Group belief reconceived

In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 200, Heft 2

Abstract

AbstractAn influential account or group belief analyzes it as a form ofjoint commitmentby group members. In spite of its popularity, the account faces daunting objections. I consider and reply to two of them. The first, due to Jennifer Lackey, is that the joint commitment account fails as an account of groupbeliefsince it cannot distinguish groupbeliefsfrom groupliesandbullshit. The second is that the joint commitment account fails because it makes group beliefvoluntary, whereas genuine belief isinvoluntary. I propose an amendment to the basic joint commitment account which offers a unified reply to both objections. Although my novel account of group belief departs from the basic joint commitment account, it retains its spirit. The account entails that genuine group belief is much rarer than proponents of the joint commitment account have hitherto realized.