Article(electronic)January 1, 2013

Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games

In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Volume 13, Issue 1, p. 1-25

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Abstract

Abstract: This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric Bayesian games. It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent, then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations. In contrast to the literature on global games, noise is not assumed to be additive. Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

ISSN: 1935-1704

DOI

10.1515/bejte-2012-0012

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