Arrangements institutionnels et modèles mentaux dans la gestion des ressource en bien commun

Open Access

Abstract

The main question that addresses this research is about the role of mental models in the institutional arrangements for common pool resource management. The central idea is that there is a cognitive conflict when different actors define use and management problems of common pool resources. Mental models are used for institutional design. Several actors, to structure commons problems, use different mental models. Mental models influence institutions and policies intended to solve such problems. The conceptual framework of the study included commons dilemmas, neo institutionalism approaches, institutional analysis and development (IAD) socio ecological systems and mental models concepts. Three case studies in Colombia (South America) were chosed to study the above question: an artisanal fishermen place in Caribbean (Barú), a communitarian aqueduct in the Andes (Lenguazque), and a forestry community in the Pacific coast (Salahonda). In order to explore the research question a multimethod framework was designed that included a first phase of economic experiments, surveys and interviews with resource users. The experiments were designed to capture the commons dilemma in each case: fishing, water and forestry. These experiments simulated also the dynamic complexity of each of the resources. The experiments also simulated three types of voted rules as solution to the cooperation dilemma. Resource users from the three case studies participated in the experiments. A second field phase was carried out using the companion modeling approach (ComMod) approach. The experimental setting was used to start a co-construction of a role playing game with a group of users in each village. Once the new game was designed a group of users were invited to play the new game. Additionally, a new set of interviews was applied. An institutional analysis and a mental models study was carried out for each of the cases. The evaluative criteria of the action arena were trust and cooperation levels and morality conformance. Among the more relevant findings is the necessity of including the study of morality systems to understand the relation between decision-making, rule design and compliance, and mental models. A conceptual framework for evaluate the outcomes of the action arena is proposed. The central point is the idea that the morality system is at the same time an outcome of interactions, but also it feeds back the interactions in the action arena. This system produces specific levels of trust and cooperation, which are also influenced by contextual mental models of resource users. In order to address commons management is central to understand the gap between morality, culture and legal valid behavior in a community.