Article(electronic)March 10, 2016

Excess pay and deficient performance

In: Review of financial economics: RFE, Volume 30, Issue 1, p. 1-10

Carter, Mary Ellen; Li, Lei; Marcus, Alan J.; Tehranian, Hassan

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Abstract

AbstractWe investigate the link between abnormal CEO compensation and firm performance, asking whether high unexplained compensation relative to several benchmarks is a sign of hard‐to‐measure but desirable executive attributes or is instead a symptom of unsolved agency problems. We find that abnormally high CEO pay predicts worse future firm performance. Abnormally high compensation that is performance‐contingent is a less ominous signal about the future success of the firm. But abnormal levels of even performance‐contingent compensation predict worse future performance. We conclude that abnormally high CEO pay can be useful as an independent indicator of agency problems.

Languages

English

Publisher

Wiley

ISSN: 1873-5924

DOI

10.1016/j.rfe.2015.08.003

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