ALLAINCES AND ASYMMETRY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CAPABILITY AGGREGATION MODEL OF ALLIANCES

In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 904-933

Abstract

AN ALTERNATIVE LOGIC OF ALLIANCES TO THE CAPABILITY AGGREGATION MODEL WHERE BOTH ALLIES RECEIVE SECURITY BENEFITS FROM THE ALLIANCE IS PROPOSED BY THIS PAPER. ALL THE HYPOTHESES ARE SUPPORTED BY A STATISTICAL EXAMINATION OF MILITARY ALLIANCES FORMED BETWEEN 1815 AND 1965. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT FOR SEVERAL TOPICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY ARE DRAWN OUT. IN THIS ALTERNATIVE LOGIC, ONE PARTNER RECEIVES AUTONOMY BENEFITS, AND THE OTHER, SECURITY BENEFITS FROM THE ALLIANCE. THE FORMER TYPE OF ALLIANCES ARE CALLED SYMMETRIC AND THE LATTER ASYMMETRIC. THE PAPER DEVELOPS BOTH LOGICS FROM A MODEL OF ALLIANCE CHOICES IN THE FACE OF TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND SECURITY AND PROVICES A PRECISE DEFINITION OF THOSE TWO CONCEPTS.