Aufsatz(elektronisch)25. Juli 2014
Project design with limited commitment and teams
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 598-623
Verfügbarkeit an Ihrem Standort wird überprüft
Dieser Artikel ist auch in Ihrer Bibliothek verfügbar: |
elektronisch
gedruckt
Abstract
We study the interaction between a group of agents who exert effort to complete a project and a manager who chooses its objectives. The manager has limited commitment power so that she can commit to the objectives only when the project is sufficiently close to completion. We show that the manager has incentives to extend the project as it progresses. This result has two implications. First, the manager will choose a larger project if she has less commitment power. Second, the manager should delegate the decision rights over the project size to the agents unless she has sufficient commitment power.
Problem melden