BUREAUCRACY AND THE PUBLICNESS OF LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS

In: Public choice, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 271-284

Abstract

IN THIS PAPER THE AUTHOR USES A MODEL OF BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE TO ARGUE THAT BUREAUCRACY CANNOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ANOMALOUS RESULTS FOUND IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE. THE PAPER DEMONSTRATES THAT: (1) IF BUREAUCRACIES CAN ALTER THE COMPOSITION OF SPENDING IN A COMMUNITY, THEY WILL PUSH FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS WHICH ARE CLOSE TO THE PURE PUBLIC GOOD, RATHER THAN PURE PRIVATE GOOD, EXTREME; AND (2) IF BUREAUCRATIC POWER IS CORRELATED WITH POPULATION, THE ESTIMATED RESULTS WILL BE BIASED TOWARD THE PURE PUBLIC GOOD EXTREME. THE PURPOSE OF THE PAPER IS TO DIVERT STUDY ON THE QUESTION OF THESE EMPIRICAL RESULTS AWAY FROM BUREAUCRACY INTO MORE FRUITFUL LINES OF RESEARCH.