Suchergebnisse

[2], 242, [2], iii p., 22 cm. ; In the late 1880s Alberto Lombardo traveled by train and steamboat through much of the United States, noting the natural features of the countryside, the architecture of the cities and towns, and the customs and social behavior of the Americans he encountered. Setting out from Mexico City and traveling to Veracruz, Lombardo began his American journey in Galveston, Texas, and proceeded through Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, Nebraska, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, and California. Along the way he remarked on both the landmarks he visited and those political or social connections which interested him, from the carnival in New Orleans to the Mormons in Salt Lake City, and from the prevalence of public libraries, discovered during a daytrip to Brooklyn, to the treatment of Chinese immigrants in the western states and the astonishing and exotic vitality of San Francisco's Chinatown.

A review of races this fall in Bossier Parish government shows
an expected electoral quietude among executives, but perhaps having the chickens
coming home to roost for many of the incumbents on the Police Jury.

Parishes have four elective executive offices up
for grabs, but there will be next to no drama in Bossier for these. The
incumbent assessor, clerk of court, and coroner drew no challengers, letting
all three cruise to reelection. Republican Sheriff Julian Whittington did
receive a challenge from political unknown Republican Chris Green, a former
deputy who would seem to have little chance for the upset.

The Jury contests are another matter. In 2019, eight
incumbents walked back into office, with District 2 Republican Glenn Benton
being the only incumbent to receive a challenge. This time he avoided one,
along with Democrat Jimmy Cochran (unchallenged in District 7 since 1999) and
Republicans Doug Rimmer (unchallenged since 2011 in District 8) and Tom Salzer
(never challenged since being the only one to qualify for a special election for
District 11 in 2017) while the other eight incumbents all filed for reelection
against opposition.

Make that seven. District 10's independent Jerome Darby,
the longest serving juror in the state in his tenth term, shortly after
qualifying withdrew, perhaps because there still will be a Darby on the ballot.
Democrat former School Board member Julian Darby, his younger brother, signed up,
along with a pair retired military veterans Democrats James Carley and Mary
Giles. The Darby family machine, whose Samm Darby as a Democrat represents the
district Julian once did, despite having Jerome facing just one election in
2007 since 1987, should get cranked up enough to keep the seat in the family.

As for the other seven incumbents with a fight on
their hands – the most since 1987 – from the rhetoric of the challengers it seems
that has come at the expense of Jury actions over the past several years. Since
2016 jurors have served illegally on the parish Library
Board of Control, currently Benton, Republican Bob Brotherton from District
1, Democrat Charles Gray from District 9, Republican Julianna Parks from
District 5, and Rimmer. Jurors also tolerated inserting
themselves into another dual officeholding controversy when their appointee
to the Cypress Black Bayou Recreation and Water Conservation District Robert
Berry also became its executive director, which changed only last month when
jurors didn't reappoint Berry. Even so, three jurors – Gray, Parks, and District
12 Republican Mac Plummer – didn't go along with that.

Incumbent jurors also have courted
controversy with their management of its Consolidated Waterworks/Sewerage
District #1, its growing attempt to provide centralized water and sewerage provision
to areas outside of municipalities. Deliberate lowballing on rates that
taxpayers had to subsidize that may mushroom costs to all in the future and
problems in absorbing new systems have raised the ire of some parish residents.

The Jury and parish government also have done
little to make their dealings transparent, in contrast to every other major northwest
Louisiana local government. Meetings are narrowcast on a hard-to-view and
nearly impossible-to-hear Facebook Live channel, years
after a statement that it would move to a professional setup (last year's
meeting dealing with the budget wasn't delivered or archived at all). Online agendas
carry the barest of information so citizens prior to meetings have no idea about
the items being discussed and voted upon. Meeting minutes habitually are posted
well past their meeting dates.

Perhaps worst of all, incumbent jurors have stuck
by Parish Administrator Butch Ford as he continues apparently to violate state
law that says a parish chief executive must be a registered voter in that
parish, which means he must have his primary residence that would qualify for a
homestead exemption in that parish. Over the past 19 months – the first 10 of which
jurors ignored Ford's full-time residence at a Caddo Parish property with a homestead
exemption and his registration to vote in Caddo, a property he still maintains –
Ford has been unable to establish with certainty that he qualifies to register
to vote in Bossier Parish, yet the Jury reappointed him without dissent earlier
this year (and originally hired him the year before without a job search).

This pattern of obscurantism, questionable fiscal administration
of the water utility, and lawlessness likely provoked many, if not all challengers.
The most vulnerable perhaps is Brotherton, whose health problems have prevented
him from attending most Jury meetings this year and will make it difficult for
him to campaign. In a solidly Republican district, Republican small businessman
Mike Farris has a distinct chance to replace him, much likelier to do so than the
two Democrats running, retiree Mary Odom and trucking executive Andre Wilson.

District 3 Republican Philip Rodgers, who in 2019 ran on
addressing problems with the Berry-run CBB, even as Berry's
ouster – which also means by state law he must give up his executive
directorship – has occurred, created some more problems for himself when in the
process of criticizing District actions at one of its recent meetings opened
himself to charges that he sought and obtained 
with its Board's knowledge favorable treatment from Berry. He is opposed
by Republican Andy Modica, a District critic, parish constable, and recent
applicant to fill a vacant School Board slot, who complained at the meeting where
the Jury didn't reappoint Berry – at which Rodgers' campaign supporter Rodney
Madden received the nod – that the fix was in against him and other applicants
for the post that went to Madden. It wouldn't be hard for Modica to campaign
contrasting the sweet deals political insiders get with the reception others encounter.

If that seems at all vengeful, forget it when
compared to the fate suffered by District 6 Republican Chris Marsiglia. He drew
as a challenger none other than Berry, running as a Republican. There's no fury
like a scorned former CBB executive director/ex-commissioner, who lost both gigs
because the Jury didn't reappoint him – with good reason, of course, since the judiciary
declared a situation like his in violation of the law and the District was footing
legal bills in his defense equivalent to about an eighth of its total revenues
in a losing cause.

Marsiglia was one of three first-time electees
(although he had run for a seat unsuccessfully years ago) who faced opposition
then and now. District 4 Republican John Ed Jorden (who also ran years ago) turned
out to be another, and worse off since in 2019 he had just opponent and now
faces two. While district demographics suggest Democrat Donald Stephens can't
win, he might make a runoff against either Jorden or Republican appraiser Jack Harvill.

And one of the most polarizing figures on the
Jury, Parks who won a special election for the post in 2021, faces perhaps the
most quality challenger running, Republican Barry Butler who formerly served in
her spot from 2008-12. In his term, Butler distinguished himself by challenging
orthodoxy and refusing to get along and go along as so often happens among
jurors, often serving as the only voice willing to take up topics and bring out
information that didn't portray parish policies in only rosy hues. Parks, who through
her husband Republican Bossier City Judge Santi Parks has a considerable parish
political establishment network to fall back upon, can bring a lot of resources
to bear to retain office, but Butler, who suffered defeat through the efforts
of that network, has the capacity to knock her off.

At the other end of the parish, after three
straight elections without an opponent, Plummer will be forced to work for his
job against Republican small businessman Keith
Sutton. Also a critic of business-as-usual on the Jury with a desire for
greater Jury fiscal responsibility, transparency, and term limits, he hosts a
podcast with former School Board member Shane Cheatham that in part discussed
politics of the day.

Republicans dropped the ball in the Darbys' District
10, which has been a plurality white district that has 41 percent black registration
that should give them a decent chance to win with relatively fewer black Democrats,
by not running a candidate there. They also blew it in 2019 in District 9, then
with a narrow white plurality, when the only Republican who qualified subsequently
was disqualified over not being a district resident, handing the victory to
Gray. Since then, the district has moved to a black plurality of around 47 percent.

This time, the GOP challenger should stick, and a
quality one at that – former Bossier City chief administrative officer Pam
Glorioso, who might well have run for and possibly won the mayoralty had her
boss Lo Walker not ran for a fifth term. She doesn't have the reform potential
that challengers in other districts have (in Berry's case, perhaps more out of
spite), having been a longtime part of the parish political establishment, and
she may not have the numbers on her side to knock off Gray in a district that
has become more secure for him.

If everything goes right for reformers, known quantities
such as Farris, Modica, Butler, and Sutton could form a solid bloc on the Jury.
If Berry and Glorioso also make it, matters become more interesting still.
Throw in Harvill and a Darby opponent and some real change could be on the way.
Even if turnover ends up minimal, clearly the challengers who have stepped up means
there's more of the grassroots upset at sitting jurors that there has been for
decades.

In this issue, readers will find two subject matter sections: 1. Contemporary Security and 2. International Relations CasuistryContemporary SecurityCésar Ross and Gonzalo Montaner Correo open the Volume 12 Number 2 issue with the article titled "The Post-9/11 Security Studies Agenda: What is Being Discussed and Who are Being Discussed?", offering a context for the new era of international security from the starting point of those terrorist attacks which imbued in the international system the friend-enemy ideology. In addition, these attacks managed to modify the traditional concepts of war, and in concordance we present Mariano César Bartolomé's contribution, his article "The Current Use of the Concept 'War' in International Relations". In it, a deeper insight on the epistemology associated with the new deontological needs stemming from the mutation of revolutions is offered. Accordingly, and in order to close this subject matter section of the International Relations, Strategy, and Security Journal, you can find "The Perception of Political Elites and the Predilection for Private Forms of Violence: From Mercenaries to Military Private Security Companies", by Mario Iván Urueña Sánchez, a document in which the contributions from the previous authors come to fruition.International Relations CasuistryErnani Contipelli wrote the article "Global Governance and Comparative Analysis of the Integration Processes in Latin America: The Andean Community and the MERCOSUR". Following a similar approach, we find Jerónimo Ríos Sierra's contribution, "The UNASUR and the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America: Another Lost Decade?" Here, he meticulously analyzes the toll paid due to the auctioning of other regional international organizations. In turn, Wilson Fernández Luzuriaga presents "Uruguay and its Incorporation to the United Nations Security Council. International Law in the Role of a Small State". He describes tendencies that could be adopted by peripheral actors in the international system and that can be perfectly spotted in other case studies, as the one carried out by Mariano Turzi in "Latin American silk road: China and the Nicaragua Canal". Now, and from the south of the American continent, Melisa Deciancio enriches our issue with the article "The Construction of the Argentinian International Relations (IR) Field: Contributions from Geopolitics". Meanwhile, María Cecilia Míguez reflects on "The Unorthodox Autonomy and the Classification of Foreign Politics in Argentina". Finally, two related articles are presented in our issue; both focus on the "hot" topic of drug trafficking, one from Brazil and the other from Argentina. The former was written by Esteban Arratia Sandobal and is titled "Beyond Pacification/Competition: State-Making in Rio's Favelas", and it could be contrasted with the peculiarities of the Argentinian territory, so well described by Carolina Sampó in the latter, "Drug and Human Trafficking: A Sample of How Organized Crime Advances in Argentina". To close this current edition, we present "62 Years of Indonesia – Mexico Diplomatic Relations: Some Reflections and Ways Forward", from the author Sulthon Sabaruddin Sjahril.We expect that, with this collection of research efforts and reflections from expert social scientists from a variety of disciplinary approaches, this current issue of the International Relations, Strategy, and Security Journal will please all its readers. ; Editorial En la presente edición, el lector encontrará dos secciones temáticas: 1. Seguridad Contemporánea, y: 2. Casuística Internacional.Seguridad contemporánea T1César Ross y Gonzalo Montaner Correo abren la edición volumen 12, número 2, con el artículo denominado "La agenda de los estudios de seguridad post 9/11: ¿de qué y quiénes hablan?", contextualizando la nueva era de la seguridad internacional derivada de aquellos ataques terroristas, que imprimieron la ideología de amigo-enemigo en el sistema internacional. Logran, además, modificar los conceptos tradicionales de guerra, para lo cual presentamos la contribución de Mariano César Bartolomé, con su artículo titulado "El empleo actual del concepto guerra en las relaciones internacionales". En este se profundiza en la epistemología relativa a las nuevas necesidades deontológicas que presenta la mutación de las revoluciones. En consecuencia y para finalizar esta sección temática de la Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, está "La percepción de las élites políticas y la predilección por las formas privadas de violencia: de los mercenarios a las compañías militares de seguridad privada", escrito por Mario Iván Urueña Sánchez, documento en el cual se cristalizan los aportes de los autores iniciales. Casuística en relaciones internacionales Ernani Contipelli escribió el artículo "Gobernanza global y análisis comparado de los procesos de integración en américa latina: comunidad andina y el Mercado del Sur", Por la misma línea se encuentra el aporte de Jerónimo Ríos Sierra, pero esta vez analizando con lupa los costos en el recorrido de otras organizaciones internacionales de la región: "La Unión de Naciones Suramericanas y la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América: ¿otra década perdida?". Por su parte, Wilson Fernández Luzuriaga, presenta "Uruguay y su ingreso al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Claves para comprender el rol de un Estado pequeño", en el cual escribe tendencias que podrán ser adoptados por la periferia del sistema internacional y que pueden perfectamente palparse en estudios de casos, como el que realizó Mariano Turzi Correo en "At world's end: China, US and the Panama canal". Ahora, hacia el sur del continente americano, Melisa Deciancio enriquece nuestra edición con el artículo "La construcción del campo de las relaciones internacionales (ri) argentinas: contribuciones desde la geopolítica". Entretanto, María Cecilia Míguez reflexiona sobre "La Autonomía Heterodoxa y la clasificación de las políticas exteriores en la Argentina". Finalmente, se cotejan en nuestra edición dos artículos enfocados en el "caliente" tema del narcotráfico, uno en Brasil y otro en Argentina: el primero de ellos, escrito por Esteban Arratia Sandobal y titulado "Beyond pacification Competition State-Making in Rio's favelas", contrastado con la particularidad del territorio argentino, bien descrito por Carolina Sampó: "Narcotráfico y trata de personas, una muestra de cómo el crimen organizado avanza en Argentina". Se cierra la presente edición con "62 Years of Indonesia – Mexico Diplomatic Relations: Some Reflections and Ways Forward", del autor Sulthon Sabaruddin Sjahril. Se espera con la presente colección de investigaciones y reflexiones de expertos cientistas sociales con multiplicidad de enfoques disciplinares que este número de la Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad sea de su total agrado. ; Nessa edição, o leitor encontrará duas seções temáticas: 1. Segurança contemporânea e 2. Casuística internacional.Segurança contemporâneaCésar Ross e Gonzalo Montaner Correo abrem a edição volume 12, número 2, com o artigo denominado "A agenda dos estudos de segurança post 9/11: de que e quem são os que falam?", contextualizando a nova era da segurança internacional derivada de aqueles ataques terroristas, que imprimiram a ideologia de amigo-inimigo no sistema internacional. Conseguem, além disso, modificar os conceitos tradicionais da guerra, para o qual apresentamos a contribuição de Mariano César Bartolomé, com o seu artigo titulado "O emprego atual do conceito guerra nas relações internacionais". Neste se aprofunda na epistemologia relativa as novas necessidades deontológicas que apresenta a mutação das revoluções. Em consequência e para finalizar esta seção temática da Revista de Relações Internacionais, Estratégia e Segurança , está "A percepção das elites polí- ticas e a predileção pelas formas privadas de violência: dos mercenários as expedições militares de segurança privada", escrito por Mario Iván Urueña Sánchez, documento no qual se cristalizam as colaborações dos autores iniciais.Casuística em relações internacionaisErnani Contipelli escreveu o artigo "Governança global e análises comparativo aos processos de integração na américa latina: comunidade andina e o Mercado do Sul", Pela mesma linha encontrasse a colaboração de Jerónimo Ríos Sierra, mas nesta vez analisando com lentes de aumento os gastos no caminho de outras organizações internacionais da região: "A União das Nações Sul-americanas e a Aliança Bolivariana para os Povos de Nossa América: outra década perdida?". Por sua parte, Wilson Fernández Luzuriaga, apresenta "Uruguai e a sua entrada ao Conselho de Segurança das Nacoes Unidas. Chaves para compreender o rol de um Estado pequeno", no qual escreve tendências que poderão ser adotadas pela periferia do sistema internacional e que podem perfeitamente palpar-se em estudos de casos como o que realizou, Mariano Turzi, em "A rota da seda latinoamericana: a China e o Canal da Nicarágua". Agora, para o sul do continente americano, Melisa Deciancio enriquece nossa edição com o artigo "A constru- ção do campo das relações internacionais (ri) argentinas: contribuições desde a geopolítica". No entanto, María Cecilia Míguez reflexiona sobre "A Autonomia Heterodoxa e a classificação das políticas exteriores na Argentina". Finalmente, se enumeram na nossa edição dois artigos enfocados no "quente" tema do narcotráfico, um no Brasil e o outro na Argentina: o primeiro deles, escrito por Esteban Arratia Sandobal e titulado "Beyond pacification Competition State-Making in Rio's favelas", comparado com a particularidade do território argentino, bem descrito por Carolina Sampó: "Narcotráfico e tráfico de pessoas , uma amostra como o crime organizado avança na Argentina". Termina a apresente da edição com "62 years of Indonesia-México Diplomatic Relations: some reflections and ways forward", do autor Sulthon Sabaruddin Sjahril.Esperasse com a presente coleção de investigações e reflexões de experientes cientistas sociais, multiplicidade de enfoques disciplinares que este número da Revista de Relações Internacionais, Estratégia e Segurança seja do seu total agrado.

In this issue, readers will find two subject matter sections: 1. Contemporary Security and 2. International Relations CasuistryContemporary SecurityCésar Ross and Gonzalo Montaner Correo open the Volume 12 Number 2 issue with the article titled "The Post-9/11 Security Studies Agenda: What is Being Discussed and Who are Being Discussed?", offering a context for the new era of international security from the starting point of those terrorist attacks which imbued in the international system the friend-enemy ideology. In addition, these attacks managed to modify the traditional concepts of war, and in concordance we present Mariano César Bartolomé's contribution, his article "The Current Use of the Concept 'War' in International Relations". In it, a deeper insight on the epistemology associated with the new deontological needs stemming from the mutation of revolutions is offered. Accordingly, and in order to close this subject matter section of the International Relations, Strategy, and Security Journal, you can find "The Perception of Political Elites and the Predilection for Private Forms of Violence: From Mercenaries to Military Private Security Companies", by Mario Iván Urueña Sánchez, a document in which the contributions from the previous authors come to fruition.International Relations CasuistryErnani Contipelli wrote the article "Global Governance and Comparative Analysis of the Integration Processes in Latin America: The Andean Community and the MERCOSUR". Following a similar approach, we find Jerónimo Ríos Sierra's contribution, "The UNASUR and the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America: Another Lost Decade?" Here, he meticulously analyzes the toll paid due to the auctioning of other regional international organizations. In turn, Wilson Fernández Luzuriaga presents "Uruguay and its Incorporation to the United Nations Security Council. International Law in the Role of a Small State". He describes tendencies that could be adopted by peripheral actors in the international system and that can be perfectly spotted in other case studies, as the one carried out by Mariano Turzi in "Latin American silk road: China and the Nicaragua Canal". Now, and from the south of the American continent, Melisa Deciancio enriches our issue with the article "The Construction of the Argentinian International Relations (IR) Field: Contributions from Geopolitics". Meanwhile, María Cecilia Míguez reflects on "The Unorthodox Autonomy and the Classification of Foreign Politics in Argentina". Finally, two related articles are presented in our issue; both focus on the "hot" topic of drug trafficking, one from Brazil and the other from Argentina. The former was written by Esteban Arratia Sandobal and is titled "Beyond Pacification/Competition: State-Making in Rio's Favelas", and it could be contrasted with the peculiarities of the Argentinian territory, so well described by Carolina Sampó in the latter, "Drug and Human Trafficking: A Sample of How Organized Crime Advances in Argentina". To close this current edition, we present "62 Years of Indonesia – Mexico Diplomatic Relations: Some Reflections and Ways Forward", from the author Sulthon Sabaruddin Sjahril.We expect that, with this collection of research efforts and reflections from expert social scientists from a variety of disciplinary approaches, this current issue of the International Relations, Strategy, and Security Journal will please all its readers. ; Editorial En la presente edición, el lector encontrará dos secciones temáticas: 1. Seguridad Contemporánea, y: 2. Casuística Internacional.Seguridad contemporánea T1César Ross y Gonzalo Montaner Correo abren la edición volumen 12, número 2, con el artículo denominado "La agenda de los estudios de seguridad post 9/11: ¿de qué y quiénes hablan?", contextualizando la nueva era de la seguridad internacional derivada de aquellos ataques terroristas, que imprimieron la ideología de amigo-enemigo en el sistema internacional. Logran, además, modificar los conceptos tradicionales de guerra, para lo cual presentamos la contribución de Mariano César Bartolomé, con su artículo titulado "El empleo actual del concepto guerra en las relaciones internacionales". En este se profundiza en la epistemología relativa a las nuevas necesidades deontológicas que presenta la mutación de las revoluciones. En consecuencia y para finalizar esta sección temática de la Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, está "La percepción de las élites políticas y la predilección por las formas privadas de violencia: de los mercenarios a las compañías militares de seguridad privada", escrito por Mario Iván Urueña Sánchez, documento en el cual se cristalizan los aportes de los autores iniciales. Casuística en relaciones internacionales Ernani Contipelli escribió el artículo "Gobernanza global y análisis comparado de los procesos de integración en américa latina: comunidad andina y el Mercado del Sur", Por la misma línea se encuentra el aporte de Jerónimo Ríos Sierra, pero esta vez analizando con lupa los costos en el recorrido de otras organizaciones internacionales de la región: "La Unión de Naciones Suramericanas y la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América: ¿otra década perdida?". Por su parte, Wilson Fernández Luzuriaga, presenta "Uruguay y su ingreso al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Claves para comprender el rol de un Estado pequeño", en el cual escribe tendencias que podrán ser adoptados por la periferia del sistema internacional y que pueden perfectamente palparse en estudios de casos, como el que realizó Mariano Turzi Correo en "At world's end: China, US and the Panama canal". Ahora, hacia el sur del continente americano, Melisa Deciancio enriquece nuestra edición con el artículo "La construcción del campo de las relaciones internacionales (ri) argentinas: contribuciones desde la geopolítica". Entretanto, María Cecilia Míguez reflexiona sobre "La Autonomía Heterodoxa y la clasificación de las políticas exteriores en la Argentina". Finalmente, se cotejan en nuestra edición dos artículos enfocados en el "caliente" tema del narcotráfico, uno en Brasil y otro en Argentina: el primero de ellos, escrito por Esteban Arratia Sandobal y titulado "Beyond pacification Competition State-Making in Rio's favelas", contrastado con la particularidad del territorio argentino, bien descrito por Carolina Sampó: "Narcotráfico y trata de personas, una muestra de cómo el crimen organizado avanza en Argentina". Se cierra la presente edición con "62 Years of Indonesia – Mexico Diplomatic Relations: Some Reflections and Ways Forward", del autor Sulthon Sabaruddin Sjahril. Se espera con la presente colección de investigaciones y reflexiones de expertos cientistas sociales con multiplicidad de enfoques disciplinares que este número de la Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad sea de su total agrado. ; Nessa edição, o leitor encontrará duas seções temáticas: 1. Segurança contemporânea e 2. Casuística internacional.Segurança contemporâneaCésar Ross e Gonzalo Montaner Correo abrem a edição volume 12, número 2, com o artigo denominado "A agenda dos estudos de segurança post 9/11: de que e quem são os que falam?", contextualizando a nova era da segurança internacional derivada de aqueles ataques terroristas, que imprimiram a ideologia de amigo-inimigo no sistema internacional. Conseguem, além disso, modificar os conceitos tradicionais da guerra, para o qual apresentamos a contribuição de Mariano César Bartolomé, com o seu artigo titulado "O emprego atual do conceito guerra nas relações internacionais". Neste se aprofunda na epistemologia relativa as novas necessidades deontológicas que apresenta a mutação das revoluções. Em consequência e para finalizar esta seção temática da Revista de Relações Internacionais, Estratégia e Segurança , está "A percepção das elites polí- ticas e a predileção pelas formas privadas de violência: dos mercenários as expedições militares de segurança privada", escrito por Mario Iván Urueña Sánchez, documento no qual se cristalizam as colaborações dos autores iniciais.Casuística em relações internacionaisErnani Contipelli escreveu o artigo "Governança global e análises comparativo aos processos de integração na américa latina: comunidade andina e o Mercado do Sul", Pela mesma linha encontrasse a colaboração de Jerónimo Ríos Sierra, mas nesta vez analisando com lentes de aumento os gastos no caminho de outras organizações internacionais da região: "A União das Nações Sul-americanas e a Aliança Bolivariana para os Povos de Nossa América: outra década perdida?". Por sua parte, Wilson Fernández Luzuriaga, apresenta "Uruguai e a sua entrada ao Conselho de Segurança das Nacoes Unidas. Chaves para compreender o rol de um Estado pequeno", no qual escreve tendências que poderão ser adotadas pela periferia do sistema internacional e que podem perfeitamente palpar-se em estudos de casos como o que realizou, Mariano Turzi, em "A rota da seda latinoamericana: a China e o Canal da Nicarágua". Agora, para o sul do continente americano, Melisa Deciancio enriquece nossa edição com o artigo "A constru- ção do campo das relações internacionais (ri) argentinas: contribuições desde a geopolítica". No entanto, María Cecilia Míguez reflexiona sobre "A Autonomia Heterodoxa e a classificação das políticas exteriores na Argentina". Finalmente, se enumeram na nossa edição dois artigos enfocados no "quente" tema do narcotráfico, um no Brasil e o outro na Argentina: o primeiro deles, escrito por Esteban Arratia Sandobal e titulado "Beyond pacification Competition State-Making in Rio's favelas", comparado com a particularidade do território argentino, bem descrito por Carolina Sampó: "Narcotráfico e tráfico de pessoas , uma amostra como o crime organizado avança na Argentina". Termina a apresente da edição com "62 years of Indonesia-México Diplomatic Relations: some reflections and ways forward", do autor Sulthon Sabaruddin Sjahril.Esperasse com a presente coleção de investigações e reflexões de experientes cientistas sociais, multiplicidade de enfoques disciplinares que este número da Revista de Relações Internacionais, Estratégia e Segurança seja do seu total agrado.

This dissertation examines how states shape civil society. The past two decades have seen a resurgence of scholarly interest in associational life. Some researchers place liberal civil society at the heart of democratic transformation and consolidation. Others question such claims, citing examples of authoritarian states supported by dense but illiberal associational landscapes. Yet there is a lack of research on the development of associational life. Responding to this gap in the literature, I ask what forces shape civil society and in particular its liberal or illiberal character? Despite the paucity of scholarship focused on factors that mold civil society and its character, significant amounts of research have engaged questions of how the economy and political institutions shape liberal and illiberal political outcomes. Drawing on the implicit, and in a few instances explicit, claims found in disparate debates about the relationship of the state and market to civil society, I construct various state-centered and market-driven explanatory approaches of the development of liberal and illiberal civil societies. On the one hand, economic interest or market-driven approaches claim that capitalist development drives the emergence of classes, the self-organization of which promotes the development of liberal civil societies and the consolidation of democratic states. On the other hand, institutionalism and state-centered approaches argue that states, not markets, shape the character of civil society. I examine these competing explanations of civil society and its character through an analysis of how economic development and state policies of cultural tolerance and political inclusion shaped civil society and its regional variation in pre-WWI regions of the former Lithuanian-Commonwealth (1795-1914) and of interwar Poland (1918-1939). Through a historical-comparative and narrative, mechanism-oriented, analysis, I propose a state-centered explanation of civil society that focuses on elites' conflicts, interests and the strategies that elites can apply in pursuit of those interests. I agree with economic interest approaches that economic development, particularly the growth of capitalist markets, promotes conditions favorable to the emergence and growth of associational life. However, I argue that the state, specifically the degree of political inclusion or exclusion of local elites and of the ethno-cultural autonomy or repression of the masses, plays a central role in shaping the liberal or illiberal character of civil society. The end of the 18th century marked the division of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by Russia, Prussia (the German Empire after 1871) and the Habsburg Empire (Austria-Hungary after 1867). A historical-narrative analysis of the pre-WWI Warszawa Governorate in the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland, the independent and subsequently Austrian-ruled Duchy of Kraków in western Galicia and of the Austrian-ruled province of Lviv in eastern Galicia illuminates how state policies of cultural repression and political exclusion rather than economic development shaped the character of each region's civil society. While the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland saw the political exclusion of local ethnic majority elites and cultural repression of the masses accompanied by an industrial revolution, Austrian-ruled eastern Galicia's political exclusion of local majority elites and ethno-cultural repression and discrimination of the local Ukrainian masses was accompanied by economic underdevelopment. In comparison, the Duchy of Kraków not only experienced a long period of local autonomy, and thus the rule of local ethnic majority Polish elites, but when placed under Austrian rule, it saw the continuation of political inclusion of local elites and cultural autonomy of the local Polish masses. Political liberalism in western Galicia, however, was accompanied by the absence of an industrial revolution and general economic underdevelopment similar to that found in eastern Galicia. Significant variation in economic development, political inclusion of local elites, and ethno-cultural discrimination aimed at the masses across the partitioned regions of the former Commonwealth facilitate a fruitful analysis of how state-backed cultural repression and political exclusion interacted with distinct paths of economic development and local ethno-cultural dynamics to shape the character of each region's late 19th and early 20th century civil society. Significant political and economic transformations within each case further enable the examination of how political and economic changes affected the developmental trajectory of each associational landscape. Thus, such cross-regional and cross-time comparisons allow for both an assessment of implied existing theoretical approaches to understanding and predicting the development of civil society and its character, and the development of an alternative approach focused on the relationship between the state and non-state elites. Building on state-centered, postcolonial and nationalism theories, I support claims that variation in state-backed ethnic discrimination deepens ethnic cleavage. However, I diverge from such theories in assessing the implications of political exclusion of elites for civil society. Instead of arguing that exclusion of elites necessarily undermines their power, I show that increasing political exclusion of local ethnic majority elites contributes to elite domination of associational life. For instance, the political exclusion and marginalization of local ethnic majority elites in Warszawa and Lviv contributed to elite domination of social life as elites sought to augment their social backing within and through civil society as a means of countering state power. At the same time, imperial and local, respectively, state-backed ethno-cultural discrimination invaded practices of daily life, turning culture into a tool of political repression and, thus, of political resistance. As such, cultural repression allowed local, excluded elites to politicize and dominate the public sphere by forging a common identity and interests with the ethno-culturally repressed masses. Through cultural, cross-class alliances, elites mounted support for their political struggles with exclusionary ruling elites. Conversely, after the Austro-Hungarian compromise, local majority Polish elites in Kraków received local relative political and cultural autonomy. As elites focused on negotiating power within political institutions associations developed more autonomously. Moreover, lacking cultural repression, Kraków developed a longer history of cross-ethnic cooperation.Drawing on narrative and comparative analyses of pre-WWI regions of the former Commonwealth, I suggest that elites in states with inclusive politics should protect their positions and power through participation within formal state institutions. Thus, by focusing on negotiation and cooperation with other elites within political society, these elites should allow civil society to develop more autonomously from both state and non-state elite control. However, when excluded from formal political institutions, elites should seek to counter state power through social mobilization within and through civil society. The degree to which their mobilization is successful, however, depends on the excluded and marginalized elites' ability and potential to muster significant alliances and support in civil society. In other words, the degree to which elites are successful in dominating associational life is rooted in their ability to draw on common identities or interests with broader masses. Economic and social transformations can significantly alter the identities and interests of elites, thus altering the strategies that they may be willing to enact. Yet the strategies that elites can successfully implement to forge broad-based alliances are largely shaped by the state. In particular, through policies of ethno-racial discrimination, states can provide excluded elites with the necessary mutual identities and interests to successfully dominate and mobilize large sectors of associational life, thus promoting the development of an illiberal—elite-dominated and ethno-racially fragmented—civil society. In 1918, Poland re-emerged as an autonomous state. Its first years were marked by increased political marginalization and then temporary inclusion of minorities after Piłsudski's 1926 military coup. In 1930, Piłsudski's regime overtly increased its marginalization of left-wing and right-wing political actors. Once more, excluded elites fostered close, top-down ties to civil society as a means to challenge the state. The Second Polish Republic's significant political transformations allow for an auxiliary examination of competing explanatory approaches of the development of civil society's liberal or illiberal character, including the elite-centered argument proposed by this dissertation and developed through a historical-comparative analysis of the pre-WWI regions of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Furthermore, a comparative analysis of civil society in two regions of interwar Poland illuminates the extent to which legacies of a century of imperial policies persevered, and the political and economic pressures under which they began to wane. Civil society that emerged in Kraków under pre-WWI policies of political inclusion and cultural toleration was more resistant to interwar political domination and ethnic fragmentation than that which emerged in Vilnius under pre-WWI policies of political exclusion and cultural repression. On the one hand, the analysis of interwar Polish civil society supports claims of institutional stickiness in the face of external pressures. Moreover, it demonstrates specific internal mechanism of institutional reproduction, ones rooted in the ideals, habits and goals of members and others in associations' rules, which allowed pre-WWI civil legacies to persist throughout the interwar period. On the other hand, though significant, the interwar cross-regional variation in the political domination of civil society was waning. Thus, I show that though historical legacies embedded in civil society are persistent even in the face of significant external transformations, they are not impervious to externally-driven change.

A Comment on: "Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Europe" by Thomas Ertman(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, 350 pp.)Understanding the origins of the modern state –and the different forms these political units eventually took- is a central enterprise in the discipline of political science. Relevant not only as a necessary first step in the development of several fields inside political science (e.g. how can we talk of an international, or better inter-state system, if we do not know where this concept of "inter-state" comes from?) but also for the contemporaneity of state-building in the 21st century. Pivotal as it is, the literature still has too many open-ended pathways and many more to discover. It is in this scenario that Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan appears as a very welcome contribution to the study of the origins of the Modern State.The problem Ertman poses is not entirely new. In his own words: "Why had some states developed in a constitutionalist direction during the formative centuries of European state-building, while others had become absolutist? And why had military pressures driven some states to construct effective, proto-modern bureaucracies, while others remained wedded to administrative methods that seemed highly dysfunctional?" (p. xi). The resemblance to the questions in which, to take a well-known example, Charles Tilly had been working on for a long time is strong. (1) Notwithstanding, three features stand out in the Birth of the Leviathan: a) the type of intra- and inter-state changes that the author discusses along the extended process of state-building (the time frame for the study is circa the fall of the Roman Empire and the French Revolution), b) the complexity of the theory proposed, and c) the impressive empirical research undertaken to support his theory.As Ertman's quote above suggests, the goal of the book is to explain why some states developed an absolutist regime while others came up with a constitutionalsystem. Moreover, and reaching to Max Weber's thought, the author also provides an answer to the diversity (divergence??) in the paths of state infrastructure –that is: why some states ended up with a modern bureaucratic administration while others remained, to their own detriment, with patrimonial systems. Thus four variables define the typology of states presented: patrimonial absolutism (France and Spain), bureaucratic constitutionalism (Great Britain), bureaucratic absolutism (Germany), and patrimonial constitutionalism (Poland and Hungary).There are two sets of dependent variables. The political regime on one side – i.e.absolutism and constitutionalism- respond to differences in the strength of representative institutions. Grosso modo, polities situated inside those territories characterized by large-scale and mostly unsuccessful experiments to install homogeneous political regimes during the Dark Ages will be more prone to an absolutist regime. (2) On the other hand, states on the periphery of these historical processes could "begin their state-building from zero" and thus were more prone to develop constitutional regimes with strong representative institutions that constrained royal power.The other dependent variable is the one concerning state-infrastructure. This can take the form of patrimonialism or bureaucracy. The core of the explanatory or independent variable would be that the states involved in early conflict (3) –"early" being defined as pre-1450- tended to build state infrastructures with "outmoded and even dysfunctional" institutional arrangements (most commonly office-holding and the grant of state functions, such as taxing, to private hands). On the contrary, latecomers to war were able to take a bureaucratic path for two reasons: a) they could benefit from the know-how and learn from the errors of states which had been involved in the expansion of the state-authority for a long time, and b) the exponential increase in the supply of personnel professionally trained to run state affairs. (4)A problem the author encounters is that this scheme cannot explain two of its four cases: bureaucratic-constitutionalism and constitutional-paternalism. Why did Great Britain follow the bureaucratic path given it was a clear case of early state-builder for war purposes? And why is it that Hungary and Poland, two cases of latecomers to war, ended up with patrimonial administrations? The explanation for this anomaly rests in the existence of strong representative institutions that influenced state infrastructure. In the case of Great Britain, redirecting the state in a bureaucratic path (against the attempts of interest groups to impose patrimonialism), in the cases of Hungary and Poland, acting as an agent of patrimonial administration.Let me offer some final comments (in an unjustly oversimplified manner) that follow from the reading. Ertman's book turns out to be a rigorous and intensely (with historical descriptions that might be too dense in some instances) researched study. His comprehension of the subtleties of state-building in modern Europe certainly surpass most of the work this reader has seen in the literature. While the work of a Charles Tilly analyzed the role of war, coercion, and capital in trying to explain why such different paths of state-building ended up with the same outcome -i.e. the nation-state- Ertman's book goes much deeper. The inclusion of the analysis of changes in the domestic structures is particularly welcome. In other words, where Tilly saw a path towards convergence in the form of the nation-state, Ertman disentangles a process that leads to the formation of critically different types of states. This divergence becomes particularly relevant when one reflects on the contemporaneity of this work, since it was not only the convergence in the nation state form, but also the stark differences –especially in state infrastructure- that defined and continue to define the European countries studied. (5)Some final thoughts, that would have to be more developed to do the author justice, will be irresponsibly thrown as questions for further consideration:The author seems to focus too much in the methods of resource extraction (e.g. taxing) without taking seriously the given pool of resources each territory had. A better consideration of this issue –for example benefiting from Tilly's hypothesis on the importance of cities as centers of capital and their interplay with central governments- might be a good idea (Was it the same for a King to have a Madrid than a Ghent?)What is the real role of war? The author measures the effectiveness of state administration by their fighting performance. But, is losing a war, let's say Jena, a valid yardstick to define efficient and inefficient administrations, or as in the case of Jena other things might be in play (Napoleon's mighty army)?Is it acceptable to have such a flexible theoretical model? Are not the explanatory variables modified to fit the cases, thus incurring in a grave methodological problem? In general, how heavy are the costs in parsimony of such a detailed and complex study?In any case, The Birth of the Leviathan is an essential study for anyone trying to understand where the central political unit in international relations comes from, and why has this institution differed, not only in its path –as Tilly tells us- but also in its final form. The interested reader should save some time to seriously engage in a dialogue with Ertman and his Birth of the Leviathan.(1) "What accounts for the great variation over time and space in the kinds of states that have prevailed in Europe since A.D. 990, and why did European states eventually converge on different variants of the national state? Why were the directions of change so similar and the paths so different?" Tilly, Charles, "Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800"; Theory and Society, Vol. 18, No. 5, Special Issue on Cities and States in Europe, 1000-1800 (September, 1989, p.565). Nevertheless, there is one important distinction between these two questions that will be discussed at the end of this essay.(2) It is not completely clear though, at least to this reader, the logical explanation for this hypothesis. Is it that the post-Dark Ages and its failed attempts to impose working political systems (e.g. the Carolingian Empire) generated such a marked decentralization in the political landscape that the only viable solution for the Crowns was to try to impose a severe centralization over the aristocratic landlords? Or that such decentralization and the pattern of landlord aristocracy that followed were not compatible with the bicameral representative organizations (typical of constitutional regimes)? Or both? This is particularly troublesome since the author defines the variance in political regime as "a ruler who was relatively constrained (constitutionalism) or unconstrained (absolutism)" (p. 19).(3) Here the author wisely sticks to Tilly's maxim "War made the state and the state made war." (4) A phenomenon linked to the proliferation of the University as a social institution.(5) As the author remarks at the end of the book: "…patrimonial institutions can also have nagging long-term consequences. Despite the reforms of the 19th century, patron-client relations, lack of clear boundaries between politics and administration, and redistribution of public funds towards political insiders remain a serious problem in Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy…" p. 322. *Ph.D. StudentDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Pennsylvania.Profesor Depto. Estudios Internacionales. FACS - Universidad ORT Uruguay. MA en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di TellaE-mail: gcastro@sas.upenn.edu

AMÉRICA LATINA México decomisa 105 toneladas de marihuana en la frontera con los Estados Unidos.Para más información: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39729635/ns/world_news-americas/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/americas/19mexico.html?ref=worldhttp://diario.elmercurio.com/2010/10/20/internacional/internacional/noticias/1DD32331-C203-43C5-9840-ED5D3053D128.htm?id={1DD32331-C203-43C5-9840-ED5D3053D128}http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Mexico/decomisa/105/toneladas/marihuana/frontera/EE/UU/elpepuint/20101019elpepuint_5/Teshttp://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2010/10/19/saisie-record-de-marijuana-a-tijuana_1428043_3222.htmlProsiguen las disputas por la presidencia brasileña.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/ecologista/Silva/evita/dar/consigna/voto/Brasil/elpepuint/20101018elpepiint_2/Teshttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/rousseff-amplia-ventaja-sobre-serra-para-las-presidenciales_8148400-4 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/millones/armas/irrumpen/debate/electoral/brasileno/elpepuint/20101019elpepuint_1/TesFARC ejecuta a guerrillero que cuestionó lucha armada.Para más información:http://diario.elmercurio.com/2010/10/20/internacional/internacional/noticias/946251F4-90DE-40B0-87BC-3D3B1DAD6F16.htm?id={946251F4-90DE-40B0-87BC-3D3B1DAD6F16}Inundaciones causan 12 muertos en Haití.Para más información:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39724551/ns/weather/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/science/19quake.html?ref=world Los trabajadores de la mina San José se enfrentan a la empresa.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/trabajadores/mina/San/Jose/enfrentan/empresa/finiquitos/elpepuint/20101019elpepunac_5/TesPiñera promete mejores condiciones laborales para los mineros chilenos.Para más información:http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/10/18/chile.miners.president/index.htmlhttp://dailynightly.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/10/18/5311847-chilean-endurance-has-precedencehttp://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2010/10/19/sebastian-pinera-veut-faire-du-chili-d-ici-dix-ans-l-egal-de-l-espagne_1428099_3222.htmlEl oficialismo argentino aprueba un anteproyecto para declarar de "utilidad pública" producción de papel de diario.Para más información:http://diario.elmercurio.com/2010/10/20/internacional/_portada/noticias/1EC48588-7726-4401-9A7D-06EA182247CE.htm?id={1EC48588-7726-4401-9A7D-06EA182247CE}Choca autobús en México dejando 19 muertos.Para más información:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39728257/ns/world_news-americas/La oposición a Chávez suma fuerzas.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/oposicion/Chavez/suma/fuerzas/elpepuint/20101018elpepiint_6/Tes'Santos ha mejorado muchísimo las relaciones', admite Rafael Correa.Para más información:http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/santos-ha-mejorado-muchsimo-las-relaciones_8136020-4Polémica ley contra la discriminación en Bolivia.Para más información:http://diario.elmercurio.com/2010/10/20/internacional/_portada/noticias/E99E850D-0580-4C3E-9549-B1E70ABD65F3.htm?id={E99E850D-0580-4C3E-9549-B1E70ABD65F3}Colombia reporta 50 mil desaparecidos políticos.Para más información:http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/717583.html ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADÁComienza el 'tour' del Tea Party.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Comienza/tour/Tea/Party/elpepuint/20101018elpepuint_9/TesObama intenta recuperar el espíritu del 'Yes, we can' ante las elecciones de noviembre.Para más información: http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2010/10/18/une-vingtaine-de-morts-dans-un-violent-accident-d-autocar-au-mexique_1428010_3222.htmlhttp://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Obama/intenta/recuperar/espiritu/Yes/we/can/elecciones/noviembre/elpepuint/20101018elpepuint_3/TesRetrasado juicio por los detenidos de Guantánamo.Para más información:http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/10/14/us.gitmo.trial.delay/index.htmlComandante canadiense culpable de asesinato.Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/americas/19canada.html?ref=worldEstados Unidos vota por la despenalización de la marihuana.Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1316699El Pentágono pide a los medios que no divulguen los nuevos documentos de Wikileaks.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Pentagono/pide/medios/divulguen/nuevos/documentos/Wikileaks/elpepuint/20101019elpepuint_3/TesEUROPAProtestas paralizan Francia.Para más información:http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-10/18/content_11425872.htmhttp://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/nicolas-sarkozy-intervendra-para-remediar-la-escasez-de-carburantes_8147060-4http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2026553,00.htmhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39709416/ns/world_news-europe/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39735520/ns/world_news-europe/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/world/europe/20france.html?ref=worldhttp://diario.elmercurio.com/2010/10/20/internacional/_portada/noticias/1D2931F2-1F39-4242-8778-82BEFEC19702.htm?id={1D2931F2-1F39-4242-8778-82BEFEC19702}}http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/19/france.strike/index.htmlhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11591517http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1316726http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-france-protests-20101020,0,5832853.storyVarios muertos en un ataque terrorista al parlamento checheno.Para más información: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/19/chechnya.parliament.attack/index.html http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2010/10/19/prise-d-otages-au-parlement-tchetchene_1428050_3214.html http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/ataque-al-parlamento-de-chechenia_8148200-4 http://diario.elmercurio.com/2010/10/20/internacional/internacional/noticias/51891385-5B45-423A-9A03-3188A9019803.htm?id={51891385-5B45-423A-9A03-3188A9019803}http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Varios/muertos/ataque/terrorista/parlamento/checheno/elpepuint/20101019elpepuint_6/Teshttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39734140/ns/world_news-europe/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/world/europe/20chechen.html?ref=worldRigor en las escuelas inglesas respecto al burka.Para más información:http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2010/10/18/burqa-de-rigueur-dans-des-ecoles-anglaises_1427710_3214.htmlReding renunciará a sancionar a Francia por las expulsiones de gitanos.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Reding/renunciara/sancionar/Francia/expulsiones/gitanos/elpepuint/20101019elpepuint_8/TesPara Merkel el "multiculturalismo alemán" ha fracasado.Para más información:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39703380/ns/world_news-europe/ http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/europe/10/17/germany.merkel.multiculturalism/index.htmlEl debate sobre la inmigración divide a los conservadores de Merkel.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/debate/inmigracion/divide/conservadores/Merkel/elpepuint/20101018elpepiint_3/TesImportantes cortes en el gasto público británico.Para más información:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11579979http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-britain-military-20101020,0,7437908.storyhttp://diario.elmercurio.com/2010/10/20/internacional/_portada/noticias/8F536479-E397-40A6-BB51-ACE454BF06E8.htm?id={8F536479-E397-40A6-BB51-ACE454BF06E8}El terrorismo y los ciberataques, prioridades de la Defensa británica.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/terrorismo/ciberataques/prioridades/Defensa/britanica/elpepuint/20101019elpepiint_5/Tes"Time" analiza: ¿"Podrán los conservadores británicos escaparse del legado de Thatcher?".Para más información:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2023908,00.htmlSuiza celebra la inauguración del túnel ferroviario más largo del mundo.Para más información:http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2026369,00.htmlContinúan las amenazas del derrame de Hungría.Para más información: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2026177,00.html#ixzz12vFUdIwUEn medio de la crisis, Rodríguez Zapatero anunció la remodelación de su gabinete.Para más información:http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1316718 ASIA- PACÍFICO/ MEDIO ORIENTELa disidencia china denuncia una oleada de detenciones.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/disidencia/china/denuncia/oleada/detenciones/elpepuint/20101019elpepiint_10/TesEl Partido Comunista chino revela al sucesor del presidente Hu Jintao.Para más información:http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Partido/Comunista/chino/revela/sucesor/presidente/Hu/Jintao/elpepuint/20101019elpepiint_9/Teshttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/asia/19china.html?ref=worldBomba en carretera de Bagdad mata a oficial.Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/middleeast/19iraq.html?ref=worldImportante explosión en mina china.Para más información:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39735594/ns/world_news-asiapacific/http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2010/10/16/une-explosion-dans-une-mine-fait-20-morts-en-chine_1427008_3210.htmlIrak quiere ser un peso pesado del sector gasífero licitando tres grandes yacimientos.Para más información: http://diario.elmercurio.com/2010/10/20/internacional/internacional/noticias/43A7D248-7EEE-4ECD-B2C0-DA8C6D73FC71.htm?id={43A7D248-7EEE-4ECD-B2C0-DA8C6D73FC71}Un súper tifón arrasa Filipinas.Para más información:http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2010/10/17/les-philippines-menacees-par-un-super-typhon_1427448_3210.htmlhttp://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-10/18/content_11423194.htmhttp://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/19/philippines.typhoon/index.htmlhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39735317/ns/world_news-asiapacific/http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/10/18/world/asia/international-us-philippines-typhoon.html?ref=worldhttp://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/super/tifon/arrasa/Filipinas/elpepuint/20101018elpepuint_5/Teshttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39716105/ns/weather/Se estrechan relaciones entre China y Corea del Norte.Para más información: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-10/19/content_11429258.htmAhmadineyad reta a Israel en Líbano.Para más información: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ahmadineyad/reta/Israel/Libano/elpepuint/20101014elpepuint_3/Teshttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39724502/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-lebanon-iran-ahmadinejad-20101015,0,7878076.storyhttp://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Miles/libaneses/reciben/Ahmadineyad/calles/Beirut/elpepuint/20101013elpepuint_3/Tes12 muertos dejan inundaciones en Vietnam.Para más información: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/18/vietnam.floods/index.htmlMyanmar bloquea la entrada de observadores internacionales para verificar las elecciones.Para más información: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/10/18/myanmar.elections/index.html http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/asia/19briefs-JOURNALISTS.html?ref=world¿Mejora en las relaciones entre Pakistán y Estados Unidos?Para más información: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/asia/19diplo.html?ref=worldIrán niega compra de armas vía Venezuela.Para más información:http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/717618.htmlComienza conferencia sobre biodiversidad en Japón.Para más información:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/asia/19tokyo.html?ref=world ÁFRICALos saharauis realizan su mayor protesta desde hace 35 años. Para más información: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/saharauis/realizan/mayor/protesta/hace/35/anos/elpepuint/20101019elpepiint_11/TesPara Estados Unidos las elecciones en Sudán se deben realizar en tiempo y forma.Para más información: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/10/15/sudan.referendum/index.htmlVíctimas de violaciones en Congo marchan en contra de la violencia.Para más información: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/africa/19somalia.html?ref=worldLos atentados en Nigeria fueron vinculados a una secta islámica.Para más información: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/world/africa/19nigeria.html?_r=1&ref=worldRelato de las vivencias de los refugiados somalíes.Para más información:http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-somalia-refugees-20101018,0,1806396.story OTRAS NOTICIASThe Economist presenta su informe semanal: "Business this week".Para más información:http://www.economist.com/node/16648201?story_id=16648201CNN publica la sección: "Impact your world".Para más información:http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/impact.your.world/Terremoto sacude a Nueva Zelanda.Para más información:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39730403/ns/world_news-asiapacific/Grupos de Al Qaeda amenazan a Europa y los Estados Unidos.Para más información:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39711709/ns/us_news-security/Líderes tendrán 21 minutos para cambiar al mundo.Para más información:http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/717564.htmlSegún informe de la ONU: violencia sexual menoscaba a las sociedades.Para más información:http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/717570.htmlIndia y Brasil hacia un futuro de "economías verdes".Para más información:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11588020

Po upadku komunizmu i zakończeniu zimnej wojny wydawało się, że świat na trwałe wchodzi w okres stabilizacji, pokoju i współpracy. Szybko jednak okazało się, że świat narastającej globalizacji ma różne oblicza, także negatywne, co rzutuje na prawie każdą sferę życia, także na bezpieczeństwo. Spadło co prawda zagrożenie nuklearne, ale pojawiły się nowe zagrożenia oraz nasiliły te, które przedtem przesłonięte były rywalizacją Wschód – Zachód. Chodzi głównie o konfl ikty etniczno- -religijne, kulturowe i cywilizacyjne, w tym rozlewające się konfl ikty wewnętrzne w państwach słabych i upadłych, proliferację broni masowego rażenia, niebezpieczne ambicje państw dyktatorskich. Ogromny wpływ na ład międzynarodowy i bezpieczeństwo miały zamachy 11 września 2001. Zmieniły one percepcję zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa. Terroryzm uznany został za największe zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa, a ogłoszona przez prezydenta Busha walka z terroryzmem doprowadziła Stany Zjednoczone i prawie cały Zachód do zaangażowania w dwie wojny: w Iraku i w Afganistanie. O ile interwencję w Afganistanie i obalenie reżimu Talibów można uznać za swoiste prawo do samoobrony Stanów Zjednoczonych (a właściwie po uruchomieniu art. 5 traktatu waszyngtońskiego za sprawę całego NATO), bo Al-Kaida, która była organizatorem zamachów 11 września, za przyzwoleniem tego reżimu była na stałe zainstalowana w tym kraju, to już interwencja w Iraku miała wątpliwe podstawy prawne, a właściwie była ona jednostronną decyzją USA, podjętą mimo protestów połowy sojuszników NATO. To co nastąpiło potem, w ramach wojny z terroryzmem, przekształciło się w totalny chaos, przypominający wojnę domową, w Iraku obecnie wygasającą, w Afganistanie zaś, już w warunkach obecności tam Międzynarodowych Sił Wsparcia Bezpieczeństwa (ISAF), coraz bardziej nasilającą się. W ostatnich dwóch latach warunki bezpieczeństwa w Afganistanie, za które w praktyce, w ramach ISAF, odpowiedzialne jest NATO, gwałtownie się pogorszyły. Gwałtownie wzrosła liczba zamachów terrorystycznych, a talibowie odzyskują pozycje, kontrolując już prawie 40% obszaru Afganistanu. Sytuacja w Afganistanie i odpowiedzialność NATO za bezpieczeństwo tego kraju budzi ogromne zaniepokojenie przywódców państw natowskich oraz kierownictwa sojuszu. Staje się to również jednym z centralnych problemów nowej administracji waszyngtońskiej. Trwające już siedem lat i rosnące zaangażowanie NATO i sił koalicyjnych w Afganistanie, pionierskie w ramach misji out of area, mimo zaangażowania ok. 64 tysięcy żołnierzy, sprzętu i idących w miliardy dolarów kosztów operacji nie przynosi jak dotąd, oczekiwanych rezultatów. Dlatego też przygotowana i realizowana jest nowa strategia obecności USA i NATO w Afganistanie. Zaangażowanie NATO w Afganistanie często interpretowane jest jako swoisty test dla Sojuszu, jako wyraz rosnącej odpowiedzialności za bezpieczeństwo globalne, w tym za zwalczanie nowych zagrożeń, takich jak terroryzm, których eskalacja jest także ubocznym skutkiem globalizacji. Autor nie w pełni podziela te opinie, choć niewątpliwie obecność NATO w Afganistanie jest ważną i trudną próbą dla Sojuszu, w tym także dla Polski ze względu na rosnące zaangażowanie sił zbrojnych naszego kraju w tę operację. Sprawa udziału NATO jednak rzutuje na stan bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, eskaluje napięcia i budzi negatywne emocje cywilizacyjno-kulturowe, utrudnia walkę z terroryzmem, kładzie się cieniem na i tak niejasny obraz sytuacji na Bliskim i Środkowym Wschodzie. Na wiele spraw z zakresu bezpieczeństwa globalnego i regionalnego, w tym narodowego poszczególnych krajów (choćby USA), patrzy się przez pryzmat Afganistanu. ; When the cold war ended, after the collapse of communism and when fi nally the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was a widespread feeling through the world that at long last universal peace had descended on earth. The fear of war in which weapons of mass destruction would be used had vanished. Today's world is a vastly different place. It is a world of globalization, which has both good and bad sides. This inexorable process has extended the opportunities of worldwide interchange. But this same globalization process and associated technology have also brought major new threats and intensifi ed existing ones. The threats we face are seamless, running across the boundaries of defence, foreign affairs, domestic and social life. It has left nations and peoples ever more vulnerable to phenomena ranging from international crime and terrorism through to cyber-attacks, health pandemics, energy politics, resource shortages and fi nancial crisis. We are facing the problem of failed states, WMD proliferations, rough countries challenges. We all have to agree that it was a great impact of 9/11 terrorist hijackers and attacks on security. The perception of international security threats has changed. Terrorism has been recognized as the biggest threat for security. The war on terrorism, declared by George W. Bush, has engaged United States and almost the whole West in two wars: in Iraq and in Afghanistan. As far as Afghanistan case is concerned, one has to recognize the legitimacy of American intervention (as did the UN Security Council), as U.S. had the right to self-defence after Al-Qaeda attacks, operating from Afghan territory. In the case of intervention in Iraq there are far going doubts about its legitimacy. The result was not only the overthrow of both regimes, of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Taliban in Afghanistan, but a real mess – if not a civil war – in Iraq. Today, after seven years, the security situation in Iraq has much improved, but in Afghanistan there is ongoing process of violence escalation. In the last years the conditions of security in Afghanistan, for keeping which responsible is ISAF (and practically NATO, being a core of ISAF), has dramatically deteriorated. The number of terrorist attacks has enormously increased and Taliban have regained the control over 40% of Afghan territory. The security situation in Afghanistan and NATO's responsibility for that is the reason of deep concern for both the leaders of NATO member states and Alliance itself. The new American administration has made the confl ict a policy priority. President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan, including the decision to commit an additional 30 000 U.S. military forces to address the confl ict. NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is treated as a kind of test for Alliance and a confi rmation of NATO's rising responsibility for global security, opening new out of area alliance missions. It is also important for Poland, taking in consideration the rising number of Polish troops in Afghanistan. Many questions of global and regional [Middle East] security are treated in the framework of Afghanistan case. ; Многие считали, что после падения коммунизма и окончания холодной войны, мир входит в период стабилизации, мира и сотрудничества. Однако вскоре ока- залось, что в эпоху глобализации мир имеет разные обличия, в том числе нега- тивные, что отражается почти на каждой сфере жизни, в том числе и на безопас- ности. Хотя и уменьшилась ядерная угроза, но появились новые угрозы, а также усилились те, которые ранее, в связи с соперничеством Востока и Запада, на- ходились на втором плане. Главным образом здесь необходимо иметь ввиду эт- ническо-религиозные, культурные и цивилизационные конфликты, в том числе, внутренние конфликты в слабых и распавшихся государствах, распространение оружия массового уничтожения, опасные шаги диктаторских государств. Огромное влияние на международный порядок и безопасность оказали террористические акты 11 сентября 2001 года. Они полностью изменили вос- приятие угроз безопасности. Терроризм был признан самой большой угрозой безопасности, а провозглашенная президентом Бушем война с терроризмом вовлекла Соединённые Штаты и почти весь Запад в ведение двух войн: в Ира- ке и в Афганистане. Если интервенцию в Афганистане и свержение режима та- либов еще можно признать своеобразным правом на самозащиту Соединённых Штатов (а имея ввиду 5 статью Вашингтонского договора делом всего НАТО), поскольку Аль-Каида, ответственная за организацию терактов 11 сентября, с согласия режима талибов имела постоянные базы в этой стране, то интер- венция в Ираке имела очень слабые юридические основания и в действитель- ности она была односторонним решением США, принятым вопреки протестам половины союзников НАТО. То, что произошло в рамках войны с терроризмом, позже превратилось в тотальный хаос, приведший к ослабевающей гражданс- кой войне в Ираке, и усиливающейся войне в Афганистане, происходящей в ус- ловиях присутствия там Международных сил содействия безопасности (ISAF). В последние два года безопасность в Афганистане, за которую в действитель- ности в рамках ISAF, несет ответственность НАТО, сильно ухудшилась. Возрос- ло количество террористических актов, а талибы контролируют уже почти 40% территории Афганистана. Ситуация в Афганистане и ответственность НАТО за безопасность этой стра- ны, вызывает огромное беспокойство глав государств членов НАТО, руководс- тва союза, а также становиться одной из главных проблем новой вашингтон- ской администрации. Продолжающееся уже семь лет и растущее присутствие НАТО и коалиционных сил в Афганистане, не взирая на контингент численностью около 64 тысяч солдат, современную технику и исчисляющуюся в миллиар- дах долларов стоимость операции, пока не принесло ожидаемых результатов. В связи с чем, подготавливается и реализуется новая стратегия присутствия США и НАТО в Афганистане. Действия НАТО в Афганистане часто интерпретированы как своеобразный тест для союза, как проявление растущей ответственности за глобальную бе- зопасность, в том числе за борьбу с новыми угрозами, такими как терроризм, эскалация которого в какой-то степени является побочным следствием глоба- лизации. Автор не полностью разделяет такое мнение, хотя, несомненно, при- сутствие НАТО в Афганистане – это важное и тяжелое испытание для союза, в том числе также для Польши, ввиду возрастающего присутствия вооружён- ных сил Польши в этой операции. Вопрос участия в операции НАТО, хотим мы этого или нет, отражается на состоянии международной безопасности, вызыва- ет напряжения и отрицательные цивилизационно-культурные эмоции, затруд- няет борьбу с терроризмом, оказывает влияние на и так непростую ситуацию на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке. На многие вопросы в сфере глобальной и ре- гиональной безопасности, в том числе и национальной, отдельных стран (даже США), нужно смотреть сквозь призму Афганистана.

This paper analyzes the transfer and spread of laparoscopy in Korea in the 1970–80s and its impact on Korean society from a historical perspective. It raises three questions: first, what was the reason that laparoscopy was introduced and spread in Korea, even though other contraceptive technologies were already in use? Second, what was the impact of laparoscopy on the Family Planning Program in Korea? Third, what subsequent effect did laparoscopy have on obstetricians in Korea? To clarify these points, this study examines government documents, NGO reports, and medical research papers produced in Korea and the United States of America (USA). There were three main reasons due to which laparoscopy was introduced and spread in Korea. Firstly, it was the necessity and the possibility of new contraceptive technology. The limitations of existing contraceptive technology led to the need for tubal sterilization. Intrauterine devices and oral contraceptives caused many side effects due to defects in the technology itself and baseless target amount; additionally, they were a substantial economic burden due to their long-term costs. Vasectomy and artificial abortion were suggested as alternatives, but the limitations were obvious; vasectomy could not overcome the psychological resistance among males, while artificial abortion was vulnerable to the ethical condemnation of sacrificing life. As intrauterine devices, oral contraceptives, vasectomy, and artificial abortion exposed several limitations, tubal sterilization, which had not been discussed as an alternative, began to emerge as a viable method. The Hospital Family Planning Program and the introduction of laparoscopy realized and expanded the possibilities of tubal sterilization, which until the early 1970s had been a difficult surgery, only available at hospital-level institutions. This constraint was resolved with the implementation of the Hospital Family Planning Program in response to the rise of the urban population problem. As hospitals, concentrated in cities, emerged as new centers of family planning, the technological limitations blocking the spread of tubal sterilization were naturally solved; further, laparoscopic surgery, introduced in the mid-1970s, expanded possibilities of tubal sterilization. With the introduction of laparoscopy, tubal sterilization changed from a complicated surgery requiring hospital-level institutions to a simple surgery available at clinic-level institutions. With both necessity and possibility in place, tubal sterilization became a key means of the Family Planning Program. The second reason is that laparoscopy met the interests of the governments and medical professionals of both the USA and Korea. In the late 1960s, the governments of both countries sought new means to replace the existing contraceptive technologies. As mentioned above, intrauterine devices and oral contraceptives caused frequent side effects and were quite expensive. Under these circumstances, laparoscopy emerged as a groundbreaking technology for popularizing tubal sterilization, decreasing the difficulty of the operation and increasing its safety. Although the problem of its high initial cost remained, a single surgery could have a permanent contraceptive effect, thus, it seemed to be an economical option. For both governments, laparoscopy was an excellent technical solution to overcome the technological and economic limitations of existing contraceptive technologies. Laparoscopy also met the interests of medical practitioners in both countries. Obstetricians in developed countries, leading the development and diffusion of contraceptive technology, were able to secure huge amounts of clinical cases through worldwide population control projects. Proving the effectiveness of new medical technologies required a sufficient number of cases; however, this was not an easy task in developed countries, where population problems were not prominent. The solution was the 'extension of the operating room.' If the surgical procedure could be standardized and the results could be reported in a systemized format, cases could be collected easily from various countries. Medical professionals in Korea also saw their benefits. Based on the network between Korea and the USA through the standardization of laparoscopic surgery, obstetricians in the former country received technology transfer and exerted authority as experienced surgeons. Behind the Johns Hopkins Program for International Education in Gynecology and Obstetrics lay the overlapping interests of the governments and medical professionals of both countries. Lastly, laparoscopy was technically improved to suit the situation of developing countries. When first used for tubal sterilization, laparoscopy was not an appropriate technique to be used in developing countries as it was neither safe nor cheap. Laparoscopic surgeries sometimes caused complications, such as perforation of the small intestine; furthermore, in developing countries, where medical personnel and facilities were scarce, such complications could threaten the lives of the patients. The lack of safety was a major flaw preventing the spread of laparoscopic sterilization, as it could not be implemented at the expense of people's lives. The complexity and low economic efficiency of laparoscopy were also problematic. Although it was simple and inexpensive compared to open surgery, it was still complex and too expensive to be widely used in developing countries. To solve these problems, public and private organizations such as the United States Agency for International Development and the Ford Foundation, and several medical professionals dove into the improvement of laparoscopy; consequently, laparoscopy became affordable and safe enough for developing countries. With three conditions in place, the necessity and the possibility for tubal sterilization, overlapping of the interests in technology transfer, and technological improvement to suit the environment of the developing countries, laparoscopy could be transferred and spread rapidly. After laparoscopy was introduced in Korea, laparoscopic tubal sterilization quickly matched other contraceptive techniques and finally outpaced them in the early 1980s. The second and third questions correspond to the influence of laparoscopy on Korean society. Regarding the impact on the Family Planning Program, laparoscopy solidified and deepened the male-dominant gender order. The Family Planning Program had always targeted women. It was the result of the consensus of the two major powers, namely, government officials and doctors; most government officials viewed family planning as the job of a 'housewife,' and doctors also focused mostly on female contraception. It is no exaggeration to state that the Family Planning Program was a project to spread female contraceptive technologies. The budget was focused on the dissemination of intrauterine devices and oral contraceptives rather than vasectomy; in turn, it became evidence proving the effectiveness of targeting women, fixing them the subject of the program. Laparoscopy consolidated this flow. The side effects of intrauterine devices and oral contraceptives, ironically, could resolve gender inequality in family planning strategies. As the sustainability of the program became uncertain, a group of bureaucrats and doctors who had shifted all responsibility to women began to reorient the plan toward vasectomy. With the introduction of laparoscopy, however, the plan focused on women again. As laparoscopy popularized tubal sterilization, political will toward vasectomy decreased accordingly. In the circular logic by which the availability of technology determined the direction of the policy, and such policy proved the value of technology, women became the set target of the Family Planning Program, and laparoscopy became a driving force to maintain this vicious circle. The same was true for the initiative of the Family Planning Program. The program was designed and implemented by male doctors and policy-makers from the beginning. The women's birth control movement, which existed until the end of the 1950s, came to an end with the military coup. The military regime excluded female organizations from the program, and the international organizations represented by the International Planned Parenthood Federation focused on population control projects under the order of Cold War rather than women's right to control childbirth according to their will. Given the change of circumstances, the initiative of the plan was transferred to a group of male doctors who had acquired knowledge of preventive medicine, population theory, and had become proficient in English by studying abroad; they emerged as a point of contact between the international order and Korea. Furthermore, they took over key posts in the public and private sectors. The introduction of laparoscopy strengthened the male dominance of the program. In the 1960s, although a group of male doctors led the plan's design and supervision, it was the women who were tasked with its implementation in the field. Family planning agents were in charge of inserting the intrauterine devices and providing guidance on the usage of oral contraceptives as well as promoting and enlightening the program. The situation changed with the popularization of laparoscopic tubal sterilization. As the program was reorganized to focus on laparoscopic surgery, the role of female agents was reduced to promoting the new technology, while obstetricians—predominantly male—emerged as the main actors intervening in women's bodies. Thus, laparoscopy was a technology that reproduced and reinforced gender inequality in terms of the plan's targets and initiatives. Laparoscopy also had an impact on the Korean obstetrician community. In short, it was the basis of technological catch-up. Elite obstetricians in Korea who joined the international trends of obstetrics continued to face new technologies, such as surgical microscopes used for microsurgery (e.g., tubal reanastomosis) and in vitro fertilization (IVF). Encouraged by the introduction of laparoscopy, obstetricians in Korea once again tried to keep up with the trends in global obstetrics and attained some success. This was because laparoscopy created the necessity and the possibility of technological catch-up. The popularization of laparoscopic tubal sterilization meant an increase in the demand to restore fertility. Although the proportion of those who wanted reversal surgery was not significantly high, the absolute number was not small because sterilization was performed on hundreds of thousands of people every year. This resulted in the demand for tubal reanastomosis and IVF. Laparoscopy created the possibility of introducing new reproductive technologies also. Microscopic tubal reversal was transferred to Korea through the same network by which laparoscopic tubal sterilization had been introduced. The main agents of technical education and financial support, and the operation of the training programs, were identical. The case of IVF was slightly different. In the case of IVF, universities and laboratories were competing to achieve success first. In this competitive structure, nobody wanted to disclose their technology; therefore, it was not easy for medical professionals of developing countries to go abroad to learn new skills. However, the human network established during the introduction of laparoscopy enabled many Korean obstetricians to seek training overseas, thereby introducing IVF technology to Korea. In conclusion, laparoscopy was developed and spread through the unique social structures of the time, whilst reproducing and strengthening them at the same time. First, in the political order of the Cold War, laparoscopy was rediscovered and improved as a means of intervening in the population of developing countries and then became the basis for the continuation of population control projects. Second, in the patriarchal setup of Korea, laparoscopy was introduced through the Family Planning Program assuming women as the main target of the program; further, the spread of laparoscopic sterilization circularly strengthened this assumption and the dominance of male doctors. Finally, in the context of the aspirations to high technologies of medical professionals in Korea, laparoscopy could defeat competing technologies and spread quickly; moreover, it functioned as a basis for technological catch-up. In short, laparoscopy was a technology that mediated and reinforced the multilayered structures of the Cold War, gender politics, and technological aspirations. 이 논문은 1970년대와 1980년대 한국에서 복강경 기술이 도입되고 확산하는 과정과 그것이 한국 사회에 미친 영향을 역사적으로 분석하였다. 문제의식은 다음의 세 가지였다. 첫 번째, 이미 다른 피임 기술이 보급되어 있던 상황에서, 복강경 기술이 한국으로 도입되고 확산할 수 있었던 까닭은 무엇인가. 두 번째, 이렇게 도입되고 확산한 복강경 기술은 한국 가족계획 사업에 어떤 영향을 주었는가. 세 번째, 복강경 기술은 이후 한국의 산부인과학계에 어떠한 영향을 주었는가. 이를 밝히기 위해 1970년대와 1980년대 당시 한국과 미국에서 생산된 여러 정부 문건과 비정부기구 보고서, 의학 연구 논문 등을 살펴보았으며, 그러한 탐구의 결과 다음과 같은 결론을 내릴 수 있었다. 먼저 복강경 기술이 한국으로 도입되고 확산할 수 있었던 이유는 크게 세 가지였다. 첫 번째는 난관 불임 수술이라는 새로운 피임 기술의 필요성과 가능성이 갖추어졌기 때문이다. 1970년대에 들어서면서 기존에 사용되던 자궁내장치와 경구피임약, 정관 불임 수술 등의 방법은 기술 자체의 결함과 근거 없는 목표량 설정에 따른 잦은 부작용, 심리적 저항 등의 한계를 노출했다. 이에 따라 많은 의학자와 인구학자는 난관 불임 수술이라는 대안 기술에 주목했다. 물론 난관 불임 수술은 수술실과 입원실이라는 물적 조건을 갖춘 병원에서만 시행 가능한 까다로운 기술이었다. 하지만 한국의 경우 도시 가족계획 사업의 시행으로 병원이 사업의 새로운 중심으로 부상하고, 여기에 1970년대 중반에 도입된 복강경이 수술의 물적 조건을 완화하면서, 이러한 한계는 상당 부분 극복될 수 있었다. 두 번째는 복강경 기술이 미국과 한국 양국 정부와 의학자의 이해관계에 고루 부합하였기 때문이다. 기존의 피임 기술이 한계를 노출하는 상황 속에서, 미국 정부와 한국 정부는 복강경 난관 불임 수술을 시행함으로써 인구 조절 사업을 통한 자유 진영의 수호와 경제 개발 계획을 지속할 수 있었다. 복강경 기술은 양국 의학자의 이해에도 합치하였다. 피임 기술의 개발과 확산을 주도하던 선진국의 여러 의학자는 수술법을 표준화하여 보급하고 규격화된 양식으로 결과를 보고받는 '수술실의 확장'을 통해 막대한 양의 임상례를 확보할 수 있었다. 한국의 의학자 역시 복강경 수술의 표준화로 이어진 양국의 연결망을 바탕으로 선진국의 기술을 이전받는 동시에, 다량의 임상례를 생산하는 자로서의 권위를 누릴 수 있었다. 마지막은 복강경이 개발도상국의 상황에 맞게 개량되었기 때문이다. 난관 불임 수술에 사용되기 시작한 초기만 해도, 복강경은 개발도상국의 환경에 적합한 기술이 아니었다. 복강경은 기대만큼 안전하지도, 기대만큼 저렴하지도 못했다. 이를 해결하기 위하여, 국제개발처와 포드 재단 등의 관민 기관과 여러 의학자가 복강경의 개량에 뛰어들었다. 복잡한 부품은 간단한 부품으로 교체되었고, 위험한 방식은 안전한 방식으로 대체되었다. 이렇게 난관 불임 수술의 필요성과 가능성이 갖추어지고, 기술 이전을 향한 이해관계가 중첩되는 동시에, 이전 대상국의 환경에 따라 복강경이 개량됨에 따라, 복강경은 급속도로 이전되고 확산할 수 있었다. 한국에 복강경 기술이 이전된 이후 복강경을 이용한 난관 불임 수술은 다른 피임 기술을 빠르게 추격하였고, 마침내 1980년대 초반에 이르러 수위(首位)를 차지했다. 두 번째와 세 번째 문제의식은 복강경 기술이 한국 사회에 미친 영향에 해당한다. 먼저 가족계획 사업에 끼친 영향이다. 요컨대 복강경은 남성으로 치우친 사업의 젠더 질서를 고착화하고 심화하였다. 복강경은 사업의 대상을 여성으로 고정하는 결과를 가져왔다. 사업을 주도하던 양대 세력인 정부 관료와 의사 집단은 사업의 초기부터 줄곧 여성을 대상으로 삼았다. 자궁내장치와 경구피임약의 확산이 정체하면서 정관 불임 수술이 대안으로 떠올랐지만, 복강경의 도입과 함께 사업은 다시 여성으로 집중되었다. 사업의 주도권 역시 마찬가지였다. 남성 의사 집단이 사업의 설계와 감독을 주도하였지만, 복강경이 도입되기 전까지만 해도 현장에서의 실행만큼은 여성의 몫이었다. 그러나 사업이 복강경을 중심으로 재편되며 여성 요원의 역할은 새로운 기술을 홍보하고 안내하는 수준으로 축소되었고, 남성이 다수이던 산부인과 의사가 여성의 신체에 개입하는 주요 행위자가 되었다. 이렇게 복강경은 사업의 대상과 주도권의 측면에서, 젠더 불평등을 재생산하고 확대하였다. 다음은 복강경 기술이 한국 산부인과학계에 미친 영향이다. 복강경을 계기로 산부인과학의 국제적 조류에 합류한 한국의 엘리트 산부인과 의사는 계속해서 수술 현미경이나 체외수정과 같은 새로운 기술을 도입하였다. 이는 복강경이 기술 추격의 필요성과 가능성을 만들어낸 결과였다. 먼저 복강경은 신기술이 도입되어야 할 필요성을 창출했다. 복강경의 확산에 따른 난관 불임 수술의 보급은 다시 생식능력을 복원하려는 수요의 성장으로 이어졌다. 복강경은 새로운 기술이 도입되는 가능성이기도 했다. 현미경을 이용한 난관 복원 수술은 복강경 난관 불임 수술을 도입하던 연결망을 통해 한국으로 이전되었고, 체외 수정 역시 복강경 기술의 이전 과정에서 생성된 인적 연결망을 바탕으로 도입될 수 있었다. 이처럼 복강경은 당대의 고유한 사회 구조를 매개로 만들어지고 퍼져 나갔고, 동시에 이러한 구조를 재생산하고 강화하였다. 먼저 오래된 기술인 복강경은 냉전의 정치 상황 속에서 개발도상국의 인구에 개입하는 수단으로 재조명되며 비로소 개량될 수 있었고, 이렇게 개량되어 보급됨으로써 다시 인구 조절 사업을 이어나가는 바탕이 되었다. 또한 남성으로 치우친 한국의 젠더 질서 속에서 복강경은 여성을 사업의 주요 대상으로 상정하는 사업 기조를 매개로 한국에 도입되어, 다시금 여성을 사업의 대상으로 고정하는 동시에, 남성 의사의 주도권을 강화하기도 했다. 마지막으로 복강경은 선진국을 향한 여러 엘리트 의학자의 열망에 힘입어 빠르게 이전되고 확산하였으며, 이는 이후 수술 현미경과 체외수정 기술을 추격하는 기반으로 작동하였다. 요컨대 복강경은 냉전과 젠더 불평등, 그리고 선진 기술을 향한 선망이라는 당대의 구조를 매개하고 강화하는 기술이었다. ; open ; 박사

Esta Semana: Comunicado de Departamento del Tesoro de los EE.UU. El 13 de julio el titular del Departamento del Tesoro de Estados Unidos, Henry M. Paulson, Jr, emitió un comunicado sobre la caída y rescate de los gigantes inmobiliarios Fannie Mae y Freddy Mac. Les acercamos el comunicado extraído del Departamento de Prensa del Tesoro americano. El pasado 25 de julio se produjo la Cumbre Unión Europea - Sudáfrica. En la oportunidad y como resultado de la misma los participantes emitieron una declaración conjunta. Véala aquí Les acercamos este informe del Alto Comisionado de Derechos Humanos de la ONU sobre Derechos Humanos y Terrorismo que nos pareció de gran interés. Véalo aquíRadovan Karadzic en La Haya.Responsable por uno de los genocidios mas sangrientos de la historia reciente, Radovan Karadzic, el ex jefe político de los serbobosnios comparecerá ante el Tribunal Penal Internacional para ex Yugoslavia. Karadzic fue trasladado en la noche del pasado martes a La Haya. Horas antes del traslado, tenía lugar una manifestación organizada por la oposición nacionalista serbia en el centro de Belgrado, que degeneró al final en altercados entre unos centenares de jóvenes y la policía. Varios medios informan al respecto: "El Mercurio" de Chile: "Masiva protesta antes de su traslado en las calles de Belgrado: Karadzic fue extraditado a La Haya":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/30/internacional/internacional/noticias/B46C4AF2-02E3-4C90-823E-ECC1FC5E98D2.htm?id={B46C4AF2-02E3-4C90-823E-ECC1FC5E98D2}"El País" de Madrid: "Karadzic llega al Tribunal de La Haya: Serbia envía de noche al presunto criminal de guerra a las dependencias penitenciarias internacionales.- Será juzgado por genocidio y otros crímines por el Tribunal Penal Internacional para la ex Yugoslavia": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Karadzic/llega/Tribunal/Haya/elpepuint/20080730elpepuint_4/Tes"New York Times": "Karadzic Arrives in Hague After Protest by Loyalists":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/31/world/europe/31hague.html"CCN": "Karadzic set to make first court appearance":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/30/karadzic.deportation/index.html"Karadzic appeal not received by court"http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/28/karadzic.deportation/index.html"Karadzic to defend himself in war crimes court":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/23/serb.arrest/index.html"Thousands protest Karadzic arrest":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/07/29/karadzic.deportation/index.html"Time":"Karadzic Wants No Lawyer":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827424,00.html"Le Monde": "Radovan Karadzic comparaîtra jeudi devant le TPI"http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/07/30/radovan-karadzic-est-arrive-a-la-haye_1078522_3214.html#ens_id=1075781"Los Ángeles Times": "War crimes suspect Karadzic extradited to The Hague":http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-serbs30-2008jul30,0,2903253.story"MSNBC": "Karadzic in U.N. custody in Netherlands: Ex-fugitive flown to the Netherlands following violent protest in Belgrade":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25887949/"Thousands protest in Belgrade for Karadzic: U.S. Embassy warns Americans to avoid protest amid fears of violence":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25890371/"Paper: Karadzic lawyer tries to stop extradition: Appeal meant to prevent war-crime suspect from being sent to U.N. court":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25859649/"Times":"Radovan Karadzic extradited to The Hague":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4427730"La Nación": "Está acusado de genocidio: Radovan Karadzic, a disposición de La Haya. El ex líder serbio llegó a Holanda para ser juzgado en el Tribunal Penal Internacional":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034845"Avanza su extradición: Karadzic será llevado a La Haya en secreto": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034388"El Tiempo" de Colombia: "Radovan Karadzic fue llevado a La Haya, Holanda, para ser juzgado por crímenes de guerra":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/radovan-karadzic-fue-llevado-a-la-haya-holanda-para-ser-juzgado-por-crimenes-de-guerra_4416080-1"The Economist":"Arrest of a bearded man": http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792314"El Universal" de Méjico: "Karadzic queda en poder de la ONU en Holanda":http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/526234.htmlAMERICA LATINA"El Mercurio" publica: "Reclaman la restitución del Ejército: Ex militares haitianos ocupan un antiguo cuartel":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/30/internacional/internacional/noticias/B0B07BB4-211D-4F05-9FEB-6704AF47278D.htm?id={B0B07BB4-211D-4F05-9FEB-6704AF47278D}"La Nación" publica: "Uribe pide "discreción"":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034424"MSNBC" informa: "Woman suspected of being FARC's Europe link: Maria Remedios Garcia Albert, 57, was the alleged rebel liaison":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25873981"The Economist" analiza: "Energy reform in México: Crude and oily. A controversial referendum and the future of the state oil company":http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11791596"MSNBC" anuncia: "Mexican military losing drug war support: Border residents report abuse, violence by soldiers sent to curb narcotics": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25851906/"El País" de Madrid publica: "El presidente electo de Paraguay ya no es sacerdote: El Papa ha suspendido definitivamente a Fernando Lugo porque las profesiones de obispo y gobernante de un país no son compatibles http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/presidente/electo/Paraguay/sacerdote/elpepuint/20080730elpepuint_8/Tes"El País" de Madrid informa: "Chávez: "Bush quiere revivir la guerra fría". El presidente venezolano dice, en una carta enviada a Fidel Castro, que EE UU planea agredir a Cuba http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Chavez/Bush/quiere/revivir/guerra/fria/elpepuint/20080728elpepuint_14/Tes"The Economist" anuncia: "Argentina: Et tu, Julio? :The president suffers a heavy defeat at the hands of her number two":http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11791614"La Nación" informa: "Bolivia: ratifican el referéndum. Pese a los pedidos de suspensión, la Corte Electoral dijo que se celebrará el 10 de agosto":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034389ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"New York Times" informa: " U.S. Military Says Soldiers Fired on Civilians":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/28/world/middleeast/28iraq.html?ref=world"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "La Casa Blanca pronostica un déficit presupuestario récord para 2009: Sería de 482.000 millones de dólares, aproximadamente el 3,5% de la economía": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Casa/Blanca/pronostica/deficit/presupuestario/record/2009/elpepueco/20080728elpepueco_8/Tes"La Nación" publica: "La economía enfrenta a Obama y McCain: El candidato demócrata advirtió que Estados Unidos está en "emergencia económica"; fuertes críticas de su rival republicano":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034414"The Economist" analiza: "It's the economy again, stupid.John McCain and Barack Obama are offering profoundly different prescriptions, though economic and political realities will limit their ambitions": http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792500"El País" de Madrid informa: "Republicanos y demócratas se enfocan en la economía: Barack Obama convoca a un panel de lujo para revisar sus propuestas.- John McCain mantiene contactos con las autoridades monetarias": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Republicanos/democratas/enfocan/economia/elpepuint/20080728elpepuint_13/Tes"El Mercurio" de Chile anuncia: "Le queda menos de un mes antes de ser proclamado oficialmente en la Convención Demócrata: Obama entra en la recta final para decidir quién será su candidato a Vicepresidente":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/07/30/internacional/_portada/noticias/CAE4A8B7-3485-4112-8844-D31E89023938.htm?id={CAE4A8B7-3485-4112-8844-D31E89023938}"Time" informa: "Obama's Vice-Presidential Dilemma":http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1827714,00.html"Time" publica su sitio con links sobre las elecciones en los Estados Unidos: http://thepage.time.com/EUROPA"El País" de Madrid informa: "Erdogan llama a la unidad tras los atentados de ayer en Turquía: La explosión consecutiva de dos bombas sacude un barrio obrero de Estambul.- La cifra de muertes sube a 17 y hay unos 150 heridos, una decena de ellos de gravedad.- La policía sospecha de los independentistas kurdos": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Erdogan/llama/unidad/atentados/ayer/Turquia/elpepuint/20080728elpepuint_4/Tes"New Yorrk Times2 anuncia: "Police Investigate Istanbul Bombings":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/world/europe/29turkey.html?ref=world"Time" publica: "Fatal Bombings in an Edgy Turkey":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827056,00.html"El País" de Madrid informa: "Comienza el proceso para ilegalizar el partido de Erdogan": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Comienza/proceso/ilegalizar/partido/Erdogan/elpepuint/20080728elpepiint_6/Tes"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "El Tribunal Constitucional de Turquía rechaza ilegalizar al partido de Gobierno":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Tribunal/Constitucional/Turquia/rechaza/ilegalizar/partido/Gobierno/elpepuint/20080730elpepuint_9/Tes"Le Monde" publica: "Turquie : la justice n'interdit pas le parti au pouvoir":http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2008/07/30/turquie-la-justice-n-interdit-pas-le-parti-au-pouvoir_1078861_3214.html"Time" analiza: "Who Was Behind the Turkish Blasts?":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827398,00.htmlEl País" de Madrid informa: "Las peores inundaciones en Ucrania en 100 años se cobran la vida de 13 personas. Las fuertes lluvias han destruido más de 21.000 casas y 20.000 hectáreas de cultivos, y han dejado inutilizadas 2.020 kilómetros de carreteras y más de un centenar de puentes": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/peores/inundaciones/Ucrania/anos/cobran/vida/personas/elpepuint/20080728elpepuint_5/Tes"MSNBC" publica: "Ukraine floods kill 22, force 20,000 to flee: Damages estimated at $800 million, but few funds available to clean up":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25887744/"Time" informa: "Thousands of British Passports Stolen": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827501,00.html"La Nación" publica: "Los que huyen de la miseria. Actos desesperados de los ilegales en España para no ser deportados: Viajes riesgosos y casamientos arreglados":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034426"MSNBC" informa: "7 jailed for genocide over Srebrenica massacre. War crimes court orders Bosnian Serbs to serve sentences of up 42 years":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25908708/"The Economist" analiza: "France: The reformist president. Quietly but determinedly, Nicolas Sarkozy is pressing ahead with reforms in France-all without provoking huge strikes and street protests":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792306ASIA – PACÍFICO /MEDIO ORIENTE"New York Times" informa: "Bomb Attacks in Baghdad and Kirkuk Kill Dozens": HTTP://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/2008/07/29/WORLD/MIDDLEEAST/29IRAQ.HTML?REF=WORLD"El País" anuncia: "Tres mujeres suicidas causan al menos 28 muertos en Bagdad. Miles de peregrinos llenan Bagdad con motivo de una importante festividad chií.- En Kirkuk, otro atentado suicida deja 22 muertos": HTTP://WWW.ELPAIS.COM/ARTICULO/INTERNACIONAL/MUJERES/SUICIDAS/CAUSAN/28/MUERTOS/BAGDAD/ELPEPUINT/20080728ELPEPUINT_9/TES"La Nación" publica: "Cuatro mujeres suicidas atacaron en Irak:: Hicieron detonar los explosivos que llevaban y mataron a 57 personas; hay por lo menos 300 heridos":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034419"MSNBC" informa: "Female suicide bombers kill 57, wound dozens. Attackers target Shiite pilgrimage in Baghdad, Kurdish rally in Kirkuk": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25880699/"New York Times" anuncia: "Olmert to Resign After September Vote": HTTP://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/2008/07/31/WORLD/MIDDLEEAST/31MIDEAST.HTML?_R=1&HP&OREF=SLOGIN"CNN" publica: "Ahmadinejad: The big powers are going down":HTTP://EDITION.CNN.COM/2008/WORLD/MEAST/07/29/IRAN.AIDS.AP/INDEX.HTML"Time" informa: "Ahmadinejad: 'Powers' Going Down": HTTP://WWW.TIME.COM/TIME/WORLD/ARTICLE/0,8599,1827377,00.HTML"The Economist analiza: "Iran: Who runs it?": http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792348"La Nación" anuncia: "Irán criticó a la ONU ante los Países No Alineados. Ahmadinejad aseguró en la cumbre de cancilleres que el organismo actúa "a favor de las grandes potencias"; pidió crear un fondo para financiar proyectos del bloque":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034530"CNN" informa: "Pakistani militants abduct 30 police": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/29/pakistan.abductions/index.html"Time" anuncia: "Cambodia Reelects Longtime Leader": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827054,00.html"MSNBC" publica: "Typhoon slams Taiwan, triggering floods, slides: At least one killed, air traffic disrupted; Typhoon Fung Wong heads to China": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25881000/"The Economist" analiza: "The Beijing Olympics:Five-ring circus": http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792915"El Mercurio" publica: "Denuncias a días de la inauguración de los Juegos Olímpicos: China no cumple promesas y mantiene censura a la prensa y faltas a DD.HH.": HTTP://DIARIO.ELMERCURIO.COM/2008/07/30/INTERNACIONAL/_PORTADA/NOTICIAS/CB8049AE-EDCE-4C33-AF25-F7337A8C08B6.HTM?ID={CB8049AE-EDCE-4C33-AF25-F7337A8C08B6}"El País" informa: "Ni los Juegos Olímpicos pueden con la censura en China: El COI no logra convencer al país asiático para que los periodistas tengan acceso libre a Internet": HTTP://WWW.ELPAIS.COM/ARTICULO/INTERNET/JUEGOS/OLIMPICOS/PUEDEN/CENSURA/CHINA/ELPPGL/20080730ELPEPUNET_3/TES"New York Times" anuncia: "China to Limit Web Access During Games":HTTP://WWW.NYTIMES.COM/2008/07/31/SPORTS/OLYMPICS/31CHINA.HTML?HP"China Daily" publica: "WTO talks collapse amid farm row": HTTP://WWW.CHINADAILY.COM.CN/CHINA/2008-07/30/CONTENT_6887475.HTM"CNN" informa: "China rebuffs human rights report":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/29/china.humanrights/index.html"CNN" publica: "India: Police defuse 18 bombs at market":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/07/29/india.bombs.ap/index.html+"Time" anuncia: "India: The Terrorists Within": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1826950,00.htmlAFRICA"New York Time" informa: "Sudan Rallies Behind Leader Reviled Abroad":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/28/world/africa/28sudan.html?ref=world"CNN" publica: "U.S. expands Zimbabwe sanctions":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/07/25/zimbabwe.sanctions/index.html"MSNBC" publica: "Officials say Zimbabwe talks break off: Mugabe insists he remain president":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25887595/"MSNBC" informa: "Cash crisis, inflation worsen in Zimbabwe: Bank chief plans new currency reforms to tackle inflation and shortages":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25869792/"CNN" anuncia: "Nigerian militants: We'll destroy oil pipelines":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/07/23/nigeria.oil/index.htmlECONOMIA"The Economist" analiza: "World trade: Dried up. Talks over the Doha round of global trade talks have collapsed":http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11831960&source=features_box_main"The Economist" publica su informe semanal: "Business this week":http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11793527&CFID=15321684&CFTOKEN=24001901"New York Times" informa: "Stock Indexes Continue to Slip":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/29/business/29stox.html?_r=1&ref=business&oref=slogin"El País" de Madrid informa: "El FMI alerta del empeoramiento de la crisis crediticia: La institución internacional achaca este empeoramiento a la ralentización de la economía mundial.- Subraya la caída de los precios de la vivienda en España": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/FMI/alerta/empeoramiento/crisis/crediticia/elpepueco/20080728elpepueco_7/Tes"CNN" publica: "Global trade deal falls apart":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/07/29/wto.collapse.ap/index.html"CNN" informa: "High oil price boosts BP profit":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/07/29/bp.profit.ap/index.html"La Nación" publica: "La liberalización del comercio mundial. Anunciaron el fracaso de la Ronda de Doha. El director general de la Organización Mundial del Comercio, Pascal Lamy, confirmó que las negociaciones quedaron truncas; declaró estar "profundamente consternado"":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034531La caída del crudo impulsa a Wall Street: "La Bolsa de Nueva York muestra fuertes avances; el petróleo bajó más de tres dólares y se negocia en US$ 121 el barril en el mercado estadounidense": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1034574OTRAS NOTICIAS"Time" publica: "Beijing Cites Many Olympic Threats": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1827353,00.html"MSNBC" publica: "Olympic threats fuel unease about security: China says heavy defense will secure Games, but clampdown is smothering":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25890371/"Time" informa: "A Video Threat to the Olympics?":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1826953,00.html"The Economist" analiza: "Global Islam: Unusual guests, a most unusual host. A new breeze may be blowing very softly from the Saudi sands":http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11792340

NDI's Chris Fomunyoh is once again joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson as they discuss the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy. They continue their conversation with their thoughts on the key challenges and opportunities facing Africa this year.
Find us on: SoundCloud | Apple Podcasts | Spotify | RSS | Google Play
Johnnie Carson: When female voices are not heard, the conversation is crippled, the policy is crippled, the institutions are crippled and the results are crippled.
Chris Fomunyoh: I'm Chris Fomunyoh, senior associate and regional director for Central and West Africa at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, NDI. Welcome to this edition of DemWorks.

Again we're joined by Ambassador Johnnie Carson, a proud member of the board of directors of The National Democratic Institute, NDI with a 37 year career in the U.S. Foreign Service focus on Africa. In our previous episode, you spoke about the risk of back sliding. So for this episode, we will focus on the steps that can be taken to strengthen democracy in Africa.

I'd like us to pivot a little bit to the Sahel because in Tanzania we see the back sliding that's coming from political actors themselves, but there's something happening in the Sahel, which is a region in which we see a lot of political commitment to democratic governance, whether it's from the leaders and activists in Niger Republic, in Burkina Faso and in Mali, but at the same time these countries are coming under tremendous pressure from violent extremists who are coming across the desert and destabilizing what would be an emerging democracy and what concerns do you have and how do you think organizations like NDI, like USIP and others that have the self-power expertise, so to speak can contribute to the efforts to counter violent extremism like Sahel and also the whole of Africa?

JC: Chris you're absolutely right and we should all be concerned about outside forces that can come in and destabilize a country, its politics, its economy and its society and across the Sahel we in fact see this happening. The challenges to stability, to democracy to holding free and transparent and creditable elections and having democratic systems that work, are not only challenged by sometimes authoritarian leaders seeking to maintain power and control, we also can see this emerging as a result of exogenous forces coming in from outside, and here we see non-state actors undermining stability across the Sahel, which is creating tension for democracies and tensions for states.

I think one of the things that is absolutely critical in addressing the problems with the Sahel is for government to reconnect with their citizens, to put in place the kinds of services that citizens are looking for and are demanding and expecting. They need to be responsive to the needs that they, citizens believe are not there and they have to have these connections in order to build up resilience, to build up strength against the ideologies and to the negative forces that are brought in by extremist groups.

It is extremists groups across the Sahel are taking advantage of the absence of good services and good connectivity between government and citizens and one of the things that must accompany the security response is in fact a development and government response. Security alone cannot end the problems in the Sahel. It's an important ingredient but the most important ingredient is government going in and establishing responsible connections, providing services, education, healthcare, sanitation, water cattle feeding stations and services that citizens require and are being deprived of.

So one of the things that must be hand in hand and be out front is not the military response and the security response but the governance response, the social service response and if that is absent, the security response will be deficient and will not work.

CF: In fact, I'm so thankful you say that, because I know that you and other members of our board, Secretary Albright, in particular the chair of our board, you've been emphasizing reinforcing this message about democracy and development component as part of the toolkit in conquering violent extremism and in fact, that's the approach that NDI is taking to its work in the Sahel because we currently have ongoing programs in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, and our focus, the main focus of that piece of work is on people, processes and the politics and trying to create platforms where governments can reconnect with citizens at a grassroots level.

So in a number of cases we've set up platforms where civil society with legislatures and members of the executive branch, including representatives of the security services get together regularly to figure out what the challenges are in various communities and how to foster inter-communal dialogue and better relationships between the security services and the populations that they seek to serve, because you may remember there was a UN study that said that in many of the cases where violent extremism persist, that 70% of the people who join extremist organizations, are reacting to poor performance by security services and you have paid a lot of attention to Nigerian and the whole Boko Haram phenomenon.

I don't know how this would fit into our conversation with regards to the Sahel as well.


JC: I think it also very pertinent for Nigeria, and I too have seen studies of some very distinguished organizations, Mercy Corps and others that talk about why people are recruited and indeed, the authoritarian sometimes brutal nature of security forces towards communities that they should be protecting drives individuals away from the government and into the hands of Boko Haram.

Even the origin of the current violence in Northern Nigeria has its origins in the brutal extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram's first leader in 2009. His apprehension, his questioning, his interrogation, torture and mistreatment were all recorded on someone's cellphone and became widely seen throughout the country and throughout the north. Two years later, after that event in 2009 we saw and upsurge in 2011 and the activities of Boko Haram and indeed people continued to say that the brutal nature in which the security forces sought to root out Boko Haram, in fact generated more recruits for Boko Haram than it did for support for the government's efforts.

It is absolutely critical, it's absolutely critical that security forces recognize that they have a responsibility to protect the civil liberties and the human rights of the citizens of the state that they are protecting and that the way they treat the individuals in areas that they go into, may have an impact on their ability to ultimately win the conflict, but one thinks of Nigeria and particularly of the North East and there again weak institutions of corruption of lack of social services are all playing a major part in why the conflict in that region continues.

In the north east of Nigeria particularly and the three most affected states, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Those three states have the lowest social indicators of any of Nigeria's 36 states, less access to education, to healthcare, to water resources and to jobs and access and this all plays out as well. Governments needs to be responsive to their citizens and while a security response is important, governance and providing social services and the needs to citizens to build resilience is critical as well.

CF: This seems like a good place to take a short break. For well over 35 years NDI has been honored to work side by side with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help contribute to develop the institutions practices and skills necessary for democracy's success.

I realize it's many countries to cover but in the few minutes that are left, I just see if you have any parting words for four countries that we haven't really focused that much on and those are Ethiopia, Kenya, The Democratic Republic of Congo and we'll exit with Cameroon. What are your thoughts?

JC: My thoughts on Ethiopia. It is absolutely essential that those of us who support a democracy and democratic progress lend all of our efforts to those of the Ethiopian government to ensure that the democratic experiment that is underway is successful. Prime Minister Abiy won the Nobel Prize for bringing about peace with Eritrea but the more important thing is that we, outside step up our effort to help him ensure that his legislative elections, this year, are successful and that we do what we can to strengthen his country's democratic progress.

He has appointed and outstanding leader, Birtukan, former opposition leader, spent many years in jail as his country's election commissioner. We need on the outside to provide the kind of technical and financial and advocacy support that she might need to put in place the architecture for running the country's elections. It will in fact be the first real serious elections in that country since the collapse of the Derg in the early 1990s. So it's important that we help do this.

Ethiopia is Africa's second most populous country behind Nigeria and it's important that we help democracy there. It's also a key and strategic state in the region bordering a number of other countries that will look to the success of what happens here. So we need to support.

Kenya, will have elections next year. It is important that there be a continuation in the improvement of the country's electoral agencies. The shadow of the flawed and failed and controversial and violent elections of 2007 and 2008 continue to be a shadow. The controversies associated with the last elections and court decisions there continue to hang over. It is important to continue to support civil society, support the electoral commission and work with the Kenyan government to ensure an outcome.

It appears very clearly that President Kenyatta wants to leave a positive legacy of progress, economically, politically and electorally. This will be a challenge but we should support the process moving forward. The features are still there.

CF: In fact, I should say before end up with the last two countries that for listeners, Ethiopia has got a parliamentary system of government. That's why the parliamentary elections are extremely important, the national elections for Ethiopia and also with regards to Kenya, as you say, President Uhuru Kenyatta would like to leave a good legacy. He's coming to the end of his second term and NDI working with partners on the continent has been very strong on the issue constitutionalism, respect for rule of law. In fact, we had a continent wide conference in Niamey, Niger Republic last October on the whole question of presidential term limits and we'll be having a second conference in Botswana in June to discuss term limits with former African heads of states and various other partners on the continent.

Just to say that, as leaders relinquish power when their terms come to an end, they help consolidate and strengthen democratic practices and institutions. So, with the two remaining countries-

JC: I applaud President Kenyatta for saying very early on that he would adhere to the constitution, he would serve two terms and step down. This is an important message for the most important country in East Africa, especially looking at the neighboring states, particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda where leaders there have found ways to extend themselves in office. He recognizes the importance of transition at the top and allowing the citizens of the country to select new leadership on a constitutional basis rather than trying to alter the constitution to eliminate term limits, age limits and perpetuate themselves in power.

So I hope others in the region are in fact looking at Kenya's model. One jumps across to West Africa and looks at President Paul Biya who's been in power for three decades, plus shows no desire whatsoever to leave office. Here is a man who has lost touch with his citizens and the communities of his country and because he has lost touch with his citizens, because there have been structural deficiencies and weaknesses and the institutions that he is responsible for, we now see a country that is suffering from three or four major political crisis, crisis with the English speaking portion of this country in the south west, the emergence of Boko Haram and radicalism across the border from Nigeria in the north west and problems of herders and farmers driven by drought and climate conditions.

President Biya has lost touch with the needs of his citizens and his government has not been responsive to anyone but himself and a small political elite. I think it is important for the international community to point out the failures and the flaws of his governance, the corruption that underpins it and to support those internally who are pushing for a constitution and political policies that fundamentally change the nature and structure of society, political architecture in society.

CF: You're so right, because that's one country that it's got tremendous potential but that it's not pulling its weight at all and because of its strategic location, invariably weakens other countries in the central Africa sub region, as well as in West Africa too and it's now taking full advantage of what could be real opportunities to improve the wellbeing of its citizens.

We'll be right back after this quick message.

And let's end with the country right in the heart of the continent, The Democratic Republic of Congo. I was in Kinshasa in October and met with political leaders and opinion leaders across the board, civil society, religious leaders who are very powerful in the Congo, very influential and I came away, I should say, a little more optimistic than I was going in. I was quite apprehensive given what has transpired in the 2018 presidential elections but after talking to the Congolese, I got a sense that a genuine attachment to reform.

Everybody wants some reforms of the political process or the electoral process and the key question is whether they are going to be able to set aside their personal agendas and actually get together to help this country, which has got tremendous resources and tremendous potential get back on its feet. I was very impressed by the fact that most of the leaders in Congo are pretty young. I know that you and I have talked about Congo for many, many times and when you were still in the administration you had to deal with some of their crisis.

I don't know what you take is on the present leadership and the present challenges but also the opportunities that present themselves in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

JC: Let me say that The Democratic Republic of the Congo has more unrealized potential than any other large state in Africa and that potential has continued to be in held in check and not realized because of the poor nature of the politics that have occurred there since the 1960s.

The 2018 elections were deeply flawed and irregular and not representative, I think, of the vote of the people. The one thing that one can say about the process that it did lead to President Kabila stepping down and a new younger president, Tshisekedi coming into power. There was immediately after the election a strong feeling that Tshisekedi was going to be instrument of Kabila going forward in that his leadership and his authority and his ability to do things would be substantially constrained. Tshisekedi has shown some degree of independence.

It is again important to recognize that there is little we can do to rerun that election or to reverse it but there is something that all of us can do going forward, and that to put pressure on President Tshisekedi to ensure that the electoral commission is strengthened, it has more independence, more technical capacity and more of an ability to deliver a more responsible, fair and transparent election going forward.

It is also important that he continue the fight against corruption, that he begin to put in place the kind of economic reforms that are going to unleash the potential of the Congo and to provide the people, The Democratic Republic of the Congo an opportunity to realize so many of the opportunities that they have been denied in the past. He has shown more independence than I thought but it is important that he not stop, that he continue to move forward, that he open up political space and continue to open it up for civil society, for the opposition, for the media, that he not constrain but unleash the country's potential and that he continue to show both in reality and fact his independence away from Kabila and those who were around him in the past.

He will be judged on the next four years very keenly, but it's important that the institutions of democracy to the extent that we can help civil society strengthen them, that they be nurtured and pushed forward. Elections and democracy...Democracy doesn't depend essentially, solely on elections. It is institutions that must be strengthened and we can help the DRC and civil society move those forward.

Again, working effectively with religions groups, Catholic Church, a very powerful instrument, working with women's groups, with working youth groups across the DRC and working with an emerging entrepreneurial class of young Congolese as well. We have to nurture and strengthen and push them forward. These next elections will be able to tell us whether there's been progress. President Tshisekedi needs to continue to move forward.

CF: Thank you very much Ambassador Johnnie Carson. It's really been an honor to have you do this tutor for us on the entire continent. Of course there still would always be ground to cover. As you were speaking, I thought about what late President John F Kennedy said about democracy as a never ending endeavor, and so NDI and similar organizations will continue to work side by side with our African partners to make sure that we can support them, give them the support and share experiences that they need so that we can all collectively, continue to work to strengthen and support democracy in countries like the DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan and across the entire continent.

Thank you also for being a member of our board of directors. We are extremely proud of that and extremely proud of the partnership that NDI has with USIP and hope that our two organizations would continue to work together to support the growth of democracy across Africa and to our listeners, can I just say thank you for sharing in this edition of DemWorks, to follow our next podcast. Please check us out on our website www.NDI.org.

Thank you for listening.


Ambassador Johnnie Carson





Peace, Security and Democratic Resilience,

Transcript of an oral history interview with Arsalan "Arsi" Namdar, conducted by Sarah Yahm on 2 April 2015, as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project of the Sullivan Museum and History Center. Arsalan Namdar was one of a number of midshipmen from the Iranian Imperial Navy to enroll at Norwich University for education and training between 1976 and 1980. His interview reflects on his experiences as an international student from Iran as well as the impact of the Iranian Revolution on his life. ; 1 Arsalan M. Namdar, Oral History Interview April 2, 2015 Interviewed by Sarah Yahm Sarah Yahm: OK. So, I'm going to turn this recorder on. Let me just check one thing. Ah, that's number one. So, you're number one. OK. So, this will probably take about an hour. Do you have about an hour? ARSI NAMDAR: Mm-hmm. OK. SY: OK. Excellent. And I'm really just looking for your stories. Your stories, and your life history, and things you remember. And so I thought I'd start from the beginning. So, if you could just introduce yourself, and say your full name and where you were born. AN: Arsi Namdar. And actually my full name is Arsalan Namdar, and I was born in the city of Abadan, which is a— southwest of Iran. At the age of seven I was— my family moved to Tehran, and left Iran until I was about 18 or 19. SY: What's your earliest memory? Do you have an earliest memory? AN: From Iran? I was— I remember in Tehran, it was a beautiful city then. It was pretty populated. I think we had about four million in population. Right now, I think it's about 16— 14 or 16 million. And Tehran was always a very big populous, modern city, and always a lot of activity, and nightlife, and day life. It was really amazing. And the closest that I can think of it now is it's something like New York City, and now— so, I was— I lived with my family in an apartment. We had— actually, eight of us living in a three bedroom apartment, and we were raised really— we were a poor family, and my father was the only bread winner, and my mom was a house— a homemaker, but it was— we were a really close family, and we enjoyed being together, and I always— when I was growing up I was very patriotic in Persian ways, and I loved my mother country, and I wanted to become a writer, so I wrote some novels, and I was pretty good in Persian literature. And then I met— I was— I knew this girl who was my neighbor, and we had a four year age difference, and we ended up befriending each other, and so, it ended up being a love relationship. And then for some reason when I was 17 or 18 I— we had a falling out, and so, I don't— I didn't tell her that I was going to join the navy. So, I joined the navy, and Imperial Navy, and so, then they shipped us out after a year, and sent us to the US. So, that was the end of my stay in Iran, and my memory from those days. SY: Did you get to say goodbye to her, or— AN: Never did. (laughter) SY: You never did? AN: Yeah. So— SY: You ever had contact with her since? AN: Yes. I did. This is probably— I know that she's still— she's doing very well, and so I know that she's been married twice. And she's got two daughters— well, two daughters and one son. So, I think she's doing well. (laughter) SY: So, what made you decide to join the navy? AN: I was— actually, I wanted to dis-- my basic reason was that I just wanted to get away from that environment, and I wanted to— 2 SY: Because you were heartbroken, or because you wanted to get out of poverty? AN: I really— I think I was heartbroken, and I just— I'm the kind of person that I need to— I feel like there are times where you need to make a physical change, environmental change, in order to really put yourself in a new situation, new atmosphere and environment. And that really does a lot of good for you. So, I went and applied for— back then the Shah of Iran was very close to the US. He was one of the greatest US allies, and they had just begun sending— recruiting a lot of young folks— young men— to become pilots, and to go to pilot schools, and to join the navy. And because the navy was— the Shah's one of— he wanted to be a super power in the region, so he wanted to strengthen the navy, and air force in particular, and so I went and applied for a pilot job, and went through all the tests and everything, and I was rejected because I didn't have the good depth perception. So, I was really disappointed, and so, then I said, "What's the next thing I can do?" So, I went and applied for helicopter pilot position, and I was accepted. And so I passed the test, and went home, and told my mother, and she just went crazy. She said, "You know how many people are getting killed as pilots?" And this was for the navy pilots, and as a navy helicopter pilot. And so she cried day and night, and she was just really upset, and so I decided— I said, "Well, what's the next safest thing I can do? So, I said, "Well, I'll go join the navy as a midshipman, and become a navy officer." So, I went in and applied for that program, and I was accepted. And after some physical tests and background checks and everything, then we officially entered the rank of midshipman in Iran, and my particular crew was there for about a year before we were given the opportunity to come to the US. So— SY: And you were— because you said you wrote a lot— so, I imagine that you had wanted to go to college and get more of an education. AN: Yes, I did. And going to college in Iran is pretty— you have to really earn— really have to be good at what you do. And in terms of academics. And I was— I wasn't really the best student, and I wasn't the worst student. I was somewhere in the middle, and I don't think I had the aspiration to become a college student or to graduate from college. I really felt that because of what I wrote, I felt like I had— I wrote very well, and I was a well-read person as well. And so I did— back then I read a lot of Persian novels, and a lot of American, European, Russian novels, so that's what really— I spent a lot of time on doing that kind of educating myself. So, I really never planned on being— going to college, because I thought that I probably wouldn't be able to enter college. So, I never applied for national tests, and they call it the Concour, which is— it's just a national test that everybody goes and takes it, and depending on the level of— the score you get, then you can become eligible for certain universities. So, when this opportunity came in the navy, and I thought, "I can go do the two year of service in the armed forces." Everybody who graduated from high school, they had to serve two years in the military. That was a mandatory thing. And so, either do that, or just join the navy, because I thought the navy is pretty sophisticated, I saw the outfits they wore, all the uniforms were all really chic, and they got to go Europe and the US, and I thought, "Oh, that's really not a bad thing. It's great." So, that was one of the main attractions to the navy, and so I was glad to be able to join, but at first like 3 any military training it's pretty hard. You don't get all the glory and everything. Glory comes later on when you become somebody or you accomplish something much more— later in your life. SY: What was the military training like in Iran? AN: It was pretty tough. It was pretty brutal, and they— we had— basically as a military student you really had no rights. They just told you what you had to do, and then you did it. And the punishments were pretty severe sometimes. I remember once or twice I didn't march the right way, and they made us put little pebbles— stones in your boots, and then you had to march like that. So, it was kind of like a torture. And so, when we came here to the US, and we started at Norwich, Rook Week here was pretty— it was piece of cake, because it was always push-ups, and sit-ups, and running, and they really were nothing to us because— SY: (sneezes) AN: Bless you. SY: Sorry. It was— you said it was nothing to you? AN: Nothing really. It wasn't that big a deal, so as a result we— at first— the first few weeks we kind of goofed off, so that really made our classmates pretty upset because we weren't taking this seriously, but we had already been through all of that. SY: And I think both Bizhan and Sussan mentioned hating having these, because you guys have been in— you were really in the navy for two years, and then there were these kids shouting in your faces. AN: Yeah. Yeah. Exactly. And in hindsight, I really think— when you think about it, I think it was pretty silly. And you're pretty— at least on average, we were two to three years older— or maybe even older— than some of these newcomers, so we felt like we had experienced more of life than these kids who had just graduated high school. And in a way we had done it, because we were away from our parents— when I was 17, 18, I joined the navy, and they shipped us off to some center to be trained in it, so it was— for us, we were used to that kind of environment. To being alone, being independent. And then they sent us here to the US, and they sent us to the Citadel, a group of us— the second group with Bizhan— I think Bizhan was on it, too. They sent us to the Citadel, and that's the military college in Charleston. And so, we had first a three month training there, and then of course they would let us do some weekends, and we just partied, because young guys, and being in the navy, and Charleston being a navy town, it was just always fun. And so, that was— so, we were used to a lot harder times than— when we came here, that military life in the beginning was not as hard. But over time, it got really hard, because of we didn't get recognized Rook Week, our group, the Rooks, didn't get recognized, I think, until February, and that was pretty, pretty long, and it was torturous in a way, and being cold, and all that stuff. It just wasn't really pleasant. SY: Did you— and I think Bizhan also said that in Irani military training you don't get shouted at in the same way, is that true? AN: Well, he— actually, Bizhan actually went to a longer training than I did. He served his— part of his two year mandatory training, and then he came back, 4 joined the navy. I didn't go to that first mandatory training. But in Iran, I mean, punishments are not— they really mean it when they punish you, and you can't say one country's better than the other— I've seen the marines, and how they train them, the special forces, and the— here, and I just feel like that— those are pretty vigorous, too. And we were just— we were not special forces. We were just navy. Just simple navy midshipmen. And— but what he was referring to was that the part of the navy that sent us— that one year, we— I guess the focus was for us just to learn English. Nothing else. We did some marching, and some military stuff. But, it wasn't like 24 hour doing all hardcore military stuff. That didn't happen until later on in the process. SY: Interesting. So, what was your first impression of Norwich? AN: Norwich? (laughter) So, as I said to you, the first group of us— they sent us to the Citadel, and it was pretty— it was a pretty hard school, and it was in the South, and beautiful weather, and it was summertime, and it just really felt for me close to Iran than any other place. So, when we— at some point, I guess, they lined us up, and— a group of us— our commanders came and said, "You go to Norwich, you go to Citadel, you go to Jacksonville, you go to this, you go to Maritime Academy." And I ended up being assigned to Norwich. And I thought, "My God, what is Norwich? It's so old. Norwich is near the capitol of Vermont." Oh, okay. Capital of Vermont. This is really great. I looked on a map, and I couldn't find Vermont. And they said, "Oh, it's near New York City." And so— and you have to just put this into perspective. We didn't have Google, we didn't have iPhones, anything easy to use. So, maps, and just simply asking people about things. So, we came— they said, "Oh, you're going to Norwich." Okay, Norwich. It's near the capitol. It's great, it's good. It's going to be like the Citadel, and like Tehran, it's going to be good. It's great. So, the last night we all went to disco, and we all had fun, and it was a great time, and the next morning we all had to get up, and they shipped us to Norwich. And we got off the plane in Burlington International Airport. Look at it, and said, "Burlington International Airport?" We saw maybe one or two planes. And again, you have to understand, we came from a very populated area, and we went to Europe, we— bigger cities, and we came here to the US, and saw Vermont. Saw only one, maybe another plane. Two planes. So, and they have one of those ladders that in the middle of the runway you all have to get off. Here we are, we all have— it was in August, we all had jackets, suit jackets and ties, and are coming down the plane, and I look, and I look, "Oh my God." In the distance I see two or three yellow buses, and just all of a sudden all of us have a heart attack. My God, what are these? I've never seen these. What kind of buses are these? So, anyway, they put us on these buses, and just, clunk, clunk, clunk, the buses are driving, and they're— we go passed all these farms. For the first time I see cows. And I'm looking, "Oh my God, so many cows. More than humans here." And so, anyway, that was the end of our journey. They brought us here to Norwich, and although it was a gorgeous, gorgeous campus, for us,— that's something I didn't expect. I expected more of a city, a lot of action, a lot of fun and stuff. Came to Norwich, and they assigned a room to me and one of my friends. I think it was in Dodge Hall, and so, we looked at each other, he was my maybe classmates, and looked at each other, and I said, "Oh my God. 5 What did we get ourselves into?" And so, that next morning the two of us took a bus to Boston, and we stayed there for two weeks, because our vacation— we had two weeks of vacation— two or three weeks of vacation before we had to go back. So, that was my first experience in Norwich, and I tell you, that was— from my perspective, that was the most depressing day of my life. And of course that changed later. And when we got to love the institution, and all the memories that it brought for us, and all the good times and bad times that we had here. Friends we had, Americans and Iranians, and the friends that really to this day I'm still good— many of them are friends with. Even the Americans as well as Iranians. SY: Can we pause for one second because I can hear the vacuum, and it's showing up on the tape. AN: Oh, it does? SY: Yeah. The microphone's really sensitive, so it picks up things— because I can barely hear the vacuum, but it audible. Okay. So, yeah. So, what were your encounters like with other students? AN: So, when we came to Norwich, and really the administration was very supportive, and they were really great to us. In particular, I had a professor by the name of Professor [Larsen?]. Fred Larsen. He was a professor of Geology, and I think he retired a few years ago. A couple few years ago. And he and his family really took myself and another friend of mine— the guy I went to Boston with— under their wings, and they invited us to the house, and really tried to make us feel good about our stay here. And of course this is August, and August going to September, and the leaves start to fall and changes, fall, it's not— it's pretty, but then it's cold. And so, when fall started, and with Rook Week and everything, that was, I think, the toughest for us, because they queued us up with an American classmates, and so, we were all together for years and years, and all of a sudden they said you room with these guys. And I had a wonderful roommates who was a very nice guy, and so I got to know him and like him and everything else. But it was pretty hard because we couldn't really— of course, we didn't have radio— again, this is back 30 something years ago. No radio, no iPhones, no TVs— no cable TVs, no internet, no nothing. So, we really had to interact with each other in certain ways that, for me, it was tough at that point, because I just— I had to really rely on my English a lot. It just— it wasn't the same as spending time with friends. And— well, initially, there was some fights between the Americans and the Iranians over different things. The most obvious one was that the navy used to give us a full salary, and that full salary— we went— all bought Trans AMs, Firebirds, Mustangs, Corvettes, and so we see all these first years students driving these expensive cars, and that really is not— thinking back on it, it just doesn't really sit well. Like, people who just came here and have really nothing, even though they came— most of them came from most prominent families, and are richer. But you just didn't have anything at that point, and so we were just driving around recklessly and having fun. Again, because we were in some ways, we were a lot older than them, and for us, we felt like we had experienced a lot of different ups and downs back home and different states. So, just for us, that was a normal thing. So, initially we had some issues, some fights, the Iranians and the Americans, and the way we dressed, that was— and of course, we were all young guys, more 6 mature, there were no girls left here in the Northfield area, or the Burlington area that we could date, or we could go out with, so I think that was a natural tendency for them to dislike us. SY: So, there are these pimply faced American kids, and you guys have sophisticated clothing. You're urban and cosmopolitan. AN: I mean, seriously, we had— we all had really tailored outfits, and nice cars. We drove everywhere. We didn't really— we didn't have cabs, we didn't have bikes, or we didn't walk. Everybody drove everywhere. And so, that naturally caused some frictions, and some frictions between us and them. But, in later years I think when they became friends, my friends, Americans and Iranians really became friends based on the values, not based on cars and things like that. They learned to like us for some of the things we offered, and we liked them for some of the things they offered. Mostly friendship and being really decent to us. And of course, you can always find some prejudiced rednecks out there who— they don't like you for whatever reasons. Just because you don't look like them. And that's not a low rank. That's a high rank. It just happens from— at every level. But we had some people that were really nice to us, and they really had— they respected us, and as a result to this day we still respect them. I mean, one example is [Keith Barrette?]. He was our classmate, and he's still around. Actually, he's still around. He's very involved in Norwich. He was one of the nicest guys. To this day, we all really like him. We all love him, and respect him, and we are happy that he was part of our history, and part of our life back then, and then we still have the ability to be friends and meet with him from time to time. But I think for me, the most painful thing was they gave us— my room was in the back of India Company, alumni, and it was— I think it was on the second floor, or third floor, and it faced— there was pine trees. And seriously, every time I looked at them I felt like I was in a prison camp. And that was really the most depressing thing for me. And that didn't feel good. And coming back to the same hall after the same building after like 20-some years a few years ago, I just saw the difference. I mean, I was just flabbergasted. How— so much difference and so much improvement. Kids nowadays have so many things that students— cadets— they just don't value. I mean, we used to march to the campus to the dining hall, and we had only one choice of meal. They would bring it to us, and most of us didn't eat pork, and so American friends, they were all waiting for us. As soon as we sat down, and we knew that, too, we never paid attention to it. So, as soon as they saw us sit down, they would say— they would come to us and ask for our portions, and we would give it to them because we just— it just— we didn't eat pork. And of course I eat everything now, you just had to get used to it. SY: Well, I mean, culturally— so, Commander [Arumi?], I was reading in the archives, he actually tried to intervene and explain to the administration about pork. Do you remember that? AN: Yes I do. And actually, he was a very sweet guy. He and his wife were very helpful to the Iranian guys, and she would cook for us every Friday. Persian meals, and they were delicious. I mean, I don't know if you've ever had (inaudible) [00:24:28]— SY: So good. 7 AN: -- they just— and so, she was cooking for us, we know where they would go. And people— Friday night a whole bunch of guys, they're not going to go to somebody older than them, to their house, and sit down and talk about this. They want to go party. So, our story with Diamond Hall was— I just wanted to pick up with that— that was our story. They would come and the days that they had pork or ham or anything like that, you just would— most of us would give up our dish, and our meal, and just— everybody would walk to the— there was a cafeteria down here that Officer Burger used to— that was our favorite. Officer Burger and then go play foosball. And that's what we did most of the time. SY: What did you say? What type of burger? AN: Officer Burger. SY: Officer Burger. What was that? AN: It was just a hamburger with a whole bunch of condiments on it. SY: So, there was something to eat if you couldn't eat in the dining hall. AN: We could not the first few months. The first year we weren't allowed. I think you either had to be recognized or upperclassmen. SY: So, did you go hungry a lot? AN: Sometimes we did, yeah. Sometimes we did. Yeah. And, you know, vending machines weren't available a lot then. And so— and of course lot of us were used to that kind, we just— it didn't matter if you had to have lunch or breakfast or whatever, because we were used to the kind of life that we could go like two meals without eating anything, and then go out at night just have a hamburger or hot dog or some-- not hot dog, just hamburger or something like that in Burlington. That's why a lot of us were very, very skinny. I'm 175 pounds now, but back then I was— when I was at Norwich I was 124 pounds. And most of my friends, if you looked at them, they were very, very skinny. Not because they were malnutrition, just because we just— that wasn't a priority to us. Priority was everything else. And everybody smoked too, so that suppresses your appetite as well. SY: Were you frustrated or angry that Norwich didn't seem to understand that culturally pork was not cool? AN: No. That didn't really bother me, and I really think that Norwich did a lot to help us. I really— I always appreciated their administration, and this has been really a great school in terms of being open and supportive, and I really think after all these years— still 35 years or so, they have not changed, and they have even gotten better. And I personally never felt that way, and what I felt was that there were cultural differences, and that's because it just— it was what it was, and it didn't really bother me. It wasn't like I would go out and say, "Oh my God these Americans are going to beat me up and kill me," or anything like that. You would make fun of them, and they would make fun of us. They would make fun of us for whatever. The way we dressed, the cars we drove. Sometimes you show up at regi balls, with girls that were not from around here who all were decked out. And we would make fun of them for doing some stupid things. We had a guy— a football player— who would get angry from time to time, pick up the soda machine, and just shake it up. To us, it was a funny thing. And so, the years I was here I really felt like it was one of the best experiences of my life. I mean, I 8 think Norwich taught me a lot in terms of quality and integrity, and really experiencing life, and trying hard, and just trying to work with others and be friendly. I learned a lot of that here. So, just because it was really encouraged by administration. SY: Did your kind of political understanding of the world change? You grew up under the Shah, not the most open of regimes. Not— I mean, and then you came to Norwich. Did you ever get to go to a town meeting? Did you sort of understand the different political system? How did you sort of understand the political differences? AN: We didn't actually— I didn't go to any town meetings, but I basically— we read a lot of newspapers, and sometimes from the TV, and watching TV, and we were really political in terms of American policies, we actually couldn't be. We were under the Shah, and we couldn't have any political affiliation. Only to the Shah. It wasn't until the year I got married to my American wife in secret— that was my last year here— that I felt like I was open to that, the idea of, "Oh, this is politics, and this is how this country is run." And by the way, I loved it. This is the greatest country. And I still do. This is the greatest country. No matter what your opinions are. And to a large degree you have freedom, and your freedom to do things and say things, and so I really— I was really fascinated by it. And I am now. It just is great. And I don't really think many countries are like this, and that's what makes the United States a unique country in itself. And— SY: What was it like growing up under the Shah? In terms of— did you experience repression or not? Were your family loyalists? How did that work? AN: So, under the Shah, we had to— if we agreed with the Shah and did not say anything against his regime, you could actually do okay. And I'm not saying well okay meaning you could become a millionaire. You could just have a normal life, and— SY: Under the radar. AN: Under the radar. But he just— exactly. He didn't want people to say things about him and about the regime. And that was really rightly controlled. And so they had this secret police called the SAVAK [Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar, Organization of Intelligence and National Security]. That— they were times where people would be really— and they would use that as a scare tactic. Really, if you say something that they didn't like, they could technically go after you and your family members, and really create some problems for you. There is no difference between then and now with what happens in Iran. You can't do the same thing in Iran either. This time the difference is they can't say that against the regime of Ayatollah, Khomeini, or his successors. So, to me, it's a lot more oppressed now than it was then. It just— the Shah— the thing I like about the Shah was he was very modernized. He was a great ally of the US, and unfortunately he wasn't supported when he was facing the Mullahs. When the Mullahs were taking over Iran, and that was his demise. And to this day I think everyone is realizing that they lost— I mean, look at the Middle East. There's really no one that is our ally here. There's really no one. And the Shah was undoubtedly the biggest supporter of the US and US ally. So— SY: Was there talk of the 1935 coup— right? 9 AN: Right. Yeah. The coup d'état, right. SY: -- the overthrow. Was that something that was talked about when you were in Iran? AN: I think it was in 1953, or— SY: Oh, sorry, it was '53. I was totally wrong. It was later. AN: I think it was 1953. But, no. My father, when I was in Iran, would mention it, and he would say to me, "These people, these religious factors, who come here and say death to the Shah and whatever." He said— he used to tell me they don't understand what the regime was like under— before the Shah took over because it was a kind of religious dynasty. And so he would always— was in disagreement with people who were against the Shah. And back then when I came here to the US, obviously I had to pass all sorts of background checks. They wouldn't let us into the navy unless we were completely clean. Not only us, but our families, and a good extension of our families. So, when I came to the US and things started to get bad last year of college year, then I could see that— what was happening in Iran. I just— people who were all against the Shah, all of those people who were against the Shah, they were moving towards all the religious factors, and for a time— a very brief time— things happened to be— they appeared to be OK. And as we all know, they went the other way, and went to the other end of the spectrum, and it's really— I don't think it's any good at all in terms of the economics, social, and any other way you look at Iran. SY: So, do you remember hearing about the revolution while you were here? AN: Iranian Revolution? You're talking about the— SY: I'm sorry. I'm talking about the overthrow of the Shah. AN: Overthrow of the Shah. SY: Do you remember hearing about that? AN: Oh yeah. I did. Because my family were also affected by it. My brothers— two of them— were arrested by Khomeini's regime, and because they— I think the crime was that they were trying to spread propaganda against the regime. One of my brothers was jailed for seven years, and the other one was jailed for a couple years, he had been tortured. And then my other sister, who was also arrested, and so, eventually escaped Iran all three of them. And they are living in Europe, and one in the US. So, the regime went after a lot of people for no reason at all. It just, as I said, it wasn't any better than the Shah. And the Shah was actually giving freedom to people. Women had freedom. Women had freedom to vote. They had a say in their daily life, and work, and society, and anything else. They don't have that now. They just— man in the king of the castle, and it's more of the— the regime is a more of an oppressive regime in more ways than people thought or imagined. So— SY: So, yes. Let's talk about that. So, here you are. Senior year, and you're starting to hear rumblings of what's happening in Iran. So, what filtered down to you from here. What were your— AN: Only people who would go to Iran for visits. Some of the cadets would go there, and then would come back and say this is really bad. And of course we would read the American media at that point, and we would watch things, and we would know what's going on. And I remember one year we were all— all of the navy 10 guys— were gathered here by our commanders, and rented a whole bunch of buses, and they put us all on the bus, and they said, "We're going to Washington to see because the Shah's coming, and we're going to be supportive of the Shah." So they had all of us military students on one side, then they had all the civilians on the other. Some Iranians were against the Shah, so at some point a fight broke out, and it was really nasty. It just— they ran after us. We didn't have anything to defend ourselves with. These anti-Shahs had everything in their position, so— SY: You guys had no idea that— AN: No, no idea— SY: -- you were going into that? AN: -- they didn't tell us. No. They just said to support the Shah. SY: And so how do you think— do you think that— how do you think you ended up there? What was the conversation between the Norwich administration and the Iranian ambassador? Like, how did that happen? AN: No, they just— they could just say— because technically we were their— Iranian government's possessions. Norwich really had no say in it because we weren't American. We were all Iranian and had Iranian passports. So, technically I could just be picked up during the day, in the middle of the night, put on a plane, and be taken back home. And it happened to some of our friends, and it just— they either had not done well in school, or they said something that was not favorable, so they were shipped back. So, Norwich really didn't have a say in it. They were— didn't know, because I think the commanders just told them, "They're going on a vacation. We're going to take you on vacation." SY: So, they didn't even know what you were getting into? AN: We didn't know that, no. We had no idea until we got to the hotel in D.C., and they said, "Oh, you're going out there, and this is the placards you can have," and said, "Long live the Shah." And it wasn't until later that we saw the other students running after us with sticks and— sticks with nails on them, and stone, and everything after us, and it just— it was really nasty. SY: So, how did it end? Were you terrified? AN: Oh, we ended up— someone was— some got involved in fights, some people got injured, but because we didn't have any— really any way to defend ourselves, we had casualties in terms of severe beatings, and I don't think anybody got killed, but injuries. SY: Wow. So, Norwich students got injured. AN: Oh, yes. They did. SY: Wow. Do you remember when you came back, did people ask what had happened? AN: I don't remember to be honest with you, no. SY: No? And you didn't get injured? AN: I didn't. Actually, I got beat up, but didn't get injured. It wasn't visible. But every single one of us got a piece of it. So, that was [New York?]— there in D.C. for two or three days, and that's— I think it was a good two days, and then— SY: Did you have to keep going back out? AN: Oh, yeah. The second— we went there in like the morning, and the next morning, and the next afternoon. So, it wasn't a onetime event. 11 SY: And did you— when you went back out— did you have weapons of any sort, or know what you were getting into? AN: The second time we just— we had— we brought some bottles and things like that just in case, because you don't want those guys to go after you, you need to defend yourself, so— SY: And the US police didn't touch it at all? AN: I think it was such a big crowd. It was thousands. Just imagine. And these police officers on horses— say, even 20 of them, 30 of them, 100 of them. We're talking about thousands of— it was just a mob scene, and so really, I think it was out of control. And it was out of control. SY: And were the Irani students of the Citadel and VMI, did they come up, too? AN: Oh, everybody. Everybody in the navy, air force, anybody that the navy ordered, and the military ordered— the Iranian military. We all had to go. We had no choice. We were the agents of the Iranian government. SY: Yeah. So, you weirdly went into battle in D.C. without any— without the US knowing or noticing. AN: I don't know— I'm sure people knew. I mean, you see group here and a group there. You see the potential for some interaction. It could— it's possible. But the job wasn't to protect us. The job was to protect people around the White House, and the dignitaries and everything. I mean, there's a mob scene. They're not going to go and worry about individuals like me, they're going to worry about individuals like Heads of State. So— SY: That makes sense. So, were you starting to get worried in your senior year about stuff that was going on back home? AN: Actually, I was not senior— I was junior year here. And it was— I was really worried at that point. And to be honest with you, I changed my mind about being— serving under the Shah at that point temporarily. But then I thought about it. If we go to sign allegiance to Ayatollah, then that's something that really wasn't in my dream. So, that's when I got married, said I'm not going back to Iran to serve the Ayatollah. I just really— this is not what I want to do. My allegiance is not to him. So, that's why I stayed here. SY: And so you had a secret marriage. AN: I had a secret marriage— SY: That worked. AN: Yeah. I had a secret marriage. And then came back, and told my commander that I was going to go on vacation, and I never came back. And that was Runi, and never said, so— SY: Where did you guys go? Where'd you have your secret marriage? AN: We went to my wife's— she has an aunt— back then she lived in New York in Glenn's Falls, and my father-in-law— so we got married on a Saturday, this particular Saturday, December 30th. Then we went to— he arranged with his sister to have us work— well, live with them for a few months. Ended up living with them for nine months. In the basement she had a room, I would say 5 by 10, dark, used to be a bar that had some use. So, they gave it to us. It had no toilet, it had— it was awful. Nine months my wife and I lived there. We had a couch that my father-in-law bought from Sears for 300 dollars, and that was a sofa bed, too. 12 So, that would be the couch, and then open up to sleep in. So, that's where we lived. And that was rough. And I was in the navy. I had never worked in my life. I was being paid a handsome salary a month as a midshipman, and then I had to go find a job, and so my first job was— I started as a busboy in a hotel nearby. Queensberry Hotel. And I loved it. It was really— all the waitresses were really good to me. I would help them out— I was a young guy. I was in my twenties, and they were older than me, and I would be stronger, carrying trays and things like that. And the hotel general manager really took a liking to me, and so he would order— he and his family lived in one of the rooms— so he would order food every day and want me to bring him the food. Prepare them and bring them to him. And I had no idea what these American foods were like. What does this mean? What does that mean? So, I had a tough time with that. But every time I went up he gave me a tip, and he wanted me take care of me. Really nice man. And so, then I— my wife started waitressing at a restaurant nearby, and then so we needed another job, so I went and got another job as a temporary street worker. Basically you help all the digging holes and jackhammer and things like that. And sometimes if I didn't have that I would go into the police department— it was a city job— I would go to the police department and help paint the walls, wash the cars, and things like that. So, that was my salary of two dollars and 10 cents an hour. And I was really proud of this, by the way. That was great money. So, that's how we started. I learned a lot from it, and I learned that no matter what you do, it's not what you do, it's how you do it. And I still to this day believe it. And I have a really good job now, but if I have to go lose my job for whatever reason I have to do something else, I can go to sweeping the floors and waxing the floors, but I can guarantee you it's going to be the best looking, cleanest floor you've ever seen in your life. And that's how I did it when I started as my houseman job in a hotel in Burlington. So, I started as a houseman, and within six months I became everybody's supervisor. SY: Why do you think— AN: It wasn't because I was a good looking guy and they liked me to be in the front— it was because I did such a great job. I had— they had us scheduled to do different tasks, and I did them all, and I did them all perfectly. I waxed the floors. Anybody who— any issues they had they didn't want to do, I would do it. Any time somebody called in sick, I would go in. The bathrooms— they have public bathrooms, and on the first floor of the hotel— and public bathrooms are always very dirty— I would go in and 10 minutes, I'd clean it up. I mean, that bathroom was spotless. So, people notice that. They see this guy is doing a good job. So, that's how I started— I got promotion like that. SY: So, what about— at this point you had two years of school? AN: Three years. SY: Three years of school. And so, what was your major? AN: Business. SY: Business. OK. And did you want to— I imagine you wanted to finish. AN: Yes. SY: So, how'd you go back and finish school? 13 AN: So, I went— when I got married, I wanted to come back to Norwich. Obviously, I couldn't, because the navy still had a hold of my academics, and they didn't release that until later apparently. SY: How did they set a hold on your— AN: Well, they wouldn't— I— for whatever reason, I couldn't get my credits here at Norwich. It didn't get released until later. Some years later. So, at that time I had gone to Trinity College in Burlington, and I got my Associates. SY: So, you had to redo all that. AN: Part of it, yes. And then I went to— I went another three of four years, and I went back to Trinity and got my Bachelor's. Well I got it all. My Bachelor's, I had like 12 or— no, 17 credits I had to take. No, I'm sorry. Seventeen courses I had to take, and I did them all in a year. So, I did day, night, and I had a full time job, and by the way I was cum laude. So, I just— it just proves that I really wanted to do it then, and I did it. Then, it wasn't until 2005 that Norwich granted 10 of us honorary degrees. And that was, to me, that was my most prized possession aside from my Norwich ring that— it just really— I had my other diplomas, but Norwich is bigger, and it's right in the middle of it, and it's a joy and pride for me. SY: Now did you stay in touch with any of your fellow students? So, did they know that you were going to leave and get married? AN: No, they didn't' know that until I left. Because you couldn't really trust anybody. I didn't know who was SAVAK, you couldn't— I didn't— also I didn't want to create any friction so that my family would get in trouble back home because my father cosigned me, so that if anything would be resolved, so if anything happened to me, and I left the navy, then he would pay all the expenses the navy had already put in my education. And they did. About 20 years later they went after my parents, and they wanted to take possession of the house and their belongings. So, my father called me, and said, "This is what's happening." I asked how much is it, and he said, "This much." And I just wrote a check, and they paid the government, and they were clear. So— but it was good timing then because inflation was so high that the amount I gave was almost 10 times more than it would have been up— 10 times less than I would have paid, so it just— it all worked out. SY: Yeah. And— OK. And then did you start— did you stay in touch with your family at all during that time? AN: I did, and it was pretty— we would write letters. Of course, they didn't have (inaudible) [00:48:24] or Tango and things like that— iPhone, you could talk to each other. So, from time to time we would write letters, and it would be pretty generic. No names, and no insulting the government, things like that. And sometimes I would call, and there are times that somebody— if you say something— the monitor on the other end would scold you for saying it, so— so they would do that, yeah. Because again, maybe my family— because we had three bro-- three siblings in prison by the Mullahs, and a number of family mem-- relatives who got executed by the government because they were against the government, so. SY: So, when did you get to see your family again? 14 AN: I got to see my mom about 15— 20 years ago. Eighteen years ago, I'm sorry. She came here to visit us, and then I went— my family and I went to Europe to Holland, a couple— three years after, and met with my mother and father. And they're still both of them living. My mom is in her 70s, my dad is in his 80s, so— SY: And are they in Iran, or— AN: In Iran. Tehran. SY: In Tehran. And your siblings? When did you get to see them? AN: My siblings— last time I saw my brother was about a few years ago. My sister is— oh my brother, five years ago. I went to see him, and I saw him there. SY: And it sounds like there's a period of, I don't know, 20 some odd years where you didn't see your family at all. AN: Yeah, it was. And it was one of the hardest things. And the reason is, I know my wife's family, they're really great. They love me. And really it was good to be accepted and to be part of them. But, you always feel like you don't— you— sight of it— there's something missing, and that is some of the things that have been missing for me and for my kids, because I always wanted to— I wanted to experience the love from my side of the family, because in Iran it's a lot more personable. I'm not saying— just, family is— it's— family relations are very deep. SY: And more affectionate, right? AN: More affectionate, just like— and they just— you feel like— we were talking to one of my friends, talking with how many people go see therapists here in the US, and it just really— it's hard for people to be talking to each other about— because no one's got time. In Iran, people don't go to therapists, they have family members. It's really— it's not unusual to have family members who live with you, so any problems you have you can always— you always have that support that— that support network that can always help you out. So, that's one other thing that I wish I had that for my kids, and I wish I had that for myself. I think that would have made me a lot better person in some ways for them, they would have a richer youth, and teenage years. It would be a lot better for them. SY: Do you speak Farsi with them at all? (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) [00:51:47] AN: No, I did not. I did initially, but that's one of the regrets. I should have spoken with them. I should have taught them, but I didn't. And actually, when I became a US citizen back three years after I got married. So, that was like '81, '80, '81 or so. Eighty-two. So, I was just— I was so mad at the Iranian government and all the things they do, I just didn't want to deal with it. Now, the last five, 10 years or so, I've started to pick up on strengthening my Farsi, because I was forgetting it, and I just realized— I just kind of made myself— I thought— I was thinking about, really, because I'm mad at them doesn't mean I don't— I love that language, and I just— it's really hard on me. So, I started to really read a lot of Farsi and listen to things, because you forget things, and I try always to see when I say something, how would it translate into Farsi, or the other way around. SY: Do you still dream in Farsi? AN: I dream about— yeah. I do. I mean, especially food involved. (laughter) 15 SY: That's what I was going to say. You must be homesick for food. What food do you crave that you can't get here? AN: They have these kebabs, filets, and they also have, we call them barg, which means leaf. But it's just kind of like leaf of meat. Filet. And they skewer it, and it's just unbelievably tasty. And that's served with rice and saffron. And they have this other kebab called koobideh, and that's basically kind of like hamburger, but it's on skewers this long, but it's absolutely the most delicious thing on earth. I mean, all Iranians, you don't find anybody who doesn't love chelo kebab. They call it chelo kebab. So, that's one of the things that— I mean, the smell of it, the taste of it, it's just out of this world. Seriously. SY: I believe you. (laughter) AN: Yeah. It just— it's just unbelievable. And that's one of the things I miss. And I miss the traditions. I miss the New Year. Persian New Year. It's a big deal in Iran. It was— SY: It was just last week, or two weeks ago, yeah. AN: Two weeks ago. Yeah. Twenty-first. And I know it's not a big deal here, but my wife does some prep for it, but it's just— it's not the same. So, those are the things that you feel like you wish you had. I wish for our governments— Iranian government and US government to get along, so people— SY: It looks like they're having— AN: I hope so— SY: Fear about what's going on this week, and last week. AN: Yeah, I'll see it when it's actually executed. I don't know. I don't trust these guys over there. SY: You'll believe it when you see it. AN: Yeah. I— you know what? It would be great if these two countries could get along and people could travel without the fear of getting hurt and kidnapped or whatever. SY: Bizhan's been back, have you ever gone back? AN: No, I've not gone back. He actually— when he resigned, he resigned from the navy. I did not. I just went AWOL, and because of my last name, because my brothers being anti-government, I really don't think I have a chance of going there freely. I would really— I wish I could, but I don't think so. Unless this government changes. SY: So, you're going to have to wait for news (overlapping dialogue; inaudible) [00:55:17]— AN: Yeah, to be honest with you, I don't think in my lifetime that's going to happen. I really don't think it. This is— traditionally, Iran— a regime lasts 70 to 100 years. Happened to Shah, it was 75. To these guys, it's only been 35, 40 years. I don't think I'm going to live another 30 years to see that, we'll see. SY: I don't know, you keep eating those egg white omelets, you might live another 35, 40 years. (laughter) AN: Yeah, maybe. SY: Sussan talked about how when she came back, because of the hostage crisis, there's a lot of hostility towards Iranians. Did you experience that? 16 AN: Yes, I did. Very much so. When— back in '78, or '79, I was working at this hotel called— maybe it was '80. The Radisson in Burlington. It's called Hilton now. So, I had an employee he worked for me. His name— whatever. And he was very anti-Iranian. And it was Iran this, Iran that, swear words, and— so, he didn't know I was Iranian, and finally when he found out I was Iranian, he just said, "I'm so sorry. I just didn't know you're Iranian, and I've been saying all these things." And I said, "It happens a lot. People don't know." When you talk about Americans are bad, or Iranians are bad, you just think of them in general. But you meet people, and you realize that really is not the case. And the prejudice I faced was not because of me. Once people started talking to me, they said, "Wow, you're not like that." Well, of course. I live in this country. I became a US citizen. I love this country. I'm not— it's not— I'm not the enemy. I'm like anybody else. But, my origin is Iranian. Just like you being Italian or being Irish. So, that's the way it is. But yeah. People— I mean, even after 9/11, just anybody who was dark, it was just— they were targeted. And then we learned to live with that. We learned to really put that aside. It's gotten a lot better in terms of labeling people and profiling them, I think so. So, I think, once people— and that's one of the things I love about Americans. Once they get to know you, and— first of all, I don't think many Americans are, in my experience, many Americans are not really vicious in terms of trying to put somebody down. People are very— they joke a lot in many ways. People like to be humorous about some things. That's just the way it is. And my experience has been I really haven't had people say, "You. Because of you." And once they get to know me, and say, "Hey, that's the situation. It is what it is." SY: Yeah. So, after all this, you're— you feel you— you arrive in Northfield, you arrive in the boonies, you say, "Oh my God, what is happening to me?" You end up staying in Vermont. Why'd you end up staying in Vermont? AN: Well, I stayed up in Vermont, the reason is because my wife is a Vermonter, and she wanted to be— she wanted to live here. I don't really like Vermont weather. I love the people. They're just the sweetest, most friendly, kind people. I just don't like the weather. And really, it's getting to me year after year. Just, I don't like the cold. Today's March— April. April second. I had to wear a long coat to come out. It's just— there's got to be an end to this at some point. So, my daughter lives in Florida. Southwest Florida. So, my dream is to move there someday and— but my wife is not convinced yet. That's the problem. That's the problem. SY: I don't know. You compromised. You've been here for a long time. Maybe it's your turn, huh? AN: Yeah. I don't know. We'll see. We'll see. Maybe another five or six years. We'll see. SY: Yeah. Exactly. I don't know if I have any more questions. I'm just looking through my list. Oh, yeah. So, then years later some of your classmates managed to trickle back in. So, what were those conversations like when you re-met them? AN: Oh, so coming back from Iran, or just— SY: Yeah. So, Bizhan makes his way back, Sussan makes her way back. It takes a while though. 17 AN: It does, yeah. It took a lot. For Bizhan, he almost didn't make it back here. He was stuck in [Bromford?] quite a long time. What really confirmed things for me was that I was right from the beginning that I shouldn't have gone to Iran, because a lot of my friends went, and said— and they went, and resigned, they almost didn't make it back, and they hated every minute of being in Iran. Even though it's our mother country, just because the regime made it so hard. And it was interesting to hear that people were in the same timeframe as I was in terms of thinking, and so for me it just was kind of a sweet— it's a pleasurous— pleasuring— pleasing thing to hear that I was— what I felt about Iran, not going to Iran was the right thing, and— SY: And everybody came back, and you could probably talk freely in a way that you hadn't been able to. AN: Oh yeah. Yeah. We did. And Bizhan's been to Iran several times. And even the last time that he went he said it was just really tough for him after a week. Said it was really tough. Just because we used to it— it's a part of our— we've been here more than half of our lives here in the US than we have been in Iran. So, for us in particular it's really hard. I don't think if I went to Iran, honestly I couldn't last more than a week or two. I seriously couldn't. Because A) the way of life B) all the different— the environment, the society and— SY: And the anxiety of whether or not you'd be able to leave. AN: Right. And that's a thing. And they have a different concept about things. Time is not important at all. So, you could go— when you invite Iranians over in Iran, you tell them dinner at 8:00. Dinner doesn't mean at 8:00, it means at 8:00 they start preparing the dinner. So, you end up eating dinner at 11:00 sometimes. SY: I think that's true for every people besides white Anglo-Saxons, you know what I mean? Any other country you go to it's the same. AN: And it's good to have that time concept. It's good to say, "Look, dinner's at 8:00. Be here at 7:45." Or whatever. I like the way things are more clear here what it is in the US. And people are pretty straightforward about it. In Iran, no. In Iran, say, "Hey, come here for dinner." Yeah, OK. And you can't tell people just come by yourself. You would say you come to my house, meaning you, that means the entire family. The entire family comes. So, it just— it's nice, in a way, and because everybody is together, and they love guests. That's another thing about our culture. We just love people coming and enjoying our food and being part of our lives. SY: Yeah. So, what's your job now? AN: I am the VP or Information Technology and CIO at Visiting Nurse Association in Colchester. SY: That sounds like a very good job. AN: It is actually. I started at— I went up the ranks. And I've been there 21 years. So, I really worked hard at getting here, and they just didn't give it to me because they liked— they thought they should have somebody like me. I worked hard for it. And I guess you have to prove yourself. Because again, you have in this country, again, you are given an opportunity, I feel like you people should be— they should use it to the absolute max, and if they don't use it— and that's why if they don't use it they're putting themselves at a disadvantage, and that's why it's true 18 that it's the land of opportunity. And it's true that if you want to do it you can do it. But you really have to work at it hard, and sometimes you have to work harder just because of who you are. Sometimes— different times I have to work a lot harder to prove myself because people just look at you and for whatever reason they just think you might not be able to write well, you might not be able to speak well, so those are things that kind of— they put you— you're set back, and they don't give you the opportunity. SY: Did you ever get disheartened during your sort of rise up the ranks? AN: I did. Like, you get— against what? My work, or people I work with? SY: No, just frustrated. I mean, like, yes. This is the American Dream. You can work hard and you can rise up, but there is discrimination, there are barriers, there are different things. It's frustrating. AN: No, I never did. I seriously I— again, I always thought this is such a great country. And if I can imagine myself when we had the hostage crisis here in this country, Iranians took those Americans hostage, 52 of them, for 444 days or something like that, and people still here we could live and we could get promotion. We could work hard. I mean, it doesn't happen everywhere, but I feel like I never had any backlash against me because of that. But I can't imagine being in Iran and being an American, and you take Iranians— Americans take Iranians hostage, and Americans in Iran be treated this well. And again, this is one of the greatest things about the United States, because that is— that's what makes us such a great nation. And that's what makes us so special. I mean, every day when I talk to these young people, I say to them, "You have this opportunity in this country, you have such a great country here, you have to realize it. Don't say US this, and US that, address it in a negative way. You haven't been to the other side to see what it is to live in this great country." And just have to— you just have to cherish that, and appreciate it, and you have this opportunity, you're part of this nation. SY: Yeah. One last question. How did you meet your wife? AN: Well, actually, I was— we were going to a disco called Friends in Burlington, and I had a girlfriend here one— actually, I had a live in girlfriend here, and I had a fight with her one night, and just went to disco with my friends. My male friends. So, my wife saw me at the— standing there by the cigarette machine, because they had cigarette machines inside, and she asked me to dance, and we danced for three hours. And so, that's— I think I told her I fell in love with her that night, and she said, "Oh, [I can't hear?]?" I said, "I loved you from the minute I saw you." So that's— SY: And now that's 30-- AN: Thirty six years we've been married. Yeah. Yeah. So, like any marriage, there's just like anything. You'll have ups and downs, but more ups. I really think that. More positive stuff than. SY: Absolutely. So, any last thoughts? AN: Last thought is I hope someday my kids will be able to listen to all these stories from Iranian guys, and Norwich cadets, and I hope they should— that they have an opportunity to come back and listen to some of these. 19 SY: Well, actually you're going to get a copy of this, and pretty soon the interviews I did with Bizhan and Sussan will be available online. So, that wish will be able to be granted very quickly and concretely. AN: Yeah? Great. SY: So, I'll send you— I'll send you— [01:07:09] END OF AUDIO FILE

In this paper authors argue that the main determinants of differences in prosperity across countries are differences in economic institutions. To solve the problem of development will entail reforming these institutions. Unfortunately, this is difficult because economic institutions are collective choices that are the outcome of a political process. The economic institutions of a society depend on the nature of political institutions and the distribution of political power in society. As yet, authors only have a highly preliminary understanding of the factors that lead a society into a political equilibrium which supports good economic institutions. However, it is clear that it is the political nature of an institutional equilibrium that makes it very difficult to reform economic institutions. The authors illustrate this with a series of pitfalls of institutional reforms. The author's analysis reveals challenges for those who would wish to solve the problem of development and poverty. That such challenges exist is hardly surprising and believe that the main reason for such challenges is the forces authors have outlined in this paper. Better development policy will only come when authors recognize this and understand these forces better. Nevertheless, some countries do undergo political transitions, reform their institutions, and move onto more successful paths of economic development.

Nearly two months into the war in Gaza, the Biden administration finds itself in a bind. International support for Israel, once strong in the aftermath of Hamas' brutal October 7 attacks, has given way to broad condemnation as Tel Aviv's campaign has left at least 15,000 Palestinians dead in addition to 30,000 injured and 1.8 million displaced.The White House's answer to this anger has been twofold. In public, President Joe Biden and his allies have emphasized the need for Israel to follow international law in its campaign to destroy Hamas but avoided weighing in on whether Israel has already violated the laws of war. In private, officials have urged their Israeli counterparts to "fight more surgically and avoid further mass displacement of Palestinians" after the temporary truce ends, according to the New York Times.But what does it mean for Israel to conduct a "surgical" war against an enemy embedded in an area roughly the size of Philadelphia with more than two million residents? And what does international law mean to a state whose leaders appear committed to destroying Hamas by any means necessary?Few thinkers are better equipped to answer these questions than Samuel Moyn, a professor of law and history at Yale University and a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute, which publishes RS. Moyn has long grappled with the relationship between war and morality, most notably in his 2021 book "Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War."RS spoke with Moyn about how U.S. policymakers think about war and what the Gaza conflict means for the future of international law. The conversation has been edited for length and clarity.RS: U.S. officials have reportedly admonished Israel to be more 'surgical' in its war against Hamas in Gaza. How do you interpret that call? What does it tell us about how officials view war more broadly?Moyn: It seems as if American policymakers are pushing on Israel their own solution to a controversial war, which is to combine an unlimited right to self-defense with a humanization of the conduct of the hostilities. Now, the truth is, Israel probably got to that combination before September 11, 2001, and the United States learned it from Israel in the first place. But given that America is Israel's patron and protector, it's now in a position of teaching the lesson to Israel that it learned from it. Now, I'm all for saying that these wars — the War on Terror, the campaign in Gaza — are parodies of humanized war because they're so costly in civilian lives. But they're not as bad as they could be because of this new policy — it's still largely rhetorical, but it's policy too — of containing the collateral damage and saying that that makes the war more tolerable.RS: Why is the U.S., and the Biden administration in particular, so focused on questions of international law in war? To the extent that they have placed checks on Israel, it's been to suggest that international law is the thing that they must be holding to, rather than a broader sense of morality.Moyn: Well, it's really only a part of international law, which is itself very interesting. Claiming an unlimited right to self-defense isn't just a moral claim; it's also a legal claim, and it's wrong. It was wrong in the War on Terror, and I think it's wrong when Israel asserts it today. We could get into the details on that side of the equation, but you're right that in our debates, international law has become something that for many listeners means constraint not of the right to wage war but of how it's waged. I think that Joe Biden, in his so called 'bear hug' strategy, thought that once it became clear how controversial this war was going to be, he would push humanitarian concern as a way of not interfering with Israel's claimed right of self-defense, [just as] America didn't tolerate those who said its wars were illegal while sometimes accepting the criticism that the way it conducts them is illegal.RS: How, both in its justification and in its conduct, does this war differ from the wars that the U.S. carried out following 9/11?Moyn: It is more similar to the ground campaigns that America fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, which involved a pretty substantial commitment of troops and a lot of blood spilled just because ground warfare is bloody, especially when it involves cities like Fallujah or Gaza City. It's not similar to the absolutely no-holds-barred phase of the War on Terror where the George W. Bush administration asserted that international law just didn't apply to what it did to detainees. The whole point of humanized warfare is that Israel is claiming that it's following the law. But it's also not similar to the later, so-called "sustainable" phase of America's War on Terror when America pulled out troops even while extending its drone campaign and special forces deployments and then claimed to sanitize that phase of the War on Terror without all the messiness of American troops on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. Israel's currently in a phase that combines lots and lots of violence with claims to still be following international law. It has had phases of its struggle against Hamas that involved just bombing or its own use of special forces that were about conducting the struggle but making it as antiseptic as possible. It's just that Israel can't conduct that kind of campaign while promising to remove Hamas from power altogether.RS: Do I understand correctly that, generally, law of war questions only concern conduct within the war and not whether the broader goals of a war are appropriate or inappropriate? Doesn't it leave those questions entirely to the discretion of states?Moyn: It depends on how you define laws of war, but what we call international humanitarian law, or the laws of armed conflict, is really exclusively about how you fight. And there are other laws about when, whether, under what circumstances you can fight at all. You could call that body of law part of the laws of war, but it wouldn't be what most people mean when they use that phrase.RS: I guess I'm thinking about the question of proportionality.Moyn: The reason that's a tricky concept is that it applies in both stages of the analysis. In the so-called jus ad bellum analysis — when the resort to force in the first place or on a continuing basis is legal — there's the question of whether the exercise of a self-defense right is proportional. That is a totally different inquiry than what has generally been talked about in terms of proportionality because that's in the jus in bello — the laws of war about the conduct of hostilities. And there the question is, does the collateral damage in any particular attack outweigh the anticipated military advantage of that attack? We could argue that Israel is being disproportionate in the war in general, on the first part of the question, or we can argue with regard to any particular attack whether its attacks are disproportionately harmful to civilians.RS: Guardian columnist Nesrine Malik recently wrote that the lesson of this war is "brutal and short: human rights are not universal and international law is arbitrarily applied." Do you agree with that take?Moyn: No, because it was a lesson that the whole history of human rights and international law already taught.RS: Can you tell me more about that?Moyn: Well, there was never a time when human rights weren't selectively applied, and there was never a time when international law wasn't the law of the powerful. This campaign seems like a rather late date to learn what has always been obvious.RS: Is that a fundamental problem for international law? Or is there a possibility of a more effective international legal system in the future?Moyn: Sure, it's not as if there isn't a struggle within politics, and therefore in law, to make the law different than it has been. I could say that American law works to the advantage of the powerful and against the weak, and that would be true, but that doesn't mean we can't change it for the better.I think international law has been changed for the better at times, but it's never been freed from this syndrome that it's a body of law of, by, and for states, framed with their approval, and interpreted by them to suit their ends. We can struggle to make it more constraining in more ways, but never is it apart from the political context. Never will it transcend selectivity and inadequacy.RS: You've already written a book-length answer to this, so I'll forgive you if it's not the easiest one to answer quickly, but do you think that international law can be a tool to fight for an actual end to war? Or is it simply a tool to manage war into the future?Moyn: I do think there are a lot of resources in it. It is revolutionary that we can make claims not just that states are fighting brutally but that they're engaged in illegal war-making. The trouble is that, if we prioritize the first claim, the second claim gets lost in the shuffle. I think that's what's happened in our time through the War on Terror, with the emphasis on torture and later civilian death in drone campaigns. It seems to be repeating itself in this situation, with the emphasis on civilian death, which is not dishonorable, but in the end there's only a political solution, which means we should focus at some point on who's in the right, who has a just claim, and what would make political violence something of the past.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!