Peacekeeping in the abyss: British and American peacekeeping doctrine and practice after the Cold War

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- 1 Military Strategic Culture and Doctrine -- 2 British Military Strategic Culture-The Cardwellian Conundrum -- 3 American Military Strategic Culture-The Uptonian Paradox -- 4 Existing Peacekeeping Doctrine at the End of the Cold War -- 5 The American Military in Somalia-Into the Abyss -- 6 The British Army in Bosnia-Adapting on the Hoof -- 7 Strategic Change and Doctrinal Outcomes for Peace Operations -- 8 Conclusion and Policy Implications -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

Military organizations are cultures, and such cultures have ingrained preferences and predilections for how and when to employ force. This is the first study to use a comparative framework to understand what happened with the U.S. military endeavor in Somalia and the British effort in Bosnia up to 1995. Both regions were potential quagmires, and no doctrine for armed humanitarian operations during ongoing conflicts existed at the outset of these efforts. After detailing the impact of military culture on operations, Cassidy draws conclusions about which military cultural traits and force struct