Suchergebnisse

Bu çalışmada, Turgut Özal'ın Başbakanlık ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemlerindeki Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri incelenmektedir. Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri, ülkemiz açısından son derece önemlidir ancak iki ülke ilişkilerinin aynı zamanda çoğu zaman meydan okuyucu bir doğası olduğu da görülmektedir. Türk siyasi tarihinde Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri söz konusu olduğunda ismi geçen liderlerin belki de en başında Turgut Özal gelmektedir. Turgut Özal'ın 12 Eylül askeri darbesinden sonra gelen ilk sivil başbakan olması ve yeni Türkiye'nin inşasında üstlendiği roller kendisini Türk siyasi tarihi için önemli bir figür haline getirmiştir. Turgut Özal dış politikayı iyi analiz edebilen, realist ve pragmatik bir liderdir. Dış politikaya bakışı, kendisinden önceki liderlere göre oldukça farklıdır. Kendisi, Yeni Türkiye'nin inşasında aktif ve ekonomi eksenli bir dış politika anlayışına büyük önem atfetmiştir. Turgut Özal'ın bu anlayışı çerçevesinde en çok önem verdiği ülke ise Soğuk Savaş sonrası dünyanın tek süper gücü olduğunu ilan etmiş olan ABD olmuştur. Tezin ilk bölümünde, Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin hangi zeminde olduğunun anlaşılabilmesi için 1945 yılında Truman Doktrini'nden başlayıp, 1980 yılındaki Rogers Planı'na kadar Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinde yaşanan "Batı Bloğuna Yaklaşma", "Tam İttifak" ve "İttifakın Sarsılması" süreçleri tüm detaylarıyla incelenmiştir. İkinci bölümde Turgut Özal'ın hayatı, kendisinin dönemindeki Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin alt yapısını oluşturan siyasi ideolojisi ve bununla birlikte dış politika hedefleri incelenmiştir. Bu bölümün sonunda da Turgut Özal'ın Başbakanlığa giden süreçte yaşanan kırılma noktaları olan 24 Ocak 1980 kararları, 12 Eylül darbesi ve kendisinin Başbakan Yardımcılığı görevi, istifası ve Anavatan Partisi kuruluş süreci, ABD'nin de bu gelişmelerdeki etkileri göz önüne alınarak tüm detaylarıyla ele alınmıştır. Üçüncü bölümde ise Turgut Özal'ın iktidar olmasıyla birlikte Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin nasıl bir döneme girdiği konusu üzerinde durulmuştur. Önce Turgut Özal'ın ABD'ye ve ABD'nin Turgut Özal'a bakışı, daha sonra da Turgut Özal'ın 10 yıllık Başbakanlık ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemlerinde Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinde yaşanan inişli ve çıkışlı süreçler ve olaylar, iki ülkenin birbirlerine karşı yaklaşımları tüm detaylarıyla incelenmiştir. Ayrıca Turgut Özal'ın, Türkiye'nin çıkarını düşünerek ABD ile pozitif ilişkiler kurma yönünde gösterdiği tüm çabalara karşın, 10 yıllık dönem boyunca iki ülke arasında geçmişten gelen başta Kıbrıs ve Ermeni Soykırım İddiaları gibi kronikleşmiş tüm sorunların iki ülke ilişkilerine yansımaları da analiz edilmiştir. ; In this study, relations between Turkey and the United States during Turgut Özal's prime ministery and presidency periods are investigated. It is rather obvious that Turkey's relationships with the US have a critical significance for our country, however the nature of the relationships between the two countries can be clearly observed to be challenging. Turgut Özal can be said to be one of the most prominent leaders if not the most prominent one, when US-Turkish relations are taken into consideration. Being the first civil prime minister of Turkey in the aftermath of the 12 September military coup and the roles he has undertaken for the construction of new Turkey have made him an important figure in the Turkish political history. Turgut Özal is a realist and pragmatic leader, who can analyse foreign politics well. His perspective with regards to foreign politics was substantially different from that of past leaders. He has attributed great significance to an active and economy-oriented foreign policy perspective for the building of "New Turkey". With this perspective in mind, the country that Turgut Özal prioritized the most has been the US, which has declared to be the world's one and only super power after the Cold War. In the first part of the thesis, in order to be able to shed light upon US-Turkey relationships, the "Full Partnership" and the "Dissolution of the Partnership" periods in US-Turkey relationships starting with the Truman Doctrine of 1945, continuing until the Rogers Plan of 1980 have been thoroughly examined. The second chapter is devoted on Turgut Özal's life story, his political ideology that basically shaped the US-Turkish relationships in his period and his foreign policy goals. At the end of the chapter, the breakpoints that have paved the way to Turgut Özal's Prime Ministery such as 24 January 1980 decisions, 12 September coup d'etat, his role as Vice Prime Minister, his resignation and the establishment process of the Anavatan Party (ANAP) have been examined in detail, with the influence of the US on these developments being taken into consideration. The third chapter dwells on the dynamics of US-Turkey relationships after Turgut Özal came to power. Firstly, Turgut Özal's perspective on the US and the US perspective on Turgut Özal has been taken into consideration. Afterwards, the dominant and partly rugged processes and events that have come to characterize US-Turkey relationships during the 10 years of Turgut Özal's prime ministery and presidency periods have been focused on. The particular perspectives that the two countries hold for each other have also been analysed in detail. Turgut Özal has tried his best to nourish positive US-Turkey relationships for the sake of Turkish interests. However, some conflicts that have become cronically problematic in the long term such as the Cyprus conflict and the so-called Aermenian Genocide Claims, have influenced the bilateral relations during the 10 year periof of Turgut Özal's leadership. These have also been analysed in the thesis.

Historians have long been drawn to the story of Barbados and the tales of sugar, slavery, empire, and wealth that defined the colonial history of this small West Indian island lying on the southeastern margins of the Caribbean Sea. First settled by the English in 1627, it quickly developed into 'one of the richest Spotes of ground in the wordell' after the introduction of sugar cane agriculture in the early 1640s and, by 1660, had become one of the most valuable and influential colonial possessions in the western hemisphere. Barbados was famous in its own time, especially after Richard Ligon, a three year resident on the island from 1647 to 1650, wrote his popular A True and Exact History of the Iland of Barbados in 1657. In this work, he vividly described a range of topics that included the island's exotic flora and fauna, the methods used to convert cane into sugar, the trials many experienced in adjusting to life in the tropics, and the arrival of enslaved Africans for a public eager to receive such information on the distant domains of a growing empire. Contemporary scholars followed Ligon with other works in which Barbados figured prominently, such as John Oldmixon's The British Empire in America (1708) and two important natural histories by Hans Sloane (1708) and Griffith Hughes (1750). It also served as the setting for many popular works, including a brief poem by the well-known English bard Richard Flecknoe and Richard Steele's famous newspaper serial 'Inkle and Yariko. Academic interest in the island's past has also remained high since the eighteenth-century, with historians consistently drawn to Barbados' integral role in the development of sugarcane agriculture based on enslaved African labour and the influence this had on England's imperial mission. As B.W. Higman explains: the colonial history of the Caribbean is commonly characterized by the intimate relationship of sugar and slavery…and the defining moment of that relationship is located in the sugar revolution, beginning in Barbados in the middle of the seventeenth century. It is the sugar revolution above all which has come to represent the vital watershed, starkly separating the history of the islands from that of the mainland, not merely in terms of agricultural economy, but in almost every area of life, from demography, to social structure, wealth, settlement patterns, culture, and politics. Higman's quotation highlights the important work on the island's past that has already been completed by modern historians, especially in regard to sugar, slavery, and their combined effects upon the economic and political relationships that dominated the planters' lives. Richard Dunn, for example, notes that 'we have detailed political and institutional histories of the several Caribbean colonies in the seventeenth centuries and excellent studies of Stuart colonial policy in the West Indies.' Books such as those written by Dunn, Vincent Harlow, Gary Puckrein, Larry Gragg, Noel Deerr, Richard Pares, Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh, Richard Sheridan, Russell Menard, and Hilary Beckles have successfully highlighted the importance of Barbados' place within the sugar-producing Caribbean and have helped to contribute to the further understanding of the relationship between the development of the plantation complex, the growing power of the West Indian planter, and the forced enslavement of a large African population. Combined, these authors adequately cover most of the important events in Barbadian history, ranging from the early settlement period and the emergence of sugar to the emancipation of the enslaved in 1834. Nevertheless, gaps in the historiography still exist, leaving several significant periods of the island's history under-analyzed and misunderstood. One such lacuna exists for the twenty-year period between 1680 and 1700, a vital two decades that represented great tragedy, violence, and change throughout the English empire from an ugly combination of rebellion, revolution, and war. These events profoundly influenced and altered the lives of the 66,000 people living on Barbados. Yet, many historians gloss over this period in favor of either the island's early settlement period or later emancipation era. They often avoid the 1680s and 1690s by hastily contending that the two decades were a period of relative decline defined by a combination of low prices, limited supply, infertile soil, war, and disease. Historians often attempt to justify these assertions by pointing to two contemporary documents that, when read in tandem, appear to paint a dismal picture of island conditions during this era. The first of these is the 1680 census, a compilation of demographic statistics collected by each parish vestry at the request of Governor Sir Jonathon Atkins in 1679. Under intense suspicion from the Lords of Trade and Plantations for not following the proper protocol concerning colonial laws and for refusing to send requested information back to England, Atkins demanded the name, location, acreage, and labor force of every landowner living on the island. He also collected specific accounts of the militia, island fortifications, and emigration, while receiving tallies of the Anglican baptisms, deaths, and marriages that occurred in each parish. Many historians use these demographic statistics to draw important conclusions about Barbados, including the continuing consolidation of the island's limited acreage by the elite, the wealthy's dominance of politics and the military, the lopsided burial to baptism rate, the high number of white emigrants, and the near-complete replacement of indentured servants by enslaved Africans.

    It may look as if Greece has beaten the record of political instability by calling a snap election only five weeks after the previous one. But the recent developments are, on the contrary, rather an instance of economic and political recovery and restored stability within the European Union. Greece was the
most damaged European country by the Great Recession generated nearly fifteen
years ago. Unemployment skyrocketed, per capita GDP decreased to 55% of the
previous level, emigration of young and qualified workers was massive.

In 2015, a
Memorandum of Understanding put under the control of the EU, the ECB, and the
IMF virtually all Greek policies on taxes, pensions, health care, control of
the banks, labor market, competition, energy, administration, justice against
corruption, and several others to be implemented "over many years". Greece
eluded a declaration of bankruptcy by accepting the EU's bailout and the reduction
of its autonomy to the election of the domestic rulers that would implement the
decisions of the European Empire.

Now, Greece has
repaid part of its debt ahead of schedule, it is being upgraded to welcome
foreign investments, and grows at an almost double rate than the European average.

There are some
similarities between Greece and Spain, including a long delay to recover the
levels of per capita GDP previous to the Recession and the low rates of
employed people out of the total population. But there are also significant
differences regarding the ways they democratized in the 1970s, in particular regarding
the party system and the types of leadership for the resolution of crises. I
warn the reader that, in the following, I am using "center" and "extreme" as geometric
relative positions along a political space, not as ideological references.

In Greece, the
military was removed from the government and democracy was restored under the
leadership of the center-right led by Konstantinos Karamanlis, a former prime
minister before the dictatorship who returned from exile and later on was also president
of the Republic. Since then, his party, New Democracy, now led by Kyriakos
Mitsotakis, has been in government more than half of the time, was back four
years ago, and has been reelected now.

In time, the
extreme left, organized as Syriza, appeared as an alternative to face the
crisis. Its government, led by Alexis Tsipras, called a referendum for "no" to
the EU bailout, which might have triggered Grexit, but then it canceled its
result.

On the other
extreme of the Mediterranean, in Portugal, the other country democratized in
the 1970s, the process was kind of symmetric. The initiative was pushed by
extreme left military officers of the Armed Forces Movement, which provided
several prime ministers and presidents, with the help of the Communist Party. This
left room for the main alternative to be located on the center-right, around a
member of the European People's Party that is as moderate as it calls itself
Social-Democrat.

The case of
Spain was different from both Greece and Portugal. The main actors in the first
stages of democratization were neither the center-right nor the extreme left. It
was the ex-Francoist right, which ended up as the People's Party, eventually alternating
in government with the center-left Socialist Party. In contrast with the other
two countries, the center-right failed once and again: Christian-democracy, Liberal
Union, Union of Democratic Center, Democratic and Social Center, Reformist
Party, Citizens. Currently, the Spanish People's Party is the most rightist
member of the European People's Party, according to eupoliticalbarometer.com,
to which the even more extreme Vox is annexed.

Certainly,
Greece is relatively less difficult to be governed than Spain because it is a
smaller country (one-fourth in population and one-sixth in GDP). It does not
have a vacate meseta or centrifugal peripheries. It suffered a much briefer
dictatorship, for only seven years. More than 50%of its citizens can speak
English, more than double the proportion of the paltry 22% in Spain, the lowest
in Europe.

Of course, all Greek
prime ministers have been English speakers, able to actively participate,
negotiate, and have some say at the European Council, as well as at the summits
of NATO and other organizations of paramount importance for the country's
governance (as have been all Portuguese prime ministers too). In contrast, only
two of the seven Spanish heads of government have been able to sustain a
conversation in English: the current one, Pedro Sanchez, and the brief Leopoldo
Calvo Sotelo. (I do not include Aznar because I have seen him in a one-hour
meeting in English).

In short: Greece's
economy was crushed by the Troika because it was a small and relatively poor
country. But its politics has achieved a more stable situation that is helping
its economic recovery.

Spain, in
contrast, is dickering. Europe cannot afford Spain's economic collapse because it
is too big to fail, and the subsequent restrictive effects on trade, foreign
investments, and emigration to other countries would be too disruptive. So, Spain,
which has about 10% of the EU's population, is allocated more than 20% of the EU's
Recovery Instrument (Next Generation EU). This is not a badge of pride, but
rather the opposite.

A consequence of
this overprotection is that, unlike in Greece, the Spanish politicians can
continue arguing more about where and to whom the funds are distributed than
about what they should be invested in, fighting among themselves, getting by,
and muddling through.

The article analyses the impact of present-day Russian internal structural factors, searching national ideology and shaping "Russian conservatism" line formation marked the links between this ideology and Russian foreign policy. The main focus is designated to Russia's politics after the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008, highlighting the response of Vladimir Putin's regime to several domestic policy tensions related with: 1) the structure of the Russian regime and the domination of siloviki group in the power structures; 2) the etno-federalist structure of Russia and the growing nationalism; and 3) the competition of several ideologies, which increasingly turns to the support of Eurasianist ideology line and its transformation into "Russian conservatism". Theoretically, this analysis is based on the internal and external factors that have an impact on the state's policies (e.g. Walter Carlsnaes concepts), as well as on the theories analysing Russian etno-federalism and informal networks/relations. This article argues that Russian internal structural factors strongly support the Russian Eurasianist direction as the dominant policy doctrine, and this doctrine defines the Russian foreign policy, limits its balancing and influences the dynamics of foreign policy. It shows how, during the recent years, Russia's assertive foreign policy has become influenced by neo-imperialist vision of a strong, conservative, and alternative Russia, which actively uses the "Russian conservatism" as an ideological justification, supports active protection of Russia's interest in the post-Soviet region (e.g., war with Ukraine) increasing the use of foreign policy in the post-Soviet region (e.g., war with Ukraine) or raising the question about the multipolar world order. Other competing ideological lines (pro-Western liberalism and Slavic nationalisms) are still included in the balancing if there is demand, however, it remains non-typical forms of current Russia's ideological framework. Since the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, the aggressive Russian foreign policy depends not only on the external factors, but it also increasingly reacts to internal factors, especially to Putin's interest to maintain the vertical power and ensure further legitimacy of the regime. Russia's "electoral authoritarianism", which actively used the concept of "sovereign democracy" last decade, faced serious challenges in 2011– 2012. After public protests for electoral fraud, Putin's circles have perceived that Russia's ruling elites need to initiate a new turn for the country, either to a wider democracy development or to find other resources to mobilise society. By reacting to the interest of siloviki group and seeing the confrontation between Russian ethnic and minorities' nationalism manifestations, Putin's regime strengthened its orientation towards the new Eurasianism, which emphasized the special path of Russia's civilization: being alternative to the Western world, adjusting only "appropriate for Russia" democracy standards, opposing human rights development, and seeing it as a harmful foreign influence. State patriotism was framed under the new "Russian conservatism" line, which emphasized strong authority of central power, Russian imperial identity, Russia's interest in Eurasian regions, support for multipolar world, and the spread of conservative values as opposition to Western cosmopolitism. It helped to mobilise Russian society, integrate the great old and the new military victories of Russia's state and received a new support and greater legitimacy for Putin's regime. This ideology leaves room for integration of separate narratives from various ideological lines (from the Soviet nostalgia and technocratic modernisation to "old Russia" traditionalism). Military actions in Ukraine in 2014–2015 have illustrated that imperial approach effectively mobilises not only the Russian society but a certain part of the other post- Soviet societies (e.g., the idea of the Russian world). This "Russian conservatism" also attempts to respond to other internal tensions, such as ethnic conflicts, by promoting a more intensive Russian state identity instead of an ethnic identity. The situation, when various ethnic minorities and their leaders (e.g., R. Kadyrov) actively supported Russia's actions in Ukraine and the new Putin's activism, revealed that under this ideological umbrella, such local actors as in Putin's circle, leaders of ethnic regions, Orthodox church, and media authorities find themselves in the state's ongoing narratives. Under this situation, Putin's regime effectively marginalises their opponents. Non-systemic liberal-democrats are presented as acting against Russia's interests. The discourse for keeping the relationship with Western partners, which emphasizes the modernisation or stresses the importance of economic developments, is still valid, and it is still used for balancing, but current ideological trend has clearly prioritised the imperial identity over democracy development. ; Straipsnyje analizuojamas šiandienės Rusijos vidaus struktūrinių veiksnių ir vidaus veikėjų poveikis nacionalinės ideologijos paieškai ir "ru­siškojo konservatizmo" linijos formavimui, nužymint ir šios ideologijos sąsajas su Rusijos užsienio politika. Pagrindinį dėmesį skiriant Rusijos po­litikai nuo Gruzijos ir Rusijos karo 2008 m. iki 2016 m. yra išryškinama, kaip Vladimiro Putino režimas, atsakydamas į vidaus politikoje kylančias įtampas, susijusias su: 1) Rusijos režimo struktūros specifika, silovikų do­minavimu; 2) etnofederalizmo struktūra ir stiprėjančiu nacionalizmu bei 3) ideologijų konkurencija, vis aktyviau imasi eurazianistinę kryptį transfor­muoti į valstybine doktrina tampantį "rusiškąjį konservatizmą". Šiai anali­zei yra naudojamos vidaus ir išorės struktūrinių veiksnių poveikio politikai (pvz., Walterio Carlsnaeso konceptai), etnofederalizmo tyrimų bei neforma­lių ryšių teorinės priegos. Straipsnyje tvirtinama, kad Rusijos vidaus struk­tūriniai veiksniai formuoja Rusijos eurazianistinę kryptį kaip dominuojančią politikos doktriną, kuri apibrėžia (riboja) Rusijos užsienio politikos balan­savimą ir padeda paaiškinti jos dinamiką. Parodoma, kaip pastarųjų metų Rusijos agresyvėjanti užsienio politika tampa persmelkta valdžioje neoimpe­rialistų vizijos apie "stiprią, konservatyvią ir alternatyvią Rusiją", kuri lemia "rusiškojo konservatizmo" plėtojimą ir didėjantį naudojimą užsienio politi­kos kontekste, pagrindžiant Rusijos aktyvumą (agresyvumą) posovietiniame regione (pvz., kare su Ukraina), keliant daugiapolio pasaulio tvarkos klau­simą. Kitos konkuruojančios idėjinės linijos (provakarietiškas liberalizmas ir slavofiliškas nacionalizmas) yra įtraukiamos į balansavimą pagal poreikį, tačiau išlieka netipinėmis formomis, tam tikrais ideologiniais kraštutinumais.

Doutoramento em Estudos de Desenvolvimento ; A gestão de bacias hidrográficas tem uma dimensão inerentemente política uma vez que envolve tomar decisões que são limitadas pelos contextos institucionais, caracterizados por escassez de recursos e conflitos entre múltiplos atores, políticas e estruturas institucionais. No caso de nações em desenvolvimento que padecem de instabilidades políticas, a gestão de bacias hidrográficas torna-se um teatro político em que os principais objetivos de produção alimentar e gestão ambiental ficam fragilizados perante complexos interesses políticos que envolvem o controlo de recursos, a governação de organizações e a política partidária. Enquanto medida de recuperação no pós-guerra e com o apoio das Nações Unidas, a Nigéria adotou uma abordagem integrada para a gestão das bacias hidrográficas. Esta gestão cabe às Autoridades para o Desenvolvimento das Bacias Hidrográficas (ADBH) que estão sob a alçada do governo federal. A sua evolução reflete a instabilidade que caracteriza o federalismo nigeriano. Envolvidas numa política faccionária, com recorrentes intervenções militares e várias reformas no setor da água, as ADBH têm tido um desempenho abaixo do esperado. Este estudo visa explorar a economia política das ADBH na Nigéria, mais concretamente, a trajetória de desenvolvimento das ADBH enquanto reflexo do instável federalismo nigeriano. O documento está organizado em seis capítulos autónomos mas interligados que, no conjunto, encerram uma análise de nível macro e outra de nível micro. O primeiro capítulo descreve a forma como diferentes líderes nigerianos deixaram a sua marca no desenvolvimento das ADBH, desde a sua fundação até à presente administração de Muhammadu Buhari. De uma forma ou de outra, todos os grandiosos planos para aumentar a produção alimentar terminaram em nobres ambições. O capítulo inicia-se com a identificação dos motivos que desencadearam a reorganização da rede hidrográfica na Nigéria. O rescaldo da Guerra Civil, as secas na região do Sahel e a pressão da publicação do relatório das Nações Unidas em 1969 encontram-se entre os principais motivos. Depois de um fraco desempenho inicial em que vários princípios da gestão integrada das bacias hidrográficas foram ignorados, seguiu-se um conjunto de contributos de chefes de estado e presidentes. Infelizmente, nenhuma das promessas feitas surtiu os resultados esperados. O segundo capítulo analisa as ADBH à luz da turbulência que caracterizou o federalismo nigeriano, utilizando o paralelismo como estilo. Este capítulo inicia-se com a discussão do conceito de Federalismo enquanto sistema político e prossegue com a conclusão de que o federalismo existente na Nigéria é peculiar. No início do processo de independência nigeriano, os grupos étnicos não negociaram os termos deste federalismo e a governação militar continuada erodiu os já frágeis pilares criados pelos fundadores da nação. O sistema militar criou os estados e as áreas de governo locais por fragmentação, bem como os mecanismos federais, como são exemplo as três Constituições pós-independência e o Princípio do Carácter Federativo (PCF). O capítulo aborda igualmente vários fatores que influenciaram este paralelismo entre as trajetórias do federalismo nigeriano e das ADBH, nomeadamente, a delicada e volátil questão das minorias, o papel dos militares, o boom petrolífero da década de 70 e o PCF enquanto mecanismo de consociativismo e as recorrentes descontinuidades das políticas públicas e de governação. O paralelismo estabelecido mostra-nos que as ADBH tem uma trajetória que espelha a turbulência do federalismo nigeriano. O terceiro capítulo conclui a primeira parte da tese. Este capítulo foca-se nas reformas introduzidas por diferentes administrações das ADBH e na forma como a organização foi afetada por essas reformas. Os desafios colocados às ADBH começaram com a administração de Shagari, na década de 80, apesar da primeira tentativa para reposicionar as bacias hidrográficas ter ocorrido apenas no final dessa década, com o Programa de Ajustamento Estrutural de Babangida (PAE). Neste capítulo são detalhados o quadro de comercialização parcial criado e alguns dos seus conceitos centrais, as várias fases de preparação das ADBH para o seu novo estatuto, o seu processo de recapitalização e o cronograma da organização até se tornar financeiramente autossuficiente. Todo este processo foi condicionado pela cedência de Babangida à pressão pública e sua consequente demissão. Depois desta tentativa de comercialização das ADBH, várias outras se seguiram mas nenhuma foi bem-sucedida. No capítulo quatro inicia-se a segunda parte da tese, que corresponde a uma abordagem de nível micro à Autoridade para o Desenvolvimento da Bacia Hidrográfica do rio Lower Benue (ADBHLB), uma das doze autoridades existentes no país. Foi dado enfoque a como é que as dinâmicas observadas na primeira parte da tese ocorrem no contexto de apenas uma Autoridade. Este quarto capítulo documenta as observações conseguidas em projetos de irrigação da ADBHLB. As evidencias apresentadas provêm de dezasseis instalações da organização, incluindo a sua sede. Na conclusão do capítulo, são discutidos os traços característicos dos projetos de irrigação. Todos os projetos tem recursos naturais abundantes tais como vastos terrenos, acesso a água e localização em planícies férteis. No entanto, são disfuncionais e tornaram-se dívida pública. A constante mudança política deixou uma longa cadeia de construções inacabadas (e.g. a barragem inacabada de Guma, os terrenos abandonados em Tede ou sistemas de irrigação inacabados em Doma e Guma) e gestores de projeto desesperados. O capítulo cinco trata os impactos da fragmentação do federalismo ao nível de análise micro e detalha como é que o conflito de interesses se transformou à medida que o numero de partes interessadas na ADBHLB aumentou. Este capítulo dá-nos a conhecer como é que a ADBHLB reflete a instabilidade do federalismo nigeriano através de ilustrações da fragmentação estrutural da bacia hidrográfica da ADBHLB, que passou de dois estados fundadores (Benue e Plateau) para quatro (Benue, Plateau, Kogi e Nasarawa), após a fragmentação dos estados fundadores. O capítulo apresenta igualmente casos em que a ADBHLB se tornou uma plataforma política na medida em que os seus executivos de topo utilizam as instalações governamentais para alcançar os seus objetivos políticos. Neste capítulo, é possível concluir que os reveses descritos são um efeito em cascata da fraca negociação do federalismo na Nigéria. O sexto e último capítulo da tese dedica-se a como a ADBHLB respondeu à política de comercialização parcial de Babangida, o esforço renovado de Obasanjo e administrações seguintes. O capítulo inicia-se com a análise do quadro para a comercialização criado pelo governo federal e o plano articulado pela ADBHLB como resposta. O plano estratégico da organização traçou a forma como a ADBHLB se deveria impor no mercado competitivo mas não foi feita qualquer implementação. O capítulo finaliza com a conclusão de que o plano estratégico da ADBHLB foi mal sucedido, com base numa análise aprofundada dos relatórios do trabalho de campo realizado. Esta investigação foi afetada pela limitação do acesso a documentação oficial, tanto ao nível federal como ao nível da ADBHLB. Além disso, a falta de segurança vivida no país não permitiu a cobertura de todas as instalações da ADBHLB. Contudo, o estudo mostra claramente que o fraco desempenho das ADBH reflete a instabilidade do federalismo fragmentado nigeriano. A busca pela revitalização, reposição e comercialização parcial das ADBH deve ter em consideração as suas motivações. O documento termina com um conjunto de sugestões de pesquisa futura. Entre elas, inclui-se uma análise das políticas que estão a conduzir ao crescimento do número de ADBH e, em particular, ao argumento de que não há correlação entre a dimensão das ADBH e a dotação orçamental recebida do governo federal. ; The management of river basin organisations is inherently political, due to its unalienable constraints and institutional structures. Characterised by resources limitedness, conflicts of multiple actors, policies, and evolving institutional structures, river basin organisation often becomes the centre of political intrigue and power-play. In developing nations struggling with political instabilities, river basin management is the theatre of complicated politics, and its yield is often minimal since the primary goal of agriculture becomes emasculated by other interests. This study explores the political economy of the River Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs) as a mirror phenomenon of Nigeria's peculiar and challenge-laden federalism. The mission of the RBDAs become an instrument in the politics of fissiparous fragmentations, recurrent military interventions, and a series of reforms in the water sector. In six separate but interrelated chapters, set out as macro-level and micro-level analyses, this study explores the development trajectory of the RBDAs as a reflection of the turmoil that characterises Nigerian federalism. The macro-analyses focus on the federal actors, while the micro-analyses examine the case of the Lower Benue River Basin Development Authority (LBRBDA). The literature review and the field trips confirm, at both levels of analysis, the claim that river basin organisation is intrinsically political. The study also found that the social life or the politics of the RBDAs derive its push from the general politics of its ambient environment, and bears a likeness to it, as exemplified by the case study. The quest to reposition Nigeria's ailing RBDAs must further explore the role that politics plays in the creation and management of the RBDAs. The insights from the study will prove valuable to the stakeholders and policymakers. Considering the findings and limitations, the conclusion also highlights some areas for further research. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The short-lived popularity boost of the Osama bin Laden operation having all but faded, President Obama for the first time appears vulnerable and could be defeated in the 2012 election. Indeed, many are starting to wonder if he will be a one-term president like Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush. As congressional leaders continue to meet with Vice President Joe Biden to negotiate a reduction of the federal budget and to avoid a potential default on government debt, the economic recovery seems to be stalling: reports released last week show unemployment rose again to 9.1 % and job growth slowed down, and manufacturing and retail sales are also down from last quarter.The only good news for the President is that the Republican field of candidates, while still fluid, is very weak so far, and the Republican Party leadership divided and ineffective. Hefty potential candidates such as Jeb Bush (undoubtedly the strongest intellect in the GOP today) and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie have eschewed confronting the formidable President-candidate in 2012 and seem to be lying in wait for 2016, when they expect the field to be wide open.The first serious national presidential debate for the Republican candidacy took place on Monday, June 13. Mitt Romney, former governor of Massachusetts and the author of a health plan there which critics contend is very similar to Obama's, emerged as the solid front-runner and Michelle Bachman, an Evangelical Congresswoman from Minnesota and a Tea Party favorite, as the one who can challenge him. She is a former tax lawyer and a mother of five, who also apparently has found time to raise 23 foster kids. She is often compared to Sarah Palin, but most agree that she has more substance, understands how the government and can articulate ideas. She portrays herself as the anti-establishment figure, although she has been in Congress for a while and is at present the Chair of the House Intelligence Committee. Similarly to Palin, she considers the federal government an "elitist conspiracy" against middle-America and has invoked the War Powers Resolution to force Obama to request Congress authorization to continue operations in Libya. Tim Pawlenty, former governor of Minnesota, also an Evangelical with Tea Party following, was expected to be a serious challenger, but missed an opportunity to confront Romney on his health care plan for Massachusetts, which he had severely criticized the day before on national TV, stating it was very similar to Obama's, and going as far as calling Romney a "co-conspirator in Obama care." This lack of courage to confront the front-runner personally has made him a distant third in the primary race. Romney, on the other hand, was very well-prepared, confident in his own image of the businessman/CEO who can fix the jobs problem. The rest of the Republican candidates were a motley crew, starting with Herman Cain, an African-American businessman, owner of a pizza chain and talk show host, followed by Ron Paul, a radical libertarian that in spite of his quirky ways is quite endearing in his candid contempt for government, and Newt Gingrich, whose entire campaign staff had just resigned due to his lack of discipline and inability to run a serious campaign. All candidates focused more on bashing Obama than each other, since it is early in the race and there will be time enough for that this coming fall. Rick Santorum, another fiscal and social conservative (but in this case Catholic) and former Senator for Pennsylvania, completes the second-tier line-up of Republican candidates.But the Republican field has not firmed up yet, and there could be some surprise Republican candidates entering the race, as the President appears more vulnerable. In fact, only yesterday John Huntsman, a new intriguing figure who has been Obama's ambassador to China, joined the fray announcing his candidacy from Liberty Island, next to the Statue of Liberty, in the same spot where Ronald Reagan announced his in 1980. Huntsman, former governor of Utah, is a billionaire, a moderate and a Mormon, just like Romney. Both will skip Iowa, the first test for candidates, and one dominated by Evangelical "value" voters. Both are well-spoken, good looking family men with no rough edges. Unlike Romney, he has very little name recognition at the national level, and spent years as a missionary in China, where he learnt to speak Mandarin fluently. What he brings to the race is his expertise in that country, the main holder of American's debt, and therefore, the one that worries Americans the most. He has framed this primary contest as one between "renewal and decline". He speaks in a very quiet, civil tone and he introduced himself to the public through a stream of unusual videos, one for example that shows the candidate himself, in motocross attire from heads to toe, riding his motorbike across the Utah desert, as dreamy country music plays in the background. The White House is said to be concerned about his candidacy, not only because of moderation, his capacity and his presidential demeanor but also because he has been an insider of this administration and may use information thus acquired against the President. He could become a formidable opponent, a Republican mirror image of the President.Another prospective candidate, who, if he decides to run, could throw all calculations into disarray, is Rick Perry, the Governor of Texas. He is an attractive candidate for the party establishment and has two very strong qualities: first, he is a social conservative who could supersede Bachman and Pawlenty in drawing the Tea Party vote; second, he has been a successful governor who can boast about his job creation record in Texas (40% of all new jobs during the recovery were created in Texas). He is still testing the waters, and similarly to Huntsman, may perhaps use 2012 as a platform that can propel him into the 2016 election. Although he has not announced his candidacy, observers point to his convening of a "National Day of Prayer" for early August as a sign that he may run. He would be a formidable contester, since he can speak both the language of the Tea Party as well as the national language of this 2012 election, which is the economy and jobs.In comparing the Republican Party today with the one of ten years ago, one cannot help but notice the big shift that has occurred, and in doing so, perhaps be less dismissive of Ron Paul's philosophical influence on the party rank and file. The truth is the libertarian streak has made important inroads inside the party, and voters are now serious about not only fiscal conservatism and smaller government, but also a retrenchment of America's role in the world. This was apparent during last week's debate and the public conversations that followed in the airwaves throughout the week. Most of the candidates blasted Obama for intervening in Libya and called for an early withdrawal from Afghanistan. Michelle Bachman invoked the War Powers Resolution, passed in 1973 during Watergate, which obligates the President to seek the approval of Congress 60 days after the beginning of hostilities. The Republican Party has traditionally been the home of National Security "hawks", and the last strong isolationist mood in the party dates to the 1920s. While an isolationist wing emerged again right before Gen. Eisenhower became president, after that it was represented by a very small group, led in the last twenty years or so by Pat Buchanan. Today, a war-weary and budget- conscious American public is in favor of withdrawal from Afghanistan by a wide majority (73% of all Americans, 59% among Republicans), in spite of the fact that most had understood that to be a "war of necessity" as opposed to Iraq, a war of choice. If we count American military presence in Iraq, Libya, Yemen and the tribal areas of Pakistan, today the US is involved in five different conflicts, and spending billions of dollars a month on them, most of which are considered wars of choice. Today, President Obama is in fact a victim of his own success: bin Laden is dead, so Americans want out of Afghanistan. This is echoed loudly enough by his opponents. The President is thus under pressure to bring the troops home not only by libertarians but also by extreme Right candidates (Bachman) and even by mainstream candidates like Huntsman and Romney.After the debate, Republican Senators John Mc Cain and Lindsay Graham and Defense Secretary Gates took to the airwaves to admonish the candidates on this issue, accusing them of choosing politics over policy in matters of national security. Mc Cain went so far as to say that Reagan would not recognize his own party: "This is not the Republican Party of Ronald Reagan, who was always willing to stand up for freedom all over the world". He insisted that Khadafy was crumbling and that US logistical support, intelligence and refueling capabilities had to be continued to finish him off. He went even further and picked the opportunity to criticize Obama for not using America's own airpower, and instead "leading from behind". This was a theme that Bachman had also used in her speech, somewhat incoherently, since she vilified Obama for allowing the French to lead the operation in Libya while at the same time invoking the War Powers Resolution and demanding US withdrawal, since there were no apparent US interests involved there. Mc Cain in his own interview with Christiane Amanpour, later refuted Bachman's claim by stating that Khadafi had consistently supported terrorism, was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 and was about to massacre his own people at Benghazi when NATO intervened and stopped him. "Our interests are our values" and "Sometimes leadership entails sacrifice," he added.To Romney's equivocal reference to the "Afghanis (sic) war of Independence" (an expression that per se brings serious doubts to his basic knowledge of geopolitics) Senator Lindsay Graham also in his own interview, later retorted: "This is not a war of Afghan independence, from my point of view" (of course, it isn't, it's a civil war!). He continued: "This is the center of gravity against the war on terror, radical Islam. It is in our national security interest to make sure that the Taliban never come back". He warned them not to try to position themselves to "the Left" of President Obama on this issue" and he hinted that that decision would lose them the nomination.Among the wide array of opinions, only Tim Pawlenty heeded the party line that the advice of military commanders and the situation on the ground would be the main determinant of troop withdrawals under his watch. Outgoing Defense Secretary Robert Gates criticized the "declinists" who put the short term expediency politics ahead of long-term national security interests. He added that examining the bottom line only is short-sighted, since intervention is not about sheer cost, it is about the cost of failure of early withdrawals, such as Afghanistan in 1989. Earlier, on his last trip as defense secretary, Gates had bluntly told NATO members meeting in Brussels that the military weakness of most members and their lack of will to share risks and costs of NATO operations were putting severe strains on the organization and particularly on the United States. Indeed, less than a third of NATO members are taking part in the Libyan operation, although NATO is a consensus- based organization and therefore, all members voted to approve it.According Secretary Gates, the need to cut spending and radically reduce the budget has become an obsession and sparked a new current of isolationism that now insidiously divides the traditionally hawkish Republican Party. This, he told a Newsweek interviewer, is one of the main reasons that have led to his resignation, after serving two administrations and becoming the epitome of bipartisanship. His unwillingness to plan for more withdrawals and find other ways to reduce the bloated defense budget has been criticized both from the Left and the Right. He complains about how both "Congress budget hawks and defense hawks" constantly interfere with his work. He ends by saying he refuses to be part of a nation that is forced to scale back its military power so much that it can no longer lead. His frustration is apparent; his resignation paved the way for Obama's announcement of troop withdrawal, a few days later.This last week, the presidential politics of war became clearer. Feeling the pressure of Republicans attacking him from his "left flank", President Obama told a war-weary nation that he plans to start withdrawing troops by December this year, ending the surge by the summer of 2012 and bringing home most of the rest by 2014. Although there is a widespread sense that Obama has gotten so involved in the daily details of the war that would prefer to stay on and see his counterinsurgency policy through, he has quickly readjusted to the realities at home and accelerated the withdrawal timeline that his generals had recommended. With his earlier decisions of aggressively pursuing the war on terror, signing off on drone killing missions, and having bin Laden killed inside Pakistan, he successfully beat the image of a Dovish President, weak in National Security. This past Wednesday, with the words, "It is time to do nation-building at home", he acknowledged the public's concerns about the waste of American power, blood and treasure abroad while the country is still suffering from the recession, and quickly moved back to center.This is the spirit of the times. It requires a new type of leadership, one that is strong enough to face down enemies, yet flexible enough to accommodate to the new and constantly shifting realities, to accept a revised status of the nation and to lead it into new era in its history. Time will show whether such leader is among the Republicans new line-up or whether he is already in the White House.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

The most unsettling book I have ever read is "The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Attacks Against the United States," by Jeffrey Lewis. As the title suggests, it's an alternative history in which the diplomacy between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un goes terribly wrong. While Lewis criticizes Trump and Kim's style of governing, the story is not about a mad king destroying the world. Instead, it demonstrates how governments concerned with their own interests and survival can misread each other's signals and accidentally escalate beyond the point of no return.A new book, "Nuclear War: A Scenario" by Annie Jacobsen, promises to provide the same kind of realistic, unsettling scenario. Based on dozens of interviews with former officials, Jacobsen plots out minute by minute and second by second how a nuclear exchange would happen. She illuminates — at least as far as her sources are legally allowed to — the processes that govern American and Russian nuclear command and control. The reader learns what alarms would go off in which control rooms, what orders would have to be spoken to which officials, and which keys would have to be turned in which silos during an apocalypse. It is supposed to worry the readers.The book falls short of that goal. It treats nuclear war as an incomprehensible horror, rather than something human beings plan to do to each other for human reasons, and focuses on the most unlikely scenarios. For all the action-movie details about nuclear weapons being deployed, Jacobsen fails to explain how or why a nuclear war might start. In other words, she treats nuclear annihilation like an asteroid strike or a bear attack, something that is scary to picture but fundamentally impossible to predict or stop. So why should the reader worry about it in day-to-day life?"With time, after a nuclear war, all present-day knowledge will be gone. Including the knowledge that the enemy was not North Korea, Russia, America, China, Iran, or anyone else vilified as a nation or a group," Jacobsen concludes. "It was the nuclear weapons that were the enemy of us all. All along." Perhaps that's a call to abolish nuclear weapons. If so, Jacobsen doesn't provide any reason to believe that might happen.And by juxtaposing the murderous insanity of nuclear war with the sleek efficiency of the institutions designed to fight one, Jacobsen might have hoped to jar her readers. Instead, the book comes off as a demented combination of anti-war pamphlet and U.S. military recruitment ad. ("The function of NATO is to further democratic values and peacefully resolve disputes," comes right after a graphic description of everyone in Washington burning to death.) The only real coherent point it makes is how little time world leaders have to deliberate and react to a nuclear launch—which is certainly an important problem.But again, Jacobsen does not explain why they might be faced with such a problem. "Nuclear War" focuses on a "Bolt out of the Blue" scenario, the U.S. military's term for a complete surprise attack. Although that kind of attack might be "what everyone in DC fears the most," according to a former assistant secretary of defense who speaks to Jacobsen, it is the least likely fear to come true. As Jacobsen herself admits, an unprovoked nuclear first strike would be "national suicide" for any country that launches it. What kind of a madman would do that?Her answer is Kim, the North Korean ruler. "In this scenario, we don't know why the North Korean leader chose to launch a Bolt out of the Blue attack against America, but paranoia almost most certainly played a role," Jacobsen asserts. She throws out a theory about Kim feeling slighted by satellite photos of North Korea at night. To show how Kim fits the bill of a "nihilistic madman," the book cites examples of how oppressive the North Korean system is. Oppressive, however, doesn't mean suicidal. If Kim lives lavishly while his citizens starve, shouldn't he want to keep that arrangement going?Jacobsen misrepresents the purpose of the North Korean nuclear program by glossing over its history. The Clinton administration, she writes, tried to convince North Korea "to abandon the [nuclear] program in exchange for economic benefits. The result was nil." In reality, North Korea did agree to the deal, which broke down a decade later. Believing that North Korea was about to collapse, the Clinton administration implemented it only halfheartedly. North Korea, of course, shirked its own obligations in return, provoking the Bush administration to tear up the deal completely.The supervillain theory of geopolitics, in which America's enemies are plotting to destroy the world for fun, doesn't make sense. China, Russia, and North Korea all oppose the U.S.-led world order due to their specific national interests. For all of those countries, nuclear weapons are the ultimate life insurance policy. The real danger posed by North Korea lies in the Kim dynasty's rational fears; they know that they are quite vulnerable to both internal and external enemies, so their threat calculus likely leaves little room for error.The "2020 Commission Report," on the other hand, lays out the kind of crisis that might push things over the edge. After a North Korean radar crew mistakes a malfunctioning South Korean airliner for a hostile bomber, fighting breaks out on the peninsula. The Trump administration believes that, through threatening bluster, it can force North Korea to stand down and restore calm. Instead, the threats convince Kim that a regime change war has already begun, and that he must show strength to force the United States to back off. That scenario — a series of "normal" mistakes adding up to an extreme outcome — makes more sense to worry about than an unlikely bolt out of the blue.Strangely enough, Jacobsen also describes American policy as irrationally genocidal. She quotes John Rubel, a former U.S. defense official who sat through the secret unveiling of the Single Integrated Operational Plan, the 1960 plan for a "general nuclear war." Years later, a guilt-stricken Rubel compared himself and the generals in the planning room to the Nazis who plotted the Holocaust, according to Jacobsen. After all, the Single Integrated Operational Plan called for the murder of hundreds of millions of civilians, many of them random bystanders in third countries, not counting the Americans who would be obliterated in retaliation.Daniel Ellsberg, another defense planner from the 1960s, had a similar reaction when he read the death estimates. "This piece of paper should not exist," he remembered thinking in "The Doomsday Machine," his 2017 memoir. "It should never have existed. Not in America. Not anywhere, ever. It depicted evil beyond any human project ever. There should be nothing on earth, nothing real, that it referred to." Ellsberg, who died in 2023 and whose parents were Jewish, called it a scheme for "a hundred Holocausts.""The Doomsday Machine," however, goes beyond his immediate reaction to explain why such evil does exist in the world. In the 1930s and 1940s, military planners around the world had come to accept that "strategic bombing," the destruction of enemy cities from a distance, would be the best way to end wars quickly. When the atomic bomb was created, the U.S. military simply thought of it as a more efficient version of the firebombs it was already dropping on German and Japanese cities. For a couple decades after World War II, planners continued to believe in the possibility of a "damage-limiting" nuclear strike, of wiping out the enemy's weapons in order to save cities at home. After many close brushes with nuclear war, world leaders slowly developed the understanding that nuclear weapons were a completely different kind of weapon. And these close brushes, for the most part, were not random or irrational events. Incidents like the 1962 Cuban missile crisis were the result of politics, when one superpower pressed its advantage too hard and set off its rival's survival instinct. Even a 1983 false alarm in Moscow that Jacobsen mentions, the closest thing to a real-life bolt out of the blue scenario, came amid rising U.S.-Soviet military tensions in Europe.The knowledge that mass murder can be a product of normal human motivations is depressing. Yet it's also a relief. Nuclear war is not an inhuman force like an asteroid or a bear. It is a political problem with political solutions. There are many steps that world powers can take — even short of abolishing nuclear weapons — to reduce the risks, by communicating and respecting each other's existential fears. Ellsberg, for example, called on the United States and Russia to at least deactivate the weapons designed for a first strike and take forces off of hair-trigger alert.The enemy is not, as Jacobsen writes, any specific vilified nation. But it is not the nuclear weapons, inanimate objects sitting in silos, either. The problem is us. Nuclear weapons, like every other nasty implement of war, are a means to a human end.

W artykule przyglądam się temu, jaką edukację polityczną warto rozwijać we współczesnej polskiej szkole i wszędzie tam, gdzie buduje się w ludziach zdolność do wspólnej i niewyalienowanej pracy. Kierunek rozważań wyznaczyła konieczność ustosunkowania się myśli pedagogicznej – i równoległego dostosowania praktyk wychowawczych – do zmian w sposobie koordynacji społeczeństwa, które dokonują się w atmosferze groźby wybuchu wojny. Rozważania te buduję na dotychczasowych badaniach własnych z obszaru uczenia się w ruchach społecznych, analizując trzy porządki zapewniające koordynację społeczeństw (neoliberalizm, nacjonalizm, militaryzm) w kontekście wykluczanych przez nie wartości: dobra wspólnego, samorządu i pokoju. Rezultatem pracy jest matryca przyporządkowująca te kontrwartości różnym typom współpracy (koordynacji, kooperacji i kolaboracji). Matryca pozwala identyfikować specyfikę konkretnych przykładów mobilizacji społecznej, jak i rozpoznawać luki w kształceniu kolektywnych umiejętności współdziałania. Rezultaty analizy pozwalają zoperacjonalizować praktyki oporu pod kątem celów wychowania i stawiają w nowym świetle problemy powiązań i nawarstwiania się wrogich szkole ideologii neoliberalizmu, nacjonalizmu i militaryzmu. ; The paper analyses types of political education worth developing in contemporary Polish schools and in other places dedicated to building human capacity to work together in a non-alienated way. The analysis is based on my own research from the area of learning in social movements. I analyze three orders ensuring social coordination (neoliberalism, nationalism, and militarism) in the context of the values they exclude: the common good, self-government and peace. The result of the work is a matrix assigning these counter-values, accordingly, to coordination, cooperation and collaboration. 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"What's happened to the Democrats? They used to be antiwar!" Such is one of the many questions being bandied about by an online commentariat seeking to make sense of a litany of Republican endorsements of Kamala Harris, many of them made by party elites known for their hawkish foreign policy like former Wyoming Representative Liz Cheney and former Vice President Dick Cheney. One could find similar consternation with American liberals' support for U.S. involvement in the Ukraine crisis. The confusion is based primarily on nostalgia, a selective view of history that obscures the Democratic Party's longer, more complicated relationship with interventionism. The reality is quite different: what we are witnessing is the latest iteration of an ongoing intraparty struggle where the dominant liberal interventionist core asserts itself over a smaller progressive noninterventionist periphery. While the latter often dominates popular conceptions of the Democratic Party and its vision for American foreign affairs, the former drives the reality of party politics. This has been happening since the First World War, best encapsulated by the public debate between Columbia professor John Dewey and one of his students, writer Randolph Bourne. While both were considered liberals of a progressive stripe, they maintained opposing views on American entry into Europe's conflagration. Known for his adherence to philosophical pragmatism, Dewey asserted that the war could save the world from German militarism and be used to shepherd the American political economy toward a fairer, managed state. Bourne rejected this notion and argued that American entry into the war would undermine the egalitarianism of the larger progressive project and create a labyrinth of bureaucracies that would undermine democracy.While Dewey's arguments held sway as the United States entered the war, American involvement in Europe's quarrel, compounded by civil rights abuses at home, proved Bourne posthumously correct. Despite succumbing to the Spanish Flu in 1918, Bourne's views of the war, bolstered by the posthumous publication of a collection of essays entitled Untimely Papers, found fertile soil in an American society horrified by the conflict. Chastened by the realities of the Western Front, interwar progressivism took on a solid strain of pacifism and opposition to centralized authority.While Bourne's sentiments survived the Great War and inspired a postwar mood of non-interventionism, they would not survive America's subsequent entry into World War II, which set the tone for the foreign policy of American liberalism and, by extension, the Democratic Party for the next 30 years. Liberal interventionism won out in the face of a threat posed by the distinctly right-wing geopolitical threat in the form of the Axis powers. Except for a few strident leftwing pacifists and a few dissident liberals who took refuge with the Republican Right, the bulk of the formerly pacifist left took up the cause of intervention in the name of antifascism. The tone set by the Second World War carried through into American liberalism's conduct of the Cold War. Beneath the din of anti-communism, one often amplified by conservatives, American foreign policy was shaped by a liberal understanding of recent history and the origins of communism. President Harry Truman's eponymously titled doctrine entangled the United States in Europe's security architecture.After the Eisenhower administration, which solidified the Truman doctrine and expanded it to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the Cold War framework was thickened further still by a liberal cold warrior, President John F. Kennedy.Empowered by a materialist and universalistic view of human advancement and the belief that the U.S. had fallen behind the Soviets, JFK pursued a policy known as "flexible response" that expanded American military spending beyond the bounds of nuclear deterrence. These policy changes, maintained under his successor, President Lyndon Johnson, and coupled with a dramatic increase in foreign aid spending, expanded U.S. commitments throughout the postcolonial world. This combination of asymmetric warfare and economic development drastically raised the stakes of the Cold War and led directly to U.S. entry into the quagmire of the Vietnam War. Contrary to nostalgia present the Kennedy era as a missed path towards peace, in reality, JFK continued America on a path of war-making and militarization laid out by his predecessors and stretched well beyond the deaths of the slain Kennedy brothers.While the Vietnam War was the product of Cold War liberalism, it was also its undoing. The horrors of the war, coupled with the inequities of the draft and government secrecy revealed, inspired a mass antiwar movement among the heretofore latent progressive left that found a resonant audience on Capitol Hill. Earlier antiwar works from the left, including that of Randolph Bourne, were revived for a youth movement radicalized against the war. This movement similarly inspired subsequent debates during the late Cold War, particularly on the issue of the Reagan administration's arming of the Contras in Nicaragua and intervention in the Angolan Civil War. The future seemed bright for a left-wing anti-war sensibility and its access to a Democratic Party that was amenable to its views. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, internal changes within the Democratic Party, and the subsequent birth of a new logic for humanitarian interventionism subsumed the ruptures caused by the Vietnam War. While the Democrats indeed offered notable resistance to Operation Desert Storm, often invoking the specter of Vietnam, congressional Democrats provided significant support to U.S. operations in Somalia and interventions in the former Yugoslavia. During the Clinton administration, inspired by retrospectives on the Holocaust compounded by the Rwandan genocide, the notion of a "responsibility to protect," the concept that the U.S. had the moral obligation to use force to prevent mass atrocity, took hold within elite liberal circles.Due to these competing impulses, Democratic opposition to the Global War on Terror was checkered and paired by a left-wing anti-war movement that, in retrospect, was a shadow of its Vietnam-era self. While, as with Iraq War I, Democrats posted noticeable opposition to Iraq War II, such opposition was overshadowed by the fact that Democratic leadership, especially in the Senate, acquiesced to a war spearheaded by a Republican administration. Three of the last five Democratic presidential nominees — then Senators John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Biden — voted in support of using military action against Iraq. President Obama won in 2008 in part because he publicly opposed war in Iraq before it began and campaigned on ending that war. While he advanced that sentiment by pursuing diplomacy with Iran and opening up to Cuba, he also launched interventions into Libya, Syria, and Yemen, often sold on the grounds of a "responsibility to protect." Much like the liberal rationale of interventions past, American involvement was justified on humanitarian grounds and met largely with Democratic acquiescence in Congress and voter apathy. Liberalism has entered a new wave of internal strife regarding America's role in the world. In a new era of great power competition, the progressive base of the Democratic Party has come out hard against unconditional U.S. support for Israel's war in Gaza and Lebanon. It has also shown varying degrees of opposition to U.S. involvement in the Ukraine crisis. Yet, unlike the Vietnam era, this grassroots opposition has been unable to substantively influence Democratic politics, where a party elite clings to old views about upholding international norms and alliances, no matter how inconsistent or counterproductive those views in practice may be. Given this intraparty divide, it should not be surprising that the Harris campaign has courted the endorsement of hawkish Republicans. This history, however, should not be viewed as determinative of an inevitable path forward. The past has shown that these impulses are not static but held by individuals determined to shape the future.

One might assume that U.S. nuclear strategy and force structure are determined through serious deliberations among high-ranking officials in decorated uniforms considering adversary capabilities and targeting requirements. Sometimes that's not too far from reality. But in many cases, business interests and politics have played a larger role in shaping nuclear force structure than military strategy. The most recent example is the Air Force's new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, which the Pentagon has certified to continue despite its questionable strategic value along with its now $141 billion price tag and several-year schedule delays. Just two weeks ago Air Force Lt. Gen Andrew Gebara told an audience at the Mitchell Institute that while the force will "restructure to get after the cost growth," there is no effort to slow down and "work can still continue under the contract that exists today." Bringing the pork homeICBMs in the United States have been intrinsically tied to money and politics since they were first deployed in the 1960s, and rural Midwestern communities witnessed their fortunes changing with the arrival of these weapons of mass destruction. As Matt Korda, Associate Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, explains, local residents watched as the U.S. government paid to pave their dirt roads, rebuild their bridges, and upgrade their telephone and power lines to accommodate the needs of the missile bases. To these long-ignored communities, nuclear missiles brought money, jobs, and modernization. Since the end of the Cold War, politicians from ICBM states have lobbied fiercely to preserve these missile bases. As the primary threat of a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack from the Soviet Union faded, so did the need for a force of ICBMs meant to deliver a devastating preemptive blow against Soviet forces. When the Clinton administration thus considered eliminating ICBMs entirely during its Nuclear Posture Review process, a group of senators lobbied to have the issue dropped. Around the same time, senators from the ICBM host states — Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Utah, home to Hill Air Force Base where ICBM support activities are headquartered — formed the "Senate ICBM Coalition" with the mission of preserving America's missiles.The Senate ICBM coalitionThe coalition's role in the Sentinel ICBM program can be traced back to 2006. The Air Force previously claimed that the arsenal of Cold War-era Minuteman III ICBMs could be sustained through 2040. But an amendment by the Senate ICBM Coalition to the FY07 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) trimmed the lifespan by ten years.
Thus, coalition members used their influence to accelerate the development of a replacement ICBM, sustaining the force and ensuring benefits for their states for decades longer.
The coalition added other measures to the FY07 NDAA to hinder President Bush's planned reduction of the ICBM force by 50 missiles.
As President Obama was finalizing negotiations with Russia for New START in 2009, coalition senators worried what the treaty would mean for their ICBMs. Leveraging their votes on the treaty's ratification, the coalition successfully pressured Obama into limiting the reduction of ICBMs and committing to replace or modernize each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.
This presented an opportunity for the Air Force to recommend replacing Minutemans with a new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), later named "Sentinel."
In 2013, the Senate ICBM Coalition blocked the Pentagon from conducting the environmental impact study required before eliminating ICBMs. Also, when a 2013 interagency review concluded that the U.S. could maintain its strategic deterrent with a one-third reduction in deployed forces, the Pentagon began considering a significant reduction in the ICBM force. The coalition, however, successfully pressured the Pentagon to abandon the idea.
Another significant coalition success was a provision to the FY17 NDAA prohibiting the Air Force from deploying fewer than 400 ICBMs, which has been included in the NDAA every year since and which effectively grants lawmakers nuclear force posture authority over military officials. Lobbying for SentinelIn recent years, members of the Senate coalition, their allies in the House, and Northrop Grumman — the sole contractor for the Sentinel ICBM — have lobbied fiercely to sustain the Sentinel program.
To get ahead of a potential nuclear force review by a new Trump administration, the Senate coalition published a white paper in 2016 presenting the "strong case" for the Sentinel program, while acknowledging the "strong local interests in the ICBM mission" they represent.
In 2019, coalition allies in the House — and lobbying by Northrop Grumman — helped kill an amendment to the FY20 NDAA that would have required a study on life-extending Minuteman. The ICBM coalition then sent a letter to the secretary of defense conveying concerns over considerations of an alternative to GBSD and imploring him to "ensure the GBSD program is not disrupted or delayed."
On top of that, Northrop Grumman and its subsidiaries contributed $1.2 million to members of the Senate ICBM Coalition between 2012 and 2020 and over $15 million to members of the Senate and House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittees and the Senate and House Appropriations subcommittees on defense.
One beneficiary was Sen. Jon Tester (D-Mont.), a long-time member of the ICBM Coalition and Senate Appropriations Committee and current chair of the defense subcommittee. During a recent hearing, Tester urged Air Force leadership to keep the Sentinel program on schedule, saying it is "a project that's near and dear to me."
Tester has made his personal interest in the Sentinel issue clear, communicating to constituents last month that he's working to bring the Sentinel pork home: "[Sentinel will] bolster our local economy… I'll continue pushing the Air Force and government contractors to use as much Montana labor as possible on the project, because if you want a job done right, you hire a Montanan."
Last year, a group of coalition senators including Steve Daines (R-Mont.), John Barrasso (R-Wyo.), Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyo.), Mike Lee (R-Utah), and Mitt Romney (R-Utah) introduced the "Sentinel Nuclear Deterrence Act of 2023," which would authorize the Air Force to enter multiyear procurement contracts for Sentinel missiles.
North Dakota Senator John Hoeven (R) boasted in May that he pressured Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown to commit to "continue modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, especially the intercontinental ballistic missiles." Hoeven, a member of the Appropriations Committee, took credit in March for securing $4.5 billion in the FY24 Defense Appropriations bill for Sentinel development and procurement.The fate of SentinelThe Air Force notified Congress in January that the Sentinel ICBM program would cost 37 percent more than projected and take at least two years longer than estimated — an overrun in breach of Congress's Nunn-McCurdy Act, putting the program at risk of cancellation.
The Pentagon's internal review found that the cost would be even higher than previously stated — approximately $141 billion, an 81% increase from 2020 estimates. Despite this exorbitant price tag and "delay of several years," the Department of Defense this month certified the program to continue.
Besides excessive cost, there is little rationale for ICBMs in a post-Cold War era. Despite arguments by ICBM proponents of the responsiveness of ICBMs, government evaluations reveal that U.S. ballistic missile submarines are "almost equal in speed and reliability" and "virtually undetectable."
In contrast, ICBMs' sitting-duck vulnerability invites a devastating strike on U.S. soil by Russia. Beyond Russia, ICBMs are practically useless given that targeting China or North Korea would require overflight of Russia, which could too easily be mistaken by Russia as an incoming attack, risking a preemptive launch.The diminishing utility of ICBMs has been reflected in moves by multiple administrations and Pentagon officials to reduce and even eliminate their role in recent decades. At every turn though, these moves were fought by senators with personal stake in the preservation of ICBMs.

This week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky offered his starkest warning yet about the need for new military aid from the United States."It's important to specifically address the Congress," Zelensky said. "If the Congress doesn't help Ukraine, Ukraine will lose the war."Unfortunately for Zelensky, Congress does not appear to be listening. In fact, Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) is now on the verge of losing control of the House due to deep Republican disagreements over Ukraine aid and a host of other issues. If Johnson fails to rein in his colleagues, the House may be unable to pass much of anything for the rest of the year.As Kyiv's ammunition shortage worsens, a Wednesday dispute revealed just how weak of a hold the speaker has on his caucus. Johnson is trying to renew a spying authority before it expires on April 19, but a last-minute intervention from former President Donald Trump led Republicans to kill his bill before it even reached the floor.Ukraine and its allies seem to have internalized the lesson that Johnson is now learning: As the presidential election season gets into gear, the center of gravity in Republican politics has shifted southward. Hence why British Foreign Minister David Cameron's pro-Ukraine charm tour made its first stop in Palm Beach, Florida.Cameron met with Trump Monday at Mar-a-Lago, where he pushed the Republican candidate on aid. "[I]t's in everybody's interest that Ukraine is in a strong position and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is in a weak position at the end of this year," Cameron said following the meeting. "Whoever is president wants to be able to push forward in a way that is backing success and not trying to overturn failure."The former British prime minister then went to Washington, where he met with congressional leaders, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). Cameron did not, however, sit down with Johnson. A British source told Politico that there were scheduling issues, though the symbolism is hard to ignore.The Biden administration, for its part, has made some efforts to bridge the gap in hopes that the House will eventually pass a new aid package. The White House authorized a $138 million weapons sale on Tuesday, and it followed up by sending Ukraine thousands of Iranian guns and ammunition that the U.S. had seized en route to Yemen last year. But this pales in comparison to the billions of dollars worth of weapons that Kyiv received each month in the early stages of the war.All of this is further complicated by the fact that corruption in Ukraine has led to price gouging on some items purchased by Ukraine's Defense Ministry. "Corruption has been deeply ingrained in Ukraine's defense sector since Soviet times, with manufacturers routinely bribing officials to purchase equipment at inflated prices," the Wall Street Journal reported. "Changing those practices would be hard enough in peacetime, let alone in the midst of war."This leaves Ukraine in its weakest position since the early weeks of the war. Without new aid, Kyiv risks losing both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, with Moscow holding an apparent advantage in each domain.This wasn't always the case. In late 2022, when Ukrainian forces pushed Russia from the outskirts of Kyiv all the way back to the Donbas, Ukraine had the momentum in every domain. As George Beebe of the Quincy Institute wrote at the time, "Ukraine's successes on the battlefield have provided it with substantial leverage to shape the terms of any settlement.""This success story does not mean that either Russia or Ukraine is yet ready for serious negotiations," Beebe, who previously led Russia analysis at the CIA, argued. "But it offers a window of opportunity for the United States to prepare the diplomatic ground for an eventual settlement of the conflict — a window that may get smaller over time if we do not act now."Beebe's prediction has proved prescient. Russia, now in a much stronger position, has far fewer reasons to grant concessions to Ukraine than it did a year ago. This does not necessarily mean that all is lost. If Congress can pass a new Ukraine aid package, then Kyiv may be able to at least hold onto the stalemate that has prevailed for much of the past year. This would create an opportunity to sue for peace, though likely on less favorable terms than were previously possible.But it does mean that maximalist goals — including the reconquest of Crimea, which Russia has held since 2014 — are that much less realistic now than they were in 2022. Even some mainstream Democrats are coming around to this position, as exemplified by recent comments from Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee."Realistically, Crimea is not coming back to Ukraine, and we can absolutely win this war and absolutely make a difference even in that reality," Smith said in a hearing Wednesday."We do not have to have Crimea to make it 1000% worth it to give Ukraine the money," he argued. "We need a sovereign democratic Ukraine that can survive."In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Three drones slammed into a Russian-occupied nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on Sunday, reigniting fears that the war could spark a nuclear accident, according to the BBC. Russia blamed Ukraine for the strikes, while Ukrainian officials argued that the Kremlin may have staged it as a "false flag" attack. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said the attack was the first direct hit on the plant since late 2022 but noted that there are "no indications of damage to critical nuclear safety or security systems."— European states penned a new deal to enhance cooperation on protecting undersea infrastructure in the North Sea, according to Reuters, which noted that attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022 has focused attention on security issues along Europe's northern coast. Not noted in the Reuters report is the increasingly popular view that Ukraine or pro-Ukrainian forces were behind the attack. The pact — signed by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom — mostly focuses on sharing information about threats to underwater cables and pipelines, with a focus on potential Russian malfeasance.— The European Union tightened restrictions on imports of Ukrainian produce in an effort to stem concerns that European farmers are being undercut by cheap goods from Ukraine, according to Politico. The issue has taken on particular salience in the run-up to the EU elections, with politicians anxious to avoid political costs from drawn-out fights with farmers, who have staged major protests in Poland and France. As Politico notes, the short-term tug of war over Ukrainian imports signals a larger problem: If Ukraine joins the EU, then farmers across the continent risk being put out of business by Kyiv's massive agricultural sector.— In The Hill, Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) argued that "peace talks remain the only viable option" to end the war in Ukraine. "No hard power endgame is viable for the U.S. in Ukraine, and the terms for Ukrainians get worse every minute the U.S. enables the continuation of this war," Lee wrote. "Our best hope to stop the bleeding is at the negotiating table. The blank checks must end, and American statecraft must start."U.S. State Department news:In a Monday press conference, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller renewed the U.S. call for Russia to withdraw from the Zaporizhzhia power plant following this week's attacks. "Russia is playing a very dangerous game with its military seizure of Ukraine's nuclear power plant, which is the largest in Europe," Miller said. "We continue to call on Russia to withdraw its military and civilian personnel from the plant, to return full control of the plant to the competent Ukrainian authorities, and refrain from taking any actions that could result in a nuclear incident at the plant."

On April 11th, 2024, US President Joseph Biden will host Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and the President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., in Washington, DC for the first US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit. It aims to reaffirm "the ironclad alliances between the United States and the Philippines, and the United States and Japan." The expectation is that the trilateral will result in several significant announcements relating to AUKUS, the military structure of the US-Japan alliance, trilateral interoperability, and joint patrols in the South China Sea. Yet, above all, this trilateral is strategically significant not only for its policy announcements, but because it demonstrates another high point in the emerging "latticework" security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. US mutual defense treaties in the Indo-Pacific have traditionally been "hub-and-spoke," with each US ally having strong defense ties and alliances with Washington but not each other. This is unlike the collective security approach taken by NATO in Europe, where an attack on one would trigger a response from all. Relatedly, US relations with its two allies in Southeast Asia have experienced a particularly rocky period during the past decade, as US ties to Thailand remain lukewarm and the previous President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, had turned towards China. This compounded a traditional overemphasis in US security architecture and force posture on Northeast Asia, meaning that the United States has faced a strategic gap in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. With Taiwan and the South China Sea as potential hotspots, a weak position in Southeast Asia is strategically challenging.However, under growing multidimensional threats from a revisionist China, the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral signals that the latticework is filling out in Southeast Asia to correct these problems. Importantly, Manila's own embrace of expanding security ties to other US allies and partners drives this development, lending it a "stickiness" that will ensure it can weather any future challenges in US-Philippines relations.The Philippines Under Marcos Jr.The Philippines' recent shift towards the United States and other allies and partners is a crucial strategic development after years of uncertainty. Upon taking office in 2016, former President Rodrigo Duterte immediately began courting China and threatening aspects of the longstanding US-Philippine alliance. The Philippines' turn towards Beijing under President Duterte raised serious concerns for observers in Washington. Yet, Duterte's efforts largely came to naught. China continued to apply pressure on the Philippines despite Duterte's attempts to come to some sort of arrangement in the South China Sea, all while promised Chinese economic investment largely failed to materialize. By 2022, Duterte's efforts to rebalance the Philippines had clearly failed to appease China. Riding on the outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte's domestic popularity, Ferdinand Marcos Jr.—the son of an ousted, former dictator—won the Philippines' 2022 election handily. However, his lack of policy details and ambiguous positioning during the race raised questions about how he would govern.Yet, upon taking office, Marcos soon quieted concerns about his foreign policy agenda and reversed the Philippines' course. Facing down continued Chinese gray zone coercion in the South China Sea, he quickly indicated that the Philippines would stand up against China and reembrace its strained alliance with the United States and ties with US allies and partners. Meanwhile, the United States invested heavily in repairing the relationship. This effort resulted in a variety of positive bilateral outcomes, the most significant being the expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and reaffirmation of the alliance. Building a Latticework Around the PhilippinesImportantly, building US-Philippines security relations is only one part of a larger picture. Although an Asian NATO isn't likely, nor are mutually obligated alliance treaties between US allies and partners, we are seeing the development of a latticework security architecture to replace the "hub-and-spoke" model in the Indo-Pacific, thus ensuring "integrated deterrence."US Indo-Pacific Strategy aims to forge closer relations between US allies and partners, all while encouraging their own efforts to deepen defense ties. A latticework structure enhances deterrence against China because it closes off opportunities for Beijing to buy off or coerce US allies and partners, deepens and institutionalizes government-to-government cooperation, and ensures that China has to think twice about taking aggressive action in the Indo-Pacific due to the size and depth of any potential coalition against it. Importantly, it extends beyond hard power issues into economic security, cyberspace, the information domain, and other policy areas.Over the past few years, the Indo-Pacific has witnessed the rise of a variety of security minilaterals and initiatives dedicated to building this out. From the Quad and AUKUS to the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral summit, the region is integrating across all aspects of national security, including defense industrial capacity, joint military exercises, technology development, and more.Given the Philippines' strategic location within the first island chain just south of Taiwan and its previous president's hostility to the United States, Manila's growing engagement in the latticework is a clear strategic win. Since Marcos began his term, the Philippines and Japan have both pursued the acquisition of long-range ballistic missile capabilities; Manila-New Delhi security relations have improved steadily, as has Manila-Hanoi cooperation; the Philippines and Australia signed a Strategic Partnership in 2023 with clear security implications; and Manila and Tokyo agreed to consider entering a reciprocal access agreement that could enable Japanese troops to operate in the Philippines. Conceptually, these arrangements integrate the Philippines more deeply into Indo-Pacific security architecture and enhance its deterrence against Chinese gray zone coercion. Importantly, this effort is not driven by Washington but by the Philippines own interest in securing itself and ensuring strong relations with a diversity of security partners.The Broader Implications of the US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral SummitThe upcoming US-Japan-Philippines trilateral sends important strategic signals regarding improved US-Philippines ties and Manila's engagement in the latticework security architecture. One, although domestic politics in Manila and its tendency to hedge in its foreign policy mean that Washington and Tokyo should not assume that the Philippines is forever in lockstep with them vis-à-vis China, the trilateral and other initiatives strengthen ties and render them "sticky." This reduces the risk of backsliding in the future back to the poor relationship of the Duterte period. Two, the involvement of Japan elevates the summit beyond what a bilateral presidential meeting would achieve. It's a sign of the latticework working as intended. Tokyo is increasingly committed to a forward-leaning security posture, particularly regarding Taiwan. Of course, Japan's defense policy changes will take time and remain limited given Japanese legal constraints, but Tokyo is taking unprecedented steps to increase its defense capabilities and commitments in the Indo-Pacific.Three, US security architecture and force posture in the Indo-Pacific is no longer as overweighted towards Northeast Asia. Building out the latticework in the Philippines fills crucial strategic gaps in Southeast Asia for the United States and its allies and partners. Crucially, US military access, enhanced logistics, and the prepositioning of equipment and supplies via EDCA, along with Japan's floated reciprocal access agreement, greatly build out US and allied force posture in Southeast Asia. All three of these developments increase deterrence against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan. The past few years have seen the US-Philippines alliance surge to new heights, and the trilateral sends an important signal of deepened resolve in the Indo-Pacific. The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.

On April 11th, 2024, US President Joseph Biden will host Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and the President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., in Washington, DC for the first US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit. It aims to reaffirm "the ironclad alliances between the United States and the Philippines, and the United States and Japan." The expectation is that the trilateral will result in several significant announcements relating to AUKUS, the military structure of the US-Japan alliance, trilateral interoperability, and joint patrols in the South China Sea. Yet, above all, this trilateral is strategically significant not only for its policy announcements, but because it demonstrates another high point in the emerging "latticework" security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. US mutual defense treaties in the Indo-Pacific have traditionally been "hub-and-spoke," with each US ally having strong defense ties and alliances with Washington but not each other. This is unlike the collective security approach taken by NATO in Europe, where an attack on one would trigger a response from all. Relatedly, US relations with its two allies in Southeast Asia have experienced a particularly rocky period during the past decade, as US ties to Thailand remain lukewarm and the previous President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, had turned towards China. This compounded a traditional overemphasis in US security architecture and force posture on Northeast Asia, meaning that the United States has faced a strategic gap in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. With Taiwan and the South China Sea as potential hotspots, a weak position in Southeast Asia is strategically challenging.However, under growing multidimensional threats from a revisionist China, the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral signals that the latticework is filling out in Southeast Asia to correct these problems. Importantly, Manila's own embrace of expanding security ties to other US allies and partners drives this development, lending it a "stickiness" that will ensure it can weather any future challenges in US-Philippines relations.The Philippines Under Marcos Jr.The Philippines' recent shift towards the United States and other allies and partners is a crucial strategic development after years of uncertainty. Upon taking office in 2016, former President Rodrigo Duterte immediately began courting China and threatening aspects of the longstanding US-Philippine alliance. The Philippines' turn towards Beijing under President Duterte raised serious concerns for observers in Washington. Yet, Duterte's efforts largely came to naught. China continued to apply pressure on the Philippines despite Duterte's attempts to come to some sort of arrangement in the South China Sea, all while promised Chinese economic investment largely failed to materialize. By 2022, Duterte's efforts to rebalance the Philippines had clearly failed to appease China. Riding on the outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte's domestic popularity, Ferdinand Marcos Jr.—the son of an ousted, former dictator—won the Philippines' 2022 election handily. However, his lack of policy details and ambiguous positioning during the race raised questions about how he would govern.Yet, upon taking office, Marcos soon quieted concerns about his foreign policy agenda and reversed the Philippines' course. Facing down continued Chinese gray zone coercion in the South China Sea, he quickly indicated that the Philippines would stand up against China and reembrace its strained alliance with the United States and ties with US allies and partners. Meanwhile, the United States invested heavily in repairing the relationship. This effort resulted in a variety of positive bilateral outcomes, the most significant being the expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and reaffirmation of the alliance. Building a Latticework Around the PhilippinesImportantly, building US-Philippines security relations is only one part of a larger picture. Although an Asian NATO isn't likely, nor are mutually obligated alliance treaties between US allies and partners, we are seeing the development of a latticework structure to replace the "hub-and-spoke" model in the Indo-Pacific and ensure "integrated deterrence."US Indo-Pacific Strategy aims to forge closer relations between US allies and partners, all while encouraging their own efforts to deepen defense ties on their own. A latticework structure enhances deterrence against China because it closes off opportunities for Beijing to buy off or coerce US allies and partners, deepens and institutionalizes government-to-government cooperation, and ensures that China has to think twice about taking aggressive action in the Indo-Pacific due to the size and depth of any potential coalition against it. Importantly, it extends beyond hard power issues only into economic security, cyberspace, the information domain, and other policy areas.Over the past few years, the Indo-Pacific has witnessed the rise of a variety of security minilaterals and initiatives dedicated to building this out. From the Quad and AUKUS to the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral summit, the region is integrating across all aspects of national security, including defense industrial capacity, joint military exercises, technology development, and more.Given the Philippines' strategic location within the first island chain just south of Taiwan and its previous president's hostility to the United States, Manila's growing engagement in the latticework is a clear strategic win. Since Marcos began his term, the Philippines and Japan have both pursued the acquisition of long-range ballistic missile capabilities; Manila-New Delhi security relations have improved steadily, as has Manila-Hanoi cooperation; the Philippines and Australia signed a Strategic Partnership in 2023 with clear security implications; and Manila and Tokyo agreed to consider entering a reciprocal access agreement that could enable Japanese troops to operate in the Philippines. Conceptually, these arrangements integrate the Philippines more deeply into Indo-Pacific security architecture and enhance its deterrence against Chinese gray zone coercion. Importantly, this effort is not driven by Washington but by the Philippines own interest in securing itself and ensuring strong relations with a diversity of security partners.The Broader Implications of the US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral SummitThe upcoming US-Japan-Philippines trilateral sends important strategic signals regarding improved US-Philippines ties and Manila's engagement in the latticework security architecture. One, although domestic politics in Manila and its tendency to hedge in its foreign policy mean that Washington and Tokyo should not assume that the Philippines is forever in lockstep with them vis-à-vis China, the trilateral and other initiatives strengthen ties and render them "sticky." This reduces the risk of backsliding in the future towards the poor relations of the Duterte period. Two, the involvement of Japan elevates the summit beyond what a bilateral presidential meeting would achieve. It's a sign of the latticework working as intended. Tokyo is increasingly committed to a forward leaning security posture, particularly regarding Taiwan, as any potential Cross-strait conflict would necessarily involve the Philippines. Of course, Japan's defense policy changes will take time and remain limited given Japan's legal constraints, but Tokyo is taking unprecedented steps to increase its defense capabilities and commitments in the Indo-Pacific.Three, US security architecture and force posture in the Indo-Pacific is no longer as overweighted towards Northeast Asia. Building out the latticework in the Philippines fills crucial strategic gaps in Southeast Asia for the United States and its allies and partners. Crucially, US military access, enhanced logistics, and the prepositioning of equipment and supplies via EDCA, along with Japan's floated reciprocal access agreement, greatly build out US and allied force posture in Southeast Asia. All three of these developments increase deterrence against Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan. The past few years have seen the US-Philippines alliance surge to new heights, and the trilateral sends an important signal of deepened resolve in the Indo-Pacific. The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.