Der 'Kernbereich exekutiver Eigenverantwortung' - zur Relativitat eines suggestiven Topos

In: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen: ZParl, Band 45, Heft 4, S. 885-907

Abstract

To enable parliamentary control over both the government and the administration, the Constitutions in Germany assign information rights to parliament and to the opposition in parliament. Thus, parliament gains access to the government's area. However, the control power does not allow parliament to participate in governing processes as such ('co-government'), Thus the separation of power principle provides for restrictions to information, shortly termed as 'core area of governmental authority'. This concept suggests a perfectly protected area, which is never open to parliament. Such absolute exemption of control is, however, not supported by constitutional law. Rather the 'core area argument' is the basis for a relative boundary, relative in content and time. To define the 'protected area' a consideration of each individual case is necessary. Therefore, government has to justify the rejection of parliamentary claims for information. The authority to reject information claims lies only with the present government. Constitutional law does not provide for a continuing blocking effect of an information refusal, based on the 'core area argument'. Thus, after a change of government, a new balancing between parliamentary information rights and the governmental right to withhold information can become necessary. The potential right to withhold information of a former government cannot, in principle, be transformed into an obligation of the new government to withhold it. Adapted from the source document.