Evolutionary dynamics of promoting electric vehicle-charging infrastructure based on public–private partnership cooperation

Abstract

Low profit margins have become a significant barrier to investment in and the operation of electric vehicle-charging infrastructure, leading to an urgent need for new business models. Notwithstanding, nonmandatory policies and unclear responsibilities create a social dilemma in which it is difficult to promote charging facilities in urban residential areas. This study examines the feasibility of overcoming this dilemma by examining possible incentive mechanisms involving government, charging infrastructure operators, real estate agencies, and electric vehicle users. Leveraging evolutionary game theory, this study designs a theoretical model based on strategic interactions among different agents in promoting charging facilities in urban residential areas. Our results indicate that (1) the optimal scenario in one in which all participants work closely together to popularize charging facilities, and this scenario has theoretical possibilities in the real world; (2) government subsidies are necessary but not sufficient for promoting charging facilities in urban residential areas; (3) electric vehicle user participation in promotion is critical; and (4) the operation model in this study is more economically efficient than prevalent industrial operation models, and the role of real estate agencies cannot be ignored.