Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models: Essays by and in Honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley

In: Studies in Choice and Welfare

In: Springer eBook Collection

Abstract

1 Introduction Mostapha Diss and Vincent Merlin -- Part IThe Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules and Related Paradoxes -- 2 Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley -- 3 Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules under IAC: Indifference and Abstention Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui -- 4 The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner Mostapha Diss, Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, and Abdelmonaim Tlidi -- 5 Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, and Martin Strobel -- Part II Other Voting Paradoxes -- 6 On the Probability of the Ostrogorski's Paradox William V. Gehrlein and Vincent Merlin -- 7 Violations of Reversal Symmetry under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules. Raouia Belayadi and Boniface Mbih -- Part III Binary Voting in Federations -- 8 Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean Louis Rouet, and Laurent Vidu -- 9 "One Man, One Vote" Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik versus May Olivier de Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, and Issofa Moyouwou -- Part IV Resistance to Manipulations -- 10 Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules: A Comparison of Standard and Favardin-Lepelley types of Individual Manipulations Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander Ivanov, and Vyacheslav Yakuba -- 11 Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer, and Martin Strobel -- 12 Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: Scoring Rules and Scoring Run-off Systems. Eric Kamwa and Issofa Moyouwou -- Part V Game Theory 13 Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results Fabrice Barthelemy and Mathieu Martin -- 14 Who Wins and Loses under Approval Voting? An Analysis in Large Elections Sébastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez -- Part VI Techniques for Probability Computations -- 15 Combinatorics of Voting Rules under Anonymity and Neutrality Alexander Karpov -- 16 From Gehrlein-Fishburn Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of the Ehrhart Extended Conjecture Nicolas-Gabriel Andjiga, Boniface Mbih, and Issofa Moyouwou -- 17 IAC-Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui. .