Who Ratifies Environmental Treaties and Why? Institutionalism, Structuralism and Participation by 192 Nations in 22 Treaties
In: Global environmental politics, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 22-64
Abstract
International environmental accords have become important mechanisms by which nations make promises to administer natural resources & manage the global environment. Previous studies, relying mainly on single cases or small-n data sets, have shed light on the proximate political causes of participation in these agreements. However, no study has yet systematically explained the deeper social determinants of why nations sign, ignore, or resist environmental treaties. We offer a theoretically sequenced model that exploits complementarities between rational choice institutionalism & world-systems theory. Key variables posited by realists & constructivists are also examined, using a new environmental treaty participation index based on ratifications of 22 major environmental agreements by 192 nations. Cross-sectional OLS regression & path analysis strongly supports the institutionalist claim that credibility -- the willingness & ability to honor one's international environmental commitments -- "matters." But these measures also lend considerable support to the world-systems hypothesis that state credibility is strongly influenced by a legacy of colonial incorporation into the world economy. Narrow export base -- our proxy for disadvantaged position in the world economy -- directly & indirectly (through institutions & civil society strength) explains nearly six-tenths of national propensity to sign environmental treaties. A nation's natural capital, its ecological vulnerability, & international environmental NGO memberships had no explanatory power in the path analysis. Our results indicate that new theoretical, methodological, & policy approaches are needed to address structural barriers to international cooperation. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 6 Appendixes, 162 References. Adapted from the source document.
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Englisch
ISSN: 1526-3800
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