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Socio-economic scenarios constitute an important tool for exploring the long-term consequences of anthropogenic climate change and available response options. They have been applied for different purposes and to a different degree in various areas of climate change analysis, typically in combination with projections of future climate change. Integrated assessment modeling (IAM) has used them to develop greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions scenarios for the 21st century and to investigate strategies for mitigating GHG emissions on a global scale. Analyses of climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerabilities (IAV) depend heavily on assumptions about underlying socio-economic developments, but have employed socio-economic scenarios to a lesser degree, due mainly to the multitude of contexts and scales of such analyses. A more consistent use of socio-economic scenarios that would allow an integrated perspective on mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts remains a major challenge. We assert that the identification of a set of global narratives and socio-economic pathways offering scalability to different regional contexts, a reasonable coverage of key socio-economic dimensions and relevant futures, and a sophisticated approach to separating climate policy from counter-factual "no policy" scenarios would be an important step towards meeting this challenge. Such "Shared Socio-economic Pathways" (SSPs) should be specified in an iterative manner and with close collaboration between IAM and IAV researchers to assure coverage of key dimensions, sufficient scalability and widespread adoption. They can be used not only as inputs to analyses, but also to collect the results of different climate change analyses in a matrix defined by two dimensions : climate exposure as characterized by a radiative forcing or temperature level and socio-economic development as classified by the SSPs. For some applications, SSPs may have to be augmented by "Shared Climate Policy Assumptions" (SPAs) capturing global components of climate policies that some studies may require as inputs. Finally, sufficient coverage of the relevant socio-economic dimensions for the analysis of mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts may be assessed by locating the SSPs along the dimensions of challenges to mitigation and to adaptation. We conclude that the development of SSPs, and integrated socio-economic scenarios more broadly, is a useful focal point for collaborative efforts between IAM and IAV researchers. This is likely to be a long-term and iterative enterprise comprising a collection of different activities : periodically taking stock of the evolving scenario work in both research communities, linking up individual efforts, and pursuing collaborative scenario work through appropriate platforms that still need to be established. In the short run, an important goal is to produce tangible outcomes that would allow the 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC to take a more integrated perspective on mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts. ; Les scénarios socio-économiques constituent un important outil d'exploration des conséquences de long terme du changement climatique d'origine anthropique, et des options disponibles pour y répondre. Ils ont été appliqués pour différents objectifs et à des degrés différents dans plusieurs domaines de l'analyse du changement climatique, typiquement en combinaison avec les projections de changements climatiques futurs. Les modèles d'évaluation intégrés (MEI) les ont utilisés pour développer des scénarios d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre (GES) pour le XXIe siècle et pour examiner les stratégies d'atténuation des émissions de GES à l'échelle planétaire. Les analyses sur les "impacts, l'adaptation, et la vulnérabilité" (IAV) du changement climatique dépendent fortement des hypothèses relatives aux développements socio-économiques sous-jacents, mais elles ont utilisé dans une moindre mesure les scénarios socio-économiques, principalement en raison de la multitude des contextes et des échelles de telles analyses. Il reste aujourd'hui difficile de mettre en place une utilisation plus cohérente des scénarios socio-économiques, qui autoriserait une vision plus intégrée de l'atténuation, de l'adaptation et des impacts climatiques résiduels. Nous soutenons qu'une étape importante pour relever ce défi est l'identification d'un ensemble de scénarios qualitatifs globaux et des trajectoires socio-économiques correspondantes, qui pourraient être déclinés à différentes échelles spatiales et couvriraient de manière convenable les différentes dimensions socio-économiques des futurs possibles. De telles " trajectoires socio-économiques partagées " (TSP) doivent être spécifiées de façon interactive, par une étroite collaboration entre les chercheurs MEI et IAV pour garantir le traitement des dimensions les plus importantes, la possibilité de décliner les scénarios à différentes échelles, et pour favoriser une large utilisation des TSP par l'ensemble de la communauté. Ces TSP peuvent être utilisées non seulement comme une information d'entrée pour des analyses spécifiques, mais aussi pour rassembler les résultats de différentes études dans une matrice définie selon deux dimensions : l'exposition climatique, caractérisée par un forçage radiatif ou un niveau de température, et le développement socio-économique, décrit par les TSP. Les TSP pourront également être augmentées "d'hypothèses partagées de politique climatique" (HPP), qui décrivent les composantes globales des politiques climatiques, nécessaires à certaines études. Finalement, on pourra vérifier que les TSP réalisent une couverture suffisante des dimensions socio-économiques pertinentes pour l'analyse de l'atténuation, de l'adaptation, et des impacts climatiques résiduels, en les situant selon deux dimensions, la première mesurant la capacité à l'atténuation et l'autre la capacité à s'adapter. Nous concluons que le développement des TSP, et plus largement celui des scénarios socioéconomiques intégrés, est un point central des efforts de collaboration entre les chercheurs des communautés MEI et IAV. C'est probablement une entreprise itérative et de long terme comportant un ensemble d'activités très différentes : faire périodiquement un bilan du travail des deux communautés de recherche sur les scénarios, rapprocher les efforts individuels sur ce thème, et mener un travail collaboratif sur les scénarios via des plates-formes appropriées qui restent encore à instituer. À court terme, un objectif important est la production de résultats tangibles permettant au cinquième rapport d'évaluation du GIEC d'adopter un point de vue plus intégré sur l'atténuation, l'adaptation et les impacts climatiques résiduels.

Die Autorin betrachtet die Sicht der Wähler bzw. der wahlberechtigten Bevölkerung in Deutschland auf die Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise. Die aktuelle wirtschaftliche Situation wird als schlecht eingeschätzt. Allerdings blickt eine relative Mehrheit optimistisch in die wirtschaftliche Zukunft und meint, dass sich die Konjunktur binnen eines Jahres erholen werde. Die Mehrheit der Bürger ist von der Krise bislang nicht betroffen, manch einer aber hat bereits finanzielle Verluste erlitten. Die Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung zur Krisenbewältigung werden anerkannt und die Bürger vertrauen der politischen Führung, auch wenn eine klar erkennbare politische Linie vermisst wird. Angesichts des Ausmaßes der wirtschaftlichen Verwerfungen blieb auch die Bundestagswahl 2009 nicht unberührt von der Krise. Während die CDU/ CSU aufgrund der ihr zugeschriebenen Wirtschaftskompetenz ihre Verluste begrenzen konnte, wurde die SPD weder als Wirtschafts-noch als Krisenbewältigungsinstanz wahrgenommen. Schlüsselwörter Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise; Einschätzung der wirtschaftlichen Lage; Krisenbewältigung; Bundesregierung; Bundestagswahl 2009. ; The author considers the view of voters and the voting population in Germany on the economic and financial crisis. The current economic situation is estimated as poor. However, a relative majority is optimistic about the economic future and expects the economy to recover within one year. The majority of citizens is not affected by the crisis so far, although some have already suffered financial losses. The measures of the federal government for crisis management are approved and citizens trust the political leaders, even though a clearly recognizable political strategy is missing. Given the scale of the economic turmoil, the General Election of 2009 did not remain untouched by the crisis. While the Conserva-tives was able to limit their losses because of the economic compe-tence attributed to them, the Social Democrats were perceived as much less qualified in economic affairs or crisis management. Keywords Financial and economic crisis; assessment of the economic situation; crisis management; German government; general election 2009. ? ; Nous vivons depuis un an et demi dans l'ombre de la plus grande crise économique depuis les années 1930. Au moment où l'effondrement du système financier a débuté, pour s'accélérer ensuite durant l'année 2007, les Allemands n'ont, en majorité, pas envisagé qu'il pouvait représenter une menace pour l'économie de leur pays ; ils ont continué à considérer celle-ci comme saine. Ce ne fut que durant l'été 2008 qu'ils changèrent d'avis et dès l'automne, une atmosphère morne se répandit. À la fin 2008, ils ne pensaient plus que la conjoncture pourrait s'améliorer rapidement, bien au contraire. Les avis pessimistes concernant l'économie subsistèrent en 2009 : on ne cessa de parler d'une situation négative. Il reste pourtant que, depuis l'été 2009, une majorité relative de la population considère que la conjoncture va s'améliorer dans un délai d'un an. Au moment de l'élection du Parlement, en 2009, les Allemands se projetaient avec espoir dans le futur de l'économie.La grande majorité de la population n'a pas été touchée par la crise : en novembre dernier, les deux tiers des personnes disaient n'avoir pas subi jusqu'alors de problèmes dus à la crise financière et économique. Par contre, en ce qui concerne les perspectives d'avenir, l'humeur est actuellement au pessimisme. En novembre 2009, 55 pour-cent des personnes interrogées disaient se faire du souci pour leur avenir personnel. Elles faisaient alors référence à deux aspects touchés par la crise : d'une part, elles avaient peur de perdre leur emploi, d'autre part elles n'étaient plus certaines que leurs économies ne risquaient rien.Alors que le premier programme lancé par le gouvernement fédéral pour améliorer la conjoncture avait été considéré comme un pas dans la bonne direction, il n'y a plus qu'un citoyen sur trois pour évaluer de la même manière le programme II. La liste de mesures proposées par le gouvernement inclut un soutien financier et des garanties d'État offertes aux entreprises privées. Le cas du constructeur automobile Opel n'a pas fait l'unanimité : à peine la moitié de la population fut d'avis qu'il fallait que l'État lui apporte un soutien, les autres pensant qu'il ferait mieux de ne pas intervenir. Par contre, lorsqu'il s'est agi de la chaîne de grands magasins Karstadt et du fabricant de pièces automobiles Shaeffler-Continental, l'opinion publique fut clairement d'avis que l'État n'avait pas à contribuer au maintien d'entreprises spécifiques, même si celles-ci devaient faire face à une situation financière très difficile. Par contre, les Allemands pensent autrement lorsqu'il s'agit des banques. Ici, une majorité de la population est favorable à une intervention du gouvernement, que ce soit par le biais d'une participation ou par celui d'une étatisation.Les Allemands ont admis que le gouvernement fédéral gérait la crise avec beaucoup de détermination. Mais à mesure que celle-ci évoluait, ils ne surent plus bien quelle stratégie il adoptait. Il reste qu'ils accordent une confiance considérable aux capacités de la coalition et d'un gouvernement noir-jaune à gérer les domaines économiques et financiers. Comparé à ce qui s'est passé dans d'autres pays, comme la France et l'Espagne, les Allemands font plus confiance à leurs décideurs politiques.Compte tenu du fait que les problèmes économiques étaient très importants, ils ne pouvaient qu'influer sur le comportement des électeurs durant l'année 2009 (année électorale et élection des membres du Parlement). La crise économique a incité la population à favoriser d'autres partis et cela a contribué en bonne partie à la victoire de la CDU/CSU et du FDP. Pour les électeurs, les choix personnels se sont fait en fonction de l'économie : les conditions cadres qui règnent actuellement sont favorables à la CDU/CSU puisqu'elle est traditionnellement considérée comme compétente dans le domaine économique. L'Union a finalement réussi à limiter ses pertes au niveau du nombre de sièges au Parlement - contrairement au SPD qui est perçu comme un parti qui n'est pas apte à gérer l'économie et la crise. Parmi les plus petits partis, le FDP a gagné du terrain dans la mesure où on lui fait confiance dans ces domaines. La gauche n'a presque pas profité de la crise économique, dans la mesure où on pense d'elle qu'elle n'est pas là pour gérer les problèmes, mais pour les articuler.Les citoyens allemands évaluent la conjoncture de manière réaliste et avec le sérieux requis, sans tomber dans le désespoir ou l'hystérie. Cette attitude est motivée par le fait que le gouvernement fédéral a pris des mesures bien réfléchies.

Socio-economic scenarios constitute an important tool for exploring the long-term consequences of anthropogenic climate change and available response options. They have been applied for different purposes and to a different degree in various areas of climate change analysis, typically in combination with projections of future climate change. Integrated assessment modeling (IAM) has used them to develop greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions scenarios for the 21st century and to investigate strategies for mitigating GHG emissions on a global scale. Analyses of climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerabilities (IAV) depend heavily on assumptions about underlying socio-economic developments, but have employed socio-economic scenarios to a lesser degree, due mainly to the multitude of contexts and scales of such analyses. A more consistent use of socio-economic scenarios that would allow an integrated perspective on mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts remains a major challenge. We assert that the identification of a set of global narratives and socio-economic pathways offering scalability to different regional contexts, a reasonable coverage of key socio-economic dimensions and relevant futures, and a sophisticated approach to separating climate policy from counter-factual "no policy" scenarios would be an important step towards meeting this challenge. Such "Shared Socio-economic Pathways" (SSPs) should be specified in an iterative manner and with close collaboration between IAM and IAV researchers to assure coverage of key dimensions, sufficient scalability and widespread adoption. They can be used not only as inputs to analyses, but also to collect the results of different climate change analyses in a matrix defined by two dimensions : climate exposure as characterized by a radiative forcing or temperature level and socio-economic development as classified by the SSPs. For some applications, SSPs may have to be augmented by "Shared Climate Policy Assumptions" (SPAs) capturing global components of climate policies that some studies may require as inputs. Finally, sufficient coverage of the relevant socio-economic dimensions for the analysis of mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts may be assessed by locating the SSPs along the dimensions of challenges to mitigation and to adaptation. We conclude that the development of SSPs, and integrated socio-economic scenarios more broadly, is a useful focal point for collaborative efforts between IAM and IAV researchers. This is likely to be a long-term and iterative enterprise comprising a collection of different activities : periodically taking stock of the evolving scenario work in both research communities, linking up individual efforts, and pursuing collaborative scenario work through appropriate platforms that still need to be established. In the short run, an important goal is to produce tangible outcomes that would allow the 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC to take a more integrated perspective on mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts. ; Les scénarios socio-économiques constituent un important outil d'exploration des conséquences de long terme du changement climatique d'origine anthropique, et des options disponibles pour y répondre. Ils ont été appliqués pour différents objectifs et à des degrés différents dans plusieurs domaines de l'analyse du changement climatique, typiquement en combinaison avec les projections de changements climatiques futurs. Les modèles d'évaluation intégrés (MEI) les ont utilisés pour développer des scénarios d'émissions de gaz à effet de serre (GES) pour le XXIe siècle et pour examiner les stratégies d'atténuation des émissions de GES à l'échelle planétaire. Les analyses sur les "impacts, l'adaptation, et la vulnérabilité" (IAV) du changement climatique dépendent fortement des hypothèses relatives aux développements socio-économiques sous-jacents, mais elles ont utilisé dans une moindre mesure les scénarios socio-économiques, principalement en raison de la multitude des contextes et des échelles de telles analyses. Il reste aujourd'hui difficile de mettre en place une utilisation plus cohérente des scénarios socio-économiques, qui autoriserait une vision plus intégrée de l'atténuation, de l'adaptation et des impacts climatiques résiduels. Nous soutenons qu'une étape importante pour relever ce défi est l'identification d'un ensemble de scénarios qualitatifs globaux et des trajectoires socio-économiques correspondantes, qui pourraient être déclinés à différentes échelles spatiales et couvriraient de manière convenable les différentes dimensions socio-économiques des futurs possibles. De telles " trajectoires socio-économiques partagées " (TSP) doivent être spécifiées de façon interactive, par une étroite collaboration entre les chercheurs MEI et IAV pour garantir le traitement des dimensions les plus importantes, la possibilité de décliner les scénarios à différentes échelles, et pour favoriser une large utilisation des TSP par l'ensemble de la communauté. Ces TSP peuvent être utilisées non seulement comme une information d'entrée pour des analyses spécifiques, mais aussi pour rassembler les résultats de différentes études dans une matrice définie selon deux dimensions : l'exposition climatique, caractérisée par un forçage radiatif ou un niveau de température, et le développement socio-économique, décrit par les TSP. Les TSP pourront également être augmentées "d'hypothèses partagées de politique climatique" (HPP), qui décrivent les composantes globales des politiques climatiques, nécessaires à certaines études. Finalement, on pourra vérifier que les TSP réalisent une couverture suffisante des dimensions socio-économiques pertinentes pour l'analyse de l'atténuation, de l'adaptation, et des impacts climatiques résiduels, en les situant selon deux dimensions, la première mesurant la capacité à l'atténuation et l'autre la capacité à s'adapter. Nous concluons que le développement des TSP, et plus largement celui des scénarios socioéconomiques intégrés, est un point central des efforts de collaboration entre les chercheurs des communautés MEI et IAV. C'est probablement une entreprise itérative et de long terme comportant un ensemble d'activités très différentes : faire périodiquement un bilan du travail des deux communautés de recherche sur les scénarios, rapprocher les efforts individuels sur ce thème, et mener un travail collaboratif sur les scénarios via des plates-formes appropriées qui restent encore à instituer. À court terme, un objectif important est la production de résultats tangibles permettant au cinquième rapport d'évaluation du GIEC d'adopter un point de vue plus intégré sur l'atténuation, l'adaptation et les impacts climatiques résiduels.

Este artigo analisa se as reformas recentemente introduzidas nas políticas da família, tanto em França como na Alemanha, estão a direccionar os dois países para uma convergência. A Alemanha tem introduzido mudanças drásticas, especialmente um novo subsídio de licença parental, enquanto a França, por seu lado, optou por uma abordagem mais gradual que se tem traduzido por um reforço da promoção das suas políticas de conciliação trabalho-família juntamente com um aumento continuado da oferta de serviços de cuidados a crianças durante a última década. Apesar de um aumento na oferta global de equipamentos de cuidados a crianças, a Alemanha continua atrás da França neste domínio, fenómeno que pode ser parcialmente explicado por uma combinação de obstáculos institucionais, a persistência de normas sociais no que diz respeito aos cuidados a crianças com idades inferiores a três anos e uma procura excessiva. Defendemos que os principais motores para uma mudança paradigmática na Alemanha têm sido as preocupações com as consequências do declínio da fertilidade, da falta de trabalhadores qualificados e, segundo um estudo da OCDE, o desvanecimento de certezas sobre a educação infantil. Em França, as reformas nas políticas de licenças parentais têm apostado, por exemplo no maior encorajamento das mães a manter o vínculo laboral mesmo enquanto estão de licença. Mas, enquanto as reformas adoptadas por parte da Alemanha representam um corte radical com o antigo modelo masculino de provedor da família, as taxas de emprego das mães permanecem mais baixas do queemFrança e as mães alemãs trabalham com mais frequência a tempo parcial do que as suas homólogas francesas. ; This article investigates whether the recent reforms introduced in the family policies of both France and Germany are leading the two countries towards some measure of convergence. Germany has favoured dramatic changes, especially a new parental leave allowance, while France, for its part, has chosen a more gradual approach that has translated into an enhancement of its promotion ofwork-family reconciliation policies along with steady increases in spending related to childcare provision over the last decade. Despite a rise in its overall supply of childcare Germany still lags far behind France in this domain, aphenomenonthat can be partially explained by a combination of institutional obstacles, the persistence of social norms governing childcare for under- 3s, and excessive demand.We argue that the main drivers for paradigmatic change in Germany have been concerns over the consequences of declining fertility; a shortfall of qualified workers; and, the shattering of certitudes following an OECD study on childhood education. In France reforms in parental leave policies have been more incremental with, for example, mothers being encouraged to retain their links to theworkforce even while on leave. But while the reforms adopted by Germany represent a radical departure from the former 'male-breadwinner model', mothers' employment rates remain lower than in France and German mothers work part-time with much greater frequency than their French counterparts. ; Nous analysons les réformes introduites depuis les années 1990 dans les politiques relatives aux aides à la conciliation travail/famille en France et en Allemagne et examinons si elles contribuent à une relative convergence dans ce domaine. L'Allemagne a réformé le congé parental (Elterngeld) en s'inspirant du modèle suédois, tandis que la France a poursuivi ses efforts en faveur des politiques d'accueil du jeune enfant sans pour autant modifier le dispositif du congé parental qui reste peu rémunéré. Outre-Rhin, tous les enfants âgés de trois à six ans bénéficient maintenant d'une place dans un jardin d'enfants, le plus souvent à temps partiel. L'accueil des enfants de moins de trois ans, en revanche, reste très limité. Des obstacles institutionnels, la persistance des normes éducatives et une forte demande expliquent ces différences entre les deux pays. Parmi les facteurs de changement, en Allemagne, figurent les préoccupations démographiques, la pénurie de travailleurs qualifiés et la volonté politique d'augmenter les taux d'emploi des mères, compte tenu de la diminution de la population active. La participation de celles-ci au marché du travail a beaucoup augmenté mais demeure moins élevée qu'en France et elles travaillent plus souvent à temps partiel que leurs homologues françaises. Onpeut conclure toutefois qu'on assiste à une relative convergence des politiques familiales des deux pays. ; Este artículo analiza si las reformas recientemente introducidas en las políticas de la familia, tanto en Francia como en Alemania, están direccionando a los dos países para una convergencia. Alemania ha introducido cambios drásticos, especialmente un nuevo subsidio de licencia parental. Francia, por su lado, optó por un abordaje más gradual que se ha traducido por un refuerzo de la promoción de sus políticas de conciliación trabajo-familia conjuntamente con un aumento continuado de la oferta de servicios de cuidado para niños durante la última década. Apesar de un aumento en la oferta global de equipamientos de cuidados para los niños, Alemania continua atrás de Francia en este dominio, fenómeno que puede ser parcialmente explicado por una combinación de obstáculos institucionales, la persistencia de normas sociales en lo que se refiere a los cuidados de niños con edades inferiores a tres años y una búsqueda excesiva. Nosotros defendemos que los principales motores para el cambio paradigmático en Alemania han sido las preocupaciones con las consecuencias del declive de la fertilidad, de la falta de trabajadores calificados y del desvanecimiento de certezas sobre educación infantil según un estudio de la OCDE. En Francia, las reformas en las políticas de licencias parentales han sido demayor destaque, como, por ejemplo, la valentía de las madres por mantener el vínculo laboral aún estando de licencia. Sin embargo, las reformas adoptadas por parte de Alemania representan un corte radical con el antiguo modelo masculino de proveedor de familia, las tazas de empleo de las madres permanecen más bajas que en Francia y las madres alemanas trabajan con más frecuencia de tiempo parcial de que sus homólogas francesas.

Our thesis concerns the study of the penal colonization of the French Guiana by one relegated interned in the penal colony of Saint-Jean-du-Maroni. The law on the banishment of the recidivists voted May 27th, 1885 entails the exile for life within a colony of delinquents and criminal recidivists. From 1887 till 1953, Guyana is so going to receive more than 17 000 condemned persons intended to become colonists and to become integrated in economic and social structures of the colony. The targets of this law are essentially delinquents recidivists condemned for offences of common theft, swindle and wandering and their " social elimination " bases on a unique mechanics in the history of the French criminal law. The banishment indeed fits out a " irrefragable assumption of incorrigibility " which bases on a quantum, that is on a number of punishments which, if they are quite registered on the police record of a condemned person recidivist, entail the compulsory pronouncement for the magistrate of the punishment of the banishment. This law so determines a positive threshold which dedicates the existence of criminals and delinquents said incorrigible. Our work thus bases on one hand on the analysis of the construction of the penal category of incorrigible criminals whom the banishment comes to dedicate in law from 1885 and articulates on the other hand on the modalities of application of this measure on the ground of the metropolis then on that of the colony. The process of elaboration of the banishment is made within a political configuration which leads the legislators to undergo multiple pressures and to take into account conclusions brought out by actors' large number outer the parliamentary sphere. The origin of this law is so strongly packaged by experts of the crime and the punishments, by magistrates and by statisticians who are going to build in their respective fields of activity a representation of the criminality which bases on a fundamental distinction from the second half of the XIXth century: the sharing between criminals of accident either second-hand and criminal usually or incorrigible. These last ones correspond to all those whom the classic penalty, that is the detention, does not any more succeed in "correcting" and the multiple second offenses of which they are guilty show to the eyes of the legislators their turned out dangerousness. In this plan, the banishment allows to guarantee in the metropolis its security by exiling them beside herself and allows to hope their recovery thanks to a change of saving "environment". But the banishment, by labelling as incorrigible all the condemned persons whom it affects, does not miss to indicate them as such on the ground of the colony. The stigma of the incorrigibility so pursues the relegated in Guyana and, shared by the actors to condemn them in mainland France, it is also shared in Guyana by the actors to facilitate and to organize their reintegration. Far from facilitating their spot installation, the banishment is so similar to a condemnation to the hard labor and the relegated remain a workforce essentially employed on the needs of a penal colony. ; Notre thèse porte sur l'étude de la colonisation pénale de la Guyane française par des relégués internés au bagne colonial de Saint-Jean-du-Maroni. La loi sur la relégation des récidivistes votée le 27 mai 1885 entraîne l'exil à perpétuité au sein d'une colonie de délinquants et de criminels récidivistes. De 1887 à 1953, la Guyane va ainsi recevoir plus de 17 000 condamnés destinés à devenir des colons et à s'intégrer au tissus économique et social de la colonie. Les cibles de cette loi sont essentiellement des délinquants récidivistes condamnés pour des délits de vol simple, d'escroquerie et de vagabondage et leur "élimination sociale" repose sur une mécanique unique dans l'histoire du droit pénal français. La relégation aménage en effet une "présomption irréfragable d'incorrigibilité" qui repose sur un quantum, c'est-à-dire sur un nombre de peines qui, si elles sont toutes inscrites au casier judiciaire d'un condamné récidiviste, entraînent le prononcé obligatoire pour le magistrat de la peine de la relégation. Cette loi détermine ainsi un seuil positif qui consacre l'existence de criminels et de délinquants dits incorrigibles. Notre travail repose donc d'une part sur l'analyse de la construction de la catégorie pénale de criminels incorrigibles que la relégation vient consacrer en droit à partir de 1885 et s'articule d'autre part sur les modalités d'application de cette mesure sur le sol de la métropole puis sur celui de la colonie. Le processus d'élaboration de la relégation s'effectue au sein d'une configuration politique qui conduit les législateurs à subir de multiples pressions et à tenir compte des conclusions dégagées par un grand nombre d'acteurs extérieurs à la sphère parlementaire. L'origine de cette loi est ainsi fortement conditionnée par des experts du crime et des peines, par des magistrats et par des statisticiens qui vont construire dans leurs domaines d'activité respectifs une représentation de la criminalité qui repose sur une distinction fondamentale à partir de la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle : le partage entre criminels d'accident ou d'occasion et criminels d'habitude ou incorrigibles. Ces derniers correspondent à tous ceux que la pénalité classique, c'est-à-dire l'emprisonnement, ne parvient plus à "corriger" et les multiples récidives dont ils sont coupables manifestent aux yeux des législateurs leur dangerosité avérée. Dans ce schéma, la relégation permet de garantir à la métropole sa sécurité en les exilant hors d'elle et permet d'espérer leur relèvement grâce à un changement de "milieu" salvateur. Mais la relégation, en étiquetant comme incorrigibles tous les condamnés qu'elle atteint, ne manque pas de les signaler comme tels sur le sol de la colonie. Le stigmate de l'incorrigibilité poursuit ainsi les relégués en Guyane et, partagé par les acteurs en charge de les condamner en métropole, il est également partagé en Guyane par les acteurs en charge de faciliter et d'organiser leur réinsertion. Loin de faciliter leur installation sur place, la relégation s'apparente ainsi à une condamnation aux travaux forcés et les relégués demeurent une main-d'œuvre essentiellement employée aux besoins d'un bagne colonial.

The term localisation is derived from the word locale, which traditionally means a small area or vicinity. In ancient days, localisation meant navigation -- an art of finding the way from one place to another. Tremendous advancement in the science of navigation dates back to the sixteenth century, when instruments like compasses, sextants and the first ever clock to keep the time exactly were devised. Advancement in navigation brought ways and means to explore the world, be it for expansion of the territories or for promoting trade and business. Since then localisation has been explored for several decades as a classical problem in many disciplines -- including robotics, virtual reality, navigation. Now we are in the era of ubiquitous computing -- a term coined by the visionary Mark Weiser in the early 1990s. Weiser sees technology only as a means to an end, which should take a back seat in order to allow user to fully concentrate on the task at hand. Looking from a technological standpoint, today we are surrounded by a wealth of devices enriched with sensing, computing and communication capabilities which are seamlessly integrated in our daily lives. Knowing the location of an object is an important cornerstone and fertile research area in ubiquitous computing. The growing need of location systems underscores the importance of addressing this problem -- government initiatives to locate emergency call by cellular network providers and the increasing usage of global positioning systems (GPS) in many commercial applications as in navigation are just a few examples. Since the field is active and vibrant, new services and market players are constantly emerging. Google have just launched a new service called Latitude, which lets smart phone and laptop users share their location with friends and allows those friends to share their locations in return. Latitude uses satellites and cell towers to estimate location. The market for GPS products and services alone is expected to grow to USD200 billion by 2015. Real-time location systems (RTLS) in the transport and logistics sector drive the penetration of several location-based solutions. The number of RTLS suppliers is expected to increase from 50 to 200 by 2013, reflecting a market growth from USD 145 million in 2008 to USD 2.7 billion in 2013. Despite the extraordinary advances in outdoor localisation and navigation, indoor localisation still remains an open challenge. Fundamental to any location system are the algorithms used to estimate location. This thesis focuses on formulation of localisation algorithms with the capability of fusing measurements from multiple modalities. We begin by systematically analysing the basic principles of localisation through a review and classification of the state of the art. From our detailed survey, it is evident that no location system is error-free and suited for all situations. For example, pure inertial sensors suffer from drift, ultrasound sensors require clear line of sight and magnetic sensors are affected by ferromagnetic and conductive materials in the environment. Thus, we rationalise "multimodal localisation" as one of the promising ways for improving location accuracy. Apart from improving performance of the location system in limited measurement volumes, fusion of heterogeneous sensing systems will ultimately allow people to move between places covered by different sensing systems without loss of location knowledge. We explore localisation algorithms that use multiple sensing modalities to improve accuracy and robustness. To ground our work, we have chosen three specific applications covering both infrastructure-based positioning and ad hoc-based positioning systems. From our taxonomy, we create a blueprint of location technologies that would meet those three application needs. -Localisation in office environments to facilitate social networking, as a way to help coordination of people and understand social patterns. We leverage the existing wireless local-area networks (WLAN) infrastructure to sense motion and location with the main motivation of building wide-area location services. Our contributions include-- (i) in-depth characterisation of received signal strength (RSSI), (ii) novel algorithms to deduce motion by observing fluctuations in RSSI across all the access points in range, and (iii) performance comparison using real data against common deterministic location algorithms with and without adding motion information. -Transport and logistics operation (e.g. in warehouses), motivating the need of fine-grained location information. We use ultra-wideband (UWB) as it copes with harsh indoor environments better than conventional radio technologies. Our contributions include-- (i) characterisation of heterogeneous observations (pseudoranges and angles) obtained from two deployments, mimicking real-world (low-overhead) vs. ideal deployment (carefully planned and calibrated), (ii) formulation of algorithms to fuse heterogeneous observations and (iii) a thorough evaluation for both static and dynamic tracking. -Emergency response scenarios, motivating the need for ad hoc positioning capabilities. In particular, we use a combination of inertial sensors and ultrasound sensors. The position error in a purely inertial system increases with time and requires correction from external sources. We address this problem by deploying ultrasound sensors as landmarks correcting for the inertial drift. Our contributions include-- (i) characterisation of inertial and ultrasound data, (ii) algorithms to support guidance and tracking and (iii) a thorough evaluation from data gathered from real deployments. While the chosen technologies and applications are not exhaustive, they are representative as they cover a broad spectrum across several dimensions: accuracy -- fine grained to coarse grained, coverage -- room-level to wide-area, dependence -- dense infrastructure to ad hoc, cost -- expensive to minimal cost. In every instance, we have illustrated the benefits of combining multiple modalities. In short, our contributions include algorithms for motion detection and technology independent localisation algorithms that have the ability to fuse readings across different sensing technologies and incorporate motion models to improve accuracy significantly. Another important aspect of the work presented in this thesis is the characterisation of the raw measurement errors of the individual modalities. In all cases, we perform a rigorous evaluation of the presented algorithms by using measurements collected from real deployments.

Preface Half a century since its inception as a community of western European democracies, limited in scope and competences, the European Union (EU) is taken to denote a composite polity that combines unity and multiplicity while having the capacity to produce publicly binding decisions and allocate values in European society. It is thus possible to capture the endemic systemic complexity of the regional process through the lens of new theoretical perspectives with a view to developing a series of novel understandings of EU governance in the early twenty-first century. p. far, the EU polity refers to a system of institutionalized shared rule among multiple state and non-state actors, characterized by the dispersal of political authority among various levels and the transcendence of hierarchical forms of power distribution. Thus different notions of democracy, legitimacy and representation produce novel accounts of post-national politics. Accordingly, a new democratic concept for the EU project should entail a balanced mix of social and political forces that share in the emerging sovereignty of the larger unit. Within the latter, public authority should not reside within a single decision-making centre, but rather should be diffused among different governance levels and forms of social, political and cultural contention that can combine territorial and substantive public issues. At the same time, recent changes in the workings of the EU polity have not affected its nature as an essentially statecentric project, preserving a balance between state sovereignty and a relatively moderate yet discernible deepening of integration by means of producing a system of political co-determination; in other words, a new form of synarchy between states and demoi – an ensemble sui generis of highly interdependent systems – is created, its structural and functional interaction resulting in a multilogical system of entwined sovereignties.1 Yet, the EU polity still remains a treaty-constituted body politic and not the unilateral act of a single and undifferentiated demos. Moreover, it does not derive its political authority from its citizens directly and has not – as yet – resulted in a complete fusion among different levels of public authority. Also, its constituent parts, in the form of historically constituted nation-states, are free to dissociate themselves from the larger unit. Finally, its emerging yet nebulous and even controversial constitutional identity rests heavily on the domestic orders of states, although the EU already projects a profound intertwining of democracies regarding the joint exercise of fundamental powers. Arguably, all of the above is crucial to understanding the changing conventions regarding state sovereignty that may now be interpreted as the right to be involved in the joint exercise of competences with other states. Linked to the question of sovereignty is that of democracy, which currently points to a negative side-effect of European integration: the growing dissonance between the requisites of democratic rule and the actual conditions on which the political management of EU affairs is largely based. The crucial distinction here concerns an institutional and a sociopsychological perspective. Whereas the former focuses on power-sharing and on institutional reform as a solution to the actual or perceived problems of democracy in the EU, the latter is concerned with questions of European identity and the formation of a composite European demos that is nonetheless distinct as a collectivity. As the current debate raises fundamental questions about the future form of the EU as a polity of highly interrelated states and demoi – a synarchy of entwined sovereignties – recent reforms, including the Lisbon Treaty2, whose ratification is still pending, failed to enhance the democratic properties of the general system, leaving the EU to resemble a system of democracies more than a democratic system in its own right. In a period when transnational pressures are challenging both intrastate and interstate relations, it may no longer be enough to confine democracy within state boundaries to deal effectively with the implications of new forms of polity. This raises new questions such as how to hold transnational decision-makers to account to citizens who belong to different national political systems. Such questions reflect substantive concerns that have grown as the regional process has evolved from an interstate diplomatic forum to a fully-fledged polity. This development, otherwise known as a "normative turn" in EU studies, has led to scholarly interest in the idea that the EU might one day transform itself into a democratic political system. While there is some measure of agreement that the EU is not democratic, there is no consensus on how it might become so. Indeed, there are two different understandings of what the EU's democratic deficit comprises. The first focuses on institutional properties, arguing that the problem of democracy in the EU is tied to the flawed interinstitutional interactions that characterize the functioning of a non-state polity like the EU. In this context, proposals for further reform speak of the EU's "institutional imbalance" and of the need to enhance the public accountability as well as the representative nature of EU policy-makers and decision-takers. The second focuses on sociopsychological factors and makes the case for a new sense of European "demos-hood". It argues that the EU's present democratic pathology occurs because of the absence of a European demos. As a consequence, this second perspective is more interested in collective civic identity and the extent to which there is "a feeling of community" amongst Europeans. Acknowledging that the absence of a European demos – assuming that a legal or economic demos already exists – is a barrier to a democratic Europe, proposals for further reform tend to suggest paths to transnational demos-formation based on a common European civicness3. These notions of plural citizenship give rise to the idea of a "Republic of Europeans", to which we now turn. ; peerReviewed

Diese Studie befasst sich mit Aspekten der Raumplanung und der städtischer Landwirtschaft in Dar es Salaam, Tansania, einer der rasant anwachsenden Regionen Afrikas südlich der Sahara. Die Studie zeigt anhand der Untersuchungsregionen Goba, Chango'mbe 'A' und Ubungo Darajani, in welcher Weise städtische Landwirtschaft mit dem Ziel die städtische Raumplanung zu verbessern in diese integriert werden kann. Lage und periurbane Typologie der Gebiete bilden die theoretischen Grundlagen der Studie, was die Politik und praktische Voraussetzungen besser verstehen lässt, welche die Integration der von städtischer Landwirtschaft abhängigen Existenzen in städtische Raumplanungs- und Landentwicklungsprozesse hemmt. Angewandte methodologische Aspekte sind Literaturrecharge, Interviews, Kartenanalyse, Beobachtungen und die Analyse historischer Entwicklungstrends. Kontext, empirische Forschungsgrundlage und institutionale Vernetzungen wurden als analytischer Rahmen herangezogen. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass Urbanisierungsprozesse, städtische Armut, Nahrungsunsicherheit und unzureichende Beteiligung der Gemeinden an der Raumplanung verstärkende und katalysierende Faktoren von Landnutzungsproblemen, Landumnutzung, Immigration und der Zunahme von städtischer Landwirtschaft sind. Dies lässt annehmen, dass die mangelnde Verwaltung staedtischen Landes nicht als einziger Verursacher der Probleme gesehen werden darf, sondern ebenso die Versäumnisse seitens Planungseinrichtungen, Veränderungen rechtzeitig zu erkennen und die Planung an diese neuen Herausforderungen, die die städtische Landwirtschaft in den Prozessen der städtischen Raumplanung darstellt, anzupassen. Dementsprechend zeigt die steigende Zahl der mit städtischer Landwirtschaft genutzten Flächen Unstimmigkeiten mit den Planungsrichtlinien. Ein Standard würde äußerliche Landnutzungsplanungsprozesse und Strukturen der städtischen Entwicklung bestärken. Diese beinhalten Zonenbildung, Lage, Änderungen in der Landnutzung, Dichteverteilung, Zugang zu Ressourcen, Pachtverhältnisse und gerechte Verteilung grundlegender Leistungen um eine nachhaltige Nutzung von städtischem Land zu gewährleisten. Die Studie weist ebenso auf die bestehende städtische Landentwicklungspolitik und Landesgesetzgebung für städtische Landwirtschaft hin, die jedoch in der Praxis mit gesundheitlichen, sanitären und ökonomischen Rückläufen konfrontiert sind. Diese Probleme machen sich in der wachsenden städtischen Landwirtschaft mit negativen Vorstellungen der Kunden, mangelnder Akzeptanz räumlicher Landnutzungsplanungsprozesse und seiner Durchführung bemerkbar. Der Sektor macht produktiven Nutzen von unerschlossenem Land, Grüngürtel der Stadt sichern Einkommen, Ernährung und stellen oft Sicherheitsnetzfunktionen für die Ärmsten der Gesellschaft dar. Beispielsweise ist städtische Landwirtschaft ein wichtiger Ansatz zur Minderung städtischer Armut, Mobilisierung des Sozialkapitals und nachhaltigen Landnutzung. Die Studie führt auf, dass in Zukunft das Wachsen des städtischen Landwirtschaftsektors vorrausichtlich eine unerlässliche Realität in der städtische Raumnutzung der schnell wachsenden Städten südlich der Sahara bleibt. Eine Aufnahme der von städtischer Landwirtschaft abhängiger Existenzen in die Landnutzungsprozesse und Entscheidungsstrukturen durch Bereitstellung, Anwendung und Überwachung wird für die Verbesserung des Lebensumfeldes der armen, städtischen Kleinbauern als notwendig betrachtet. Dies kann durch die Aufnahme betreffender Ziele städtischer Planung, Aufwertung der Siedlungen, institutionale Zusammenarbeit und der Dezentralisierung der Rollen auf ein lokales Level erreicht werden. Diese Möglichkeiten können dann effektiv sein, wenn sich die Regierung bemühen würde, Politik und Gesetzgebung an Ort und Stelle durchzuführen und alles zu überprüfen, indem unterschiedliche Akeure im den Entscheidungsprozess miteinbezogen werden und dadurch das Bewusstsein von Informationen und Kommunikation verbessert wird. Teilweise wird die Nutzung von Abwassertechnologie in die Landwirtschaft miteinbezogen, welche auf lange Zeit betrachtet Sicherheit und Zugang garantiert und flexible Planungsstandards vorgibt. Die Studie schließt mit dem Aufzeigen der geringen Wahlmöglichkeit der Stadtplaner und Entscheidungsträger, die zukünftige Form der städtischen Landwirtschaft auf anderem Wege als in Form der Landnutzungspraxis in einem angeleiteten Planungsrahmen zu gestalten und zu verfestigen. Wenn die städtischen Landwirtschaftsformen nicht angeleitet werden, untergraben die negativen Langzeiteffekte die Existenzen der armen Stadtbevölkerung und die Umweltqualität. Es besteht die dringende Notwendigkeit, die Prozesse zu leiten und die institutionalen Strukturen und Verbindungen der Raumplanungspraktiken zu stärken, die lokalen Gemeinden als primäres Arbeitsfeld zu betrachten, um die Verwaltung staedtischen Landes in Tansania zu verbessern. ; This study examines spatial land use planning and urban agriculture practises in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, one of the rapidly urbanising cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. It demonstrates how urban agriculture livelihood can be integrated in spatial land use planning and improve urban land governance by taking Goba, Chango'mbe 'A' and Ubungo Darajani as case study settlements. Location and periurban typology are theoretical premises used in this study. These help in understanding the policy and practical premises that constrain urban agriculture livelihood integration in urban land use planning processes and land management principles. Methodological aspects deployed are documentary search, interviews, mapping, observations, and historical trends analysis. In addition, context, evidence based and institutional links are analytical frameworks used. The study shows that the urbanisation processes, urban poverty, food insecurity and inadequate community involvement in land use planning are the factors underpinning and catalysing changes in land use, land transactions, immigration and overall urban agriculture proliferation in the city. The implications generated by these factors suggest that poor urban land governance is not only the cause, but it is caused by the weakness of planning institutions to realise and adapt to the new challenges that urban agriculture presents to urban land development process. Correspondingly, the rise of urban agricultural land use by and large, indicates a disparity between the widely cherished planning norms and standards underpinning formal land use planning processes and structures in urban development. These include land use zoning, location, land use change conditions, density distribution, accessibility to resources, land tenure modalities, and equitable provision of basic services in ensuring sustainable use of urban land. Equally, the study indicates the existence of supportive city land development policies and country legislature for urban agriculture, which are in practise faced with health, sanitation and economic return constraints. These constraints increase urban agriculture's negative perceptions to consumers and decrease acceptance in spatial land use planning processes and output implementation. However, urban agriculture has been observed to make productive use of undeveloped land, green the city, provide income and nutrition, and is often a safety-net function for the poorest sectors of society. As such, it is an important vehicle for poverty alleviation, capital mobilisation, and sustainable use of land. The study argues that for an unforeseeable future, the growth of the urban agriculture sector is likely to remain an indispensable reality depicting urban land development in rapidly urbanising cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Inclusion of urban agriculture based livelihoods in spatial land use planning processes and structures, including decision making, preparation, implementation and monitoring are observed rationale for improving the livelihoods of the urban poor-smallholder farmers and space use. This can be achieved through, but not limited to, adopting participatory urban planning approaches, settlement upgrading, institutional collaborations, decentralising roles to the local level and strengthening smallholder organization through institutionalisation and giving them a voice platform in the political dialogue. These options can be effective if the government is able to enforce and review policy and legislatures in place and if different actors are involved in the decision making processes, and if information and communication awareness is established. Other improvement include the use of treated wastewater technology for farming, granting long term tenure security, improving accessibility to resources, and adopting flexible planning standards. The study concludes that urban planners and policy makers have little choice but to ensconce and consolidate emerging forms of urban agriculture based livelihoods within land use planning practises and within a guided planning framework. If urban agriculture forms are not guided, then the negative effects, in the long run can undermine the livelihood of the urban poor and degrade the environment. Thus, there is an urgent need to guide the processes, strengthen institutional structures and linkages in land use planning practises, and consider local communities priorities when working to improve urban land governance in Tanzania.

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht das Potential und die Bedingungen alternativer Regulierungsformen vor dem Hintergrund von Better Regulation in Deutschland. Nahezu alle EU- und OECD-Staaten betreiben heute umfassende politische Reformprogramme zur Modernisierung der Regulierungsarchitekturen, die unter dem Label Better Regulation subsumiert werden. Die Zielsetzung dieser Programme besteht zum einen in der wirtschaftsfreundlichen Reduktion von Regulierungskosten und zum anderen in der Effektivitätssteigerung von Regulierung durch Vermeidung unintendierter Nebeneffekte. Better Regulation ist ein Toolkit verschiedener metaregulativer Policy-Instrumente, deren programmatische Zusammensetzung vom nationalen politischen Kontext abhängt. Im Rahmen der parallel verlaufenden Reformagenden werden überdies alternative Regulierungsformen von verschiedenen Advokaten besserer Regulierung thematisiert, und als Alternative zur rein staatlichen, hierarchischen Command-and-Control-Regulierung (CaC-Regulierung) promotet, jedoch weder näher auf deren Bedingungen noch deren Konsequenzen einzugehen. Den optimistischen Vorstellungen eines evidenzbasierten Regulatory Managements folgend, erfolgt die Prüfung und Analyse alternativer Regelungsformen im Zuge der Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung (GFA; Regulatory Impact Assessment RIA). Bisher fristen alternative Regulierungsformen allerdings ein Dasein im Schatten von Standardkosten-Modell, RIA und Co. und werden von den Policy-Makern nicht systematisch in Betracht gezogen oder eingesetzt. CaC-Regulierung ist und bleibt das dominante Steuerungsinstrument des Staates. Es existieren jedoch zahlreiche diskursive Anknüpfungspunkte einschließlich zahlreicher Kritiken an der hierarchisch-regulativen Steuerung, welche die Auseinandersetzung mit alternativen Regulierungsformen begründen. Ziel dieses Papieres ist es daher, die in der Kritik stehende CaC-Regulierung Modellen alternativer Regulierungsformen entgegenzustellen, wobei alternative Regulierung mit den Konzepten Selbstregulierung, Koregulierung und regulierter Selbstregulierung eng definiert wird, und nur jene Konstellationen betrachtet werden, die kooperativ zwischen Regierung und Wirtschaft operieren. Ebenso wird der Versuch unternommen, die mannigfaltigen Konzepte und Erscheinungsformen alternativer Regulierung zu definieren und zu kategorisieren. Im Anschluss an den theoretischen Part erfolgt im nächsten Schritt die Identifikation der Einsatz- und Erfolgsbedingungen alternativer Regulierung. Dies geschieht anhand zweier empirischer Fallbeispiele aus den Politikfeldern Berufsbildungspolitik ("der Ausbildungspakt der deutschen Wirtschaft") sowie Umweltpolitik ("die Mehrwegquotenverpflichtung"), wobei gezielt ein erfolgreiches und gescheitertes Beispiel alternativer Regulierung verglichen werden und Erfolgsfaktoren abgeleitet werden. Das Ergebnis ist, dass alternative Regulierung gewisse Potentiale und Anreize für staatliche wie privatwirtschaftliche Akteure bietet, aber der Einsatz dieser Steuerungsformen höchst voraussetzungsvoll ist und nur in wenigen Politikfeldern möglich und zu empfehlen ist. So besteht das Potential alternativer Regulierungsformen vor allem in der ganzheitlichen Senkung von Regulierungskosten (Befolgungs- und Vollzugskosten) und in der Erhöhung der Steuerbarkeit der Adressaten. Allerdings sind die korporativen Akteure auf beiden Seiten zum einen nicht immer hinreichend auf diese Form indirekter Steuerung vorbereitet. Zum anderen wird alternative Regulierung durch die Fragmentierung und Schwäche von Wirtschaftsverbänden sowie durch Interessengegensätze unter den Regelungsadressaten gehindert, die in Trittbrettfahrertum und dem letztlichen Scheitern selbstregulativer Verpflichtungen münden. Als entscheidende, aber anspruchsvolle Erfolgskomponente erweisen sich die politische Kommunikation und die Durchsetzbarkeit staatlicher Sanktionen sowie die Erfolgskontrolle, um die Regelungseinhaltung durch die Wirtschaft zu gewährleisten. Generell ist zu konstatieren, dass alternative Regulierungsformen dort zustande kommen, wo sich konzentrierter Widerstand auf Seiten der Adressaten gegen geplante, autoritative Steuerung abzeichnet, eine gewisse Pfadabhängigkeit bzw. eine Historie sektoraler Selbstregulierung vorliegt und eine Win-Win-Situation bei der Kooperation für Politik und Wirtschaft ersichtlich ist. In der Konsequenz zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass alternative Regulierung nicht nach einem synoptisch-rationalen Modell politischer Prozesse entsteht, sondern ein ursprünglich nicht intendiertes Produkt Garbage Can-artiger Verhandlungen mit einem hohen Konfliktniveau darstellt. Folglich ist das Resultat für die Vorstellung einer "Rational Regulatory Choice" induzierenden Better Regulation-Agenda desillusionierend. ; This paper analyses the potentials and the preconditions of alternative forms of regulation against the background of Better Regulation in Germany. Today, almost every OECD- and EU-country runs extensive regulatory reform programs to modernize its regulatory governance structures, which are summarized under the label Better Regulation. The goal of this type of agenda can be regarded, firstly, as the business-friendly reduction of overall regulatory costs and secondly as the increase of regulatory efficiency by removing unintended side-effects. Better Regulation is a toolkit consisting of several meta-regulatory instruments, whose programmatic composition and use varies with the national political context. Moreover, within these parallel proceeding reform agendas alternative forms of regulation are constantly promoted by advocates of Better Regulation and portrayed as alternative to purely governmental command-and-control approaches (CaC), though neither responding to their preconditions nor addressing their consequences. According to the optimistic notion of an evidence-based regulatory management, the examination and analysis of regulatory alternatives is supposed to be carried out within regulatory impact assessments (RIA). However, hitherto alternative forms of regulations exist unnoted in the shadow of the standard cost model, RIA and co. and they are not systematically considered and applied by policy-makers. CaC-regulation is and remains the dominant and favoured policy-instrument of the state. Yet, there are several discursive connections including broad criticism on hierarchical-regulative steering, which give reason to the deeper analysis of alternative forms of regulation. Therefore the aim of this paper is to contrast alternative regulation with the criticized CaC-technique, whereas alternative regulation is defined narrowly as the concepts of self-regulation, co-regulation and regulated self-regulation which operate as cooperative substitutes of CaC between government and business. Moreover, this paper attempts to define and to categorize the diverse concepts and natures of alternative regulation. Subsequent to the theoretical part the preconditions and critical success factors for alternative regulation are identified in the next section. For this purpose two empirical case studies from two different policies, under which one is successful and the other has failed, are examined and compared to deduce success factors. The case studies are from vocational training policy ("The Training Pact of the German Business") and waste policy ("refill quota for beverage containers"). The result is that alternative forms of regulation offer several potential und incentives for state and business actors, but that the use of these policy instruments is highly demanding and in addition only possible and recommendable in few policies. Undoubtedly its potential lies in the holistic reduction of regulatory costs (compliance and enforcement costs) and in the enhancement of the governability of the regulated business. However, the corporate actors on both sides are not always adequately prepared for this indirect mode of steering. Furthermore, alternative regulation is hindered by the fragmentation and weakness of business associations and opposing interests among the regulated sectors and companies, which may lead to free-riding and could result in the final failure of alternative regulation. The political communication and assertiveness of public sanctions as well as the measurement of success, which ensure self-regulatory compliance, turned out to be decisive, but very demanding constituents of success. Generally speaking, alternative forms of regulation emerge in those cases and policy areas, where concentrated resistance against planned CaC-measures becomes apparent, where a certain path dependency or history of sectoral self-regulation exists, and where a win-win-situation becomes obvious for politicians and business. To sum up, this paper argues that alternative regulations don't emerge by a synoptic-ration model of policy process, but that they present an unintended product of garbage can like policy processes, further characterized by a high level of conflict. Consequentially, this paper's findings disillusion the (exaggeratedly) optimistic notion of a rational regulatory choice inducing Better Regulation agenda.

Iam pleased to know that Vilnius University is publishing a volume containing papers presented at the 2nd Indology conference for the Central and Eastern European region held at Vilnius University on the 24–26 August 2006. There is no doubt that the Indology Department at Vilnius University acted as a wonderful host for the conference and contributed immensely to strengthening the academic and scholarly ties of departments of Indology all over Central and Eastern Europe. The Indology Department in Vilnius can proudly claim to have strengthened the long-lasting relationship between India and Lithuania.The departments of Indology in Central and Eastern Europe have not only facilitated the spread of Indian studies in their respective countries but also reinvigorated and strengthened ties between India and Central and Eastern Europe. They have helped in the widespread dissemination of knowledge about India and expanded scholarly and academic interactions between departments of Indology throughout this region. Today these departments boast of several eminent scholars whose knowledge of Indian subjects, including languages and literature and history and culture, is of a high standard.The study of Indology directly contributes to the importance of India—its history, civilisation and culture—in today's globalised world. India, and therefore Indology, is also important in the study of the economy, science and technology and for technological exchanges in today's context. India remains the fourth largest economy in the world in terms of purchasing power parity. The Indian economy is currently growing at the rate of nearly 9 per cent per annum, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world. India's foreign trade in 2006–7 is expected to surpass US $200 billion, as compared US $30 billion in the early 1990s. The country's foreign exchange reserves reached a healthy US$196 billion in March 2007. India is one of the most favoured destinations for foreign direct investment—close to US $12 billion a year. For knowledge processing industries, as well as back office processing, India has emerged as a major hub of global research and development analysis and scientific inventions. The strengths of India in the new economy—which consists of information technology, bio-technology, nanotechnology and material sciences—are now known all over the world. Indian manufacturing strength is now coming to fruition and these strengths are visible also in the Central and East European market. Several important investments from India have taken place in the steel, electronics, automobile, pharmaceutical, packaging and information technology sectors, to namea few. It is quite evident that this trend will strengthen in the future. Similarly, trade between India and Central and Eastern Europe is increasing between 20–30 per cent a year and is expected to flourish in the near future as more countries from Central and Eastern Europe join the European Union. India has warmly welcomed the recent accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union.All this makes India not only a viable subject of study for its history and culture but also fascinating for its growing economic, scientific and technological strength. These new developments require added attention. It is essential for the course curriculum of Indology studies to be standardised across Central and Eastern Europe as far as is feasible on the basis of cooperation between the universities of the region. I am glad that a website and a network for this purpose have been set up and are functional, with funding from the Embassy of India in Warsaw. The course curriculum for Indology needs to be updated. The knowledge imparted at the Indology centres needs to be well-rounded and contemporary; this will provide the necessary additional tools to the students to understand not only India's past glories but also its present strengths and future prospects. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR ) and the government of India are convinced that this is the course that centres for Indology studies should follow in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in other regions of the world. India is no longer a country known only for its ancient literature, drama and complex society. It is a nation on the move. Studies on ancient India and modern India should be complementary. I certainly hope that those who impart the knowledge of Indology will themselves catch up with modern developments to be able to contribute to the betterment of the students, who, in all fairness, deserve up-to-date information and knowledge of India.The papers published in the volume cover diverse areas and they are well researched and documented and could become a useful source of reference material for various institutions who offer courses on India. The organisation of the conference in Vilnius has already given exposure to the strength of Indian studies in Lithuania and Central and Eastern Europe. It is remarkable that during this conference a Central and Eastern European Network of Indian Studies (CEENIS) was founded with the participation of institutions at universities from 10 countries in this region.I would sincerely like to thank the faculty and staff, particularly Prof. Audrius Beinorius, the head of the department, for organising the conference and for publishing this volume. I also wish to place on record sincere appreciation to contributions made by a number of other scholars and professors at the Indology Department in Vilnius, as well as to the scholars from other countries, some of whom participated in the conference, for spreading Indian studies in Central and Eastern Europe over the pastfew decades. I am certain that the tradition of Indian studies in Central and Eastern Europe will become stronger over the years to come and prove beneficial for Indian and Central and Eastern European relations as well as for the teachers and students engaged in Indian studies in the region. My best wishes are with the faculty, staff, and students of Indian studies all over Central and Eastern Europe. HE Anil WADHWA, Ambassador of India to the Republics of Poland and Lithuania31 March 2007

Unter dem Einfluss des Agrarstrukturwandels reagieren gemischt land- und forstwirtschaftliche Betriebe mit sehr individuellen Lösungen um neue Einkommensquellen zu erschließen. Deren Eckpunkte werden einerseits durch die Aufgabe des landwirtschaftlichen Betriebsteils und andererseits durch die Vergrößerung der Nutzflächen markiert. Zwischen diesen "Extremen" hat sich eine große Bandbreite von Bewirtschaftungsformen und Eigentümerzielen herausgebildet. Vor diesem Hintergrund liegt die Intention der vorliegenden Arbeit darin, Muster für verschiedene waldbäuerliche Strategien zu erkennen und darzustellen, um daraus Hinweise für die Gestaltung differenzierter forstpolitischer Instrumente der Förderung im bäuerlichen Privatwald abzuleiten. Die Datenbasis der vorliegenden Untersuchung wird durch das Testbetriebsnetz Kleinprivatwald der Forstlichen Versuchs- und Forschungsanstalt Baden-Württemberg bereitgestellt. Für die Jahre 1998 bis 2002 konnten Daten von 148 konstant teilnehmenden Forstbetrieben zwischen 5 und 200 Hektar ausgewertet werden. Diese Kennzahlen lassen sich in die drei Hauptgruppen "betriebliche Strukturdaten", "Naturaldaten" und "finanzielle bzw. operative Daten" einteilen. Hierauf aufbauend greift der methodische Ansatz der Clusteranalyse den Grundgedanken einer strukturierenden Typisierung der vielfältigen Erscheinungsformen bäuerlicher Waldbewirtschaftung auf - das Ergebnis: eine Gruppierungen von Betrieben, die in wesentlichen sozialen, strukturellen und ökonomischen Charakteristika eine so weitgehende Übereinstimmung aufweisen, dass sie von anderen Gruppen unterschieden werden können. Durch dieses Verfahren konnten vier Gruppen (Cluster) identifiziert werden, die sich in der Mehrzahl der untersuchten Variablen signifikant voneinander unterscheiden. Diese Gruppen werden daraufhin im Spiegel einer soziologisch ausgerichteten Befragung zu den motivationalen Einstellungen der Waldbesitzer zusätzlich diskutiert und validiert. Zur Ergebnisdarstellung wurden die Cluster mit Kurzbezeichnungen wie "Forstprofis", "konventionell landwirtschaftliche Betriebe", "ideell interessierte Landnutzer" und "naturräumlich begünstigte Betriebe mit überdurchschnittlicher Nutzungsintensität" versehen. Für das Cluster der "Forstprofis" spielt das Einkommen aus Waldbewirtschaftung eine herausragende Rolle. Die Forderung nach Liquidität gestattet den "Forstprofis" auch bei schlechter Holzmarktlage keine Einschlagszurückhaltung. Sie haben ihre Bestände in den letzten 40 Jahren vermehrt mit Mischbaumarten verjüngt. Die "konventionell landwirtschaftlichen Betriebe" verfügen über das Potenzial, um als landwirtschaftliche Haupterwerbsbetriebe bestehen zu können. Mit dem höchsten Anteil forstlicher Eigenarbeit weisen sie eine günstige Kostenstruktur auf. Das waldbauliche Verhalten dieses Clusters ist eher konservativ. Das Kollektiv der "ideell interessierten Landnutzer" zeigt eine hohe Bereitschaft zur Abwanderung aus dem primären Sektor. Sie verfügen nur über beschränkte Einschlagskapazitäten und weisen eine ungünstige Ertrags- und Kostenstruktur auf. Durch die - noch vorhandene - hohe emotionale Verbundenheit mit ihrem Waldbesitz bestehen für dieses Cluster - noch - gute Beratungsmöglichkeiten für die Umsetzung von Maßnahmen des naturnahen Waldumbaus. Das Cluster der "naturräumlich begünstigten Betriebe mit überdurchschnittlicher Nutzungsintensität" findet gute Wuchs- und Bewirtschaftungsbedingungen sowohl im land- wie auch im forstwirtschaftlichen Betriebsteil vor. Auf "Hochleistungsstandorten" erbringt die Baumart Fichte hohe Erträge und bleibt auch unter den verjüngten Baumarten die Nummer eins. Die familiären Arbeitskapazitäten konnten die "Begünstigten" ihren hohen zufälligen und planmäßigen Nutzungen entsprechend anpassen. Eine Gegenüberstellung der durch die Clusteranalyse ermittelten Gruppen mit verschiedenen univariaten Typisierungen bestätigt die Ausgangshypothese, dass der Einsatz multivariater statistischer Methoden ein Bild der bäuerlichen Waldwirtschaft zeichnen kann, das der Vielfalt an Erscheinungsformen und den veränderten Rahmenbedingungen besser Rechnung trägt als univariate Typisierungen. Eine grundsätzliche Folgerung hieraus lautet, dass forstliche Förderung effizienter sein kann, wenn sie sich noch mehr als bisher an den spezifischen Erfordernissen ihrer Zielgruppen orientiert. Diese lassen sich nicht durch einzelne Merkmale wie Betriebsgröße, -form oder regionale Zugehörigkeit bestimmen. Auf Basis der identifizierten Cluster werden abschließend differenzierte Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten von aktuell existierenden Instrumentarien forstlicher Förderung aufgezeigt. ; Under the impact of the ongoing agrarian structural transformation process, the mixed farm forest enterprises reacted with very individual solutions in order to develop new sources of income. The extent of these solutions is marked by abandonment of the agricultural part of the farm on the one hand and by expansion of the production area on the other. A large spread of management techniques and owner's objectives has established itself in-between these two "extremes". Against this background, the objective of this study lies in identifying and describing patterns of various farm-forest strategies, in order to derive information about the design of differentiated forest policy promotion instruments in smale-scale private forestry. The data base of the present research is provided by the Small-Scale Forestry Accountancy Network of the Forest Research Institute of Baden-Württemberg. For the years 1998 to 2002, data was evaluated from 148 consistently participating forest enterprises managing between 5 and 200 ha of timberland. These data can be divided into the three main groups of "structural data of enterprise", "natural data", and "financial or operational data respectively". Based on these groups, the methodical approach of a cluster analysis takes up the basic idea of a structuring classification of the varied appearances of farm-forest management. The analysis establishes groups of enterprises that show such large similarities in essential social, structural, and economic characteristics so as to be distinguishable from other groups. In this way, the present study identifies the Clusters of "forest professionals", "conventional agricultural farms", "idealistically interested land users" and "geographically favoured enterprises with above average utilisation intensity". These groups are then discussed and validated through an independent interview about the motivational attitudes of the forest owners. Income derived from forestry plays an important role for the "forest professionals" cluster. The requirement of financial liquidity does not allow the "forest professionals" to restrain their timber harvests during poor timber market conditions. In the last 40 years, they have increasingly regenerated their stands with mixed species. The "conventional agricultural farms" have the potential to subsist as farms whose primary income is derived from agriculture. Having the highest proportion of active forestry work, they show a favourable cost structure. The silvicultural behaviour of this cluster is rather conservative by comparison. The collective of the "idealistically interested land users" shows a high willingness to drift away from the primary income sector (agriculture and forestry). The "idealists" have limited timber harvest capacities as well as an unfavourable yield and cost structure. Good consulting opportunities for the implementation of close-to-nature forest conversion measures still exist for this cluster because of the owner's remaining strong emotional ties to their forest property. The cluster of the "geographically favoured enterprises with above average utilisation intensity" displays good growing and management conditions both in the agricultural as well as the forestry parts of the enterprise. Norway spruce provides high yields and remains the number one regenerated tree species on "high performance sites". The "favoured enterprises" were able to adapt the family's labour capacity in correspondence with their high levels of incidental and planned timber harvests. A comparison of the cluster analysis groups with various univariate classifications confirms the initial hypothesis that the application of multivariate statistical methods can paint a picture of farm-forest management that better accounts for the diversity of appearances and the changing general conditions than univariate classifications. A fundamental conclusion derived from this is that the promotion of forestry can be more efficient, if it is more closely oriented towards the target groups than before. These target groups in turn can no longer be solely classified along such characteristics as enterprise size, enterprise type, or regional affiliation. For this reason, differentiated development potentials of currently existing instruments of forestry promotion are shown in conclusion.

"One good thing could come from this horror: it could spell the end of the age of irony," Time columnist Roger Rosenblatt wrote in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. After two airplanes flew into the World Trade Center, many other pundits also claimed an immediate end to, of all things, irony. A few years prior, the 1990s saw a flood of books, articles, and concern for the state of civic trust and the rise of citizen cynicism in America. Simultaneously, pop culture was churning out situation comedies, advertisements, and movies drenched in ironic self-awareness, cynicism, and sarcastic knowingness, all of which continue healthily to this day, if not even more intensely. In debates by political pundits, however, cynicism and irony were frequently thrown around as a causes of civic decline; the attitude of ironic disengagement involved a wry, knowing view of the world and a distancing from the moral values of middle-class America. The media and intellectuals were to blame for fomenting this stance. But why were irony and the values of middle-class America so opposed to each other? What relationship does irony have to morality? What is the genesis of this opposition in the American mind? "Inward, Christian Soldiers: Romantic Irony and Civic Trust in the American Mind" addresses these issues, specifically as irony plays a divisive role when it comes to those who "get it" and those who don't, those who connect by sharing this worldview, and those who are distanced by it. Irony has been characterized, since Aristotle, as sly, knowing, disingenuous, anti-civic. But what sorts of philosophical values and ideals separate those who share irony as a worldview and those who lambaste the stance as snide and vain? How might irony be a defense against a culture perceived as inauthentic, saccharine, and untrustworthy? Many of the answers to these kinds of questions come down to differing philosophical understandings of how one is to achieve inner freedom and maintain a sense of authenticity. The historical genesis of the ironic worldview is Romanticism and its understanding of how man attains happiness and freedom by going around society; this position sits in direct opposition to earlier Puritan notions of the same drive, which is to join with others through society to attain freedom and salvation, i.e. through civic trust, through the divine covenant secularized. What originates in German Romanticism is amplified in America by Emerson. Puritan notions, on the other hand, remain with Americans through our normative understanding of the social contract and its original Christian intonations. These dual mindsets—that of the ironist and that of the earnest, committed citizen—often take encampment on either side of the culture wars. Crucially, though they seem to fundamentally disagree, they both retain a shared and basic Protestantism: they both value inwardness, authenticity, sincerity, and individual conscience as the seat of certainty. The means are different, but both aim at correcting society. Irony continues the Protestant project. This dissertation trespasses on the Olive Garden, The Daily Show, The Simpsons, German Idealist philosophy, American social criticism, and Protestant ideology alike. In the end, it aims to show that the debate about irony as civic decline is misled, and that calls for the "end of irony" will never work, that is, never seem convincing to ironists. Young, media savvy Americans are all ironists now; and renewed calls to believe are quickly ironized. Politicized calls for civic trust are belied by a political culture suffused with cynicism. And to express the value of authenticity, the ironist must perform it oppositely. So as the ironist leans inward, away from the social, away from a culture he perceives as shot through with inauthenticity, he takes his trust with him. ; Vielfach wurde das ironische Weltbild—eine distanzierte, verzerrte, allwissende Wahrnehmung der Welt—als ein radikaler Gegensatz zum Standpunkt des eingebundenen, pflichtbewussten und ernsthaften Bürgers dargestellt. Dies waren und sind die Charakterisierungen im öffentlichen Diskurs über Ironie, Zynismus in den USA der letzten zwanzig Jahren. Inward, Christian Soldiers behandelt die ironische Weltanschauung die von der Romantik des späten achtzehnten Jahrhunderts hervorgebracht wurde, und die oft als Gegensatz zu Ernsthaftigkeit und Pflichtgefuehl eingesehen wurde. Allerdings folgen beide Lager implizit den gleichen philosophischen und religiösen Anregungen und teilen die gleichen Werte, da sie beide im Kern protestantisch sind. Der ironischen und der "ernsthaften" Weltanschauung sind gemein: eine radikale Wertschätzung für die Innerlichkeit in seiner Rolle als Ort der letzendlichen Gewissheit, die Achtung der Authentizität, das Selbst als der Ort der Freiheit und des Gewissens, die Prämisse der Abgetrenntheit des menschlichen Geistes von der Welt, sowie die Behauptung, dass individuelle Erlösung auch eine Beziehung zu Anderen habe. Sie unterscheiden sich darin, dass die romantische Ironie den Gedanken verfolgt, dass individuelle Erlösung unter Umgehung der Gesellschaft erfolgen muss. In der calvinistisch geprägten Tradition des amerikanischen Gesellschaftsvertrags dagegen ist Erlösung letztlich durch die Gesellschaft zu erreichen. Der Mensch brauche Andere sowie die Aufrechterhaltung von gemeinsamer Moralität, um sich geistig zu entwickeln. Von diesem Unterschied, so argumentiere ich an vielen Beispielen, stammt der Nachhall in der gegenwärtigen Debatte über Ironie und Gesellschaftsvertrauen. Kritiker übersehen die tiefere Verpflichtung und das Vertrauen der Ironiker in die Gesellschaft, um eine komplexere nuanciertere Analyse der zeitgenössischen Situation zu erlangen, durch ein stillschweigendes Verstehen, dass mehr durch Implikationen sagt als durch Worte, ein Ausdruck seines Verstehens von Ambivalenz und Kontingenz. In den religiös orientierten Teilen der amerikanischen Gesellschaft, wo Buchstabentreue und Direktheit geschätzt werden, wird die Ironie als elitär, selektiv, nicht greifbar und unengagiert interpretiert. Aber die Kritiker der zeitgenössischen Ironie übersehen, dass Ironie letztlich moralische Verpflichtung und Stetigkeit in hohem Masse schätzt, zeitweise profunder und religiöser als andere Haltungen. Vielmehr hat sie Aufmerksamkeit erhalten, da sie ein mächtiger Gegner zu sein scheint. Wie Randolph Bourne 1913 erklärte, "the ironic life is . indeed a rival of the religious life." Dies ist der Grund, warum, Jahrzehnte später, der Versuch, "Ironie" und "Ernsthaftigkeit"/ "Aufrichtigkeit"/"moralische Werte" als Gegensätze zu verstehen, wie die Debatte über das "Ende der Ironie" dies tut, nicht funktionieren kann: Weil der Ironiker so konditioniert ist, dass er ernste Versuche, ihn zum Glauben zu bekehren, ablehnt. Seine Persönlichkeit wehrt instinktiv alle geradlinigen Annäherungen ab. Da sich der ironisch losgelöste Mensch noch immer nach Kontakt, Engagement und der Zugehörigkeit zu einem besseren Gesellschaftskörper bzw. einer besseren Kultur sehnt, findet er echte Beziehungen zu Anderen durch die Ironie, und eben zu denen, die verstehen, was gemeint ist, ohne dass es gesagt werden muss; zu denen, die seine Betrachtungsweise von amerikanischer Gesellschaft und Kultur teilen. Beide, der zeitgenössische Ironiker und seine Kritiker, obwohl uneins über die Eigenschaften der heutigen Gesellschaft sowie die Methoden, sie zu verändern, versuchen also das gleiche Ziel zu erreichen: eine ehrliche Gesellschaft und Engagement für das Gemeinwohl. Die jüngeren zeitgenössischen Vertreter vom Schriftsteller Dace Eggers über Jedediah Purdy, bis hin zu Jon Stewart, South Park und den Simpsons, versuchen nicht, das soziale Geflecht zu zerstören, sondern es zu reformieren, es weiter in Richtung einer Vision von einer guten Gesellschaft zu voranzubringen. Inward, Christian Soldiers versucht ein tiefergehendes Verständnis und eine historische Anerkennung der ironischen Weltsicht zu erzeugen, als eine Weltsicht, die ernsthaft und präsent ist in der amerikanischen Kultur und Politik, als eine schwierige aber auch notwendige Sicht; als eine Weltsicht, mit der Amerika auch weiterhin eine tiefe und problematische Beziehung haben wird.

Date de rédaction : 2006-07-15 ; The author shows how technology, what is about mechanization, irrigation or IT, is included, as space in the social one. If IT have their own dynamic, built by multiple interactions between exogenic and endogenous actors, the author subscribes neither to the paradigm technicist nor with the autonomy of the technology. The difficulty consists in evaluating the place of IT in a territorial system like sign and/or agent of the production of space. It is a question of going beyond from a geography of the inventory certainly useful for such a recent and unstable object, to turn to a geography of space engineering, integrating in a reasoned social criticism, "effects" of the introduction of a disturbance on a place. The approach is focused on the interactions and them scalings which show that according to the keys of entry, the hierarchy of interactions can change even if the framework of the research remains stable and rests on a set of seven variables (innovation, fields of force of macro-system, public policies, social capital of the place, strategies of the actors, temporalities, space forms). The strategies of the social actors thus occupy a major place in this work ; this book focuses an interdisciplinary approach and tries to clarify the whole of the problematics recutting the fields of technology, space and society. The author revisits the problems of the fitment of the territorial scales. How strategies of actors, external with a territory (on a local or regional scale), interfere with the territorial system of actors and produce space? Three levels of analysis are enchased. A macro-analysis is based on the constraining effects for the sets of actors, the lawful executives (laws, standards, norms) and ideological, themselves produced social of plays actors. A meso-analysis is focused on the set of actors of the public policies (crossing of the policies of subsidies, of the choice of the territories, the speech on technology). Finally a micro-analysis consists in studying technology "in practice" starting from longitudinal terrain surveys. A turning towards the literature of the "strategists" makes it possible to reintroduce a little more "time" in space. If these positions of research gave always an important place at the crystallized time of the objects or at the present time of the conflicts of actors or the representations, time of technology presents characteristic features (glance of the technology, importance of prospective dimension). This implies to include all the tactical and especially strategic dimensions of the stakeholder's plays in the analysis. Inquire, models and modelings, analyzes systemic or systems theoretical accompanied the step by research. Making way, the author uses a social sciences toolbox. His tools are the product of a synthesis, that of the methodological contribution (investigation of ground, interdisciplinarity, systemic analyzes) of two successive Masters, B. Kayser and R. Brunet. ; Ces travaux font l'hypothèse que la technologie, qu'il s'agisse de mécanisation, d'irrigation ou de TIC est incluse, comme l'espace dans le social. Si les TIC possèdent leurs dynamiques propres, construites par des interactions multiples entre des acteurs exogènes et endogènes, l'auteur ne souscrit pas ni au paradigme techniciste ni à l'autonomie de la technique. S'il n'y a pas lieu de mythifier les TIC, la difficulté consiste à évaluer leur place dans un système territorial comme signe et/ou agent de la production de l'espace. Il s'agit d'aller au-delà d'une géographie de l'inventaire certes utile pour un objet aussi récent et instable, pour se tourner vers une géographie de l'ingénierie spatiale, intégrant dans une critique sociale raisonnée, les « effets » de l'introduction d'une perturbation sur un territoire. L'approche se centre sur les interactions et les changements d'échelle qui montrent qu'en fonction des clés d'entrée, la hiérarchie des interactions peut se modifier même si le cadre d'analyse utilisé pour la recherche reste stable et repose sur un ensemble de sept variables (l'innovation, les champs de force du système englobant, le jeu des politiques publiques, le capital social du territoire, les stratégies des acteurs, les temporalités, les formes spatiales). Les stratégies des acteurs sociaux occupent donc une place majeure dans des travaux qui ne prennent tout leur sens que dans une approche interdisciplinaire s'ils veulent éclairer l'ensemble des problématiques recoupant les champs de la technologie, de l'espace et de la société. L'auteur revisite la problématique de l'emboîtement des échelles territoriales. Comment des stratégies d'acteurs, externes à un territoire (à l'échelle locale ou régionale), interfèrent-elles avec le système d'acteurs territorial et produisent-elles de l'espace ? Trois niveaux d'analyse sont enchâssés. L'analyse « macro » se fonde sur les effets contraignants pour les jeux d'acteurs, des cadres réglementaires (lois, normes, standards) et idéologiques, eux-mêmes produits sociaux de jeux d'acteurs. L'analyse « méso » est centrée sur le jeu d'acteurs des politiques publiques (croisement des politiques de subventions, du choix des territoires, du discours sur la technologie). Enfin l'analyse « micro » consiste à étudier la technologie « en pratique » à partir d' études de terrain longitudinales. Un détour vers la littérature des « stratégistes » permet de réintroduire un peu plus de « temps » dans l'espace. Si ces positions de recherche ont toujours donné une place importante au temps cristallisé des objets ou au temps présent des conflits d'acteurs ou des représentations, le temps de la technologie présente certains caractères (évanescence de la technique, importance de la dimension prospective) qui impliquent d'inclure toutes les dimensions tactiques et surtout stratégiques des jeux acteurs dans l'analyse. Enquête, modèles et modélisations, analyse systémique ou systèmes théoriques ont accompagné la démarche de recherche Chemin faisant, l'auteur a écarté de sa boîte à outil certains appareils ou au contraire procédé à quelques acquisitions. Mais tout cet outillage est le produit d'une synthèse, celle de l'apport méthodologique (enquête de terrain, interdisciplinarité, analyse systémique ) de deux maîtres successifs, B. Kayser et R. Brunet.

Conclusion: Having described the alchemy through which mandates are forged and having analysed problematic aspects of mandates, how can one conclude the study and appraise the process? One obvious difficulty is that of selectivity. By focusing on the interventions shaped by mandates, those situations that fall outside the realm of the possible in international politics also fall outside the appraisal process. So appraising mandates tells us nothing about the fate of Chechnya or self-determination for Kurdish people or the future of Tibet. Focusing on the interventions themselves poses further problems of appraisal. Is an intervention successful because fighting stopped or ceasefires were maintained? This is often the media interpretation of events and thus a key component in shaping public perceptions. But the fundamental question of the health of the polity that is the subject of the intervention remains unanswered if we look simply at the cessation of hostilities. Measuring state building is a difficult medium to long-term venture. Perhaps the best political measurement is the satisfaction with the UN intervention by the parties principal including not only the leaders and factions within the polity but also the key actors in the international community such as the permanent members, the troop and civilian staff contributors and the neighbouring countries. It is perhaps on this basis that the 1995 Agenda for Peace claimed that in most cases the interventions have been conspicuously successful with Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique drawing particular praise. Many commentators would agree with this general comment. The success of an intervention tells us that the clear and practical mandate was well suited to the result being sought. But the success of the intervention is also due to the five other factors said to be critical: the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support. So the mandate is only one part of the formula. Within the process of judging the intervention as a whole, mandates need to be appraised on their clarity and practicality. A workable mandate will comprise mainly of action tasks that are simply described for the benefit of both the implementers and the subjects. Many of these tasks will be measurable in terms of performance, cost and timeliness. A workable mandate will avoid vague compromise words that paper over essential differences and thus leave the dilemma unresolved and in the hands of the implementers. A workable mandate will have direction and closure. The end point may not always be predictable but the direction should be clear and a point should be ascertainable where the emergency intervention ends and the regular processes of development assistance take over. A workable mandate will have a defined division of labour. This may be based on subject matter, on geographical area or on organisational competence. One of the avoidable problems referred to in Agenda for Peace concern difficulties with coordination arising from the various specific mandates decreed for the agencies by discrete intergovernmental bodies. The UN has the responsibility to coordinate its various inputs into a coherent effort. It is open from the foregoing analysis to conclude that the UN process of developing mandates for democratisation and state-building purposes have improved with practice. Mistakes have clearly been made but they have contributed to the learning and drafting process. It would be unrealistic to demand that the vagaries of international politics be somehow eliminated from the process of decision-making and formulation of mandates. The power of the permanent members can be seen as a way of channelling realpolitik into the decision-making process. For that reason alone, it would be futile to demand consistency. Interventions that have a direct impact on one of the permanent members will not be treated in the same way as the more remote situations. To what extent should democratisation be a priority in the mandate? The problem with asking this question is that democratisation competes with the reestablishment of security and the provision of humanitarian aid as the three major thrusts of mandates. There can hardly be a process of democratisation without a generally secure environment and humanitarian aid in an emergency situation is clearly a priority for the subject peoples. The better way of posing the question is to ask whether sufficient priority is being given to the democratisation process. That is a valid question because without a democratisation process it is unlikely that the polity can ultimately achieve a form of governance that will encourage reconciliation and favour long-term recovery socially and economically. The reply, inevitably, is yes and no. Yes, democratisation has found a place in the UNs rhetoric and in its mandates. As one practitioner noted ruefully, even delegates from non-democratic countries happily accept the inclusion in mandates of provisions for free and fair elections and support for civil society. Mandates have become more sophisticated and the UNs response is improving with experience. There have been significant achievements in half a dozen difficult situations and a willingness to build on these processes in the future. But there is also a negative response. The problem is one of maintaining focus. Democratisation is not achieved by putting out fires, nor is it established by a single transition election; it is a long-term process requiring the patience to endure setbacks and to accept the slow pace of reform. Each new crisis faced by the UN naturally detracts attention from the smoky ruins of the last fire. The funds required for the long haul are often inadequate and the benefits gained initially are put at risk. A mandate can therefore only begin a process of democratisation. It can put some of the basic foundations in place and set a certain direction. Thereafter the process of democratic transition and consolidation is in the hands of many actors and political forces. No more should be asked of the UN interventions in the field.

Conclusion: Having described the alchemy through which mandates are forged and having analysed problematic aspects of mandates, how can one conclude the study and appraise the process? One obvious difficulty is that of selectivity. By focusing on the interventions shaped by mandates, those situations that fall outside the realm of the possible in international politics also fall outside the appraisal process. So appraising mandates tells us nothing about the fate of Chechnya or self-determination for Kurdish people or the future of Tibet. Focusing on the interventions themselves poses further problems of appraisal. Is an intervention successful because fighting stopped or ceasefires were maintained? This is often the media interpretation of events and thus a key component in shaping public perceptions. But the fundamental question of the health of the polity that is the subject of the intervention remains unanswered if we look simply at the cessation of hostilities. Measuring state building is a difficult medium to long-term venture. Perhaps the best political measurement is the satisfaction with the UN intervention by the parties principal including not only the leaders and factions within the polity but also the key actors in the international community such as the permanent members, the troop and civilian staff contributors and the neighbouring countries. It is perhaps on this basis that the 1995 Agenda for Peace claimed that in most cases the interventions have been conspicuously successful with Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique drawing particular praise. Many commentators would agree with this general comment. The success of an intervention tells us that the clear and practical mandate was well suited to the result being sought. But the success of the intervention is also due to the five other factors said to be critical: the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support. So the mandate is only one part of the formula. Within the process of judging the intervention as a whole, mandates need to be appraised on their clarity and practicality. A workable mandate will comprise mainly of action tasks that are simply described for the benefit of both the implementers and the subjects. Many of these tasks will be measurable in terms of performance, cost and timeliness. A workable mandate will avoid vague compromise words that paper over essential differences and thus leave the dilemma unresolved and in the hands of the implementers. A workable mandate will have direction and closure. The end point may not always be predictable but the direction should be clear and a point should be ascertainable where the emergency intervention ends and the regular processes of development assistance take over. A workable mandate will have a defined division of labour. This may be based on subject matter, on geographical area or on organisational competence. One of the avoidable problems referred to in Agenda for Peace concern difficulties with coordination arising from the various specific mandates decreed for the agencies by discrete intergovernmental bodies. The UN has the responsibility to coordinate its various inputs into a coherent effort. It is open from the foregoing analysis to conclude that the UN process of developing mandates for democratisation and state-building purposes have improved with practice. Mistakes have clearly been made but they have contributed to the learning and drafting process. It would be unrealistic to demand that the vagaries of international politics be somehow eliminated from the process of decision-making and formulation of mandates. The power of the permanent members can be seen as a way of channelling realpolitik into the decision-making process. For that reason alone, it would be futile to demand consistency. Interventions that have a direct impact on one of the permanent members will not be treated in the same way as the more remote situations. To what extent should democratisation be a priority in the mandate? The problem with asking this question is that democratisation competes with the reestablishment of security and the provision of humanitarian aid as the three major thrusts of mandates. There can hardly be a process of democratisation without a generally secure environment and humanitarian aid in an emergency situation is clearly a priority for the subject peoples. The better way of posing the question is to ask whether sufficient priority is being given to the democratisation process. That is a valid question because without a democratisation process it is unlikely that the polity can ultimately achieve a form of governance that will encourage reconciliation and favour long-term recovery socially and economically. The reply, inevitably, is yes and no. Yes, democratisation has found a place in the UNs rhetoric and in its mandates. As one practitioner noted ruefully, even delegates from non-democratic countries happily accept the inclusion in mandates of provisions for free and fair elections and support for civil society. Mandates have become more sophisticated and the UNs response is improving with experience. There have been significant achievements in half a dozen difficult situations and a willingness to build on these processes in the future. But there is also a negative response. The problem is one of maintaining focus. Democratisation is not achieved by putting out fires, nor is it established by a single transition election; it is a long-term process requiring the patience to endure setbacks and to accept the slow pace of reform. Each new crisis faced by the UN naturally detracts attention from the smoky ruins of the last fire. The funds required for the long haul are often inadequate and the benefits gained initially are put at risk. A mandate can therefore only begin a process of democratisation. It can put some of the basic foundations in place and set a certain direction. Thereafter the process of democratic transition and consolidation is in the hands of many actors and political forces. No more should be asked of the UN interventions in the field.