Securing Software Updates under Receiver Radio Frequency Geolocation Risk
In: http://hdl.handle.net/10945/69405
Abstract
17 USC 105 interim-entered record; under review. ; In the new, ever-changing cyber domain, it is crucial that the military establishes a method of delivering large data payloads to remote locations that minimizes radio frequency (RF) signature for receivers, thereby reducing the associated geolocation potential. This paper introduces three cryptographic protocols for different components of a delivery architecture for a large data payload from a trusted, back-end source to receivers: a low-response protocol for initial transmission and confirmation and two possible inter-unit distribution protocols with differing optimizations based on connectivity scenarios. All three protocols expressly aim to minimize the radio frequency (RF) footprint created on the receiver end. We provide security models and analyze the security protocols, and furthermore provide a worst-case example bound on RF footprint created at the receivers for each protocol, with variable inputs for data transmission size. These protocols introduce a means for accounting for both security (authentication) and safety (minimized RF footprint) in the delivery of critical data payloads to remote receivers.
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