How amoral is hegemon?

Abstract

In the post-Cold War world, the last remaining superpower is almost hegemonic. Almost: but not quite. The US cannot act all on its own. It needs — or thinks it needs, or pretends to need — the support of at least a few other countries in anything it does. But it only needs a few, and there are many that could serve equally well. That may not be yes of all policy areas. But some such thinking certainly underlies the US's "floating coalition" for its "war against terror". "Some countries may want to participate in one way, but not in another." Some countries will join the fight against one foe, others against other foes. But "make no mistake about it: if they do not act, America will." No particular ally is an indispensable element of any coalition. No other country enjoys a veto against American action. "Our mission will not change to fit any coalition's." Such is the rhetoric. So too is the action. As the Washington Post reports, 'Washington has established a floating coalition of allies, friends, useful strangers and the occasional opportunist to chase Osama bin Laden's network. But in waging war on Afghanistan, the Pentagon prefers an alliance of one, or at most one and a half. The United States has gratefully accepted the help of police, intelligence and financial authorities around the globe to track al Qaeda's operatives, money and plots. Washington has also used the airspace, ports and bases of a few nations to get in position to attack. But the strike force assaulting Afghanistan is essentially an all-American affair, with the important involvement of British commandos'. Paradoxically, after hectoring its European allies for years to get more interested in NATO operating outside Europe, Washington today is setting aside for the time being offers of direct military help from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and others. The painful memories of command and control coordination problems in the Kosovo air war of 1999 and the Persian Gulf War of 1991 are still fresh. And the remote and fractured nature of the theater of operations in and around Afghanistan makes simpler a lot better. Evidence from experimental games should make us very wary of an Almost Hegemon of this sort. In the psychological laboratory, anyway, the dominant player in an "any of many" coalition game proves to be less solicitous of the interests of the junior partners in its coalition than is even an absolute dictator who needs none of them. If transferable to the real world, those findings seem to suggest that an Almost Hegemon is worst of all: even an Absolute Hegemon would treat others more fairly; and a Semi-Hegemon, with few junior partners to choose among, would be fairer yet again.