Does increasing auditors' independence lead to more forceful public auditing? A study of a Canadian internal audit reform

In: Public administration: an international journal, Band 102, Heft 3, S. 1045-1068

Open Access

Abstract

AbstractThe value of auditing as an instrument of accountability depends upon the independence of auditors. However, the extent to which auditors feel free to review the operation, compliance, and performance of public programs and objectively communicate findings to stakeholders has rarely been assessed. A Canadian public service reform in 2006 introduced institutional safeguards to bolster the independence of departmental internal auditors, but left legislative auditors working for the Auditor General's Office (i.e., Canada's Supreme Audit Institution) unaffected. We analyze and compare 2677 audit reports written by internal and legislative auditors before and after the reform. After the reform, the language used by internal auditors became more assertive and evaluative, but not more critical. This suggests that the safeguards had a meaningful impact on how auditors perform their accountability function but that factors other than independence may be driving their willingness to be more adversarial and critical when communicating audit findings.