Controlling the Agenda with Special Rules: A House‐Senate Comparison of Legislation in the Postreform Congress

In: Politics & policy, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 672-693

Abstract

One of the central questions in legislative politics is whether rules are used to achieve non‐median policy outcomes (Dion and Huber 1996: Krehbiel 1991; Sinclair 1999). This study does not measure outcomes directly. Rather, the analysis assesses expectations from theories of legislative organization regarding both congressional process and behavior. Restrictive procedures are associated with policies that tend to have important collective consequences for the political parties. The analysis also demonstrates that voting on amendments allowed under the rules disproportionately favor the majority party. Finally, a comparison of voting behavior on final passage of legislation highlights House and Senate differences in leadership powers to control the agenda. The findings are consistent with a partisan rationale and reflect the significance of House special rules in limiting minority influence on the legislative agenda.