi il est passé de l'une à l'autre. Ainsi l'organisation chronologique de ces textes, de 1888 à 1938, à laquelle je me suis attelé, donne soudain la vision d'une pensée en marche qui évolue d'un texte à l'autre de manière perceptible, et à la compréhension de laquelle tous les écrits peuvent enfin contribuer. Mon travail a alors consisté à constater et répertorier ces différentes étapes puis à essayer de comprendre comment et pourquoi Kanō Jigorō a pu passer de l'une à l'autre en prenant pour indices les faits, les anecdotes, évoqués dans ses différents textes. Il m'a semblé pertinent de présenter les conclusions auxquelles j'ai abouti selon une logique personnelle, reconstruite à partir de cette étude, et selon le découpage suivant : une première partie consacrée à la démarche de Kanō Jigorō, une deuxième à la méthode, sa structuration, ses éléments, leur construction et rôles, et une troisième aux discours, et évolution de ceux-ci, sur la méthode et démarche. Ainsi, la première partie consacrée à la démarche resitue-t-elle d'abord le jūdō dans l'histoire du combat – armé ou non, duel ou sur le champ de bataille, réel ou rituel – au Japon avant de s'intéresser au caractère de Kanō. Puis je retrace le parcours conceptuel de celui-ci, qui le mène de jū, « l'adaptation », à seiryoku zen.yō, « bonne utilisation de l'énergie », au travers de phases conceptuelles et formulations intermédiaires.La deuxième partie, qui concerne la méthode, décrit et explore le jūdō tel qu'il doit se pratiquer dans les dōjō pour Kanō : kata, randori, mondō, kōgi. Je les définis comme étant quatre piliers de la pratique qui concernent trois domaines : celui du combat, celui du corps, et celui de l'intelligence et de la morale, domaines auxquels sera ajouté à partir de 1915 et plus précisément encore à partir de 1922, un quatrième, celui de l'application dans la vie quotidienne des principes du jūdō. Quatre piliers, trois domaines et enfin trois éducations : l'éducation physique, l'éducation intellectuelle, et l'éducation morale.La troisième partie concerne le discours. Discours qui connaît trois grandes périodes : la première est marquée par son absence, où plutôt la seule promesse d'un idéal social, jusque 1915 ; la deuxième consiste en une période normative, jusque 1922 ; la dernière, enfin, est caractérisée par un certain apaisement, s'agissant d'inviter simplement à la réflexion d'abord de manière fortement incitative, puis plus discrètement et légèrement. Ce discours, foisonnant et souvent indissocié, je l'analyse enfin selon trois cercles contextuels : celui du combat, celui de l'attitude quotidienne, et celui de l'idéal. CONCLUSION DU TRAVAIL DE RECHERCHESi l'étude des textes m'avait permis de recenser des faits, des intentions, des colères, des étonnements, des explications, des discours, il restait à les organiser. C'est cette méthode de travail qui justifie le titre définitif : « Kanō Jigorō et l'élaboration du jūdō » car je propose de découvrir comment, petit à petit, pierre après pierre, choix après choix, Kanō construit le jūdō. Organiser les éléments est déjà source de découvertes mais c'est leur analyse qui s'est révélée la plus fructueuse. Et c'est dans ce cadre que l'idée qui est devenue le sous-titre, le « choix de la faiblesse », s'est imposée, d'abord timidement, puis de façon de plus en plus obsédante jusqu'à devenir une sorte d'évidence en comparant les faits, anecdotes et récits de Kanō. Le « choix de la faiblesse » est la thèse que je propose, c'est ma lecture du jūdō et du système de pensée de Kanō.Le jūdō est conçu pour que le faible, s'il utilise habilement ses ressources et le contexte, ait une chance de se trouver en position de force, et aussi que le fort agisse avec prudence, conscient que toute situation est relative et temporaire, préparant le temps – qui souhaitonsle lui, ne viendra pas – où il se retrouvera en position de faiblesse. Cette pensée ne conditionne pas seulement la conception et la méthode de combat mais jusqu'à la vision du comportement attendu de l'individu comme acteur social. L'étude des textes montre que Kanō Jigorō portait trois projets distincts tout autant qu'entrelacés, unis globalement dans le mot jūdō. Le premier, c'est l'étude et l'enseignement du principe qui permet l'efficacité. Le second, c'est la mise en application par chacun de ce principe dans la société. Le troisième, c'est la formation de chacun selon son idéal de l'homme et de la société.Le jūdō devait changer l'homme et la société. Cela l'a-t-il fait ? Cela le peut-il encore alors que le jūdō apparaît aujourd'hui tronqué tant dans le discours du fondateur que dans sa méthode ? C'est un autre débat. ; 起草前の研究について柔道に対しての言説は様々である。だから出来るだけ柔道の原点の理想をはっきり理解するように前の世代の文献の研究の基となる学術的方法を通して嘉納治五郎の残した手がかりを得ろうとすることは不可欠である。研究の始まった1999 年私は嘉納が文書を残していたかどうか知らなかった。西欧には何も出版されていなかった。フランス語で書かれた柔道についての本Le jūdō,école de vie1 (『人生の学校としての柔道』)の付録には嘉納の演説を基にした文献があるが、その演説が日本語であったか、他の言語であったか、いつどこでどのような状況で話されたか、全くわからず、学術的には利用出来ない。日本でも多くの柔道の指導者に彼の著作が実際にあるかどこで探したらいいかと聞いても答えを得ることはできなかった。この研究の最も難しい学術的問題はまずは文献を探すことであるということはすぐに分かった。したがって柔道の歴史についての記録や研究の本を集めるべく努力した。自分が読める言語、仏語と英語では何もないことが分かった。柔道の技についての本はたくさんあるが、嘉納治五郎が柔道をどのように構想したかについては何もなかった。ただ、パリの国立図書館でJiujutsu (柔術), the old samurai art of fighting without weapons2 とJudo (Jūjutsu)3 と題された嘉納治五郎の英語の著作を見つけ驚いた。残るは日本語の文献のみとなった。技術に関する出版物は避けて歴史のみを扱う文献を研究しても結果は期待に沿うものではなかった。柔道の歴史の本の大部分は嘉納の伝記であり、彼の仕事、書物、またその方法の研究ではなかった。嘉納治五郎の人生を出来るだけ詳しく知るべく伝記の研究に数カ月を費やした。何冊も真面目に読んでいくうち予期せぬ発見をした。どの著者でも同じことを説明しており、言葉の選び方まで近いので皆同じ原典から本を書いたということが分かった。その原典は嘉納治五郎自身の著作ではないかと考えた。そこで手に入れるのは容易ではなかったが、最近出版された、三巻からなり1500 頁に及ぶテーマ別の嘉納治五郎著作集4 を見つけることができた。1882 年から1898 年に嘉納治五郎が教育のために戦かった過程を追ったこの文献が私の専門研究課程修了論文の基となった。その後国会図書館からも、東京の神保町の古本を扱う書店からも嘉納の文献を手に入れることができ、合計約5000 頁の575 件の文献を集めて研究することができた。埃かぶって開けた形跡のない出版社のダンボール箱の中に15 巻からなる嘉納治五郎体系5 という著作集をある古本屋で発見、これが研究の中核となった。嘉納治五郎の著作の大部分は記事で、その他は演説や序文などである。1 頁だけのものもあり、200 頁以上のものもある。時期としては1888 年から1938 年までで、柔道は当然のこと、彼の生涯や教育や政治や国際関係や旅の印象なども含まれておりテーマは広い。研究方法について揃った資料文献から柔道に関するものに重点をおき、嘉納の柔道構想について分析ができたと考える。すべての側面を研究できたわけではないが少なくとも将来この分野においての調査の基となるものを築こうと力を尽くした。はじめに、これらの様々な文献はそれ自体混乱の源である。実際、柔道の定義は何度も出てくるし、柔道の役割の説明、目的などは次々と修正されていく。なのでテーマを分類したい誘惑にかられたが、それは実りの多いものではなかったし、すでに多くの著者、編集者がしてきたことだった。さて、私はすべての定義において、いつも同じある一部分のみが使われていることに気づいた。というわけで私は、この部分が創立者の完成された思想であるのではないかと仮定した。そのため、三件の文献を比較することとした。まず柔道に関して最も古い講演である1889 年のものより『柔道一班並ニ其教育上ノ價値』1 と、最も新しく、1938 年彼の亡くなる数週間前に行われた講演より、『柔道の根本精神』2。三件目には、この二つの講演のちょうど中間、1915〜1916 年に出版された、柔道の解説として完全な『講道館柔道概説』3 を選んだ。これらの文献を綿密に比較するうちだんだんと思想の進化が見えてきた。そして年代順に整理してみてわかったことは、嘉納にとって一時に複数の柔道の定義はなく、ただ時代に沿ってその定義が変わっていくということ、しかも一度過ぎると過去の定義には戻らず新しい定式に移り、どうして変化したかを説明することもなかったということである。1888 年から1938 年まで年代順の分析から、文献から文献へと進化していく発展中の思想をかいま見ることができ、その進化を理解するために、一見柔道に関係のないほかのすべての文書も助けとなった。そこで私はこれら様々な進化の過程を確認、整理し、その後、これらの文書から事実やエピソードを手がかりに、なぜ嘉納治五郎が次から次へと思想を変えていったのか、理解しようと試みた。この研究から私なりの論理で達した結論は、以下の区分に分けて提示するのが最善であろう。まずはじめに嘉納治五郎という人物の人生、背景、次に柔道の指導方法、その構造化と要素、さらにそれら要素の構成と役割、三番目にこれらについての嘉納の説明とその変化についてである。第一部では嘉納の人柄について語る前に、まず武装あるいは武器なし、決闘か戦場での戦闘、儀式的あるいは実践的など、日本における戦いの歴史上での柔道の歩みについて述べる。柔すなわち「順応」から「精力を有効に使う」という意味の精力善用まで、構想における段階を追って、60 年に及ぶ嘉納の思考の進化をたどる。第二部は指導方法に関してだが、嘉納にとって柔道がどのようにして道場で実践されるべきかを詳しく述べる。形、乱取り、問答、講義が含まれる。これらを実践の四本の柱と定義し、この四点は戦い、身体、そして知性と倫理の三分野にあてはめられる。その後、四分野目として、1915 年とさらに詳しく1922 年に柔道の原理の日常生活への応用が加えられる。このほか、体育、知育、徳育の三つの教育がある。第三部では言説を扱う。談話、論述は三つの重要な時期に分けられる。まずは1915 年までの論述の欠落の時期、あるいは社会理想主義的希望が見えるだけの時期、次に1922 年までの規範を確立した時期、その後は一種の鎮静化があり、ただ熟考を促すようなやり方へと変化する。これらの言説は豊富な上、秩序立っていないが、理想の枠の中に日常の態度、さらにその中に戦闘、というような枠組みに分けて捉え、分析することとする。結論へまだ体系化する必要があるが、この研究で、嘉納の逸話、意図、怒り、驚き、解説や談話などを抜き出すことができた。少しずつ、石をひとつずつ築き上げていくように選り抜きに選り抜きを重ねて嘉納が柔道を構築していった様を見出せる内容にふさわしく、この論文を「嘉納治五郎と柔道の構想」と名づけた。要素を整理することはそれだけで発見の多い作業だったが、それらの分析は最も実り多きものだった。そして論文の副題となった「弱さの選択」は、はじめは遠慮がちではあったが、徐々について離れないような姿で現れ、逸話や談話を通して嘉納の言説を比べると、ついには自明の理となる。「弱さの選択」は私の提案する命題であるが、それは私の柔道と嘉納の思想体系に対する解釈である。柔道は、状況に応じて巧みにその潜在的能力を活用できれば、弱い者でも、強い立場に立つことができるように構想されている。また強い者にとっては、すべての状況は相対的、一時的であることを意識し、弱い立場に立たされる時がくるとすればそれに備えるべく慎重さを持って行動できるように考案されている。この思想は戦闘法だけでなく、社会の一員として求められる個々の振る舞い方にも影響を与えている。この研究より柔道というものの中に、嘉納治五郎は絡み合う三つの異なる計画を組み込んだ。一つには効率さを活かす原理の研究と教育、二つ目には各個人によるこの原理の社会への応用、三つ目には嘉納の人と社会の理想に基づく個人の養成である。嘉納は人と社会を変えるために柔道を創った。それは果たして成功したのだろうか。創立者の目から見て、現在の柔道にはまだ欠けている部分があるのではないか。だがそれはまた別の議論である。

Issue 32.2 of the Review for Religious, 1973. ; Review ]or Religious is edited by faculty members of the School of Divinity of St. Louis University, the editorial offices being located at 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boulevard; St. Louis, Missouri 63103. It is owned by the Missouri Province Educational Institute; St. Louis, Missouri. Published bimonthly and copy-right (~) 1973 by Review ]or Religious. Composed, printed, and manufactured in U.S.A. Second class postage paid at St. Louis, Missouri. Single copies: $1.25. Sub-scription U.S.A. and Canada: $6.00 a year; $11.00 for two years; other countries, $7.00 a year, $13.00 for two years. Orders should indicate whether they are for new or renewal subscriptions and should" be accompanied by check or money order payable to Review ]or Religious in U.S.A. currency only. Pay no money to persons claiming to represent Review ]or Religious. Change of address requests should include former address. R. F. Smith, S.J. Everett A. Diederich, S.J. Joseph F. Gallen, S.J. Editor Associate Editor Questions and Answers Editor March 1973 Volume 32 Number 2 Renewals, new subscriptions, and changes of address should be sent to Review for Religious; P.O. Box 6070; Duluth, Minnesota 55802. Correspondence with the editor and the associate editor together with manuscripts, books for review, and materials for "Subject Bibliography for Religious" should be sent to Review for Religious; 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boulevard; St. Louis, Missouri 63103. Questions for answering should be sent to Joseph F. Gallen, S.J.; St. Joseph's Church; 321 Willings Alley; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106. Religious and Social. Security William Quinn, F.S. . Brother William Quinn,F.S.C., is the Assistant to the President of the Conference of Major Superiors of Men of the USA; Suite 114; 1330 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.; Washington, D.C. 20036. For some years the Internal Re~)enue Service of the U.S. Government has recognized that religious with the vow of poverty require a specific treatment under the law. In virtue of their vow of poverty, religious have no income in the sense in which this word is used by Internal Revenue Service. What-ever salary they might earn is in reality earned as an agent of their order, not for themselves personally. Because of this, religious have been exempt from the federal income tax; when the Social Security System was begun in 1936, .religious were excluded for the same reason: They had no income upon which to base the Social Security tax and which would serve to determine the level of benefits upon retirement or disability. In 1967 the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress passed legislation extending Social Security coverage to members of religious orders under a vow of poverty. However, when the matter was considered in the Senate, representatives of religious orders requested time for further study of the effects of coverage. The provision was not included in the Senate: passed bill which went to conference, and th~ conference agreed to post-pone the matter pending study of the orders. The status of religious under Social Security was not changed in the Social Security Amendments of 1967. The 1972 Provisions The provision for extending coverage to members of religious orders that is contained in the 1972 Amendments to the Social Security Act is based upon recommendations submitted to the Congress by a joint Social Security study committee, established by the two conferences of religious superiors in the U.S., LCWR and CMSM. 210 / Review for Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 On October 30, 1972, President Nixon signed into law the Bill, H.R. 1, entitled Social Security Amendments of 1972; this Bill is now known as P.L. 92.603. The Bill provided many modifications in the existing Social Security legislation, but Section 123 is of particular interest to religious since its heading is: Coverage for Vow-of-poverty Members of Religious Orders. Religious orders are given the option of electing coverage under Social Security for their members under a series of rather well-defined conditions. The option is open-ended, that is, there is no time limit for when this option must be exercised, but it is irrevocable once it has been made. It will then be binding upon all present and all future members of the order. This new legislation recognizes the special situation of religious with the vow of poverty by creating for the purpose of Social Security coverage a unique definition of "wages": "The term 'wages' shall include the fair market value of any board, lodging, clothing, and other perquisites furnished to such member." Two things might be remarked about this definition: First, it is in no way related to the salary a particular religious might be receiving, and second, every religious in the order has an assignable "wage." The services performed by the religious might actually be carried out in an institution such as a school or hospital, but for the purposes of this Bill these services are deemed to be performed by the religious as an employee of the religious order. The obligation of paying the Social Security taxes members of the order falls upon the order, and not the particular institution for which the religious might be working. The effect of this legislation is to allow religious orders (or an autono-mous subdivision, such as a province or an independent monastery) the option of entering the Social Security system. The rates of taxation, the conditions for claiming disability, and the requirements for old-age benefits are the same for religious as all other participants in the Social Security pro-gram. A retroactive feature is built into the legislation, to allow the order to make the effective date of coverage any time'up to five years previous to the date of election of coverage. The order must pay the accumulated back taxes for all of its members, starting with the chosen effective date, but in so doing a number of older religious Will qualify immediately for old-age and Medicare benefits. The answers to specific questions about eligibility, tax rates, and bene-fits must be found in publicatigns of the Social Security Administration, or by consulting local offices of the Administration. These questions and answers are part of the daily routine of these offices and should not present any great difficulty. Special Questions Some questions, however, do pertain directly to religious, and some of these present rather difficult technical considerations. Examples of these Religious and Social Security might be: What is an autonomous subdivision of an order; are alien mem-bers of the order living in the United States covered; what about U.S.A. citizens, living and working in a foreign country; when is a religious retired? It is relatively easy to know when a lay worker in a business enterprise is retired. The case of one who stops working and who is no longer paid a salary is rather obvious, but even with the layman there may be some diffi-culty in establishing the fact of retirement. This would occur, for example, in the case of a self-employed person who would substantially reduce the time devoted to employment. In the case of a religious, where the "wage" is calculated on the basis of room and board and other perquisites furnished to him by the order, the question as to when the religious is to be considered as retired becomes more difficult. Retirement, for a religious under Social Security, is defined in the new legislation as the situation in which the religious no longer performs the duties usually required (and to the extent usually required) of an active member of the order. In spelling out the interpretation of this definition for the benefit of the religious superiors who will have to make the certification of retirement, the Social Security Administration calls attention to two con-siderations: a comparison of the nature of the work being performed before retirement with that performed after, and the amount of time devoted to this service. Should a sister, for example, be assigned to the motherhouse after fifty years of teaching and there devote herself to monitoring the phone, it is clear that she has retired. The case is more difficult, say, for a con-templative sister who gradually grows more feeble with age and who is not able to keep up the pace of former years. She is considered to be retired, for Social Security purposes, when the religious superior certifies that she is no longer able to perform the services required of active members. A Typical Illustration The operation of the new Social Security legislation could perhaps best be appreciated by considering a particular case as a typical illustration of how the law would work out in practice. Suppose, for example, that Brother John Doe, born in 1917, has taken a vow of poverty as a member of a re-ligious order. Suppose further thai the prov.ince of his order elects to partici-pate in Social Security by filing the appropriate Certificate of Election, with an effective date of January 1, 1973. The tables of eligibility for retirement benefits and for hospital insurance (Medicare) indicate that 31 quarters of coverage are needed in order to be fully insured; this means that Brother John Doe must have paid Social Security taxes on his "wages" for 31 quarters, at least, in order to be fully insured. An important parameter in the discussion is the amount of "wages" on which Brother John Doe pays the tax. This is an amount arrived at by the religious superior of his province as a result of considering the fair market 212 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 value of the board, lodging, clothing, and other perquisites furnished mem-bers of the province. Suppose for the sake of our illustration that this figure is $2,500 per year. The province, beginning in 1973, must pay a Social Se-curity tax for Brother John Doe at a rate of 11.7%, or $292.50 per year. The tax rate will remain at 11.7% until 1978, when it will increase to 12.1%. This rate will continue through 1980; from 1981-85 it will be 12.3%; 1986-1997 it will be 12.5%. This tax must be paid until Brother John Doe becomes disabled or until he retires. Brother John Doe will reach the age of 65 in 1982. At this time he may apply for old-age benefits. By 1982 he will have earned 36 quarters of coverage, and he will therefore be qualified for both retirement and Medi-care benefits. The amount of Brother's retirement benefits are calculated on the basis of his average "wage" over a period of 26 years (this number is given in a Social Security table, depending on date of birth and whether the person is a man or woman). In Brother John Doe's case his total earnings are 9 × $2,500 or $22,500; this divided by 26 gives his average yearly earn-ings as $865, or $72 a month. The Social Security Administration table of benefits indicates that Brother John Doe qualifies for the minimum benefit of $84.50 per month, or $1,014 per year. American Experience of Mortality Tables show that, on the average, men who reach age 65 will live another 15 years. Applying this figure to Brother John Doe gives his total old-age benefits as $15,210. Medicare Provisions After reaching 65, Brother John Doe automatically qualifies for Medi-care, Part A, the hospital insurance part of the health insurance program. This provides payment for services received as a bed patient in a hospital, or in an extended care facility, or at home as a patient up to 90 "hospital days" or 100 "extended care days" or 100 "homeohealth visits." The details of these benefits are spelled out in Your Medicare Handbook published by the Social Security Administration. After reaching age 65, Brother John Doe may elect to participate in Part B of Medicare which is a medical insurance program that helps pay for doctors' services, medical services and supplies, and other health care services. The cost of this insurance is reevaluated by the Government an-nually, but was $5.60 per month for the period July 1971-July 1972. Again, the details of this insurance program are contained in the same Handbook referred to above. Brother John Doe may continue to work after reaching age 65; should he do so, he will continue to pay Social Security on his wages. Further, the first $2,100 of his wages do not influence the old-age retirement benefits he receives, but the $400 beyond $2,100 (recall that our example set Brother John Doe's wages at $2,500) reduces his benefits by a proportion of one dollar for each two dollars earned over $2,100, or, in our example, by Religious and Social Security $200. Upon retirement, Brother John Doe would receive the full amount of his retirement benefit and would no longer pay the Social Security tax. Upon his death, a cash benefit of $251 is paid the beneficiary of Brother John Doe. However, for Social Security purposes Brother John Doe has no dependent survivors; after the deathbenefit is paid, no further benefits are paid on Brother John Doe's account. The Question Facing Each Religious Order Each religious order is now faced with a rather complex question-- what would be the economic consequence of exercising the option of joining the Social Security system. The order becomes liable to the Social Security tax on all its present members add all future members; it also gradually qualifies its members through quar.ters of coverage for the benefits of the Social Security program, chiefly disability, retirement, and Medicare. The order must make a careful evaluation of its age profile, its wage level, and its health and mortality experience.', to arrive at a prudent judgment as to lhe advisability of joining the Social Security program. The retroactive feature of P.IS. 92.605, Section 123, requires special consideration. This will allow religious who have recently retired, or those who will retire in the next several years, to qualify for full coverage, but the price that must be paid is the back Social Security tax for all members of the order who were active at the effective retroactive date. This date may be any number of quarters up to '~a maximum of 20 prior to the date of election of coverage. The effect of not choosing the retroactive feature is that some of the present older religious will not qualify for Social Security benefits, nor will they be eligible for Part A of Medicare after reaching age 65. Detailed information on Social Security matters is contained in the .publications listed below. Also, more specific reference to Social Security as it affects religious with a vow of poverty is given in the series of questions and answers that follow. Critical Social Security Questions Question 1. For purposes of the law relating to the Social Security coverage of religious (P.L. 92.603), what are considered wages? Answer. Wages for the purpose of this law shall include the fair market value of any board, lodging, clothing, and other perquisites furnished to a member by the order or autonomous subdivision thereof or by any other person or organization pursuant to an agreement with the order or subdivi-vision. Question 2. Does the law provide for a minimum or maximum amount for evaluated maintenance? Answer. The legislation specifically provides that the evaluated mainte-nance shall not be less than $100 per month. The maximum of course 214 / Review [or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 would be $10,800 under the 1972 amendments. The committee reports emphasize that the evaluation shall be on a reasonable basis. There is no indication that cost accounting principles must be applied. The committee reports also emphasize the understanding that there will be one established or evaluated wage for all of the members of the order regardless of the position which they occupy. Question 3. Are religious subject to both Social Security and income taxes? Answer. This law does not affect the vow of poverty but rather confirms it. Therefore, there would be no income tax liability on evaluated board and lodging. The Social Security taxes imposed on wages are limited by the law to orders which waive their tax exempt status for the limited purpose of Social Security coverage. Question 4. Will the religious be required to file any income tax forms? Answer. No, this law is not based on the self-employment concept as in ~the case of ministers. The only form filed is that which is required of tile employer; that is, the order or a subdivision thereof. Question 5. Who determines the level of income for a particular religious order or autonomous subdivision thereof? Answer. This is determined by the religious super:,or, based on a study of the actual situation existing with the members of the order or subdivi-sion thereof. Question 6. The order or subdivision thereof decides whether or not to come into the Social Security System; how is this decision made? Answer. The law does not specify how the decision is to be made. The provincial may get to~ether with the council and make the decision. Alterna-tively, the entire membership might be polled on the question. Question 7. If the order elects to come under Social Security, is this election irrevocable? Answer. Yes. Question 8. How many quarters of coverage are necessary in order to be fully insured under Social Security? Answer. Ultimately, the answer depends on the date of birth of the person being considered. It is necessary to go to a table supplied by the Social Security Administration to find the answer to this question. It should be observed here that, depending on the age of the individual, it may not be necessary to have as many quarters of coverage to secure Medicare coverage. This too depends on Social Security Administration tables. Question 9. Is it economically advantageous for a religious order to participate in Social Security? Answer. It is difficult to give a generalized answer to this question. It must be determined for each individual order. Three of the most signifi-cant factors are: the level of wages of the members of the order, the age distribution of the members of th+ order, and the benefits which would be Religious and Social Security / :215 receivable, that is, old age and survivors benefits, Medicare coverage and disability insurance and death benefits. Question 10. What retirement benefits are paid to a retired religious who has been fully insured under Social Security? Answer. This depends on the level of "income" on which the religious paid Social Security taxes during the years he was acquiring the necessary number of quarters of coverage; however, there is a minimum benefit paid to everyone who has the requisite number of quarters. At present this minimum is $84.50 per month or $1,014 per annum. Question 11. What is the situation with respect to a religious who pays Social Security taxes for ten years and then leaves the order? Answer. The credits a religious earns toward Social Security coverage belong to him/her as an individual; should the religious leave the order he takes the earned eligibility with him into secular life. Question 12. A religious man with sufficient quarters of coverage to be fully insured reaches age 65 but continues to work; that is, he is not retired in the technical sense of the term. What is his status under Social Security? Answer. Upon reaching the age of 65 the religious who has earned the required quarters of coverage may apply for Social Security benefits and he would be entitled to the same. If he continues to work, that is, he is not retired, the order must pay the Social Security taxes on his wages even though he is receiving old age benefits. If his wages are $2,100 or less, there would be no reduction of his old age benefits. If, on the other hand, they are in excess of $2,100 there would be a reduction of one dollar for every two dollars in excess of $2,100. The above answer would apply to a member of a religious order of women with the exception that she would be eligible for Social Security at the age of 62. Her benefits, however, would be somewhat reduced. Under the 1972 amendment a man may likewise be retired at 62 but his benefits would be reduced. Question 13. Is there any significant difference in the Social Security law as it applies to men or to women? Answer. The age at which women may receive benefits, and is the nor-mal retirement age for women, is 62, whereas it is 65 for men; however, men may retire at 62 and receive i'educed benefits. The required quarters of coverage to be fully insured differs for men and for women. The exact details should be checked with table~ supplied by the Social Security Administration. Question 14. Is there any time limit in which to elect coverage? Answer. No, an election may be made at. any time the order so desires. Question 15. Is there any time limit for electing retroactive coverage? Answer. No; however, if. the order defers the election of retroactive coverage for a significant amount of time it will be more costly when the order does elect to come in on a retroactive basis. The rate for the retro-active purchase of coverage is determined by, existing tax rates during the :216 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 five year period. For example, if an order elected five years retroactive cov-erage in December the tax rate for 1967 and 1968 would be 8.80%; for 1969 and 1970 it would be 9.60 and for 1971 and 1972 it would be 10.40. In 1973 the rate will be 11.70 and by 1978 it will rise to 12.10. In addi-tion to the increased costs it is possible that some religious will not be covered if the retroactive buy-in is deferred for a substantial period of time. Some members, for example, may retire and, consequently, will not be cov-ered in the retroactive purchase. Question 16. Must one elect for a retroactive period of five years or may one elect for a lesser number of years? Answer. The order may elect to "buy in" for any number of years it wishes, the maximum being five. Question 17. If a religious is active during the retroactive period and alive at the time of election but no longer a member of the order should he be counted in determining retroactive coverage? Answer. Yes. Question 18. When must the order pay for the retroactive coverage? Answer. By the end of the quarter in which the election is made. This payment must be made in a lump sum; there is no provision for an install-ment buy-in. Question 19. May an order elect coverage before the forms and regula-tions are finalized? Answer. Yes; notification of election of coverage may be sent to your district Social Security office. Question 20. When should a religious secure a Social Security number? Answer. As soon as possible. It is not necessary to have Social Security coverage in order to acquire a number. Acquisition of a number might speed receipt of benefits when an election is finally made. Question 21. If a religious subject to a vow of poverty performs ser-vices not required by the order but merely with the approval of his or her superior may he or she receive the benefit of this law? Answer. No, the services performed must be at the requirement of the religious order or subdivision thereof. Question 22. If a religious receives board and lodging from another organization (parish) how shall the wages be determined for Social Se-curity purposes? Answer. The tlat rate which is adopted for all religious shall prevail. Question 23. How much would it cost to buy in retroactively for a five year period at an evaluated wage of $100 per month? Answer. It would cost $612 per member who was active during the five year period and alive at the time of election. Some Available Literature 1. Social Security Handbook (SSI 135). This is available from the Religious and Social Security / 217 Superintendent of Documents and provides o]~erall ~nformatlon but nothing more recently than 1969. It will be 3 to 6 rrionths, before anything like its counterpart will be brought out. The volume c~sts $2.25. 2. Your Medicare Handbook (DHEW ,Publication; SSA 72-10050). This is available from the Superintendent of Documents at 35 cents in bulk rate, free for a few copies. The Handbook is available to anyone entitled to Medicare. 3. Your Social Security (DHEW SSA 72-10035). This provides gen-eral information and is available free from the Superintendent of Documents. 4. If You Become Disabled (SSA 73-10029). Available free even in bulk. 5. Your Social Security Earnings Recordi (DHEW 73-10044). Avail-able from the Superintendent of Documents. 6. How Medicare Helps You When You Go to the Hospital (DHEW 72-10039). This may be free in bulk. 7. Estimating Your Social Security Retirement Check (SSI 47). Avail-able free. Theological Reflections on the Ordination of Women Committee on Pastoral Research and Practices The Committee on Pastoral Research and Practices is a committee of the' National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Foreword This report prepared by the Committee on Pastoral Research and Practices has been approved for publication by the Administrative Committee of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. The report is not definitive. It deals only with the question of ordination to diaconate and priesthood, leaving aside the question of installation of women in ministries of lector and acolyte. It is a contribution to the con-tinuing dialogue on a subject of great importance. Its purpose is to encour-age further study and discussion while making honest efforts to identify the major questions which must be examined in depth before conclusive answers can be given. We are conscious of the deep love for the Church which underlies the growing interest of many women in the possibility of ordination. Our own appreciation of their indispensable contribution to the life of the Church underlies this effort at honest dialogue. Other churches are also engaged in a study of this question. While their reflections have been helpful to us, we hope ours may be helpful to them. Theological Reflections on the Ordination ot Women The question of ordaining women is an old one in the Church, but it has not yet been thoroughly researched for Catholic theology. There is no explicit authoritative teaching concerning the ordination of women that settles the question. The topic should be given exhaustive study. The theological reasons for and against the ordination of women need to be developed in careful and 218 The Ordination of Women / 219 objective fashion. A thorough study is required not because of sociological trends, but because of developments in the Church within the past decade. The encyclical Pacem in terris (no. 41) in 1963 listed the emancipation of women as a positive development of modern times. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (nos. 9, 29) in 1965 rejected any discrimination based on sex. The admission of women as auditors to the last two sessions of Vatican II (1964-65), the proclamation of St. Theresa of Avila as Doctor of the Church (1970), the discussions on this subject in the Third Synod of Bishops (1971)--these trace a considerable recent development concerning woman's role in the Church. The revelation given in Galatians 3:28 shows the equality before God of every Christian: "There does not exist among you Jew or Greek, slave or freeman, male or female. All are one in Christ Jesus." In the Church then there is no distinction of persons: Discriminatory lines have been erased by Christ. In the Church there can be no discrimination. The basic text and basic teaching, however, do not mean that there are not different ministries in the Church, or that one ministry is to be pre-ferred over another--as the same St. Paul taught in 1 Cor 12:4-14: 1. In spite of this doctrine of the equality of all in Christ, no woman has ever been pope, bishop, or priest. At the present time it cannot be proven or disproven that women were ever ordained deacons. It is Church law (Canon 968) that women are not eligible for orders. Several scriptural and theological justifications have been proposed to explain why women are not eligible for ordination. They are here listed-- in a general order of increasing importance--with some brief comments. 1. In the Old Testament, authentic priesthood was limited to males. The Aaronic priesthood and the levitical service (a service somewhat analogous to the diaconate) were similarly limited to males (cf. Exodus 28, Leviticus 8). This was in keeping with the strongly patriarchal Hebrew society. Be-cause we accept the law as invested with divine authority, we accept this limitation of Old Testament priesthood to men of one family within one tribe of Israel as expressing God's will-for the Old Testament. The exclusion of most males and of all females was then also God's will. This entire presen-tation, however, seemingly has no direct bearing on the issue at hand. We of the New Testament are studying the will of God concerning the New Testa-ment priesthood of Jesus Christ. 2. In the New Testament there is mention of a woman who was called "deaconess" (Rom 16:1) and of other women serving as deacons (1 Tim 3:11). Similarly in the early centuries of the Church, and especially in the East, there were deaconesses. Unfortunately no clear conclusions can be drawn from this information. There is no way at present to determine whether these women were called by this title in a formal or an informal way, whether the women in scripture were wives of deacons .who aided their deacon hus-bands, whether they were ordained, whether any ordination they received 220 / Review for Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 was sacramental, etc. The uncertainty of Scripture scholars concerning an "order" of deaconess is illustrated in the Jerome Biblical Commentary, 53: 136; 57: 21. A similar uncertainty seemingly exists concerning the deaconess in the early Oriental Church. This deaconess tradition is helpful in approach-ing the present question. However, we must beware of constructing a case for or against the sacramental ordination of women on such fragmentary and indefinite information. 3. Saint Paul repeatedly directed that women hold to a subordinate posi-tion in the Church, keep silence in the Church, keep their heads covered, tend the home and family, etc. (cf. 1 Cor 11:2-16; 14:33-36; Eph 5:22-24; Col 3: 18; Titus 2:5; cf. 1 Pet 3: 1-7). There seems to be little question but these texts are of Pauline authority alone. The developments of the past decade in the Church listed in this letter, and the authorized functioning of women as lectors and commentators, further demonstrate that these Pauline texts should not be cited as arguing against the ordination of women. 4. The New Testament doctrine on "headship" as reflected in the order of creation is given to justify the leadership of men and the subordination of women in the Church (cf. 1 Cor 11:3-12; 1 Tim 2:8-15). This same reasoning is advanced to explain the ordination to the priesthood of men but not of women. This doctrine of the dependence of woman on man is seem-ingly the teaching of Genesis (cf. JCB 2:18) as well as of Saint Paul (cf. supra). However, much further study is needed before conclusions can be drawn. 5. The incarnation is given as a reason for the ordination of men only. The word of God took on flesh and was made man--as a male. This then was the divine plan. It is stated that this divine plan is expressed in the person of Christ (cf. Decree on the Ministry and Li]e o[ Priests, no. 2). It is argued that a male priest is required to act in the person of the male Christ. 6. The selectivity of Christ and of the early Church presents another ap-proach. It is known that Jesus did not hesitate to contravene the law and sociological customs of his time. Yet Jesus selected only men as his apostles and disciples. Further, the replacement for Judas was to be specifically one of male sex (Acts, 1:21 in the Greek), even though women who fulfilled the other conditions were present and available. Similarly the seven assistants to the apostles (Acts 6:3) were all men, even though the work was to be that of serving widows. This limitation to men, it is argued, goes beyond socio-logical conditions of that day and points to a divine choice. 7. Revelation is made known to us from tradition as well as from Sacred Scripture (cf. Constitution on Divine Revelation, nos. 8-10). It is then necessary for theology in this question to look to the life and practice of the Spirit-guided Church. The constant practice and tradition of the Catholic Church has excluded women from the episcopal and priestly office. The-ologians and canonists have been unanimous until modern times in con- The Ordination of Women / 221 sidering this exclusion as absolute and of divine origin. Until recent times no theologian or canonist seemingly has judged this to be only of ecclesiasti-cal law. It would be pointless to list the many authorities and the theological note that each assigns to this teaching. However, the constant tradition and practice of the Catholic Church against the ordination of women, interpreted (whenever interpreted) as of divine law, is of such a nature as to constitute a clear teaching of the ordinary magisterium of the Church. Though not formally defined, this is Catholic doctrine. These seven approaches have been used to document the exclusion from ordination of women. From them we attempt to draw six somewhat tentative conclusions: 1. Reasons no. 5 and no. 6 call for considerable further study in order to measure their validity. 2. Reason no. 7 is of ponderous theological import. Its force will not be appreciated by those who look for revelation and theology in Scripture alone, and who do not appreciate tradition as a source of theology. Because of rea-son no. 7 a negative answer to the possible ordination of women is indicated. The well-founded present discipline will continue to have and to hold the entire field unless and until a contrary theological development takes place, leading ultimately to a clarifying statement from the magisterium. 3. This question is extraordinarily complex. It is influenced by the indi-vidual's point of departure, viewpoint, and choice of terminology. Even in this study some helpful distinctions have not been spelled out for the sake of brevity. It would seem that neither Scriptural exegesis nor theology alone can give a clear answer to this question. The ultimate answer must come from the magisterium, and the current question is whether the magisterium (as reason no. 7 explains) has already given a definite and final answer. And at this level of doubt, only the magisterium itself can give" ultimate clarification. 4. It is possible to draw distinctions between the diaconate and the epis-copal- priestly order, and within the diaconate itself. Assuming that the diaconate is of ecclesial and not divine, institution, and that it can be sep-arated from the sacrament of orders, it would seem possible that special study be given to the possibility of a diaconate of service, non-sacramental and non-liturgical, which would be conferred on women. It has been noted that Pseudo-Denys in the 5th century made such a distinction within the diaconate. 5. Some contemporary writings on this subject approach priestly ordina-tion as "power" rather than service, and speak of a "right to ordination." Such views appear to overlook the clear doctrine that priestly ministry is service to the People of God, that no Christian has any right to ordination, and that it involves the mystery of God's free election. One who is not an ordained priest is not thereby, a lesser Christian, a lesser minister, or a victim of discrimination. In the Church there are many ministries, but all Christians do not have all charisms, and the hearts of all should be set on the greater 222 / Review ]or Religious, l/olume 32, 1973/2 gifts of God's love (1 Cor 12:4-13:3). Further, all Christians share in the common priesthood of the faithful (cf. Constitution on the Church, no. 10); from among these some are chosen by God to minister to the others by priestly service. In such a context should this question be presented. 6. Beyond the question of theological possibility is the further considera-tion o~ what is pastorally prudent. For the present, however, we can see from theology only a continuation of the established discipline. Considering the strength of that discipline and the numerous uncertainties detailed in this paper, the needed study on this question is now just beginning. As is evident, every one of the points listed in this report calls for a major study. The German theologian Ida Friederike Gorres reminds us that it is God's will and plan that must be determinant in this question: The Catholic priesthood is a unique phenomenon, springing solely from the faith, the doctrine, the history, the growing self-consciousness of the Church: not from the religious needs of the Catholic people, certainly not from any principles or theories concerning the rights of men and women, nor yet from the necessity of particular functions which could be assigned at will to various persons. The one and only exemplar of the Catholic priest is the living person of Jesus Christ, in his relationship to the Church: in the mystery of the one, perfect, indissoluble life he leads, with her (Catholic Transcript, Dec. 17, 1965). Pluralism in the Works of Karl Rahner with Applications to Religious Life Philip S. Keane, S.S. Philip S. Keane, S.S., is the Vice Rector of St. Patrick's Seminary; 320 Middlefield Road; Menlo Park, California 94025. As a working theologian moves from place to place, he finds himself being asked questions on a wide variety of subjects and his interests tend naturally to move towards those questions which he is asked over and over again. In the past twelve to eighteen months there is no question which I have been asked about more frequently than the theological meaning of pluralism. The question has come from virtually all segments of the Christian community, but it has been asked with special urgency by the members of religious communities, with at least one religious community having enough concern about the issue that it has called for a serious study of pluralism in its newly adopted constitutions.1 Pluralism a Perennial P~oblem In a certain sense I have found the repeated questions about pluralism amusing. My amusement has come from the fact that my questioners (sisters in particular) so often seem to be presupposing that pluralism is a brand new issue, perhaps even a .brand new toy, which theologians have just lately discovered. Some of the questioners seem very excited about this new issue as if it will solve all their community living problems while others are quite frightened by it, but they all seem to have the idea that pluralism is a totally new problem. This I find amusing inasmuch as pluralism is a perennial problem which theologians have .wrestled with for centuries; it is hardly a new issue. Many of today's older theologians such as Karl Rahner aConstitutions o] the Sisters o] St. Joseph o] Carondelet, a Congregation o] Pontifical Right, St. Louis, 1972, p. 29. 223 224 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 have been working with pluralism for 30 or 40 years, that is, since before a number of my excited questioners were born. Thus perhaps the first point to be made to those who are either nervously or excitedly asking about theologi-cal pluralism today is that it is anything but a totally new theological concept. Nonetheless, theological plurfilism is a most important issue for the whole Church today and for religious communities in particular. Also, it is an issue which is not well understood especially from the theological view- . point. Hence, the goal of this article will be to aid our understanding of pluralism as a theological reality by presenting the concept of pluralism found in the works of Karl Rahner and by applying this concept to the situation of the religious community today. In the past 10 or 15 years Rahner has written very extensively and incisively on pluralism'-' and his work on the theme should surely be a help to us in forming a workable theological concept of pluralism. Divisions and Presuppositions Our reflections on the theology of pluralism will be divided into five parts: first, pluralism as a basic theological reality; second, the unique character of pluralism today; third, some consequences of today's pluralism for the Church as a whole; fourth, pluralism and the oneness of our faith; and finally the implications of pluralism for religious community life. The first four parts will gather and coherently organize Rahner's ideas on plural-ism. The final section will move beyond what Rahner says explicitly, but it will seek to be faithful to his views on pluralism. An important note before beginning the explanation of Rahner's writings on pluralism is that, as with any Rahnerian topic, the vastness and.depth of Rahner's total theological synthesis are such as to render the treatment of a particular Rahnerian theme such as pluralism somewhat difficult without at least some grasp of the whole of Rahner. In our particular case, for example, Rahner's metaphysics of human knowing as bipolar (explicit and implicit), his concept of God as indescribable mystery, his explanation of Christianity as an openness to all that is genuinely human, and his concept of man as ~Rahner's major articles on pluralism include "The Theological Concept of Con-cupiscentia," Theological Investigations (hereinafter T1) [8 volumes 1961-71; vs. 1-6, Baltimore: Helicon; vs. 7-8, New York: Herder and Herder], v. 1, pp. 347-82; "The Man of Today and Religion," TI 6, pp. 3-20; "A Small Question Regarding the Contemporary Pluralism in the Intellectual Situation of Catholics and the Church," ibid., pp. 21-30; "Reflections on Dialogue within a Pluralistic Society," ibid., pp. 31-42; "Philosophy and Philosophizing in Theology," Theology Digest, Sesquicentennial issue, 1968, pp. 17-29; "Philosophy and Theology," Sacramentum Mundi (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968-70), v. 5, pp. 20-4; "Theological Reflections on the Prob-lem of Secularization," Theology o] Renewal (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), v. 1, pp. 167-92; "Pluralism in Theology and the Oneness of the Church's Profession of Faith," Concilium, v. 46 (1969), pp. 103-23; and "Glaube des Christen und Lehre der Kirche," Stimmen der Zeit, July 1972, pp. 3-19. Pluralism in Rahner / 225 a future-oriented being whose most fundamental virtue is hope are all themes which form a substratum for his theology of pluralism? These themes will be given brief explanations as needed and the reader less familiar with Rahner is advised to consider them carefully when they occur. Pluralism as a Basic Theological Reality First of all then, what is the basic theological meaning of pluralism? Rahner began to develop his thinking on this matter in his well known 1941 article on concupiscence.4 Therein while discussing Heidegger's distinction between human person and human nature, Rahner makes the point that the human person, the source of human freedom and human longing for God, can never fully dispose of himself in a single action. Instead, man's person finds himself limited by man's nature as a material or incarnate spirit. Man cannot make a total act of movement towards God, an act which is uni-formly effective in all the aspects of human nature. For man's person which freely seeks God lives in an insuperable tension with his nature which limits his ability to move towards God. Some years later (1959) Rahner explained this kind of thinking further in another context when writing about the mystery of God) Here the point is that the mystery of God so totally tran-scends human knowledge that no concrete human experience or human expression can ever fully encapsulate the mystery of God. This mystery which is at the very root of man's being constantly eludes man's efforts to grasp or formulate it. At the level of concrete human knowing man does not have a total understanding of God. Rather man in his materiality and there-fore in his limitation has only partial knowledge of the mystery of God. The more he learns about God the more there is to learn, for God will always be the mystery who exceeds the depths of our understanding.~ Our life then is a day by day effort to see, follow, and love God more clearly, nearly, and dearly as the popular song from Godspell puts it. All this of course is no new insight. St. Paul said the same thing centuries ago: "Oh, :~Good background reading on these themes includes "Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of Christ," TI 5, pp. 199-201; "The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology," TI 4, pp. 36-73; "Anonymous Christians," TI 6, pp. 390-8; "On the Theology of the Incarnation," T) 4, pp. 105-20; and "The Theology of Hope," Theology Digest, Sesquicentennial issue, 1968, pp. 78-87. ¯ ~"The Theologi~:al Concept of Concupiscentia," TI 1, pp. 347-82. For what follows see especially pp. 368-9. In recent articles Rahner has explicitly shown how his present thinking on pluralism is rooted in his early writings on concupiscence; for example, "Theological Reflections on the Problem of Secularization," Theology o] Renewal, v. 1, pp. 187-8. 5"The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology," TI 4, pp. 36-73, especially pp. 46-8. 6Rahner pushes this position about God as absolute mystery to its ultimate radicality when he argues that God will still be m. ystery for us in heaven (ibid., pp. 53-60), and that in God all the mysteries of our faith are ultimately one (ibid., pp. 61-73). 226 / Review ]or Religious, Vohtme 32, 1973/2 the depths and the richness of the wisdom of God; how incomprehensible his judgments are, how unsearchable his ways" (Rom 11:33). Unavoidable Pluralism Putting these ideas together, we can see that both man's unlimited desire to choose God in freedom and his ceaseless yearning to know God with his intellect are limited in such a way that in actual fact man only chooses and knows God through a series of particular or partial acts of choice or knowledge. His choice of God comes through a multiplicity of human choices, his knowledge of God comes through a multiplicity of human acts of knowing.; All this leads Rahner to a basic dictum of his religious or theological anthropology, namely, that the inherently limited and seriated character of all human choice and knowledge of God means that all human experi-ence of God has about it a necessary and unavoidable element of multiplicity or pluralism. Since man cannot fully embrace the mystery of God in single actions, he must experience God through many actions. Pluralism thus be-comes a basic or fundamental element of man's relationship to God. Rahner states this in many ways in his works. He states that man is ever subjected to the agony of pluralism,s and even more strongly he calls pluralism a radical or irreducible fact of human existence.'~ Because God made man as a material or embodied spirit, man cannot escape from pluralism, from the fact that he must learn about God, and indeed about all of life bit by bit, part by part. There just is no other way for the human spirit. Any form of mysticism which tries to escape from man's bodiliness and multiplicity is a pseudo-mysticism in the opinion of Rahner?° It is particularly important to note that since Rahner's concept of plural-ism is founded upon man's way of knowing and choosing God, it is a radi-cally theological concept, that is, a concept asserting a basic aspe.ct of man's relationship to God. This is significant today because very often pluralism is bandied about as a sociological or political concept, whereas Rahner's idea of it is much deeper. The trouble with those who limit their concept of pluralism to sociology or political science is that, whether they like pluralism or not, they can very easily look upon it as a fad which will pass away. In :Rahner uses both Scotist approaches (the limitations of our freedom) and Thomist approaches (the limitations of our knowledge) in explaining pluralism theologically. In later years he tends mostly towards knowledge oriented or Thomist examples, perhaps most celebratedly with his concept of "gnoseological concupiscence" ("The-ological Reflections on the Problem of Secularization," Theology o] Renewal, v. 1, p. 187). But both ways are possible for him. Slbid., pp. 190-1. :"'Philosophy and Philosophizing in Theology," Theology Digest, Sesquicentennial issue, 1968, p. 22. 1°Hearers o] the Word (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), pp. 77-9. Pluralism in Rahner / 227 particular those threatened by pluralism will wait for it to pass if they view it as a fad. But pluralism is not a passing fad. Its basic point is that no two of us ever experience and formulate our approach to God in exactly the same way. We are truly moving towards the "many mansions in our father's house." Ultimately then we must see pluralism as a theological issue. Problems of Pluralism Rahner's language in describing the fundamental phenomenon of pluralism raises some interesting questions. Why does he describe man as "subjected" to pluralism? Why does he call pluralism agonizing? Why did he begin to develop his treatment of it in the context of a theology of con-cupiscence? The answer to all these questions is that in Rahner's view it is man's irreducible pluralism which makes it possible for man to sin. It is precisely man's ability to explicitly grasp only partial goods or values which enables him to sin, to sin by absolutizing one or some of these partial values and thus shutting himself up in the finite,~1 closing himself to the unfathom-able mystery of God. The agony for man is that he experiences or perceives value only in partial and thus plural realizations. His very way o~ being drives him towards the multiple or plural values. The temptation to ab-solutize such values is the temptation to sin. Rahner's whole theology of hope, of man as a being who must be open to the future, a being who must refuse to absolutize the partial values of the present, is, of course, echoed here.l~ These thoughts bring up another problem. Do pluralism's close connec-tions with concupiscence, and hence its status as the occasion which renders sin possible make pluralism a bad or evil thing? Definitely not! This rejection of a condemnation of pluralism is one of the most emphatic rejections in Rahner's entire theological system. His whole reason for beginning to write about man's concupiscent movement after multiple and partial values was to insist that such movement cannot be called fundamentally evil?:' Rahner holds that it was the all good God who made us .as material and pluralistic beings and that, therefore, we must accept ourselves as we are in faith, in hope, and in love. Rahner is determined to teach that we should love the nature God gave us and this means that we must openly embrace our radi-cal, God-given pluralistic state. We simply cannot flee from it, agonizing though it may be. Are we ready to accept Rahner's challenge on this point? The Unique Character of Pluralism Today Our reflections so far have shown us that pluralism is a basic constituent of man's experience of God affecting all men at all times. But another vital 11,,Thoughts on the Possibility of Belief Today," 7~1 5, p. 10. V-'For a position similar to Rahner's on this point see Wolfhart Pannenberg, What is Matt? (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), pp. 68-73. ~:t"'The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia," TI 1, pp. 369-71. 228 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 point needs to be made. Why is it that pluralism, always a part of man's situation before God, has become such a particularly pressing concern in our times? Why are so many in religious communities suddenly talking about it? Why has a man like Rahner written so much on pluralism in recent years? To put all these questions more precisely we should ask the following: Is there something specifically unique about pluralism in the 20th century? Are there new factors today which further complicate man's fundamentally pluralistic situation? In answer, the first assertion to be made is that Rahner very definitely feels that 20th century pluralism is a specifically unique phenomenon in the history of the human race. He explains the uniqueness of 20th century pluralism by referring to the tremendous, historically unparalleled explosion in human knowledge which is taking place in our century.TM Man has prob-ably learned more (and therefore appropriated more multiple or plural values) since the beginning of our century than he learned in all the previous centuries combined. Thus, specialization has become the byword of our age. Each individual human being is learning more and more about less and less. Human communication is becoming harder and harder. In the 19th century those who went to college or graduate school could be rela-tively certain that their studies would include a good deal of the "liberal arts" and that they would arrive at basically similar value systems. Even in the early 20th century this was still so. Today, however, people are sent away to school to study various disciplines (art, sociology, psychology, literature, mathematics, and so forth) and they come home with such varied value systems that for all practical purposes they are speaking in different languages. Many segments of society experience this problem in-cluding religious communities. The situation is especially burdensome for persons in authority insofar as persons in authority are never again going to be able to learn enough to understand all the varied value systems and languages of the people under them. A Qualitatively New Situation Rahner gives his position on the uniqueness of 20th century pluralism a deeply radical meaning when he refuses to explain today's pluralism on a merely quantitative basis, that is, on the basis of the increased number of plural values which different men are learning about today. Rather he holds that the numerical increase in man's knowledge of pluralistic values has placed mankind in a qualitatively new situation,x'' The qualitative l~"Reflections on the Contemporary Intellectual Formation of Future Priests," T! 6, pp. 114-20; "Reflections on Dialogue in a Pluralistic Society," ibid., pp. 39-40; and repeatedly elsewhere in Rahner's works on pluralism. ~z"Pluralism in Theology and the Oneness of the Church's Profession of Faith," Concilium 46 (1969), p. 104. Pluralism in Rahner / 229 difference is this: In the past the number of insights and values known to man was limited enough that it was at least possible in principle for one person or one group of persons to gather together the known human insights and values in such a way as to formulate one coherent worldview or philosophy of life which could be accepted and embraced by all men at least in a given part of the world. Further, in the past, the world's great civiliza-tions (Western, Oriental, African, American) were so insulated from one another by "cultural no-man's lands" that the fact of one civilization's philosophy of life not including the values known to other civilizations made no difference in practice,a'~ Today, however, the whole world is different; the barriers between the great civilizations are collapsing, and the number of pluralistic insights and values has so increased that it is simply impossible for any person or group to embrace all known values and thus establish a worldview which can attain anything approaching a universal acceptance by a civilization or civilizations.1~ This is why Rahner says that 20th century pluralism has put man in a qualitatively new situation: man can no longer thematize universally acceptable worldviews. 20th century pluralism is therefore radi-cally new. The adjectives which Rahner uses to describe it become stronger and stronger as the years pass. He describes today's pluralism as irreduc-ible, indomitable, unconquerable, unsurpassable, and so forth,as Another way of describing the qualitative difference between today's pluralism and that of the past might be to say that in former times the plural values perceived by man could be conquered by inclusion within one philosophical worldview so that they were reduced to diverse aspects of that worldview, to diversities within one philosophical system. But the differing values of today cannot be conquered or reduced to one system; thus we no longer have diversities within a system but instead we have something much more radical, we have a pluralism which is in Rahner's words unconquerable and irreducible. Rahner never precisely uses the words diversity and pluralism to characterize the old and new aspects of human multiplicity, but such a terminology certainly seems to fit in with his description of the qualitative difference between today's pluralism and that of former centuries. In any case the point is that pluralism, while ~"Philosophy and Philosophizing in Theology," Theology Digest, Sesquicentennial issue, 1968, p. 22. ~r"A Small Question Regarding the Contemporary Pluralism in the Intellectual Situa-tion of Catholics and the Church," TI 6, p. 22, and in a number of other places in Rahner's works. ~SAmong many examples of Rahnerian language of this type are: "Theological Reflec-tions on the Problem of Secularization," Theology o] Renewal, v. 1, pp. 188-90; "Reflections on the Contemporary Intellectual Formation of Future Priests," TI 6, p. 117; "The Man of Today and Religion," ibid., p. 20; "Pluralism in Theology and the Oneness of the Church's Profession of Faith," Concilium 46 (1969), p. 107. Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 always a fact for man before God, presents us with a new series of problems in our times. Consequences of Today's Pluralism for the Church What should be the attitude or response of Christianity towards the qualitatively new phenomenon of 20th century pluralism? Six different aspects of Christianity's response to today's pluralism can be distinguished. The first of these aspects is a general picture of Christianity's response to pluralism; the remaining five are specific consequences of the new pluralism for the Church. First then and in a general way, it can be said that throughout his writings Rahner comes across very strongly as a man who is deeply con-vinced that one of Christianity's most vital and essential tasks for our times is to accept and embrace the pluralistic situation which God has given us today just as all men in ages past have had to accept the experience of pluralism which God gave them. This open thinking is found in Rahner's works on non-Christian religions,19 on the secularity and godlessness of today's world (which Rahner says we must bravely and courageously accept because it has a positive meaning and challenge for us),-°° and on the pluralistic sciences which he espouses and encourages.21 Even the shrinking of the Church in today's pluralistic world must be accepted ~vithout fear and loved by the Christian as part of God's plan for us, part of salvation history?-° Definitely, theret~ore, Rahner sounds a clarion call to the 20th cen-tury Church to face without fear or escapism the task which God has given us of coping with the new pluralism. I have little doubt but that in future centuries, Rahner's brilliant and insightful challenge to the Church on this matter will be one of the things for which he will be most remembered. In so many ways it can be said that for Rahner the name of the game for the Christian today is to be open. The whole thrust of Rahner's thinking on anonymous Christianity suggests this. Specific Consequences Secondly and more specifically, Rahner holds that in the light of modem pluralism Christianity must give up the idea that its entire message and value system can be embraced in any one philosophical system and in par: ticular it must give up the idea that the Thomistic philosophical system can continue to be the one decisive dialogue partner in which all Christian in-ag" Christianity and the non-Christian Religions," TI 5, pp. 115-34. =°"The Man of Today and Religion," TI 6, pp. 1 I-2. '-'1"Philosophy and Philosophizing in Theology," Theology Digest, Sesquicentennial issue, 1968, p. 27. "-'~"The Present Situation of Christians: A Theological Interpretation of the Position of Christians in the Modem World," The Christian Commitment (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), pp. 3-37. Pluralism in Rahner / 231 sights can be expressed to the world. Rather in the future Christianity will simply have to accept a who~le host of diaiogue partners (the arts, the be-havioral, social, and pure sciences, Oriental philosophies, and so forth) in expressing the Gospel messa'ge to the world. Rahner says this explicitly at least twice~3 and gives many other hints of it as well. For instance, he says that we must study all the great philosophies of the world because in an anonymous way they may be,' as much or more Christian than our explicitly Christian philosophy. In other words we are moving into an age of Christian philosophies and worldview!, instead of an age of a univocal Christian philosophy and worldview. Note carefully that Rahner who is a Thomist never says that Thomism sl~ould be abandoned as a philosophy. What he does say is that Thomism can no longer be given the absolute, monolithic status ascribed to it in the 15ast by the Church. Instead it must constantly criticize itself, realizing that it can never express the fullness of the truth of God. It must relentlessly op.en itself to the lns~ghts of other philosophies, which must in their turn be~ open to it. No longer will there be any one philosophy of life (in the sense values) upon which the Chu~rch or communities within it can operate.~' Thirdly as a consequence of pluralism for the Church Rahner holds that since theology depends on philosophical thinking for its mode of ex-pression, the fact that there can no longer be only one exclusively Christian philosophy suggests directly that there can no longer be one theology in the Church. Instead there Will be many theologies, a fact that the Church I ¯ " must bravely accept as Rahner puts it. no way denies our oneness of faith (Rahner calls it credal oneness) but it does demand that in the future our expressions of the one faith will be plural, in accord with the plu~iformtty of human experience. Next, and closely related to the idea of many theologies, Rahner argues I . that the magisterium or teac, hmg office of the Church finds itself cast into a whole new situation by tod.ay's pluralism.-oG Rahner points out that on rare occasions the teaching office[of the Church will have to continue to operate in the traditional mode, that [is, by rejecting this or that theological formula-tion as inconsistent with the faith,z7 Much more often, however, Rahner holds that in today's plurahst~c world the magisterium will have to take on z~"Philosophy and Philosophizing in Theology," Theology Digest, Sesquicentennial ~ssue, 1968, p. 18; 'Phdosophy ~nd Theology" Sacramentum Mundt, v. 5, p. 23. ~4This position does not deny the underlying unity of our faith, a matter we shall consider later. '-'SIbid., pp. 23-6. Rahner does speak herein of a sense in which there is still one theology, but this will emerge in our forthcoming consideration of our one faith. "-'Glbid., p. 26; "Pluralism in Theology and the Oneness of the Church's Profession of Faith," Concilium 46 (1969), pp. 112-3. ~7"Pluralism in. Theology and the Oneness of the Church's Profession of Faith," Concilium 46 (1969), p. 113. 232 / Review for Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 a new function, a function which can be well described as a challenge func-tion rather than a judgment function. The idea of this challenge function of the magisterium is that no longer can the teaching Church understand all the formulations of all the theologians as it did in the past. Thus the Church will often not be in a position to judge the works of an individual theologian. But she can challenge him. She can urge him to be certain that his formula-tions are faithful to the Christian tradition. By so doing the teaching Church can render real service to the individual theologian and to the Christian community as a whole. Obviously a magisterium which challenges more than it judges will have to be more trusting of its theologians, trusting that they are faithful to our traditions even when the magisterium is not totally clear on how the new formulas of theology relate to the faith. Rahner states that this new challenge aspect of the Church's teaching office is already occur-ring. 2s The whole situation also suggests to Rahner that today's magisterium will generally refrain from proclaiming new dogmas, as it refrained at Vatican II. A fifth consequence of pluralism for the Church today is a fact which we previously alluded to, namely, that persons bearing authority in the Church (including bishops, pastors, religious superiors, and so forth) are placed in an extremely difficult but still very important position by con-temporary pluralism. All of us, therefore, should be deeply sensitive to the burdens of those who hold ecclesial office. Rahner points out that at times such authorities may have to exercise authority traditionally, saying no to this or that.-09 In most cases, however, office bearers in today's Church will follow the style of the new magisterium by challenging their subjects rather than judging them. In this context a particularly important task for Church authority figures will be to maintain openness, that is, to keep any of their subjects or groups of subjects from so locking themselves to a partial set of values (whether liberal values or conservative values) that they fail to be genuinely open to the mystery of God and thus commit the ultimate human sin of absolutizing finite values. Need for Constant Dialogue The last and perhaps most important implication of contemporary plural-ism is that in our times Christianity must engage in a constant and genuine dialogue with itself and with the world around it. Since today's man realizes that his philosophy of life can never be a total or absolute system, he must constantly seek to correct and expand his own viewpoint by dialoguing with other men. Rahner points out that genuine Christian dialogue is truly possible in a pluralistic society because for the man of faith all true values in 2s"Philosophy and Philosophizing in Theology," Theology Digest, Sesquicentennial issue, 1968, p. 27. 29"The Future of Religious Orders in the World and Church of Today," Sister Forma-tion Bulletin, Winter, 1972, p. 7. Pluralism in Rahner / 233 various philosophical and theological systems are seen to be rooted in the one mystery of God. Values not rooted in the mystery of God are not true values and will be shown as such in the dialogue. Hence as we journey through history together, there is hope that men can come to understand how their partial expressions of value are integrated in the absolute mystery or absolute future of man which is God. Those of course who lack faith will not see human differences as resolvable even in our future in God. But for those of us who do believe, there is hope that full unity will be attained in the eschaton. And in this hope we can keep on talking with each other despite repeated misunderstandings. Our age is peculiarly an age of going to meetings, and no doubt many of us get tired of meeting after meeting. But, if we are to be Christians in these pluralistic times, it seems we must keep on having meetings no matter how boring they, become. As Rahner sees it, dialogue is the only possible mode of coexistence for mod-ern Christian persons."~° In ending this section an observation which ought to be made is that none of these consequences of pluralism we have just reviewed really solve the problem of how the Christian is to live and form community today. For in all honesty we have to face the fact that pluralism as it now exists is a new problem which the generations who have preceded us did not face in the way we face it. Thus nobody today really knows how to cope with our pluralism and our inability to form worldviews which large scale segments of society can accept. Rahner makes some suggestions on the matter for the Church as a whole, but even he admits that he is far more asking the question about pluralism than answering it.~1 This lack of answers to the challenge of pluralism may not make us feel comfortable, but we must realize that that is where we are. Pluralism and the Oneness of Our Faith An especially nagging question seems to underlie much that we have said. Is pluralism something like the dualisms of former centuries with their many gods? Does pluralism have some effect on our faith in one God? In the Rahnerian thought world the answer is quite simple. Theological plural-ism positively does not weaken the oneness of our faith; if anything it strengthens that oneness by focusing us on the true source of our faith instead 'of on the more superficial sources of unity upon which we too often relied in the past. To understand Our oneness in faith in Rahner's system, we must advert to a basic theme of Rahner's theological anthropology or vision of man, namely that there are two poles or levels to human exis- :~°"Reflections on Dialogue within a Pluralistic Society," TI 6, p. 35. The whole article is valuable on dialogue. :~lThis point is made clear by the title and substance of Rahner's article, "A Small Question Regarding the Contemporary Pluralism in the Intellectual Situation of Catholics and the Church," TI 6, pp. 21-30. 234 / Review lor Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 tence.3~ One of these poles, in fact the more obvious of them, is the pole of concrete human activity and experience. This is the pole of human expres-sion, of human speech, of explicit consciousness and choice. On this pole or level the effects of man's materiality and limitation are clear, and thus man operates from this pole in a radically pluralistic fashion. He has many con-crete acts of learning and many forms of speech. He makes many choices. There is, however, another, a deeper and ultimately more significant level to human existence, a level which precedes the level of the concrete and multiple. This is the level of man's preconscious existence, of his deepest self-awareness before his God. Those who speak of man's funda-mental option are referring to this level of man's life. On this level rather than multiplicity and a myriad variety of human acts of knowledge and choice, man, if he is a believer, has a basic and simple openness to his God. On this level man in his radical openness no longer experiences a pluralism of values. Instead he knows one Lord and one faith. He and his neighbor may not be able to describe their faith in the same way, but as believers they are surely experiencing the one ineffable God. This level of transcen-dent human openness to God makes Christian faith community real. Our faith, therefore, is not hindered by pluralism. In fact, pluralism only serves to buttress our faith, because it forces us to realize that our faith can only be genuine faith if it is based on the unfathgmable mystery of God. No other source but this mystery can stand as an adequate ground for us as believers. Surely with this ground we can cry out in the words of Malachy: "Have we not all one father? Has not the one God created us?" (Mal 2:10). The Foundation in Tradition Rahner's position on human openness to the ineffability of God as the source of our faith and upon (he inevitable pluralism which begins to ensue as soon as we start expressing that faith finds much support both in the tradition of the Church and in modern authors. Traditionally, for instance, Christian authors have emphasized that the ways of knowing God by specific affirmation (via allirmativa) or negation (via negativa) had a validity .but still a clear limitation. Thus traditional authors appealed to a third way of knowing God, to the way of eminence or transcendence (via eminentiae), that is, to a primal recognition by man of the mystery of God. As Henri de Lubac has pointed out this third way is really the first and most fundamental way. a3 Among modern authors Bernard Lonergan in his new book, Method in Theology,34 gives particularly noteworthy support to Rahner's idea that we 3'-'"Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of Christ," TI 5, pp. 199-201. a:~Henri de Lubac, The Discovery o! God (New York: Kenedy, 1960), pp. 122-3. 34New York: Herder and Herder, 1972. In our context see especially pp. 265, 323, 326-30. Pluralism in Rahner / :235 all share one ineffable faith despite our various perceptions of that faith. Lonergan's insistence that true objectivity in man is not an "out there now real" set of facts, but rather man's honest habit of mind as he keeps him-self attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible would seem to place faith on the deepest level of human openness while realizing that faith will be expressed in various formulations. Even more explicitly, Lonergan's carefully reasoned argument that what is permanent in our dogmas is their meaning, not their formula supports Rahner's effort to place faith at the core of the human person while being open to pluralism on other levels of human perception or choice. Perhaps the title of Rahner's article "Pluralism in Theology and the Oneness of the Church's Profession of Faith" sum-marizes all this very nicely?5 We may have to use many words but we still have the Word of God. Pluralism thus creates no fundamental faith problem. It helps us to see that our faith must be based on the mystery of God. Our openness to this mystery is the primary source of our existence as a faith community. It is true, of course, that Christians need other levels of communal togetherness and organization besides this primary mystery of faith level. Some of these other or "second level" approaches to community will be considered in what follows about religious communities. First, however, we must realize that none of these other levels will have any meaning unless we begin by seeing ourselves as united on the primal level of faith in God. Implications of Pluralism for Religious Community Life~ With less specific guidance from Rahner, but in the spirit of all that we have seen, what can be said about the implications of contemporary plural-ism for religious communities in the Church? First, if we accept the idea that a religious community is called to be a genuine sign of hope to the whole Church and if contenlporary theological pluralism is one of the most critical and fundamental challenges facing the Church today, the task of opening itself to and coping with man's radically pluralistic situation is one of the most formidable and vital tasks facing the religious community today. It seems to be the kind of issue concerfiing which the religious community must live up to its eschatological nature as a sign of transcendent hope for the whole Church, a sign that real Christianity is possible in the modern pluralistic world, a sign to the Church of where she is going. It is an historical fact that over the centuries, religious com-munities have been leadership organizations in the Church in times of crisis. :~SA section of Lonergan's new book has almost exactly the same title (pp. 326-30). a6White the title of this section speaks of religious communities, surely the remarks herein can be taken as referring to the various n6ncanonical religious groups in the Church today as well as to the canonically approved religious communities. Indeed, the noncanonical groups may have an especially important task in showing religious communities their possibilities in our pluralistic world. 236 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 In our times pluralism is the crisis and millions of persons throughout the world are seeking to overcome the alienation which can exist in our plural-istic world. New experiments in communal living abound. In the crisis of pluralism can the religious community live up to its historic role of leader-ship for the future? Second, if religious communities do face up to this challenge of assuming a leadership function in showing the Church its role in a pluralistic society, probably the most realistic forecast which can be made is that the days ahead are going to be days of agony and suffering for religious communi-ties, agony because of the very nature of pluralism, and because no one right now knows precisely what to do about pluralism. This does not mean at all that religious communities should give up hope or lose faith, but it does mean that the years ahead and the paths to adapting to pluralism are going to be most difficult. Just one example of this difficulty will be that almost in-evitably more religious will have crises of faith and perhaps leave com-munities, even later in life?7 For an honest facing of pluralism will create more options for the religious and these options will create more crises. Third, it would seem that the option being taken by a few communities of refusing virtually all change and forward movement simply is not a viable option in the light of the theology of pluralism. With the greatest respect for the good faith of the leaders and members of these communities, there is an honest question about how such nondialoguing communities can continue to exist in our pluralistic .world. It is true that these communities are doing rather well as far as incoming candidates are concerned. But are these candidates accepting the vocational task of building community amidst the pluralism which God has given us all? Or are they fleeing from that task and seeking after a security which refuses to admit that pluralism exists? The Option of Fragmentation Fourth, and of special importance, the option of "fragmentation," the option of a larger religious community dividing itself into two or more smaller groups with each group representing a particular viewpoint would also seem to be foreign, at least in principle, to Rahner's theology of plural-ism. Many religious are heard to call for this option today when there is so much clamor about the bigness of organizations and the value of small, intimate communities. While I can see real value in religious communities working out living arrangements based on small, relatively homogeneous groups, I would argue that the large community structure with its varying viewpoints should be retained in our pluralistic world. My reasons for saying this is that there would seem to be a great possibility that smaller groups of religious in cutting off dialogue with other thinking about religious ::rKarl Rahner, "The Future of Religious Commonities in the World and Church of Today," Sister Formation Bulletin, Winter, 1972, p. 4. Pluralism in Rahner / life would become ineffectual, would fail to grow in maturity, and would stand in a real danger of closing in on themselves in such a way as to become unresponsive to the demands of a pluralistic society. Incidentally, the danger of a select group becoming closed would be just as great for a progressive group as for a conservative group. The Pharisees are the classical example of a progressive group who closed in on themselves and subsequently became of little value to society. Further, the fragmentation option for religious seems to ignore another of Rahner's noteworthy themes, namely that the power inherent in a larger organization can be a genuinely redemptive value in a pluralistic society.3s The foregoing remarks against the fragmentation of religious com-munities should not be taken as an absolute stand against such fragmenta-tion. Rather these remarks are a general or "in principle" statement. Rahner himself points out that in some hopefully exceptional cases in life there is so little possibility of creating understanding that a particular dialogue must be broken off so that a group can keep dialoguing at all."~ In these cases other forms of dialogue must replace the broken ones, since genuine dialogue is essential for human coexistence in a pluralistic society. There have been a few cases in recent years of religious communities dividing; and who are we to say that these particular terminations of dialogue were not genuine in-spirations of the Holy Spirit, genuine efforts to establish other forms of dia-logue when one form had become impossible? In general, however, dialogue between differing viewpoints is so essential in a pluralistic society that the option of fragmentation should not be taken except under extreme and oppressive circumstances. Experimentation and Incarnationalism Fifth, if the religious community accepts its leadership mission for the world, and if it refuses the anti-change and fragmentation options, it be-comes clear that the most helpful (and also most difficult) option for a religious community today is to let its structures become open to genuine dialogue and pluralism in such a way that the community becomes truly re-flective of the actual condition of the whole Church today. This will mean as Rahner sees it that the religious community will be engaged in a constant process of. experimentation as it seeks to face up to new perceptions of value in our pluralistic world?" Such experimentation will stem from all levels in a community: individuals, groups, and organized authority. Only through such experimentation will a religious community achieve the true openness and dialogue needed in a pluralistic ~ociety. ~S"Theology of Power," TI 4, pp. 391-409. :~:~"Reflections on Dialogue within a Pluralistic Society," Ti 6, pp. 40ol. ¯ "~"The Future of Religious Communities in the World and Church of Today," Sister Formation Bulletin, Winter 1972, pp. 6-7. 238 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 Lastly, a religious community living amidst pluralism must advert to what Rahner calls the "incarnational principle" of Christianity.'1 This principle means that the ineffable faith unity which we share in the depth of our being must somehow become incarnate, must somehow be incorpo-rated into tangible structures. Otherwise we could never experience our faith unity. More particularly, a religious community as a small unit in the Church can never embrace all the possible incarnations or concrete ex-pressions of faith value. A religious community is thus only one form of faith expression. It is only one "social institutionalization''42 of Christianity. All this implies that in addition to its underlying faith unity, a religious community will necessarily have to embrace certain second level values (the first level is always our faith), certain particular incarnations of the mystery of God. Such second level values are genuinely worthwhile in a pluralistic society for they do lead us to the one God, though in a limited way. Traditionally, the second level values around which religious com-munities have been organized have included the confession of the members of a community (Roman Catholic), their apostolate, their sex, their vowed life, their prayer, their communal living, and so forth. Openness and Second Level Unifiers Now what, in our pluralistic society, can be said about religious com-munities' second level sources of unity? Two main points must be made. First, important though these second level unifiers are, they are not ab-solute expressions of the mystery of God. Thus the place, meaning, and even the continued existence of such second level unifiers of a religious community are subjects which cannot be exempted from dialogue if a re-ligious community is going to be genuinely open to the pluralism of today's world, to our inability to form a total worldview as we did in the past. A religious community which seeks to be open to the absolute mystery of God is not absolutely open to that mystery if it absolutizes any other points besides the one mystery. And when a religious community says that values such as the vows do not call for further dialogue and understanding, it is precisely absolutizing something other than the mystery of God; it is sub-mitting to the ultimate temptation created by our pluralistic situation, the temptation of seeking particular goods instead of the good. It would be most paradoxical if today's religious community were to submit to this temptation. The whole history of religious communities has been one of protest (by vows) against the absolutization of partial human goods such as marriage, wealth, and power. And even though this protest has had tremendous impact in the history of salvation, can a religious corn- 41"Membership of the Church according to the Teaching of Pius XII's Encyclical 'Mystici Corporis Christi,'" TI 2, p. 34. a~Karl Rahner, "Reflections on Dialogue within a Pluralistic Society," TI 6, p. 31. Pluralism in Rahner / 239 munity absolutize its means (and its understanding of this means) of dialoguing with the world, of showing the world where it must move in the spirit of Christian hope? Many examples of how a religious community must be open to dialogue about second level values could be cited. Apostolates obviously need to be reconsidered today. The vow of poverty is in great need of reassessment inasmuch as the mere fact that one cannot dispose of his or her own funds does not make one poor if he or she belongs to a rich community.4'~ To take another example which has probably been thought of a good deal less, who are we to say that religious communities are always going to remain ex-clusively Roman Catholic? Granted that Vatican II has already described the other Churches as true ecclesial realities, granted that Eucharistic Inter-communion is probably not too far off, granted that many young people in the other Christian confessions (especiall.y young women) find an idealism, way of life and apostolic zeal in Catholic-religious communities for which there is no parallel in their own confessions, and finally granted that more and more the real need is for a united Christianity to show its value to a secular (and sometimes atheistic) world rather than for Catholicism to show its value to Protestantism or vice versa, might it not ultimately be-come a genuine call of the Spirit for the Catholic religious communities to accept members from other confessions? While not offering an absolute answer, I hope the example at least helps make the point that dialogue on the values which I have called second level in the religious life seems to be an inescapable consequence of the theology of pluralism. Necessity of Second Level Unifiers Our second major observation on religious communities and second level values or unity sources is a strong reminder that, granted that these values are a constant subject of dialogue, growth, and change, a religious community movement simply cannot exist without some sort of second level value commitment and organization. The religious community must operate through a concrete value-unity structure in order to be open to ultimate value. It must have a concrete vocation if it is going to have a vocation at all. It cannot have its absolute, transcendental goal (the mystery of God) without expressing this goal in concrete goals. A religious community's concrete vocation and concrete goals are so necessary sociologically that, in the midst of all the open dialogue about them, they should be seen as a requirement for membership in the community. Those who do not agree with a religious community's particular goals may be perfectly good Christians, but a community will only retain its societal identity insofar as its members agree upon a particular sociological format for moving towards the mystery of God. This is why Rahner argues that authority in a religious community 43On this point see Karl Rahner, "The Theology of. Poverty," TI 8, especially p. 172. 240 / Review jor Religious, Volume 321 1973/2 may sometimes have to operate in the traditional yes or no method. Surely the yeses or noes of a religious community's authority can never be more than provisional since the community's self understanding and consequent second level values will grow and change in dialogue. But the fact remains that the growth process of permanent religious commitment (and this is what permanent commitment is, a growth process) can only function at a particular point in space and time through the acceptance of second level goals.44 Religious communities which have forgotten this point in recent years have had their troubles as a result. Conclusion By way of a concluding thought, especially for those who are fearful of what will happen to religious communities as they face their future with all its pluralism, I would like to make the very joyful and hopeful point that there are already some indications that an honest, pluralistic dialogue on religious life's second level values will probably do a great deal more to reinforce rather than to downgrade the traditional wisdom of the Church on religious life even though this wisdom may not be asserted as absolutisti-cally as it was in the past. For instance, I have noted and been truly inspired by the fact that Christian virginity has been emerging as a very deep seated value in the lives of some members of the noncanonical religious com-munities in which it is required neither by Church law nor by any public vow. In an era when so many priests, brothers, and sisters are questioning celibacy and virginity, this is most refreshing; it suggests that our pluralistic, open-ended society (which is, after all, God's gift to us) is not so much a thing to be feared as it is a genuine opportunity for spiritual growth. Per-haps it will teach us some things we have been trying to learn all along. ¯ ~4The insistence of second level goals does not of course imply anything like the detailed agreement which existed when religious communities operated from a homogeneous worldview. But some admittedly evolutionary sociological coherence on the second level is a necessity. Pluralism and Polarization among Religious George M. Regan, C.M. Father George Regan is associate professor of theology at St. John's University; Grand Central and Utopia Parkways; Jamaica, New York 11432. The recently published sociological and psychological studies of priests in the United States have no counterpart as yet in special studies about religious men and women. Tempting hypotheses could be constructed on the basis of personal experience and impressions about the levels of maturity and self-actualization among religious, about their attitudes toward authority, and about their opinions on specific issues such as birth control, celibacy, divorce, and liturgical practices. The surveys of priests indicated that widespread disagreement exists among various segments of the Catholic clergy on such issues and that deeply polarized attitudes seem rooted in profound ideologi-cal differences. In the absence of hard data leading to actual percentages of religious who hold certain views, one can nevertheless reflect on the divergence experienced firsthand in contacts with religious communities these days. Pluralism of approach, outlook, and conviction characterize religious at all levels of the same community at times, and comparison of one community with others easily substantiates this impression of diversity, which has re-placed the former uniformity. Pluralism reaches into all levels of community life, encompassing not only particular questions such as order of day, con-crete regulations on government, poverty, and style of dress, but also more fundamental aspects of the institute's l!fe, such as its purpose and nature in the larger Church, its basic ideals and values, and its charismatic qualities for today's world. Members thus find themselves split deeply at official chapters and in less formal gatherings on the most fundamental meanings of their religious life and on many more superficial issues. Coupled with this pluralism has arisen a sense of alienation, an outright bitterness about 241 242 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 the frustrating experience of division, or an aimless confusion. Polarization of groups may be discerned not infrequently. The vitality of individual religious and of entire communities has suffered immeasurably as a conse-quence. This extensive pluralism and the resulting polarization constitute a rich and inviting ground for thorough exploration by specialists in various fields. At times in recent years, some religious have tended to look upon their problems as mainly theological in nature, but further reflection casts grave doubt on the accuracy of this claim. In particular, the psychological and social factors of given attitudinal differences and divisions often feed into the situation more than do the theological and philosophical viewpoints espoused. This may be seen clearly in many contemporary divisions which have emerged between young and old, or between liberals and conservatives. Such divergences often manifest features closely resembling matters dis-cussed in development psychology or sociology in general. This article will concentrate principally on the more theoretical and intellectual roots of today's pluralism which underlie the theological, psychological, and sociological differences. In a sense, it will address the issue of the basic framework within which various groups of religious operate. It will not offer a litany of the specific differences which separate religious, nor will it provide a "medicine chest" of remedies. Our more limited purpose is simply to reflect on the different levels and .origins of pluralism in the ways of thinking and acting among relig!pus and to inquire into some possible means of coping with its sometimes unhappy results. The Death of Old Theory In an address to a committee of American bishops in which he inter-preted the results of the sociological survey of priests, Andrew Greeley claimed that "we have not yet discovered that our fundamental problem is the collapse of old theory combined with the non-appearance of new theory." In his usage, theory means those goals, values, models, and basic assumptions that allow the given human grouping to interpret and order phenomena, to justify its own existence, to explain its purposes to outsiders and new members, to underwrite its standard procedures and methodologies, and to motivate its members toward its goals. Though Greeley's comments regarding such theory concern priests alone, his approach has direct bear-ing on the question of the emergence of pluralism in all areas of American Church life, including religious communities. According to Greeley, the old theoretical structure began to crumble in the United States about ten years ago, and it has now disappeared, never to be restored. This rigid and unconscious theory emerged as a mixture of post-Tridentine garrison Catholicism and American immigrant Catholicism. It laid stress on loyalty to the Church, certainty and immutability of an-swers, strict discipline and unquestioning obedience, a comprehensive Pluralism and Polarization Catholic community, suspicion of the world beyond the Church, avoidance of re-examination of fundamental principles, and clearly defined models of behavior. The reasons substantiating .this theory were largely extrinsic and suasive, not decisive, for they were justified by one's loyalty to the teachings and structures of the Church and not by their intrinsic rationality. When various elements of this theoretical structure were thrown into doubt, the entire theoretical structure collapsed without warning. Since all rules, however minor, were viewed as immutable and unquestioned, change in even a few rules such as "meat on Friday" exposed the shaky foundations of the whole structure. The very suddenness of the change had excluded any opportunity to rethink the grounds of past assumptions and when these assumptions fell into disrepute, confusion resulted. Greeley believes that there exists virtually no theoretical perspective to replace the old theory, for the fads and fashions, clich6s and slogans of recent years lack sound and solid scholarship. His remedies for this situation center on the indis-pensability of scholarship in all areas of Church life. Scholars must get to work on building a new theory; and all levels of the Christian community must manifest openness, respect, and understanding for the results of their scholarship. One might justifiably criticize various elements of Greeley's presenta-tion, which sometimes verges more on polemical journalism than on ob-jective analysis. Sweeping generalizations about the old theory's "avoidance of re-examination of fundamental principles," and about the former lack of rational foundations do not ring completely accurate. One may well disagree with the actual cogency of the intrinsic reasons advanced for many past approaches, but it strikes one as gross exaggeration to deny their very existence, as Greeley seems to do. Consequences ot the Loss o~ the "Old Theory" His overall analysis seems true enough, however, and its application to the current situation which exists in many religious communities also seems clear. In a peculiar fashion and perhaps more strongly than in the priesthood, many religious institutes had embodied the chief marks of the "old theory" which Greeley describes. Disappearance of these characteristics or questionings about their presentday relevance have split many a com-munity or left it adrift aimlessly. The basic goals, values, and assumptions of past approaches to religious life constitute the kind of "old theory" which has undergone increasing challenge. Debates about such funda-mentals have obviously far more import than does disagreement about more superficial features in religious communities. How often does one not hear religious, usually older in age, wondering about the seeming decrease in loyalty to the community and its traditions among some members, the ever-changing views of the young, the lack of discipline and compliance with authority which has grown, the intrusion ~/44 / Review for Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 of what seems a worldly spirit, the lessening in time devoted to formal prayer, an overstress on personal fulfillment, an endless questioning of basic goals, values, and principles, and the advancement of vague and im-precise models of religious conduct? It takes little effort to draw the sharp contrast between these tendencies and the "old theory" formerly in effect. Another group of members, on the other hand, may criticize the present situation and urge change from precisely an opposite vantage point: Why has the community not updated more its apostolate, life style, government, and spirituality? Why do institutional requirements outweigh personal needs? Such conflicting comments and complaints signal at the least that the members of the religious community have failed to agree on some essential aspects of their life together. Onguing Crisis If one were to accept Greeley's views, then a religious community which lacks agreement on a theory in this deep sense of goals, values, and basic assumptions must of necessity expect ongoing crisis, for it lacks the founda-tions needed by any human organization. Without such organizational ele-ments agreed to substantially by the members, the religious community will lack the tools to provide a rationale for its existence, thereby undercutting its ability to attract new candidates and to motivate its present members. The conflicting expectations of its members, furthermore, would in all likeli-hood lead to frustration and anger, which may become repressed and then manifested only in hidden agendas. The real issues which separate may appear rarely in open discussion; a superficial facade of friendly toleration may mask underlying divisions. Instead of religious' testing one another's assumptions in healthy confrontation and seeking to incorporate whatever seems of value, defensive listening may begin whereby one person listens caret~ully in order to gather information, or better ammunition, to contra-dict. In extreme cases, open hostility or full withdrawal into silence may eventuate. Such problems parallel closely communications difficulties de-scribed extensively in marriage counseling literature. In such an atmosphere, not only deterioration of the human relationships involved, but also de-terioration of the persons themselves must set in eventually. Need for Substantial Agreement This sobering prospect lends a special urgency to the continuing task of striving to clarify and reach substantial agreement on the fundamentals of each religious community. If the members differ broadly on the very purpose and values of the community, how can they realistically expect one another to pursue vigorously and in unison some common goals? The various issues which polarize groups may, in fact, be symptoms of the deeper pathology in the religious community: a lack of common goals, values, and assump-tions essential to the life of the organism. For example, when large numbers Pluralism and Polarization / 245 of religious in a teaching community favor direct social work for the poor, the issue of the apostolic purpose of the institute should be addressed courageously. Similarly, communities which experience sharp and immense diversity among the members on their inner identity as contemplatives or apostolically oriented religious should discuss the matter openly, rather than avoiding the problem or simply drifting indecisively into a new identity through the sheer force of circumstances. When religious of the same community differ enormously on such a basic point of their common life as that of the character of the institute, they have little reason to hope for harmonious concord on lesser ideals and values. The more that significant pluralism enters these foundational areas of goals, values,, and basic assumptions regarding the community itself, the more the members should expect a sense of aimlessness, disunity, and confusion, it would seem. Unless some shared meanings emerge at these deep levels of their life together, religious must prepare for the inevitable results which flow from vague and overly general goals and values. Un-fortunately, dialogue may at times neglect these basic levels of religious life and concentrate on the more superficial, day-to-day aspects or happenings. Such failure may even carry over into official discussions at chapter and the like where extreme defensiveness or closed-mindedness can prevent needed exchange of opinions among the members. In a positive way, therefore, it seems incumbent on religious, especially those in higher authority, to raise these issues when disagreement exists below the surface and to foster free airing of views in the hope of clarifying goals and values. This seems a healthier solution than pretending outwardly that the members amicably share the same opinions. Some meeting of minds may follow more readily in this unhampered atmosphere, despite the anxieties created by confronta-tion. The Roots of Change Greeley's analysis of the contemporary situation in the Church and in the American priesthood is professedly that of a sociologist. When he speaks of the disappearance or collapse of the old theory, therefore, he refers hardly at all to the philosophical and theological underpinnings of the old theory, which he discusses more in empirical terms. Appreciation of these more theoretical dimensions may assist us in gaining additional insight into the roots of pluralism and in evaluating proposed means of coping with it. We shall direct our attention to two matters in particular: the emergence of pluralism in ecclesiology today, and the shift from a classicist to an his-torically conscious worldview. Pluralism in Ecdesiology Though Greeley mentions the death of post-Tridentine garrison Cathol-icism, he does not explore the highly juridical theology of the Church which 246 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 had justified these tightly knit patterns of behavior. This ecclesiology often found direct application to the models of authority and the corresponding structures employed in religious communities. The overcentralization, lack of sufficient subsidiarity, and overly juridical conception of authority found in the Church at large and in diocesan structures existed in religious com~ munities as well and rested its common roots in this understanding of the Church. This former approach to a theology of the Church had the added implication of overstressing the divine element of the holy Church, in too great contrast at times with the so-called profane world. In failing to give enough weight to positive elements outside the Church and to see God present there among men, "this understanding lent a basis to a spirituality tinged with suspicion of the world, "merely natural" or human values, and human institutions. God's self-communication seems relegated more readily to the more narrowly institutional context of the Church and open dialogue with the world appears foreign or dangerous in this conception. Religious communities which operated within this conceptual framework more natur-ally took on reservations about contacts with the world and the need to separate oneself from its perverting influences gained favor. By way of contrast, many contemporary writings which view the Church as servant and healer of the total human society understand her as essentially related to the world; and they take a far more accepting view of human values and institutions: the Church "goes forward together with humanity and experiences the same earthly lot which the world does. She serves as a leaven and as a kind of soul for human society as it is to be renewed in Christ and transformed into God's family" (The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, no. 40). The more that individual religious communities as a whole have taken on this more openly secular approach, which views the world and human values more favorably, the more they customarily take a somewhat negative view of factors which are viewed as separating the religious from the world or from human customs. Resulting Disagreements Inevitable disagreements must exist in religious communities and throughout the entire Church so long as disagreement exists on such funda-mental approaches to a theology of the Church. Pluralism among religious in this basic theological area sometimes underlies the members' differing convictions on contact with or separation from other people, openness or closedness to human standards and patterns of conduct, and general in-volvement with or disassociation from ordinary human events. Disputes about religious garb, about freedom to come and go, about visiting with laity or entering into friendship with them, and about attendance at or participa-tion in recreational or sports activities sometimes stem from more profound differences about the way in .which religious are conceived of in their rela-tionship to "the world." An implicit ecclesiology often seems at work in the Pluralism and Polarization / 247 way people think about such concrete matters. Similarly, disagreements in ecclesiology are bound to influence one's notions of Church authority. These disagreements become manifest frequently in the comments or criticisms by religious that they find their community's authority too centralized in the person of the provincial authorities or the local superior; or that col-legial bodies such as consultations of the local house are given mere lip service by the local superior; or that decisions which can be reached by themselves individually or at the local level are reserved to higher authority. Once again, these issues seem symptomatic of the more profound ideological differences in ecclesiology which separate Catholics today. Though such disagreements seem inevitable in today's climate of plural-ism, the destructive manner of coping with them found so often need not exist. More comments will be made on this topic later in this article, but some reflections seem pertinent even at this stage. Disagreement can at times be a constructive and enriching force in human relationships, within toler-able limits and depending on how people react. Deep differences should be faced squarely in a climate of open communication, if some valid hope remains of fostering closer harmony and unity in community. To bury di-vergences o~r to treat only the symptoms or external manifestations of pluralism and the resulting polarization insures an eventual destruction of interpersonal sharings promotive of personal growth. It would be more worthwhile to plunge tactfully into the more basic levels of disagreements, which in this case touch on the very nature of the Church and of ecclesiasti-cal authority. One's assumptions, spoken and outspoken, should be brought to light in mutual respect and openness. A willingness to temper one's views, to grant honesty and good will to the other party, and to speak about issues, not personalities, seems a minimum condition in such dialogue. In this deeper context where lie the roots of more shallow differences, mere pragmatic techniques for bettering the current situation will prove in-sufficient. Though the American passion for such practical programs may obscure one's vision, religious communities must accept the need of dealing with these more profound, theoretical dimensions of these issues. If reli-gious communities are to adopt even more moderate thrusts of contemporary theologies of the Church and of ecclesiastical authority, for example, they should at least acquaint all members with a more positive view of the world beyond the Church. Leaders in each community must also embody the con-viction that authority means service, not naked power disguised under new forms; that collegial functioning flows from Christian coresponsibility as members of the community; that love, trust, and friendship must be present in any effective Church leader and perhaps even more in a leader within a religious community. This kind of new theory, if it be that in contrast to some past distorted notions, surpasses mechanical techniques of improving government and the community's stance vis-?a-vis the rest of mankind. To expect that religious superiors familiar with another approach to authority 248 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 can automatically learn and adopt this new theory and behavior seems rather unrealistic. Practice based on such theory would go a long way in alleviating some tensions which exist among those who doggedly hold to outmoded con-ceptions of the Church and of authority, and those who stridently favor newness uncritically, perhaps urging the abandonment of most structures and of practically any interpretation of authority. Once more, unless some attempt is made to deal with issues below their surface and to strive for some limited agreement in fundamentals, religious communities cannot rightfully expect polarization to lessen, let alone disappear. A Changed Worldview Beyond Greeley's empirical analysis and the implications of the ecclesi-ological factors described above, we can explore still further to the deeper roots of today's pluralism in religious communities. Catholic authors in recent years have noted a significant shift in the basic worldview whereby we do philosophy and theology these days, and whereby we approach prac-tical solutions to questions in Church life. By worldview, these authors mean the fundamental framework whereby one interprets and orders reality and thus arrives at more detailed convictions. Bernard Lonergan in dogmatic theology, Charles Curran in moral theology, John Courtney Murray in matters pertaining to religious freedom, and Avery Dulles in ecclesiology have all referred to a contemporary change from a classicist worldview to an historically conscious worldview, which they all see as having immense ramifications in their areas of concern. Greek philosophy and Christian thought represented by thinkers ranging from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas to nearly all Catholic theologians until quite recently employed an approach which emphasized man's ability to grasp the essence of reality through his reasoning faculty. This so-called "classicist worldview" left little room for change, variation, or uncertitude. Since reason can easily enough penetrate to the essence of reality, im-mutability, certitude, timelessness, and absoluteness characterized such varied matters as moral principles, images of the Church, Church laws, and inherited patterns of conduct. In moral issues, for example, this thought pattern leaves little room for variability and relativity because of cultural diversity, historical development, or concrete circumstances. A variety of universal, negative norms, "Thou shalt nots," became part and parcel of the moral theology built on this worldview. In ecclesiology, this approach favored descriptive notes which emphasized similar qualities of unchange-ableness, universality, absoluteness, and certainty. The canon law elaborated in former times also mirrored this conception of reality. Modern influences of personalism, phenomenology, and existentialism and the scientific spirit of modern times bore in on Catholic philosophers and theologians in recent decades and turned the tide against this classicist Pluralism and Polarization / 249 worldview for many an author and, seemingly, for our entire Western cul-ture. The historically conscious worldview embodied in many Catholic writ-ings today views man and his world as evolving and historical, rather than as static and unchanging. Progress, development, and growth are seen as marking man and his world, and these qualities should carry into all philosophical, theological, and practical understandings of Christian life. A stress on the human person in his subjectivity and concreteness, on this man or men, rather than simply on "man," characterizes the contemporary in-quiry. The individual's feelings and non-rational states understandably receive more attention in this approach. Since concreteness, change, and diversity are such prominent features, tentativeness and openness to excep-tion replace the past tendency to formulate a host of absolute understand-ings. Pluralism and Worldviews Results of this shift in worldviews can be seen clearly in recent debates in the field of Christian moral theology. The uniqueness and unrepeatability of the individual person and his myriad moral situations have eroded for some authors the very possibility of articulating general moral norms with an absolute force, the "Thou shalt nots" so familiar in past presentations of Catholic morality. Rather than centering their treatment of a question like divorce, contraception, or pre-marital relations on the essence of marriage and human sexuality, for instance, authors writing in this vein will tend to discuss the empirical consequences and concrete circumstances of divorce, contraception, and pre-marital relations in order to arrive at their moral reflections on the proposed conduct. Nearly all authors show some reliance these days on this historically conscious view of man, though most have combined this with some continuing reliance on man's essential structures. This eclecticism does, however, lead inevitably to a spectrum of theological opinions, instead of the one "Catholic opinion" found in moral writings in use even into the past decade. A main result of this shift in worldviews and the accompanying eclecti-cism, consequently, has been the emergence of pluralism in many areas of Catholic thinking and living. One answer no longer exists for many issues in theology, philosophy, and Church life. Catholics' opinions run the spectrum from the essentialism inherited from past approaches through all shades of combinations to the other pole, new approaches heavily conditioned by existentialism, process thought, and consequ.entialism. Many common em-phases can, of course, be discerned in contemporary writings: a stress on the human person in his freedom, dignity, and personal fulfillment; the possibility of more room for change in previously accepted theological opinions, in social customs and law, and in Church structures; a thrust toward service in the world, rather than an emphasis on the dangers of con-tamination from the world; and an understanding of the Church more in 250 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 32, 1973/2 terms of the persons involved than in terms of institutions. These common emphases do not, however, lead to one new theory; they lead instead to new theories, new theologies, new understandings of the Church and ecclesiastical laws, customs, and structures. In a real sense, a new theory has developed which permits and even fosters a plurality of theories, of theologies, and of understandings. Pluralism constitutes a key-note of such "new theory." Disappointment may well await those who urge and expect some new univocal theory in the sense of an all-comprehensive and wholly coherent system of goals, values, and models of appropriate behavior and assumptions for the Church at large. Such a theory seems un-likely to appear on the horizon in the foreseeable future, if at all. What seems far more plausible and realistic to expect is an acceptance of pluralism in theology, philosophy, Church structures, and social customs and laws. Worldviews and Polarization This contrast between the classicist and historically conscious worldviews has influenced greatly the polarization so evident in religious communities today. At the roots of the various groupings whose labels have become pop-ularized-- liberal vs. conservative, old vs. young, secular-minded vs. cultic --often lies this more fundamental difference in the very approach to reality which religious and other Catholics now have. Inevitably, religious working within the historically conscious worldview will be more prone to accept or even to foster change in structures, in theological understandings, in the manner of doing Christian service to the world, in the proper exercise of authority in their community, and in traditional laws and customs. Since their entire outlook on reality promotes change and development in the name of human and Christian progress, and diversity and tentativeness in all formulations, which must of necessity be time-conditioned, they will urge these qualities in all aspects of religious life. Bedause their worldview con-centrates more on the human person in his concreteness and uniqueness, they will react strongly against whatever structures, institutions, and under-standings hinder the individual's fulfillment. A deeper interpersonal sharing at a different level of friendship than found in traditional approaches to religious life will leave these religious unsatisfied with forms of life which they find impersonal, institutionalized, and shallow. De~ires for small group-living frequently result from their reaction to such weaknesses, which they discern in large religious houses. Such issues as those of optional celibacy for secular priests, the ordination to priestly ministry of women, freedom of life style for priests and religious in such matters as dress, residence, and occupation, remarriage or readmis-sion to the sacraments of the divorced, and collegial living without a local authority in the person of a superior flow more naturally from a person whose fundamental outlook remains open to newness and progress in the sense described and whose value system places great emphasis on the indi- Pluralism and Polarization / :251 vidual person's development. Often enough, the individual religious will not have clearly articulated the theoretical foundations of his basic worldview or framework for thinking and judging; he simply finds himself doing it rather consistently without much reflection. No more than for many a person operating within the classicist worldview, his basic presuppositions and unarticulated theory rarely enter formally into discussion. Unless other members of religious communities come to appreciate this basic contrast in worldviews, they will find it most difficult to understand the rationale for many present-day movements and for viewpoints like those described previously. They will greet each new issue in the community with dismay, wondering why large numbers of their own community fail to see things their way. "Where have they gone wrong?" may be their continuing puzzled query. They will not grasp that an entirely different framework, the historically conscious worldview, has its own inner logic, as compelling for its adherents as their own classicist approach. One need not, of course, actually agree with the historically conscious worldview in its main lines or certainly in its applications. Unless one has some minimal understanding ot~ its overall thrust, however, one seems doomed to confusion, so far-reaching has been its influence and acceptance. Rancor and anger leading to hardened opposition of polarized camps may eventually set in. This seems already to have occurred in numerous instances in religious communities and rela-tions have become strained or, in some cases, non-existent. The Danger of Worsening The pluralism of opinions has threatened and disturbed many religious precisely because it has unsettled the foundations of their entire worldview and the conclusions which flow from it. The wonder, at times is that more polarization fails to exist, given the chasms in viewpoints. A hankering after the former uniformity in outlook and the accompanying security may under-standably have crept into one's (onsciousness in this charged atmosphere. Condemnation of unexamined new approaches as untenable or foofish may prove the only sustainable defense for the threatened and vulnerable person trained in another way in a different era. Conversely, religious who operate within the historically conscious Worldview may retreat into an unsubstan-tiated dogmatism in reaction to this rejection which they sense in their fellow religious. The wounded feelings they experience may lead some into frustrated withdrawal, whose sequel will be loneliness and depression. In overreaction, others may lash out negatively against traditional values and customs, denying in the process the continuity with the past which will insure the future. This unhealthy and mutally destructive atmosphere will breed a polarization far removed from the ideals of Christian community. Unless some steps toward amelioration of this situation can be under-taken, the current crisis in some religious communities seems likely to con-tinue and to deepen. An already bad situation may worsen. In particular, 252 / Review ]or Religious, l/olume 32, 1973/2 the strong, balanced, and idealistic candidates needed so badly in religious communities will not be attracted to a divided and polarized group who seem unable to live the unity their very notion implies. A deep and urgent crisis exists; yet the tone of given communities sometimes manifests business as usual in an atmosphere of unrealistic hope for a better future. Doomsday prophets are usually proved wrong and their message hardly accords with Christian hope. Yet Christian hope has always avoided the twin shoals of despair and presumption. Both undue pessimism and unwarranted optimism remain excluded. Coping With Pluralism and Polarization What suggestions can be offered for coping with pluralism and its fre-quent companion, polarization? At the outset, it would be profitable to recall that any such discussion should proceed within the prayerful recol-lection of Jesus' prayer "that they may all be one, even as you Father in me and I in you; that they may all be one in us." Religious communities' unity must fit within this larger context of the unity among men and the unity of the Church, as prayed for by Jesus. Constant prayer for faithfulness to the gospel ideal of loving union with all one's neighbors should mark every Christian. I-Iow much more so in those situations when religious experience disunity, discord, and polarization? Prayer for one another, reflection on those features which the religious share in common, and a positive desire for loving union should receive more emphasis than often seems the case. Besides these most fundamental suggestions, several more come to mind. First, it would seem helpful as a starting point to realize and expect that pluralism will be unavoidable in the years ahead in most areas of Church life and theology. Pluralism will not simply go away overnight, if at all. The fundamental differences in outlooks among Catholic moral theologians, for example, in such basic matters as the existence of absolute norms, the epistemology of theological ethics, the use of Sacred Scripture, the binding force of the Church's teachings on moral matters, the importance of esti-mating consequences and employing empirical data, all point to long-reaching splintering into various camps of moral theologians for the fore-seeable future. Logically, authors who disagree on such basic items must disagree also in matters pertaining to medical ethics, sexual ethics, social issues, or any other concrete moral question. Similarly, the different worldviews employed by religious who live under the same roof or in the same province dictate perforce some degree of continued divergence on matters pertaining to their religious lives. Keeping these facts in mind, expectation of pluralism in a realistic way may cut away some of the unnecessary emotional defenses which hinder rational analysis of the new premises and conclusions. In this unhampered atmosphere, de-fensiveness will diminish, hopefully, and reasoned consideration and genuine dialogue, in the sense of a candid exchange of views, may follow the more Pluralism and Polarization / 25

Issue 30.5 of the Review for Religious, 1971. ; EDITOR R. F. Smith, S.J. ASSOCIATE EDITOR Everett A. Dledertch, S.J. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS EDITOR Joseph F. Gallen, S.J. Correspondence with the editor, the associate editors, and the assistant editor, as well as books for review, should be sent to Rxvmw FOR I~LIOXOUS; 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boulevard; Saint Louis, Missouri 631o3. Questions for answering should be sent to .Joseph F. Gallen, S.J.; St.- Joseph's Church; 3~21 Willings Alley; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 191o6. + + + REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS Edited with ecclesiastical approval by faculty members of the School of Divinity of Saint Louis University, the editorial offices being located at 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boulevard; Saint Louis, Missouri 63103. Owned by the Missouri Province Edu-cational Institute. Published bimonthly and copyright ~) 1971 by REVIEW VOR RELIC;IOUS. Published for Review for Religious at .Mr. Royal & Guilford Ave., Baltimore, Md. Printed in U.S.A. Second class postage paid at Baltimore, .Maryland and at additional mailing offices. Single copies: $1.25. Subscription U.S.A, and Canada: $6.00 a year, $11.00 for two years: other countries: $7.00 a year, $)3.00 ~or )wo years. Orders should indicate whether they are for new or renewal subscriptions and should be accompanied by check or money order paya-ble to REvIEw FOR RELIGIOUS in U.S,A. currency only. Pay no money to persons claiming to represent REVIEW Fog RELIGIOUS. Change of address requests should include former address. Renewals and new subscriptions should be sent to REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS; P. O. Box 1110; Duluth, Minnesota 55802. Manuscripts, editorial correspondence, and books for re-view should be sent to REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS; 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boulevard; Saint Louis, Missouri 63103. Questions for answering should be sent to the address of the Questions and Answers editor. SEPTEMBER 1971 VOLUME 30 NUMBER 5 EDWARD J. FARRELL The Journal--A Way into Prayer If the lost word is lost, if the spent word is spent If the unheard, unspoken Word is unspoken, unheard; Still is the unspoken woriJ, the Word unheard, The Word without a word, the Word within the world and for the world; and the light shone in darkness and against the Word the unstilled world still whirled about the centre of the silent Word --Ash Wednesday, T. S. Eliot. Prayer is a hunger, a hunger that is not easily quieted. Today the cry, "Teach us to pray," echoes and reverber-ates from many directions. One of the ways I have learned to pray is by writing. I began by copying favorite passages from reading, then thoughts and ideas of others and fi-nally came to jotting down my own insights and reflec-tions from the prayer and experiences of each day. This prayer journal at times seems like my own biography of Christ, a kind of Fifth Gospel. Writing makes me think of the Evangelists' experience. Why and how did Mat-thew, Mark, Luke, and John begin their writing? What happened in them? What kind of grace was affecting them? Certainly their experience in writing was a prayer, an entering into the mind and heart of Christ. I wonder if the evangelists' experience is not to be a more common experience for many Christians. We know that God has expressed Himself in a unique and privileged way in Scripture, and yet He continues to reveal Himself and ourselves to us in the events of our ~everyday life. His written word is fresh born each morn-ing and He appeals to us: "Harden not your hearts this day as your fathers did in the desert" (Ps 95). We dare to ask Him each day: "Give us this day our daily bread," knowing that it is not by bread alone that man lives but by every word that comes from the mouth of God. The Father continues to communicate to each of us through E. J. Farrell is a faculty member of Sacred Heart Semi-nary; 2701 Chicago Boulevard; Detroit, Michigan 48206, VOLUME 30, 751 ÷ ÷ E. ]. Farrell REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS the Spirit of His Son, "for the Spirit reaches the depths of everything, even the depths of God. After all, the depths of a man can only be known by his own spirit, not by any other man; and in the same way the depths of God can only be known by the Spirit of God. Now instead of the spirit of the world, we have received the Spirit that comes from God, to teach us to understand the gifts that he has given us" (1 Cot 2:10-2). Rahner somewhere writes: "There are things which theologians try to explain. The Lord has other means of making them understood." Christ speaks to us each in a unique way. I think and pray and speak to Him in a way no one else has ever spoken to Him. He speaks to me in a way that He has spoken to no one else. Moments of depth and rare in-sight, of meeting with God, the sacred, are to be treasured and pondered within the heart. What photography is to the visual, writing is to the intuitive and moment of light. Paul wrote: "If you read my words, you will have some idea of the depths that I see in the mystery of Christ (Eph 3:4). Writing enables us to see into the depths. It is not a simple recording of thoughts already finished; it is crea-tive in its very activity and process. Writing is a journey, exploring the countries of the mind and heart, the never ending revelatory Word spoken once for all time. Little attention has been given to the value of writing as a way into prayer, an openness to contemplation, as a celebra-tion and remembering, as discovery, as centering. Deep calls to deep and the deep conscious level responding to the deep, not yet conscious reality of our being. In the beginning was the Word and He had to become incar- Ilate. There is I hope something of the Evangelists' grace for each of us, the grace of writing, of incarnating, infleshing the word in our self and imprinting it and making it our word. None of the Evangelists were "writers" in the pro-fessional sense; yet their writings were a deep communi-cation with God, with themselves, with others. Our Lord frequently asked His listeners: "What do you think?" He constantly compels us to think, to contemplate! How sad it is that so often we lose our capacity for truth, for depth; numbness, overload fuses out and shortcircuits our perceptive facuhies. Writing creates an opening in the stream of uncon-" sciousness and breaks up the automatic pattern of our life. One awakes to the newness that comes so unexpected each day. Our eyes see differently as through the wonder of a new camera. One becomes aware that ihis is the only moment like this that I shall ever have. The first con-scious thought of the day becomes an exciting experi- ence. As a person writes he begins to recognize an extraor-dinary relation between the hand as it writes and the mind and heart, like an ignition. What is written is not as significant as what happens to us in the process. Some-thing is growing within; hidden capacity gently reveals itself. New sensitivities unfold. The horizon sweeps back, the veil lifts, and we experience Emmaus: "Did not our hearts burn within us as he talked to us and explained the scripture to us" (Lk 24:32). Rollo May describes creativity as "the encounter of the intensely conscious human being with his world." Writing is an experience of creativity immediately availa-ble to everyone: "To write one has but to begin, to take the risk, to take it seriously enough to play with it, for it is by walking that one creates the path." It is so easy to live outside of ourselves, to be unaware of the inner center, the inner dialogue, the inner journey. But once a man begins, he experiences the' thrill of his own unique thoughts and insights. He begins to descern his own words from the borrowed words of others. What an ac-celeration to discover the "hidden manna" and He who gives him "a white stone, with a new name written on the stone which no one knows except him who receives it" (Rev 2:17). T. S. Eliot expresses it so simply: With the drawing of this Love and the Voice of this Calling We shall not cease from exploration And the end of all our exploring Will be to arrive where we started And know the place for the first time. Writing is a way into what is going on and developing within ourselves. It can become a powerful way of prayer, a key to self-understanding and inner dialogue. The power in writing stimulates the very inner process that it is engaged in describing, drawing the process further inward. It is not a passive retelling of events, or a de-scribing of an experience. It becomes one's own experi-ence. Nor is it a self-conscious analytical introspection. Expressing oneself in words is rather an active and con-tinuing involvement in a personal inner process through which one is drawn into an expanded understanding of the reality in his own existence. For example, most peo-ple pray the Our Father every day. One can hear Christ's words and then suddenly hear what his own heart is saying: "Hallowed by my name, my kingdom come, my will be done." This inbreaking of understanding can be-come just another forgotten inspiration and lost grace or by getting it down it becomes specific, focused, and deci-sive. If one writes regularly, no matter how briefly, a con-scious thought, insighL prayer, reflection,he will find that 4- + + The Journal VOLUME ~0, 1971 753 ÷ ÷ ÷ E. J. Farrell REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS "/54 it becomes a cumulative enrichment. It is tuning into what is going on, seeing the connection and relationship, capturing that which is behind the consciousness. Writing and contemplation tend to merge. We know the saints best who found themselves compelled to write---Augus-tine, Bernard, Catherine, Teresa, and our own contem-poraries John XXIII's Journal of a Soul, Dag Hammar-skjold's Markings. In this day of so much glib talk, when we are daily inundated and assaulted with unending words and speech, when everyone is correspondingly articulate on every-thing, the written personal word is increasingly impor-tant. Such words come out of silence and expand silence. They reestablish privacy so rare today, and a comfortable sense of solitude. They beget the dialogue between one's known self and one's deeper, unknown self that is coming into being. One begins to hear the wordless dialogue be-tween one's deepest sel{ and God. Christ taught His Dis-ciples through the deep questions--"Who do you say I am? . Do you love me? . What do you think?" We can-not but respond to His questions and imperatives with our own questions and responses: "Is it I, Lord? W.here do you live?" As never before, each of us has to personalize our faith; we must initial it with our own name and make it ours. We must be able to give reason for the faith that is within us. People do not ask about the formal teachings of the Church. They want to know your experience, what you think, what difference does Jesus make. Here are some of the questions that I. have been asked and that I write about in order that I may be ready to speak His word in me for others: "How do you pray? . Who is Jesus for me?.When do you believe? .W. hen do you love?" "How? .When have you experienced penance? .W. hat difference does the Eucharist make in you? . What do you expect of you? .How does your vineyard grow?" "What is your charism? .W. hat is your sin? .W. hat would it take for you to be a saint now? . What is Jesus asking of you today? . What effect are you making on your world?" These questions demand thinking; they demand contemplation. Answering the questions in spoken words may avoid the implications of their personal meaning. Thinking is so diffused, unformulated, scattered, easily distracted. To write an answer for one's self is to drive deep; it disciplines, focuses, and brings one to face Christ with his conviction. A journal is a journey--the journey of today--both words are from the French word "le jour"--today. The journal is the coming into possession of life this day in the written word, capturing its secret, its mystery. The written word is perhaps more like a kiss than a possessing as in the words of Blake: He who bends to himself a joy Doth the winged life destroy But he who kisses the joy as it flies Loves in Eternity's sunrise. The journal calls for honesty, for a search into meet-ing. It is a discipline in a day when discipline is rare: "But it is a narrow gate and a hard road that leads to life, and only a few find it" (Mt 7:14). Time set aside to move from the outer to the inner, to discover new depths, to see new connections, to perceive fresh insight--surely this work is prayer. It is at times unselfconscious poetry and contemporary psalmody. The journal is a putting into words the praise of God that leaps from the transparencies of life which the light of faith illumines for us. Each of us has our own nnique psalms; the journal helps us to find the words which in turn we share with those He sends to us. Each must honor the desire to express one-self or not. Every person has his own inner rhythm, and each must have his own way of getting to it. Writing Together When people come together and are silent, something in addition becomes present: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them" (Mt 18:20). As a group turns their focus from outside to inside, to a level of depth, something else be-comes present and makes other kinds of experiences pos-sible. This contact with ourselves would not happen by oneself. A cumulative atmosphere of depth allows us to come to new depth within ourselves. One of the more fruitful group prayer experience that I have worked with is using a three-hour block of time. A gronp of six to ten sit in a small circle in the presence of the Eucharist or with the open Scripture and lighted candle, in the center. The first hour is a prayer of adoration, of silent witness to the Presence in the presence of each other. This hour is an experience of silence and hiddenness with the Father: "You are dead and your life is hidden with Christ in God." The second hour is the hour of writingmthe quantum leaps from nothingness into creation--the power of a word pulling many things into understand-ing. Out of the silence the word comes forth. A field of energy is generated by the concentration of the others around oneself, and one is supported by the current of their efforts. The hour of writing is more than a remem-bering the hour in silence. It is an unfolding experience in itself that carries new dimensions of perception with it. The third hour is one of sharing, of speaking the word 4- + + The .lournal 755 to one another. The sharing is at a depth level because of the common experience of the previous two hours--it is no longer an exchange of words and ideas, it is a meeting of persons. In some dim way these three hours are a Trinity experience--the Father in the hour of silence, the Son in the hour of writing, and the Holy Spirit in the hour of sharing. God speaks! We are compelled to etch Him upon our hearts in writing; and then we are ready to bear witness unafraid and we dare to say with Paul: "If you read my words, you will have some idea of the depths that I see in the mystery of Christ" (Eph 3:4). EDWARD HAYES, O.C.S.O. Probings into Prayer One of the purposes of transactional analysis is to liber-ate people from unheahhy negative feelings about them-selves and others. To do this, one endeavors to evoke the same original sitnation wherein the "child" made a feel-ing decision from the experience. Once the original expe-rience is evoked, one has to re-decide, perhaps years later, at a feeling level, to liberate oneself from sulzh unhealthy negative feelings. In short, one has to return to the origi-nal injunction and re-decid~ on a feeling level. It is al-most a cliche in some circles: go back to childhood, to one's origin in order to understand one's present situa-tion better. ,'1 Wider Concept o[ Prayer To better nnderstand prayer it is also beneficial to return to its origins.1 St. John tells us: "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was toward God and the Word was God" (Jn 1;I). The Word was "toward God" sounds strange. We usually translate it by "with God," "near God," changing the meaning of the Greek, "pros theon." " The evangelist wants to express a mystery that our translation ought to respect. "Toward God" implies relationship, motion. From eternity the Word was turned toward the Father, the Word's Personality, His divine gaze, was totally addressing the Father--a Thou. An un-ceasing movement drew the Word toward the Father. Prayer is a movement toward Another, a responding rela-tionship. St. John, in describing the origin of prayer, is telling us something of great import: to become fully conscious you need only to look with love on another-- on a "Thou." And this is what the Word does from all eternity--turning totally toward His Father. Prayer de-scribed as this means it is relational, a moving toward Another. Responding to my life situation is a "moving 1Jean Galot, s.J., La pri~re (Bruges: Desclfie de Brouwer, 1965); throughout this article I am indebted to this hook. '~ I. de La Potterie, "De interpunctione et interpretatione versuum Job. 1:3, 4, I1," Verbum Domini, v. 33 (1955), pp. 193-208. 4- Edward Hayes is a staff member of the House of Prayer at Durward's Glen; RR 2, Box 220; Baraboo, Wisconsin 53913. VOLUME 30, 1971 757 4. 4. °4. Edward Hayes REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS toward the Father," is prayer, is an earthly embodiment of the Eternal Word's incessant prayer. In this sense of prayer as a "pros theon" movement, prayer is as wide as life. Saying yes to the summons in one's daily circum-stances is a "pros theon" movement, is saying yes to ulti-mate Responsibility, God Himself. In this way man is again and again opening himsel[ to the summons availa-ble in his life, seeking to respond to it with courage and generosity. Although not in a specifically religious exer-cise, not even with a supernatural intention, man, in answering the appeals in his daily secular experiences, is moving toward the Fathei', is at prayer. Formal prayer, then, simply clarifies and intensifies the moving toward the Father wherever people try to become more truly themselves. Another example o[ this wider concept o[ prayer as a movement toward, as a dynamic thrust toward Another, is at the end o[ the prologue. "No one has ever seen God, it is the only Son who is into the bosom o[ the Father, he it is who has made him known" (Jn 1:18). Verse 1 and verse 18 together make an inclusion to the prologue. The prologue begins and ends with the Word's (Son's) dy-namic movement into the Godhead. Here in verse 18, "eis ton kolpon," literally, "into the Father's bosom," is trans-lated like its counterpart in verse 1. Translations hesitate to express the original and prefer, "He who is in the bosom of the Father." Ke.eping the awkward translation makes evident the expression of movement, "into the bosom of the Father." Here is a dynamic thrust, a vital relationship of the Son toward the Father. From eternity, the authentic core of His Person is addressed and called forth in filial love. True prayer is being summoned and responding, a reality as wide as life itself. Beyond Professionalism It has been pointed out to us that many in pastoral care take special training because of their need to be more skillful in their pastoral relationships,z The increas-ing number of pastoral training centers witnesses to the great desire to find an answer to the "how-to-do-it" ques-tion. How to relate to hippies, to young radicals, to stu-dents, to those in crises. Those in pastoral care do look to the masters of behavioral sciences to give them answers [or their urgent questions. Certainly, the assistance o[ these social sciences is o[ tremendous importance. Yet there is a unique dimension which goes beyond the ex-pertise o[ the behavioral sciences, that goes beyond pro- [essionalism to the internal dynamism of one's faith. We n Henri Nouwen, "Pastoral Care," National Catholic Reporter, v. 7, n. 20 (March 19, 1971), p. 8. are referring here not to techniques but to one's spiritual quality, to one's inner thrust, to one's conviction and authenticity to be communicated in encountering others. Jesus Himself cared for souls and their individual needs, for Magdalene, for the woman at the .well, for Nicode-mus. Jesus was skillful in His relationships with them and was not afraid to use His insights into the stirrings of the human heart. But when asked about the source of His knowledge He said: "My teaching is not from myself; it comes from the one who sent me" (Jn 7:16), This exemplifies going beyond techniques and skills and plunging into the heart of relationship to Another. Another text indicating the relationship between inner depth and one's mission, skillfully relating to others, is: "No one has seen God except the only Son who is into the bosom of the Father. He it is who has made him known" (Jn 1:18). "Into the bosom of the Father" means that the Son penetrates into the deepest secrets of the Father. Prayer, as was mentioned, inv~)lves a filial dyna-mism wherein the Holy Spirit, like di~cine energy, seizes the Son, carrying Him into the bosom of the Father. But then John adds: "He [the Son] it is who has made him known," marking the relationship between prayer and one's mission. To make known the Father, to be witness, one must give witness not only for Someone but to what one has seen. The only Son has made known what His divine gaze, in moving deeper into the secret recesses of the Father, has grasped and contemplated. All one's wit-nessing value issues out of a dynamism which has carried him, first of all, into the bosom of the Father. Again we are going beyond professionalism. Making known the Fa-ther, accomplishing one's apostolate, is to issue out of or be blended with searching into the inner recesses of the Father, that is, prayer. If one ceases to "wonder" in the silent reflection of his inner loneliness, if one has not yet begun to imbibe the Spirit by letting Scriptures speak to him, if one rationalizes his way out of praying together with a handful of friends who mediate the Spirit to him --this apostle has not gone beyond professionalism and can scarcely bring hope and ultimate meaning to the lives o£ others.4 Again we can approach the same matter by looking further into the meaning of "into the bosom of the Fa-ther." It means attaining the secret depths of God, plung-ing deeply into reality where God is hidden. Human experiences have privileged moments of disclosure where the infinite Thou is unveiled from within the finite 4 Gerard Broccolo, "The Priest Praying in the Midst of the Fam-ily of Men," Concilium, n. 52 (New York: Paulist, 1970). 4- 4- ÷ Prayer VOLUME 30, ).971 ÷ + + Edward Hayes REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 760 thou.~ Searching into the bosom of the Father can mean a sensitivity for the deeper and transcending element that is experienced as co-present. We call this ultimate and hidden depth of human experience "Person" or "Father." The divine presence is hidden in the deepest dimension of human experience and so moving "into the bosom of the Father" can also mean contemplating God's work with man, distinguishing with a growing sensitivity the light and darkness in the human heart. Prayer, in this sense, is the ongoing disclosure of the deepest dimension of reality to us, revealing both God's light and man's darkness. In this perspective, our apostolate is never lim-ited to the application of any technique but ultimately goes beyond professionalism. It is the continuing search for God hidden in the life of the people we serve. Prayer, moving into the bosom of the Father, means searching and finding the God we want to make known in the lives of the people to whom we want to reveal Him. Prayer and Sell-identity ~Arho am 1? Do 1 think of myself as isolated, as exposed to the coincidences of every day, as placed in a universe withont meaning and without a fi~tnre? There are indeed moments in my life when I experience myself in this way. In faith I acknowledge nay new self-identity: I am a son and therefore given a destiny. I nnderstand myself as placed in a context where meaning and purpose are avail-able to me. This destiny makes me someone. In faith, therefore, I acknowledge nay own worth, not because of the efforts I make but because, as a son, I am accepted. In faith, there is no reason for me to be ashamed of myself. As son I rejoice in myselfY This filial identity is expressed and intensified by prayer. When the Son leaves the bosom of the Father and enters human life, his eternal "pros theon" movement is embodied at moments of prayer so that there is, in the evangelist's mind, a certain bond between Christ's prayer and manifesting His filial identity. For instance, at His Baptism there is a solemn declaration of His divine filia-tion by the Father as a result of Jesus' own prayer: "Now when all the people had been baptized and while Jesus after his own baptism was in prayer, heaven opened and the Holy Spirit descended on him in bodily shape, like a dove. And a voice came from heaven, 'You are my Son, the Beloved; my favor rests on you' " (Lk 3:21-2). It was in the midst of His prayer that the Spirit's descent and ~ Fons d'Hoogh, "Prayer in a Secularized Society," Concilium, n. 49 (New York: Paulist, 1969), pp. 42 ft. ~ Gregory Baum, Faith and Doctrine (New York: Newman, 1969), p. 18. the Father's proclamation took place as if the Father was awaiting the filial dlan of His son, which prayer embod-ies, before declaring Jesus' divine filiation. Recognizing in Christ's words and gestures the authentic expression of sonship, the Father proclaimed with power that this man is His beloved Son. Notice the bond between Christ's prayer and revealing the true identity of Christ as Son. Again, at the Transfiguration, prayer plays the same role: "He took with him Peter and John and James and went up the mountain to pray" (Lk 9:28). The purpose was to pray and only during the course of their prayer did the incident of the Transfiguration take place. Jesus inwardly gazing upon the Father suddenly makes Him appear visibly what He is in reality: the resplendent glory of the Father (Heb 1:3): "As he prayed the aspect of his countenance was changed and his clothing became bril-liant as lightning" (Lk 9:29). As at the Baptism, by pray-ing Jesus adopts a filial attitude and in this "pros theon" movement the proclamation of divine Sonship is heard. Again, the bond between prayer and His self-identity as Son is seen. Finally, at His death, Jesus prays: "Father, into your hands I commend my spirit" (Lk 23:46). By beginning with "Father," Jesus changes the Psalmist's prayer of the Old Testament (Ps 21:6) into a filial prayer. The Psalmist was crying out to Yahweh but Christ trans-figures the Psalmist's prayer by saying "Father," making it a filial prayer. That cry was His last testimony as Son. At the supreme moment Jesus pulls Himself together so that fi'om the very ground of His being there arises the strength to proclaim what is closest to Him, His Sonship. This is the most moving revelation of His Sonship, so moving that it convinces the pagan centurion: "In truth this man was the son of God" (Mk 15:39). In the three most privileged moments wherein Christ is revealed as Son of God we are aware of the role of prayer. At the Baptism, at the Transfiguration, and at His death it was prayer that evoked the manifestation of Jesus' filial identity. In turning toward the Father in prayer Jesus is acting as Son and this gesture provokes on the part of the Father the proclamation of Christ's Sonship. This sponta-neous gesture belongs to the revelation of the mystery of His person. Whenever in prayer, Jesus is unveiling His divinity under a filial form. In Him there exists a bond between prayer and revealing the quality of sonship which allows us to say that prayer manifests and intensi-fies our self-identity as sons. If you are traveling on a train it occasionally happens that the steady clicking of the rails and the movement of the train begin to put you to sleep. When the train slows down and comes to a halt the little jolt involved in stop- Prayer VOLUME 30, 1971 ping awakens you. As-we move from one day into the next, often the sameness in daily situations can put one into a spiritual somnolence. It is when we stop that rhythm by breaking off for the sake of reflection that an awakening of inner life happens. Prayer, reflection, is an awakening to your deeper self, recalling you to what is the most basic dimension within you, to the reality as son. Prayer is discovering what you already are. You do not have to rush after it. It is there all the time. All that is needed is time for it to unfold. If you give it time it will make itself known to you. Christ established a new principle of human life: man becomes his true self espe-cially in prayer. Grace hides a filial identity and it is prayer which reveals to a human person that which is the deepest and truest nobility within onself: the quality as son of the Father. This turning toward the Father affirms and (leepens one's self-identity as son. Like Jesus Himself, man in prayer, continuing the mystery of the Incarna-tion, can become fully aware of what he really is, son. + + + Edward Hayes REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS PETER BYRNE, C.Ss.R. Teilhard de Chardin and Commitment There is now incontrovertible evidence that mankind has just entered upon the greatest period of change the world has ever krlown.~ These stirring words were first uttered in 1936 by Tell-hard de Chardin, and they bear scrutiny today more than 30 years later when change seems to be not only taking place but seems to be the most constant feature of life. In fact change occurs so rapidly in these times that soci-ologists tell us that a new generation rises every 5 years. Practically, this means that the mores and values of any age group five years ago seem to the equivalent age group today to be dated. It may seem strange, but while all agree that rapid and radical change is taking place there is very little agreement as to the fundamental nature of the change itself. The symptoms of radical discontent with the past are apparent; but historians, philosoph.ers, theo-logians and scientists hardly dare to guess what will be the shape or appearance of the future, This paper is an attempt to find something constant at the heart and center of the changing world. It will at-tempt to answer the question of man's responsibility to direct and control change, and finally it will say some-thing about the part that religious rnust take in this dy-namic and changing world. We can list the symptoms of change under two head-ings, namely, destructive and constructive. On the de-structive side we witness the breakdown of authority and consequent concern about law and order as traditionally understood. Protest marches and demonstrations are the order of the day and often lead to violence and death. The establishment everywhere is under fire from young people demanding change, relevance, and recognition. I Teilhard de Chardin, Building the Earth (Wilkes Barre, Pa., 1965), p. 22. ÷ ÷ Peter Byrne gives missions and re-treats and can be reached at P.O. Box 95; Bacolod City, Philippines. VOLUME 30, 1971 763 Peter Byrne REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 764 Every year brings a new record of abortions, murders, suicides, and violent deaths. Add to this the ever increas-ing number of drug addicts and drop-outs from society, the wars that rage in three continents and that are a constant threat to peace and order and established gov-ernment. This very age which we call the age of progress seems to be also the age of progressive estrangement from God. "Eclipse of the light of heaven, eclipse of God, such indeed is the character of the historic hour through which the world is passing." _o So wrote Martin Buber and man's loneliness and isolation from his fellowmen predictably led to isolation from God who was variously described as absent, silent, or dead. On the constructive side man has also something to show. In the short span of a few decades modern man has learned to fly, invented radio, telephone, and television; he has set up worldwide communications network, trans-planted hearts, harnessed electric and atomic power, pro-longed life expectancy, probed the secrets of the heavens, and landed on the moon. The new style of Christian life already in vigor in the world may be described as "more commitment and less devotion, more spirit and less super-stition, more autonomy and less authority, more society and less herd, more concern and less worry, more sponta-neity and less guilt, more creativity and less rote, more joy and less fear, more humanity and less pomposity, more thought and less testament." :~ Are we picturing only the sunny side of life and shut-ting our eyes to the horrors of life? "Men still merely understand strength, the key and symbol of violence in its primitive and savage form of war.''4 Have we forgotten Nagasaki, Biafra, Dachau--symbol of a Christian nation methodically with the aid of modern science exterminat-ing five million Jews and (often forgotten) six million Christians? This.age .of "civilisation" shows a record of at least one major war every decade leading to direct or in-direct killing of millions. A discussion of the comparative strength of nations means not their power to construct a better society and raise the standard of living, but rather their military resources in terms of minutemen, warheads, rockets, bombs and all kinds of fighting equipment. A well-known writer has said that he always reads the sports page of the newspaper first and the front page last be-cause the former contains the record of man's triumphs and the latter his defeats. We do not ignore the grim ~ Martin Bubcr, The Eclipse oJ God (New York, 1957), p. 23. ¯ ~ Leslie Dcwart, The Foundations oJ BelieJ (New York, 1969), p. 486. ~ Building the Earth, p. 73. reality of the turmoil in the world; it must enter into any view of the total human situation. Before going on to give interpretations of the trend of the human race and to theorize about its final end, we can make one observation here which I think will be accepted by all as true. At any stage of the history of the human race we can put down side by side the best and the worst features of the age, the constructive and the destructive elements that made up the human situation of the time. Numerically they may often seem to cancel each other out, leaving us to ponder the question of Sartre whether progress and life are not finally absurd. However, the good and bad elements of human history differ markedly in one important respect; namely, the bad pass and the good remain. To clarify--the natural disasters like plagues, famine, earthquakes, fires, floods; the man-made calamities of war, murder, and scientific destrnction, which directly and indirectly have claimed millions of lives, we have survived all these (though by no means paid the debt of expiation). Not only has the human race survived all disasters but established a world opinion that seems to make a recurrence of the worst of these virtually impossible. Not only has the human race survived and grown more and more enlightened but the products of man's skill and inventiveness spread further every day and be-come more and more available to people everywhere-- medicine, transportation, communication, education, all adding up to man's conquest of matter and coming to enjoy greater personal fi'eedom. It does seem that general history shows that the good things of life survive while the less worthy perish and pass into comparative oblivion. This is not to say that there were no exceptions to this general rule. Many of the ancients showed skills in archi-tecture, sculpture, acoustics, writing, whose secrets have been lost. This paper is concerned with the future and the pres-ent rather than with the past. What we say of the past has value mainly for our extrapolated assessment of the trend of progress in the future. The attitude that we adopt to-wards the world and towards life is determined by our philosophy, our theology, or simply by our experience. People who have had firsthand experience of war often lose faith in human nature and faith in God Himself. If God exists and is good, how can He permit the sense-less killing of innocent human b(ings? Sartre reached the conclusion that man is utterly alone: "With no ex-cuses behind us or justification before us, every human being is born without reason, prolongs life out of weak- + ÷ + Teiihartl and Commitment VOLUME 30, 1971 765 ÷ ÷ ÷ Peter Byrne REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 766 ness and dies by chance." "~ For Sartre God did not exist and life was absurd. This does not do justice to Sartre nor do we intend here to dwell on him because it does not seem possible to build a philosophy of hope for the fu-ture on the premise that life is absurd. I should like to contrast here two attitudes towards the future of the earth---one is found in what may be loosely called traditional Catholic spirituality and the other in the works of Teilhard de Chardin. The traditional Catholic expression of the purpose of our life is contained in the oft quoted words of St. Ig-natius Loyola: "Man was created to praise God his Lord, to give Him honor and so to save his soul." 6 The helleni-sation of Christianity brought into clear relief the dis-tinction between body arid soul and practically the mes-sage of salvation as preached was preoccupied with saving the soul which was imprisoned in the body. The great enemies of salvation were the world, the flesh, and the devil. The question was asked: What does. Jesus say to teach us that saving our soul is more important than anything else? And the answer: Jesus says: "What doth it profit a man if he gains the whole world but suffers the loss of his own soul?" 7 If the world posed a threat to the salvation of the soul, the proper attitude towards it was one of detachment if not positive conflict. It should be used to sustain life but never developed for its own sake. It could be used also to store up merit through labor: "Labor as the fulfillment of God's will is a source of merit, atoning for sin and lay-ing up glory in heaven. Through it I work out my own salvation and contribute to the good of my neighbor, both spiritual and material good." s Distrust of the flesh easily led to distrust of human emotions and heavy emphasis on the necessity of asceti-cism. Penance was exalted and a luxurious life frowned upon. Scientific advances were often judged not by bene-fits they conferred but rather by the threat that they posed to a way of life that should be sealed with the cross of Christ. Taken all in all, this world and even the human body was man's temporary prison from which the true Christian looked forward to release for his entry into his true home in heaven. Of course, it was a matter of emphasis acquired little by little as the Church tried to meet the challenges that she had to face. And how does traditional Christianity appear ~ H. J. Blackman (cd.), Reality, Man and Existence (New York, 1965), p. 325. ~A Catholic Catechism (New York, 1963), p. 2. z Ibid., p. 299. s Leo Trese, Guide to Christian Living (Notre Dame, 1963), p. 345. to modern man? He sees it as indifferent if not actually hostile to science, no leader in the world but a deserter, scared of personalism and love; a religion of death, pov-erty, suffering, sorrow, that knows how to weep at the crucifixion but incapable of joy at the resurrection; with no adequate theology of work, success, joy, marriage, youth, hope, life, or love. Young people today are looking for a presentation of Christianity that will endorse their admiration for sci-ence, their love of the workl, and their hopes for the fu-ture. It is Teilhard de Chardin who seems to give Chris-tianity the particular emphasis necessary to meet these aspirations of our time. In contrast, the traditional preaching of Christianity seemed to be more interested in the past than the future; it seemed cold towards science and detached from the earth. This of course was reflected in the practical lives of Christians, causing Christianity to be dubbed as irrelevant. Let us see how Teilhard un-derstood the trend of evolution and the implication of his views in terms of commitment: The situation which Teilhard entered was one in which materialists asserted that everything in this world is governed by blind purposeless determinism; while christians too often were simply fighting a rear-guard action against them, trying to resist as long as possible any scientific theory which seemed to conflict with traditional ideas.° Teilhard was at the same time .a devoted priest and a devoted scientist. His closest friends included unbelievers, agnostics, skeptics--many of them outstanding scientists for whom Christianity was an outdated monolith indiffer-ent to progress. Teilhard wanted to find a way of giving expression to the faith that was in him in a way that the scientists would listen to. And so he began by speaking the language of the scientist in terms that held their attention and commanded their respect because of his diligence in research. However his life work was not intended merely as an apologetic for others but because he felt also within himself the anguish of trying to reconcile progress on earth with the christian ideal of detachment: This has always been the problem of my life; what I mean is the reconciliation of progress and detachment---of a passionate and legitimate love for this great earth and unique pursuit of the kingdom of heaven?° ÷ And so he set out to try to reconcile in a single synthesis + these two. He believed that they could not be opposed + but must in some way complement one another. To effect Teilhard and the synthesis he did not begin with revelation but with Commitment ° Fr. John Russell, A Vision o/Teilhard de Chardin, p. 9. ~°Christopher F. Mooney, Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery Christ (New York, 1966), p. 28. VOLUME 30, 1971 767 + ÷ ÷ Peter Byrne REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 768 what can be observed by human perception. He was not afraid of what science might discover. "We christians," he said, "have no need to be afraid of, or to be unreason-ably shocked by, the resuhs of scientific research . they detract nothing from the almighty power of God nor from the spirituality of the soul, nor from the supernatu-ral character of christianity, nor from a man's superiority to the animals." al For Teilhard the whole world was in a state of becom-ing. It has very obviously developed from a state of chaos to a state of order. It may have taken five billion years to reach its present state. In the course of those years the earth cooled and became gradually disposed to produce and sustain life. Even prior to the emergence of life on earth a very important aspect of evolution is observable, namely, complexity. Electron, atom, molecule--these show not only. succession in time but gradual growth in complexity organized about a center. Teilhard calls this centro-complexity. This process is carried further in vi-ruses and further still in cells which are the first bodies that beyond doubt possess life. Still further tip the scale of development are plants and animals which have their own order of complexity. But Teilhard observed also that growth in complexity is accompanied by a gradual intensification of conscious-ness. By means of the mechanisms of reproduction and association, life on earth moved forward in time and upward on the scale of coxnplexity. Man made his appear-ance one million years ago which in terms of the age of life on earth is quite recent. The thin line of life that has survived and developed on earth ~loes not amount to one millionth of the leaves that have sprouted on the tree of life. Complexity is a measure of time and this complexity in the various forms of life helps us to differentiate the time of their emergence in the course of evolution. But complexity alone does not mark one stage of evo-lution from another. A new element enters in, conscious-ness. The more complex a being becomes, the more centered it is on itself and the more aware it is. This aware-ness gives the being spontaneity of action and the ability to adapt and to dominate. This consciousness is further accompanied with the growth and refinement of the nerv-ous system. Matter achieves the break-through into con-sciousness through the complexification of the cells which produced the nervous system. The "within" of a thing grows more intense as the external o~'ganisation of the nervous system grows more complex. This "within" of things is a spiritual energy that was latent in matter im-n Teiihard de Chardin, Science and Christ (New York, 1968), p. 35. pelling evolution upwards in a glorious ascent. It is called by Teilhard "radial energy" and is that ever vibrating and vital force that has maintained the evolutionary process despite the unimaginable hazards that the process has encountered in the course of its millions of years of duration. A new threshold in the evolutionary process is crossed after due process of divergence, convergence, and emerg-ence. The final emergence is a new development in con-sciousness, something old because it came from the po-tential in the antecedents and emerged through creative union. Nevertheless, the new .emergence can be called new because it cannot be reduced to anything that was there before. Thought was the sign of a new emergence. In primates nature concentrated on the development of the brain. This is the process of cerebralisation. An increase of con-sciousness is in direct proportion to the degree of cere-bralisation, that is, increase in the complexity of brain structure. Among the primates when a certain advanced stage of brain development had been achieved, thought was born and with thought man was born. So that is the position of man in the evolutionary proc-ess. He is not the offshoot of a runaway evolution but the supreme culmination and product of the process itself-- the result of development and effort that covered aeons of time. Man is a person and he personalizes the world. He penetrates the world by his creative thinking and organizes the world-around himself. Man is not only conscious but also self-conscious; he can think and reflect on himself. He can survey the whole length of his own past history; he can see the process of successive emer-gences by which he himself has come to be. He sees the ever enduring quality of "radial energy" that still drives the process onward and upward. Comparing his present state with the state of evolution prior to man he asks the question: Where do we go from here? And then realizes that he does not only have the question but that the answer also is up to man himself. The new quality of the present stage of evolution is that it is under man's control. All stages prior to the emer-gence were at a subhuman level and therefore outside man's own control. In a certain sense man is the creator and not merely the passive recipient of the next stage of evolution. Before determining what are our obligations to the future we must continue the scientific process of observa-tion and try by extrapolation if we can know the trend of evolution for the future. The process leading to emer-gence must continue and this is leading mankind ~o ever greater and greater unity. This socialization of commun-÷ ÷ ÷ Teilhard and Commitment VOLUME 30, 1971 769 4. 4. Peter Byrne REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS ity is truly the crucial phase of the whole evolutionary process, and the deepest longing of the human heart is that it will never end but that it will reach fulfillment. This fulfillment cannot destroy thought or consciousness or personality. On the contrary it must eternalize them. Teilhard's idea of final synthesis becomes clearer when we contragt it with Bergson's idea that the elan vital (his name for what Teilhard calls radial energy) would finally issue in plurality and divergence: Bergson chose the plurMity and divergence. According to the Jewish philosopher, the world is evolving towards dispersal. As it advances its elements acquire greater autonomy. Each being is to achieve its own utmost originality and its maximum freedom in opposition to others. Perfection, bliss and supreme grandeur belong to the part not to the whole. From this dis-persive point of view socialisation of tb~ ".-.roman masses seems to be absurd regression or servitude. ~Lssentially the universe spreads like a fan; it is divergent in s :~cture."-' Teilbard's conclusion from science was that the universe has a goal and that this goal will be achieved because if the universe bas hitherto been successful in the unlikely task of bringing human thought to birth in what seems to us an unimaginable tangle of chances and mishaps it means that it is fundamentally directed by a power tbat is eminently in control of the elements that make up the universe.'" This power is the omega that must be personal, im-manent, and eternal. The answer to this need felt by the scientist is in the Christ of revelation. "By itself science cannot discover Christ--but Christ satisfies the yearnings that are born in our hearts in the school of science." 14 This is the achievement of Teilhard--to show how sci-ence and Christianity can join bands in accomplishing the final destiny of mankind. "Humanity," he says, "evolves in such a way ;is to form a natural unity whose extension is as vast as the earth." a~ Greater planetization, greater socialization, greater unity in love, this is the stage of development that we have reached. This conclu-sion is compatible with science and doubly borne out by our faith. "A passionate love of growth, of being, that is what we need." ~ (These sentiments were echoed by Pope Panl Vl in Populorum progressio when he said of the underprivileged: "They want to know more, and have more, because what they really want is to be more.") Love is the most universal, formidable, and mysterious of the cosmic energies; and Teilbard defines love as "the '~ Francisco Bravo, Christ in the Thought o] Teilhard tie Chardin, p. 15. ~.s Science and Ctirisg, p. 41. ~ Ibid., p. 36. ~s Ibid., p. 93. ~" Building the Earth, p. 108. attraction which is exercised upon each conscious element by the center of the universe." ~7 "The age of nations is past. The task before us now, if we would not perish, is to shake off our ancient !)rejudices and to build the earth." ~s Therefore Teilhard's contribution in respect to the fu-ture is to show us where the radial energy at the heart of evolution is driving us. We are tending towards not a meaningless annihilation, but, through interaction and love, towards the blending into one commnnity and even into one consciousness of all humanity. In fact, Teil-hard says that the crisis of the present time is a spiritual crisis in the sense that men "do not know towards what universe and final end they shonld direct the driving force of their sonls." ~'~ But we Christians know that prog-ress is leading to the restoration of all things in Christ. History, science, anthropology can systematically ennmer-ate the timeless longings of the human heart and can list the various endeavors to accomplish tlteir fnlfiIlment. The endeavors failed for it is only Christ who meets the demand of the alpha and the omega. Teilhard was able to show that science does not have to eclipse religion or vice versa. In fact both of these need each other if total harmony in the world is to be ac, hieved. Of science Tell-hard said: "The time has come to realise that research is the highest hnman ftmction, embracing the spirit of war and bright with the splendor of religion." '-'~' And of religion he writes: "Out of universal evolution God emerges ill onr consciousness as greater and more neces-sary than ever." ~1 Teilhard summed up his convictions succinctly when he wrote in The Divine Milieu: . three convictions which are the very marrow of christian-ity, the unique significance of Man as the spear-head of life; the position of Catholicism as the central :~xis in the convergent bnndle of human activities; and finally the essential ftmction as consummator assumed by the risen Christ at the cemer and peak of creation: these three elements have driven and con-tinue to drive roots so deep and so entangled in the whole fabric of my intellectual and religious perception that I could now tear them out only at the cost of destroying everything.~ He says that a challenge is put to a C/n'istian to be ac-tive and busily active "working as earnestly as the most convinced of those who work to build up the earth, that Christ may continually be born more fnlly in the world ~ Ibid., F- 45. ~8 Ibid., p. 54. "~' 'S Bciueinldcien agn tdh eC Eharirstth, ,p p. .1 5061. -"r Ibid., p. 59. '-'-'Teilbard de Chardin, The Divine Milieu (London, 1968), p. 38. + + 4- Teilhard and Commitment VOLUME ~0, 1971 + ÷ ÷ Pete~ Byrne REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 772 around him. More than any unbeliever never outstripped in hope and boldness." Teilhard spoke also of the task that confronts theolo-gians to think through the implications of evolution so that a new proclamation of thegospel may herald the new era in which we live. For the Christian this world is not only an antechamber to heaven but a task and a vo-cation. He wants Catholic doctrine to be given a dynamic aspect and a universal, cosmic, and futurist dimension34 The turmoil that we witness in the Church today may well be the birth pangs antecedent to a new emergence of Christianity not merely in the shadow of the cross but, more relevant to the hope that is in us, in its shining light. Leslie Dewart expresses the same hope when he writes: "Christian belief may yet become the leading cultural force contributing to the conscious self-creation of the hnman world." For Teilhard religion fixes its gaze not on the past but on the future which offers us the snre promise to make all things new: His concern was to blaze a trail for the new type of christian of his dreams---one in whom love for the task of living here on earth in an evolving world would coincide with a love for Christ, goal and crowning glory of that world; a christian whose vision would be focused upon the future and whose faith would take full account of the world's new dimensions; a christian in whom openness toward all mundane values would be matched with an unconditional commitment to God."~ It is important to note that involvement with the world and commitment to God if properly understood do not produce any dichotomy in man. It rather answers to the dual natnre of man "slime o~ the earth made into the image and likeness of God." ~ Modern psychology and related sciences now show that for mental health it is absolntely necessary to preserve these two in a fine bal-ance. "Moral norms," writes Erich Fromm, "are based upon man's inherent qualities, and their violation results in mental and emotional disintegration." zs If we do succeed in achieving the balance required it will be due not only to knowledge but also to faith and hope and the Holy Spirit. We are in the world not merely to foster evolution at a natural level: "In the life of the individual Christian as well as in the life of the Church as a whole there is an immediate and transcendent relationship to the Person of Christ which is independ~ent of all human ~ Science and Christ, p. 68. " N. M. Wildiers, An Introduction to Teilhard de Chardin (Lon-don, 1968), p. 123. '-'~ Leslie Dewart, op. cit., p. 689. '¯-'~ Wildiers, op. cit., p. 161. .,r Genesis 1:27. = Erich Fromm, Man ]or Hirnsel! (Greenwich, Corm, 1968), p. 17. progress and which cannot be reduced to any mere hu-man energy." .~9 Teilhard's pre6ccupation with his particular point of view and the particular purpose of his synthesis may have led him to understate the radical nature of the Incarna-tion and Redemption as a free gift of God apart from creation. Yet again it may be merely a question of empha-sis. He expressly left it to theologians to think through the implications of his theories for Christian doctrine as a whole. In this connection it would be interesting to ask what Teilhard thought of the religious life, aml how it fits into his world vision. He did not treat of the subject explicitly at any great length but we can gather some of his ideas on the subject, We can state at once that, in spite of many trials from superiors, Teilhard remained faithful to the Society of Jesus and even said: "The faintest idea of a move to leave the Order has never crossed my mind." ~0 He saw fidelity to the Order as the only reasonable course for him. We can go at once to the heart of the matter by stating that the bond of union among men in the final stage of evolution is love, and love is also the pnrpose and the essence of the religious life. According to Teilhard it is only with man that love appears on earth. Sexuality ap-peared first in the evolntionary history of the world as an exclusively physical phenomenon h~ving as its primary function the conservation of the biological species. But with the coming of man sex begins to manifest a spiritual dimension which is ever expanding. The personalizing function of sexual love is becoming more and more prominent. Teilhard uses sexual love in a much wider sense than the merely genital: "Sexual love is rather the personal union in oneness of being achieved by a man and a woman, an interpenetration and constant exchange of thoughts, dreams, affections, and prayers." al He says that there is a general drift of matter towards spirit in sexual love the ideal of which is found in Christ who authenticated celibacy, "a human aspiration that had been maturing in the human soul." :v, Celibacy is the evidence of humanity's ability to affect the transcendence to which it aspires. Speaking of his own witness to this he says: To the full extent of my power, because I am a priest I wish from now on to be the first to become conscious of all that the world loves, pursues and suffers; I want to be the first to seek, ~ Christopher F. Mooney, op. cit,, p. 209. ~Teilhard de Chardin, Letters to Leontine Zanta (London, 1969), p. 33. ~t Charles W. Freible, S.J., "Teilhard, Sexual Love, and Celibacy," R~w~w ro~ R~L~C,~OUS, v. 26 (1967), p. 289. ~'~ Ibid., p. 290. 4- 4- 4- Teiihard and Commitment VOLUME 30, 1971 773 to sympathise and to suffer; the first to open myself out and sacrifice myself--to become more widely human and more nobly of the earth than any of the world's servants.= By his vows he wished to recapture all that was good in love, gold, and independence. The religious therefore, far from being a deserter is the witness to the final end of man's striving, to his aspira-tion for spiritualization and complete Christification of his life. Christ preaches purity, charity, and self-denial-- but what is the specific effect of purity if it is not the concen-tration and sublimation of the manifold powers of the soul, the unification of man in himself? What again does charity effect if not the fusion of multiple individuals in a single body and a single soul, the unification of men among themselves? And what finally does christian self-denial represent, if not the deconcentration of every man in favor of a more perfect and more loved Being, the unification of all in one.~ The religious is precisely the especially chosen to show forth in'his life the joy of the new resurrection to which the whole of humanity tends. Finally, the consummation in glory that mankind awaits is not merely the dream of a distant future. The transformation and divinization of the universe occurs sacramentally in the Mass when the bread and wine rep-resenting mankind and mankind's universe become Christ. The Euchararistic consecration renders present the final victory for mankind which will bring a new heaven and a new earth and Christ will be all in all. The Divine Mih'eu, p. 105. Science and Christ, p. ~4. + + + Peter Byrne REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 774 SISTER MARY HUGH CAMPBELL The. Particular Examen-- Touchstone of a Genuinely Apostolic Spirituality There is perhaps today no prayer-category considered so lifeless, so vulnerable to attacks of "formalism," so rejected as a lure of regression into an exclusive and introverted Jesus-and-I existence as is the particular ex-amination of conscience. Yet it held pride of place in a spirituality characterized as one of dynamism, initiative, and filan--that of Ignatius Loyola, a spirituality pecul-iarly suited, it would seem, to attract adherents in our last third of the twentieth century, when man has finally admitted his basic call to be a movement out of himself to serve that brother who has now displaced the sun as the center of his universe. The ideal of Ignatius was first and last apostolic: "To serve Christ through the aid of souls in companionship." 1 And to attain it, "he seemed to count primarily on the examens of conscience, exercises from which he never dispensed." "' One of his early followers, Louis Lallemant, the master of novices who formed Isaac Jogues, echoed Ignatius in his insistence upon the apostolate as the sum-mit of the spiritual life: "The last reach of the highest perfection in this world is zeal for souls." s And to attain this ideal, he prescribed the same "slow work of purifica- 1 Cited by John C. Futrell, S.J., Making an Apostolic Community o] Love (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1970), p. 14. -"Alexandre Brou, S.J., La spiritualitd de saint lgnace (Paris: Beauchesne, 1928), p. 23. aCited by Francois Courel, S.J., ed., La vie et La doctrine spiri-tuelle du P~re Louis Lallemant (Paris: Descl~e de Brouwer, 1959), p. 25. Subsequent references to Courel are references to his intro-duction; when the work itself is in question, Lallemant will be cited. Sister Hugh is a member o~ the Di-vinity School of St. Louis University; 3825 West Pine; St. Louis, Missouri 63~08. VOLUME 30, 1971 ÷ ÷ ÷ Sister Hugh REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 776 tion and discernment." 4 Francis de Sales, accorded new relevance todi~y as having been among the first to sense the need of a spirituality adjusted to life in the secular sphere, himself a product o{ Jesuit training, taught Phil-othea in his Devout I~i[e that the examen, which he called the "spiritual retreat," was "the great heart of de-votion," which on occasion "can supply the lack of all other prayers." '~ Each of these was a man of ~nvolvement; and for each of them Lallemant's dictum held true: the attention he paid to external things, instead of weaken-ing his union witlt God, served rather to strengthen it, because in the last analysis, the equilibrium of the apos-tolic life was a matter of the love which was to be exer-cised in everything. And for each of the three, the partic-ular examen--by whatever name--held primacy of place among spiritual exercises. The word "discernment" is enjoying a new vogue at the moment; it is vaguely sensed that the notion is cen-tral to the spiritual life in a century of acceleration, and that in some nebttlous way it means a form of prayer-in-activity for which many are searching. This is very true. Yet the term has a disciplined precision of meaning: it is the name for the entire, dynamic process of discovering and responding to the actual word of God here and now.~ It is the core of Ignatian spirituality. Within it--and one might add, only within it--"the practice of daily examens of conscience is completely intelligible." ~ A life of discernment is one in which one's core experi-ence of self-identity as openness to Christ personally known is the ground of all his conscious choices. Each significant decision is made after prayer and a careful weighing of all available evidence (a vahtable element of tire latter being often the counsel of another), and con-firmed--~ tlways, of course, in faith--by the peace which testifies to its affinity with one's primordial experience of being possessed by Christ. Gradually even lesser decisions are sttccessively, almost instinctively, submitted to the same process of alignment until one ends by finding Christ everywhere, as willing and accepting this concrete service of love. Discernment is not ttnderstood, however, as the sum toted of prayer: moments of distancing from the human situation are essential if one is to give expres-sion to his faith-experience of union with Christ, an ex-pression without which it cannot know new illumination or deepening. Only in this way can he be assured of ~ Courel, Vie, p. 24. '~ Cited by Aloys Pottier, S.J., Le P. Louis Lallemant et les grands spirituels de son temps (Paris: Tequi, 1928), pp. 342 f. passim. 6John C. Futrcll, S.J., lgnatian Discernment (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1970), pp. 47-52. r Ibid., p. 81. finding Christ in more ambiguous choices, and in those even more painful decisions in which he discerns the paradox of absurdity to be the condition for his finding him. The increasing incalculability, if one may so term it, of man's evolving universe might alone render discernment a delicate, even a hazardous, process. Personal notes of Ignatius reveal the prolonged tension which important decisions produced in him, and the slow, painful groping for certitude which followed them. Yet difficult as these were, he very realistically saw that man had within him sources of darkness which could render any discernment at all impossible. Another element was necessary before one could hope to make decisions in the clarity of truth: personal freedom from anything that could close him to the light. As Lallemant, who followed him, was later to call it, the other pole of discernment was "the study of purity of heart." 8 An illuminating study might result from a search into the imagery by which saints and theologians throughout the ages have inscaped man's frightening potency for evil. Olier's "stagnant pool," Marmion's "depth of our way-wardness," Rahner's "deadly abyss of [utility"--all alike point to a reality which it is impossible to dismiss. Lalla-anant wrote very candidly of the "muddy well" in which "a multitude of desires are unceasingly fermenting," a well "full of false ideas and erroneous judgments." ~ To assign to each of these its local habitation and its name-- to say them as they are in us--is the cotmterpoise of discernment, and an exercise at least as painful as the former. Examination of conscience, then, is a proviso, a sine qua non. And Lallemant recognized that "the heart re-coils from nothing so much as this search and scrutiny. all the powers of our soul are disordered beyond measure, and we do not wish to know it, because the knowledge is humiliating to us." 10 To dispense with it is, as P. de Ponlevoy incisively saw, to rester darts le vague.11 On the contrary, one who "submits to the real" has given up the dreams which kept him marking time, because he finally found the real to be truer and less deceiving than dreams,v' Seen in this light the examen becomes a disci-pline of authenticity, a sharpening of the pole of purity of heart which ensures gentfineness of docility to the Spirit. Lallemant saw a direct correlation between super- Courel, Vie, p. 81. Lallemant, Doctrine, p. 140. Ibid., pp. 141-2. Cited by Pottier, Le P. Louis Lallemant, p. 344. a~Antoine Delchard, S.J., "L'filection darts la vie quotidienne," Christus, v. 14 (1958), pp. 206-19 passim. ÷ ÷ ÷ Particular Examen VOLUME ,~0, 1971 4" 4" 4" REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 778 ficial examens and lack of sensitiveness tt~ the guidance of the Spirit; on the other hand, he was convinced that "they who have applied themselves for three or four years to watch over their interior, a.ud have made some prog-ress in this holy exercise, know already how to treat a multitude of cases with address and absence of all rash judgment." 1.s It would be difficult to label as "formalism" the exigen-cies of Lallemant's asceticism: "guard of one's heart; deep and prolonged examens; progressive purifications contin-ued for years." 14 He defined purity of heart to mean "having nothing therein which is in however small a degree opposed to God and the operation of His grace." 1.5 And he went so far as to say that this was the exercise of the spiritual life against which the spirit of evil directed most opposition. He urged those under his charge to guard themselves carefully from any deliberate resistance to the Spirit by venial sin, to learn to recognize the first disorderly movements of their hearts, to watch over and regulate their thoughts, so as to recognize the inspirations of God--so as to be able, in other words, clearly to discern the word of God in the concrete situa-tions which presented themselves. He declared that "we never have vices or imperfections without at the same time having false judgments and false ideas." a0 And yet he insisted that this work of moving toward ever greater openness and freedom be done calmly, and especially that it be joined to a deep devotion to the person of Christ: examination was never to become the cult of itself. Such constant, increasingly more honest surveillance is taxing; he admitted this. Actually, in the words of those he directed, "he required nothing else ]rom us but this constant attention." His ultimate counsel was that of Christ: Vigilate--watch; until n~thing should escape one's attention, until the inner roots from which egotism took its rise were destroyed. He expected, in the end, spontaneity without strain, sureness of discernment, readiness, in the service of souls, for the cross. And among those who listened, noted, and demanded of himself this most to be dreaded of all disciplines, of all confronta-tions, was Isaac Jogues. Many have been alienated from the exercise because they conceived the medium as the message; the little check-list of "G's," familiar from the Exercises, was iso-lated from the spirit--so absolutely aware of the needs of his own temperament, yet so absolutely respectful of the freedom of others--of the Basque soldier who drew it up Lallemant, Doctrine, p. 262. Pottier, Le P. Louis Lallemant, p. 168. Lallemant, Doctrine, p. 80. Ibid., p. 101. for his own searing symbols of an utterly blunt honesty with himself. His strategy had the labored realism of one for whom the calculated small gains of military planning had been a fact of daily experience; and if his proposed concentration upon one fault at a time has impressed many as me.chanistic and rigid, it has been suggested that their preference for prolonging sterile efforts endlessly is hardly less painful.17 And Ravignan notes, in this connec-tion, "How strong one is, when he concentrates all his energy in unity. To think of only one thing, wish only one thing, do, finally, only one thing is the secret of all power." 18 And in the mind of Ignatius, this "one thing" was response in freedom to the word one had clearly discerned. In the end, it had become quite simply his life. No less than the check-list, the well-known "five points" of the two daily examens have been misunder-stood and exteriorized. Ignatius saw three different times of day and two examinations to be involved when he advocated the practice; but the laconic outline in which he explains them must be seen in the light of his final "Contemplation to Attain the Love of God," especially in its close where he sees God as a fountain from which all goodness pours out on him, a light in which everything bathes. Gerard Manley Hopkins has, in an unfinished lyric, given rich expression to Ignatius' simple prose: Thee, God, I come from, to thee go, All day long I like fountain flow From thy hand out, swayed about Mote-like in thy mighty glow. What I know of thee I bless, As acknowledging thy stress On my being and as seeing Something of thy holiness . '~ This is why the first point is a prayer of gratitude for the goodness and forgiveness which are man's twofold debt. Louis du Pont has probed the familiar method in order to discover its marrow: the optimism which pre-scribed gratitude first, thus guarding against sadness; the realism of seeing that the memory is so unfaithful, the mind so darkened, and the will so loveless that there is deep need of prayer for light. The examination itself, the third point, is a sincere acknowledgment of good, where this is recognized; and in the admission of sin or failure there is a counsel to do this in a spirit of the untranslata-ble douceur--that gentleness which refrains from turning bitter reproaches against itself, but rather grieves over the H. Pinard de la Boullaye, S.J., La spiritualitd ignatienne (Paris: Plon, 1949). Cited by Brou, Spiritualitd, p. 93. W. H. Gardner and N. H. MacKenzie, ed., The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins (Oxford: Oxford University, 1970), n. 155, p. 194. + + Particular E~amen VOLUME 30, 1971 779 + ÷ ÷ Sister Hugh REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 780 injury to One who has poured himself out, as fountain and light, in such generous giving. After the expression of perfect sorrow, one is urged in a fifth point to an efficacious resolution--so, practical as to foresee and so circumvent future failure. Previsioned when rising, this exercise is to be made at two different times of the day--at noon, and again after the evening meal,.and this in addition to a final, general examination made before retiring. Such a discipline can only confirm the fact that, throughout the Exercises, Ig-natius "supposes that one knows where he is going and wants to get there, and is ready to take the best means, then to examine those which present themselves, to weigh them, to choose them with knowledge of the cause." 20 In a word, lie s~pposed that one was ready to discern, among many means, that one whose cause was the inspi-ration of the Spirit; through long experience with his own peculiar cast of egotism, he would swiftly dismiss false weights. And those who followed this profound psy-chologist- saint did know where they were going, and did want to get there: the summit of apostolic zeal. Such a man as Claude de la Colombi~re, to take a single exam-ple, vowed never to pass from one occasion to another without a backward-forward look: from self-scrutiny to discernment. Again, from these particular exercises, described as j;ournalier, Ignatius never dispensed: "The importance accorded these examens is the touchstone of truly igna-tian spirituality." '-'x And the ~ournalier--"daily"--has been interpreted by some as actually occupying the whole day. For such a man as Lallemant, it actually did. He described as one of the greatest of all graces that of being "SO watchful that the least irregular movement rising in the heart is perceived and immediately corrected, so that in the space of a week, for example, we should perform very few external or internal acts of which grace is not the principle."'-'" Particular examen and discernment thus become arsis and thesis of a single life, until finally "some have no need of making a particular examen, be-cause they no sooner commit the least fault than they are immediately reproved for it and made aware of it; for they walk always in the light o~ the Holy Spirit, who is their guide. Such persons are rare, and they make a par-ticular examen, so to say, out of everything." 2~ All the energies of the person are concentrated in a single care not to sully the light which ponrs into and then from him, an instrument entirely at the service of Christ. Such ~ Brou, Spiritualitd, p. 83. .-t Pottier, Le P. Louis Lallemant, p. 335. = Lallemant, Doctrine, p. 228. '-"~ Ibid., p. 229. men have reached that fullness of the apostolate which is the summit of the spiritual life, discerning as they do in entire freedom that which is most conducive to the reign of God. So conceived, the examen is possible under an infinite number of forms; endlessly supple, it can be adapted to a variety of conceptual, cultural, and temperamental differ-ences. But always it is a sincere and considered pursuit of an ideal which is one's own most personal name given him by God: "The particular examen, practiced by a soul which has begun to climb, is sacrifice which has reached the stage of being one's rule of life." ,.,4 Far from having become "irrelevant" in spiritualities vowed to the genu-ine only, it is rather the infallible touchstone of their authenticity. -"~ Brou, Spiritualitd, p. 96. ÷ ÷ ÷ Particular Examen VOLUME 30, 1971 78] JAMES C. FLECK, S.J. The Israeli Kibbutz and the Catholic Religious. Community: A Study of Parallel Communal Life Styles j. c. Fleck, S.J., lives at Apartment 208; 150 Driveway; Ottawa, Canada. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS The kibbutz movement in Israel consits of about 250 agricultural-industrial collectives. They have a popula-tion of 90,000, slightly tinder 4% of the Jewish popula-tion in the State of Israel. This population includes full members (Jewish men and women, nearly all married, who have completed their military service and have been accepted by the kibbutz after a trial period of a year or two), the children of the kibbutz members, selected lead-ers of the Jewish youth movement abroad who plan even-tually to join a kibbutz, U1pan students (predominantly Jewish) who combine study and work on the kibbutz for periods ranging from six months to a year, and volun-teers (predominantly non-Jewish) who volunteer to work on the kibbutz for at least a month in return for room, board, and a very small amount of spending money. The first kibbutz was founded in Israel in 1909. The largest period of growth was prior to and immediately after the Second World War. In this period the kibbutz population represented nearly 10% of the nation. In the past fifteen years there has been no significant growth in the number of kibbutzim. The slightly increasing num-bers of kibbutzniks is accounted for primarily by internal growth, due to an increasing average family size. There are four federations to which nearly all kib-butzim belong. Each one is delineated by the political party to which it is or was affiliated. One, the smallest federation comprising 4,000 members (3% of the total kibbutz population), is religious, consisting of practicing Orthodox Jews. The other kibbutz federations shade fi'om non-religious to anti-religious. The land tilled by the kibbutzim is owned by the Is-raeli government throngh the Jewish National Fund. The original physical plant is financed by the govern-ment on low-interest long-term loans. When a kibbutz becomes operationally profitable it pays regular corpora-tion taxes. In addition, the kibbutz must pay a national consumption tax on the living expenditures of its mem-bers comparable to the personal income tax paid by the general public. The purpose of this study is to examine parallels in the life style between the kibbutz movement and Catholic religious orders. Wbile the common life in the two insti-tutions are often merely analogous, they are in many instances equivalent. Thus, a knowledge of the kibbutz movement can provide valuable insights in examining religious orders. The Kibbutz as a Religious Sect The basic motivating factors that built the kibbutz movement are: (l) Zionism, (2) Marxism, (3) the German Youth (Wandervogel) Movement. The founders of the kibbutz movement rejected the religion, the life style, the family structure, and the business interests of the Euro-pean Jewish community of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Wandervogel Movement fostered a spirit of youth peer group identity, a desire to return to nature, and a spirit of travel and adventure. Marx offered a model of productive and consumptive collectivism in a secular society. Zionism offered an escape from European anti-semitism and a positive aspiration of nation-building.~ The Pristine "'Religious" Values Based on the Boy Scouts, the Wandervogel Movement had basic principles which were incorporated into the kibbutz ideology. They include: truth, loyalty, brother-hood, dependability, a love of nature, obedience to the group, joy in living, generosity in work, courage, and purity in tbougbt, word, and deed. This latter was inter-preted to mean opposition to drinking, smoking, and sex-ual relationships. The Youth Movement believed all the pettiness and sordidness of human behavior was a func- ~ Melford E. Spiro. Kibbutz, Venture in Utopia, New York, pp. 44, 48, 175 ft. 4- 4- 4- Kibbutzim VOLUME 30, 1971 783 ÷ ÷ J. C. Fleck, S.J. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 784 tion of city living with its concomitant luxuries and false conventions." Consequently the early kibbutz movement was marked by asceticism. There was a rejection of material comfort, abstinence from alcohol and tobacco, no "ball room" (lancing, no motion pictures, simple housing and cloth-ing, no children (since they would pnt a financial burden on the community), communal property, common toilets and showers, dormitories, common dining hall, simple and inexpensive food, an emphasis on hard physical work and menial tasks. The Faith of the Kibbutz Marxism is the religion of the kibbutz. The basic maxim is: "From each according to his ability; to each according to his need." Initially the kibbntzniks hoped to find a form of collective salvation in withdrawal from the world and the re-establishing of a microcosm o{ the per-fect society based on fellowship. It next blossomed into a militant sect devoted to converting the world.:~ Today the kibbutz movement has returned to its pristine withdrawal state of conversion by witness. Karl Marx has been the prophet for this faith. His writings served as intellectnal fare, inspiration, sacred and therefore infallible norms.4 The attitude of the So-viet Union vis-a-vis Israel has had the effect of diluting kibbutz Marxism. Bnt in the early years Marx was dog-matic truth. Human failings could be tolerated, but not political differences. Even today, deviations from either basic Marxist concepts or pristine kibbutz ideals offer occasions for schisms and deep polarizations within a par-ticular kibbntz. Faihlre of a given kibbutz to vote "cor-rectly" in a national election is cause for its ejection from the basic kibbutz federation and political party to which it is allied. The Vows Chastity--While there is no binding force of conscience eqnivalent to the traditional religious vows, membership in a kibbutz implies a permanent but not binding commit-ment. Members are free to leave if they lose their "voca-tion," and their departure is mourned in the same way a religious regrets the departnre of a close friend from the Order. The "apostate," however, is welcomed back if he wishes to return. But with this exception of personal freedom for departure, permanent commitment to the group ideal is a sine qua non for a happy kibbutz life. The sexual idealism in the kibbntz movement has II)id., p. 43. Ibid., p. 180. Ibid., p. 184. never been consistent. The Boy Scout concept of purity derives from the Christian ideals of its European and American proponents. The Jewish founders of the kib-butz movement experienced tiffs value as a rejection of the romantic sexual conduct of the European society o~ their youth. They wanted to change the false sexual mo-rality of the city, the patriarchal authority of the male, the dependence of the child on his father, and the subjec-tion of women.~ The sense of "organic community" that the early kib-butzniks experienced as young men and women is related to their freedom from the restrictions imposed upon sex-uality by their contemporary society. They practiced a trial and error, sexual code that included polygyny and polyandry. Mating was entered into at will. But as the original founders aged, their sexual attitudes have be-come surprisingly conventional.6 Pre-marital sex among the school children is actively discouraged. Marriage is today a formal, and often religious, event. Patriarchal ties have returned. The relative affluence of the kibbutzim has ended the era of few or no offspring. This change has been augmented by the population growth stimulus instituted by the Israeli government in response to military manpower requirements connected with national security. Yet casual sex has no moral stigma within kibbutz life, and abortion requests are routinely handled by the kib-butz medical committee. These seeming contradictory ex-periences can be understood only in the context of the general Jewish belief that sexuality is a personal matter, not one of group concern, unless the sexual activity has consequences affecting the community. The Spartan attitude toward sexual abstinence ended when the young men and women who founded the kib-butzim experienced the eroticism engendered by "organic community." This youthful abandon has subsequently matured into a conventional sex-marriage code no differ-ent from that of the general Israeli populace. And with the lack of privacy in the kibbutz as well as the dispropor-tionate amount of social damage that infidelity wreaks in a small community, kibbutz sexnal morality approximates that of any small village. Poverty--Just as sexual morality has had an erratic path in the kibbutz history, so too their attitude toward the possession of material goods. The pristine attitude of the founders was .essentially a negative reaction to the bour-geois mentality of their forefathers in the Jewish communi-ties of Enrope. Ostracized in many instances by the Gentile majority, the Jew was unable to compete for social and n Ibid., p. 54. ~ Ibid., p. 110-117. 4- 4- 4- Kibbutzim VOLU~E 30, 1971 785 J. C. Fleck, S.J. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 786 economic prestige with his non-Jewish counterparts. As a result, the ghetto Jew attained personal ego satisfactions in business acumen, especially in areas connected with money where traditional Christian restrictions on usury opened up opportunities. Intellectual pursuits leading to l~rominent positions in the professions were a later development of the 19th and 20th centuries. But the possession of land and agricultural interests were not part of the self-image of the pre-Israel Jew. The rejection of materialism and capitalism are an integral part of the developing kibbutz ideal. The found-ers, were, almost without exception, intellectuals. The idealization of common labor was for them a cultural revolution. Raised in a tradition of prestige and aspira-tion for upward mobility in society, they deliberately chose the reverse. Instead of aspiring to "rise" in the social ladder, they chose to "descend." 7 Having to do without material possessions was both a concomitant of this conscious decision and a result of it. The early kibbutzniks had what Melford Spiro calls "two moral principles." These were (1) the sacral nature of work and (2) the communal possession of property. Labor was to be a uniquely creative act and an ultimate value. Through labor man would become one with himself, with society, with nature.8 The early kibbutzniks experienced this sacral nature of work in their conquest of the desert and the swamps which were the only lands made available to them by the Arab landowners prior to 1948. Those kibbutzim estab-lished after Israel became a State were often located in similar agriculturally disadvantaged areas for strategic reasons. Personal sacrifice and "doing without" were per-sonal virtues that made possible the economic success of the group effort. All personal aspirations and creature comforts had to be subordinated to the common good. With the exception of a few struggling new kibbutzim along the post-1967 borders, this period of sacrifice has passed. Although limits on the amount of water that can be used for cultivation and a crop surplus condition in Israeli agriculture have imposed ceilings on land use, many collectives are maintaining and increasing profita-bility by operating factories which in turn have increased the kibbutz standard of living. The communal facilities that were an economic necessity in the pioneer era have given away to luxury apartments, a private social life, advanced education, extended vacations, and other phe-nomena related to economic well-being. Ideological ascet-icism is not an operative principle in contemporary kib-butz life. Not surprisingly, a great number of the contem- 7 Ibid., p. 14. s Ibid., p. 12. porary problems in the kibbutz movement stem from the vast discrepancy between the physical privations of the early kibbntzim and the high standard of living and expec-tations of the present members. Obedience--In a first glimpse of the organizational strncture of a kibbutz, one would discern little there that reflects the monarchical authority structnre that pervades both Catholic ecclesiastical organizations and the religious orders. The ideal of the kibbutz is total democracy. Execu-tive authority is a delegated power, revocable, and subject to a constant change of personnel. The executive branch functions only to implement group decisions. Each indi-vidual kibbutz is essentially autonomous from the federa-tion to which it belongs. The officers of the federation have no direct antbority over the activities of any mem-ber kibbutz. All decisions are made at the local level by vote and the majority opinion is binding on tbe minor-ity. But no majority is irrevocable. The minority may campaign for a reversal. There is a minority compliance "by necessity" but nothing resembling the "submission of tile understanding." Tile will of the majority has to be obeyed for pragmatic reasons, to preserve the common good. But any decision can be, and often is, reversed. Even certain "essentials" of the founders can be changed if the kibbutz members no longer consider them a cur-rent value, or if the life of the kibbutz itself is at stake by continued adherence to an outdated fundamental princi-ple. The typical kibbutz is closer to the Benedictine model of religions life than to the Jesuit form. Membership in a particular kibbutz is akin to monastic stability. The his-toric connection between the monastery and its fields is similar to the main kibbntz economic enterprise. The kibbutz, like the monastery, has a self-contained cultural environment; library, music, beautification of the grounds, locally produced music and entertainment, and the chapter. Unlike the monastic uadition, no kibbutz has a perma-nent official like that of a life-tenured abbot. Nor do office holders have the long terms allowed by canon law. The kibbutz executive personnel pool is rotated from one ex-ecutive task to another with short interim periods as com-mon laborers. Executive efficiency is somewhat reduced by such rapid turnovers, but the movement prefers this to an entrenched hierarchy. Fnrther, it increases the partici-pation of the membership in decision-making operations of the kibbutz. The nsual term for a kibbutz office is one year.° For a few highly specialized tasks, for example, the treasurer, it runs two years, no more. ~ Ibid., p. 78; see Dan Leon, The Kibbutz, a New Way of Life, Oxford, 1969. 4- 4- Kibbutzim VOLUME 30, 787 ÷ ÷ ÷ J. C. Fleck, S.J. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS '788 In a remarkable number of ways the kibbutz resembles traditional Catholic religious life. A messianic ideological basis of membership is parallel to both.Being a kibbutz-nik is "a way of life" comparable to a religious vocation. The inOividual is expected at times to sacrifice his per-sonal ambitions and opportunities to the group needs. The members' meeting has many of the aspects of a com-munity liturgy, as do the secular celebrations in the kib-butz of the national and religious holidays. Each kibbutz follows a common style of life and the kibbutz is often referred to as an extended family. Aspirants must try out the life and be accepted. They usually must dispose of their material wealth upon admission. There is security for the ill and the infirm. Members are not rewarded economically for their productivity or profitability. The federation to which each kibbutz belongs resem-bles to some extent the province of the religious order. Recruiting of youth leaders, new members, Ulpan stu-dents and vohlnteers are bandied at tbe central level as are contacts with the government and the army. The federation has an internal tax system to equalize income discrepancies between richer and poorer kibbutzim. Most federations have produced a model constitution for their member kibbutzim. Each kibbutz is taxed a number of its members to staff federation offices and overseas re-cruiting posts (missions). The federation, in union with the national trade union, handles both buying and sell-ing cooperatives, runs research centers and regional high schools for kibbntz children.1° Today the federations have joined toget_her to found a centralized kibbutz uni-versity to provide for the increasing number of kibbutz youth who want both a university education and an envi-ronment in which their kibbutz values will be preserved. The arguments used for establishing this new educational effort are ahnost identical to those used in the 19th and 20tb centuries for Catholic high schools and universities. Charity Fraternal love, over and above its function as a crite-rion for true Christianity, has been considered a hallmark of religious life, and a sine qua non of common life. In the "organic community" which the founders of the kib-butzim experienced in their pioneer days in Israel, this same basic group fellowship and fraternal love was pres-ent. The movement was small and each person knew every other member well. They were economically and socially interdependent. Their lives depended on mutual security. They were, as a group, alone in a foreign and (langerous land, cnt off from outside aid. Their bond of friendship was solidified in a common ideology, in oppo-a" Op. cir., Leon, p. 158. sition to the false value system of the world, and in a common enemy, the Arab. These same three basic princi-ples have beeu present in every religious order; some concrete vision of Christianity conceived by their found-ers, the false value system of a pagan or barely Christian world, and the enemy, successively the devil, the pagan Romans, and finally heretics. The passage of time and aging has effected major changes in the first ardor of the kibbutzniks, as it has on the members of many long established religious orders. One kibbutznik reported to Spiro: "The evening meetings, (lances and song, group conversation, and the sharing of experiences--these are the phenomena of youth. The retirement to their own rooms and the substi-tution of private for group experiences is not the result of the influx of stangers . It represents . an inevitable retreat on the part of middle-aged people from the group-centered activities of an adolescent youth move-ment, to interests which are more congenial to their own age--children, friends, and personal concerns." ~x The kibbutz movement has faced up to a reality which hitherto has destroyed practically every ntopian society ever attempted by man, except possibly the Catholic reli-gious orders, the inability to re-create a new man in the institutiug of a new way of life?e Some of the larger kibbutzim have nearly 2000 residents. Only a handful are less than 100. Universal friendship is obviously impossi-ble. Deep interpersonal relationships are cuhivated be-tween husband, wife, and their immediate family. Other close friendships are built around those in neighboring apartments or those whom they meet in work fnnctions. Relationships to other kibbutzniks is functional not per-sonal. Nor does the kibbutz attempt to abolish natural indi-vidual aggressive tendencies. It merely channels them into socially acceptable substitntes. Gossip and petty criti-cism abound. Quarreling, but no physical violence, is common. Skits at community entertainments satirize non-conformists. Aggression is channeled into pride in one's own family, work ability, success of one's economic branch in the kibbutz, and participation in national politics?:~ If universal charity were an essential prerequi-site for the successful functioning of kibbutz society, the movement would have failed long ago. The system has been devised to operate without it, subordinating indi-vidualism to the common good, and substituting for char-ity the personal involvement of each kibbutznik in group decision making. Op. cit., Spiro, p. 216. Ibid., p. 236, 103. Ibid., p. 103-107. + Kibbutzim VOLUME 30, 1971 789 ÷ ÷ ÷ ~. C. Fleck, S.]. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 790 Generation Gap One of the "essentials" of the early kibbutz movement was the communal raising of children. Immediately after birth, the child was placed with his peers and raised by a community appointed nurse. This same system was fol-lowed throughout childhood. Boys and girls of the various kibbutz parents were raised as brothers and sisters. This accounts for the lack of a normal amount of pre-marital sexual activity among young people who live in close proximity even after puberty. Sex activity between boys and girls of the same age groui~ would be incest, an almost unheard of problem in a kibbutz. However, as the young people raised in this communal manner have returned to their kibbutz as full adult members, they have generally asked for a major change in the system. They want to raise their own children at home. Throughout the entire kibbutz movement this issue has been raised. In every federation except the one which is most Marxist-oriented the young people have endetl the absohlte commtmal rearing of the children, Since the young couples were ntu.nerically outnumbered, the process by which they won over the majority opposed to their demands for a revolutionary change proves en-lightening. The kibbutz at Kefar Blum recently under-went such an experience.~4 When the young people pro-posed this radical change they were voted down by an 80-20% vote. When the results were tabulated the young people decided they would leave this kibbutz and found one of their own with their rules. This would eventually lead to the death by attrition of the older kibbutz. Recog-nizing this, the older members formed reconciliation committees designed to keep up the hopes of the young and change the minds of the old. A new vote was taken several weeks after the intial setback. This time the youngster's proposal won by an 80-20 vote. As the government is anxious to form new kibbutzim in border areas, young Israelis can easily become founders of a new kibbutz, sharing the same challenges and oppor-tunities their elders had in the pioneer years. To over-come this possible source of defection of younger mem-bers, most kibbutzim practice rapid advancement of tal-ented young people into positions of responsibility. There is no waiting for years while the entrenched old guard dies off before the young people can achieve posi-tions of authority and adopt new policies in keeping with the needs of the clay. James c. Fleck, s.J., private notes taken during a study of the kibbntz movement, Israel, October-November, 1970. Employment outside the Kibbutz This is a growing phenomenon in the kibbutz move-ment paralleled by an increasing number of religious men and women employed in apostolic work and employ-ment not part of a corporate apostolate. For a kibbutz member to undertake such work he must have commu-nity approval. While many working outside the kibbutz are employed in various federation projects, an increasing number are engaged in "secular" activity, outside indus-try, government, and teaching. Their salary is either paid directly to the kibbotz or turned in to the kibbntz treas-nrer by the individual. One factor not present in snch kibbutz outside employ-ment is the gradual diminishing interest of the individual in his collective during the months and years the man may be working outside the kibbutz. Since Israel is very small, the outside employee almost always lives on the kibbutz with his family and returns there after work. In the case of those stationed in more remote sections of the country, or working in the government or in the army, they return to the kibbutz each Friday night on the Sab-bath eve. This same holds true of kibbutz students study-ing at the university or the technical institute. The mem-bers do not endanger their commitment to the collective way of life by prolonged absence from their kibbutz. Use o~ Money The strictness of control over independent use of money varies according to which federation the kibbutz is affiliated with. Ha Artzi, the most Marxist, is also the strictest. No one may possess any outside money nor is there an internal money system. The other federations are more flexible. In some each member is paid "script" or "kibbutz money" each month to use in lieu of Israeli currency at the kibbutz store for personal items. In others the members have a charge accotmt credited against a monthly allowance. The Ha .drtzi kibbutzim also require all new members to dispose of all property and money they possess after the intitial trial period. Other kibbutzim permit mem-bers to retain previously acquired wealth and even use the money independently of the kibbutz so long as the member does not use any of the money for improving his own life style in the kibbutz. Some demand that members deposit such funds with the kibbutz on a non-interest bearing basis. The money is returned if the new member ever leaves the kibbutz. In most kibbutzim today individual members are given a monthly credit covering items over which he may exer- 4- 4- 4- Kibbutzim VOLUME 30~ 1971 791 4. 4. 4. J. C. Fleck, S.J. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 792 cise individual discretion, such as clothes, a household allowance, food for one's apartment, and the annual va-cation. In most instances the individual can make substi-tutions that better reflect his own tastes, more money for vacation and less clothes for examples. Housing In the early kibbutz days housing was primitive and inadequate. Many members lived in tents even during the winter months. Toilet and shower facilities were to-tally communal and produced a camaradarie not unlike that of army barracks life or that in athletic teams. Today the norm in most kibbutzim is a 2½ room apart-ment for all married members which usually includes a modern bathroom and also a kitchenette. As individual families are allowed to raise their own children this hous-ing allocation will have to be increased depending on the size of each f;imily, end~mgering the traditional equality of housing facilities. The newest apartments are allocated on a seniority basis which takes into account both the age of the member and the number of years he has belonged to the kibbutz. Expulsion Like any other communal society, on occasions mem-bers whose activities or ideas are not compatible with the group ideal are expelled from membership hy the kib-butz voting at a weekly meeting. Since most dissidents leave freely, expulsions are rare and several kibbutzim report that they are willing to allow expelled members to 'eturn after a probationary period. This tolerance is probably necessary in a communal society where the hus-band and a wife are both members of the kibbutz and when only one of them is expelled from membership. While normally the couple would leave together after expulsion proceedings, it is not unknown for one member to stay on alone since the remaining member's rights are not affected by the expulsion of the spouse. Vohtntary Departures The abandonment of a kibbutz "vocation" almost al-ways involves dissatisfaction on the part of the wife. As women usually work in the institutional housekeeping tasks, they enjoy the least modal satisfaction in their daily work. In many instances, too, the wife has come from outside the kibbutz movement, having married a kibbutz boy she met in the army. Spiro found that nearly every man leaving a kibbutz is prompted by his wife who ulti-mately prewfils in convincing her husband to leave.1'~ '~ Op. cit., Spiro, p. 223. Automobiles There are relatively few automobiles in a kibbutz car pool, since most of the motor vehicles are used for farm work. While most of the equipment consists of trucks and tractors, there are usually several private cars for officials whose work takes them into the city and for those mem-bers working outside the kibbutz. When not being used for official business, these cars are available, theoretically, for common use. Some abuses have been reported in the area of private possessiveness by those assigned private cars, but there seems to be no. widespread dissatisfaction. This is attributable in part to the convenience of public transportation throughout the country as well as the kib-bntz tradition of attending outside social functions as groups, transported by trucks fitted out with temporary seats, When an individual does have the use of a commu-nity car he is charged a mileage fee. Each member is allocated an annual kilometer allowance. He may pool this with other couples for extended trips and usually may transfer other credits from his monthly allowance toward a larger mileage usage of the private car. Mileage is charged only against personal use of the car, not for travel on kibbutz business. Clothing The federation Ha drtzi follows a policy of specifying in detail the clothes members may receive each year. A man gets a coat once every five years; a pair of pants, sweater, or jacket every year; a shirt every year. These rations are for Sabbath or dress clothes. Work clothes and shoes are issued as needed. The kibbutzim of the other federations normally assign a cash allowance for clothing, permitting the members to decide for themselves the kind of clothing they prefer. In the early days of the kibbutz movement each kib-butz had a common stock of clothing. The clothing was distributed without regard to sizes and washed without laundry marks. Each person wore what chance provided. But variations in size presented insuperable problems. The system was changed to grant each member personal possession of his own clothing. Radio and TV At first every kibbutz had a communal radio room. But as radios became cheaper, more and more members re-ceived them as gifts and kept the radios for their own private apartments. Today, a radio is considered a per-sonal item. Now there is in each kibbutz a TV room. As TV has become a part of the Israeli cnlture attendance in the TV + + + Kibbutzim VOLUME 30, 1971 793 4" 4" ~. C. Fleck, REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 794 lounge is large. Bnt the limited broadcasting schedule and restriction of available channels has not yet made ¯ selection of the program to be watched a major commu-nity concern. There is, nonetheless, growing pressure for permitting members to have their own TV sets in their private apartments. Illness, Old Age, Death All kibbutzniks are covered tinder the national health service. In case of extraordinary expenses, such as special-ized foreign medical treatment, the kibbutz pays all costs for its members. In one sitnation recently at kibbutz Kefar Blum where open heart surgery bad to be per-formed in the United States on the daughter of one mem-ber and the kibbutz income was below normal, the ment-bets voted to meet the high surgical costs by voting out the annual household improvements and vacations and to substantially rednce the cigarette expenditures. Women are given rednced working hours during preg-nancy, and the required daily hours of work are progres-sively reduced as members age. But no one, except the infirm, is every really retired. Every member, as long as he lives, is expected to remain economically productive to the extent that his health allows. This minimum may be simply the caring for the roses in front of his apartment, but it is expected. Recently many kibbutzim have established actuarial funds to provide cash income for members during their old age. There are two reasons: (1) they believe there is a psychological need for infirm and retired people to feel that they are not a financial drain on the younger mem-bers; (2) there is concern over a possible future age imbal-ance. Since every member is always free to leave, some internal crisis in the kibbutz conld result some day in all the younger and productive members leaving the kibbutz, thus depriving the aged of the "living social security" provided by the younger members. At death members are buried simply in the kibbutz cemetery. Luxuries The tents and the tar-paper shacks that once housed the kibbutzniks have given way to modern concrete apart-ments, some with air-conditioning. The housing and fur-nishings for the average kibbutznik compare favorably with those of comparably skilled workmen in Israel's cit-ies. Depending on tastes and family skills, some kibbutz apartments approach lfigb fashion in their appearance. The women have modern stoves and refrigerators to feed their families at home when they wish. There are, as yet, no private telephones, TV, or automobiles. Work Tasks Ill general, inembers are allowed and encouraged to work in the particular department that they like best. The actual assignment is made by the work manager, but great care goes into making sure each member is happy. ~,'Vork assignments, like everything else in the kib-butz, is subject to the scrutiny of the weekly meeting. Assignment to disliked tasks sometimes has to be made by collective action. The individual assigned to such is expected to subordinate his own wishes to those of the community. In most cases the onerous jobs are assigned for short periods of time and given to a wide segment of the membership. Some tasks, such as kitchen clean-up and waiting table, are so universally disliked they have to be allotted in strict rotation. Candidates [or membership, tile U/pan students, and the temporary volunteers are almost always assigned to those tasks the regular members most dislike. Committees The Executive is a committee consisting of those mem-bers holding key administrative jobs and some "ministers without portfolio." The term of office on the Executive coincides with the term of their administrative job, one or two years at most. Tile Executive consists of six or seven members. These members are drawn from a pool of the acknowledged leaders in the kibbutz who rotate in and Out Of the more important leadership posts. Besides this top executive committee, there are myriad others covering every aspect of kibbutz life. Approxi- ~nately 50% of the members of a kibbutz are serving on some committee at any given time. Over a three year span, practically 100% of the membership participates in some committee work. There are a few who have opted out of this participatory democracy and refuse to serve on any committee. These few have narrowed their kibbutz lives to their work and their immediate family.~ The Apostolate The kibbutz serves two specific economic functions. It is both a commtmal productive society and a communal consumptive society. These two functions are coalesced into one organic community. There is in Israel another type of collective called the Moshave, where there is a communal productive system but private ownership in the consumption area. But for the kibbutznik the Marx-ist axiom "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need" dictates that their communal so- ~" Up. cit., Leon, p. 67. ÷ ÷ Kibbutzim VOLUME 30, 1971 795 + + + J. C. Fleck, S.J. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 796 ciety must combine the collective control of both produc-tion and consumption. Kibbutzim have been tried in the past in the cities where the members worked totally in outside industry and the kibbutz was formed primarily as a consumption society. Every attempt along this line has failed. There is in Jerusalem at this time a group who are hoping to organize a commune of professional people as a consump-tive kibbutz. But kibbutzniks do not expect this move-ment to succeed. They view the total integration of the community into both production and consumption as necessary for the survival of community life. The kibbutz in Israel is primarily an agricultural eco-nomic movement. The success of this movement in at-tracting and holding members can be attributed to the historical conditions which led the original founders to abandon the metropolises of Europe. They became en-chanted with nature, an enchantment which anyone who has ever had a hackyard vegetable garden or even a flower pbt in a window will understand. The grower as well as what is grown becomes in some psychological way a part of the basic life cycle of nature. Akin to this is the psychic reward a teacher sometimes feels as he watches his students grow and mature. The farmer, and to some ex-tent the teacher, become united to the invisible power of life itself. In recent years the kibbutz movement has added facto-ries to increase the standard of living, otherwise limited by crop quotas and water restrictions. These factories also provide a more satisfactory employment for those mem-bers technically inclined who would otherwise abandon the farm life of the kibbutz for industrial employment in the city. There are, however, fewer modal satisfactions in this type of work. Marx and a host of other analysts have noted the inherent alienation process at work in the fac-tory system. To some extent the kibbutz factories have disproved Marx's theory that this ~ense of alienation ex-perienced by factory workers can be overcome by com-munal ownership. Like the disliked jobs in the kitchen, most dull assembly line duties must be filled with hired casual labor or low cost volunteers. The External Enemy In traditional Catholic terminology the enemy of Christianity and therefore of Catholic religious orders was the world, the flesh, and the devil. In each era these primordial forces are concretized into existential realities. As such they are a motive for both joining and remaining a member of a religious order. It should be noted that this is a negative motive, and almost always found in conjunction with a positive aspect, namely the apostolate. The kibbutz movement has had equiwdent motivation: anti-semitism, the European bourgeois society, capitalism, the false wdue system of the city, Hitler, Nasser, and the Arab world. These are the kibbutz's world, flesh, and devil. There seems to have been a direct relationship between the presence, or perhaps more accurately an awareness of this presence, and the motivation for mem-bership in the kibbutz. Membership figures in kibbutz history show a positive correlation between increased membership and the danger from some facet of the exter-nal enemy. Since 1967 the kibbutz membership has shown its first marked increase in nearly two decades as the government, in the wake of the Six Day war, has begun to establish new kibbutzim in Syria, along the Jordan river in former Arab territory, and in the Sinai. Conclusions The ideological fervor of the early kibbutz movement that Spiro connected so intrinsically with classical Marx-ism has withered considerably in the Israeli kibbutzim. The kibbutz has become a desirable form of agricnltural life, not gracious but certainly pleasant. This is especially true for the Sabra, the young children of the kibbutz who accept kibbutz life as a natural and wholesome place to live, work, and raise their families. They are not espe-cially ideologically motivated despite great efforts by the kibbutz educational programs to continue the motivating principles of the kibbutz founders. Kibbutz membership still adds lustre and prestige to politicians and military leaders, something like the "log cabin" birth-place of 19th century American presidents. But the increasing "westernization" of Israel is rapidly diminishing the ego satisfaction of kibbutzniks, whose vocation was once considered the national ideal. The increasing standard of living is also having its effect. Except for work and meals in the common dining hall, there is little "common" living on an Israeli kib-butz. The family has replaced the commune as the center of interest of the members. The replacement of com-munal showers and toilets by private ones is a sign of increased privatization. The trend away from communal ownership in the consumptive sector is clear and likely irreversible. To some extend the Marxist Ha Artiz federation has most successfi~lly resisted these individualistic tendencies. But Marxist ideology has been so closely associated with the now discredited Soviet system (discredited not for intrinsic principles but because of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East), that there is little evident grass-roots Marxist ideological fervor among the Artzi members. Thus the basic Messianic ideology is no longer an opera- 4, 4, 4- Kibbutzim VOLUME 30, 1971 797 + + + ]. C. Fleck, S.]. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 798 tive principle in the kibbutz movement, although some lip service is still paid to it in the literature of the move-ment. The religious fervor is gone; and, as has been shown in tiffs study, the ascetic principles of the Wandervogel Movement have also slowly eroded. Only the presence of a dangerous external enemy remains as a major factor in maintaining the kibbutz as kibbntz. For the kibbutzniks, there is a growing interest in the Israeli culture outside the barbed wire barriers of the kibbutz boundaries. Tel Aviv, Jernsalem, the beaches at Asbkalon, the symphony, the movie theatres, and jobs in outside industries are no longer an evil "world," an eneiny to be avoided. With both Hitler and Nasser dead, the Arab masses remain a clearly perceived danger, and a sufficient cause justifying the sacrifices intrinsically connected with living a com-munal life. The increasing toleration of personal prop-erty by kibbutz melnbers shows that the original kibbutz asceticism was a necessity of the moment, a means not an end. Taken altogether these factors indicate a shaky fu-tnre for the kibbutz movement in the long rtm. Only the miniscnle religious federation seems to have the tran-scendent valnes that will hold this gronp of kibbutzim together. This segment of the kibbutz movement has a proven long-run ideology, their Jewish Orthodox Faith and perduring external enemies, the secular Israeli state. For Roman Catholic religious gronps these principles of the kibbutz movement can indicate the hazards of certain contemporary trends in Catholic religious com-munities. There seems to be a serious drawback to any community in ending the integral connection between the conamunity apostolate and the common life, between the production and consumption activities. X,Vbatever the legal advantages of separate incorporation of the apos-tolic endeavor, it appears such a change may prove dys-functional to the best interests of the community unless some psychological identification can replace the legal one tying the commonity members to a common aposto-late. Otherwise the religious will become mere employees of their former vocational apostolate. Like kibbutz asceticism, the vows, traditional forms of Cbristifin asceticism, are also increasingly seen as merely ~neans which can and in some instances should be aban-doned as a condition for membership in the group, or for individnal apostolic effectiveness. The trend in substitut-ing community for poverty as the true significance of this evangelical counsel, presages many of the problems the kibbutzim have experienced in their trend toward more and more priw~tization and increasing personal property. At the moment Roman Catholics have no apparent "external enemies" of snfficient threat to bind members and aspirants to religious communities to the requisite personal sacrifices basic to any communal effort. Ecumen-ism has replaced enmity in relating to Protestantism. In-carnational theology no longer sees the world as a "valley of tears." Unity of doctrine is no longer a characteristic of the orders, or even theChurch. Increasing numbers of religious seek employment in secular jobs or outside the order's organized apostolates. The religious life no longer commands the prestige it once bad among the faithful. Tbe kibbutz movement has also shown several possibil-ities that have been traditionally lacking in Catholic reli-gious orders. A communal society of married conples is clearly possible and in some cqntemporary aspects possi-bly superior (in personal fulfilhnent and interpersonal love) to the celibate life. While the structures of existing religious communities do not seem likely to encompass this facet of communal life, it would not be surprising to see new communities of married religious come into exist-ence in the not too distant future. Another wdue of the kibbutz movement is the seeming success of communal groups based on a total democratic process. There are already some indications that the traditionally monarchi-cal religious orders are already moving swiftly to a capi-tular form of government. In most cases the founders of the majority of the Israeli kibbutzim are still alive and to some extent still reflecting the charism that marked the foundation of their commu-nity. Yet it appears that the "routinization of their cha-risma" is not likely to be overly successful. The ideological and "religious" sonrce of the kibbutz movement has al-ready given way to a rapid "secularization" of values by the second generation whose devotion to the kibbutz is either pragmatic or cultural. The positive inspiration of Zionism that has so effec-tively supported the establishment of a Jewish State will certainly diminish in time. Antisemitism is not a motive in a Jewish state, and thus not operative on the Sabra. If and when the Arab situation is normalized, the Kibbutz "external enemy" will also have disappeared. The pris-tine Marxist ideology has been snbject to constant revi-sion, and a wide range of personal and public views are now tolerated among kibbutzniks. The long range prognosis for the kibbutz movement is one of no sizeable growth and more than likely a rapid diminishing of the movement once peace comes to Israel. The small number o[ religious kibbutzim should remain active, as well as a limited number run by convinced Marxists. But the kibbutz movement as a whole will likely prove to have been a temporarily significant social structure in Israeli history due to the particular condi-tions that Jews faced in the 19th and 20th centuries. ÷ ÷ Kibbutzim VOLUME ~0, 1971 799 If this analogy between the kibbutz movement and Catholic religious community life is correct, and if the same present trends continne in both institutions, there is a reasonable predictability that many if not most of the present religion,s commonities may be viewed from some future historical perspective as having served the Church's vital needs effectively up to the end of the 20th century. "!" 4" 4- J. C. Fleck, S.J. REVIEW FOR RELIGIOI, JS 8O0 SISTER CHARLOTTE HANNON, S.N.D. DE N. The Graying of America The far left, the far right, the in-betweeners, the libs and the cons, the silent majority and the articttlate mi-nority have reached a consensus on one point at least-- they all agree that "Darling, you are grown older." Laughingly we sing the line at birthday parties and re-unions, but behind the laughter there is the realization that okt age and retirement are major concerns that warrant major consideration. If Toeffler in Future Shock has clone nothing else, he has alerted ns to the need for planning ahead. Last August and November the Finance Retirement Committee of the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur of the Maryland Province sent out 415 questionnaires to religious communities across the country. The returns are interesting and informative as the following table indi-cates: Questionnaires sent out . 415 Questionnaires returned . 271 Retirement Plans in operation . 100 No Retirement Plan in operation . 171 Most of the communities in the last category are anxious to know what others are doing about retirement planning, and they indicate a need to begin making plans as soon as possible. Retirement Age and Status The majority of congregations state that they have no "fixed" age for retirement. They agree that the person himself, his state of health, his vitality, mental and physi-cal stamina--all these factors mnst be considered on an individual basis. Although 65 years is mentioned as a possible age/'or part-time retirement, 70 is the time when most religious begin to think seriously abont retiring. Studies show that the life-span of religious exceeds that of the ordinary layman by five to nine years. If there is difference of opinion about a specific age, there is deft-nitely consensns on retirement status. All agree with the statement from the "Older Americans Act," Article 10: 4- 4- Sister Charlotte is Director of Re-search and Funding for the Sisters of Notre Dame de Na-mur; Ilchester, Maryland 21083. VOLUME ~0, 1971 801 + ÷ ÷ St. Charlotte REVIEW FOR RELIGIOUS 802 "Older Americans or Senior Citizens should be permitted the free exercise of individual initiative in planning and managing one's own life for independence and freedom." Such thinking, of course, originates in the basic Christian