Scandinavian Diplomacy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Official and Unofficial Soft Power
In: Israeli History, Politics and Society Ser.
Intro -- Endorsements -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1 Soft power diplomacy -- 1.2 Political secrecy in the Middle East -- 1.3 Unofficial diplomacy -- Notes -- Bibliography -- 2. Historical Background -- 2.1 Scandinavian foreign policy: Autonomy, neutrality and Scandinavian balance -- 2.2 The beginning of modern Scandinavian mediation -- 2.3 Scandinavian foreign diplomacy -- 2.3.1 Norway -- 2.3.2 Sweden -- 2.3.3 Denmark -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Primarily source -- Secondary source -- Interviews -- 3. Norway -- 3.1 Building the channel: Opening the Oslo channel -- 3.2 The first three rounds -- 3.3 The process intensifies -- 3.4 The point of no return -- 3.5 Norwegian shuttle diplomacy -- 3.6 Signing the Oslo accords -- 3.7 Reaching for a new Middle East: Political and security implications -- 3.8 Preserving Norwegian involvement -- 3.9 Limitations of Norwegian mediation policy -- 3.10 The Norwegian model: Image and reality -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Primary sources - Archives -- Secondary sources -- Interview -- Online source -- 4. Sweden -- 4.1 Swedish mediation in 1988 -- 4.2 The Geneva declaration 1988 -- 4.3 Swedish diplomacy implications -- 4.4 Sweden's response to the Oslo accords -- 4.5 Forging political ties -- 4.6 The Beilin-Abu Mazen channel -- 4.7 The core issue of Jerusalem: Unofficial channel -- 4.8 Preparing the path to official Harpsund negotiations -- 4.9 Harpsund negotiations begin -- 4.10 The Camp David Summit -- 4.11 Post Camp David: The Beilin-Schori channel -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Primary sources - Archives -- Secondary sources -- Interviews -- 5. Denmark -- 5.1 The Louisiana process -- 5.2 The first Copenhagen conference -- 5.3 The impact of the Copenhagen declaration -- 5.4 Wye River memorandum.