Agriculture is one of the main sources of income in developing countries and at the same time one of the major drivers causing environmental conflicts like loss of biodiversity. Agroforestry, which combines agricultural with forestry components at plot, community and landscape level, through a component-specific management can satisfy a series of multiple demands, among them, biodiversity conservation and in general the provision of environmental services. Since environmental services are proposed as alternative compensation schemes to prevent and remediate negative environmental impacts, incentives that support ecologically sound agricultural management practices are therefore needed. These incentives (e.g., compensation payments) have to be based on an adequate understanding and evaluation of the services provided by the agricultural systems. For this purpose, the concept of biodiversity in land-use systems has been revised. 'Functional biodiversity', in contrast to traditional approaches, emphasizes the system's dynamics at various levels and the implications of these on its functioning as a whole. To operationalize such a concept, an assessment protocol based on multicriteria analysis has been developed. The approach combines productive, ecological and operational indicators to describe functional biodiversity, and aims at the identification of those management decisions and interventions that support this. The suitability of the evaluation protocol was tested with 70 farms in the Brazilian Amazon region divided in three groups, which had been defined based on the time of settlement, property size, technological know-how, organization and access to market, i.e., 'CAMTA partners' long-ago established farmers, 'immigrated' some time ago and recently immigrated farmers 'newcomers'. The analyses reveal that the most relevant factors supporting functional biodiversity in agroforestry systems are: (1) the farmers' technical qualification, (2) their preference for low impact techniques, (3) their capacity to adapt to environmental, social and political changes, (4) the diversification of species composition at plot level, (5) the increase in the use of perennial species; and (6) the financial profitability of the system. Concerning the differences among groups, the 'CAMTA partners' farmers are significantly superior to the two other groups only in agricultural practices related to production. As the functional biodiversity concept is based on an integrative approach, its outputs provide a supportive platform for the proposed assessment framework. In turn, the developed protocol can be used to optimize biodiversity roles on farms and support decisions regarding compensation payments. Nevertheless, its further validation, testing and adaptation as a monitoring tool are necessary. ; Die Bewertung von Umweltserviceleistungen: funktionale Biodiversität in tropischen Agroforstsystemen (Das Beispiel Tomé-Açú, Nordbrasilien) Landwirtschaft ist eine der Haupteinnahmequellen in den Entwicklungsländern und gleichzeitig einer der größten Verursacher von Umweltkonflikten wie z. B. Biodiversitätsverlust. Agroforstwirtschaft, die landwirtschaftliche und forstliche Komponenten auf Feld-, Gemeinde- und Landschaftsebene verbindet, kann durch flächenspezifisches Management vielfältige Anforderungen erfüllen, unter anderem den Erhalt von Biodiversität und ganz allgemein die Bereitstellung von Umweltdienstleistungen. Da Umweltdienstleistungen dazu beitragen können, Umweltprobleme zu verhindern oder zu lösen, sind Anreize notwendig, die ein ökologisch sinnvolles Landmanagement unterstützen. Diese Anreize (z.B. Ausgleichszahlungen) müssen sich auf eine fundierte Kenntnis und auf die Bewertung der Umweltleistungen von Landnutzungssystemen stützen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wurde ein Konzept erarbeitet, das auf der funktionellen Rolle der Biodiversität in Landnutzungssystemen basiert. 'Funktionelle Biodiversität', im Gegensatz zu traditionellen Ansätzen, betrachtet auf verschiedenen Ebenen die Dynamik des Systems sowie deren Auswirkungen auf das Funktionieren des Systems als Ganzes. Als wesentlicher Bestandteil des Konzeptes wurde auf der Grundlage einer 'Multicriteria Analysis' ein Bewertungsprotokoll entwickelt. Dieser Ansatz verbindet produktive, ökologische und operationale Indikatoren mit dem Ziel, funktionelle Biodiversität zu beschreiben und Managemententscheidungen und -eingriffe zu ermitteln, die diese unterstützen. Die Eignung des Bewertungsprotokolls wurde auf 70 Farmen in der brasilianischen Amazonasregion überprüft. Die Farmen wurden in folgende drei Gruppen eingeteilt: (1) Zeitpunkt der Niederlassung des Farmers, (2) Größe der Farm, und (3) technologisches Know-how, Organisation und Zugang zum Markt. Die untersuchten Farmen gehörten Farmern, die sich (1) vor Jahrzehnten ('CAMTA Partner'), (2) vor längerem ('immigrated'), und (3) vor kurzem niedergelassen hatten ('newcomers'). Die Analysen ergaben, dass (1) die technische Qualifikation der Farmer, (2) minimale Bodenbearbeitung, (3) die Fähigkeit der Farmer, sich an ökologische, gesellschaftliche und politische Veränderungen anzupassen, (4) die Artendiversifizierung auf der Fläche, (5) der verstärkte Einsatz von mehrjährigen Arten, und (6) die Wirtschaftlichkeit des Systems zur Aufrechterhaltung der funktionellen Biodiversität in agroforstlichen Systemen beitragen. Hinsichtlich-- der Unterschiede zwischen den Gruppen, heben sich die lang etablierten Farmer ('CAMTA Partner') signifikant von den anderen beiden Gruppen nur in den produktionsspezifischen landwirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten ab. Da das Konzept der funktionellen Biodiversität auf einem integrativen Ansatz beruht, liefern die Ergebnisse eine Grundlage für den vorgeschlagenen Bewertungsrahmen. Das entwickelte Protokoll kann zur Optimierung der Rolle der Biodiversität auf der Farm und als Entscheidungshilfe hinsichtlich Ausgleichszahlungen eingesetzt werden. Weitere Validierungen und Anpassungen als Monitoringinstrument sind notwendig.
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Over the past decade the Chinese economy has nearly doubled in size, going from 8.93 trillion dollars in 2012, to 16.33 trillion dollars in 2022 (the most recent year for which we have data). This has led to concerns that China represents a viable alternative to the Western Order and that the "China's Model" is superior to the experience of the West. Such concerns have extended all the way to the top of the American government. The White House's most recent National Security Strategy argues that we must out-compete China, and further states that "The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it." President Biden has directly weighed in with his March 2021 statement [RZ1] that "we've got to prove democracy works," which led to concerns that China's version of development and authoritarianism is not only preferable, but more importantly, better suited to the needs to the world's developing countries. Such fears are misguided. It is true that China's growth has been phenomenal with the country transforming from an agrarian society to a high-tech juggernaut that is now the world's second largest economy. The World Bank estimates that this growth has lifted roughly 800 million people out of poverty, and according to the UN, China's Human Development Index (HDI) has increased from .41 in 1978 to .76 in 2021, the most recent year data is available. These impressive statistics have led to anxiety among some that a version of authoritarianism is a necessary condition for economic growth. However, these fears are misplaced. The Chinese experience (not the so called "China model") does not represent a viable alternative to development under democratic governments with strong institutions. The real-world data does not support the argument that non-democratic regimes perform better at developing their countries. In fact, the data proves that democracy is far superior to authoritarianism. While there is no doubt that the Chinese government has done many things right in its quest to modernize China and turn it into a great power, a key question remains: does it represent an alternative to the Western order?. This question is not an esoteric academic debate. If China represents a viable and alternative "model" to the Western experience, other states may be well served by emulating the Chinese experience. This issue has been clouded by the Sino-US rivalry and has taken on ideological undertones with Chinese officials insisting that their "socialist system" is "superior" and Chinese commentators arguing that the United States and its system of governance is in decline. Based on an examination of Chinese language sources, academic studies, and publicly available data, I argue that China and its development experience do not challenge the Western order. I break this observation into three parts. First, I point out that contrary to popular belief, there is no discernible China "model." Second, if there is a specific China model, after 45 years of "Opening and Reform" in China, there should be real world examples of countries that have successfully adopted China's experience. The reality is that there are no states that have effectively copied China's experience. Finally, if the foundation of the China experience is the supposed superiority of non-democratic regimes to "get things done," the data on global development and regime type should reflect this. The data does not. A Model or a Process?If the experience of China constitutes a viable alternative to democratic-market-based systems, there needs to be a rough agreement on what exactly a "China model" consists of. The International Monetary Fund states that economic models can be explained by the regularities of their systems or the objectives they seek to achieve. Unfortunately for China, there is no agreement on what exactly the China model is, with some scholars calling the so called model a myth. Xiaoyang Tang of Tsinghua University argues that the Chinese government has not specified what exactly is the China model. Yu Wen Chen and Obert Hodzi point out that it is frequently defined by comparisons to the Washington Consensus instead of what it actually is. Interestingly, Zhao Qizheng, the former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, eschewed the term China "model" in 2010 and states that it is not only not universal, but that "Exporting the "China model" violates China's adherence to the principle of formulating policies in combination with China's national conditions." Furthermore, he prefers the term "China case," (中国案例) instead of "China model" (中国模式). Regardless of whether a coherent "model" actually exists, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated at the 19th Party Congress that China offered a "blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind." More recently, President Xi's August 2023 trip to the BRICS summit in South Africa furthered this perception. China's economic and development success are best understood as a process of trial and error ("crossing the river by feeling the stones") that has mixed different approaches over the decades. Crucially, many of China's experiences proved contradictory over the decades with periods of free market capitalism, significant market restrictions, state capitalism, and more recently attacks on the tech sector. Taken as a whole, this does not constitute a model but is better understood as a process with key aspects such as a massive rural population, large injections of FDI, geographic advantages, high levels of state capacity, and perhaps most importantly, a vast, competent and professional bureaucracy. When combined with constant changes of direction by the Chinese state, it is difficult to discern what elements of the model need to be replicated for other states to achieve success. The absence of a step-by-step model makes it extremely challenging, if not impossible, to copy. For example, should foreign countries copy the more entrepreneurial friendly free market capitalism of the 1980s, the crackdown on the private sector after Tiananmen in 1989, the gutting of state-owned enterprises of the late 1990s, the "gilded age" of crony capitalism of the 2000s, the advancement of the state at the private sectors expanse, or should they focus on achieving high levels of state capacity and a professional bureaucracy? What matters here is that the contradictory policies of various periods of Chinese economic reforms debunk the perception that a linear, and therefore, easy to follow model exists. Understanding the ups and downs of the China experience is essential. Unfortunately for China and the rest of the world, important junctures in China's economic history are no longer readily accessible due to Chinese government censorship. For example, former Party Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang, was instrumental in China's early economic reforms in the 1980s, but has largely been removed from official history. Where are the Examples? Since the start of Chinese reforms 45 years ago, there has been plenty of time for real world examples of emulation to emerge and determine if the China "model" is transferable. Additionally, the fact that Beijing sponsors training programs in China for people and groups from all over the world (especially the Global South) to learn about China's experience can be viewed as an attempt by Beijing to share its experience. For example, Beijing has established training institutions such as the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development (ISSCAD) set up at Peking University in 2016 to train foreign officials and elites from the developing world. These people earn a professional degree in national development. Another academy was set up in Guangxi for similar purposes, with most students coming from Southeast Asian countries. In this author's in-depth interviews with experts based in think tanks and universities, as well as former and current government officials in states ranging from Nepal to Sri Lanka to Kenya, one hears about the "China model" and how this offers an alternative. However, details are scant on both what the "China model" is and on what their specific country is doing to make this happen. Media and scholarly reports have suggested that African countries are the best test cases for the success of Chinese style modernization. However, on close examination, many of these reports have concluded that there is little evidence of African states' emulation of China's experience.Ethiopia has been signaled out as a crucial test case for the application of the "China model." With Africa's second largest population at 123 million people, Ethiopian elites have been eager to emulate China and its success since at least 2005. The results for Ethiopia are, at best, mixed. China is supporting Ethiopia's quest to becoming an African manufacturing center, and this sector in Ethiopia has been influenced by China. Critically, as Edson Ziso points out, Ethiopia has not exactly copied China's model, instead various circumstances have led the country on a trajectory that has allowed for the accommodation of Chinese and Ethiopian interests. The crucial data for the percentage of annual GDP growth is arguably the most important indicator for measuring whether Addis Abba's embrace of China "model" has been successful. Considering Ethiopian leaders started to look to China since at least 2005, we should see sustained and increasing GDP growth over the past two decades. Instead, according to the World Bank, the annual growth rate of GDP in Ethiopia has been on a clear downward trajectory. In 2004 it was 13.6 percent. By 2012 it was 8.6 percent, 2018 it came in at 6.8 percent, and in 2021 and 2022 it was in the 5 percent range. The trajectory of GDP growth in Ethiopia, coupled with the recent civil war and the current insurgency, raises serious questions about how applicable the China "model" is in the country. One academic study pointed out that Ethiopia will end up with its own version of development, which it will call "the Chinese model of development," thus superficially coupling it with China. African leaders have adopted Chinese norms not out of the attractiveness of China's experience, but as justification for a strong state that keeps their regimes in power. Leaders in Zambia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have engaged with China to challenge liberal values and expand surveillance of their citizens. Thus adoption of a "China model" by African elites is best seen as a way for leaders to leverage their ties with Beijing to renegotiate with the West. One scholarly study argued that African elites "pretend to follow the ideological preferences of China to derive material benefits." Despite Zimbabwe's attempts to implement the "China model, it has failed to adopt any meaningful reforms aimed at increasing innovation and experimentation. Instead, over the past 20 years, Zimbabwe has tried to strengthen the ruling party but has neglected critical areas such as a pro-business environment, a stable political structure and a strong bureaucracy. Outside of the African context, other studies cast doubt on the "China model's" ability to gain traction in other settings. The relatively low levels of state capacity in many Middle Eastern states is cited as a major impediment for the model in the region. In the absence of viable institutions and qualified policymakers, China's experience will not be repeated in most countries. The Gulf states are different in that they depend heavily on rents from their energy resource. As such, they do not need to follow China's example. Furthermore, even in states that are politically close to China, like Iran, no consensus exists on the "China model."Overall, there is a lack of concrete evidence of a successful state not only effectively copying the so called "China model" but, more importantly, experiencing long-term increases in economic growth. This raises serious questions about Beijing possessing a viable development model that can be exported. The Proof is in the Pudding"Look, I predict to you, your children or grandchildren are going to be doing their doctoral thesis on the issue of who succeeded: autocracy or democracy? Because that is what is at stake, not just with China." The above comments from President Biden's 2021 remarks speak to the heart of the concerns over whether China represents a viable, replicable model that can outperform the western approach. Fortunately for President Biden, he does not have to worry about this, at least for now, as we have a simple and clear way to ascertain whether democratic or authoritarian states deliver to their people. As noted above, the UN's HDI is a well-respected dataset. By measuring life expectancy, income and levels of education, the index gets to the core of benefits being delivered by a state to its people. If politics is crudely defined as "who gets what, when, and how" the HDI is a good way to measure this. For authoritarianism to pose a significant threat to democratic norms, we should see a high number of non-democratic states represented among states with high HDI scores. Based on 2019 HDI scores (2019 was used as the COVID-19 pandemic may have skewed HDI levels), we find that of the top 30 countries with the highest HDI scores only two (Hong Kong-part of China, and Singapore) are not full democracies according to the Economist's Democracy Index. Of equal importance, of the bottom 30 states, not a single country is a "full," of "flawed" democracy. What the data shows is that democratic states for all of their warts and recent backsliding, are vastly superior for delivering to the people. In fact, there is no viable alternative. Apart from Gulf Petro states, China is the exception that proves the rule when it comes to authoritarian states and economic development. Simply put, the Chinese experience is an anomaly that has generated enormous opportunities for the Chinese people, but has little applicability for other states. China's experience is not necessarily unique, but it is distinct enough to limit its ability to be emulated by others. Moreover, we need to keep in mind the fact that democracies air their dirty laundry and shine a spotlight on their problems and inherent contradictions. The fact that China has stopped publishing consumer confidence and youth unemployment data in the past several months is a smoking gun of something to hide. The current economic crisis in China is largely the result of poor decision making at the top of China's political system. Furthermore, the disastrous "Zero Covid policy," which according to a recent study led to an estimated 1.87 million excess deaths, was completely avoidable. The fact that the Chinese government refused to accept more effective MRNA vaccines from the West on the eve of ending Zero Covid is horrific. Apart from this, there appears to have been no preparation for the predicated catastrophe that immediately followed the end of the policy. While the West also performed poorly during the pandemic, the fact that China was touting its supposedly superior model during the pandemic, to then let it lapse raises serious questions about the utility of the "China model." ConclusionAmerican concerns that authoritarianism will triumph over democratic norms are overblown. Authoritarian China has experienced spectacular economic growth over the past four decades, but its model is poorly understood and is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to replicate in non-Chinese settings. The fact that Chinese themselves disagree on what exactly is the "China model" is a clear indication of the difficulties for Beijing challenging the Western system. Concerns that China wants to make the world "safe for autocracy," are not without merit, but this does not represent a viable and alternative system of development. What matters most is sustained growth that delivers to the masses. China's reforms have been ongoing for 45 years, thus providing plenty of time for other developing states to successfully copy China's experience and transform their own countries. Unfortunately for China, there is scant evidence of other states doing this. Developing countries will frequently speak of following China's example and copying their system, but the empirical reality is that they do not. Reasons include multitude of factors, ranging from a lack of knowledge of what the China experience actually is, to paying lip service to China in order to obtain more benefits from both Beijing and the West, to having incompetent and corrupt bureaucracies. Yes, many democratic states, including the United States, have experienced an erosion of democratic practices and norms over the past decade, but the resilience and self-correcting nature of democracies has acted as a brake on system collapse. The reality is not that we need to prove that democracy still works, as the broad data clearly indicates that it does, but instead that China needs to prove that authoritarianism can deliver long-term measurable development beyond a couple of micro/petro-states. China's current economic crisis is proof of the inefficiencies of their system. This has led to calls that the China "model" is in its "death throes." The real question is, was there ever a model to begin with? Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
FWF (Austria) ; FNRS (Belgium) ; FWO (Belgium) ; Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) ; Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) ; FAPERGS (Brazil) ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) ; MES (Bulgaria) ; NSFC (China) ; COLCIENCIAS (Colombia) ; CSF (Croatia) ; SENESCYT (Ecuador) ; MoER (Estonia) ; ERDF (Estonia) ; Academy of Finland (Finland) ; MEC (Finland) ; CEA (France) ; CNRS/IN2P3 (France) ; BMBF (Germany) ; DFG (Germany) ; HGF (Germany) ; GSRT (Greece) ; NKFIA (Hungary) ; DAE (India) ; DST (India) ; IPM (Iran) ; SFI (Ireland) ; INFN (Italy) ; NRF (Republic of Korea) ; MES (Latvia) ; MOE and UM (Malaysia) ; BUAP ; CONACYT ; UASLP-FAI (Mexico) ; MSHE ; FCT (Portugal) ; JINR (Dubna) ; RosAtom ; RFBR ; MESTD (Serbia) ; SEIDI ; FEDER (Spain) ; MOSTR (Sri Lanka) ; Swiss Funding Agencies (Switzerland) ; TUBITAK ; TAEK ; NASU ; SFFR ; NSF ; Marie-Curie program ; European Research Council ; Horizon 2020 Grant ; Leventis Foundation ; A. P. Sloan Foundation ; Alexander von Humboldt Foundation ; Belgian Federal Science Policy Office ; Fonds pour la Formation a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium) ; Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium) ; FWO (Belgium) under the Excellence of Science - EOS ; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; Council of Science and Industrial Research, India ; HOMING PLUS program of the Foundation for Polish Science ; European Union, Regional Development Fund ; Sonata-bis ; National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund ; Programa Severo Ochoa del Principado de Asturias ; Thalis and Aristeia program ; EU-ESF ; Greek NSRF ; Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University ; Welch Foundation ; Weston Havens Foundation (U.S.A.) ; BMBWF (Austria) ; CAS(China) ; MoST (China) ; Horizon 2020 Grant: 675440 ; FWO (Belgium) under the Excellence of Science - EOS: 30820817 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 123842 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 123959 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 124845 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 124850 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 125105 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: Harmonia 2014/14/M/ST2/00428 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: 2014/13/B/ST2/02543 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: 2014/15/B/ST2/03998 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: 2015/19/B/ST2/02861 ; Sonata-bis: 2012/07/E/ST2/01406 ; National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund: MDM-2015-0509 ; Welch Foundation: C-1845 ; A search for a heavy W resonance decaying to one B or T vector-like quark and a top or bottom quark, respectively, is presented. The search uses proton-proton collision data collected in 2016 with the CMS detector at the LHC, corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 35.9 fb(-1) at 13 TeV. Both decay channels result in a final state with a top quark, a Higgs boson, and a b quark, each produced with significant energy. The all-hadronic decays of both the Higgs boson and the top quark are considered. The final-state jets, some of which correspond to merged decay products of a boosted top quark and a Higgs boson, are selected using jet substructure techniques, which help to suppress standard model backgrounds. A W boson signal would appear as a narrow peak in the invariant mass distribution of these jets. No significant deviation in data with respect to the standard model background predictions is observed. Cross section upper limits on W boson production in the top quark, Higgs boson, and b quark decay mode are set as a function of the W mass, for several vector-like quark mass hypotheses. These are the first limits for W boson production in this decay channel, and cover a range of 0.01 to 0.43 pb in the W mass range between 1.5 and 4.0 TeV.
Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy ; Austrian Science Fund ; Belgian Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique ; Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek ; Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) ; Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) ; Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science ; CERN ; Chinese Academy of Sciences ; Ministry of Science and Technology ; National Natural Science Foundation of China ; Colombian Funding Agency (COLCIENCIAS) ; Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sport ; Croatian Science Foundation ; Research Promotion Foundation, Cyprus ; Ministry of Education and Research ; Estonian Research Council ; European Regional Development Fund, Estonia ; Academy of Finland ; Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture ; Helsinki Institute of Physics ; Institut National de Physique Nucleaire et de Physique des Particules/CNRS ; Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives/CEA, France ; Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung ; Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft ; Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren, Germany ; General Secretariat for Research and Technology, Greece ; National Scientific Research Foundation ; National Innovation Office, Hungary ; Department of Atomic Energy ; Department of Science and Technology, India ; Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics, Iran ; Science Foundation, Ireland ; Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Italy ; Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning ; National Research Foundation (NRF), Republic of Korea ; Lithuanian Academy of Sciences ; Ministry of Education ; University of Malaya (Malaysia) ; CINVESTAV ; CONACYT ; SEP ; UASLP-FAI ; Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, New Zealand ; Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission ; Ministry of Science and Higher Education ; National Science Centre, Poland ; Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia, Portugal ; JINR, Dubna ; Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation ; Federal Agency of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Russian Academy of Sciences ; Russian Foundation for Basic Research ; Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of Serbia ; Secretaria de Estado de Investigacion, Desarrollo e Innovacion ; Programa Consolider-Ingenio 2010, Spain ; ETH Board ; ETH Zurich ; PSI ; SNF ; UniZH ; Canton Zurich ; SER ; Ministry of Science and Technology, Taipei ; Thailand Center of Excellence in Physics ; Institute for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology of Thailand ; Special Task Force for Activating Research ; National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand ; Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey ; Turkish Atomic Energy Authority ; National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine ; State Fund for Fundamental Researches, Ukraine ; Science and Technology Facilities Council, UK ; US Department of Energy ; US National Science Foundation ; Marie-Curie program ; European Research Council ; EPLANET (European Union) ; Leventis Foundation ; A. P. Sloan Foundation ; Alexander von Humboldt Foundation ; Belgian Federal Science Policy Office ; Fonds pour la Formation a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium) ; Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium) ; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic ; Council of Science and Industrial Research, India ; HOMING PLUS program of Foundation for Polish Science ; European Union, Regional Development Fund ; Compagnia di San Paolo (Torino) ; Consorzio per la Fisica (Trieste) ; MIUR (Italy) ; Thalis and Aristeia programs - EU-ESF ; Greek NSRF ; National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund ; Estonian Research Council: IUT23-4 ; Estonian Research Council: IUT23-6 ; MIUR (Italy): 20108T4XTM ; Measurements of normalized differential cross sections as functions of the multiplicity and kinematic variables of charged-particle tracks from the underlying event in top quark and antiquark pair production are presented. The measurements are performed in proton-proton collisions at a center-of-mass energy of 13<, and are based on data collected by the CMS experiment at the LHC in 2016 corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 35.9fb(-1). Events containing one electron, one muon, and two jets from the hadronization and fragmentation of b quarks are used. These measurements characterize, for the first time, properties of the underlying event in top quark pair production and show no deviation from the universality hypothesis at energy scales typically above twice the top quark mass.
Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy ; Austrian Science Fund ; Belgian Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique ; Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek ; Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) ; Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science ; Chinese Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Science and Technology ; National Natural Science Foundation of China ; Colombian Funding Agency (COLCIENCIAS) ; Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sport ; Croatian Science Foundation ; Research Promotion Foundation ; Secretariat for Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation, Ecuador ; Ministry of Education and Research ; Estonian Research Council ; European Regional Development Fund ; Academy of Finland ; Helsinki Institute of Physics ; Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives/CEA, France ; Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft ; Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren, Germany ; National Research, Development and Innovation Fund, Hungary ; Department of Atomic Energy ; Science Foundation, Ireland ; Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Italy ; National Research Foundation (NRF), Republic of Korea ; CONACYT ; (UASLP-FAI) ; Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission ; National Science Centre, Poland ; JINR, Dubna ; Federal Agency of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation ; Russian Foundation for Basic Research ; Secretaria de Estado de Investigacion ; Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, Spain ; SNF ; Turkish Atomic Energy Authority ; State Fund for Fundamental Researches, Ukraine ; US Department of Energy ; US National Science Foundation ; Marie-Curie programme ; European Research Council ; Horizon 2020 Grant ; Leventis Foundation ; A.P. Sloan Foundation ; Alexander von Humboldt Foundation ; Belgian Federal Science Policy Office ; Fonds pour la Formation a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium) ; Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium) ; FWO (Belgium) ; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, India ; HOMING PLUS programme of the Foundation for Polish Science ; European Union, Regional Development Fund ; Sonata-bis ; National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund ; Programa de Excelencia Maria de Maeztu and the Programa Severo Ochoa del Principado de Asturias ; Thalis and Aristeia programmes ; EU-ESF ; Greek NSRF ; Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University ; Welch Foundation ; Weston Havens Foundation (U.S.A.) ; Estonian Research Council: IUT23-4 ; Estonian Research Council: IUT23-6 ; Horizon 2020 Grant: 675440 ; FWO (Belgium): 30820817 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 123842 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 123959 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 124845 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 124850 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 125105 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: Harmonia 2014/14/M/ST2/00428 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: 2014/13/B/ST2/02543 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: 2014/15/B/ST2/03998 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: 2015/19/B/ST2/02861 ; Sonata-bis: 2012/07/E/ST2/01406 ; Welch Foundation: C-1845 ; The performance of missing transverse momentum ((p) over right arrow (miss)(T)) reconstruction algorithms for the CMS experiment is presented, using proton-proton collisions at a center-of-mass energy of 13 TeV, collected at the CERN LHC in 2016. The data sample corresponds to an integrated luminosity of 35.9 fb(-1). The results include measurements of the scale and resolution of (p) over right arrow (miss)(T), and detailed studies of events identified with anomalous (p) over right arrow (miss)(T). The performance is presented of a (p) over right arrow (miss)(T) reconstruction algorithm that mitigates the effects of multiple proton-proton interactions, using the pileup per particle identification method. The performance is shown of an algorithm used to estimate the compatibility of the reconstructed (p) over right arrow (miss)(T) with the hypothesis that it originates from resolution effects.
Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy ; Austrian Science Fund ; Belgian Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique ; Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek ; Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ) ; FAPERGS ; Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) ; Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science ; Chinese Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Science and Technology ; National Natural Science Foundation of China ; Colombian Funding Agency (COLCIENCIAS) ; Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sport ; Croatian Science Foundation ; Research Promotion Foundation ; Secretariat for Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation, Ecuador ; Ministry of Education and Research ; Estonian Research Council ; European Regional Development Fund ; Academy of Finland ; Helsinki Institute of Physics ; Institut National de Physique Nucleaire et de Physique des Particules/CNRS ; Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives/CEA, France ; Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft ; Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren, Germany ; National Research, Development and Innovation Fund, Hungary ; Department of Atomic Energy ; Science Foundation, Ireland ; Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Italy ; National Research Foundation (NRF), Republic of Korea ; University of Malaya (Malaysia) ; CONACYT ; (UASLP-FAI) ; Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission ; National Science Centre, Poland ; JINR, Dubna ; Federal Agency of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation ; Russian Foundation for Basic Research ; Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, Spain ; SNF ; UniZH, Canton Zurich ; Turkish Atomic Energy Authority ; State Fund for Fundamental Researches, Ukraine ; U.S. Department of Energy ; U.S. National Science Foundation ; Marie-Curie programme ; European Research Council ; Horizon 2020 Grant ; Leventis Foundation ; A.P. Sloan Foundation ; Alexander von Humboldt Foundation ; Belgian Federal Science Policy Office ; Fonds pour la Formation a la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium) ; Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium) ; FWO (Belgium) under the Excellence of Science - EOS ; Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, India ; HOMING PLUS programme of the Foundation for Polish Science ; European Union, Regional Development Fund ; Sonata-bis ; National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund ; Programa de Excelencia Maria de Maeztu ; Programa Severo Ochoa del Principado de Asturias ; Thalis ; EU-ESF ; Greek NSRF ; Welch Foundation ; Weston Havens Foundation (U.S.A.) ; Estonian Research Council: IUT23-4 ; Estonian Research Council: IUT23-6 ; Horizon 2020 Grant: 675440 ; FWO (Belgium) under the Excellence of Science - EOS: 30820817 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 123842,123959 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 124845 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 124850 ; Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences: 125105 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: Harmonia 2014/14/M/ST2/00428 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: 2014/13/B/ST2/02543 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: 2014/15/B/ST2/03998 ; European Union, Regional Development Fund: 2015/19/B/ST2/02861 ; Sonata-bis: 2012/07/E/ST2/01406 ; Welch Foundation: C-1845 ; A search for the electroweak production of supersymmetric particles in protonproton collisions at a center-of-mass energy of 13TeV is presented in final states with a tau lepton pair. Both hadronic and leptonic decay modes are considered for the tau leptons. Scenarios involving the direct pair production of tau sleptons, or their indirect production via the decays of charginos and neutralinos, are investigated. The data correspond to an integrated luminosity of 35: 9 fb collected with the CMS detector in 2016. The observed number of events is consistent with the standard model background expectation. The results are interpreted as upper limits on the cross section for tau slepton pair production in di ff erent scenarios. The strongest limits are observed in the scenario of a purely left-handed low mass tau slepton decaying to a nearly massless neutralino. Exclusion limits are also set in the context of simpli fi ed models of chargino-neutralino and chargino pair production with decays to tau leptons, and range up to 710 and 630 GeV, respectively.
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The divestment campaigns launched last spring by students protesting Israel's mass slaughter in Gaza brought the issue of the militarization of American higher education back into the spotlight.Of course, financial ties between the Pentagon and American universities are nothing new. As Stuart Leslie has pointed out in his seminal book on the topic, The Cold War and American Science, "In the decade following World War II, the Department of Defense (DOD) became the biggest patron of American science." Admittedly, as civilian institutions like the National Institutes of Health grew larger, the Pentagon's share of federal research and development did decline, but it still remained a source of billions of dollars in funding for university research.And now, Pentagon-funded research is once again on the rise, driven by the DOD's recent focus on developing new technologies like weapons driven by artificial intelligence (AI). Combine that with an intensifying drive to recruit engineering graduates and the forging of partnerships between professors and weapons firms and you have a situation in which many talented technical types could spend their entire careers serving the needs of the warfare state. The only way to head off such a Brave New World would be greater public pushback against the military conquest (so to speak) of America's research and security agendas, in part through resistance by scientists and engineers whose skills are so essential to building the next generation of high-tech weaponry.The Pentagon Goes to SchoolYes, the Pentagon's funding of universities is indeed rising once again and it goes well beyond the usual suspects like MIT or Johns Hopkins University. In 2022, the most recent year for which full data is available, 14 universities received at least — and brace yourself for this — $100 million in Pentagon funding, from Johns Hopkins's astonishing $1.4 billion (no, that is not a typo!) to Colorado State's impressive $100 million. And here's a surprise: two of the universities with the most extensive connections to our weaponry of the future are in Texas: the University of Texas at Austin (UT-Austin) and Texas A&M.In 2020, Texas Governor Greg Abbott and former Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy appeared onstage at a UT-Austin ceremony to commemorate the creation of a robotics lab there, part of a new partnership between the Army Futures Command and the school. "This is ground zero for us in our research for the weapons systems we're going to develop for decades to come," said McCarthy.Not to be outdone, Texas A&M is quietly becoming the Pentagon's base for research on hypersonics — weapons expected to travel five times the speed of sound. Equipped with a kilometer-long tunnel for testing hypersonic missiles, that school's University Consortium for Applied Hypersonics is explicitly dedicated to outpacing America's global rivals in the development of that next generation military technology. Texas A&M is also part of the team that runs the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the (in)famous New Mexico facility where the first nuclear weapons were developed and tested as part of the Manhattan Project under the direction of Robert Oppenheimer.Other major players include Carnegie Mellon University, a center for Army research on the applications of AI, and Stanford University, which serves as a feeder to California's Silicon Valley firms of all types. That school also runs the Technology Transfer for Defense (TT4D) Program aimed at transitioning academic technologies from the lab to the marketplace and exploring the potential military applications of emerging technology products.In addition, the Pentagon is working aggressively to bring new universities into the fold. In January 2023, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the creation of a defense-funded research center at Howard University, the first of its kind at a historically black college.Given the campus Gaza demonstrations of last spring, perhaps you also won't be surprised to learn that the recent surge in Pentagon spending faces increasing criticism from students and faculty alike. Targets of protest include the Lavender program, which has used AI to multiply the number of targets the Israeli armed forces can hit in a given time frame. But beyond focusing on companies enabling Israel's war effort, current activists are also looking at the broader role of their universities in the all-American war system.For example, at Indiana University research on ties to companies fueling the killings in Gaza grew into a study of the larger role of universities in supporting the military system as a whole. Student activists found that the most important connection involved that university's ties to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, whose mission is "to provide acquisition, engineering… and technical support for sensors, electronics, electronic warfare, and special warfare weapons." In response, student activists have launched a "Keep Crane Off Campus" campaign.A Science of Death or for Life?Graduating science and engineering students increasingly face a moral dilemma about whether they want to put their skills to work developing instruments of death. Journalist Indigo Olivier captured that conflict in a series of interviews with graduating engineering students. She quotes one at the University of West Florida who strongly opposes doing weapons work this way: "When it comes to engineering, we do have a responsibility… Every tool can be a weapon… I don't really feel like I need to be putting my gifts to make more bombs." By contrast, Cameron Davis, a 2021 computer engineering graduate from Georgia Tech, told Olivier about the dilemma faced by so many graduating engineers: "A lot of people that I talk to aren't 100% comfortable working on defense contracts, working on things that are basically going to kill people." But he went on to say that the high pay at weapons firms "drives a lot of your moral disagreements with defense away."The choice faced by today's science and engineering graduates is nothing new. The use of science for military ends has a long history in the United States. But there have also been numerous examples of scientists who resisted dangerous or seemingly unworkable military schemes. When President Ronald Reagan announced his "Star Wars" missile defense plan in 1986, for instance, he promised, all too improbably, to develop an impenetrable shield that would protect the United States from any and all incoming nuclear-armed missiles. In response, physicists David Wright and Lisbeth Gronlund circulated a pledge to refuse to work on that program. It would, in the end, be signed by more than 7,000 scientists. And that document actually helped puncture the mystique of the Star Wars plan, a reminder that protest against the militarization of education isn't always in vain.Scientists have also played a leading role in pressing for nuclear arms control and disarmament, founding organizations like the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists(1945), the Federation of American Scientists (1945), the global Pugwash movement (1957), the Council for a Livable World (1962), and the Union of Concerned Scientists (1969). To this day, all of them continue to work to curb the threat of a nuclear war that could destroy this planet as a livable place for humanity.A central figure in this movement was Joseph Rotblat, the only scientist to resign from the Manhattan Project over moral qualms about the potential impact of the atomic bomb. In 1957, he helped organize the founding meeting of the Pugwash Conference, an international organization devoted to the control and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In some respects Pugwash was a forerunner of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which successfully pressed for the U.N. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in January 2021.Enabling Endless War and Widespread TortureThe social sciences also have a long, conflicted history of ties to the Pentagon and the military services. Two prominent examples from earlier in this century were the Pentagon's Human Terrain Program (HTS) and the role of psychologists in crafting torture programs associated with the Global War on Terror, launched after the 9/11 attacks with the invasion of Afghanistan.The HTS was initially intended to reduce the "cultural knowledge gap" suffered by U.S. troops involved in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq early in this century. The theory was that military personnel with a better sense of local norms and practices would be more effective in winning "hearts and minds" and so defeating determined enemies on their home turf. The plan included the deployment of psychologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists in Human Terrain Teams alongside American troops in the field.Launched in 2007, the program sparked intense protests in the academic community, with a particularly acrimonious debate within the American Anthropological Association. Ed Liebow, the executive director of the association, argued that its debate "convinced a very large majority of our members that it was just not a responsible way for professional anthropologists to conduct themselves." After a distinctly grim history that included "reports of racism, sexual harassment, and payroll padding," as well as a belief by many commanders that Human Terrain Teams were simply ineffective, the Army quietly abandoned the program in 2014.An even more controversial use of social scientists in the service of the war machine was the role of psychologists as advisors to the CIA's torture programs at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, the Guantánamo Bay detention center in Cuba, and other of that agency's "black sites." James E. Mitchell, a psychologist under contract to U.S. intelligence, helped develop the "enhanced interrogation techniques" used by the U.S during its post-9/11 "war on terror," even sitting in on a session in which a prisoner was waterboarded. That interrogation program, developed by Mitchell with psychologist John Bruce Jessom, included resorting to "violence, sleep deprivation, and humiliation."The role of psychologists in crafting the CIA's torture program drew harsh criticism within the profession. A 2015 report by independent critics revealed that the leaders of the American Psychological Association had "secretly collaborated with the administration of President George W. Bush to bolster a legal and ethical justification for the torture of prisoners swept up in the post-Sept. 11 war on terror." Over time, it became ever clearer that the torture program was not only immoral but remarkably ineffective, since the victims of such torture often told interrogators what they wanted to hear, whether or not their admissions squared with reality.That was then, of course. But today, resistance to the militarization of science has extended to the growing use of artificial intelligence and other emerging military technologies. For example, in 2018, there was a huge protest movement at Google when employees learned that the company was working on Project Maven, a communications network designed to enable more accurate drone strikes. More than 4,000 Google scientists and engineers signed a letter to company leadership calling for them to steer clear of military work, dozens resigned over the issue, and the protests had a distinct effect on the company. That year, Google announced that it would not renew its Project Maven contract, and pledged that it "will not design or deploy AI" for weapons.Unfortunately, the lure of military funding was simply too strong. Just a few years after those Project Maven protests, Google again began doing work for the Pentagon, as noted in a 2021 New York Times report by Daisuke Wakabayashi and Kate Conger. Their article pointed to Google's "aggressive pursuit" of the Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability project, which will attempt to "modernize the Pentagon's cloud technology and support the use of artificial intelligence to gain an advantage on the battlefield." (Cloud technology is the term for the delivery of computing services over the internet.)Meanwhile, a cohort of Google workers has continued to resist such military projects. An October 2021 letter in the British Guardian from "Google and Amazon workers of conscience" called on the companies to "pull out of Project Nimbus [a $1.2 billion contract to provide cloud computing services to the Israeli military and government] and cut all ties with the Israeli military." As they wrote then, "This contract was signed the same week that the Israeli military attacked Palestinians in the Gaza Strip — killing nearly 250 people, including more than 60 children. The technology our companies have contracted to build will make the systematic discrimination and displacement carried out by the Israeli military and government even crueler and deadlier for Palestinians."Of course, their demand seems even more relevant today in the context of the war on Gaza that had then not officially begun.The Future of American ScienceObviously, many scientists do deeply useful research on everything from preventing disease to creating green-energy options that has nothing to do with the military. But the current increases in weapons research could set back such efforts by soaking up an ever larger share of available funds, while also drawing ever more top talent into the military sphere.The stakes are particularly high now, given the ongoing rush to develop AI-driven weaponry and other emerging technologies that pose the risk of everything from unintended slaughter due to system malfunctions to making war more likely, given the (at least theoretical) ability to limit casualties for the attacking side. In short, turning back the flood of funding for military research and weaponry from the Pentagon and key venture capital firms will be a difficult undertaking. After all, AI is already performing a wide range of military and civilian tasks. Banning it altogether may no longer be a realistic goal, but putting guardrails around its military use might still be.Such efforts are, in fact, already underway. The International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) has called for an international dialogue on "the pressing dangers that these systems pose to peace and international security and to civilians." ICRAC elaborates on precisely what these risks are: "Autonomous systems have the potential to accelerate the pace and tempo of warfare, to undermine existing arms controls and regulations, to exacerbate the dangers of asymmetric warfare, and to destabilize regional and global security, [as well as to] further the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force and obscure the moral and legal responsibility for war crimes."The Future of Life Institute has underscored the severity of the risk, noting that "more than half of AI experts believe there is a one in ten chance this technology will cause our extinction."Instead of listening almost exclusively to happy talk about the military value of AI by individuals and organizations that stand to profit from its adoption, isn't it time to begin paying attention to the skeptics, while holding back on the deployment of emerging military technologies until there is a national conversation about what they can and can't accomplish, with scientists playing a central role in bringing the debate back to earth?This article was reposted with permission from Tom Dispatch.
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On March 17 Niger's National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) suspended its military agreement with the United States after a visit by senior U.S. officials to the capital, Niamey. A CNSP spokesman said the decision was made after the U.S. delegation warned the military regime against partnering with Russia and Iran. Niger, which hosts around 1,000 U.S. troops and a drone base, has been an important partner in Washington's counterterrorism operations in the region. But relations have deteriorated considerably since July 2023, when Niger's presidential guard removed democratically elected Mohamed Bozoum and installed General Abdourahamane Tchiani.Russian influence looms large in Western discourse on the Sahel, and now informs U.S. policy and decision-making in places like Niger. This is a mistake. Outsized focus on Russia misunderstands the scale and scope of Moscow's presence. More importantly, it ignores longstanding patterns of governance and denies the role of Africans in emerging pro-sovereignty movements and political blocs. Neither the U.S. nor Russia are in a position to force Africans to choose sides, efforts to do so will only result in rebuke.African governments seek to balance outside powers while retaining the ability to work with each. Historically, local elites leverage these often unequal relations with powerful states to enhance their own domestic position. In francophone Africa, the cozy relationship between French officials, companies, and African autocrats came to be known as Françafrique. Niger had become somewhat of an exception among its peers, however, when it pursued close military ties with the United States.Recent years have seen a wave of anti-French sentiment hit the Sahel. Military regimes seeking political legitimacy have helped foment anti-French sentiment, but they do not control it. The backing of Paris is politically poisonous; kicking the French military out of Niger was necessary to the CNSP's survival.Neither the U.S. nor Russia have a policy to address the humanitarian, economic, and security implications of France's departure from the Sahel, which explains, in part, the focus on ideological narratives.Without a clear strategy, Russia responds opportunistically to events on the ground. And while Moscow has enjoyed more success than America in exporting security to Africa recently, it lacks comparable experience and capabilities in the humanitarian field. "We understand everything through Africa Corps," a Russian security expert in the region says. "We can strengthen it, expand it, redirect it. There are now some aspects of soft power, your matryoshkas and balalaikas. But now we need to do serious things, and that requires a lot of time, money, and people."Even though Washington historically ceded policy priorities in francophone Africa to France, anti-French sentiment did not carry over to anti-American sentiment in Niger. Close military relations, and leadership in the humanitarian field still carried weight.It appears that the U.S. delegation's visit to Niamey in March — led by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley — did significant damage. Sahel expert Alex Thurston noted the reportedly uniliteral announcement of the U.S. delegation's visit, and the relatively low rank of visiting officials, may have played a part.The subject of the talks — Niger's turn towards Russia and Iran — appears to have been equally insulting. Ironically, the U.S. delegation's attempt to counter Russian influence in Niger has further pushed the CNSP to seek ties with Russia.U.S. focus on Russia misses the reality that Africans, not Russians or Americans, are driving major political shifts in the Sahel. The formation of the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES), for example, was a project initiated by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger first and foremost to counteract the military threat from a regional bloc, ECOWAS. That Russia welcomed the development does not mean Moscow inspired it.Indeed, the overthrow of Bozoum was as unexpected in Moscow as it was in Washington. "The coup was a surprise with no obvious advantage," a Russian diplomat in the region admitted. Western media were still quick to divine a Russian hand. Implicit was the belief that Russian influence thrives in instability and can "spill" across borders.Such tropes, however, fail to account for a basic building block of politics: personal relationships. Russia's arrival in Mali was not a product of information warfare — it was the result of collaboration between Russian advisers in Mali and Malian military officers who trained in Russia, the history of which goes back to the Soviet era. Malians, not Russians, cleared the way politically, working to secure the buy-in of trade unions and other powerbrokers in Bamako.There is no equivalent history in neighboring Niger. The U.S. has the monopoly on relations with Niger's officer corps. Moscow doesn't have an embassy in Niamey. Lacking strong, proven connections, Russian diplomats and security officials feel they don't have a good read on the junta. Moreover, Russian officials have little gauge over the mood within the broader Nigerien military. "Pressure to break with the U.S.," a high-ranking Nigerien military officer adds, "comes from within, not Russia."Sensing wariness on both sides, the CNSP has tried to attract, rather unsuccessfully thus far, the Kremlin's attention. When a CNSP delegation visited Moscow in January, they couldn't land a meeting with Vladimir Putin or even Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. Still, Niamey was among the first countries to congratulate Putin on his election victory.The saga of Niger reflects a strange, transitory phase between Washington's "War on Terror" and "Great Power Competition," the strategic rivalry between the U.S., China, and Russia, in which geopolitical foes find themselves on the same side against al-Qaida and ISIS-affiliated armed groups.The Kremlin views and frames its intervention in the Sahel in counterterrorism terms — a fact likely to continue following the recent terror attacks in Moscow. This resonates far better with Sahelian leaders than geopolitical rivalry. "If the United States does not participate in the fight against terrorists, then why are they here?" the Nigerien officer asked. "To track and contain the Russians? This is not their business. We respect America, we need their help. But this does not mean that we are ready listen to reproaches and accusations from incompetent people."Some time has passed now since the U.S. delegation's visit and the denunciation of Niger's military agreement with the U.S., and it appears that the initial tension from the Nigerien authorities' categorical statement has subsided. There is still a chance that the denunciation was a strong-arm tactic to coerce Washington into dialogue.At the same time, the AES continues to gather steam, with Chad now expressing interest in joining. Niger is an integral part of this new alliance and is closer to the U.S. and further from Russia compared to Mali and Burkina Faso.If the U.S. loses a foot in the alliance, which is very possible, it will be the result of efforts to force Africans to choose sides. In the long run, if the U.S. and Russia wish to continue fighting Islamist militancy in the Sahel, they will need to find a way to, if not cooperate, at least deconflict and accommodate for each other's presence. If not, they'll both find themselves on the outside looking in.
Volume 2: Publishing and Technologies of ProductionVolume 2 Introduction BibliographyPart 1. TECHNOLOGIES AND PROCESSESJ. Y. W. MacAlister, ⁰́₈The Durability of Modern Papers⁰́₉, The Library, 1, 10, 1 (1898), pp. 295-304.⁰́₈A Commercial History of a Penny Magazine⁰́₉ (1833) [4-part series] The Penny Magazine, vol 2: ⁰́₈No. 1--Introduction & Paper-Making" 96 (August 31-September 30, 1833), pp. 377-84; ⁰́₈No. 2. Wood-cutting and Type-founding⁰́₉, 101 (September 30-October 31, 1833), pp. 417-24; ⁰́₈No. 3. Compositors' Work and Stereotyping⁰́₉, 107 (October 31-November 30, 1833), pp. 465-72; ⁰́₈No. 4. Printing Presses and Machinery⁰́₄Bookbinding⁰́₉, 112 (November 30-December 31, 1833), pp. 505-11.⁰́₈Mechanism of Chambers⁰́₉s Journal⁰́₉, Chambers⁰́₉s Edinburgh Journal, 3, 175 (6 June 1835), pp. 149⁰́₃51.William Andrew Chatto, ⁰́₈Wood-Engraving, its History and Practice⁰́₉, Illustrated London News (April 20, 1844), pp. 251-4; Supplement, pp. 257-9; April 27, 1844, pp. 273-4; May 4, 1844, pp. 293-4; May 11, 1844, pp. 309-310; May 18, 1844, pp. 325-6; June 1, 1844, pp. 357-8; June 22, 1844, pp.405-6; June 29, 1844, p. 417; July 6, 1844, p. 425. C. H. Timperley, ⁰́₈Directions to Pressmen: of Presses⁰́₉, from The printers⁰́₉ manual containing instructions to learners with scales of impositions, and numerous calculations, recipes, and scales of prices in the principal towns of Great Britain together with practical directions for conducting every department of a printing office (London: H. Johnson, etc., 1838), pp. 89-94.John Jamieson, ⁰́₈On Printing Machinery⁰́₉, Cowen Tracts, Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (1865), pp. 1-13.⁰́₈The Mechanism of the Wharfedale⁰́₉ British Printer, XV (Jan-Feb, 1902), p. 49.C. H. Timperley, ⁰́₈Hand Typesetting⁰́₉, from, The printers⁰́₉ manual containing instructions to learners with scales of impositions, and numerous calculations, recipes, and scales of prices in the principal towns of Great Britain together with practical directions for conducting every department of a printing office (London: H. Johnson, etc., 1838), pp. 12-18.⁰́₈The Monotype⁰́₉, The Graphic (6 November 1897), p. 7.⁰́₈The Linotype Machine: What it Does and How it Works⁰́₉, Journal of the American Society for Naval Engineers (Feb 1900), pp. 208-211.⁰́₈Linotype Reading⁰́₉, British Printer 16 (1903), p. 232⁰́₈A Multiface Linotype Machine⁰́₉, Scientific American (8 August 1903), p. 97.Part 2. PREMISES⁰́₈Destruction of the Caxton Printing-office by Fire⁰́₉, Imperial Magazine, 3 (1821), pp. 243-52.⁰́₈Inside a Printing Office I⁰́₉, The Leisure Hour: A Family Journal of Instruction and Recreation (London) 12, 576 (3 January 1863), 13⁰́₃15.⁰́₈Inside a Printing Office II⁰́₉, The Leisure Hour: A Family Journal of Instruction and Recreation (London) 12, 576 (10 January 1863), 28⁰́₃31.⁰́₈The Newspaper Printing Office⁰́₉, The Leisure Hour: A Family Journal of Instruction and Recreation (London) 12, 579 (31 January 1863), pp. 76⁰́₃8.⁰́₈A Modern Printing Works⁰́₉, [Manchester Guardian] British Printer, XV (November-December 1902), pp. 277-82.⁰́₈A Description of the Offices of the Strand Magazine⁰́₉, The Strand Magazine, 4 (December 1892), pp. 594-606.⁰́₈The "Daily Graphic" ⁰́₃ How it is Done (From the Supplement to the "Graphic" Christmas Number.)⁰́₉ British Printer, V (1892), Jan-Feb, p. 8.John Southward, ⁰́₈Progress in Book Printing⁰́₉, from Progress in Printing and the Graphic Arts during the Victorian Era (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co Ltd, 1897), pp. 18-22.Part 3. WORKING PRACTICES⁰́₈The Printer⁰́₉s Apprentice⁰́₉, The Penny Magazine (11 August 1838), pp. 306-8.Francis Bond Head, ⁰́₈The Printer⁰́₉s Devil⁰́₉, The Quarterly Review, 65, 129 (December 1838), pp 1⁰́₃30.⁰́₈A Few Words to Our Readers⁰́₉, Chambers⁰́₉ Edinburgh Journal, New Series, vol. III, no. 53 (4 January 1845), pp. 1-3.H. Ashton, ⁰́₈How to Succeed as a Printer⁰́₉, British Printer, VII (Jan-Feb 1895), pp. 17-19.⁰́₈Some Notes on Compositors⁰́₉, The Leisure Hour: A Family Journal of Instruction and Recreation (London) (17 January 1860), pp. 37⁰́₃40.⁰́₈The Printers⁰́₉ Chapel⁰́₉, The Leisure Hour: A Family Journal of Instruction and Recreation (London) (24 January 1863), pp. 62⁰́₃4. ⁰́₈How Macaulay⁰́₉s History was Bound⁰́₉, The Leisure Hour: A Family Journal of Instruction and Recreation (London) (31 January 1856), pp. 72-4.⁰́₈The Printing and Binding of the Revised Bible⁰́₉, The Leisure Hour: A Family Journal of Instruction and Recreation (August 1885), pp. 543-6.Frederick Saunders, The author⁰́₉s printing and publishing assistant, comprising explanations of the process of printing preparation ⁰́Œ (London: Saunders & Otley, 1839), pp 1-60.The Author⁰́₉s Handbook: a complete guide to the art and system of publishing on commission (London: E Churton, Commission Publishers, 1844).C. Kegan Paul, ⁰́₈The Production and Life of Books⁰́₉,Fortnightly Review (April 1883), pp. 485-99.Emily Hill, ⁰́₈What Can Our Daughters Do for a Living?⁰́₉, Women⁰́₉s Penny Paper, 8.195 (23 September 1897), p. 198.L. Barbara Brady and Anne Black, ⁰́₈Women Compositors and the Factory Acts⁰́₉, The Economic Journal, 9, 34 (June 1899), pp. 261-6.⁰́₈The Trades Described⁰́₉ and ⁰́₈Women⁰́₉s Work and Organisation⁰́₉, from J. Ramsay Macdonald (ed.), Women in the Printing Trades: A Sociological Study (London, 1904), pp. 1-16, 24-43.Charles Manby Smith, extract from The Working-man⁰́₉s Way in the World: being the autobiography of a journeyman printer (London, 1853), pp. 283-97.Andrew Aird, Letter Press Printing in Glasgow During the Last 50 Years (Glasgow: Privately Printed, 1882), pp. 5-10.Index
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At a time when the Pentagon budget is soaring towards $1 trillion per year and debates about how to respond to the challenges posed by Russia and China are front and center, it is more important than ever to make an independent assessment of the best path forward. Ideally, this would involve objective analysis by unbiased experts and policy makers grounded in a vigorous public conversation about how best to defend the country. But more often than not, special interests override the national interest in decisions on how much to spend on the Pentagon, and how those funds should be allocated.One practice that introduces bias into the shaping of defense policy is the revolving door between the U.S. government and the weapons industry. The movement of retired senior officials from the Pentagon and the military services into the arms industry is a longstanding practice that raises serious questions about the appearance and reality of conflicts of interest. Mostly because employing well-connected ex-military officers can give weapons makers enormous, unwarranted influence over the process of determining the size and shape of the Pentagon budget.A 2021 report by the Government Accountability Office found that 1,700 senior government officials had taken positions in the arms industry over a five year period, an average of well over 300 per year. And a new report from our organization, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, found that this practice is particularly pronounced among top generals and admirals. In the past five years, over 80% of retired four-star generals and admirals (26 of 32) went on to work in the arms sector as board members, advisers, lobbyists, or consultants. For example, Boeing recruited the former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson following his retirement from government service. The admiral joined the company's board of directors within two months of his retirement ceremony. Boeing was the Pentagon's sixth largest contractor in Fiscal Year 2022, with total prime contracts awards amounting to $14.8 billion.Another prominent example of a four-star officer going to work for a top contractor is retired Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, who served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before he retired in September 2019. Five months later Dunford joined the board of directors of Lockheed Martin. The most recent batch of retired four-stars are not only seeking employment with the big contractors, they are also branching out to work for small and mid-size companies that focus on cutting edge technology, like next-generation drones, artificial intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity. For example, the former head of Africa Command, General Stephen Townsend (U.S. Army, Ret.), joined a company called Fortem Technologies, which is dedicated to airspace awareness and defense against drones. General Mike Murray, former head of the U.S. Army Futures Command, went onto the boards of three emerging defense tech firms — Capewell, Hypori, and Vita Inclinata. And both former Chief of the National Guard Bureau head Gen. Joseph L. Lengyel and former Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. William K. Lescher went to work for AI firms upon leaving government service.If past experience is any guide, this new influx of former military officials into the arms sector will distort Pentagon spending priorities and promote higher military budgets than would be the case absent their influence on behalf of their corporate employers. As documented in our new report and in prior analyses by the Project on Government Oversight, there are numerous examples of senior military officials who have advocated for dysfunctional weapons while in government and then gone on to work for the companies that produced those systems. In addition, former military officers have played central roles in preventing the Pentagon from divesting itself of weapons it no longer wants or needs, like the overpriced, underperforming, and strategically unnecessary Littoral Combat Ship. The prevalence of this kind of activity is hard to track because of the limited information available about what retired military officers do once they join the arms industry. The most comprehensive proposal for addressing the problem of the revolving door is Sen. Elizabeth Warren's "Department of Defense Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act," which includes a number of the measures outlined below. At a minimum, to limit the undue influence of retired four-stars and the potential conflicts of interest that result from the post-service employment of former military officers, the following measures should be taken: Bar four-star officers from going to work for companies that receive $1 billion or more in contracts with the Pentagon annually.Extend "cooling off periods" before retired officials can go to work for the arms industry to four years. This would ensure that key contacts or key information that the official may have been privy to while serving would not provide an outsized advantage. Increase transparency through accurate reporting on the post-government employment of retired military officials, including a requirement that defense contractors report their interactions with relevant government officials. Expand the definition of lobbying. Current lobbying restrictions and laws allow consultants, board members, and other corporate officials to act as advocates for the arms industry without being defined as lobbyists, thereby allowing them to avoid relevant restrictions that would otherwise apply.There's too much at stake, both in taxpayer dollars and our future security, to let conflicts of interest and special interest politics shape the Pentagon budget. The time for Congress to act to reduce the influence of the revolving door is now.
Purpose Entrepreneurship is acknowledged as an essential factor for economic growth and as a critical force for a more sustainable future. However, knowledge remains vague about the variety of entrepreneurial forms as well as different treatments thereof. The present thesis seeks to strengthen the recognition of entrepreneurship as a multi-faceted phenomenon and shows that even sub-groups of entrepreneurship as in this case social entrepreneurship are rather complex and heavily dependent on the environmental context. Literature Analysis This thesis is rooted in the research streams of social networks analysis, research on social entrepreneurship, institutional theory, and the classification literature of entrepreneurial forms. The goal is to investigate the complexity of the entrepreneurial phenomenon in terms of its classifications, diversity, and dependence on the environmental context. In order to do that entrepreneurship articles in peer-reviewed journals focusing on social network actors (article 1) and all entrepreneurship articles mentioning a specific form of entrepreneurship are analysed (article 2). Next, a historical flashback and typology on social entrepreneurship is provided (article 3) and the national environment in Germany is analysed (article 4). This thesis shows how important it is to distinguish between the different forms of entrepreneurship and paying attention to the environmental context. Research Design The present thesis is of explorative nature and applies a varied set of methodologies starting with two reviews and proceeding with an article using a mixed-methods approach and concluding with a quantitative analysis. Article 1 and Article 2 employs bibliometric analysis to investigate the scientific landscape of the social networks involved in the entrepreneurial process (article 1) and the different forms of entrepreneurship discussed in the scientific literature (article 2). Article 3 applies a 'Policy Delphi' in order to identify the elements of the social entrepreneurship definition. Furthermore, factor analysis is applied to extract the different dimensions that describe social entrepreneurship and the intercorrelations are examined. Article 4 employs Logistic Regression to find out how national environmental conditions vary in terms of two different entrepreneurial forms. Results Article 1 shows the importance of social network actors within the entrepreneurial process and draws attention to the variety of entrepreneurial forms. Article 2 presents the different entrepreneurial typologies discussed in academic literature. Moreover, the first two articles provide a description of the scientific landscape. Article 3 reveals the most and least important elements in terms of the definition of social entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the article presents five factors that define social entrepreneurship. Article 4 discloses the difference in governmental funding allocation between entrepreneurs who follow social SDGs and the ones who follow economical SDGs. Implications The present thesis contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by showing how multi-faceted the phenomenon is. The results contribute to the attempt of classification of different forms of entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the results provide insights on the factors of social entrepreneurship and highlight the awareness of the environmental context in defining a specific form of entrepreneurship. The application of institutional theory for two different entrepreneurial forms within one national context highlights the differences within a single national context in contrast to cross-national differences. Finally, the results contribute to practice by providing insights into the variety of entrepreneurial facets and how different there are treated within one national context. These insights allow public policymakers to create new and re-evaluate current programs in terms of their target group. ; Zweck Unternehmertum wird als wesentlicher Faktor für Wirtschaftswachstum und als kritische Kraft für eine nachhaltigere Zukunft gesehen. Allerdings bleibt das Wissen über die Vielfalt der unternehmerischen Formen sowie deren unterschiedliche Behandlungen vage. Die vorliegende Dissertation versucht, die Anerkennung von Entrepreneurship als vielschichtiges Phänomen zu stärken und zeigt, dass selbst Untergruppen von Entrepreneurship wie in diesem Fall soziales Unternehmertum recht komplex und stark vom Umweltkontext abhängig sind. Literaturanalyse Diese Arbeit umfasst die Bereiche: Analyse sozialer Netzwerke, der Forschung zu sozialem Unternehmertum, der institutionellen Theorie und der Klassifikationsliteratur unternehmerischer Formen. Ziel ist es, die Komplexität des unternehmerischen Phänomens hinsichtlich seiner Einordnungen, Diversität und Abhängigkeit vom Umweltkontext zu untersuchen. Dazu werden Entrepreneurship-Artikel in peer-review Journals mit Fokus auf Akteuren sozialer Netzwerke (Artikel 1) und alle Entrepreneurship-Artikel, die eine bestimmte Form des Unternehmertums erwähnen, analysiert (Artikel 2). Als nächstes wird ein historischer Rückblick und eine Typologie zum Social Entrepreneurship präsentiert (Artikel 3) und das nationale Umfeld in Deutschland analysiert (Artikel 4). Diese Arbeit zeigt auf, wie wichtig es ist, zwischen den verschiedenen Formen des Unternehmertums zu unterscheiden und den ökologischen Kontext zu berücksichtigen. Forschungsdesign Die vorliegende Arbeit hat explorativen Charakter und wendet ein vielfältiges Set an Methoden an, beginnend mit zwei Reviews über einen Artikel mit einem Mixed-Methods-Ansatz bis hin zu einer quantitativen Analyse. Artikel 1 und Artikel 2 verwenden bibliometrische Analysen, um die wissenschaftliche Landschaft der am unternehmerischen Prozess beteiligten sozialen Netzwerke (Artikel 1) und die verschiedenen Formen des Unternehmertums zu untersuchen, die in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur diskutiert werden (Artikel 2). Artikel 3 wendet ein "Policy Delphi" an, um die Elemente der Definition des sozialen Unternehmertums zu identifizieren. Darüber hinaus wird eine Faktorenanalyse angewendet, um die verschiedenen Dimensionen, die sozialen Unternehmertums zu beschreiben, zu extrahieren und die Zusammenhänge zu untersuchen. Artikel 4 verwendet die logistische Regression, um herauszufinden, wie sich die nationalen Umweltbedingungen in Bezug auf zwei verschiedene Unternehmensformen unterscheiden. Ergebnisse Artikel 1 zeigt die Bedeutung sozialer Netzwerkakteure im unternehmerischen Prozess auf und macht auf die Vielfalt unternehmerischer Formen aufmerksam. In Artikel 2 werden die verschiedenen Unternehmenstypologien vorgestellt, die in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur diskutiert werden. Darüber hinaus beschreiben die ersten beiden Artikel die Wissenschaftslandschaft. Artikel 3 enthüllt die wichtigsten und am wenigsten wichtigen Elemente im Hinblick auf die Definition des sozialen Unternehmertums. Darüber hinaus stellt der Artikel fünf Faktoren vor, die soziales Unternehmertum definieren. Artikel 4 legt den Unterschied bei der Zuweisung staatlicher Mittel zwischen Unternehmern, die soziale SDGs verfolgen, und Unternehmern, die wirtschaftliche SDGs verfolgen, offen. Auswirkungen Die vorliegende Arbeit leistet einen Beitrag zur Entrepreneurship-Literatur, indem sie aufzeigt, wie vielschichtig das Phänomen ist. Die Ergebnisse tragen zum Versuch einer Klassifikation unterschiedlicher Formen des Unternehmertums bei. Darüber hinaus geben die Ergebnisse Einblicke in die Faktoren des sozialen Unternehmertums und unterstreichen das Bewusstsein für den ökologischen Kontext bei der Definition einer spezifischen Form des Unternehmertums. Die Anwendung der institutionellen Theorie für zwei unterschiedliche Unternehmensformen innerhalb eines nationalen Kontexts verdeutlicht die Unterschiede innerhalb eines einzelnen nationalen Kontexts im Gegensatz zu den länderübergreifenden Unterschieden. Schließlich tragen die Ergebnisse zur Praxis bei, indem sie Einblicke in die Vielfalt unternehmerischer Facetten und deren Behandlung innerhalb eines nationalen Kontextes geben. Diese Erkenntnisse ermöglichen es politischen Entscheidungsträgern, neue Programme zu erstellen und laufende Programme im Hinblick auf ihre Zielgruppe neu zu bewerten.
This dissertation is a monograph of the nongovernmental organisation (NGO) Doctors Without Borders (MSF). It is based on an ethnographic inquiry into the operations of this medical humanitarian NGO as they take place. Observing members of MSF providing healthcare to migrants in Paris and to inhabitants of a slum in Nairobi, evaluating and planning projects in their headquarters, we see them tinker together the sometimes-incompatible goals of a seemingly simple humanitarian mission: medical assistance to the vulnerable around the world. Our pragmatist approach consists in arguing that analysis of international aid must account for how humanitarians find a way to hold together the ambiguities, and even the contradictions, of this claimed mission in the ambivalent effects humanitarian aid in practice. To this end, we ask how MSF selects those it seeks to assist around the world. Our response entails close description of the instrumentation of triage: the problematic processes of elaborating and using tools that support the reflexive choice of beneficiaries around the globe. We then make three analytical gestures, allowing us to contribute to ongoing discussions in anthropology on global assemblages, global spaces, and global health. First, we show how the processes of bordering, territorializing, and scaling that triage instruments support, participate in producing humanitarian locations: humanitarian space, the field, medical platforms, and headquarters. Second, analysing the ways triage instruments script for those humanitarians claim to assist, we argue that MSF gains humanitarian agency in the ways it relates to humanitarian beneficiaries: the tact and tactics of care, the reciprocal recognition of beneficiaries in their need and of MSF's need to help, the acceptance of responsibility for this vulnerability coupled with an attempt to transfer responsibility to public health care systems. Third, accounting for these instruments in terms of humanitarian technologies of intervention, we demonstrate how MSF makes timely interventions into governing bodies and the bodies of the governed. Together, our description of aid as it takes place and our analysis of the problems associated with humanitarian locations, beneficiaries, and technologies of intervention constitute what we call MSF's humanitarian presence. This humanitarian presence indicates the ways MSF exists, in their global physical extension, in the health care they practice, in their nongovernmental politics and their ethics of attention. This concept supports critique by indicating, first, the multiple and incompatible goods that are to inhere in humanitarian aid, and second, those specific instances when MSF has failed to do so. ; Cette thèse constitue une monographie de l'organisation non gouvernementale Médecins Sans Frontières. Son matériel de base est une enquête ethnographique menée sur les opérations de cette ONG médicale humanitaire au moment même où elles se déroulent. En observant les membres de MSF en train de proposer des soins médicaux aux migrants dormant dans les rues à Paris ou aux habitants d'un bidonville à Nairobi, ou en train d'évaluer et de planifier leurs projets depuis le siège, nous les voyons bricoler pour faire tenir ensemble les objectifs parfois incompatibles d'une mission humanitaire en apparence simple : l'assistance médicale à des personnes vulnérables à travers le monde. Notre approche pragmatiste nous invite à prendre au sérieux dans l'analyse le fait que c'est l'aide humanitaire elle-même qui doit faire tenir ensemble en situation les ambiguïtés, les ambivalences ou même les contradictions d'une telle mission, tant dans ses projets et ses actions que dans ses effets ambivalents. Pour ce faire, nous nous sommes demandé comment procède MSF pour sélectionner celles et ceux qu'elle cherche à aider autour du monde. Pour répondre, nous avons produit une description fine de l'instrumentation du triage : les processus d'élaboration et l'usage des outils qui soutiennent le choix réflexif des bénéficiaires autour du globe. Nous proposons pour cela trois gestes analytiques, qui nous permettent de contribuer aux discussions actuelles sur la globalité en anthropologie : assemblages globaux, espaces globaux, santé globale. D'abord, nous montrons comment le tracé de frontières, de territoires, d'échelles que ces instruments de triage ne cessent de produire participe à la distribution de lieux humanitaires : l'espace humanitaire, le terrain, les plateformes médicales, le siège de MSF. Ensuite, en faisant porter l'analyse sur la façon dont les instruments de triage débouchent sur une mise en « scripts » ou en scénarios de ceux que les humanitaires prétendent aider, nous montrons comment MSF acquiert la capacité d'agir spécifiquement dans ses relations avec les bénéficiaires humanitaires : tact et tactiques du care, reconnaissance réciproque des bénéficiaires dans leur besoin d'aide et des humanitaires dans leur besoin d'aider, acceptabilité d'une responsabilité envers cette vulnérabilité associée dans le même temps à la tentative de transférer cette responsabilité vers des systèmes des santé publics. Enfin, en rendant compte de ces instruments en termes de technologies humanitaires d'intervention, nous mettons en évidence la façon dont MSF opère des interventions ponctuelles tant dans les organes de gouvernement que dans les corps des gouvernés. Notre description de l'aide en train de se faire et notre analyse des problèmes associés aux lieux, aux bénéficiaires et aux technologies d'intervention humanitaires constituent ce que nous appelons l'aide humanitaire au présent. Par aide humanitaire au présent, nous désignons les manières d'exister de MSF, son extension physique globale, les soins de santé qu'elle accomplit, sa politique non gouvernementale et son éthique de l'attention. Sur ce concept peut se soutenir une approche critique positive de l'aide humanitaire, considérant à la fois la pluralité et l'incompatibilité des bénéfices qu'elle est censée apporter, mais aussi les cas et les instances précis où MSF a échoué à les faire tenir ensemble.
From 1896 to 1957, the Lyon City council leads an ambitious innovative policy in the field of "éducation populaire" (public education, education for all).The political will to opt for an education policy can be accounted for by the particular context during the first half of the 20th century.This city is flourishing and its population is increasing constantly particularly its working class and the number of pupils.At the time, Édouard Herriot is Lyon's mayor. In Lyon he begins being involved in politics in the context of the Dreyfus affair.Lyon is to be a springboard for his political career. By becoming mayor of Lyon at the age of 33, Herriot can enforce his school and educative policy in accordance with the principles of democratization of schooling and education he advocates, a policy which makes schooling more easily accessible to all that he shares with the "Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle" intertwined networks of activists. Those networks prove to be particularly fertile and active during the period. Analyzing them shows how numerous they are and sheds light on their actions through the profusion of non-profit organizations and their many publication.However, while the analysis of the different historic sources available allow to Lyon's thriving community life related to "éducation populaire", the same sources do not mention how different organizations work.Analyzing the practices and project of the different "éducation populaire"movements and organizations show how the aims evolved during that period. Initially the goal is based on a program of hygiene physical education awareness. It is meant to fight social plagues such as tuberculoses and alcoholism. Gradually political goals emerge. The different activists have to establish a program of education in the true sense of the word of civic education, addressed to the children from Lyon working-class families. The aim is obviously to fight against the influence of opposite to the French Third Republic. In these activist circles above all clerical ones, regime evolves in these activist circle, makes the perceptions and political fears of parts of the population stand out this analysis also allows to put forward how deeply involved in politics these "éducation populaire" activists are in the second half of the 20th century. The fear of fascism then becomes a deep motivation for education.This research thus seeks to make the way these organizations and "éducation populaire" work re-emerge while attempting to be as close as possible to the viewpoint of regular activists.This bygone world of several of them whose biography could be traced. ; De 1896 à 1957, la municipalité de Lyon a développé une politique ambitieuse et novatrice dans le domaine de l'éducation populaire. Cette volonté politique d'action éducative s'explique par le contexte particulier de la ville de Lyon sur la première moitié du XXe siècle.La ville est alors en pleine croissance et économique. La population ne cesse d'augmenter, en particulier les populations ouvrières et scolaires.Cette ville est dirigée par Édouard Herriot. C'est à Lyon qu'il débute son engagement politique dans le contexte de l'affaire Dreyfus. Par la suite la ville de Lyon est pour lui un tremplin pour sa carrière politique nationale. En devenant maire de Lyon à 33 ans, Herriot est alors en position pour mettre en application une politique scolaire et éducative en lien avec ses principes de démocratisation de l'enseignement qu'il défend, celle d'un enseignement qui doit être plus démocratique et accessible, politique qu'il partage avec les Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle. Cette vision est également celle d' une partie de la population lyonnaise qui soutient Édouard Herriot.Les différentes actions menées s'appuient alors sur un ensemble de réseaux de militants entrecroisés. Ces réseaux se révèlent être particulièrement riches et actifs sur cette période. Leur analyse montre leur foisonnement et leur action à travers la multiplication des associations de type loi 1901, avec leurs nombreuses publications.Cependant, si l'analyses des différentes sources historiques accessibles permet de mettre en évidence la richesse de la vie associative lyonnaise en lien avec l'éducation populaire, en revanche ces mêmes sources restent malheureusement muettes sur le fonctionnement de ces différentes associations.L'analyse des pratiques et des projets des différents mouvements et associations d'éducation populaire fait apparaître une évolution des objectifs sur la période. L'objectif initial repose sur un programme de développement des pratiques d'hygiène et de la culture physique. L'objectif déclaré est alors de lutter contre les fléaux sociaux que sont la tuberculose et l'alcoolisme. Progressivement apparaissent des objectifs politiques. Il s'agit pour les différents militants de mettre en place une véritable éducation civique à destination des enfants des classes populaires lyonnaises. Le but affiché est de lutter contre l'influence des adversaires de la République, en premier lieu les milieux cléricaux. L'évolution de la définition de l'adversaire de la République dans ces milieux de militants permet de mettre en évidence les perceptions et les craintes politiques d'une partie de la population. Cette analyse autorise également à mettre en avant l'hyper-politisation de ces militants de l'éducation populaire dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. La crainte du fascisme devient alors une puissante motivation pour l'action éducatrice.L'objectif de cette recherche est alors de faire resurgir le fonctionnement de ces associations et œuvres d'éducation populaire, en cherchant des angles d'approche le plus près possible des militants de base. Ce monde de militants disparu peut alors être évoqué à travers la trajectoire de plusieurs d'entre eux dont la biographie a pu être reconstituée.
From 1896 to 1957, the Lyon City council leads an ambitious innovative policy in the field of "éducation populaire" (public education, education for all).The political will to opt for an education policy can be accounted for by the particular context during the first half of the 20th century.This city is flourishing and its population is increasing constantly particularly its working class and the number of pupils.At the time, Édouard Herriot is Lyon's mayor. In Lyon he begins being involved in politics in the context of the Dreyfus affair.Lyon is to be a springboard for his political career. By becoming mayor of Lyon at the age of 33, Herriot can enforce his school and educative policy in accordance with the principles of democratization of schooling and education he advocates, a policy which makes schooling more easily accessible to all that he shares with the "Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle" intertwined networks of activists. Those networks prove to be particularly fertile and active during the period. Analyzing them shows how numerous they are and sheds light on their actions through the profusion of non-profit organizations and their many publication.However, while the analysis of the different historic sources available allow to Lyon's thriving community life related to "éducation populaire", the same sources do not mention how different organizations work.Analyzing the practices and project of the different "éducation populaire"movements and organizations show how the aims evolved during that period. Initially the goal is based on a program of hygiene physical education awareness. It is meant to fight social plagues such as tuberculoses and alcoholism. Gradually political goals emerge. The different activists have to establish a program of education in the true sense of the word of civic education, addressed to the children from Lyon working-class families. The aim is obviously to fight against the influence of opposite to the French Third Republic. In these activist circles above all clerical ones, regime evolves in these activist circle, makes the perceptions and political fears of parts of the population stand out this analysis also allows to put forward how deeply involved in politics these "éducation populaire" activists are in the second half of the 20th century. The fear of fascism then becomes a deep motivation for education.This research thus seeks to make the way these organizations and "éducation populaire" work re-emerge while attempting to be as close as possible to the viewpoint of regular activists.This bygone world of several of them whose biography could be traced. ; De 1896 à 1957, la municipalité de Lyon a développé une politique ambitieuse et novatrice dans le domaine de l'éducation populaire. Cette volonté politique d'action éducative s'explique par le contexte particulier de la ville de Lyon sur la première moitié du XXe siècle.La ville est alors en pleine croissance et économique. La population ne cesse d'augmenter, en particulier les populations ouvrières et scolaires.Cette ville est dirigée par Édouard Herriot. C'est à Lyon qu'il débute son engagement politique dans le contexte de l'affaire Dreyfus. Par la suite la ville de Lyon est pour lui un tremplin pour sa carrière politique nationale. En devenant maire de Lyon à 33 ans, Herriot est alors en position pour mettre en application une politique scolaire et éducative en lien avec ses principes de démocratisation de l'enseignement qu'il défend, celle d'un enseignement qui doit être plus démocratique et accessible, politique qu'il partage avec les Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle. Cette vision est également celle d' une partie de la population lyonnaise qui soutient Édouard Herriot.Les différentes actions menées s'appuient alors sur un ensemble de réseaux de militants entrecroisés. Ces réseaux se révèlent être particulièrement riches et actifs sur cette période. Leur analyse montre leur foisonnement et leur action à travers la multiplication des associations de type loi 1901, avec leurs nombreuses publications.Cependant, si l'analyses des différentes sources historiques accessibles permet de mettre en évidence la richesse de la vie associative lyonnaise en lien avec l'éducation populaire, en revanche ces mêmes sources restent malheureusement muettes sur le fonctionnement de ces différentes associations.L'analyse des pratiques et des projets des différents mouvements et associations d'éducation populaire fait apparaître une évolution des objectifs sur la période. L'objectif initial repose sur un programme de développement des pratiques d'hygiène et de la culture physique. L'objectif déclaré est alors de lutter contre les fléaux sociaux que sont la tuberculose et l'alcoolisme. Progressivement apparaissent des objectifs politiques. Il s'agit pour les différents militants de mettre en place une véritable éducation civique à destination des enfants des classes populaires lyonnaises. Le but affiché est de lutter contre l'influence des adversaires de la République, en premier lieu les milieux cléricaux. L'évolution de la définition de l'adversaire de la République dans ces milieux de militants permet de mettre en évidence les perceptions et les craintes politiques d'une partie de la population. Cette analyse autorise également à mettre en avant l'hyper-politisation de ces militants de l'éducation populaire dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. La crainte du fascisme devient alors une puissante motivation pour l'action éducatrice.L'objectif de cette recherche est alors de faire resurgir le fonctionnement de ces associations et œuvres d'éducation populaire, en cherchant des angles d'approche le plus près possible des militants de base. Ce monde de militants disparu peut alors être évoqué à travers la trajectoire de plusieurs d'entre eux dont la biographie a pu être reconstituée.
From 1896 to 1957, the Lyon City council leads an ambitious innovative policy in the field of "éducation populaire" (public education, education for all).The political will to opt for an education policy can be accounted for by the particular context during the first half of the 20th century.This city is flourishing and its population is increasing constantly particularly its working class and the number of pupils.At the time, Édouard Herriot is Lyon's mayor. In Lyon he begins being involved in politics in the context of the Dreyfus affair.Lyon is to be a springboard for his political career. By becoming mayor of Lyon at the age of 33, Herriot can enforce his school and educative policy in accordance with the principles of democratization of schooling and education he advocates, a policy which makes schooling more easily accessible to all that he shares with the "Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle" intertwined networks of activists. Those networks prove to be particularly fertile and active during the period. Analyzing them shows how numerous they are and sheds light on their actions through the profusion of non-profit organizations and their many publication.However, while the analysis of the different historic sources available allow to Lyon's thriving community life related to "éducation populaire", the same sources do not mention how different organizations work.Analyzing the practices and project of the different "éducation populaire"movements and organizations show how the aims evolved during that period. Initially the goal is based on a program of hygiene physical education awareness. It is meant to fight social plagues such as tuberculoses and alcoholism. Gradually political goals emerge. The different activists have to establish a program of education in the true sense of the word of civic education, addressed to the children from Lyon working-class families. The aim is obviously to fight against the influence of opposite to the French Third Republic. In these activist circles above all clerical ones, regime evolves in these activist circle, makes the perceptions and political fears of parts of the population stand out this analysis also allows to put forward how deeply involved in politics these "éducation populaire" activists are in the second half of the 20th century. The fear of fascism then becomes a deep motivation for education.This research thus seeks to make the way these organizations and "éducation populaire" work re-emerge while attempting to be as close as possible to the viewpoint of regular activists.This bygone world of several of them whose biography could be traced. ; De 1896 à 1957, la municipalité de Lyon a développé une politique ambitieuse et novatrice dans le domaine de l'éducation populaire. Cette volonté politique d'action éducative s'explique par le contexte particulier de la ville de Lyon sur la première moitié du XXe siècle.La ville est alors en pleine croissance et économique. La population ne cesse d'augmenter, en particulier les populations ouvrières et scolaires.Cette ville est dirigée par Édouard Herriot. C'est à Lyon qu'il débute son engagement politique dans le contexte de l'affaire Dreyfus. Par la suite la ville de Lyon est pour lui un tremplin pour sa carrière politique nationale. En devenant maire de Lyon à 33 ans, Herriot est alors en position pour mettre en application une politique scolaire et éducative en lien avec ses principes de démocratisation de l'enseignement qu'il défend, celle d'un enseignement qui doit être plus démocratique et accessible, politique qu'il partage avec les Compagnons de l'Université Nouvelle. Cette vision est également celle d' une partie de la population lyonnaise qui soutient Édouard Herriot.Les différentes actions menées s'appuient alors sur un ensemble de réseaux de militants entrecroisés. Ces réseaux se révèlent être particulièrement riches et actifs sur cette période. Leur analyse montre leur foisonnement et leur action à travers la multiplication des associations de type loi 1901, avec leurs nombreuses publications.Cependant, si l'analyses des différentes sources historiques accessibles permet de mettre en évidence la richesse de la vie associative lyonnaise en lien avec l'éducation populaire, en revanche ces mêmes sources restent malheureusement muettes sur le fonctionnement de ces différentes associations.L'analyse des pratiques et des projets des différents mouvements et associations d'éducation populaire fait apparaître une évolution des objectifs sur la période. L'objectif initial repose sur un programme de développement des pratiques d'hygiène et de la culture physique. L'objectif déclaré est alors de lutter contre les fléaux sociaux que sont la tuberculose et l'alcoolisme. Progressivement apparaissent des objectifs politiques. Il s'agit pour les différents militants de mettre en place une véritable éducation civique à destination des enfants des classes populaires lyonnaises. Le but affiché est de lutter contre l'influence des adversaires de la République, en premier lieu les milieux cléricaux. L'évolution de la définition de l'adversaire de la République dans ces milieux de militants permet de mettre en évidence les perceptions et les craintes politiques d'une partie de la population. Cette analyse autorise également à mettre en avant l'hyper-politisation de ces militants de l'éducation populaire dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. La crainte du fascisme devient alors une puissante motivation pour l'action éducatrice.L'objectif de cette recherche est alors de faire resurgir le fonctionnement de ces associations et œuvres d'éducation populaire, en cherchant des angles d'approche le plus près possible des militants de base. Ce monde de militants disparu peut alors être évoqué à travers la trajectoire de plusieurs d'entre eux dont la biographie a pu être reconstituée.