Is the Japanese Diet Consensual?

In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 9-28

Abstract

The institutional design of the Japanese Diet is commonly believed to necessitate interparty accommodation & to make the legislative process more "viscous" than it appears. This common belief about the Diet is challenged by examining the Constitution, the Diet Law, the House Rules, & parliamentary practices with special attention to agenda-setting procedures, & argues that the "unanimity norm" is less binding than commonly recognized. By applying the criteria proposed by Doring, this paper compares the Diet with Western European parliaments, & shows that it ranks relatively high in terms of the ruling majority's ability to control the legislative agenda. Although the postwar Diet is modeled on the legislative process in the US Congress, it is critically important to keep in mind that the constitutional principle of the Diet follows the fusion of power in the British parliament. The picture that emerges from the analysis is in strong contrast to the traditional image of the Japanese Diet & sheds new light on the majoritarian foundation of the Diet. 2 Tables, 1 Figure. Adapted from the source document.