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In: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series 23
In: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy 23
Traditional microeconomic theory is concerned with the allocation of scarce resources through the mechanism of prices and markets. The efficient allocation of resources by prices and markets is called allocative efficiency. In emphasizing the allocative function of prices and markets, microeconomic theory has ignored the allocation of resources within firms, and instead assumes that firms are always internally (X) efficient, cost minimizers. X-efficiency theory shows that protection from competitive pressures produces not only allocated market-inefficiency, but inefficiency within the firm. This book is the most current, in-depth, and comprehensive review of X-efficiency theory, especially as it relates to regulatory economics and policy. It provides an understanding of X-efficiency by developing the theory, exhibiting empirical evidence, and, finally, reviewing applications of the theory
In: Topics in regulatory economics and policy series 23
In: Topics in regulatory economics and policy series
In: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series 2
In: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy 2
1. Introduction -- 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. X- and allocative efficiency, and the welfare losses from monopoly power -- 1.3. X-efficiency, and the neoclassical production and cost functions -- 1.4. The development of XE theory -- 1.5. XE theory and generalized neoclassical theory. -- 1.6. XE theory as a research design -- 1.7. Empirical research on XE theory -- 1.8. Critics of XE theory -- 2. Production, cost, and welfare: A review -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. The firm in the short run -- 2.3. The firm in the long run -- 2.4. Firms, markets, and efficiency -- 2.5. Implications -- Appendix: Regulation theory and X-efficiency -- 3. X-efficiency: The intellectual setting and an introduction to the theory -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Complex objective functions -- 3.3. XE theory: An introduction -- 3.4. Conclusions -- 4. X-efficiency theory: 1 -- 4.1. Introduction -- 4.2. The individual in XE theory -- 4.3. Individual effort and the inert area -- 4.4. Conclusions -- 5. X-efficiency theory: 2 -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Intrafirm determinants of individual and group effort -- 5.3. Productivity, effort conventions, and the prisoner's dilemma -- 5.4. Market structure, pressure, and effort -- 5.5. A synthesis and an illustration -- 5.6. Implications and conclusions -- Appendix: Regulation and X-efficiency -- 6. Empirical evidence: Regulated industries -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. Electric Utilities -- 6.3. Local government services -- 6.4. Symphony orchestras -- 6.5. Airlines -- 6.6. Conclusions -- 7. Empirical evidence: Ownership form -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Owner- versus manager-controlled firms -- 7.3. Public versus private ownership -- 7.4. Conclusions -- 8. Empirical evidence: Market structure -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Output and input ratios -- 8.3. Profits and X-efficiency -- 8.4. Price-fixing behavior -- 8.5. Conclusions -- 9. X-efficiency, its critics, and a reply -- 9.1. Introduction -- 9.2. Rent-seeking -- 9.3. Leisure as output -- 9.4. Management utility under competition -- 9.5. Property rights -- 9.6. Some general comments -- 10. Implications and conclusions -- 10.1. X- and Allocative Efficiency -- 10.2. X-efficiency theory as a research design -- 10.3. X-efficiency and its critics -- 10.4. X-efficiency theory and neoclassical theory: Some final thoughts -- References.
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