OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC REFORM OF SOCIALISM: A PROPERTY-RIGHTS APPROACH

In: The annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Band 507, S. 65-71

Abstract

THE AUTHOR EXPLAINS WHY ECONOMIC REFORMS FAIL UNDER SOVIET-TYPE SYSTEMS DESPITE THE EFFORTS OF THE RULERS TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR AILING ECONOMIES. APPLYING A PROPERTY-RIGHTS APPROACH, HE POINTS TO THE FACT THAT ALL SEGMENTS OF THE RULING STRATUM BENEFIT FROM MAINTAINING AN UNDEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM. PARTY APPARATCHIKS AND ECONOMIC BUREAUCRATS ALSO BENEFIT FROM THE PERSISTENT INTERFERENCE IN THE PATENTLY INEFFICIENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM. THEREFORE, THEY ARE MOST INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM. MOREOVER, SINCE THE RULERS TURN TO THE BUREAUCRATS TO DESIGN AND IMPLEMENT REFORMS, THEIR OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREVENTING, DISTORTING, AND/OR ABORTING REFORMS ARE GREAT.