State Implementation Effort and Federal Regulatory Policy: The Case of Occupational Safety and Health

In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 686-703

Abstract

The role played by states in the implementation of federal protective regulatory policies is analyzed from the perspective of the explanatory theories of wealth, partisanship, interest groups, & organizational search. Three sources of data are utilized to measure state implementation of the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970: (1) tabulation of Republican Party control of the state governorship, 1970-1980; (2) Republican hegemony over governership, & upper & lower state houses, 1970-1980; & (3) a version of the Ranney Index (Tucker, H. S., "Interparty Competition in the American States: One More Time," American Politics Quarterly, 1982, 10, 93-116) for the same period. Path analysis suggests that while wealth & interest group theories contribute to understanding, organizational search theory is a better predictor of enforcement vigor; partisan theory is seen to predict the best. The inclusion of these findings in any general theory of state implementation effort is suggested. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 40 References. Modified HA