Book(electronic)2012

Social Choice and Individual Values

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Abstract

Originally published in 1951, Social Choice and Individual Values introduced "Arrow's Impossibility Theorem" and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science. This new edition, including a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, reintroduces Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers."Far beyond a classic, this small book unleashed the ongoing explosion of interest in social choice and voting theory. A half-century later, the book remains full of profound insight: its central message, 'Arrow's Theorem,' has changed the way we think."—Donald G. Saari, author of Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected

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Book(electronic)#12020

Social Choice and Individual Values

Arrow, Kenneth Joseph

Intro -- COWLES COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS -- DEDICATION -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -- CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION -- 1. THE TYPES OF SOCIAL CHOICE -- 2. SOME LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS -- CHAPTER II - THE NATURE OF PREFERENCE AND CHOICE -- 1. MEASURABILITY AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARABILITY OF UTILITY -- 2. A NOTATION FOR PREFERENCES AND CHOICE -- 3. THE ORDERING OF SOCIAL STATES -- 4. A DIGRESSION ON RATIONALITY AND CHOICE -- CHAPTER III - THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION -- 1. FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CHOICE -- 2. POSITIVE ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES -- 3. THE INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES -- 4. THE CONDITION OF CITIZENS' SOVEREIGNTY -- 5. THE CONDITION OF NON-DICTATORSHIP -- 6. THE SUMMATION OF UTILITIES -- CHAPTER IV - THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE -- 1. THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION -- 2. THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPENSATION -- CHAPTER V - THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS -- 1. THE NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES -- 2. TWO INDIVIDUALS AND THREE ALTERNATIVES -- 3. PROOF OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM -- 4. INTERPRETATION OF THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM -- CHAPTER VI - THE INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- 1. STATEMENT OF THE ASSUMPTIONS -- 2. THE POSSIBILITY THEOREM UNDER INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- 3. QUASI-ORDERINGS AND COMPATIBLE WEAK ORDERINGS -- 4. AN EXAMPLE -- 5. A ONE-COMMODITY WORLD -- 6. GROUP CHOICE IN THE THEORY OF GAMES -- 7. DISTRIBUTIONAL ETHICS COMBINED WITH INDIVIDUALISM -- CHAPTER VII - SIMILARITY AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL WELFARE JUDGMENTS -- 1. COMPLETE UNANIMITY -- 2. THE CASE OF SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES -- 3. THE IDEALIST POSITION AND THE CONCEPT OF CONSENSUS -- 4. KNOWLEDGE AND THE MEANING OF SOCIAL ALTERNATIVES -- 5. PARTIAL UNANIMITY -- 6. THE DECISION PROCESS AS A VALUE -- REFERENCES.

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Book(electronic)#22012

Social choice and individual values

In: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University Monograph 12

In: Cowles Foundation Monographs

In: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University monograph 12

In: Cowles Foundation Monographs Ser.

Arrow, Kenneth Joseph

Cover -- CONTENTS -- I. INTRODUCTION -- II. THE NATURE OF PREFERENCE AND CHOICE -- III. THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION -- IV. THE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLE -- V. THE GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM FOR SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS -- VI. THE INDIVIDUALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS -- VII. SIMILARITY AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL WELFARE JUDGMENTS -- VIII. NOTES ON THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE, 1963 -- INDEX -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.