Aufsatz(elektronisch)20. Dezember 2017
A Competitive Optimal Stopping Game
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 18, Heft 1
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Abstract
AbstractThis paper explores a multi-player game of optimal stopping over a finite time horizon. A player wins by retaining a higher value than her competitors do, from a series of independent draws. In our game, a cutoff strategy is optimal, we derive its form, and we show that there is a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in symmetric cutoff strategies. We establish results concerning the cutoff value in its limit and expose techniques, in particular, use of the Budan-Fourier Theorem, that may be useful in other similar problems.
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