Deliberative Voting: Clarifying Consent in a Consensus Process

In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 302-319

Abstract

Consent in deliberative theory is often construed either as the unanimous agreement to be bound by the outcome of a procedure such as a vote, or as rational consensus or fully normative unanimity, where all come to hold the same substantive position for the same reasons. In this essay we argue for a third option, a kind of tacit consent to let something stand as the position of the group. This involves not full but partial normative unanimity, in which all participants agree to let something stand as the position of the group even if they do not personally share it. For such tacit consent to meet deliberative standards, we suggest, it must be actualized by the live possibility of refusing it. The normative potentials of such consent are realized to the extent that it is achieved in a context in which each participant has an effective veto. Furthermore, the absence of opposition or dissent must follow a process in which there were real opportunities to question, object, scrutinize, and oppose. Adapted from the source document.