Innovation policy and chronic emergencies

In: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:fa99b319-8b7c-441f-9540-8c191b13b5f8

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has thrust the potential role of the state as a driver of scientific innovation onto center stage. Vaccines have been developed and brought to market in a timescale that seemed almost impossible when the crisis first struck. The pivotal nature of government intervention in this crisis has added to calls from academics and policy makers to adopt a more proactive, mission-oriented approach to innovation policy to tackle other key global challenges. This Article considers the merits of these calls and argues that an important distinction must be drawn between what this Article terms acute and chronic emergencies. COVID-19 is a paradigmatic example of an acute emergency: its onset was rapid, its impact was dramatic, and it is a problem that demands resolution for life to proceed "as normal." Chronic emergencies, such as the problem of Anti-Microbial Resistance, can be just as, or more deadly than, acute emergencies but have a "frog in the pot" quality. They emerge over time, and, although they can have profound social and economic effects, they do so in ways that are less immediate and hence less demanding of government attention. Without the urgency, sense of purpose, and spirit of cooperation that accompany acute emergencies, there is a risk that mission-oriented approaches may fail to deliver new technologies the world urgently needs. This Article considers the problem of applying mission-oriented approaches to chronic emergencies. The analysis is grounded in an examination of Britain's system of innovation rewards in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, drawing on an extensive historical data set that the authors are continuing to develop. The central argument put forward in this Article is that Britain's historical system offers lessons for crafting state intervention to spur innovation aimed at chronic emergencies today. Britain's historical system was effective because rewards were largely bestowed post hoc with relatively little prescription as to the problems at which innovators ...