Proceduralism and the Epistemic Value of Democracy : Some reflections and questions on Estlund's epistemic proceduralism

In: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-140063

Open Access

Abstract

This short paper focuses on the relationship between the procedural and the epistemic arguments for democracy in David Estlund's epistemic proceduralism. It is argued that his theory could be purely epistemic, in the sense that it justifies democracy only from its ability to ascertain and implement an independent standard of correctness. Obedience to wrong decisions (within certain limits) – in epistemic as well as in non-epistemic cases – can be justified in terms of prospective concern for the epistemic (and moral) capacity of democracy. There is no need for a procedural justification of democratic political authority and legitimacy. ; Demokrati, kunskap och värderelativism