Power, control and denial: Australian maritime strategy and Australia's Oceans Policy

In: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/13729

Abstract

Australia is a maritime nation. Australians depend on the surrounding oceans - the Pacific, Indian and Southern Oceans - for trade, resources, transport, recreation and tourism. Australia's Oceans Policy (AOP), published in 1998, identifies the importance of the ocean s surrounding Australia. The policy endeavours to protect the oceans and their maritime resources and ensure sustainable development of them. AOP, however, was never legislated and so holds no legal power for the implementation of its agenda. The policy relies on the Department of Environment and Heritage (DEH) and existing legislation, such as the Customs Act, Quarantine Act, Defence Act and Fisheries Management Act, for the protection and sustain able management of Australia's oceans. There are significant external threats to the sustainable management of Australia's maritime environment. Maritime terrorism is a threat to Australia's offshore oil and gas installations. Damage to or destruction of an offshore installation could cause dangerous oil spills, pollution and chemical waste. ASIO has assessed that Indonesian terrorist cells are capable of committing a terrorist attack in Australia, and incidents such as the HV Limburg or the USS Cole show that terrorist are capable of attacking maritime targets. Other threats include those to Australia's fishing industry, the fifth largest primary industry in Australia. Illegal fishing is devastating Australia's fishing industry, as illegal fishermen are becoming more common and more daring. Their increasingly sophisticated vessels con tain advanced technology, such as GPS and are able to take very large catches of fish. Illegal immigration is also a concern for Australia 's oceans because illegal immigrants are often transported in unseaworthy and unhygienic vessels with little water, food or protection. Ballast water on such vessels could easily contain marine pests or infectious and communicable diseases. Illegal persons and goods may also bring such diseases ashore. The Australian Government has responded to maritime threats by implementing programs such as the Australian Maritime Identification System (AMIS) and the Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC) to combat terrorism , Operations CLEARWATER and MISTRAL to combat illegal fishing, and Operations RELEX I and II to combat illegal immigration. These initiatives involve many maritime stakeholders within Government, including the Australian Defence Force, Customs Service, Fisheries Management Authority and Quarantine Inspection Service. AOP loosely identifies the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as the primary responder in cases of oceans violation, yet, the ADF does not see itself as such. The ADF currently supports other agencies, such as Customs, in surveillance and enforcement operations but does not seek to act as the primary responder. The ADF's core task, as defined by Government policy, is warfighting and not the constabulary or peacetime tasks described above; hence, a n institutional gap exists between the two polices. Furthermore there is an operational gap between the ADF's policy and the operational activities of its forces. The ADF, and especially the RAN, is involved in many constabulary and peacetime tasks in Australia's maritime environment, but the Defence Forces are not ideally structured for such work. Rather acquisitions are made for highend, traditional conflict with an outlook to expeditionary commitments as directed by the Government. AOP and Defence policy have been linked somewhat through current educational initiatives to prevent terrorist acts, illegal fishing and illegal immigration. Continued scientific re search could link the two policies more closely and is indeed necessary to fully understand Australia's maritime environment. International consultation, cooperation and communication is also an important element in linking AOP and Defence policy . Most importantly, however, is that policy makers from both sides consult to fully understand the broader strategic importance of the ocean to Australia. This process has been advanced by the inclusion of key Defence personnel on AOP decision-making bodies, yet there is still a gap at a higher policy-making level. The enactment in legislation of AOP could be considered to give greater legal and political power to the policy's agenda. Furthermore, the RAN should investigate the scope of naval involvement in constabulary duties over the next 20 years. Finally, these initiatives could lead the Australian Government to release new or updated versions of both policies to reflect the current security environment.