On Homans' Psychological Reductionism*

In: Sociological inquiry: the quarterly journal of the International Sociology Honor Society, Volume 41, Issue 1, p. 3-19

Abstract

George Homans' numerous claims that sociological propositions could be reduced to psychological propositions are examined in terms of the various ways Homans has used the word "reduction" and in terms of the development of Homans' reductionist position over the course of his career. Attempts to answer Homans" reductionism are reviewed and Homans" challenge to his critics is presented. A general sociological proposition is then presented as an answer to Homans' reductionism and to his challenge. It is then shown that the sociological proposition is not less general than psychological propositions, cannot be deduced from psychological propositions, and cannot be analyzed without residue into the behavior of individual men. It is shown that psychological variables may be used as independent or intervening variables in such a proposition but that such an inclusion of psychological variables would not constitute psychological reduction. Some implications of a distinctive sociology are then discussed.