RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF COMPENSATION

In: Philosophy & public affairs, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 79-88

Abstract

THIS PAPER IS CONCERNED WITH TWO PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INFRINGING ANOTHER'S RIGHTS, AND WILL SUGGEST THAT BOTH REST ON MISTAKES. THE FIRST (WHICH WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN OBVIOUS TRUTH BY MOST MORAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSPHERS) IS THAT INFRINGING RIGHTS IS SOMETIMES MORALLY PERMISSIBLE; THE SECOND IS THAT EVEN PERMISSIBLE INFRINGEMENTS PRODUCE RESIDUAL DUTIES TO THE RIGHTHOLDER ON THE PART OF WHOEVER INFRINGES HIS RIGHTS. IN DISCUSSING THESE PROPOSITIONS THE AUTHORS FOCUSES ON A CLASS OF CASES WHICH SEEM TO PROVIDE CLEAR OCCASIONS FOR THEIR APPLICATION, NAMELY, THOSE IN WHICH INDIVIDUALS CAUSE OTHERS PROPERTY LOSSES AND OWE COMPENSATION AS A RESULT.