Aufsatz(elektronisch)2011

One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting

In: Public choice, Band 148, Heft 1-2, S. 197-214

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Abstract

The widespread use in legislative studies of the one-dimensional model and its median-stability consequence raises a question: Do stability and one-dimensionality rest on evidence drawn from observed votes? They do not and cannot. I prove that every possible legislative history is compatible with a transitive majority preference (hence stability), and except in very special circumstances with a cyclic majority preference (hence instability) as well: observed votes can never refute and almost never confirm stability. One-dimensionality fares worse: any legislative history is compatible with the one-dimensional model if it includes no two votes with overlapping pairs of alternatives, but otherwise, I show, it is almost certainly incompatible with the model, even in those rare cases that ensure transitivity. Voting evidence aside, the one-dimensional model is unduly restrictive, and arguments in its defense do not survive scrutiny. Adapted from the source document.

Sprachen

Englisch

Verlag

Springer, Dordrecht The Netherlands

ISSN: 1573-7101

DOI

10.1007/s11127-010-9652-3

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