Reallocative Federalism: Legislative Overrepresentation and Public Spending in the Western Hemisphere

Abstract

Federal countries & the federal institutions in these countries are characterized by asymmetries. One common asymmetrical feature is the overrepresentation of subnational territorial units like states & provinces in national legislatures. The hypothesis that this asymmetry affects the territorial distribution of federally-funded public spending is examined with economic data from the US, Brazil, Mexico, & Argentina. The US & Mexico have a more proportional allotment of legislative seats to population vs. brazil & Argentina, where several provinces are significantly overrepresented. The latter situation yields a greater impact of disproportionate public spending than other variables like senate overrepresentation, per statistical analysis. The implications of reallocative federalism in Brazil & Argentina are contrasted with the proportional federalism of the US & Mexico. The particular case of the political economy in Argentina's metropolitan vs. non-metropolitan regions is analyzed, contrasting public spending policy during different regimes. These results contrast with William H. Riker's (1964) popular theory on federalism's impacts. 10 Tables, 27 References. M. Pflum