Suchergebnisse

Junge Menschen zur aktiven Teilhabe an der Demokratie zu ermuntern und zu befähigen, ist ein Auftrag, der sich an alle Unterrichtsfächer richtet – schließlich bietet jedes Fach je eigene Perspektiven, Fragestellungen und Methoden, die zur Erfassung, Diskussion und Lösung komplexer gesellschaftlicher Problemlagen hilfreich sind. Dieser auch an Lehrkräfte und Studierende adressierte interdisziplinäre Sammelband will mehrere Möglichkeiten aufzeigen, wie demokratiepolitische Fragestellungen im Unterricht angesprochen werden können. Er führt in die theoretischen Grundlagen der Demokratiebildung ein und versammelt Beiträge insbesondere der kultur- und geisteswissenschaftlichen Fachdidaktiken. (Verlag)

In this paper authors argue that the main determinants of differences in prosperity across countries are differences in economic institutions. To solve the problem of development will entail reforming these institutions. Unfortunately, this is difficult because economic institutions are collective choices that are the outcome of a political process. The economic institutions of a society depend on the nature of political institutions and the distribution of political power in society. As yet, authors only have a highly preliminary understanding of the factors that lead a society into a political equilibrium which supports good economic institutions. However, it is clear that it is the political nature of an institutional equilibrium that makes it very difficult to reform economic institutions. The authors illustrate this with a series of pitfalls of institutional reforms. The author's analysis reveals challenges for those who would wish to solve the problem of development and poverty. That such challenges exist is hardly surprising and believe that the main reason for such challenges is the forces authors have outlined in this paper. Better development policy will only come when authors recognize this and understand these forces better. Nevertheless, some countries do undergo political transitions, reform their institutions, and move onto more successful paths of economic development.

Since the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Tunisian authorities reached in October 2022 a staff-level agreement to support Tunisia's economic policies, Tunisian President Kais Saied has been standing at the Rubicon. Lacking a vision to revive the Tunisian economy, President Saied has opted for a strategy of diversion and scapegoating. By blowing on the embers of xenophobia among his supporters and more recently by stoking the flames in the Middle East, he continues to deflect attention to conceal his economic short-sightedness and claims autonomy from foreign – mainly European – aid, in the name of sovereignty. This posture has now trapped him in his own rhetoric at a time when the Tunisian economy struggles without signs of recovery or resilience in a challenging regional and global landscape. Time is ticking, the situation remains grim, and the country may miss another opportunity to resume economic growth.A country on the verge of economic collapse
The risk of economic collapse in Tunisia is real. Tunisia is currently undergoing severe financial losses and grappling with significant economic hardships, finding it challenging to restore its financial reserves. The Tunisian government's negotiations with the IMF for a 1.9 billion US dollar loan hit a roadblock when Kais Saied rejected the agreement, labelling it as foreign "diktats" "that come from abroad and cause only more impoverishment",[1] for fear of increased unpopularity and social unrest from the requested subsidy reforms and restructuring of the country's public sector.
As a result, concerns sparked among Tunisia's international partners. The High Representative of the EU, Josep Borrell, described the situation in Tunisia as "very dangerous" and feared a "collapse"[2] – a sentiment echoed also by his US counterpart, Antony Blinken, who mentioned that the country "risks falling off the deep end".[3]
Tunisia doesn't have many alternatives left to provide a lifeline to its economy. Its needs are substantial, and it will find it challenging to continue to rely on Saudi Arabia or Algeria. And the President's pledge to crack down on corrupt businesspeople and retrieve 13.5 billion Tunisian dinars (4.8 billion US dollars) "stolen from the people" has failed so far.[4]
The time for reflection has not simplified the alternative: even though Tunisia depends on external sources for financing its economy and repaying deadlines, including the one in February 2024 (850 million euros), the option of negotiating with the IMF appears politically unacceptable for Kais Saied at this stage, especially in view of the forthcoming presidential elections in November 2024 – if maintained.
Tunisia's socio-economic situation is so precarious that it risks igniting at the slightest misstep.
To be sure, Tunisia possesses both the necessary ingredients (skills and human resources) and the capacity to revitalise its economy and become a "Mediterranean tiger." However, this potential has largely remained untapped since the dawn of its 2011 uprising. Worse, the Tunisian industrial fabric is under threat especially since Kais Saied has taken all the powers. The business environment has been marred by corruption and numerous other hurdles, creating an atmosphere that is not conducive to significant investment and the establishment of enterprises. Furthermore, the Tunisian President has considerably increased pressure on the wealthy in a desperate search for fresh funds. At the same time, small and medium enterprises have suffered significantly due to the absence of clear rules and widespread corruption.[5] Reforming and establishing external partnerships are crucial steps towards mitigating the challenges encountered by the private sector in Tunisia.Tunisia's needs – and how the EU may support them
The country needs to attract investments in innovative entrepreneurship and implement new financing models, given the dire state of Tunisian businesses at present. Sales are concentrated in a small local market, where purchasing power is diminishing day by day, and opportunities for development and internationalisation are limited by existing legal, administrative and financial obstacles.[6] All of this happens in the absence of reforms that could help navigate the crisis in the short or medium term. To mitigate this vulnerability and avoid a complete economic collapse, it is crucial for Tunisian businesses to pursue international diversification in the short term.
Last year Italy has become Tunisia's leading trade partner.[7] Italy could therefore play a pivotal role in enhancing Tunisia's integration into international trade through greater participation in global value chains (GVCs). Tunisia may subsequently reap the benefits of complementarities between economies, increased demand and access to innovation across the supply chain.
The challenge will then be for Tunisia to seize the opportunity offered by this regional reorganisation of the production and supply model. A robust and enduring partnership between Italy and Tunisia hinges on a far-reaching vision that provides Tunisians the necessary incentives to implement sustained reforms. These changes must enjoy widespread support, particularly among the youth, to alleviate political pushback. This new vision is not likely to materialise unless Tunisian policymakers and public opinion recognise that a market economy is not inherently negative, profit is not a flaw, and globalisation is not necessarily a threat. It is crucial to reshape the narrative around the significance of GVCs, trade openness and regional integration, emphasising that these factors, when combined, can be a source of wealth and a prelude to social justice.
This new approach should prompt Tunisia to resume negotiations with the EU under the Association Agreement. A shrewd agreement should focus on specific sectors that could promote economic modernisation and growth to strengthen and stabilise the country.
Italy ought to steer EU policies toward Tunisia, forging a new path by working alongside the private sector to devise innovative approaches for fostering democracy and economic growth. Just as Tunisia shouldn't adopt economic reforms simply due to "foreign diktats" but to revive its economy and generate employment, the journey toward democracy should not occur as a result of "blatant foreign interferences"[8] but because it aligns with the Tunisian people's desire for a better life.
Italy could also call upon the European Commission to reallocate the 60 million euros returned by Tunisia to DG Near[9] to a technological co-development fund. This fund could be channelled through European financial institutions and entrepreneurial development banks and serve as a leverage for financing and developing innovative and technology-oriented Tunisian companies. As highlighted recently, this could be a concrete outcome;[10] it could be an easy, quick win to implement and additional proof that the EU genuinely seeks to assist the Tunisian economy. Supporting young, innovative entrepreneurs should become the European mantra. It could be translated to a stronger cooperation on research, education and culture, as well as developing talent partnerships, opening up new opportunities for skills development and mobility for youth.
Introducing a special visa for entrepreneurs and service providers to facilitate Tunisians' mobility within the EU and people-to-people contact would also be reciprocally beneficial.
In addition, there is an urgent need to broaden the range of financing and support mechanisms for innovative entrepreneurship, because, on one hand, this sector contributes to local prosperity through the development of technology and intellectual property. On the other hand, it attracts both local and international talent, effectively mitigating the brain drain phenomenon that has reached alarming levels in Tunisia.
Such collaborative efforts can help Tunisia ride out the multicrisis and mitigate the multiple shocks and socio-economic situation. Supporting Tunisian cross-border innovative firms will not exacerbate competition in Europe but will add efficiency and competitiveness to the continent's industry as a whole and create synergies and new opportunities for both.Looking ahead
Failure to implement the long-term structural reforms required to transform a rent-seeking and state-dominated economy into a modern one that embraces both digital and ecological transformation and recognise the salutary impact of competition and private enterprise is the major cause of Tunisia's ills. Today, Tunisia is at the mercy of external shocks, such as a steep increase in oil prices or a severe agricultural crisis due to the drought that has been affecting the country for the past five years.
Against this backdrop, an agreement with the IMF has become inevitable. It is a question of time. The President knows it, and he is confronted with the formidable challenge of articulating this deal to the Tunisian public without jeopardising his image and the narrative he has crafted. Saied leverages storytelling and populism to bolster his popularity, which makes it challenging for him to contradict his stance by accepting foreign diktats.
The time for reflection has elapsed, and the Tunisian President is dithering, playing a wrong tune, like in Goethe's popular poem, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice". The latter has filled the vacuum left by the lack of foresight from the EU concerning Tunisia and its broader southern neighbourhood, compounded by the belief that a strongman could be instrumental in handling migration and serving other EU interests.
If the Tunisian President persists in refusing any economic reform as well as the IMF and EU assistance, the awakening will be even harsher when the populist bubble bursts.Ghazi Ben Ahmed is Founder and President of the Mediterranean Development Initiative.[1] Tarek Amara, "Tunisia President Rejects IMF 'Diktats', Casting Doubt on Bailout", in Reuters, 6 April 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/tunisian-president-rejects-imf-dictats-says-public-peace-not-game-2023-04-06; Souhail Karam, "Tunisian Bonds Plunge After Leader Rejects IMF's 'Diktats'", in Bloomberg, 6 April 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-04-06/tunisia-leader-rejects-imf-s-diktats-preaches-self-reliance.[2] European External Action Service, Foreign Affairs Council: Press Remarks by High Representative Josep Borrell at the Press Conference, Brussels, 20 March 2023, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/427338_en.[3] AFP, "IMF: Potential Bailout of Tunisia in Question", in VOA Africa, 26 July 2023, https://www.voaafrica.com/a/7198521.html.[4] Francesca Ebel, "Tunisia: President Vows to Fight Corruption, Retrieve Stolen Money", in Middle East Eye, 29 July 2021, https://www.middleeasteye.net/node/221026.[5] Hayet Kaddachi and Naceur Ben Zina, "The Impact of Corruption on Economic Growth in Tunisia: Application of ARDL Approach", in MPRA Papers, October 2022, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/114869.[6] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Tunisia. A Reform Agenda to Support Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth", in Better Policies Series, March 2015, https://www.oecd.org/economy/Tunisia-a-reform-agenda-to-support-competitiveness-and-inclusive-growth.pdf.[7] "Tunisia: Italy's Historical Result which Confirms Itself as the First Trading Partner ahead of France and Germany", in Agenzia Nova, 20 December 2022, https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/?p=166840.[8] "Kaïs Saïed rejette «l'ingérence flagrante de l'étranger» dans les affaires de la Tunisie", in Kapitalis, 21 April 2023, https://kapitalis.com/tunisie/?p=7549399.[9] Jorge Liboreiro, "In Stunning Move, Tunisia Snubs Brussels and Refunds €60 Million in EU Aid", in Euronews, 12 October 2023, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/10/12/in-stunning-move-tunisia-snubs-brussels-and-refunds-60-million-in-eu-aid.[10] CDP and SIMEST, Italy Meets Africa: Leveraging the Private Sector in Africa. Business Opportunities for African and Italian Companies (video), 7 November 2023, https://businessmatching.cdp.it/en/dashboard/events/italy-meets-africa-leveraging-the-private-sector-in-africa?id=84.

Tutkimuskohteena Emmanuel Macron on mielenkiintoinen ja jopa historiallinen hahmo. Macron oli valituksi tullessaan Ranskan nuorin johtaja Napoleon Bonaparten jälkeen. Macron oli niin ikään kokematon ja lähes tuntematon poliitikko, joka oli asettunut ensimmäistä kertaa ehdolle ylipäätänsä missään vaaleissa ja joka valittiin ensimmäisenä kansanliikkeen ehdokkaana Ranskan viidennen tasavallan kahdeksanneksi presidentiksi. Macronin vaalivoittojen jälkeen Ranskan vanhat mahtipuolueet tasavaltalaiset ja sosialistit olivat menettäneet täydellisesti asemansa maan tosiasiallisina hallitsijoina. Lyhyesti sanottuna: Macron toteutti täydellisen demokraattisen vallankaappauksen, jollaista kukaan ei ollut kyennyt ennakoimaan vielä vuotta aikaisemmin. Tässä lyhyesti faktat, jotka innoittivat minua tekemään väitöstutkimuksen Macronista liittyen nimenomaan hänen politiikkaansa ja poliittiseen ajatteluunsa. Varsinaisesta vaalitutkimuksesta ei siis ole kysymys, koska minua kiinnosti päästä kiinni eniten Macronin politiikan ja arvomaailman ydinkysymyksiin. Väitöskirjani nimen otsikko Ideologioiden tuolla puolen? perustui useisiin ristiriitaisiin näkemyksiin, jotka olivat ympäröivät presidenttiä koko hänen verraten lyhyen poliittisen uransa ajan. Äärivasemmisto ja äärioikeisto näkivät Macronin ehdokkaana ja poliitikkona, joka edusti uusliberalismia ja hallitsematonta globalisaatiota, jossa suuryritysten ja EU:n edut olivat etusijalla Ranskan kansallisten etujen sijaan. Macronia on myös kuvailtu populismiin taipuvaiseksi ideologialtaan ohueksi poliitikoksi, jonka kritiikki vanhojen poliittisten puolueiden ja poliitikkojen edustamaa elitismiä kohtaan ei ollut uskottavaa. Maltillinen oikeisto puolestaan kommentoi Macronia vuoden 2017 vaalien aikana presidentti Francois Hollanden epäonnistuneen hallinnon jatkeena ja edustajana. Keltaliiviliikkeen mielenosoituksissa Macronia syytettiin myös rikkaiden presidentiksi, joka oli unohtanut tavallisten ranskalaisten arkipäivän ongelmat tarjoten avokätisiä verohelpotuksia jo ennestään varakkaille kansalaisille ja yrityksille. Koska ristiriitoja oli huomattavan paljon jo pelkästään Macronin vastustajien suunnalta, oli aiheellista pohtia voiko Emmanuel Macronia arvioida perinteisellä oikeisto–vasemmisto ulottuvuudella vai pitäisikö häntä sen sijaan lähestyä kokonaan uudella tavalla? Tämä on toinen syy, miksi nimesin tutkimukseni ensimmäisiksi sanoiksi jo mainitun Ideologioiden tuolla puolen. Edellä mainittujen väitteiden ja näkemysten perusteella lähtökohtani oli pohtia Macronin politiikkaa ja ajattelua perinteisen ja dogmaattisen tavan sijaan tavalla, joka edustaisi myös Macronin henkilökohtaisia näkemyksiä ja lausuntoja ideologioiden ja politiikan suhteesta. Tässä kohtaa löysin Macronin ajattelussa yhtymäkohdan politiikan teoreetikon Michael Freedenin ajatteluun ideologioista, liberalismista ja niiden merkityksestä nykyisessä maailmassa ja politiikassa. Edellä mainittuihin seikkoihin perustuen, oli luonnollista, että lähestyisin Macronin politiikkaa pääosin retorisen analyysin avulla. Retorinen analyysi oli luonnollinen valinta myös sen vuoksi, koska suurin osa tutkimusaineistosta oli Macronin kampanjan aikana ja valituksi tulemisen jälkeen pitämiä puheita ja muita julkisia kannanottoja. Toinen tärkeä syy menetelmäni takana oli luonnollisesti itse ranskalainen poliittinen kulttuuri ja historia. Ranskassa politiikassa on aina korostunut poliitikon ja varsinkin presidentin kyky esiintyä ja käyttää erilaisia retorisia keinoja vakuuttaessaan kansalaiset vaalien aikana, mutta myös vaalien jälkeen. Edellä mainitut taidot ovat olleet myös poliittisen menestyksen ja uskottavuuden perusedellytys. Tutkimuksen kaksi tärkeintä teoriaa ovat saksalaisen politiikantutkijan ja sosiologin Ulrich Beckin luoma riskiyhteiskunta, jota seuraa Anthony Giddensin luoma kolmannen tien poliittinen teoria. Beckin globaali näkemys oli, että vanhat perinteiset instituutiot (kirkko, poliittiset puolueet, perhe, ammatit) ja niiden asema ovat rapautuneet, mikä on lisännyt epävarmuutta esimerkiksi työmarkkinoille ja kansalaisten henkilökohtaiseen elämään liittyen. Beckin teorian mukaan vakituisten työpaikkojen määrä vähentyy edelleen ja erilaiset määräaikaiset ja epätyypilliset työsuhteet yleistyvät tulevaisuudessa entistä enemmän ja vastuu menestymisestä tai menestymättömyydestä on aina selätetty kuitenkin aina yksilölle itselleen. Toinen tärkeä ilmiö liittyy globalisaation ja riskiyhteiskunnan väliseen suhteeseen, jossa päätökset mm. paikallisten työpaikkojen säilymisestä voidaan tehdä tuhansien kilometrien päässä itse tarkasteltavasta maasta. Riski-yhteiskunnan myötä globaaliksi ilmiöksi on tullut myös edelleen kasvanut riski ajautua työttömyyteen, ja tämä koskee myös useita akateemisia ammatteja. Kolmannen tien politiikan teoria oli luonnollinen valinta tutkimukselleni, koska Macronin poliittinen ajattelu perustui kolmeen kolmannen tien keskeiseen pilariin, joissa työ, yrittäjyys ja henkilökohtainen vastuu olivat politiikan lähtökohtia yhdessä markkina myönteisen ajattelun kanssa. Macron siis haastoi myös perinteisen ranskalaisen etatistisen eli valtiovetoisen talousajattelun, jossa pro-business-ajattelu hallitsi taloutta ja talousympäristöä ja jossa usein valtio-omisteiset yritykset olivat nauttineet usein valtion avokätisestä tuesta ja asemasta suhteessa pienempiin toimijoihin. Macronin mukaan säännöt tulisi olla kaikille samat ja tämä koski myös digitaalisia jättiläisiä (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple), joiden verovälttelyyn presidentti Macron on halunnut puuttua kovalla kädellä. Edellä mainittujen yksityiskohtien perusteella Macronin politiikka lähestyi Britannian entisen pääministerin Tony Blairin (1997–2007) politiikkaa, jossa kolmannen tien politiikan teoria muodosti keskeisen New Labourin ja Blairin poliittisen ja ideologisen sisällön. Macron halusi myös puuttua ranskalaisen yhteiskunnan ruohonjuuritason epäkohtiin, jotka ovat aiheuttaneet paljon negatiivisia seurauksia viimeisen kolmen vuosikymmenen aikana. Viimeksi mainittuun kuuluu pitkäaikaistyöttömyys, köyhyys ja yhteiskunnallinen syrjäytyminen. Tarkemmin sanottuna ruohonjuuritason ongelmiin puuttuminen tarkoitti sitä, että Ranskan hallitus ja Macronin hallinto olivat valmiita tekemään suuria investointeja peruskoulutukseen ja alueille, jotka olivat kärsineet eniten mm. heikosta opetuksesta ja tuetun opetuksen vähyydestä. Tasavallan presidentti kyseenalaisti myös Ranskan korkeakoulujen nykytilan ja tulokset. Macron oli huolissaan opintojensa keskeyttäneistä opiskelijoista ja hän näki myös, että Ranskassa oli vanhoja elitistisiä instituutioita, kuten ENA (National School of Administration), jotka eivät palvelleet maan etua tulevaisuudessa. Macronin ajattelussa oli myös useita yhtymäkohtia Ranskan myöhäiseen valistukseen ja erityisesti filosofien ja poliitikkojen Francois Guizot'n ja Benjamin Constantin ajatuksiin, joihin Macronin ajattelua peilasin. Macronin, Guizot'n ja Constantin ajatukset koskivat erityisesti työn, koulutuksen ja ammatin roolia yhteiskunnallisen edistyksen takaajana. Myös poliitikkojen rooli eräänlaisena roolimallina kansalaisten edessä yhdisti niin Macronia, kuin Constantia ja Guizot'a toisiinsa. Macron nosti esiin kampanjansa aikana useasti Ranskan poliittisen järjestelmän ongelmat, jossa poliitikot käyttivät hyväkseen järjestelmän porsaanreikiä ajaessaan omia ja intressipiiriensä etuja. Viime vuosituhannen ajattelijoista nostan esiin Ranskan liberaalien kärkinimen Raymond Aronin ja Macronin mentorin Paul Ricœurin. Aronia, Ricœuria ja Macronia yhdisti kiinnostavalla tavalla kriittisyys ideologiota kohtaan ja totuuden ensisijaisuus politiikan keskeisenä hyveenä. ; As an object of research Emmanuel Macron makes an interesting, and even a historic figure. The youngest leader of France since Napoleon Bonaparte, he was an inexperienced and almost unknown politician, when elected as the President of the Republic from neither of the two traditional parties. Emmanuel Macron was a political actor and a candidate of a new unknown political movement, which he founded alone only about a year before the Presidential elections. The name of my dissertation Beyond Ideologies? Risk Society in Emmanuel Macron's Reformist Politics is based on the several contradictory views that have surrounded Macron since the very beginning of Macron's career. The far left and the far right saw Macron as a candidate and politician who represented neoliberalism, and uncontrolled globalisation, in which the interests of big business and interests of the EU had priority instead of the French national interests. Macron has also been described as a politician with a thin ideology prone to populism, whose critique of the elitism represented by the old political parties and politicians was not credible. The moderate right, in turn, commented on Macron during the 2017 election as an extension and representative of President François Hollande's administration. During protests of the Yellow Vest movement, Macron was also accused of being the President of the rich, who had forgotten the everyday problems of ordinary French people and offered generous tax reliefs to the already wealthy citizens and companies. These were the main reasons behind my motivation to study Macron. Given all this controversy it was relevant to ask: is it even possible to evaluate Macron in terms of classical French ideologies or should his politics be approached in a whole new way? That is the second reason why I have named my research first: Beyond Ideologies. Starting point was to reflect on Macron's politics and thinking without resorting to the traditional and dogmatic approaches, in a way which would also represent his personal views and his statements about the relationship between ideologies and politics. Related to the previous it was relevant that I would approach Macron's politics using mainly rhetorical analysis as most of the research material consisted of the speeches and other public declarations Macron made during his campaign, and after he entered into the office in May 2017. The second important reason behind my method was of course the French political culture itself that has always emphasised the politician's ability to use various rhetorical skills and speak well in public debate. The skills have formed a precondition to one's political success and credibility. Two of the most important theories of the research are the risk society created by the German scholar Ulrich Beck and the third way political theory created by Anthony Giddens. Beck's global view was that the fragmentation and lower status of the old institutions (church political parties, family professions) have increased insecurity in the job market and in citizens' lives as the share of permanent jobs has decreased. At the same time the risk of unemployment has increased, and this concerns even academic professions. Third way theory was a natural choice as Macron was for example keen on using public money and investments on basic education and various internships programmes. Education policies were directed especially at suburban areas where the societal challenges were the most difficult. Macron's politics resembled the former Prime Minister of UK Tony Blair's politics where the third way politics was a leading political doctrine. Macron was also keen to intervene into various grass root grievances of French society which have caused a lot of negative consequences during the last three decades such as long term unemployment, poverty and social exclusion. In addition to the French government and Macron's administration making huge investments in basic education. The President of the Republic also questioned the current status and the current results of French higher education. Macron was concerned of the dropout figures and saw also that there existed old elitist institutions, such as ENA (National School of Administration) that did not serve country's interest. As my research continued it became clear quite soon that Macron's values and the goals he presented for France differed from his predecessors, and there were elements France had not actually faced during the political history of the Fifth Republic. Macron's political thinking was based on three pillars where work, entrepreneurship, and personal responsibility were the starting points together with pro-market thinking. Macron challenged also the traditional French statism thinking where the role of state dominated economic activity. One of the negative features was distorted competition with state-owned companies that had governmental support behind them. Specifically, this meant that these companies were able to receive cheap loans and other financial support guaranteed by the government. Macron wanted to create the same rules policy for all in domestic markets and this applied also to the European level. According to Macron GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) companies' tax evasion should be finished. Finally, I included several confluences from the late French Enlightenment where ideas of the philosophers François Guizot and Benjamin Constant ideas influence Macron's thinking. These ideas concerned especially the role of work, education and politicians role models in front of the citizens. A precondition to the fair and civilised society was openness and accountability. One of the typical problems in France has been how the politicians and political parties have used various loopholes in the political system as they have financed their campaigns.

The years after the fall of the USSR were times of great optimism for proponents of constitutional democracy, of a Third Way between market and welfare state, and of a politics of moderation. However, this last decade has seen the emergence of antagonistic forms of politics: left and right populisms, uncompromising forms of free market liberalism, minority rights activism, and a recent nativist explosion that has caught everyone by surprise. We try to understand the ideas behind these phenomena by articulating a conception of political radicalism and of its opposite, political moderation. Radicalism in the past has often been understood as the negative contrary of moderation (especially because of the previous dominance of Marxism as the main paradigm of radical politics). It has been understood as a body of ideas that are opposed to democracy, to the rule of law, to pluralism, or that are in favor of revolution and violence. The new radical trends of today, however, do not seem so straightforwardly anti-democratic or revolutionary as Marxism once was. Instead of defining radicalism "negatively" as a collection of ideas, policies, or attitudes that deviate from a given state of "normality" (such as anti-pluralism, anti-democracy, anti-constitutional aims, or anti-traditionalism), we instead compare it to a literary genre that a group or individual can use in order to create dichotomies and a sense of "us versus them." By describing and analyzing the thoughts of Georg Lukács, Ludwig von Mises, and Ernesto Laclau, we give examples of some "literary genres" (Marxist, free market libertarian, and postmodern), of the tropes they use to establish these dichotomies, and the way they can reinforce their arguments by using these dichotomies. In turn, we try to understand political moderation as an "anti-genre" that breaks with these attempts to create dichotomies. ; Os anos que se seguiram à queda da URSS foram tempos de grande otimismo para os defensores da democracia constitucional, de uma Terceira Via entre o mercado e o Estado social e de políticas de compromisso. Nesta última década surgiram, porém, vários movimentos políticos antagónicos que vieram abalar este status-quo: populismos de esquerda e de direita, ideologias a favor da completa liberalização do mercado, movimentos ativistas a favor dos direitos das minorias e até uma explosão "nacionalista" que apanhou o Ocidente de surpresa. O presente projeto de investigação visa estudar algumas das ideias por detrás destes fenómenos. Neste estudo, esboçamos dois conceitos para tentar perceber melhor esta nova situação: uma conceção de radicalismo político e uma conceção de moderação política. O radicalismo político foi frequentemente entendido como o contrário da moderação, pois o radicalismo era frequentemente definido à luz do paradigma dominante naquela altura, o marxismo. O radicalismo era entendido como um conjunto de ideias que se opõem à democracia, ao Estado de Direito, ao pluralismo—ou que são a favor da revolução e da violência. As novas tendências radicais de hoje, no entanto, não parecem tão antidemocráticas ou revolucionárias como o marxismo. Uma conceção diferente de radicalismo pode ajudar a entender as ideias por detrás desses movimentos. E essas ideias podem ser melhor compreendidas se conseguirmos caracterizar o radicalismo por si mesmo, de forma substantiva, em alternativa a um agregado de políticas, ideias e atitudes, como o anti-pluralismo, anti-democracia, anti-tradicionalismo, ou em vez de recorrer a outros critérios que definem o radicalismo como um desvio em relação a um certo estado de "normalidade". Podemos compreender melhor estes novos movimentos radicais contemporâneos se olharmos para a maneira como criam dicotomias e desenvolvem um sentimento de "nós" contra "eles". Defendemos neste trabalho que as abordagens do radicalismo que o tendem a definir negativamente, identificando o que este rejeita, podem ser complementadas com uma abordagem mais "positiva" que analisa o que o radicalismo oferece. Sugerimos ainda na sequência desta 10 investigação que poderíamos entender a moderação política como um conjunto de meios que tentam romper com as tentativas extremistas ou radicais de criar dicotomias. No decurso deste estudo, começamos por descrever as variadas formas como o radicalismo e o extremismo têm sido teorizados recentemente. De seguida, vemos como, subjacente à conceção de radicalismo que estamos a tentar evitar (como um desvio em relação a determinada forma de normalidade), parece haver uma abordagem bottom-up que tenta identificar as componentes constituintes do "radicalismo" (ideias, políticas ou atitudes). Nessa abordagem de baixo para cima, o grau de radicalidade do objeto de estudo é avaliado pelos elementos radicais (ideias, políticas ou atitudes) que comporta e pela sua intensidade. Em vez de considerar o radicalismo em termos de elementos constituintes, ou em alternativa, em função da dimensão da mudança social que os radicais propõem, argumenta-se nesta dissertação que se deve adotar uma abordagem top-down (de cima para baixo), quando analisamos o grau de dependência de um argumento em relação a uma narrativa radical que opera em segundo plano. Designa-se esta abordagem, de modo metafórico, como "literária": como um género literário. Os radicalismos (como o marxismo, mas outros também) podem ser vistos como histórias "familiares" cujas referências "literárias" ("a burguesia", "o trabalhador", "a revolução") podem ser usadas como indicações que apontam para a história do movimento marxista, tal podendo reforçar os argumentos de quem a utiliza. Dentro deste paradigma, quando um "autor" usa o "género" do radicalismo, os "leitores" situam-se e condicionam as suas expectativas em função de uma história cujo enredo contém dois lados, uma situação presente insatisfatória, e uma solução para resolvê-la que leva a um "final" do enredo em que a solução insatisfatória é resolvida. No exemplo clássico do marxismo, temos uma história tão conhecida que esta pode muitas vezes mergulhar intuitivamente o "leitor" na história que lhe é familiar do proletariado, a sua luta contra a burguesia e a crescente opressão de classe que eventualmente leva a uma revolução e traz a instauração do socialismo. Um autor pode usar palavras-chave – a que chamamos referências – da história do marxismo – a que chamamos metanarrativa – para referenciar a história do marxismo e reforçar os seus argumentos. Rotulando um determinado autor, grupo ou argumento como "burguês" ou "reacionário" ou, inversamente, 11 rotulando-o como "proletário" ou "revolucionário", um autor coloca o elemento atribuído num dos dois lados da história do marxismo. Graças a essa atribuição e ao uso desse termo de referência, o leitor é capaz de definir as suas expectativas em conformidade e continuar a ler desse modo, ao mesmo tempo que (1) lê esse argumento condicionado pela metanarrativa do marxismo em segundo plano e (2) que o autor, grupo (ou argumento que o autor acabou de atribuir) está do lado "errado" ou "certo" da história. A fim de aprofundar a noção de radicalismo que esboçamos na primeira parte, exploramos subsequentemente um dos primeiros pensadores que analisaram exaustivamente o marxismo como uma metanarrativa, Eduard Bernstein. Descrevemos as críticas de Bernstein à ortodoxia do SPD e, especialmente, as suas críticas à metanarrativa do marxismo e às suas "referências". No mesmo capítulo, analisamos o argumento oposto de Georg Lukács em História e Consciência de Classe e examinamos a maneira como ele se esforçou por reconectar as diferentes partes da metanarrativa do marxismo que Bernstein separou (referências como "ciência", "totalidade", "classe", "proletariado" e "revolução"). Com essa reconstrução, Lukács tentou abafar o ceticismo de Bernstein e gerar novamente uma história com dois lados. Graças a essa metanarrativa binária e estruturante que guia o "texto" político e as expectativas do leitor, Lukács é capaz de fazer saltos inferenciais rápidos de uma referência para a seguinte. Analisamos especificamente seções da História e Consciência de Classe, onde esses saltos são evidentes. Graças a tal metanarrativa de fundo, Lukács consegue utilizar duas estratégias centrais do género radical: usa essa metanarrativa para excluir elementos que são relegados para o lado "burguês" da história do marxismo (por exemplo, afirmando que Bernstein era "burguês" porque adotou uma pseudociência burguesa) ou consegue fazer alinhamentos com o lado "socialista" da história (por exemplo, dizendo que Rosa Luxemburgo era "marxista" porque adotou a verdadeira ciência marxista). Para entender completamente a noção de radicalismo político no sentido de género "literário" e como pode ser usada por outros, analisamos com detalhe e profundidade dois autores que constroem extensivamente o seu pensamento político dentro do que caracterizámos como "género radical". Primeiro, analisa-se como Ludwig von Mises constrói uma metanarrativa radical na qual opõe o liberalismo, a ciência e a 12 racionalidade ao socialismo, à pseudociência e à irracionalidade. Como no caso de Lukács, analisa-se cuidadosamente como os termos de cada "lado da história" estão ligados a tal ponto que Mises é capaz de ligar perfeitamente um termo ao outro sem interromper a "leitura" da sua teoria ou narrativa. Também analisamos um segundo aspeto que permite essa leitura subtil, que é a maneira como Mises é capaz de opor estritamente cada grupo de termos. É graças ao facto de Mises estar a escrever tendo em mente uma narrativa com dois lados que o seu "leitor" é capaz de fazer a transição de uma referência para outra. Graças a essa dicotomia como plano de fundo dos seus textos, Mises usa referências em rápida sucessão e enquadra o seu argumento numa estrutura rígida, dicotómica, enquanto continuamos a lê-lo ininterruptamente. Também tentamos perceber qual a metanarrativa subjacente de Mises e as referências que esta produz e que podem ser usadas por outros autores que partilham a metanarrativa liberal. Depois de explorar as metanarrativas de Lukács e Mises abordamos a metanarrativa anti-essencialista de Ernesto Laclau. Procedemos de maneira semelhante ao que fizemos com Mises e descrevemos como Laclau constrói uma "narrativa de narrativas" formalizando cada passo da história do marxismo. Em seguida, examinamos mais de perto como a metanarrativa de Laclau funciona na prática e analisamos como seu anti-essencialismo é uma fonte de muitas operações de exclusão através do uso da referência "essencialismo". Abordamos especificamente a maneira pela qual a metanarrativa de Laclau permite que utilize um tom iconoclástico nos seus escritos. Ao descrever a ingenuidade das crenças essencialistas dos seus opositores, Laclau é capaz de criar uma linha dicotómica de "tudo-ou-nada", enquanto passa de uma referência para a seguinte. Na mesma linha, também usamos essa abordagem "literária" para ver como se pode entender a moderação política. Tenta-se muito brevemente observar a moderação política como um género "anti-género" (anti-utopia, anti-dualismo, etc.): a expectativa que transmite é a da crítica a um corpus "literário" estabelecido, do qual no fim de contas está dependente para transmitir o seu distinto sentimento de expectativa. Muitos elementos da literatura e da retórica moderadas parecem apresentar esse mesmo padrão duplo, tal como "ironia" enquanto género ou tendências literárias "realistas". Para ganhar força, os recursos literários da 13 moderação dependem de um corpus preexistente em relação ao qual (ou contra o qual) obtêm a sua própria eficácia. Caracterizamos a moderação política, pois, como consistindo essencialmente na crítica e prevenção de uma metanarrativa extrema, a fim de romper os alinhamentos e as suas referências. A moderação, portanto, induz ou produz efeitos forçosamente recorrendo a expectativas de outras metanarrativas estabelecidas e, em seguida, oferecendo expectativas em que as referências dessas metanarrativas são separadas. Para exemplificar o "género político" da moderação, descrevemos sucintamente esta característica específica que atravessa o pensamento de alguns liberais da Guerra Fria, e especialmente de Raymond Aron.

Tutkimus pureutuu poliittisen edustuksen käsitteeseen, keskittyen erityisesti edustuksen ja demokratian yhteyteen. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan teoreettisessa ajattelussa tapahtunutta siirtymää siitä, että edustus ymmärretään edustuksellisen demokratian kontekstissa siihen, että edustus ymmärretään ideaksi ja prosessiksi, joka on demokratialle välttämätön. Tätä siirtymää analysoidaan ja kehitetään eteenpäin tarkastelemalla Talvivaaran kaivoksen ympärille kehkeytynyttä poliittista toimintaa ja edustuspuhetta. Vaaleja, edustajien responsiivisuutta edustettaville, universaalia äänioikeutta ja tasa-arvoa pidetään tavallisesti edustuksellisen demokratian tunnusmerkkeinä. Tässä katsannossa edustuksen demokraattisuuden katsotaan toteutuvan, kun vaaleilla valitut edustajat pidetään mahdollisimman lähellä heidät auktorisoineita kansalaisia. Tämä läheisyys on tarkoittanut muun muassa sitä, että lainsäätäjien päätöksiltä vaaditaan vastaavuutta kansalaisten mielipiteiden kanssa, että päättäjien pitäisi olla vastaanottavaisia (responsiivisia) kansalaisilta tuleville ärsykkeille, ja että kansanedustuslaitos olisi kansan pienoiskuva suhteessa erinäisiin sosio-demografisiin piirteisiin. Edustusta sinänsä ei pidetä demokraattisena, ellei se seuraa vaaleista ja ellei yllä kuvailtu läheisyys edustajien ja edustettavien välillä toteudu. Demokratiateoriassa on kuitenkin viimeisen 20 vuoden aikana tapahtunut niin sanottu edustuskäänne, tai konstruktivistinen käänne. Sen keskeinen huomio on, että edustus ei ole demokratian välttämätön lisäke vaan demokratia itse asiassa edellyttää edustusta. Tällä ei kuitenkaan viitata elitistiseen, schumpeterilaiseen, näkemykseen edustuksellisesta demokratiasta eikä siihen, että suuret yhteiskunnat voisivat olla demokraattisia vain edustuksen kautta. Sen sijaan edustuksen katsotaan mahdollistavan kommunikaation ja symbolit, joiden seurauksena edustettava kokonaisuus muodostuu. Edustus ymmärretään siis ennen kaikkea ajatukseksi eikä institutionaaliseksi muodoksi. Edustamisväitteillä (representative claims; Saward 2006; 2010) sekä edustaja että edustettava rakennetaan symbolisesti. Nämä väitteet ovat vääjäämättä valikoivia, esteettisiä ja performatiivisia. Tämä edustuksen esteettinen ominaisuus tekee vallankäytöstä näkyvää ja kutsuu kontrolloimaan sitä. Edustamisväitteiden tekemistä ei kuitenkaan tule ymmärtää vaaleilla valittujen edustajien yksinoikeudeksi, vaan niiden tekeminen on auki kaikille subjekteille. Edustamisväitteet mahdollistavat erilaiset käsitykset 'meistä' ja 'meidän' eduistamme ja näiden käsitysten keskinäisen kamppailun, mikä on välttämätöntä demokraattisen politiikan jatkuvuudelle. Monet empiiriset tutkimukset ovat ottaneet edustuskäänteen lähtökohdakseen. Koska siirtymä uuteen teoreettiseen ymmärrykseen on tapahtunut verrattain hiljattain, empiiriset tutkimukset eivät kuitenkaan muodosta vielä yhtenäistä tutkimusperinnettä. Edistääkseen edustuskäännettä seuraavaa edustustutkimusta, esitetään kaksiosainen tutkimusongelma: (1) Mitä oikeastaan tutkimme, kun tutkimme edustusta? ja (2) Mikä tekee edustuksesta demokraattista? Näitä kahta kysymystä tarkastellaan sekä teoreettisesti että tutkimalla edustuspuhetta (representational speech) käyttäen Talvivaaraa tapaustutkimuksena. Edustuspuhe on laajempi käsite kuin Sawardin edustamisväite, ja sillä viitataan mihin tahansa lausumiin ja (esimerkiksi visuaalisiin) symboleihin, joilla rakennetaan edustajaa ja edustettavaa tietynlaisiksi. Edustuspuheen käsitteeseen sisältyy myös eksplisiittinen puhe edustuksesta ja sen merkityksistä. Aiempien teoreettisten keskusteluiden pohjalta tutkimuksessa esitetään, että edustus toimii demokratian ehtona erityisesti siksi, että (1) se on epäsuoraa ja mahdollistaa siten kommunikaation; (2) se mahdollistaa symboliset esitykset edustajasta, edustettavasta ja todellisuudesta, eikä siten ole vain kahdenvälinen suhde; ja (3) se näin ollen mahdollistaa politiikan. Demokratia ei ole mahdollista ilman politiikkaa. Tätä teoreettista näkemystä tarkastellaan edelleen Talvivaaran tapauksen valossa. Tapaustutkimuksen aineisto koostuu 41 haastattelusta ministerin, kansanedustajien, kunnanvaltuutettujen, viranhaltijoiden, kansalaistoimijoiden ja Talvivaara-yhtiön edustajien kanssa. Aineistoon sisältyy myös osallistuvaa havainnointia mielenosoituksista, kansalaiskokoontumisista ja paneelikeskustelusta, hallinnollisia lausuntoja ja virallisia tiedotteita, eduskuntalähteitä (kirjallisia kysymyksiä, talousarvio- ja lisätalousarvioaloitteita sekä täysistunnon pöytäkirjoja) sekä Stop Talvivaara -liikkeen tiedotteita ja YouTube-videoita aikaväliltä 2005–2015. Tapaustutkimus havainnollistaa teoriaa käytännössä. Tutkimus osoittaa, että edustuksen (edustuspuheen) tutkiminen johtaa huomaamaan poliittisen toiminnan reunaehdot ja ymmärtämään, mitkä tekijät ovat tärkeitä toimijoiden legitimiteetille tietyssä kontekstissa. Talvivaaran kaivoksen kontekstissa oli paradoksaalista, että kansalaistoimijoilta edellytettiin paikallisuutta, vaikka sekä vaaleilla valitut että muut toimijat laajasti arvioivat, että Talvivaara oli kansallinen kysymys. Kansalaistoimijoiden edustamisväitteet näyttäytyivät marginaalisilta korostaessaan ympäristönäkökulmaa. Sen sijaan kansanedustajien edustamisväitteet olivat monin paikoin ympäripyöreitä ja reaktiivisia, pyrkien löytämään kultaisen keskitien. Edustamisväitteet mahdollistivat 'meidän' tulkinnan niin, että tästä tulkinnasta saattoi vetää johtopäätöksiä siitä, mitä tulisi poliittisesti päättää. Samalla edustamisväitteet paljastivat syvempiä jaettuja merkityksiä, joissa talouteen viittaavat argumentit olivat hegemonisempia kuin ympäristöön viittaavat. Tutkimuksen tulokset haastavat perinteisen edustustutkimuksen siinä, että perinteinen tutkimus jakaa edustusfokukset vaalipiiriin, koko valtioon ja puolueeseen. Tapaustutkimus osoittaa, että paikallisten ja kansallisten intressien määritelmät ovat poliittisia ja ne esitetään tietyllä tavalla riippuen puhujan poliittisista kannoista. Edustuspuheeseen liittyy merkityksiä, jotka johdattavat poliittisten (puolue)kantojen äärelle, mutta nämä kannat perustellaan puoluetta useammin viittauksilla paikallisiin tai kansallisiin etuihin. Samalla edustuspuhe tarjoaa näennäisesti neutraalin tavan puhua poliittisesti. 'Kaikkia' väitetään edustettavan, mutta mitä etuja 'kaikkiin' liitetään, riippuu puhujan poliittisista kannoista ja siitä, miten hän esittää käsillä olevan poliittisen kysymyksen. Viittaamalla 'kaikkiin' mahdollistuu poliittisten päämäärien ja ideologioiden kommunikointi tavalla, jonka kuulija voi hyväksyä mahdollisesti helpostikin. Edustamisväitteillä pystyy 'myymään' poliittisia näkökantoja yleisölle. Edustuspuhe onkin kaksiteräinen miekka: se toisaalta mahdollistaa demokratialle tarpeellisen väittelyn 'meistä' ja 'meidän' eduistamme, mutta samalla mahdollistaa poliittisuuden hämärtämisen edellä kuvatulla tavalla. Tämä edellyttää yleisöltä taitoa lukea edustamisväitteitä. Valpas yleisö tunnistaa edustamisväitteet ja pystyy arvioimaan niitä kriittisesti. Epävalpas yleisö sen sijaan ei ymmärrä edustamisväitteiden vääjäämätöntä osittaisuutta ja sitä, että mikään edustamisväite ei ole lopullinen totuus 'meistä'. Epävalppaan yleisön ollessa kyseessä edustamisväitteet avaavat tilaa populismille. Talvivaara-tapaustutkimus vahvistaa Dischin (2011) esittämän käsityksen, että demokraattisesta näkökulmasta normatiivista empiiristä tutkimusta tehdessä on kiinnitettävä huomiota edustamisväitteiden tekijöiden institutionaalisiin positioihin. Tutkimus ehdottaakin, että edustuksen demokraattisuuden tutkijoiden tulee huomioida positiot, joista edustamisväitteitä esitetään, eikä tarkastella vain yleisesti edustamisväitteiden moninaisuutta. Näin ollen tutkijoiden tulisi olla kiinnostuneita myös ei-vaaleilla valittujen toimijoiden tekemistä edustamisväitteistä ja näiden väitteiden suhteesta vaaleilla valittujen toimijoiden edustamisväitteisiin. Edustuspuheen tutkiminen paljastaa valtasuhteita, joiden analyysi on välttämätöntä poliittisen edustuksen tutkijoille. ; The dissertation studies the concept of political representation. Specifically, it examines the connection between representation and democracy. It discusses the shift in theoretical thinking from understanding representation in the context of representative democracies to understanding representation as an idea and process necessary for democracy. This shift is analyzed and developed further by an examination of politics and representational speech during the Talvivaara mine controversy in Finland. In the standard (traditional) account, elections, responsiveness of elected representatives to citizens, universal suffrage, and equality are understood as characteristic to representative democracies. In this account, normative requirements for democratic representation arise from keeping elected representatives and the represented as close to each other as possible. This requires congruence between the decisions of legislators and the opinions of citizens, responsiveness of the representatives to the represented, and descriptive similarity between the two in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. Representation as such is not held to be democratic unless representation emerges from elections and the closeness between representatives and the represented is realized. The representative, or constructivist, turn in democratic theory argues otherwise. This turn in theoretical thinking on representation has taken place over the last 20 years or so. Its central observation is that representation is not second-best to direct democracy, but democracy in fact presupposes representation. However, this argument refers neither to the elitist Schumpeterian view of representative democracy nor to the notion that representation would be the only imaginable way of organizing government in large-scale societies. Instead, it views democracy as an idea rather than an institutional form, in which representation allows for communication and symbols through which the represented constituency emerges. In making representative claims (Saward 2006; 2010), both the representative and the represented are constructed. These claims are necessarily selective, aesthetic, and performative. This aesthetic quality of representation makes power visible and invites control over it. According to this view, claims-making should not be understood as a privilege of the elected, but as open to anyone. Claims make it possible to create and contest portrayals of 'us', and thus sustain democratic politics. While there have been numerous empirical studies departing from this account, these studies point to different directions in terms of how to bring the theoretical turn into (normative) empirical research. This thesis aims to contribute to this state of affairs by addressing two research questions: (1) What do we study when we study representation after the representative turn? and (2) What makes representation democratic? These questions are addressed by studying representational speech. Representational speech is a broader concept than the representative claim. It refers to anything that can be interpreted as constructing a represented category or presenting someone as a representative. Speech about political representation is also included under the umbrella term of representational speech. The dissertation takes the representative turn further by clarifying, confirming, and defining its assertions. Based on analysis of previous theoretical accounts, it is argued that representation functions as a precondition for democracy through its indirectness. It invites communication and symbolic action, and makes politics possible. This theoretical account is further examined in the Talvivaara case study. The case study data consists of 41 interviews with a minister, MPs, local councilors, public officials, civic actors, and Talvivaara representatives. The data also includes participatory observation of demonstrations, citizen assemblies, and a panel discussion, ministerial and administrative statements, parliamentary sources (written questions, budgetary and supplementary budgetary motions, and parliamentary minutes), as well as press releases and YouTube videos by the Stop Talvivaara movement between 2005 and 2015. The case study provides an example of an application of a theory, and is illustrative, or exemplifying, in nature. The case study shows that studying representation (through representational speech) leads to unraveling institutional terms for political action and to understanding what factors are relevant for gaining legitimacy in a specific context. In the context of the Talvivaara mine, it was paradoxical that locality was required from civic actors as a proof of their legitimacy, whilst actors across the political landscape, both elected and non-elected, viewed the Talvivaara case a national issue. At the same time, representative claims made by civic actors were marginal in their emphasis on the environment, as opposed to the rather vague, reactive, and middle-of-the-road representative claims made by MPs. While representative claims allow an interpretation of 'us' that sets the stage for immediate decisions, studying representational speech reveals deeper shared meanings. In the context of Talvivaara, economic arguments were privileged over environmental concerns. The findings of the dissertation challenge traditional representation research that separates electoral district, the party and the nation as representational foci. The case study shows that local and national interests are political matters. How they are represented and defined depends on political standpoints. Representational speech carries meanings that can be traced back to political (party) standpoints. However, these standpoints are often backed with references to local and national interests rather than party affiliations. At the same time, representational speech offers a neutral way to speak politically. 'Everybody' is claimed to be represented, but 'everybody's' interests and how these interests are best served depends on the speaker's political standpoints and representations of the issue. The reference to 'everybody' allows communication of political aims and ideologies in ways that can potentially be accepted quite easily. Claiming to represent 'the people' works as a way to 'sell' policy standpoints to the public. Indeed, representational speech is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, speaking 'representationally' opens space for debates about who 'we' are and what is important to 'us'. On the other, representative claims offer ways to communicate political standpoints in a seemingly neutral way. This requires that audiences be attentive. A politically attentive audience recognizes representative claims and is able to assess whether the portrayal of 'us' is desirable or not. But a politically inattentive audience fails to see that representative claims are necessarily selective and not the final truth about 'us'. If the audience is inattentive, individual representative claims can open space for populism. The case study confirms Disch's (2011) argument that the institutional positions of would-be representatives need to be included when the representative turn is applied to normative empirical research from a democratic perspective. The study of democratic representation should take into account not simply the plurality of representative claims, but the plurality of the positions from which the representative claims are made. This is why representative claims made by non-elected actors and the relationship of these claims vis-à-vis representative claims made by elected actors are worth studying. Addressing representational speech reveals power relations whose analysis is imperative for scholars of political representation.

The virulent strain of nativist, anti-establishment, anti-corporatist and anti-immigrant sentiment is rocking the foundations of traditional party systems in all industrialized democracies. Its causes are many, but in broad terms it is safe to say they surfaced right after the 2008-09 economic collapse, an era that was characterized by intense polarization and confrontational approaches against governments, corporations and financial institutions which crossed party lines and traditional political cleavages. The sweeping changes brought about by globalized capital and corporate interests, and the blurring of national borders that accompanied them, have alienated big swathes of the population and given rise to new forms of strident populism everywhere.In the United States the main manifestation of this phenomenon is taking the form of a populist revolt, a singular form of class warfare inside the Republican Party, between the established party hierarchy and the Tea Party movement.As the next legislative election approaches, the internecine feud within the Republican Party continues to create challenges for its top candidates who must veer more right-wing to secure the nomination and then turn back to the center of American politics to win the general election. Before 2012, the GOP tried to co-opt the extreme right and used their rhetoric, but after the 2012 election losses, the party took uncertain steps to distance itself from the movement. Today, the movement rather than the establishment seems to be dictating the party line, so there is paralysis in Washington once again. The leadership will still have to govern and legislate on some central issues-increase the debt limit, fund the government, and renew the authorization charter of the Export-Import Bank, among other things, and in so doing, further alienate Tea Party voters. The Republican-dominated House will no doubt stay away from the avoidable taboos, such as considering immigration reform (for which the Senate already passed its own bill one year ago!) and in consequence, one more time unintentionally secure the Latino vote for the Democratic Party. They will continue blocking the minimum wage raise and the Fair Paycheck Act, thereby losing the minorities and women's vote. In this context, the 2016 presidential horizon looks brilliantly promising for Democrats and their two presidential hopefuls, Hillary Clinton and Elizabeth Warren.The defeat of Virginia Representative and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in the June 10th Republican primary for the seventh Congressional district is symptomatic of deep divisions not only within the Republican Partybut in the electorate at large. Eric Cantor, a Republican with impeccable conservative credentials who had been re-elected seven times and who was first in line for House Speaker,lost by ten solid points to a little known college professor who ran against him by portraying him as the pro-Wall Street, pro-K Street typical Washington insider, indifferent from Main Street needs and demands. This race is very significant for several reasons. For starters, the anti-Washington, anti "corporate welfare" and anti-Wall Street sentiment is widespread among independent voters and those GOP legislators that have been "pro-bailout, pro-Obama stimulus spending and pro-immigration," as articulated by Tea Party leaders, live in fear of being chastened by voters.That is why this week Republicans in Congress who were holding their breath, are exhaling with a sense of relief as Senator Thad Cochran wins the primary runoff against Tea Party challenger ChrisMcDaniels who ran on a promise to voters that he would add his voice to the fight against Obamacare and big government spending. It appears then that the anti-incumbent sentiment has not been strong enoughto become a sustained trend: so far, only two sitting representatives have not won re-nomination in the House and all 18 Senate races have been won by those holding the seats, including Lindsay Graham of South Carolina, who was a leader in favor of Immigration Reform in the Senate, but has been vocal in confronting Obama with his dismal record in foreign policy, from Benghazi to Syria to Ukraine, and now all the way back to Iraq. But even pollsters have been taken by surprise in most cases, whether as to the narrowness of results (such as the one is Mississippi, which required a runoff election) or to the unfathomable upsets (Cantor's represents a historical defeat: no Majority leader had been voted out in a primary election since the nineteenth century). There are many reasons why nobody saw this coming, first among them the constant problem of voter turnout, especially in primaries, followed by new strategies by candidates (David Bratt, the college professor that beat Cantor, did door -to -door canvassing, taking time to speak to prospective voters, and he beat a competitor who had outspent him 40 to 1) and by the strong commitment of a small group of activists that mobilized the grassroots against Cantor's pro-business stance. The outcome of these races is further complicated by the fact that many Democrats are taking part in open primaries, which makes them even more unpredictable. Democrats participated in both races, voting against the incumbent, Cantor, in Virginia (he was perceived as the main obstacle for bringing to the floor a vote on immigration bills that apparently would have had the votes to pass) and in favor of incumbent, veteranSenator Thad Cochran in Mississippi (he courted the African American vote, pointing out the amount of federal funds he had brought to the state in his 36 years as Senator, and they acquiesced, fearing Mc Daniels would be a worse choice for their interests in such a red state as Mississippi).These idiosyncratic variations and distortions should not distract us from the fact that the defeat of ultra-conservative House Majority leader from a white, affluent Richmond suburb is extremely significant and will have many ramifications in the near future. First and foremost, it has led to an immediate reshuffle of the party internal House leadership, as Cantorresigned his post as Majority leader. The first in line to fill his post, House whip Kevin McCarthy from California, used his insider skills to mobilize his contacts and call in his favors fast enough to pre-empt a challenge by a Tea Party congressman from Idaho, Raul Labrador, in a secret, internal party ballot. He has thus become Majority leader only eight years after he was first elected to Congress for California 23rd district. If re-elected in November, he will be first in line for House Speaker when Rep. Boehner gives up his post. This coveted position would have been Cantor's crowning achievement after a solid career of 14 years in Congress: he had hoped to become the first Jewish Speaker of the House.In spite of McCarthy's success in pre-empting challenges from outside the party leadership, the next one in line to move into McCarthy's whip position, deputy whip Peter Roskam from Illinois, lost the ballot to Tea Party challenger Steve Scalise from Louisiana, who mobilized the vote of Southern legislators and won, thereby establishing a presence for the movement inside the GOP hierarchy. Scalise, who was elected to Congress in 2008, has also risen rapidly through the ranks, as chairman of the ultra-conservative Republican Study Group and as a vocal advocate against big government.Party Whips in Congress are in charge of counting votes for and against legislation. They are enforcers, offering incentives and doling out punishments for votes among their caucus members. Their role becomes particularly important in close votes. The whip is also the main liaison between the party leadership and the rank and file.Primaries are proving to be much more dangerous for establishment Republicans than a prospective national election at the end of this year, in which they are poised to win both some Senate and House seats, mainly due to slow economic growth and low support for Obama, but more pointedly due to the opportunity created by the retirement of a significant number of long-serving senior legislators. Rather than the November election challenge against Democrats, primaries have become the main obstacle to surmount and the main focus of funding for incumbents and party establishment candidates. Memories of seats lost due to Tea party primary winners in the national 2010 and 2012 election still loom heavily in GOP minds. Karl Rove's words of advice to both the Tea Party activists and the GOP leadershipin February of 2010 still resonate in the halls of Congress:"If Tea party groups are to maximize their influence on policy, they must now begin the difficult task of disassociating themselves from cranks and conspiracy nuts. This includes 9/11 deniers, "birthers" who insist Barack Obama was not born in the U.S., and militia supporters espousing something vaguely close to armed rebellion.""The GOP is also better off if it foregoes any attempt to merge with the tea party movement. The GOP cannot possibly hope to control the dynamics of the highly decentralized galaxy of groups that make up the tea party movement. There will be troubling excesses and these will hurt Republicans if the party is formally associated with tea party groups" (Wall Street Journal, Feb. 18 2010).Because they are extremely vocal as well as media favorites (whether to disparage or to endorse them) and have made some undeniable inroads into the halls of power, the Tea Partiers have indeed made a splash in US politics, and they have re-shaped the agenda on issues of taxes and spending (with mixed success). But so far this term, 273 of 275 House incumbents and 18 out of 18 Senators have won re-nomination, even if in most House cases these contests were won by small margins. This is evidence that there is still somediscipline in party ranks, and newcomers are forced to follow the party leadership. For example in Kentucky, Sen. Rand Paul, largely recognized as the presidential candidate for Tea-Partiers and libertarians alike, did not campaign in favor of the Tea Party candidate who was running against Senate Minority leader Mitch McConnell, and gave the former only lukewarm support. Senator McConnell, a tough, seasoned veteran, was reported to have had a private, one-on-one, closed-doors conversation with Rand Paul before the primary campaign started…It then becomes clear that membership still has its privileges, and the Tea Partiers' disdain for insider politicking and the compromises required by politics in general won't take them very far. That is the stuff of politics, so now these political neophytes are getting into the fray, they will have to learn a few organizational lessons from the savvy insiders they are trying to replace. Nonetheless, one of the first comments made by Kevin McCarthy Fox News as he moved into Cantor's position was that "Yes, he would let the Export-Import Bank (reauthorization) to expire because it is something the private sector can do better". This represents a reversal from his 2012 position, and one that distances him from the business community and the party establishment, who want the Bank to remain. (Tea Partiers want to do away with the Ex-Im, the IRS and the Department of Education, among other institutions they find superfluous). In another interview, McCarthy asserted that the GOP had more to gain (politically) if it moved closer to libertarian ideas. So it has become apparent then, that the Tea Party as a movement and as a faction of the Republican Party is here to stay, at least for the near future. Its strength will depend on how they can accommodate their desires to the realities of governing the United States of America in the XXI century.María Fornella-Oehninger - Comparative Politics Professor, Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia.

At less than three weeks away from the national election, an Obama victory, even if not inevitable, seems today quite likely. Political scientist Larry Sabato of the University of Virginia, in his on-line publication Crystal Ball, has now put Obama over the magic number of 270 electoral votes (50% plus 1 of all electoral votes), with potentially many more votes to be added from close races in several states. Barack Obama leads John McCain in the polls by ten points, and the McCain campaign is in disarray. It has stopped campaigning in some states (i.e. Michigan) and is trying to hold on to other states that traditionally vote Republican but are about to be lost for the first time in decades (Virginia, North Carolina). Barring a huge end-of-October surprise, this trend will firm up and determine the result in favor of Obama. Democrats are also poised to win a majority of seats in the Senate and House of Representatives. The so-called "coattails effect" of the presidential race on the congressional election is starting to worry Republicans, who are becoming very critical of John McCain's campaign. Considering that the electoral race was at a continuous dead heat in the last two months, it is worth discussing what has determined the steady rise of Obama in the polls. First and foremost, of course, was the financial crisis. The astounding institutional banking crisis that originated from the meltdown of the real estate market, the resulting credit crunch, have created an anxiety not seen since the Great Depression of 1930. Historically, the Democratic Party has a better reputation for salvaging the economy in times of crisis. In addition to the historical record, several political scientists, Alan Abramowitz from Emory and Larry Bartels from Princeton among others, have developed models based on the correlation between economic growth and presidential election results, and have found that when the economy is not growing in the second quarter of the election year, the party in power almost without exception loses the election. But just as important as the economic disarray has been the reaction of each candidate to that crisis, and the style of leadership that emerged from it. One week before the Wall Street debacle, McCain had said that" the fundamentals of the economy were strong". That unfortunate statement immediately gave an unequivocal ring of truth to Obama's claim that his opponent was "out of touch" with the realities of the country, and it will probably be remembered in history books as the critical turning point of this election. In the first debate, both candidates were cautious about the rescue plan (which had not yet been fully developed by the Treasury) and answered the questions on the economy as if little had changed. However, two days earlier, McCain had suspended his campaign and announced he was needed in Washington to "help solve the crisis". He had also demanded that the debate be cancelled because "times were too serious for that type of exchange". This was a gamble taken by his campaign and it backfired badly, as Obama (who also flew to Washington and attended the same meeting at the invitation of Bush) insisted that because times were difficult, the debate had become even more important and should take place: Americans were now paying attention to who should be the one to lead them out of this mess. Ultimately, McCain backed down and attended the debate, after no agreement on the Rescue Plan came out of that White House meeting. Although he did very well, was energetic and on message, his erratic pre-debate behavior worked against him by providing ammunition to the opposition, who were thereby able to portray him as unpredictable and over excitable, not the steady hand you would want at the helm of a nation in turmoil. Still, most experts and observers considered the first debate a draw, with both candidates passing their respective tests: Obama proving he was presidential enough to hold the office, and McCain reminding the public of his experience and dedication to the country. However, the polls showed most voters had chosen Obama as the winner. The second debate was in a town-hall meeting format, but with strict control of time and of the questioning. Veteran journalist Tom Brockaw moderated it with a strong hand, but the questions were lame and it was a lackluster performance on the part of everybody involved. However, the body language proved an asset to Obama, who listened respectfully, did not take any notes, and when needed, moved comfortably around the set to approach the public. On the other hand, McCain had a nervous restlessness about him that put him at a disadvantage; he kept going back to his corner to make notes on his opponent's comments and at a certain point referred to Obama as "that one" in what was perceived by many to be an expression of slight contempt. This was compounded by his aimless wondering around the set, at times having to be called on by Brockaw for blocking the moderator's teleprompter. In comparison, Obama looked very relaxed and cool, exuding that kind of calm and self-confidence that most people seem to be yearning for during these difficult times. It paid off, and his numbers started mounting dramatically on the next day. Even before that debate, the McCain campaign had thrown all self-restraint overboard and was using every trick in the book of negative campaigning. Thus, the name of William Ayres has become very widely known across the country, as a "domestic terrorist" who organized a bombing campaign of the Pentagon in the 60s, and as a "close associate to Barack Obama". Ayres was the founder of the Weather Underground movement, which protested against the Vietnam War four decades ago. Today he is a university professor and an educational reformer who has worked with many politicians (both Republican and Democrat) to change the educational system in Chicago. The more McCain slips in the poll numbers, the more we hear allusions to Obama's radical "associate", even if their contacts have been sporadic, that they met only a few years ago, and that Obama was eight years old when Ayres was a radical anti-war activist. McCain, however, did not bring this up in the face-to-face debate, perhaps for fear of opening the door to his own connection to Charles Keating, the convicted Savings and Loan scandal figure of the 1980s, whose investigation by regulators McCain had tried to suppress. McCain's vice-presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, on the other hand, has at every opportunity mentioned Ayres' name at her rallies, working her base up to frenzy to the point of violent threats, with some yelling "off with his (Obama's) head". For good measure, she added underhanded allusions to his "foreignness" (read: race) by saying for example: "He is not a man who sees America the way you and I see it." This decision to play the "guilt by association" game and to associate Obama with terrorism (of any kind) has led to a violent escalation in the rhetoric and has roused the base, but does not seem to be working with the independent voters, as poll after poll continues to show. On the contrary, it seems to have hurt McCain: at last weekend rallies he had to "correct" several of his own supporters who in their questions to him claimed Obama was an "Arab", a terrorist, a criminal. After one of such claims, McCain very determinedly took the microphone away from a woman and told her: "No, Ma'm, that is not true. He is a decent family man with whom I just happen to have disagreements on policy." Surely this disappointed the base, which has been led to believe differently. In all fairness to Senator McCain, he is not a racist; in fact, he is a very moderate, middle of the road Republican who has taken on his own party on matters of campaign finance reform and immigration. Why, then, is he playing this self-destructive game? The only logical answer is: out of desperation, as his numbers slip and several senior Republicans have turned against him. The constant chasing of the headlines, the constant spewing of "rapid responses and frantic emails" has resulted in an incoherent message to the detriment of his own personal appeal. Yesterday Bill Kristol, political analyst and commentator of impeccable conservative credentials, and editor of the Weekly Standard, in an op-ed column in the New York Times, called for McCain to fire his campaign staff, "set himself free" and run as the "cheerful, open and accessible candidate" he was in the past. He said it is the "strategic incoherence and operational incompetence of his staff that has made his campaign dysfunctional…and toxic." To this, McCain retorted that "even Bill Kristol had bought into the Obama line" and that he himself was "exactly where he wanted to be, with the whole media establishment against him." However, Republicans are starting to distance themselves from McCain, who they think is dragging the whole party down and will be responsible for loss of Senate and House Republican races, too. To compound his plight even more, yesterday a bipartisan ethics report by the state legislature of Alaska found Sarah Palin abused her power when she fired the Police Commissioner over a family vendetta against a state trooper (an affair already nicknamed "Troopergate" by the media). Voters seem to have tuned McCain out; it is no longer a question of message. It is a question of leadership, of calm amid the turmoil, of whom Americans want to answer the proverbial three-in-the-morning phone call that rings in the White House. Confronted with the angst and fury of John McCain, his impulsive change of course and mixed messages at a time of enormous economic uncertainty, voters are turning in larger numbers to Obama, who has remained unflustered in the face of nasty accusations. Composed, focused on the economy, he dismisses the violent rhetoric of his opponents, and prefers to focus on the difficulty of the times and on the specifics of his policy solutions. He has sharpened his message, spoken directly to the issues and remained a sea of calm amidst the turmoil, a source of optimism amidst the gloom and doom of the headlines. In the meantime, his campaign has registered hundreds of thousands of voters in many states that have traditionally voted Republican, and that today are surprisingly in play for the Democrats (namely Virginia, North Carolina). The McCain campaign is financially weaker and had to pull out of Michigan, where he was down eight points, in order to concentrate more resources in Florida, where the race is still tight, but where the economy has been severely hit by the real estate bust and by the reduction in tourism due to the credit crunch, all of which may favor Obama. In spite of the 270 electoral votes that put him over the top, with potentially many more votes to be added from close races in several states, an Obama win is still not assured. McCain is defending states that went for Bush in the last two elections and which he absolutely must win in order to have a slim chance at the whole, and therefore he can't be on the offense as much in other states. If Obama wins Indiana, Virginia and North Carolina, he will be the first non-Southerner Democrat to carry these states since John F. Kennedy. That explains the frustration of Republican Party stalwarts with McCain, his irresponsible choice of running mate and the unraveling of his campaign. Ironically, in the first debate McCain accused Obama of not knowing the difference between a tactic and a strategy. It actually seems it is McCain who has confused the two. Populism as a political tactic is common, but as the main strategy it is ineffective and harmful for the country. At times like this, when people are worried about their jobs, their pensions and their health care, the populist message of anger and division is not what the average voter is looking for. They are looking instead for some measure of optimism and reassurance. That is why they have turned to Obama. To win, the McCain campaign should stop playing the race–and-terrorism card, and instead bring up a concept which surprisingly has been all but ignored in this election: that of Washington being swept up by a "one-party rule", with Democrats controlling not only the White House but also Congress. No checks and balances, no limits on government in this country of Lockean traditions? That is a scenario that few Americans would look forward too, even in difficult times. It may win McCain more votes than destructive insinuations about his opponent. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

A revealing look at the constitutional issues that confronted and shaped each presidency from Woodrow Wilson through Donald J. TrumpDrawing from the monumental publication The Presidents and the Constitution: A Living History in 2016, the nation's foremost experts in the American presidency and the US Constitution tell the intertwined stories of how the last eighteen American presidents have interfaced with the Constitution and thus defined the most powerful office in human history.This volume leads off with Woodrow Wilson, the president who led the nation through World War I, and ends with Donald J. Trump, who ushered the US into uncharted political and legal territory. In between, the country was confronted with international wars, the civil rights movement, 9/11, and the advent of the internet, all of which presented unique and pressing constitutional issues. The last one hundred years reveals the awesome powers of the American presidency in domestic and foreign affairs, illustrating how they have stood up to modern and novel legal challenges. The Presidents and the Constitution is for anyone interested in a captivating and illuminating account of one of the most compelling subjects in our American democracy

Bertrand Badie on the Trump Moment, the Science
of Suffering, and IR between Power and Weakness



Lire en français




IR retains a traditional focus on the
game of power between states as its defining characteristic. But what, so asks Bertrand
Badie, if this means that our discipline is based on a negation of our humanity?
A giant in Francophone IR, Badie has labored to instead place human suffering
at the center of analysis of the international, by letting loose sociological
insights on a truly global empirical reality. In this Talk, Badie—amongst others—challenges the centrality of the idea of
state power, which makes little sense in a world where most of the IR agenda is
defined by issues emanating from state weakness; argues for the centrality of
suffering to a more apt IR; and uses this to contextualize the Trump Moment.




Print version (pdf) of this Talk



What is (or should be), according to
you, the biggest challenge / principal debate in current International
Relations? What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



Unquestionably, it would be the matter of change. It is time to conceptualize,
and further than that, to theorize the change that is happening in the field of
International Relations (IR). Humans have always had the feeling that they are
living in a period of upheaval, but contemporary IR is really characterized by several
landmarks that illustrate the drastic extent of change. I see at least three of
them.



The first one concerns the inclusive nature of the international system.
For the first time in the history of mankind, the international system covers
nearly the whole humanity, while the Westphalian system was an exclusively European
dynamic in which the United States of America entered to turn it into a system,
that I would call, Euro-North-American.



The second element, around which publications abound (see notably Mary
Kaldor's work, Theory Talk #30), is the deep mutation of the nature of conflict. War used to be, in
the Westphalian model, a matter of competition between powers. Today we have
the feeling that weakness is replacing power, in that power cannot any longer
function as central explanatory term of conflictual situations, which are
rather manifestations of state weakness. Think of 'failing' or 'collapsing'
states, which refers to the coming apart of nations that have been built badly
as well as the deliquescence of social ties. This new form of conflictuality
completely turns the international environment upside down and constitutes a
second indicator of transformation.



The third aspect concerns mobility. Our international system used to be
fully based on the idea of territory and boundaries, on the idea that fixity
establishes the competences of States in a very precise way. In this
perspective, the state refers to territory—as the definition given by Max Weber
states very clearly—but today this territorial notion of politics is challenged
by a full range of mobilities, composed of international flows that can be
either material, informational, or human.



These are three indicators illustrating a deep transformation of the
inner nature of IR that encourage me to speak about 'intersocial relations'
rather than 'interstate relations'. The notion of interstate relations no
longer captures the entirety of the global game. Our whole theory of IR was
based on the Westphalian model as it came out of the peace of Westphalia, as it
was confirmed by the accomplishment of the nation-state construction process
and as it dominated the historical flow of international events until the fall
of the Berlin wall.



Until the fall of the wall, all that was not related to Europe or to the
United States of America, or more precisely North-America, was simply called 'periphery',
which says enough. Today, by contrast, the periphery is central at least
regarding conflictuality. We should therefore drop our Westphalian prism and
build up new analytical tools for IR that would take these mutations as their
point of departure. Doing away with our Westphalian approach to IR would mean
questioning both our classical IR theories and questioning the practical models
of action in international politics, which means the uses of diplomacy and
warfare.





How did you arrive at where you
currently are in your thinking about International Relations?



You know when we write, when we work, we are first of all influenced by
our dissatisfaction. The classical Westphalian approach to IR, as I said
earlier, did not satisfy me as I had the feeling that it was focusing on events
that no longer had the importance that we kept giving them—for instance the arms
race, great power politics, or the traditional diplomatic negotiations—while I
was seeing, maybe this was the trigger, that the greatest part of suffering in
the world was coming from places that IR theory was not really covering.



I have always told my students that IR is the science of human suffering.
This suffering exists of course where we are—in Europe, in North America, they
exist everywhere in the world—but the greatest part is outside of the
Westphalian area, so the classical approach to IR gives a marginal and
distorted image. Africa and the Middle East seen through the Westphalian prism are
a dull image, strongly different from the extraordinary wealth, both for good and
bad, that these areas of the world have. I've also always held that in a world
where 6 to 9 million people starve to death each year, the main foci of traditional
IR were derisory. Even terrorism, to which we collectively attribute so much
importance, hardly comes near how important a challenge food security is.



My three latest books take a stand against traditional IR theories. In Diplomacy of
Connivance (2012) I tried to
show that the great power game is really a game way that is much more
integrated than we usually say and that this game plays out in all multilateral
fora. There is indeed a club, and that is precisely what I wanted to describe,
a club of powers—one which results to the detriment of less powerful members in
the international system.



In Le Temps des humiliés ('the
era of the humiliated', 2014), I tried to crystallize what the classical theory
could not express, which is domination seen through the lens of the dominated,
humiliation as felt by the humiliated, violence as experienced by the
desperate. For instance, even if we look at powers as accomplished as China
today—sharing the first place with the USA in terms of GDP—we have to admit
that their historical experience of humiliation constitutes a huge source of inspiration
when it comes to the elaboration of its foreign policy.



And then, in my last book Nous ne
sommes plus seuls au monde ('we are no longer alone in the world', 2016), this
critique was even more explicit. We are writing an IR that encompasses only about
one billion of human beings, while forgetting all the others. Today it is
simply no longer true that these old powers are setting the international
agenda. Global politics today is written by the little, the weak, the dominated;
often with recourse to extreme forms of violence, but this needs to be analyzed
and understood, which would mean to totally change the IR theory.



We should not forget that in large part, IR theory was a given as the USA
triumphed in 1945. The well-known 'great power politics' that dominates
traditional IR theory, inaugurated by Morgenthau and supported by so many others,
described what was true at that time: the ability of American power to set us
free from the Nazi monster. Today the challenge is strongly different, and it
is by the way meaningful that two of the greatest American internationalist
political scientists, Robert Keohane (TheoryTalk #9) and Ned Lebow (Theory Talk #53),
have both written books that elude to the end of this global order
(respectively After Hegemony and Goodbye Hegemony). Well what interests
me is exactly to dig into what comes after hegemony.





What would a student
need to become a specialist in International Relations or understand the world
in a global way?



First of all, I would advise them to rename their science, as I said
earlier, and to call it intersocial relations. The future of what we call IR
comes down to the ability to understand the extremely rich, multiple and
diversified interactions that are happening among and across the world's
societies. It does not mean that we have to completely abandon the state-centric
perspective, but rather dethrone states from the middle of this multiplicity of
actors in order to realize how very often these states are powerless when faced
with these different actors. That would be my first advice.



My second advice would be to look
ahead and not back. Do not let yourself be dominated by the Westphalian model,
and to try to build up what we need—since almost nothing has been done yet
today to construct this post-Westphalian, meta-Westphalian model. Beyond power,
there are things that we still misidentify or overlook while they are the driving
forces of today's and tomorrow's IR. From this point of view, sociology could
prove particularly useful. I consider, for instance, that Émile Durkheim is a very important inspiration to understand the
world today. Here is an author to study and to apply to IR.



The third advice that I would give them would be to not forget that IR
or intersocial relations are indeed the sciences of human suffering. We should
be able to place suffering at the core of the thinking. We've lost far too much
time staring at power, now it is time to move on to place human suffering at
the center. Why? First of all because it is ethically better; maybe will we be
able to learn from it? But also because in today's actual international
politics suffering is more proactive than power, which is not necessarily
optimistic but if recognized, would allow us a better questioning of new forms
of conflictuality. Perhaps unfortunately, the international agenda is no longer
fixed with canons, but with tears. Maybe this is the key point on which we
should concentrate our reflection.



Your insistence on placing suffering at the center of
IR scholarship seems to place you firmly alongside those who recognize "grievance" ratherthan "greed" as a central logic of international politics. What do you make of this parallel?



You are right: the idea of grievance, of recrimination, is a structuring
logic of the international game today. We did not see it coming for two
reasons. First of all because our traditional analysis of international
politics presupposed a unity of time, as if the African time, the Chinese time,
the Indian time and the European time where all identical. Yet this is
completely wrong because we, in our European culture, have not understood that
before Westphalia there were
political models, political histories, that profoundly marked the people that would
then shape contemporary politics. Remember that China is 4000 years of empire,
remember that precolonial Africa was composed of kingdoms, empires,
civilizations, philosophies, arts... Remember that India also is multi-millenary.
The Westphalian time came to totally deny and crush this temporality, this
historicity, almost in a negationist way, which means that, in the spirit of
those who were defending the Westphalian model, only this model was associated
to the Renaissance; and that the age of enlightenment and reason with a big R
had a calling to reformat the world as if it were a hard drive. This was a
senseless bet, a bet for which our European ancestors who led it had excuses
because at that time we did not know all these histories, at that time we did
not have all the knowledge we today have of the other and thus we simply
resolved it, through the negation of alterity. Yet, IR ought on the contrary aspire
to the accomplishment of alterity. Inevitably, all those who saw themselves
denied their historicity, over several centuries and even several millenaries,
accumulated a feeling of recrimination, of particularly deep grievances.



The second element is that all of this happened in a context of
disequilibrium of power resources, linked to different factors that reflected
indeed the fact that at a given moment of time western powers were both
literally and figuratively better armed than other societies. Abovementioned negation
of alterity was mapped onto, and amplified, by the forceful imposition of a
multilateral system that turned into the worst situation, into a proclaimed
hierarchy of cultures; as a result and there were, as Jules Ferry put it in the France
of the 19th century, 'races'; as in, 'We have the obligation to
educate inferior races'. It is not the beginning of history, but it is the
beginning of a history of humiliation. And through subsequent waves of globalization,
this humiliation has turned into a central nerve running through international
life. A nerve that has been used by both the powerful, who made a tool out of
humiliating the others to better dominate them (think here of the opium wars, colonization)
and simultaneously a nerve that fed the reaction of mobilization in the extra-Westphalian
world by those that had to stand up against those who were humiliating them. So
you see how it truly lies at the basis of IR. In my mind, it became a forceful paradigm,
it explains everything, even though others factors continue to weigh in on
actual dynamics.



In order to appreciate all this, we need a sociological approach, which
has for me two aspects. Both these aspects must be considered together for the
approach to be well understood. The first one is a timeless aspect, which is to
consider that everywhere and in all eras politics is a social product. Politics
cannot be understood as somehow outside society. This I would say contradicts the
majority of IR scholars, who believe excessively in the autonomy of politics
and of the state—even if only for analytical purposes. The second element of
this sociological approach is the historical or temporal component. That is
what I was talking about earlier: with globalization the social fabric strongly
progressed compared to the political fabric, and considering that intersocial
relations grew, we need a sociological approach to understand them.





Do you think that the Trump period constitutes a
fundamental break with the conduct of IR?



Trump himself maybe not, but what he represents certainly. If we look at
the USA today we see, since the new millennium, three models succeeding each
other. After 11-09 there was a time of neo-conservatism where globalization was
considered by American leaders as a means or maybe a chance to universalize the
American model, willingly or not. By force, as was the case in Iraq in 2003.
This model failed.



This lead to a second model which I would describe as a liberal model,
neo-liberal, incarnated by Obama who learnt from the lessons of the failure of neo-conservatism,
and had the courage to question the hypothesis hitherto considered as indisputable
of American leadership in the world, and who considered that the USA could win
only through soft power or smart power or free-trade. That is the reason why
Obama was just a little bit interventionist and was counting a lot on the TTIP
and on all these transregional agreements.



With Trump we arrive at a third model, one that I would call
neo-nationalist, that looks at globalization in a different way. In his perspective,
globalization constitutes a chance to satisfy the national American interests. The
idea of the national comes back after a long interlude of a globalizing vision.
It does not mean that we are not interventionist anymore. What happened in
Syria proves it. It means that we will intervene not according to the needs of
globalization but rather to American interests. It is about sharing a strong
and powerful image of the USA on the one hand and on the other serving the
concrete interests of the American people and nation.



This neo-nationalist model is not defended only by Trump, that is the
reason why I was saying that we should not consider Trump individually. We find
it exactly the same way with Putin. We find it by many other world leaders,
such as Erdogan or Duterte or Victor Orbán—really different figures—or Marshal
Sissi in Egypt.



We find it as well in attitudes, for instance Brexit in Great Britain, in
right-wing neo-populism in Europe: Ms. Le Pen, Mr. Wilders...  or in a certain left-wing neo-populism as
Mélenchon in France. It is in the air, seeming almost a passing fad. But it
constitutes perhaps a double rupture within IR. First of all because since the
emergence of globalization, let's say around the 70's, the national interest as
a thought category was bit by bit replaced with approaches in terms of collective
goods. Today by contrast we witness the abandonment of this image of collective
goods for a return to the national interest. This is very clear in Trump's renouncing
of the COP21 of Paris. At the same time, second, this constitutes some form of the
rehabilitation of the idea of power, which again seeps into the language of IR.




You know the IR scholar is not a neutral person, we have to use our science
towards positive action and for the definition of sound public policies. Going
against the idea of collective goods, casting doubt on the ideas of human
security, environmental security, food security, and sanitary security is
extremely dangerous because the composition of national interests and egoism
will never converge to a globally coherent policy. It is the weak that will
suffer first.



And the same time that power is reinstated as a driving principle of IR
praxis, the paradox is that great powers are becoming more and more powerless. If
we look only since 1989, and ask, when did state power ever triumph in IR?
Where did the strongest ever find a battleship enabling him to resolve a
problem to his benefit and according to his goals? Never. Not in Somalia, not
in Afghanistan, not in Iraq, not in Syria, not in Palestine. Nowhere. Not in
Sahel, not in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nowhere. So I am a little
worried, indeed, about this naive and old-fashioned rehabilitation of state
power.





Can we say that globalization, or rather the ambition of
integration at either the European or global scale, has failed? Can today be
considered a good moment to bury of the idea of integration?



I do not like burials, it is not an expression that I would use, but
your question is very pertinent. For around twenty years I have been saying and
teaching that regional integration constituted an intermediary and realistic
level of adaptation between the era of the nation state and that of globalization,
which means that I believed for a long time that regional integration was the
final step towards a global governance of the world.



I thought for a long time that what was not possible at the global
scale, a global government, was possible at the regional level and this would already
strongly simplify the world map and thus go in the way of this adhesion to the
collective dimension required by globalization. Nevertheless, not only Europe
suffers a setback, but all the regional constructions in the world are in a
similar situation. Mr. Trump openly shoves the NAFTA agreement, MERCOSUR is
down as every State that is composing it has recriminations against it, and we
could extend the list… All the forms of integration that have been set by
Chavez around his Bolivian ideal have ceased to exist; Africa progresses very
slowly in terms of regional integration; the Arab Maghreb Union, which is an
essential device, totally failed. Thus indeed the situation does not look good.



In the case of Europe there is a double phenomenon: on the one hand,
there is this really grave failure due to the secession of Great Britain from
Europe, and then there is a general malaise of the European model. Brexit is
really rare, if you look at the contemporary history of IR it is simply
unprecedented that a state shuts the door on a regional or global organization.
As far as I remember, it only happened a few times before, with Indonesia in
the UN in 1964, which lasted only 19 months. It happened with Morocco with the
African Union and Morocco is currently reintegrating in it. This British
situation came as a thunderbolt, worsened by the fact that paradoxically it is
not so much because of regional integration that the British voted against the
European Union. It was more from an anti-migration, xenophobic and nationalist
(in reference to that nationalism trend that I was earlier talking about)
perspective and what is dramatic is that we can clearly see that the
nationalist sentiment is really attacking the inner principles of regional
integration.



I was saying that in the European case there are internal problems which
run even deeper than the British defection, and I will underline at least two
of them. First of all there is a democratic deficit of Europe, meaning that
Europe was not able to match electoral spaces with the ones where decisions get
made; people still vote at the national level while the decisions are taken in
Brussels. In consequence, democratic control over these decisions is extremely
weak. How to resolve this equation? And here the breakdown is total since very
few people are coming up with suggestions. The other factor of this crisis is,
according to me, the fact that Europe has been built with success after World
War II in a progressive way around association and indeed, Durkheim proved it,
the integrative logic makes sense. Unity makes strength and it did make
strength once in Europe to prevent war, a third World War, and secondly to
encourage the reconstruction of European countries where economy was totally
collapsed. This time is now over and it is the fault of Europe to not have
known how to recontextualize itself, to react to the new contexts.



Paying one more time tribute to Durkheim who guessed it right, Durkheim
said that there are two ways of constructing social ties: around association
and around solidarity. I think that the time of association is now over, we
should enter in the time of solidarity, which does not consist in saying 'We
Germans are associated with Greece', but rather 'We Germans are joined together
with Greece because we know that if Greece collapses, in a long term
perspective, we will suffer the consequences'. Thus this idea of fundamental
unity is an idea that has been a little bit overlooked, abandoned by the
Europeans and now they find themselves in a complete paralysis.





Is the decolonization period still having an impact on
contemporary IR?



Oh totally, totally. I would first say because it is a major event in
the field of IR, which made the World switch from 51 sovereign States of the UN
in 1945 to 193 today but above all, a very aggravating circumstance, is that
this decolonization has been a complete failure and this failure weighs
enormously on international politics.



It has been a failure because decolonization assumed the format of copying
the western state model in countries that were accessing independence, while
this model was not necessarily adapted, which provoked a proliferation of
failed states, and these collapsed states had a terrible effect on IR.



Secondly because decolonization should have led to the enrichment and to
the substantial modification of multilateralism, by creating new institutions
able to take charge of new challenges resulting from decolonization. Yet,
except the creation of UNCTAD in 1964 and of
UNDP in 1965, there have been very little innovations in terms of global governance.
Thus global governance remains dominated by what I earlier called 'the club',
which means the great powers from the north, and this is very dysfunctional for
the management of contemporary crises. Then also because the ancient colonial
powers happen to find new forms of domination that did somehow complicate the
international game. Thus in fact decolonization is a daily aspect of the crisis
that the international system faces today.





In conclusion, which question should we have asked? In
other terms, which question have we forgot?



I found your questions very pertinent as it allowed the discussion of themes
that I consider essentials. Now, the big problem that makes me worry is the
great gap between the analysts and the actors in IR. I am not saying that the
analysts understood everything, far from it, but I think that IR theorists are
very conscious of some of these transformations I have mentioned. If you look
at some great authors such as James Rosenau, Ned Lebow or Robert Keohane, to
name just a few—there are way more—they all contributed to the reconstruction
of IR.



What truly strikes me is the autism of political actors, they think that
they are still at the time of the Congress of Vienna and that is an
extraordinary source of tension. Thus as long as this spirit of change does not
reach political actors, maybe Barack Obama was the first one to enter this game
and then the parenthesis was closed, as long as there will not be this move
towards the discovery of a new world, maybe as well through the inclusion in
our reflection about the international fabric such partners as China, it is not
normal that this very powerful China does not have any choice but to share the
paradigm and the model of action proper to occidental diplomacy, as long as we
would not have done this precise effort, well, we will remain in the negation
of the human, and that is the essential problem today, we are unable to
understand that at the end there is just one unity, which is the human being.



I had the chance to visit 105 countries and everywhere I met the same
men and the same women, with their pain, with their happiness, their hardship,
their joy, their sorrow, their needs that were everywhere identical. As long as
we will not understand that, well, we will be living in a world that is in total
contradiction with what it is truly and essentially. We will live in a world of
artifice and thus a world of violence.



Related links  



Read Badie's
The Arab Spring: A starting point (SER
Études 2011) here
(pdf)



Print version (pdf) of this Talk

Bertrand Badie sur le moment Trump, la science de la souffrance, et les RI
entre puissance et faiblesse

read in English






La discipline de RI se focalise traditionnellement sur l'enjeu de pouvoir
entre états. Mais, s'interroge Bertrand Badie, est-ce que cela veut dire que
notre discipline est basée sur la négation de notre humanité ? Un géant
dans les RI françaises, Badie a œuvré pour remplacer le pouvoir et pour mettre
la souffrance au cœur de l'analyse de l'international, en appliquant des idées
sociologiques sur une réalité véritablement globale. Dans ce Talk, Badie, entre autres, défie la
centralité de l'idée de pouvoir, qui a peu de sens dans un monde où la plupart
de l'agenda international est défini par des défis qu'émanent de la faiblesse ;
défend la centralité de la souffrance pour une discipline de RI plus adaptée ;
et utilise ces idées de base pour contextualiser le Moment Trump.




Quel est selon vous actuellement le plus grand défi ou débat dans le
domaine des Relations Internationales ? Quelle est votre position vis-à-vis de
cet ou ces enjeu(x) ?



Incontestablement, c'est la question du
changement. C'est à dire que le moment est venu de conceptualiser, et au-delà
même, de théoriser le changement qui s'effectue dans les Relations
Internationales (RI). On a toujours le sentiment qu'on vit une période de
changement, mais concernant les RI nous avons plusieurs repères qui montrent
l'effectivité du changement. J'en vois au moins trois.



Le premier, c'est la nature inclusive
du système international. Pour la première fois dans l'Histoire de l'humanité
le système international couvre la quasi-totalité de l'humanité, alors que le
système Westphalien était un système Européen dans lequel les Etats-Unis sont
entrés pour en faire un système, je dirais, euro-nord-américain.



Deuxième élément, et plusieurs ouvrages
déjà ont permis de le montrer, il y a une mutation profonde de la nature du
conflit. La guerre était autrefois, dans le modèle Westphalien, une affaire de
compétition de puissance. Aujourd'hui on a le sentiment que la faiblesse
remplace la puissance, c'est à dire la puissance n'est plus explicative des
situations belligènes, que l'on doit trouver davantage dans les manifestations
de faiblesse : que ce soit les « collapsing states », c'est à dire le
déchirement des Nations souvent mal ou hâtivement construites ou encore la
déliquescence des liens sociaux. Cette nouvelle conflictualité vient
complètement bouleverser la donne internationale et constitue un deuxième
marqueur de transformation.



Le troisième axe, c'est ce que
j'appellerais la mobilité. Tout notre système international reposait sur l'idée
de territoire et de frontière, sur l'idée de fixité marquant de manière très
précise les compétences des Etats. L'Etat renvoie au territoire, comme la
définition donnée par Max Weber l'indique très clairement, alors qu'aujourd'hui
le territoire est défié par toute une série de mobilités, c'est à dire de flux transnationaux
: qu'il s'agisse de flux commerciaux, de flux d'informations ou de flux humains
à travers notamment toutes les diverses formes de migrations.



Donc voilà au moins trois indicateurs
objectifs d'une transformation profonde de la nature même des RI qui m'incitent
d'abord à parler plus volontiers désormais de « relations intersociales »
plus que de « relations interétatiques ». Les relations entre Etats
ne saturent plus le jeu mondial et ça amène à considérer que toute notre
théorie des RI reposait sur le modèle Westphalien tel qu'il est issu de la paix
de Westphalie, tel qu'il a été confirmé par l'accomplissement du travail de
construction des Etats-Nations et tel qu'il a dominé l'actualité internationale
jusqu'à la chute du Mur. Jusqu'à la chute du Mur, ce qui ne relevait pas de l'Europe
et des Etats-Unis, et de l'Amérique du Nord disons plus exactement, était nommé
périphérique, ce qui en dit long. Aujourd'hui la périphérie est centrale au
moins du point de vue de la conflictualité, donc il faut abandonner notre
grammaire Westphalienne et construire un nouveau guide d'analyse des RI qui
tienne compte de ces mutations. Supprimer notre grammaire Westphalienne des RI,
c'est remettre en cause notre théorie classique des RI et c'est remettre en
cause aussi les modèles pratiques d'action en politique internationale, c'est à
dire l'ordinaire de la diplomatie.





Comment est-ce que vous êtes arrivé dans votre pensée autour les Relations
Internationales ?



Vous savez souvent quand on écrit,
quand on travaille, on est d'abord influencé par son insatisfaction. C'est à
dire que la théorie classique Westphalienne des RI, comme je l'ai dit tout à
l'heure, ne me satisfaisait pas parce que j'avais l'impression qu'elle
focalisait sur des évènements qui n'avaient plus l'importance qu'on continuait
à leur prêter, par exemple la course aux armement, les relations entre
puissances ou les négociations diplomatiques traditionnelles alors que je
voyais, peut-être est-ce là l'élément déclenchant, que l'essentiel des
souffrances dans le monde venait d'espaces que ne couvrait pas réellement la
théorie des RI.



J'ai toujours dit à mes étudiants que
les RI c'était la science des souffrances humaines. Ces souffrances bien sûr
elles existent chez nous, elles existent en Europe, elles existent en Amérique
du Nord, elles existent partout dans le monde mais l'essentiel des souffrances
se situe hors champ westphalien et du coup l'analyse classique des RI en
donnait une image tout d'abord marginale et déformée. L'Afrique ou le Moyen
Orient vus au prisme du système Westphalien avaient une allure aplatie qui ne
correspondait en rien à l'extraordinaire richesse, en bien et en mal, de ces
régions du monde. Je considérais aussi que dans un monde où 6 à 9 millions
d'individus meurent de faim chaque année, les grands agendas des RI classiques
étaient dérisoires. Même le terrorisme, auquel on donne tant d'importance, a
des scores dérisoires par rapport à ceux de l'insécurité alimentaire.



Mes trois derniers livres sont trois
cris de révolte contre la théorie classique des RI. La diplomatie de
connivence est un livre dans lequel j'ai essayé de montrer qu'en réalité le
jeu des puissances était un jeu beaucoup plus intégré qu'on ne le dit et
renvoyant souvent à de fausses conflictualités. Il y a bien un club, et c'est
ça que j'essayais de décrire, un club de puissants.



Le Temps des humiliés était là
pour mettre en scène justement ce que la théorie classique ne savait pas
exprimer, c'est à dire la domination vue du côté des dominés, l'humiliation vue
du côté des humiliés, la violence vue du côté des désespérés. Même si on
regarde des puissances aussi accomplies que la Chine aujourd'hui, première ex
aequo avec les Etats-Unis en PIB, il faut bien admettre que la mémoire de
l'humiliation constitue pour la Chine une source énorme d'inspiration et
d'élaboration de son actuelle politique étrangère.



Et puis, dans mon dernier livre Nous
ne sommes plus seuls au monde, là le cri était encore plus direct, c'est à
dire nous sommes en train d'écrire les RI qui concernent un gros milliard
d'êtres humains en oubliant tous les autres et aujourd'hui ce ne sont pas ces
vieilles puissances qui font l'agenda international. Il est écrit à
l'initiative du petit, du faible, du dominé, avec bien entendu des recours à
des formes de violences extrêmes, mais qu'il faut essayer d'analyser et de
comprendre, donc totalement renverser la théorie des RI.



Il ne faut pas oublier que l'essentiel
de la théorie des RI nous a été livré par les Etats-Unis triomphants en 1945.
Le fameux « power politics » qui domine la théorie classique des RI,
inaugurée par Morgenthau et porté par tellement d'autres, mettait en scène ce
qui était vrai à l'époque, c'est à dire la capacité de la puissance américaine
de nous délivrer du monstre nazi. Aujourd'hui l'enjeu il est tout autre, et
c'est d'ailleurs significatif que deux des plus grands politistes
internationalistes américains, Robert Keohane (Theory Talk #9) et Ned Lebow (TheoryTalk #53), aient écrit
le premier un livre qui s'appelle After hegemony et le second Goodbye
hegemony. Et bien justement, moi ce qui m'intéresse c'est de voir ce qu'il
y a après l'hégémonie.





Une question maintenant pour les étudiants qui aspireraient à se
spécialiser dans le domaine des RI : quels conseils ?



D'abord je leur conseillerais de
débaptiser leur science, comme je le disais tout à l'heure, et de l'appeler
relations intersociales, c'est à dire que l'avenir de ce que nous nous appelons
les Relations Internationales se trouve dans la capacité de comprendre les
interactions extrêmement riches, multiples et diversifiées qui s'opèrent entre
les sociétés du monde. Ce qui ne veut pas dire de complètement abandonner la
piste des Etats, mais replacer les Etats au milieu de cette multiplicité
d'acteurs pour constater souvent l'impuissance de ces États face à ces acteurs
nouveaux. Ce serait mon premier conseil.



Mon deuxième conseil c'est regarder
devant eux et non derrière eux, c'est à dire ne pas se laisser dominer par le
modèle westphalien et essayer de bâtir ce dont nous avons besoin parce que
presque rien n'a été fait encore aujourd'hui pour bâtir ce modèle
post-westphalien, méta-westphalien. Au-delà de la puissance il y a des choses
que l'on identifie encore mal et qui sont le moteur des RI. De ce point de vue-là,
l'aide de la sociologie est particulièrement précieuse car si nous sommes dans
des relations intersociales, évidemment, la sociologie a un rôle très important
à jouer. J'ai considéré, dans ma contribution au The return of the theorists que Durkheim est une source très importante d'inspiration
pour comprendre le monde aujourd'hui. Voilà un auteur à étudier et à appliquer
aux RI.



Le troisième conseil que je leur
donnerais c'est de ne pas oublier qu'effectivement les « RI » ou les
relations intersociales sont les sciences de la souffrance humaine. Il faut
savoir remettre la souffrance au centre de la réflexion. On a trop perdu de
temps à analyser la puissance, il est temps maintenant de se mettre du côté de
la souffrance. Pourquoi ? D'abord parce que éthiquement c'est meilleur,
peut-être pourra-t-on en tirer alors des enseignements pratiques ? Mais aussi
pour une deuxième raison, c'est que dans les nouvelles RI la souffrance est
plus proactive que la puissance, ce qui n'est pas forcément optimiste mais qui
permet notamment de mieux s'interroger sur les formes nouvelles de
conflictualité. Hélas ce n'est plus avec des canons que l'on écrit l'agenda
international, mais c'est avec des larmes. C'est peut-être là qu'il y a un
effort important à consentir sur le plan de la réflexion.





Dans Le temps des humiliés, vous proposez une lecture durkheimienne
des RI dont l'accent est surtout mis sur le « grievance » qui
s'oppose à une autre logique : celle du « greed ». Que pensez-vous de
ce parallèle ?



« Greed » on peut le traduire
par accaparement, captation. En réalité vous avez raison, l'idée de grievance,
de récrimination, le mot est parfait aussi en français, est une idée très
structurante du jeu international. On ne l'a pas vu venir pour deux raisons.
D'abord parce que notre analyse classique des RI supposait une unité de temps,
comme si le temps africain, le temps chinois, le temps indien et le temps
européen étaient identiques. Or ceci est complètement faux parce que nous dans
notre culture européenne nous n'avons pas compris qu'avant Westphalie il y
avait des modèles politiques, des histoires qui avaient profondément marqué les
peuples qui les avaient alors façonnés. Pensez que la Chine c'est 4000 ans
d'empire, pensez que l'Afrique avant la colonisation c'était des royaumes, des
empires, des civilisations, un art, des productions artistiques. Pensez que
l'Inde aussi est multimillénaire. Le temps Westphalien est venu totalement nier
et écraser cette temporalité, cette historicité, presque sur un mode
négationniste, c'est à dire que dans l'esprit de ceux qui étaient porteurs du
modèle Westphalien seul ce modèle associé à la Renaissance et au Siècle des
Lumières et à la Raison avec un grand R avait vocation à formater le monde. Or,
c'était un pari insensé, un pari pour lequel nos ancêtres Européens qui l'ont
mené avaient des excuses parce qu'à l'époque on connaissait mal ces Histoires,
à l'époque on n'avait pas cette connaissance de l'autre et de l'altérité donc
on a réglé ça au plus simple, c'est à dire à partir de la négation de
l'altérité. Or les RI c'est au contraire l'accomplissement de l'altérité. Donc,
inévitablement tous ceux qui se sont vus nier dans leur historicité sur
plusieurs siècles et même plusieurs millénaires ont accumulé un ressentiment de
récrimination, de grievance particulièrement fort.



Le deuxième élément c'est que tout ceci
s'est opéré dans un contexte de déséquilibre des ressources de puissance, lié à
différents facteurs qui faisaient qu'effectivement à un moment donné du temps
les puissances occidentales étaient mieux armées au sens propre, au sens
figuré, que les autres sociétés. Donc cette négation de l'altérité a été
aggravée par l'imposition d'un système multilatéral de force qui s'est traduit
de la pire des façons, c'est à dire à partir d'une hiérarchie proclamée des
cultures, donc voilà il y avait comme disait Jules Ferry, en France au
XIXe siècle, les « races », « Nous avons l'obligation d'éduquer les races inférieures ».
C'est le début d'une Histoire, c'est le début de l'Histoire de l'humiliation et
comme au même moment la mondialisation venait à se faire, cette humiliation est
devenue le nerf de la vie international. Un nerf qui a été utilisé autant par
les puissants, qui en ont fait un instrument, c'est à dire où on va humilier
les autres pour mieux les dominer (guerres de l'Opium,
la colonisation) et en même temps un nerf qui a irrigué la réaction
mobilisatrice de ce monde extra-westphalien qui pour exister a eu besoin de
s'affirmer contre ceux qui les humiliaient. Donc vous voyez c'est vraiment la
trame des nouvelles RI. Dans mon
esprit c'est devenu un paradigme, ça explique tout même si d'autres facteurs
continuent à expliquer parallèlement.



Et pour apprécier cela on a besoin d'une
approche sociologique, ce que pour moi a
deux fonctions. Ces deux fonctions il faut les avoir en tête toutes les
deux pour bien comprendre ce qu'elle veut dire. La première c'est une fonction
intemporelle, c'est à dire considérer que partout et de tout temps le politique
est un produit social, donc ne peut pas être compris hors de la société, ce qui
n'était pas forcément la posture de certains et même de, je dirais, la majorité
des analystes qui croyaient de manière excessive à une autonomie du politique
et de l'Etat. La deuxième composante de cette approche sociologique est une
composante temporelle historique. Ce que je vous disais tout à l'heure : avec
la mondialisation le social a beaucoup progressé en propre par rapport au
politique et les relations intersociales, ayant grandi, on a besoin d'une
approche sociologique pour les comprendre.





Est-ce que vous pensez que « le moment Trump » constitue une
rupture fondamentale avec la conduite des RI ?



Trump en soi peut-être pas, ce qu'il
représente certainement. C'est à dire si on regarde les Etats-Unis on voit,
depuis le changement de millénaire, trois modèles se succéder. Vous avez eu au
lendemain du 11 Septembre un temps néo-conservateur où la mondialisation était
considérée par les dirigeants Américains comme un moyen ou peut-être une chance
d'universaliser le modèle américain de gré ou de force. De force comme ce fut
le cas par exemple en Irak en 2003. Ce modèle a échoué.



Cela a amené un deuxième modèle qui
est, je dirais, un modèle libéral, néo-libéral, incarné par Obama qui tirant
les leçons de l'échec du néo-conservatisme, a eu le courage de remettre en
cause l'hypothèse jugée jusque-là indiscutable d'un leadership américain et
considéré que les Etats-Unis ne pouvaient gagner aujourd'hui qu'à travers le
soft power ou le smart power ou le libre échangisme. C'est la raison pour
laquelle Obama se faisait très peu interventionniste et misait beaucoup sur le
TTIP, sur tous ces accords transrégionaux.



Avec Trump est arrivé un troisième
modèle, que j'appellerais néo-nationaliste, qui considère la mondialisation
mais de façon différente. La mondialisation est ramenée dans son esprit à une
chance donnée de satisfaire les intérêts nationaux américains, l'idée de « national
interest » rejaillit après ce long temps de vision globalisante. Ca ne
veut pas dire qu'on n'est pas interventionniste. Ce qui s'est passé en Syrie le
démontre. Ça veut dire qu'on interviendra non pas en fonction des besoins de la
mondialisation mais en fonction des intérêts des Etats-Unis. Il s'agit de
montrer l'image des Etats-Unis forts, puissants et d'autre part de servir les
intérêts concrets du peuple américain et de la nation américaine.



Ce modèle néo-nationaliste n'est pas
porté par Trump tout seul, c'est la raison pour laquelle je disais qu'il ne
faut pas prendre Trump isolément. On le retrouve exactement de la même manière
chez Poutine. On le retrouve chez quantité d'autres dirigeants du monde, comme
par exemple Erdogan ou Duterte ou Victor Orbán, donc des personnages aussi
différents, ou le Maréchal Sissi en Egypte.



On le retrouve dans des postures : le
Brexit en Grande-Bretagne, ce néo-populisme de droite en Europe : Mme Le Pen,
Mr Wilders, voire un certain néo-populisme de gauche comme Mélenchon en France.
Bref il est dans l'air du temps, c'est presque un effet de mode et il constitue
peut-être une double rupture dans les RI.



D'abord parce que depuis l'avènement de
la mondialisation, les années 70 disons en gros même si la mondialisation n'est
pas née à un jour précis, on avait un peu laissé de côté l'idée d'intérêt
national pour raisonner en termes de biens collectifs. Là c'est un abandon des
biens collectifs et un retour vers l'intérêt national. On le voit bien, l'un
des actes de Trump a été de dire que la COP21 de Paris doit être reconsidérée.
Et puis c'est une certaine forme aussi de réhabilitation de la force, qui
redevient le langage des RI.



Voilà deux bonnes raisons d'abord de
compléter notre science positive pour comprendre cette nouvelle tentation mais
aussi pour s'en inquiéter. Vous savez l'internationaliste ce n'est pas
quelqu'un de neutre, c'est aussi quelqu'un qui doit mettre sa science au
service de l'action et de la définition des politiques publiques. Aller à
l'encontre de l'idée de biens communs, c'est à dire à nouveau jeter un doute
sur l'idée de sécurité humaine, de sécurité environnementale, de sécurité
alimentaire, de sécurité sanitaire c'est extrêmement dangereux car ce n'est
jamais la composition des intérêts et des égoïsmes nationaux qui fera une
politique globalement cohérente. C'est le faible qui en pâtira le premier.



La deuxième raison c'est ce paradoxe à
un moment où l'on voit que la puissance est de plus en plus impuissante, j'ai
fait tout un livre là-dessus, de réhabiliter la force. Or regardez, ne
serait-ce que depuis 1989, où la force a-t-elle triomphé sur le plan des RI ?
Où donc le plus fort a gagné la bataille qui lui a permis de résoudre le problème
à son avantage ou conformément à ses objectifs ? Jamais. Ni en Somalie, ni en
Afghanistan, ni en Irak, ni en Syrie, ni en Palestine. Nulle part. Ni au Sahel,
ni en République Démocratique du Congo. Nulle part. Donc je suis un peu
inquiet, effectivement, de cette réhabilitation naïve et ringarde de la force.





Peut-on considérer que l'idée de la mondialisation, ou plutôt de l'ambition
intégratrice, aurait échoué ? Devrait-on enterrer l'idée d'intégration
régionale ou mondiale ?



Je n'aime pas les enterrements, ce
n'est pas un terme que j'emploierai, mais votre question est très pertinente.
Pendant près de vingt ans j'ai enseigné que l'intégration régionale c'était
l'échelon intermédiaire et réaliste entre le temps des nations et le temps de
la globalisation, c'est à dire j'ai longtemps cru que l'intégration régionale
était l'antichambre d'une gouvernance globale du monde.



J'ai longtemps cru que ce qui n'était
pas possible à l'échelle mondiale, à un gouvernement mondial, pouvait l'être
au  niveau régional et déjà simplifier de
beaucoup la carte du monde et donc de progresser vers cette adhésion au
collectif que commande la mondialisation. Or non seulement l'Europe est en
échec, vous avez raison de le dire, mais toutes les constructions régionales
dans le monde sont en échec. Alors Mr. Trump bouscule ouvertement le NAFTA
ALENA, le MERCOSUR est en panne chaque Etat qui le compose a des récriminations
à son encontre, on pourrait continuer l'énumération… Toutes les formes
d'intégration que Chavez avait mis en place autour de son idéal bolivarien
n'existent plus, l'Afrique ne progresse que très très très lentement en matière
d'intégration régionale : l'Union du Maghreb Arabe, qui est quand même un
dispositif essentiel, a totalement échoué. Donc effectivement la conjoncture
n'est pas bonne.



Pour l'Europe le phénomène est double :
d'une part il y a cet échec très grave du départ de la Grande Bretagne de
l'Europe et puis il y a un malaise général du modèle européen. Alors, le départ
de la Grande Bretagne c'est très grave parce que c'est très rare si vous
regardez l'Histoire contemporaine des RI qu'un Etat claque la porte d'une
organisation régionale ou mondiale. C'est arrivé avec l'Indonésie aux Nations
Unies en 1964, ça n'a duré que 19 mois. C'est arrivé pour le Maroc au sein de
l'Union Africaine et le Maroc est actuellement en voie de réintégration. Donc
ce fait Britannique claque comme un coup de tonnerre, aggravé par le fait que
paradoxalement ce n'est pas tant sur l'idée d'intégration régionale que les
Britanniques ont voté contre l'UE. C'est beaucoup plus dans un réflexe
anti-migratoire, xénophobe, nationaliste (correspondant à cet élan de
nationalisme que je décrivais tout à l'heure) et donc ce qui est dramatique
c'est que l'on voit bien que cet ère du temps nationaliste vient réellement
attaquer les principes même de l'intégration régionale.



Alors je disais que pour l'Europe il y
a des problèmes internes encore plus profonds que la défection Britannique,
j'en vois au moins deux.



D'abord il y a un échec démocratique de
l'Europe, c'est à dire l'Europe n'a pas su faire coïncider les espaces
d'élection et les espaces de décisions, le peuple vote au niveau national et
les décisions se prennent à Bruxelles. Du coup, le contrôle démocratique sur
les décisions est extrêmement faible. Comment résoudre cette équation ? Et là
la panne est complète car personne ne propose de solutions.



L'autre élément à mon avis composant de
cette crise, c'est que l'Europe a été construite avec succès au lendemain de la
Seconde Guerre Mondiale de manière progressive sur le maître mot d'association
et effectivement, Durkheim l'a montré, la logique d'intégration associative
fait sens. C'est à dire l'union fait la force et l'union a fait la force en son
temps en Europe pour empêcher la guerre premièrement, c'est à dire une
troisième guerre européenne au XXe siècle, et deuxièmement pour favoriser la
reconstruction de pays européens dont l'économie s'était totalement effondrée.
Ce temps-là est terminé et la faute de l'Europe c'est de ne pas avoir su se
contextualiser, c'est à dire réagir aux contextes nouveaux.



Rendant à nouveau hommage à Durkheim
qui avait vu juste, Durkheim avait dit il y a deux façons de construire le lien
social : autour de l'association et autour de la solidarité. Je pense que le
temps de l'association est terminé, on doit entrer dans le temps de la
solidarité, c'est à dire la solidarité consiste à dire non pas « Nous
Allemands nous nous associons à la Grèce » mais « Nous Allemands
sommes solidaires de la Grèce car nous savons que si la Grèce s'effondre, à
terme, nous en subirons les conséquences ». Donc cette idée d'unité
fondamentale est une idée qui a été un peu snobée, abandonnée par les Européens
et maintenant ils se trouvent dans une situation de paralysie complète.





Est-ce que la période de décolonisation laisse encore des traces au niveau
des RI contemporaines ?



Ah totalement, totalement. Je dirais
d'abord parce que c'est un événement majeur des RI, qui a quand même fait
passer le monde de 51 Etats Souverains membres des Nations Unies en 1945 à 193
aujourd'hui mais surtout, circonstance très aggravante, c'est que cette
décolonisation a été complètement ratée et que l'échec de la décolonisation
pèse énormément sur les RI.



Elle a été ratée parce que la
décolonisation a conduit à copier le modèle étatique occidental dans les pays
qui accédaient à l'indépendance, alors que ce modèle n'était pas forcément
adapté, ce qui a provoqué une prolifération de failed States, et ces collapsed
States ont eu un effet effroyable sur les RI.



Deuxièmement parce que la
décolonisation aurait dû conduire à un enrichissement et en tous les cas à une
modification substantielle du multilatéralisme en créant de nouvelles
institutions capables de prendre en charge les défis nouveaux issus de la
décolonisation. Or, à part la création de la CNUCED
en 1964 et du PNUD en 1965, il y a eu très peu d'innovations sur le plan de la
gouvernance mondiale. Donc la gouvernance mondiale reste dominée par ce que
j'appelais tout à l'heure le club, c'est à dire les puissances du Nord et ceci
est très dysfonctionnel dans la gestion des crises contemporaines. Puis enfin
parce que les anciennes puissances coloniales sont amenées à trouver des formes
nouvelles de domination qui ont en quelques sorte compliqué le jeu
international. Donc effectivement la décolonisation c'est l'ordinaire des
crises que rencontre le système international aujourd'hui.





Question finale : quel autre souci vous inquiète dans les RI
contemporaines ?



J'ai trouvé que votre questionnement
était très pertinent parce qu'il permettait de toucher aux thèmes que je tiens
pour essentiels. Maintenant, si vous voulez, le grand problème qui moi
m'inquiète c'est le formidable décalage qu'il y a entre les analystes et les
acteurs. Je ne dis pas que les analystes ont tout compris, loin de là, mais je
crois que les analystes sont très conscients de ces transformations. Si vous
prenez les grands auteurs comme James Rosenau, Ned Lebow, comme Robert Keohane,
juste quelques-uns il y en aurait beaucoup d'autres, ils ont tous apporté une
pierre à la reconstruction de l'édifice des RI.



Moi ce qui me frappe, c'est l'autisme
des acteurs politiques, c'est à dire ils se croient encore à l'époque du
Congrès de Vienne et ça c'est source de tension absolument extraordinaire. Donc
tant que ce parfum de changement n'aura pas touché les acteurs politiques,
peut-être que Barack Obama était le premier à commencer à entrer dans ce jeu et
puis la parenthèse s'est refermée, tant donc qu'il n'y aura pas ce mouvement
vers la découverte d'un nouveau monde, peut-être aussi en intégrant dans notre
réflexion sur l'international des partenaires comme la Chine, ce n'est quand
même pas normal que cette Chine si puissante n'ait d'autre choix finalement que
de se rallier au paradigme et au modèle d'action propre à la diplomatie
occidentale, tant qu'on n'aura pas fait cet effort là et bien on sera encore
dans la négation de l'humain, et c'est ça le problème essentiel aujourd'hui,
c'est que nous n'arrivons pas à comprendre qu'au bout de tout ça il y a une
seule unité qui est l'être humain.



J'ai eu la chance de visiter 105 pays
et partout j'ai rencontré les mêmes hommes et les mêmes femmes, avec leurs
souffrances, avec leurs bonheurs, leurs malheurs, leurs joies, leurs peines,
leurs besoins qui étaient partout absolument identiques. Tant qu'on n'aura pas
compris cela, et bien je crois que l'on vivra dans un monde qui est en
contradiction totale avec ce qu'il est vraiment et essentiellement. On vivra dans
un monde d'artifice et donc dans un monde de violence.



Lire plus



·       Lire Badie's Printemps Arabe : un commencement (SER
Études 2011) ici
(pdf)

·       Lire Badie's Pour une sociologie historique de la
négotiation (préface de Négociations
internationales) ici
(pdf)



Normal
0




false
false
false

DA
X-NONE
X-NONE




























































































































































































































































































































































































































-->


/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:"Table Normal";
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:"";
mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0cm;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
line-height:115%;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:Arial;
color:black;
mso-ansi-language:DA;
mso-fareast-language:DA;}

      

Since the 1990s, Italy has progressively become a country of destination for migration movements especially from Africa and South Asia. In 2022, Italy received a total of 84,289 claims for international protection. The main nationalities of origin were Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, Tunisia and Nigeria.[1] The causes of migration are multiple and complex, and could refer to political, economic, social and/or cultural grounds. Yet, and not without hurdles, another relevant factor that contributes to driving people to move to a different country has started to emerge: climate change (and its related impacts on disasters, environmental degradation and other environmental factors). Although the nexus between climate change and migration is complex to define and to identify, it is relevant to note that many protection-seekers in Italy come from countries most exposed to climate change that, in certain cases, may have played a role either in directly shaping migration movements or in exacerbating more proximate causes of migration, such as worsening conflicts over scarce resources, violence, poverty or discrimination dynamics in the aftermath of a disaster.[2] Against this backdrop, in the following, I will first examine how the climate change-migration nexus has been approached by the Italian legal system, to then move to the Meloni government's political strategy in the field of migration governance, followed by an assessment of their respective efficacy.Legislative actions endorsed by Italy
Not only have Italian courts and tribunals long recognised that protection needs can arise from climate and environmental factors, but decision-makers have acknowledged the influence of climate change and disasters on migration too. This is a first and extremely relevant point to stress. Unlike most countries in the EU and beyond, Italy has explicitly recognised the nexus between climate change and migration through the adoption of specific pieces of legislation. This is not common in the EU or elsewhere, where either such a link has been simply ignored, or it has been sporadically addressed through fragmented and ad hoc measures, usually in an emergency context. What makes Italy stand out as a pioneering case study is that the country's judicial system incorporates the different types of protection needs that can stem from climate and environmental factors, hence providing for different protection statuses. These refer to temporary protection due to natural disasters (Art. 20 Testo Unico Immigrazione – TUI), a six-month and renewable residence permit as a result of calamities (Art. 20bis TUI), and special protection where the return to the country of origin would violate basic human rights (Art. 19 TUI).[3] In addition, humanitarian protection, which although repealed could still apply on pending cases that had been lodged before the Decree-Law No. 113/2018 repealing humanitarian protection entered into force, has covered cases of sudden- and slow-onset disasters, such as droughts, earthquakes, floods etc. Notably, these provisions complement the statuses available at the EU level – that is, the refugee status and subsidiary protection – that have also been recognised by judicial authorities to people fleeing climate change.
Although not shielded from flaws, these legislative measures have the merit to concretely and explicitly address protection needs stemming from climate and environmental factors and have been considered noteworthy in several institutional settings. The latter include the Platform of Disaster Displacement, which is a state-led initiative aiming at enhancing protection for people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.[4]The Meloni government and the Mattei Plan
In addition (and sometimes in opposition) to essential provisions at the national level aimed at protecting migrants from climate change, the current Meloni's government is implementing a series of political initiatives in the field of migration governance that may have an impact also on migration movements in the context of climate change.
A first set of initiatives delves around building ties with African countries in the field of migration management in order to prevent migration flows. Arrangements signed, renewed or promoted with strategic countries, such Albania, Libya and Tunisia, have been harshly criticised for violating human rights and the constitutional and international obligations of the Italian state.[5] In particular, such informal arrangements foresee Italy's technical and financial support in externalising asylum processing (such as in the case of Albania) and curbing migration flows (such as in the case of Libya and Tunisia), thus hampering migrants' right to asylum, including those fleeing climate change.
The second line of initiatives sponsored by the Meloni government is about investing in partnership and cooperation with Africa. Among others, the Mattei Plan for Africa seems to inaugurate a new and comprehensive approach in Italy's relations with Africa, through which "the Italian government intends to trigger a paradigm change in the relations with the African continent and build a partnership on an equal footing, which rejects the paternalistic and compassionate approach as well as the predatory approach, and which is able to generate benefits and opportunities for all".[6] The Mattei Plan engages with key thematic areas of utmost importance for both Italy and Africa, including food security; energy, water and natural resources; healthcare; education; research and innovation; climate change and environmental protection; migration, among others.[7] In principle, therefore, it seems that managing migration and reducing African countries' vulnerability to climate change are relevant elements in the architecture of the Mattei Plan.
The Plan envisages key climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies for Africa as well as actions to limit desertification and water scarcity. Interventions and programmes in these areas will benefit from the funding available under the Italian Climate Fund – that is, the principal instrument to achieve the commitments endorsed through international agreements on climate change and managed by public development bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti. Yet, these initiatives are not detailed nor well-defined in the document. If and how the Mattei Plan will concretely foster environmental protection, communities' resilience, and a just transition in Africa is therefore still not clear. Similarly, and crucially, the way in which the Mattei Plan will combine with other multilateral actions in the field of climate change, such as the EU Global Gateway and the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, is still uncertain. Indeed, although the Mattei Plan itself mentions these initiatives as part of its synergies with EU and international programmes, the document only provides a brief description of these instruments and does not clarify to what extent and how these will interact with the Mattei Plan, or what kind of financial support these could provide to which particular areas, priorities and projects.
Likewise, migration seems prominent in the goals and objectives of the Mattei Plan. Emblematically, it argues that the initiatives set forth therein are aimed at granting African youth "the right not to migrate" and to remain in Africa.[8] Yet, this topic seems scarcely addressed as the word "migration" appears only ten times in a 102-page-long document. In addition, migration is not included in the six priorities of the Mattei Plan (education; healthcare, water, agriculture, energy, infrastructure). Actions to ensure "the right not to migrate" are mainly indirect, vaguely defined, and clustered in broader socio-economic initiatives, such as 1) the possibility to open regular pathways for labour migration to work in Italian small and medium industries; 2) the need to improve access to food security in rural and poor urban areas where internal and cross-border migration flows are more intense; 3) strengthening the school system in Ivory Coast (the first nationality of irregular migrants in Italy according to the Mattei Plan); the intention to support job creation and sustainable agriculture in those regions of Tunisia where migration rank is high. The fact that migration seems to be a key goal of the Mattei Plan but is absent from its priorities might then imply that the six pillars are the means through which the Italian government aims to achieve its main objective.
At the same time, it is important to recall that key transit countries, such as those of the Sahel region, did not attend the Italy-Africa Summit of January 2024, thus questioning the relevance that partnership on migration management may play for strategic African states. Finally, although development cooperation could surely contribute to eradicating poverty and other plagues that trigger migration flows within and from Africa, this result crucially depends on how development cooperation is intended and pursued.[9] In this regard, it is undisputed that development cooperation in the so-called Global North is increasingly directed to deter migration, based on the simplistic assumption that improving the living conditions of communities in vulnerable third countries would result in reduced emigration.[10] Such a narrative, however, has already proven to be flawed.[11]
All in all, not only are actions towards climate change and migration superficially addressed, but the nexus between the two is not mentioned in the Mattei Plan. Whereas Italy's engagement in providing protection to people compelled to flee because of climate and environmental factors is strongly present at the legislative level and is able to capture different types of causes and migration movements linked to climate stressors, Italy's political actions under the Meloni government raise questions regarding their responsiveness to the challenges posed by climate change on migration movements as well as their effectiveness in fairly managing migration. As currently envisaged, the Mattei Plan seems to fit in the established political trend of using development cooperation in third countries as a means of governing migration flows.
Time is needed to evaluate the next steps of the Mattei Plan and its concrete potential in such delicate areas. The Italian government needs to frame the projects it intends to pursue under the Mattei Plan with reference to migration and to climate change more explicitly, as well as how multilateral initiatives may support national efforts. In particular, the Italian government still has the opportunity to acknowledge the intersections between climate stressors and migration movements by unveiling their interconnections in Africa and in strategic African countries. Adequately addressing rooted climate and environmental causes of migration in a way that is in line with international standards would bring Italy's political action closer to its laudable legislative level.Chiara Scissa is Researcher in the Energy, Climate and Resources Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] Italian Ministry of the Interior, I numeri dell'asilo. Confronto dati anno 2021-2022, http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/it/node/97.[2] Chiara Scissa, "The Weaponization of Natural Resources and Disasters during Conflict: The Refugee Convention's Relevance for Syria and Yemen", in Baker Institute Policy Briefs, May 2024, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/node/77231; David Cantor et al., "International Protection, Disasters and Climate Change", in International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 36, No. 1-2 (March/June 2024), p. 176-197, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeae012.[3] Administrative and judicial authorities have recognised that returning claimants back to countries affected by sudden-onset events would be contrary to Art. 19 TUI and granted special protection. Chiara Scissa, "Human Mobility in the Context of Disasters, Climate Change and Environmental Degradation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: Challenges and Insights", in EuroMed Rights Reports, February 2024, p. 31-32, https://reliefweb.int/node/4040562.[4] Among many, Walter Kälin and Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, Protection of Persons Displaced across Borders in the Context of Disasters and the Adverse Effects of Climate Change. A Review of Literature, Legislation and Case Law to Support the Implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, Geneva, UNHCR, June 2024, https://www.refworld.org/reference/lpprs/unhcr/2024/en/148128; Walter Kälin and Hannah Entwisle Chapuisat, Policy Brief: Protection of Persons Displaced across Borders in the Context of Disasters and the adverse Effects of Climate Change, Platform on Disaster Displacement and UNHCR, December 2023, https://www.preventionweb.net/quick/82217. For an in-depth analysis of pros and cons of Italian protection statuses concerning the climate change-migration nexus, see Chiara Scissa, "Populism and Environmental Migration: The Peculiar Italian Duo", in Lorenzo Figoni et al., Climate Change Knows No Borders. Addressing Protection Gaps and Enhancing Policy Responses to Climate Mobility featuring In-Depth Research from The Gambia, ActionAid International Italia, April 2024, p. 37-43, https://actionaid-it.imgix.net/uploads/2024/06/Report_Gambia_ENG.pdf.[5] Amnesty International, The Italy-Albania Agreement on Migration: Pushing Boundaries, Threatening Rights, 19 January 2024, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur30/7587/2024/en; Mathias Hatleskog Tjønn and Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, "Migration across the Mediterranean: Shaping Italy-Libya Relations over Time", in Ricard Zapata-Barrero and Ibrahim Awad (eds), Migrations in the Mediterranean. IMISCOE Regional Reader, Cham, Springer, 2024, p. 53-69, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42264-5_4; Vasja Badalič, "Tunisia's Role in the EU External Migration Policy: Crimmigration Law, Illegal Practices, and Their Impact on Human Rights", in Journal of International Migration and Integration, Vol. 20, No. 1 (February 2019), p. 85-100, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0596-7.[6] Author's translation from Italian Government, Schema di decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri di adozione del Piano strategico Italia-Africa: Piano Mattei, 17 July 2024, p. 3, https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/1424398.pdf.[7] Daniele Fattibene and Stefano Manservisi, "The Mattei Plan for Africa: A Turning Point for Italy's Development Cooperation Policy?", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|10 (March 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18219; Filippo Simonelli, Maria Luisa Fantappié and Leo Goretti, "The Italy-Africa Summit 2024 and the Mattei Plan: Towards Cooperation between Equals?", in IAI Commentaries, No. 24|11 (March 2024), https://www.iai.it/en/node/18220.[8] Italian Government, Schema di decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, cit., p. 5.[9] Matthew Scott, "Adapting to Climate-Related Human Mobility into Europe: Between the Protection Agenda and the Deterrence Paradigm, or Beyond?", in European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2023), p. 54-82, https://brill.com/view/journals/emil/25/1/article-p54_3.xml; Stephanie Pope and Zina Weisner, "From Development to Deterrence? Migration Spending under the EU Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)", in Oxfam Briefing Papers, September 2023, https://doi.org/10.21201/2023.621536; Estela Casajuana and Giorgia Jana Pintus, Beyond Borders, Beyond Boundaries. A Critical Analysis of EU Financial Support for Border Control in Tunisia and Libya, ARCI et al., November 2023, https://actionaid.org/node/729179.[10] Sarah Louise Nash, "The Developmentalisation of Climate Mobilities Policy in Denmark and Sweden", in Miriam Cullen and Matthew Scott (eds), Nordic Approaches to Climate‑Related Human Mobility, London/New York, Routledge, 2024, p. 68-84, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003460985-5.[11] Michael Collyer, "Border Work: Frames, Barriers, and Disingenuous Development", in Tanja Bastia and Ronald Skeldon (eds), Routledge Handbook of Migration and Development, London/New York, Routledge, 2020, p. 63-73.

"The EU ahead of a new political cycle and a new geopolitical era" was the subject of the 22nd edition of the "War and Peace in the 21st Century" conference, held in Barcelona on March 16th, 2024. Organised by CIDOB in collaboration with EsadeGeo - Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, and supported by "La Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona City Council and the rest of the CIDOB board, the conference provided expert insights on the internal and external challenges facing the EU in view of the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024, the wars raging in the EU's neighbourhood, and the potential outcomes of the US elections in November 2024.







The European Union (EU) is facing a new political cycle marked by the European Parliament elections to be held in June 2024 and a shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by the war in Ukraine and in Gaza. Issues such as enlargement, institutional reform, the green transition, technological transformations, migration and asylum policy and European defence are taking centre stage on the European agenda. CIDOB's Annual Conference aimed to identify the challenges that lie ahead, both internally and in terms of external action, and discuss opportunities for a more inclusive and cohesive EU. In his opening address, Antoni Segura (Chairman of CIDOB) noted the importance of analysing the EU's internal dynamics, considering the negative consequences of the rise of the extreme right ahead of the European Parliament elections. Segura reflected on the contributions of CIDOB's Annual Conference to the study of global politics from Barcelona since its first edition, held in 2002. Speaking on behalf of the Mayor of Barcelona, Pau Solanilla (Commissioner for International Relations and City Promotion of Barcelona City Council) welcomed all the participants and highlighted the importance of reflecting on the global agenda from Barcelona, a global city and a non-state capital that benefits from the work of CIDOB, founded 50 years ago by civil society representatives. Cities can bring a human dimension and help build bridges for peace through city diplomacy, responding to today's global calls for a new way of conceiving international relations, he said. Reminding us to "never cut ties between humans in conflicts", Barcelona should once again provide a platform for dialogue for peace in Europe and the Mediterranean. Javier Solana (President of EsadeGeo and Honorary Chairman of CIDOB) began by underlining that "the project of Europe is a project of peace", requiring it to go beyond mere geopolitics. Regarding relations with the United States, he said the upcoming US elections in November made it imperative for the EU to foster its own technological sector and to construct its defence in a way which is not like America's. He addressed the EU's own upcoming elections and the need to take decisive steps to prevent populism from gaining control of European institutions. Finally, Solana underlined the geopolitical importance of China for the EU. Reforming and enlarging the European Union for a new era The first panel, moderated by Cristina Gallach (Member of Global Women Leaders' Voices), followed CIDOB's report "The World in 2024: ten issues that will shape the international agenda", which defines the geopolitical situation in two words: ballots and bullets. Ms. Gallach proposed instead to discuss ballots and policies and underlined that, with expectations of a shift from the centre to the right in the upcoming elections, the EU has never faced a set of ballots which will have such a direct influence on its green, digital, reform and enlargement policies. This set the stage for an exchange of ideas on how democratic processes intersect with policy debates. Daniela Schwarzer (Member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Executive Board) highlighted that in the present geopolitical context, enlargement policy could be a tool to bring regional stability and security, as it was in the past, but a larger union of 35 member states, and voting based on unanimity, also carries the risk of weakening the EU's decision-making capacity. The EU will only emerge stronger from enlargement if it is paired with internal reforms addressing the question of qualified majority voting and the responsibilities of the European Commission. At the same time, differentiated integration and specific policies with rule of law conditionality – as was the case with the successful Next Generation EU funds – could provide ways to protect the fundamental principles of the EU. However, if it is to be credible in expecting candidate countries to fight corruption, the EU also needs to address its own internal challenges. Loukas Tsoukalis (President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP) remarked that while enlargement may be called "the most successful foreign policy of the EU" because it helps new members to become more stable and prosperous (as it did in the case of Spain and Greece), it is not a panacea that cures all ills (referring to the problems with the rule of law in countries such as Hungary and Poland). He noted that enlargement comes at a cost: more members in a system that works through consensus and unanimity risks becoming a model for dysfunctionality. Tsoukalis said that the current challenge for the EU is reform on two levels, namely institutional reform and funding, without which it will be impossible to address any enlargement successfully. How could the EU consider exporting pax europea when neither it itself is ready to introduce the required internal reforms and budget increases, nor are the proposed countries for enlargement ready to fulfil the criteria? Brigid Laffan (President of the European Policy Centre) highlighted how the EU has moved from a technocratic to an increasingly politicised union. She reflected on how the EU has matured as a political system through crises, especially since 2009, becoming more resilient, adaptable and flexible. Laffan also pointed to four challenges for the EU if it is to be ready for the next stage. First, she focused on heterogeneity among European countries in terms of democratic capacities, with Hungary constantly blackmailing the EU and threatening unity over EU support for Ukraine. Second, she outlined the risks related to the geopolitics of war, with the resurgence of conflict in the continent and in Gaza, making relations with the US and China more problematic. Third, the EU's enlargement towards weak, aid-dependent, democratically challenged states risks undermining EU policy-making capacity. Fourth, ahead of the next European elections Laffan observed the centre-right's fatal tendency to move further right. She concluded that it remains to be seen whether the EU has the capacity to rise to these challenges and noted that a more fitting motto for the EU today is not "unity in diversity" but Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" to continue to be a zone of peace and prosperity. The contributions from the three panellists were followed by a round of debate centring on the contradictions and challenges for the European integration and enlargement project, the need for a more consolidated budget, and the question of immigration. On the subject of European integration, some participants suggested the creation of subgroups within the EU where honest discussion among geopolitically aligned countries could take place, in addition to acknowledging the need for coalitions "of willing and able" within the EU, and the need for the EU to invest in relationships between member states and those with waiting-room status to smooth the candidates' transition processes. As far as funding was concerned, the need for greater financial resources was noted, and it was argued that the EU should avoid relying solely on national contributions (and therefore taxation) and instead explore alternative methods of funding (i.e. carbon taxes). Lastly, the issue of immigration triggered a huge discussion as a divisive topic within the European community that goes to the heart of European identity. There was a consensus that Europe will need migration and that more attention and resources should be allocated to integration. The issue of controlling immigration and borders was also raised during the discussion, as well as the conflation of immigration and diversity, pointing to the ethnic and religious diversity within European societies and warnings about political exploitation of migration by far-right parties. The EU in a new geopolitical context The second panel was moderated by Xavier Mas de Xaxàs (Diplomatic Correspondent of La Vanguardia). It aimed to elaborate on the needs and efficiency of EU external action when it comes to tackling the challenges of an increasingly complex geopolitical reality, with open conflicts in European territory and its neighbourhood, including in Ukraine and Gaza; competition between the US and China; rivalry with Russia; and necessary engagement with the so-called Global South. Jean-Marie Guéhenno (Director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution, Columbia University) warned of the consequences of the return of war in Europe. He reflected on how double standards in the EU's responses to the war in Ukraine and Gaza have undermined its soft power and global respect for the universality of European values. He emphasised the importance of legitimacy for the future of European integration, hence the need to preserve the identity and core values of the EU such as the rule of law, human dignity and solidarity. In his concluding remarks, he highlighted the urgency of reinforcing the EU's industrial capacity in defence and artificial intelligence to address the existing security challenges in Europe. Drawing on some of the points raised during the first panel, he also stressed the need for multi-speed integration, especially in security and defence, and increasing financial resources for AI, research and development and technology. Natalie Nougayrède (Member of the Council, European Council on Foreign Relations) focused her contribution on the importance of putting people at the centre of geopolitics, and the objective of democratisation for a peaceful Europe. Through the examples of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Maidan revolution, and the ongoing popular resistance to Russia's invasion, she reflected on how Ukrainians have shaped geopolitics, arguing that geopolitics can also be made by people. Similarly, Nougayrède saw the empowerment of Russia's civil society and the reinforcement of democratic institutions in Russia as a necessary step towards the end of the Ukraine war. The latter, she argued, is indeed a direct result of the autocratic power system that Putin has built in Russia, for which the EU needs to think of a different Russia if peace is to be restored in the continent. Wang Huiyao (Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, CCG), began by saying that it is vital for the EU (and the rest of the world) to play a bigger role to prevent the scenario of "lose-lose" geopolitics. In the face of the uncertainty that comes with the prospect of a victory for Trump, he emphasised the importance of more strategic autonomy, noting that, as one of the world's great powers, China can act as a stabilising force in peace-making, global governance and the economy. He called for a trust-building process between major powers in global politics and a real and efficient multilateral system that reflects the current multipolar world. Given we all live on the same planet and face common threats, and therefore cannot afford to be rivals, Huiyao proposed working together on projects like climate change, the economy, green development, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway to tackle huge infrastructure deficits, while noting the need to rebuild Ukraine and Gaza. He also said that as China can mediate between Ukraine and Russia, the EU can do the same in US-China relations, making the EU, the United States and China work well as a trilateral relationship and making the world more stable. Maha Yahya (Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center) referred to the Gaza war as a game changer with direct implications for Europe. For too long, the conflict has been swept under the carpet, with an idea of peace and security in the region based on a process of normalisation. The blame game over who was responsible for the failure of the Oslo peace process and the negotiations for a ceasefire made the debate on a two-state solution unviable, while new settlements continued to be established. She also underlined the absence of leadership, not just in Israel (with its most far-right government for a long time) and the region as a whole, but also in the US and the EU, where leaderships are fragmented. While the European Commission takes a pragmatic approach, there is a lack of brainpower and political solutions in the European debate, noting that Borrell's appeals for peace will go unheeded for as long as the EU fails to send a clear, united message. Given the horrific humanitarian situation, Yahya criticised the EU's double standards in response to Ukraine and Gaza. She said that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is one leverage that European countries should use, either collectively or individually. Lastly, she noted that the perception in the region and the Global South is that the Gaza war is an incomplete decolonisation process. During the discussion with the audience, the following issues were raised: the possibility of a change of government in Israel; the necessity of reform for EU enlargement; Europe's dark colonial past and how it could engage differently with the Global South; whether it is in the interest of Europe to open negotiations with Russia; and how the green transition is impacted by war. In response, Jean-Marie Guéhenno stressed that, for a better relationship with the Global South, Europe will need a stronger stance on the Middle East, including recognising the Palestinian state. Wang Huiyao reaffirmed the importance of ending both wars, calling for a high-level peace summit. He then noted that although China was pushed towards Russia by the US, Henry Kissinger brokered US-China relations in the 1970s. Unfortunately, he added, there is "no Kissinger of the EU" now. Finally, Maha Yahya mentioned that there is no hope of an Israeli leadership change, therefore there is no significant window for peace talks. She mentioned some urgent necessities for the short term: a ceasefire, a firmer position from the EU; averting an invasion of Lebanon owing to the high risk of regional escalation; and the need to link the reconstruction of Gaza to a political track of the conflict. In his concluding remarks, Pol Morillas (Director of CIDOB) summarised the conference themes by highlighting the intersection between politics and geopolitics in both panel discussions. He concluded by stating that, while the EU has matured enough to hold discussions on critical issues such as migration, the far right or the environment, it is still in the process of defining how the challenge of enlargement and reform will be addressed to strengthen the EU in the future. By asking whether the EU is ready to do "whatever it takes" on issues like security and defence and the green and the technological transitions, he argued that the main challenge for the EU will be approaching these issues through political discussions rather than policies alone. Reflecting on the second panel, Morillas referred to the idea of geopolitics defining our identity, and the impact of people and private actors on the shaping of geopolitics, too. He noted the imperative to rebuild trust among citizens and within the global community and argued that "at a moment when politics is most needed for the challenges we are facing, geopolitics is preventing global politics from solving our shared global problems".

"The EU ahead of a new political cycle and a new geopolitical era" was the subject of the 22nd edition of the "War and Peace in the 21st Century" conference, held in Barcelona on March 16th, 2024. Organised by CIDOB in collaboration with EsadeGeo - Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics, and supported by "La Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona City Council and the rest of the CIDOB board, the conference provided expert insights on the internal and external challenges facing the EU in view of the elections to the European Parliament in June 2024, the wars raging in the EU's neighbourhood, and the potential outcomes of the US elections in November 2024. The European Union (EU) is facing a new political cycle marked by the European Parliament elections to be held in June 2024 and a shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by the war in Ukraine and in Gaza. Issues such as enlargement, institutional reform, the green transition, technological transformations, migration and asylum policy and European defence are taking centre stage on the European agenda. CIDOB's Annual Conference aimed to identify the challenges that lie ahead, both internally and in terms of external action, and discuss opportunities for a more inclusive and cohesive EU. In his opening address, Antoni Segura (Chairman of CIDOB) noted the importance of analysing the EU's internal dynamics, considering the negative consequences of the rise of the extreme right ahead of the European Parliament elections. Segura reflected on the contributions of CIDOB's Annual Conference to the study of global politics from Barcelona since its first edition, held in 2002. Speaking on behalf of the Mayor of Barcelona, Pau Solanilla (Commissioner for International Relations and City Promotion of Barcelona City Council) welcomed all the participants and highlighted the importance of reflecting on the global agenda from Barcelona, a global city and a non-state capital that benefits from the work of CIDOB, founded 50 years ago by civil society representatives. Cities can bring a human dimension and help build bridges for peace through city diplomacy, responding to today's global calls for a new way of conceiving international relations, he said. Reminding us to "never cut ties between humans in conflicts", Barcelona should once again provide a platform for dialogue for peace in Europe and the Mediterranean. Javier Solana (President of EsadeGeo and Honorary Chairman of CIDOB) began by underlining that "the project of Europe is a project of peace", requiring it to go beyond mere geopolitics. Regarding relations with the United States, he said the upcoming US elections in November made it imperative for the EU to foster its own technological sector and to construct its defence in a way which is not like America's. He addressed the EU's own upcoming elections and the need to take decisive steps to prevent populism from gaining control of European institutions. Finally, Solana underlined the geopolitical importance of China for the EU. Reforming and enlarging the European Union for a new era The first panel, moderated by Cristina Gallach (Member of Global Women Leaders' Voices), followed CIDOB's report "The World in 2024: ten issues that will shape the international agenda", which defines the geopolitical situation in two words: ballots and bullets. Ms. Gallach proposed instead to discuss ballots and policies and underlined that, with expectations of a shift from the centre to the right in the upcoming elections, the EU has never faced a set of ballots which will have such a direct influence on its green, digital, reform and enlargement policies. This set the stage for an exchange of ideas on how democratic processes intersect with policy debates. Daniela Schwarzer (Member of the Bertelsmann Stiftung Executive Board) highlighted that in the present geopolitical context, enlargement policy could be a tool to bring regional stability and security, as it was in the past, but a larger union of 35 member states, and voting based on unanimity, also carries the risk of weakening the EU's decision-making capacity. The EU will only emerge stronger from enlargement if it is paired with internal reforms addressing the question of qualified majority voting and the responsibilities of the European Commission. At the same time, differentiated integration and specific policies with rule of law conditionality – as was the case with the successful Next Generation EU funds – could provide ways to protect the fundamental principles of the EU. However, if it is to be credible in expecting candidate countries to fight corruption, the EU also needs to address its own internal challenges. Loukas Tsoukalis (President of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP) remarked that while enlargement may be called "the most successful foreign policy of the EU" because it helps new members to become more stable and prosperous (as it did in the case of Spain and Greece), it is not a panacea that cures all ills (referring to the problems with the rule of law in countries such as Hungary and Poland). He noted that enlargement comes at a cost: more members in a system that works through consensus and unanimity risks becoming a model for dysfunctionality. Tsoukalis said that the current challenge for the EU is reform on two levels, namely institutional reform and funding, without which it will be impossible to address any enlargement successfully. How could the EU consider exporting pax europea when neither it itself is ready to introduce the required internal reforms and budget increases, nor are the proposed countries for enlargement ready to fulfil the criteria? Brigid Laffan (President of the European Policy Centre) highlighted how the EU has moved from a technocratic to an increasingly politicised union. She reflected on how the EU has matured as a political system through crises, especially since 2009, becoming more resilient, adaptable and flexible. Laffan also pointed to four challenges for the EU if it is to be ready for the next stage. First, she focused on heterogeneity among European countries in terms of democratic capacities, with Hungary constantly blackmailing the EU and threatening unity over EU support for Ukraine. Second, she outlined the risks related to the geopolitics of war, with the resurgence of conflict in the continent and in Gaza, making relations with the US and China more problematic. Third, the EU's enlargement towards weak, aid-dependent, democratically challenged states risks undermining EU policy-making capacity. Fourth, ahead of the next European elections Laffan observed the centre-right's fatal tendency to move further right. She concluded that it remains to be seen whether the EU has the capacity to rise to these challenges and noted that a more fitting motto for the EU today is not "unity in diversity" but Mario Draghi's "whatever it takes" to continue to be a zone of peace and prosperity. The contributions from the three panellists were followed by a round of debate centring on the contradictions and challenges for the European integration and enlargement project, the need for a more consolidated budget, and the question of immigration. On the subject of European integration, some participants suggested the creation of subgroups within the EU where honest discussion among geopolitically aligned countries could take place, in addition to acknowledging the need for coalitions "of willing and able" within the EU, and the need for the EU to invest in relationships between member states and those with waiting-room status to smooth the candidates' transition processes. As far as funding was concerned, the need for greater financial resources was noted, and it was argued that the EU should avoid relying solely on national contributions (and therefore taxation) and instead explore alternative methods of funding (i.e. carbon taxes). Lastly, the issue of immigration triggered a huge discussion as a divisive topic within the European community that goes to the heart of European identity. There was a consensus that Europe will need migration and that more attention and resources should be allocated to integration. The issue of controlling immigration and borders was also raised during the discussion, as well as the conflation of immigration and diversity, pointing to the ethnic and religious diversity within European societies and warnings about political exploitation of migration by far-right parties. The EU in a new geopolitical context The second panel was moderated by Xavier Mas de Xaxàs (Diplomatic Correspondent of La Vanguardia). It aimed to elaborate on the needs and efficiency of EU external action when it comes to tackling the challenges of an increasingly complex geopolitical reality, with open conflicts in European territory and its neighbourhood, including in Ukraine and Gaza; competition between the US and China; rivalry with Russia; and necessary engagement with the so-called Global South. Jean-Marie Guéhenno (Director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution, Columbia University) warned of the consequences of the return of war in Europe. He reflected on how double standards in the EU's responses to the war in Ukraine and Gaza have undermined its soft power and global respect for the universality of European values. He emphasised the importance of legitimacy for the future of European integration, hence the need to preserve the identity and core values of the EU such as the rule of law, human dignity and solidarity. In his concluding remarks, he highlighted the urgency of reinforcing the EU's industrial capacity in defence and artificial intelligence to address the existing security challenges in Europe. Drawing on some of the points raised during the first panel, he also stressed the need for multi-speed integration, especially in security and defence, and increasing financial resources for AI, research and development and technology. Natalie Nougayrède (Member of the Council, European Council on Foreign Relations) focused her contribution on the importance of putting people at the centre of geopolitics, and the objective of democratisation for a peaceful Europe. Through the examples of the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2014 Maidan revolution, and the ongoing popular resistance to Russia's invasion, she reflected on how Ukrainians have shaped geopolitics, arguing that geopolitics can also be made by people. Similarly, Nougayrède saw the empowerment of Russia's civil society and the reinforcement of democratic institutions in Russia as a necessary step towards the end of the Ukraine war. The latter, she argued, is indeed a direct result of the autocratic power system that Putin has built in Russia, for which the EU needs to think of a different Russia if peace is to be restored in the continent. Wang Huiyao (Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, CCG), began by saying that it is vital for the EU (and the rest of the world) to play a bigger role to prevent the scenario of "lose-lose" geopolitics. In the face of the uncertainty that comes with the prospect of a victory for Trump, he emphasised the importance of more strategic autonomy, noting that, as one of the world's great powers, China can act as a stabilising force in peace-making, global governance and the economy. He called for a trust-building process between major powers in global politics and a real and efficient multilateral system that reflects the current multipolar world. Given we all live on the same planet and face common threats, and therefore cannot afford to be rivals, Huiyao proposed working together on projects like climate change, the economy, green development, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway to tackle huge infrastructure deficits, while noting the need to rebuild Ukraine and Gaza. He also said that as China can mediate between Ukraine and Russia, the EU can do the same in US-China relations, making the EU, the United States and China work well as a trilateral relationship and making the world more stable. Maha Yahya (Director, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center) referred to the Gaza war as a game changer with direct implications for Europe. For too long, the conflict has been swept under the carpet, with an idea of peace and security in the region based on a process of normalisation. The blame game over who was responsible for the failure of the Oslo peace process and the negotiations for a ceasefire made the debate on a two-state solution unviable, while new settlements continued to be established. She also underlined the absence of leadership, not just in Israel (with its most far-right government for a long time) and the region as a whole, but also in the US and the EU, where leaderships are fragmented. While the European Commission takes a pragmatic approach, there is a lack of brainpower and political solutions in the European debate, noting that Borrell's appeals for peace will go unheeded for as long as the EU fails to send a clear, united message. Given the horrific humanitarian situation, Yahya criticised the EU's double standards in response to Ukraine and Gaza. She said that the recognition of Palestinian statehood is one leverage that European countries should use, either collectively or individually. Lastly, she noted that the perception in the region and the Global South is that the Gaza war is an incomplete decolonisation process. During the discussion with the audience, the following issues were raised: the possibility of a change of government in Israel; the necessity of reform for EU enlargement; Europe's dark colonial past and how it could engage differently with the Global South; whether it is in the interest of Europe to open negotiations with Russia; and how the green transition is impacted by war. In response, Jean-Marie Guéhenno stressed that, for a better relationship with the Global South, Europe will need a stronger stance on the Middle East, including recognising the Palestinian state. Wang Huiyao reaffirmed the importance of ending both wars, calling for a high-level peace summit. He then noted that although China was pushed towards Russia by the US, Henry Kissinger brokered US-China relations in the 1970s. Unfortunately, he added, there is "no Kissinger of the EU" now. Finally, Maha Yahya mentioned that there is no hope of an Israeli leadership change, therefore there is no significant window for peace talks. She mentioned some urgent necessities for the short term: a ceasefire, a firmer position from the EU; averting an invasion of Lebanon owing to the high risk of regional escalation; and the need to link the reconstruction of Gaza to a political track of the conflict. In his concluding remarks, Pol Morillas (Director of CIDOB) summarised the conference themes by highlighting the intersection between politics and geopolitics in both panel discussions. He concluded by stating that, while the EU has matured enough to hold discussions on critical issues such as migration, the far right or the environment, it is still in the process of defining how the challenge of enlargement and reform will be addressed to strengthen the EU in the future. By asking whether the EU is ready to do "whatever it takes" on issues like security and defence and the green and the technological transitions, he argued that the main challenge for the EU will be approaching these issues through political discussions rather than policies alone. Reflecting on the second panel, Morillas referred to the idea of geopolitics defining our identity, and the impact of people and private actors on the shaping of geopolitics, too. He noted the imperative to rebuild trust among citizens and within the global community and argued that "at a moment when politics is most needed for the challenges we are facing, geopolitics is preventing global politics from solving our shared global problems".