Buch(elektronisch)2016

Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning

In: Classical jurisprudence series

Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb; Campbell, David; Thomas, Philip A.

Verfügbarkeit an Ihrem Standort wird überprüft

Dieses Buch ist auch in Ihrer Bibliothek verfügbar:

Abstract

section 1: Legal conceptions contrasted with non-legal conceptions. Operative facts contrasted with evidential facts. Fundamental jural relations contrasted with one another -- section 2: (a) A right in rem is not a right 'against a thing'. (b) A multital right or claim (right in rem), is not always one relating to a thing, i.e. a tangible object. (c) A single multilateral right, or claim (right in rem), correlates with a duty resting on one person alone, not with many duties (or one duty) resting upon all the members of a very large and indefinite class of persons. (d) A multital right, or claim (right in rem), should not be confused with any co-exisitng privileges of other jural relations that the holder of the multital right or rights may have in respect to the same subject-matter. (e) A multital primary right, or claim (right in rem), should, regarding its character as such, be carefully derentiated from the paucital secondary right, or claim (right in personam), arising from a violation of the former. (f) A multital primary right, or claim (right in rem), should not, regarding its character as such, be confused with, or thought dependent on, the character of the proceedings by which it and the secondary right arising from its violation may be vindicated.