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Addressing both scholars of international law and political science as well as decision makers involved in cybersecurity policy, the book tackles the most important and intricate legal issues that a state faces when considering a reaction to a malicious cyber operation conducted by an adversarial state. While often invoked in political debates and widely analysed in international legal scholarship, self-defence and countermeasures will often remain unavailable to states in situations of cyber emergency due to the pervasive problem of reliable and timely attribution of cyber operations to state actors. Analysing the legal questions surrounding attribution in detail, the book presents the necessity defence as an evidently available alternative. However, the shortcomings of the doctrine as based in customary international law that render it problematic as a remedy for states are examined in-depth. In light of this, the book concludes by outlining a special emergency regime for cyberspace.

Spanish criminal legislation belongs to the group of countries that classify self-defense as reasons which exclude criminal liability, while the criminal law literature in this country accepts so called dualistic conception of self-defense, although there is no unique attitude on the legal nature of this institute. It is very interesting that the legal practice, in spite of basic theory conception that any legal property can represent the object of attack, in a number of cases is rejecting the possibility for perpetrator to cite self-defense for violation of honor. There is a governing attitude that it is not relevant for the existence of attack as a condition for applying the Article 20. p. 4 of the Criminal Code of Spain the circumstance whether the action of the aggressor has been executed with the guilt. When it comes to unlawfulness of the attack, some authors support the attitude that very individual criminal unlawfulness of the aggressor's action can be discussed. Big part of the work was devoted to provoked defense, that is, 'absence of enough provocation by the victim'. Related to condition of simultaneousness of attack and defense, we did not accept the conception according to which in some cases it is acceptable to violate or endanger legal properties of the aggressor after termination of the attack. Further, the condition of defense necessity depends in big part on establishing 'the necessity of rational use of means for the effect of preventing or rejecting the attack' (Article 20. p. 4 of the Criminal Code of Spain). At the end, although legislator in Spain does not explicitly require so called defense mood as a condition for excluding criminal liability, there is a unique conception of both theory and practice on necessity of existence of the self-defense subjective element. ; Špansko krivično zakonodavstvo pripada grupi zemalja koje nužnu odbranu svrstavaju u osnove koji isključuju krivičnu odgovornost, dok krivičnopravna literatura u ovoj zemlji prihvata tzv. dualističko shvatanje nužne odbrane, iako o pravnoj prirodi ovog instituta ne postoji jedinstveno mišljenje. Interesantno je da sudska praksa uprkos načelnom stanovištu teorije da svako pravno dobro može biti objekt napada, u velikom broju slučajeva odbacuje mogućnost da se zbog povrede časti učinilac pozove na nužnu odbranu. Preovladava mišljenje, prema kome za postojanje napada kao uslova za primenu člana 20. stav 4 Krivičnog zakonika Španije, nema značaja okolnost da li je radnja napadača preduzeta sa krivicom. U pogledu protivpravnosti napada, pojedini autori zastupaju stav da se može govoriti o posebnoj krivičnoj protivpravnosti radnje koju preduzima napadač. Veliki deo rada posvećen je isprovociranoj odbrani, tj. 'izostanku dovoljne provokacije od strane napadnutog'. U vezi sa uslovom istovremenosti napada i odbrane, nismo prihvatili stanovište prema kome je u pojedinim slučajevima dozvoljeno povrediti ili ugroziti pravna dobra napadača posle okončanja napada. Dalje, uslov neophodnosti odbrane u velikoj meri zavisi od utvrđivanja 'neophodnosti racionalne upotrebe sredstava radi sprečavanja ili odbijanja napada' (član 20. stav 4 Krivičnog zakonika Španije). Na kraju, iako zakonodavac u Španiji ne zahteva izričito tzv. odbrambenu volju kao uslov za isključenje krivične odgovornosti, jedinstveno je mišljenje teorije i prakse o neophodnosti postojanja subjektivnog elementa nužne odbrane.

This article examines to what extent States' right to self-defence should be applied in the outer space. The concept of self-defence within international regulations remains debatable. Brought by the existing reality in international system, this article analyses and suggests in further details that the act of States' right for self-defence should be limited to the act of militarization and not weaponization in the outer space. The argument in this article is carried by the perspective of realism that argues the structure of international system as an anarchy in which states are naturally competing one and another for the purpose of power due to the effect of living within power stratification. Consequently, if states are allowed to exercise their right to self-defence without any limitation, the context of selfdefence becomes broader and will constitute a threat towards international peace and security. Therefore, the right of states to self-defence should be limited within the context of outer space to support only military purpose without any form space-to-space, space-to-earth, or earth-to-space weapons.

"Fifteen years into the era of "cyber warfare," are we any closer to understanding the role a major cyberattack would play in international relations-or to preventing one? Spanning disciplines and enriched by practitioner insights, Rethinking Cyber Warfare provides a novel understanding of the role that digital disruption plays in contemporary international security. The work focuses on the critical phenomenon of major cyberattacks against wired societies, a significant capability that, despite considerable state planning for such an incident, has received comparatively little scholarly consideration. Starting with a reconsideration of the central tenets that have shaped global powers' policies to date, it explores in-depth what forces in the international system might durably restrain their use. Arming the reader with the key technological and historical context to make sense of cyberattacks, it considers how deterrence, international law, and normative taboos operate today to shape whether and how states think about causing this kind of disruption-and how soon, those forces might combine to rethink those decisions entirely. The result is a comprehensive look at one of the most pressing issues in international security that also illuminates a new pathway for managing one of its greatest sources of instability"--